The Book of Joe: Tyler O'Neill benched, Base-running, Pitching notes

The Book of Joe Podcast begins with hosts Tom Verducci and Joe Maddon talking discipline. Joe comments on Tyler O'Neill being benched by Cardinals manager Oli Marmol for an 'unacceptable' base-running effort and how he's handled similar situations. Tom notes the changing culture in baseball and how managers have changed as well. Teams are stealing bases so far, but Joe has one concern he'll be watching for over the season.  Tom gives the early returns from the mound and a new way to look at a batter being walked.

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Episode Transcript

Speaker 1 (00:04):
The Book of Joe podcast is a production of iHeartRadio.
Hello again, everybody, Welcome back to the Book of Joe podcast.
I am Tom Verducci, joined by Joe Madden, and Joe's
been in the news lately. I'm really interested in digging

(00:24):
into this topic with you, and that is discipline. It's
a word we don't hear a lot of in baseball
these days, but it became front and center because of
an issue in Saint Louis with manager Ali Marmol and
one of his players, Tyler O'Neill. If you weren't aware
of it, I'll give you the cliff Notes version. O'Neill

(00:46):
was thrown out at the plate on a two out
single to right field. He was on second base, down
three runs. Kind of close play at the plate, but
in the manager's opinion, he did not think that O'Neill
was busting it to score the run, called him out
first in a private conversation in the clubhouse after the
game and then to the media after the game, and

(01:08):
Tyler O'Neill was a little bit taken him back by
at least being admonished publicly, and actually shot back the
next day as his manager was saying, basically, you should
have handled that in house. Ali, So, Joe, I'm curious
that you know, obviously we weren't privy to every tiny
detail that happened behind the scenes, but that's the public

(01:30):
version of the events. Give me your reaction as a
manager about how that situation was handled. Yeah, I mean,
there might have been a little bit of assumption on
his party. It looked like he was looking into the
outfield rounding third base, and I think I saw that too,
But again, that's neither here nor there, and I understand
what you're saying completely. The part that's interesting to me

(01:51):
is that he went back out on the field. You know,
if I think pretty sure if it was in my situation,
had I thought that, I would have just pulled him
right there. The fact that he went back on the field,
that could have been more easy league concealed from the
press or the public in general. You went back out
on the field, you could have had this conversation with him,

(02:12):
unless it was brought up by somebody else. There was
nothing to really talk about. And it's a little bit
cleaner to handle it that way. So I've saying this
because I've done it. I've done it I did it
with bj Upton that the minor leagues with James sap Randall,
And you know, it's obvious you're pulling him off the
field during the game after that bad after jogging the

(02:33):
first base would ever come in from center field, and
so it's obvious. So there's more, there's more explaining to do.
But anytime, in my opinion, you could protect in a
sense that that's part of the manager's job is to protect.
And then again he may have been wanting to set
an example verbally, not only to that team, but maybe
to the entire organization. I've said that too, again when

(02:56):
I've done it in the past on the major league level.
This is something I talked about in spring training. So
then I am preaching to everybody. You're not just preaching
to that player, You're preaching to the entire organization. You're
trying to establish a culture, a method of operation. This
is how we do things here. All that is in
play in that moment. So everybody could argue whether he

(03:17):
was running as hard or not, and the player can
say what he'd like to say whatever, But for me,
always tried to deal with it, praise publicly, criticized, privately,
and like I said, if you could conceal it, don't
have to talk about something right now because the the
the mechanics of the game permitted you to not have

(03:38):
to talk about it, whereas if you had pulled him,
you had no choice but to talk about it. So
quite frankly, I would to think about all those things.
They would have been all part of my decision making costs.
It was not the end of the game. I was
later in the game, but they did go back on
the field and O'Neill did stay in the game. Okay.
Ali Marmole after the game called it unacceptable, and O'Neill

(04:03):
did say, in his own defense, he thought he was
running properly. He said he was worried about forming it,
making it tight term and he thought his speed was
just fine. But I'll tell you, in today's game, we
have numbers for everything, Joe, and you know this, and
they measure the sprint speed of players, and at full

(04:23):
speed O'Neill is in the ninety seventh percentile in Major
League Baseball runners. He's a fast runner. And when you
broke down the actual sprint speed of Tyler O'Neill, he
was not running full speed. You cannot look at the
numbers of Tyler O'Neill and say he was busting it
to score that run. It was significantly down. I looked

(04:45):
just eyeballing it. I thought his break was a soft break,
not a heartbreak. As you know, Joe, with two outs,
you're on second base, you're running until you're stopped. You're
not waiting to go. It's go time. So his defense
did wash because the data proved he was not running
at full speed, and he did not say he was

(05:06):
trying to protect an injury. So I think in this case,
the data supports the manager. Well, I mean, even back then,
when an manager would be upset with you. I'm trying
to think of it. It normally was in house. It
wasn't something you really wanted to take publicly unless it
absolutely had to. I can't think of specific examples, but

(05:27):
as you're talking this all the way through, and there's
another time I had with another player, and again it
was not public, but I got him in a room
with two other coaches and myself, and I got into
him pretty good, and I wanted to. I was kind
of like criticizing his heart. You know, his method is
a motivation to play and I kind of said to him, listen,

(05:52):
unless you come in within a day or two and
apologize or no, tell me specifically that that's not going
to happen again. Until you do that, you're not going
to play. And then a couple of days went on,
player does not show up, and finally I reevaluated to
myself and that but that was really a poor method
on my part to create or put out there and

(06:13):
ultimatum like that. And so I called the player to
myself and I apologize to him for the way I
handled the situation. But again, nobody knows about it. Nobody
knew about it. Nobody knows about it. And as it
turned out, eventually he and I became like kind of
like best of friends, and I just so sometimes we
don't always handle these things properly or well. And it's

(06:34):
a lesson that I had learned in that moment. Read
in the book nineteen sixty four is at Halberstrom about
the Cardinals and the Yankees in the World Series. But
prior to that, in that season, Johnny Keane had called
Race Sadecki into his office and he was kind of
denigrating his desire and his work ethic and his competitive

(06:57):
nature and wanting to win and etc. And Sadeki he said, wait,
wait a second here. Now you you could question my performance.
You can say I'm rather you're not pitching well, you
can say kind of stink could? You could do whatever
you want, But do you do not question my heart?
Do not get in there. Stay You just don't know that,
you don't know what that's all about. So that that

(07:17):
passage in that book really in an impact on me
as a manager too. So when you're when you're doing
things like this, you're basically questioning the athlete's heart is desire,
is being a good teammate, and that's you got to
be right. You got to be right with something like that.
You can say, like I said, it's just like Sedeki said,
you can tell me I'm stinking right now, I'm not

(07:39):
playing well. I have to accept that you're right. I
gotta do something about the skip. But when you get
into the matters of the heart, the internal workings of
the human being, and question that without full knowing that
I am right, that's a real tough aread to sachet into.
So I did but the player, but fortunately did it privately,
and then eventually I apologized to him. So from that

(08:01):
moment on, and this was several years ago, that was
a lesson learned on my part. So again, this is
I think this is what we're talking about, experience in
wisdom and field, to which the job that you're doing,
mistake mistakes, make mistakes in middlind or make mistakes in
quad cities or Peoria, make mistakes where nobody else can
see these mistakes, so that when you get a chance
to do it on a larger stage, you have some

(08:23):
kind of experience to draw on. And that's the best
way I can describe this to you. So I didn't
always hand it perfectly. I did make my mistakes with it,
made my best shot. But eventually, when you make the
mistakes away from the maddening crowd, hopefully when it gets
to be more amplified, you'd be able to rely on experience.
You try to do it the right way. Yeah, that's interesting.

(08:44):
I mean he Ali Marmold did take Harrison Bader off
the field in a game last year where he thought
he was not running out of flyball. Obviously, as you mentioned,
that becomes obvious that the player is being disciplined. Oh yeah,
it was. It sounds like you almost agree here with
O'Neil after the game, who said, these conversations talking about

(09:05):
the one with his manager definitely could have been had
in house and not gotten out on the loose like
they have. Should have been handled a little differently in
my opinion. I mean, he's essentially calling out as manager,
Joe for making this thing public. Now I have a
problem with that because now you're calling out your manager

(09:27):
for calling you out, so you're doing the same thing
I saw. I'm not really buying that. But this gets
back to I think, and I'm curious your take on this,
Joe dealing with today's player, right. I mean, I've talked
to Dusty Baker about this. You cannot motivate players these
days with negative motivation, and that used to be the

(09:49):
case where you could get under a player's skin. I'm
talking publicly, but players do not respond to that these days.
I remember Joe Girardi just very softly mentioned after a
game in which Gary Sanche behind the plate just was
a little sloppy receiving the baseball, said he needs to
be better. That was it, and he almost lost the

(10:12):
player who really went into his shell because he thought
he was being criticized publicly, so be careful with today's player.
I'm looking at the Cardinals off to a three and
seven start. I'm not sure I want to connect the dots,
but in Mighty of the water is up a little
bit and it can have ramifications. So I want to
get your take now. And if you thought that some

(10:33):
of the old school methods you saw around, whether it
was Gene Mark or some other guys who had carte
blanche to be disciplinarians, whether you saw it change in
the course of your managing career and adapted to that, well,
just to expand on that a little bit too, I like.
That's why I do like the veteran players really stepping
in and that particular moment. The one thing I try

(10:55):
to establish on all the teams is that I had
that rule respect ninety That was my foundation. Is named
that for ninety feet between home plate at first space.
I wanted players to always respect that ninety feet and
if we did that, that's the only rule you had.
I don't have any rules, so I just asked the
position players to do that and ask the pitchers to
work on their defense. Those are my rules, and the

(11:16):
best teams that I've had or run where that when
that rule was breached, that the veteran player would intervene
and say something to the player in advance of me,
and sometimes the coach David Martinez was really good. Is
that as a bench coach, where the intervention would occur
and then everything would subside without having to make it

(11:38):
so obvious. And again, like we were talking about, I
think we've mentioned this in the past too. Sometimes when
you want to be publicly critical, you're protecting yourself too.
I mean, that's that's my perspective on things, where if
I have to go out there and be critical of
a player or coach somebody within my group, maybe sometimes
I'm trying to protect myself. And I think because the

(11:59):
public does like to taste a pound of flesh on occasion.
So those or these are all the different thoughts that
I have. I understand what you're saying. I'm just bringing
it up right first, of course Steinbrenner and and and
Billy Martin, especially Jean. But I'm always I was always
wary of that. I've always was. That was part of

(12:20):
my valuation. Who's who, what's going on here, who's protecting who?
And is it really is it really necessary? To make
your point or are you trying to show everybody that
I'm kind of a tough guy. I'm going to stand
my ground. I'm not going to take this from anybody
because everybody wants this pound of flesh. So there's there's
there's a lot to it. Man. It's not as simple
as it sounds. And for me, that's why I've always

(12:42):
tried to dissect it as much as I could and
rely on my past. Whether it was pulling James Randall
on a pop up in Middland on a windy day
where the ball was found in blue Back Fair, or
the time with the know BJ just chopping the ball
back to the Mount of Jog in the first space.
Even Garrett Anderson with TC back in a Terry Collins
in Baltimore, same thing happened there. Everyone's different, But if

(13:07):
it could be averted through internal means, I prefer that way. Well, Joe,
I gotta tell you, Kevin. Baseball in the eighties and nineties,
managers went after players, you know, whether from Billy Martin
to Whatdy Herzog, Dallas Green, George Steinbran or the Yankees
owner one set of Dave Righetti after he blew a save.
He should walk out of the ballpark with the hot

(13:29):
dog venders. He should be so embarrassed Dallas Green. The
Mets did cartwheels when they fired Dallas Green. Dallas would
take on anybody, Dallas. Listen to this quote from Dwight
Gooden with the Mets fired Dallas Green. I'm surprised he
lasted that long. I have no respect for him as
a manager or a person. When you did well, he

(13:49):
was your best friend. When you struggled, he was against you.
It was never his fault. Nothing was ever his fault.
He had an open door policy until he started ripping you.
But if he closed it, if you tried to go
in there and confront him, know that happened a lot.
It wasn't unusual for managers to take on players publicly

(14:10):
as a way to motivate them, right, And I'd like
to think what Ali Marmole did with Tyler O'Neill was
the right thing to do if you've got a standard
and he agreed, or at least Marmo's opinion, he thought
it was unacceptable the way his player ran. I'd like
to think you should be able to call him out
on that. You know, hustling is the easiest thing to do.

(14:32):
It takes no talent. But I just think in today's game, Joe,
there are ramifications for that. So if you're going to
do that as a manager, even if you think the
player was out of line, you want to call him,
call him out publicly and defend your standard. That's fine,
but I think you better understand there could be a

(14:52):
major downside to that. And I'm not sure that you
know that issue is buried and over with in Saint
Louis because of that. Listen, on this subject of base running,
there's there's something that's really he bothered me, Joe, and
I gotta ask you about this one play that has
become almost standard in baseball, and I hate it. I'll
explain that when we get back in a minute. Welcome

(15:24):
back to the Book of Joe podcast. Base Running. Now,
let me start with the good news, Joe. If you've
been watching these games this year, the base running has
been great. The percentage of guys taking the extra base
has jumped this year from forty one to forty four.
I think there's a new dynamic in the game, and

(15:44):
that is the stolen bases back in play. And I
think that is influencing base running overall. Where guys are
in go mode, they're a little more aggressive. The Guardians,
the Diamondbacks, the Orioles, and the White Sox together a
most aggressive team on the bases. They start out sixty
five stolen bases and sixty nine attempts, and I think

(16:06):
as the stolen base percentage rate remains over eighty percent,
it's encouraging teams to run more. And I think it's
a good thing. And I don't know what you think
watching these games, Joe, but it does seem like the
stolen bases back and play. There's only been one runner
thrown out at third base so far this season. One

(16:29):
that's it. So I don't know if you think it's
too easy to steal pass these days, but I gotta
believe the fans have to be enjoying this game they're watching. Yeah,
I would like to. I would just wait to see
the entire season because some of those teams you mentioned
have always, like Davy with the National Stabies like to
run a period, even in the past, and some of
those other teams are kind of built, they're not afraid

(16:51):
to run. I think sometimes and where the teams said
the White Sox, the Nationals. Who are the other teams, Well,
the Diamondbacks have been I've seen them running the Dodgers
and the Padres off the field. Yeah, they have so
much teams speed, Tory Lavallo is, it's just kind of loose,
and I love the way they're playing. Yeah, and that's
that's it. That's uh. I think you're going to see
it in pockets, like different teams, how they're built, They're

(17:12):
willing to try those different things. I think it's great
because when I manage the raise, we were kind of
we were not kind of like that. We were exactly
like that. I think back in the day with the
Angels in the early two thousands, that's what we were like.
And then it's just a matter of the your personnel
and your team and how it's built and which your
guys are capable of doing. And then again as the
seasons in progress, body starts taking beat and I just

(17:34):
it's everybody's like fresh right now. So I would just
wait on that a little bit. But I do like
the emphasis there because I love that game. I love
the speed game. I love putting pressure on the defense,
make them execute so that they execute themselves. That's a
line from my high school baseball coach. All of that stuff.
I love that it is in play. I'm still trying

(17:55):
to determine to be watching these games or the pitchers
making a good effort to really be quicker to the play.
These are the things I still want to see how
it plays out. And again I talked to Think we
talked about it last week. It's just again organizationally, the
analytical departments. Do we really need to spend all this
time on holding runners and trying to keep them from

(18:15):
stone basis or is it more in our favor to
really try to focus on the pitch and make the
pitch of a situation location we're looking for what it's
almost like, you know, the way the catcher's catch today
on one knee and just trying to steal strikes, and
it's not technically as solid as it had been in
the past. Although I give them credit, they are blocking
the ball well too. It seems so all these things

(18:38):
aren't related. I think they all need time. And the
last point about the stone base I'm curious, like bodies
taking a beating during the course of the year, at
what point do guys back off. Are they going to
be able to maintain this level of excitement stealing basis
over the course of the year. And again, I was
going to ask you this question. I was wondering if
anybody's keeping track unload times times to the play from

(19:01):
pitcher to catcher. I'd be curious if there's been any
upsurge uptick in that regards to quicker times, which its
been status quo as it actually evolved. I'm just I
was just curis about that too. Yeah, as you know,
it's it's almost the math equation. If you've got a
guy in the mound who's one point three to home plate,
you're gonna go. I mean, you're probably not going to

(19:21):
go if you get anything one four, one five. For sure,
you're running in today's game, especially at the limit on pickoffs.
You know, I'll watch a guy like Taiwan Walker, who's
got he's a great athlete, very quick feet. Part of
his game and defending the running game is throwing over
there a lot. You're limited now to two throws per
plate appearance, and once you use that first one, you're

(19:41):
almost signaling to the runner. You know, you can basically
time them at that point. Not too many guys are
going to use their two throws on back to backs,
So it's a little cat and mouse figuring out, you know,
what's going to happen in terms of withholding that second
pickoff try and I think what I'm seeing this was
happening in the minor leagues. Pitchers come to their set

(20:03):
positions sooner on the pitch clock. That way, you can
freeze the batter and the runner by holding the ball
for a long period of time. If you get set late,
I think you're in trouble. So the smart thing to
do as a pitcher is to get yourself set early.
What's interesting is, contrary to what you might think, this
is counterintuitive. I looked at the rate of pickoffs per game.

(20:23):
That's actually slightly up, even with a limit on the
number of times you throw over. I think what we've
done is we've got rid of that that courtesy throw over.
Hey I know you're there, or sometimes the pitchers you
know not, so it doesn't have the conviction of the
pitch and will throw over just kind of reset the mind.
So fewer throwovers, but more actual pickoffs per game. That

(20:45):
I found that interesting so far. I'm with you, though, Joe,
I think we gotta let this thing. Breathe a little
bit and see how it plays out. But I think
the stolen base is definitely more in play. Now, how
about pitchouts and catcher's pickoffs at first base? It's there
any kind of tracking done on that? Yeah, it's interesting.
I was just talking to Buckshaw Walter about that. I

(21:06):
think the back pick you're seeing more of that. There's
certainly no limits on the times that catchers can throw
to first base. There are for pitchers pitch outs. You're
still not seeing them. You're seeing still not seeing the
called pitchouts. Now, as you know, there's some you know,
high fastballs thrown that basically are glorified pitchouts, right, But

(21:26):
the traditional pitchout, No, that hasn't come back yet. And
I think that goes back to some of the analytics
things you're talking about, Joe, where you don't want to
lose count leverage on the assumption the guy's going to
steal a base. I think the focus is still more
on batter and count leveraged, and it is defending the
stolen base. I just tell you're thinking it all the
way through us. We're speaking to me as a catcher.

(21:47):
If my pitcher is thrown over twice already and he
can't go over again. That would be the pitch I
would really be looking to throw or pick off at
first base. I mean, he would think after two throwers,
that's when the runner's gonna obviously want togo if he's
gonna go and just say he gets out there a
little bit, does not time it right and he gets
caught out in no man's land. That might be the
more optimal time for catchers to look in backpick at

(22:08):
first space. I mean, there's so many times I've like
winners on first and second backpicking at first base, keeping
double plays in order. There's all these things have gone
like that by the wayside a bit, But again I
would have if I was in the dugout. These are
the kind of things I'd be looking at if after
my two pickoff attempts by my pitcher, what does that
lead look like based on that runner at first base?

(22:30):
And is there and this is something could actually scout.
Does this guy sometimes get caught in no man's land
at that point because he gets ambivalent whether I want
to go or not? These are the these are the
optimal times you may want to look to do things
like this. So pitchouts, catcher's picks and specifically when to
do that, and for me optimally also put the left
handed hitter up there and you can sneak behind him

(22:53):
and the runner gets kind of blocked by the hitter
with the catcher. So there's there's all these things that
are in play. And again, having not being in the
dugout and really seeing this real time right now, it's
hard for me to ascertain all of it. But at
the top of my head these would be kind of
interesting to me trying to establish step. But then you're like, again,
you're gonna be fighting your analytical department trying to get

(23:13):
some of the stunt all right. Now, the play that
I absolutely hate, Joe, it's first and third. There's two
strikes on the batter, there's two outs. It's become almost
standard procedure. The runner on first base is gonna run,
especially if you've got a left handed hitter up where
you see that third baseman is not really honoring the
lead of the guy on third base, teams are letting

(23:35):
that guy steal second base. Now there's some like the
Phillies with JT. Realmuto. They'll keep you honest and throw
through but I saw the Mets give luke Voit a
stolen base of second base. Luke Voit first and third,
two outs, two strikes. Next batter puts a double in
the gap, ties the game. He scores some second rather
than first. I gotta believe in today's game, you're the

(23:56):
major You're the major leagues. You can't play it like
Little league and give guys free bases. Why don't teams
defend first, the third, two out, two strikes, thrown base
more than they do. They're not even thrown through. I mean,
for me, it's it's time. What part of the game
we're talking about in regards to just let's just go
through my spring trainings right now, we would go to
the first and third situation, and I would talk about

(24:20):
early in the game, the situation you're talking about, let's
just just say two outs doesn't have to necessarily be
full count, but with two outs, if it's early in
the game, I want to stay out at a beginning,
I'm making my throw through. I'll take the out in
exchange for the potential that they might score a run.
I want the out, so I earlier in the game,
I'm more apt to want to make that throw later
in a game, tie game, or if they're up. If

(24:45):
it's a tie game, for sure, for me, they have
to earn that run. I'm not going to permit them
to steal that run. And then again, who's hitting, who's
on deck. All these things have to come into play,
like in the National League situation in the past, pitchers
coming up and the pitcher is going to be stay
in the game, a different story, completely potential for pinch
it or different thought process. All these things have to

(25:08):
be evaluated when you're going to throw or not throw,
but overarching component early in the game, get the ladder
part of the game, make them earn their out, and
then I try to evaluate all the other factors involved
in that moment in regards to whether I want to
throw through or not. So that's that's kind of like
the outline that I work from, and then you just

(25:29):
try to utilize the nuance that's part of in that
particular moment and trying to make the right decision. Yeah,
you know, listen, a lot of teams tell me that
they don't want the infielders vacating their position with two
strikes on the hit or doesn't have to be a
full count so they don't want the middle infielders moving
to open up a haul to cover the bag. So
they're going to hold their ground, give the base and

(25:52):
you know pitchers got two strikes on the hit or
you think you have the inning pretty much in hand.
But again, I think you need to show your opponent
that you will defend. That play creates some doubt. Never
allow the opponent to say, we have a free base here.
And I talked to Mike Schilt about this Shilty as

(26:13):
you know, a great fundamental baseball guy. He's with the
San Diego Padres now coaching third base, and he talked
about in his days in Saint Louis, he had Jose
A Kendo as one of his coaches, and Jose would
basically self scout the Cardinals team, and early in the season,
the Cardinals would run every single play, whether it was

(26:34):
first and third, whether it was safety squeeze, suicide squeeze,
whatever it was. They might not do it the rest
of the year, but they know other teams are writing
down everything that they do, and it's almost like you
need to show your playbook early in the season so
that other teams check that box to say we need
to defend this play because the Cardinals will run it

(26:57):
if they never throw first and third. Let's making it
too easy for the opponent. So I like that idea. Job.
I'm sure if you did this with your clouds, but
early in the season especially established that everything is on
the table. Yeah, you want to put this, you want
to plant the seat of doubt like like just as
I talked about with the pitch hut. You know, I'm

(27:17):
surprised that that's not been popped in there a little
bit more. And you know, if you get a picture
with really good command, what's wrong with taking a shot
in a real runners count? Let just say two one count.
I said, talk to Kyle Hendricks about this, because he's
such a command guy and he throws ground balls. I said, listen,
if we want to take a shot here on a
pitchhout on a two one count and I'm wrong, is
that going to blow you up? Is that going to

(27:39):
you know, make smoke come out of your ears? He said, no,
go go for it. Man. So if you're going to
do things like that again, I would it would be
specific picture as guys that can handle, the guys that
got the command, Guys that are not going to get
all out of control. If you are wrong. Of course,
everybody loves and you're right, but when you're wrong, everybody
loses their mind. So these are the kind of things

(28:00):
I would talk about in events. I've talked to you
about this too in the Texas League. This whether in
this play five and six game series. So if you're
playing a passo five or six games in a row,
and they could run a little bit, they're going to
see me pitch out in that first game. They're going
to see some pitchouts, and I would tell my pitcher listen,
I might be wrong, don't cry, don't look in the dugout.

(28:21):
It's just the ball. But I want the other team
to know that we will do this, which may prevent
them from doing it in the game in a situation
that may benefit us. Will never know because they didn't run,
will never know that it benefited us or not, but
it did. So if you could, ever, or whenever, you
can plant the seed of doubt in the other team's
mind based on something you might do, always a viable resource. Well,

(28:44):
I love it that we're talking about this stuff, Joe,
because these kind of nuances are coming back to the
game and they're the kind of nuances that you know,
this you can only understand and address in real time
in the heat of the moment. This is nothing that scripted, right.
This is about your ability to read the opponent, read
the situation, read the base runner. I just love that

(29:05):
the game now is coming back to that where it's
basically in the hands of the people who are wearing
the uniform. And I think that's a cool thing. Well,
you have to you have to have some forward knowledge
of that too. The point is, like I mean, honestly,
it's not everybody knows has to feel for this in
the dugout. They don't. They don't all have the radar.
You know, their satellite dishes are not pointing in the

(29:27):
right direction. It's something that they're not aware of. It's
not in the data bank, it's not in their random
access memory, it's not in the RAM. So you can't
go there if you don't have it there. You can't
wait for somebody to come up to you and poke
you in the side and say, hey, did you think
about this? That's not how that's That's what I'm talking about.
Experience and feel and wisdom does matter. You need to
be in advance of this. I mean, I think about

(29:50):
this stuff before they occurs, like but based on who's
coming up for them the next inning, this is what
to watch for. Watch with this account. You know, if
there's a little tip off from a runner whomever, a
coach on the side of the signs that he might
be given, You're thinking about this in advance of the
actual ending occurring, actual event happening. You have to it
just you just it's hard to randomly just pick a

(30:13):
thought out of the sky and say, oh, you know,
I'm gonna go right now. No, you have to be
well in advance of all of these things. And I'm
here to tell you, man, I don't know. I don't
know how I could have done all that I did,
do the stuff that I thought in a dugout had
I not had the experience that I had, whether it
was as a minor league manager or even as a
roping instructor where I'm always analyzing and critiquing, and even

(30:36):
as a bench coach on a major league level advising it,
whether it was Marcel or TC or soh. I mean, wow,
I just it's just so much going on in your head,
and people don't understand that and I'm here to tell you, man,
if you've not done it, A lot of the guys
that are managing now that have not done it before.
It's it's it's not necessarily part of the random access memory,

(30:59):
that moment, that click thing, that blinkeding that has to
happen right now, well said, and I think it's it's
It's always been valuable, of course, but I think it's
coming back and gaining in value. I think about those
Oakland A's teams, the moneyball teams, if you will, where
they got famous, you know, through Brad Pitt in the movie.
But I remember talking to opponents playing those Oakland teams,

(31:23):
and they were very easy to play against. The third
base coach wasn't even giving signs. If you were playing defense,
all you focused on was the hitter. You never had
to worry about a runner taking off. There was no
hit and run, there was no stolen bases. I like
the fact now again that the nuance of the game,
the strategies of the game, are coming back. So I

(31:44):
think that's a good thing. Hey, we're gonna take a
quick break here and get another question for Joe and
for all our viewers here. Have you noticed what's been
going on with fastballs. It's early, but I'll give you
the trends when we get back. Welcome back to the

(32:09):
Book of Joe podcast, Tom Berducci and Joe Madden back
with you. I mentioned fastballs, and Joe, you saw this managing.
You know, the fastball usage is going down, fastball velocity
is going up. That's been the trend, right and it's
continuing so far this season. Fastball percentage back in twenty eighteen.

(32:30):
That's not that long ago, folks, five years ago fifty
five percent. I'm not including cutters here, so this is
four seamers and two steamers. We're down to forty seven
percent this year. That's down from forty nine percent just
last year. Two percent drop. That's a big deal. And again,
we've got to be careful about some of these trends
early on. I get it, small sample size, but this

(32:52):
is what we have so far, and certainly it's been
the trend because it's been going down virtually every single
year in what I call the stat cast Rrison's twenty fifteen.
Because spin is harder to hit, and even though guys
are throwing harder, these hitters are so good training off
high velocity machines. They can time a jet engine, so
we're seeing that happen. But here's what's really interesting to me, Joe,

(33:15):
and I think this gets back to the pitch timer,
because now as a pitcher, you have less recovery not
only between pitches, but as a starter between innings as well.
What I noticed here is that velocity is down just slightly.
I mean it's not it's negligible. Ninety three point nine
down to ninety three point eight. I mean, that's not
really worth saying it's declining. But this is after the

(33:40):
sixth inning, so essentially, when the game's in the hands
of the bullpen, velocity has gone down from ninety four
to six to ninety four three. So the bigger jump
now is at the end of the game. And I'm
thinking about all these big, hard throwing relief pitchers Joe,
who macks out on every single pitch and you don't
have the thirty thirty five seconds, you know, the patro Biases,

(34:02):
the Kenley Jansens to really max out on every pitch.
Maybe that's a trend to keep your eye on where
velocity late in the game is not well, it was.
What do you think about fastball usage and velocity. You know,
it's de pics on the hitter. I mean there's times
that I hate when we throw breaking ball too. I know,

(34:23):
a guy that has more of a slider speed bat,
he's knock going to catch up to the fast way
he can see it from the side, but you're still
revert back to a pitch that he can hit as
opposed to when he cannot. So I'm always cognizant of that,
and everybody's different and you have to be aware of that.
The sweepie slider has been a really big part of
the new wave of trying to get a hitter out

(34:44):
of striking him out because it's all about swing and
miss Nobody wants the ball in play. So if we
could expand somebody strike zone, we're gonna expand the strike
zone and we're gonna go for the punch shot and
I have the ball put in play. So that's always
going to be at the crux of the analytical world
is that we want swings and misses. On defense, we
do not want the ball put in play. We don't
want to take a chance that we're going to get

(35:04):
a soft hit somewhere and it's going to destroy our
strategy whatever. So this that's still going to be part
of it. I'm a little surprised, you know, the reliever
wise that have to look at all of that, the
fact that that's down a little bit your overall velocity.
But I do you watch these guys and to me,
to be a really effective relief pitcher, it's you've got

(35:25):
to have one other outstanding pitch. You know. They don't
have to have three or four outstanding pitches because they're
out there a limited time, like you're talking about. The
spring has to be wound more quickly and then released,
number of pitches, strown, time in between pitches, all that stuff. Yeah,
it's going to have an influence because these guys are like,
really the sprinters. They're they're not the long distance guys.

(35:45):
They're sprinters and you're asked to do this on a
nightly basis, so that can take its toll too. So
I'm curious. I haven't been really locked into that mentally,
I haven't noticed that. I mean, like I said, I'm
curious as you're talking about it. But yeah, I know,
even my last year or so with the Angels, the
sweep sliders become very very popular. If it works for

(36:10):
one team, well, the other teams are going to want
it until that goes away and something else comes along.
That's just the way baseball's working right now. So I
do believe the clock. I was just writing in general
terms about the clock where just not to answer your
question specifically, But this is where the six men rotation
I think is really going to be more prominent because

(36:32):
of the clock. You know, the less time, more time
to rest, less possible injury. I also like to believe
that if they were to go to that that'd be less,
they'd be more lenient. With one hundred pitch limit. I'm
looking at the paper today, everybody like maximizes at about
one hundred pitches and nobody wants to go beyond that number,
almost like it's hot coals. And for me, it's like

(36:54):
we create the limits. We create in the limits, and
I prefer that each player creates as all limits. I'm
talking about pictures right now, And with that, I would
create more latitude on the minor league level, this is
where you have to see all this stuff. More latitude
in the minor league level, permitting these guys to one
hundred pitches or more if their arm looks like that
they're they're in their delivery. How much rest did they

(37:16):
have to their next start? And what did they how
much rest did they had, and how many pitches did
they throw in the previous starts. See, all these things,
to me are part of the evaluation. That's why you
just I just can't. It's hard just to answer a question.
And everybody wants to put everybody in the same little
compartment or box. They're all different. You can't compare it.
You can't talk about Max Sers or like you're going
to talk about some first year right hand and pitch

(37:39):
or whatever coming out of the minor league where he
wasn't permitted to throw more than ninety pitches. It's all
different stuff. So I'm curious, like you're saying the hush
small sample size, I'll pay more attention to this. I
didn't even realize that, but it's it is interesting. And again,
the clock and haven't impact in other ways other than
the fact you just have to throw the baseball sooner. Well,

(38:00):
I'll go back to something that Sandy Alderson said in
our book, The Book of Joe. I thought Sandy was
really good talking about how the game had changed and
how it did need to get back into the hands
of players, coaches, managers and out of the hands of
front office people. And he realized, Hey, it's almost like,
you know, you guys have hacked this game in terms
of the percentages of analytical baseball. We're gonna change the rules.

(38:23):
You know, you learn how to play this way at poker,
and now we're gonna play blackjack, and now they're figuring
out the rules of the way the game is right
now this year, and it's different, it's being played differently,
and you're saying, teams adjust. I think it's good. I
think it's more interesting. And getting back to your point
about pitch counts and not treating everybody the same, it
was interesting to me. I haven't checked the latest numbers,

(38:45):
but through the first week or so the season, maybe
first ten days, the most pitches thrown in the game
was one hundred and eleven pitches and that was done
by guess who show Hey Otani? How about that showy Otani?
The same guy who came out of the bullpen and
the WBC who signed up the pitch in the WBC

(39:07):
when a lot of the American pitchers were sitting on
their couch saying you know, I'm not going to ramp
up that early. The same show, Aotani is a free
agent at the end of the season. The same Showeotani,
who in that game had ninety five pitches after five
innings or six innings and said, I want to go
back out there and face the middle of the lineup
one more time to get us through, goes out there

(39:27):
and finishes at one eleven when everybody else is checking
out at ninety or third time around. I just love
the fact that, and Joe you started this with, show Hey,
don't put limits on greatness, and you know, listen, one
hundred and eleven. It's not one hundred and fifty back
in the day of Nolan Ryan. I get that. But
I love the fact that Showhey didn't bag out of

(39:49):
that game just because he was nearing one hundred pitches,
and we are seeing one hundred become the new Well
it used to be one twenty, than it was one ten,
and it's pretty much the outer limits now. So good
on Showheyotani. Yeah, he listened. He wants to stay out there,
and he'll he'll tell you now, like in that situation,
if he was gassed, he'd let you know. His gas.

(40:10):
Now I can't do that, but he wasn't gassed, and
he and he knows, like you just kind of alluded
to there. He knew that if if I don't go
back out there are chances of winning are less only
because I'm going to cover three more outs, less work
on the bullpens part. I know this is going to
benefit them, admit puts us in better position. He thinks
that way. That's how he evaluated that moment, I can

(40:33):
still do this. And then what he does. He goes
out there and he didn't he turns it up a
few notches. He just does. He's got that, he's got
that thing in him that a few few have ever had,
and he's able to go out there and pitch at
an even higher levels. So not surprising. The other thing
I just wanted to bring up. I was looking at
the box scores to day, a lot of punch out.
So as things attempt to change, the more they remain

(40:57):
the same. And look at the Mets struck out fourteen Padres,
the White Suck struck out thirteen twins Tampa Bay ten
punchy Baltimore eleven versus the A's. How about Andrew Heaney
nine consecutive punchouts last night, but that I love, I
love Andrew's fastball. And then Milwaukee Arizona fifteen strikeouts versus Milwaukee. Um,

(41:18):
so that's that's see, that's these are the things that
nobody talks about. And I to me, this is adaptations.
This is this is the mental part of the game
where I call it a b hack two strike approach
where if you swif you're watching these games and hitters
don't necessarily make any kind of adjustments when they get
to two strikes, they're still done at the end of
the bath. They're still swinging hard, they're still going for

(41:40):
the pencils. And I've been in meetings where analysts insistent, yeah,
we still want them swinging for a home run right
and we don't want them to cuddle down at all,
And it just it just boggles my mind where it's
just like a punchee to right field right there, little
blooper is gonna make a difference, It's gonna win the game. Um.
You know the two strike up poach for me, and
my BI hack is look away, first choke up. Think

(42:00):
fastball verst as an example, you're making these mental adaptations
to knock down these strikeouts. I mean, to me, all
these there's been a lot of wonderful adjustments and primate
it's been spearheaded by the clock for me. But now,
if you really want to manipulate this game and make
it more exciting, it's like to really somehow get these

(42:21):
groups to teach or practice and reward not striking out
as much or moving the ball more often, because right now,
everybody's going to argue that the only way to win
these games is to hit home runs. And they'll say
that the teams of the best winning percentages hit the
most home runs. I want to hit the most home
runs and also want to make the most contact. I
don't think it's incongruit to do that stuff. So these

(42:43):
are the things I'm looking at now, and that's going
to be individual organizational philosophy to teach that and learn
how to knock down fifteen and thirteen and eleven and
thirteen and fourteen punchy yesterday down to like less than
ten for me, like seven or eight. And then also
I would always look at the number of walks. I
like to see my walks at least behalf of what

(43:05):
my strikeouts were as a group, that night. So that's
where I think you're optimizing offensive performance. So these are
the things I've been paying attention to. Yeah, that's a
smart observation there, especially about the walks that you know
I did that Mets game you're talking about with the
fourteen strikeouts of San Diego, the Mets also walked six
batters and I don't know how many times I saw

(43:25):
full counts where it was change up or slider on
a full count. So I think it's back to what
you're saying about the home run. You're almost defending the
home run and pitching defensively at that point. But again,
I think if we get more guys who can run
and we have more stolen bases, the penalty for the
walk goes up. Yeah, and that's what I'm hoping happens
during the course of this season because right now it's

(43:46):
a great observation on your part. Walks are up and
again early I keep saying that, but you know, it's
not a trend yet, but something to keep your eye on.
Walks are up to the highest level in the last
twenty three years, walks per game, So you know, again
throwing less fastball, spinning the ball more, being having this

(44:08):
mindset that a walk is okay because you're defending the
home run. That's right. And again, if you get more
stolen basis, be careful about those walks coming back to
bite you. That's all interconnected. I could with one hundred
percent last point too. Please. Who wins the battle of
the full count on a nightly basis? I was big
on that. I really try to get into that. I

(44:28):
really started paying attention to the full count the winner
of the full count were on a specific night, your
pitchers full counts, your hitter's full counts. Who wins that?
I think that's an interesting number because the full count
winner on the offensive side normally is the guy that
doesn't chase. The full count winner on the pitching side
is the guy that's able to throw a pitch that
could become that creates a chase with the hitter on

(44:52):
the other side. So I think if even in spring
training I started talking about that a lot, I want
to I want us to dominate full count. I want
us to win the battle of the full count on
a nightly basis. I think I could leak two millions.
All good stuff. Joe. You know what I like about
this is that the game is changing in real time
with these new rules. We're not sure where it's going.
We're all trying to read the tea leaves this early,

(45:14):
but we know it's going to be different. It is different,
and we know obviously it's faster. But it's fascinating to
see how teams adjust. Whether some of these things we're
talking about developing the full blown trends, whether it's just
a blip on a you know, a two week start
to a major league season, we don't know. But we
know that baseball is being played differently than it has
been since I think in the mid nineteen eighties in

(45:37):
terms of pace. So this is all good, all good fodder.
I love your perspective from the dugout, Joe. It really
adds a lot, I think, to the way the game
is playing out this year. So we will keep an
eye on it. Always fun talking about these trends with you.
Thank you, buddy. Same here. I mean, it's it's fit
is fascinating, and I agree with you. And then it
does just stands out I think as I'll watch the game,

(45:59):
and the thing obviously that stands out so fast that
it gets ball pitcher throws ball hitters in the box,
hitters ready to swing. I love that part of it. Now,
if we could just somehow respect the base, hit again,
respect contact again, and if we could arrive at that
point where there's respect given to that, I agree with

(46:20):
you that will also lead potentially to somebody even attempting
a hit and run. And like you said earlier, and
it's true, the mental doubt, the pressure that you put
on the other team by the fact that you might
do something. Wow, that's that is that could be very

(46:41):
very substantial in regards to benefiting your group. Yeah, I
love it all right, Joe, you got something to take
us out tonight? Yeah, I mean, I'm going to go
back to my boy winning. Apparently he drank a lot,
you know, And I guess you had to if you're
gonna like run England during World War Two with all
the stuff going on around you. But this is just
typical of its brilliance and also self confidence. History will

(47:05):
be kind to me for I tend to write it.
I love that. I love that, you know. That's that's
that's what you want to do as a baseball organization,
as a baseball team, as a group. History is going
to be kind of to the twenty sixteen cups because
we wrote it. You know, you write your own history,

(47:26):
and you think for yourself and you think on your
own two feet, and you don't just follow the crowd
just because the crowd says something or a group think.
You've got to fight that stuff sometimes. So mister Churchill
wrote it, and that's what we're attempting to do here,
is we're just trying to write your own history. And
we'll see how that all plays out. Because this year

(47:48):
is going to be it's very influential. Like you've been
talking about now, you're making a lot of wonderful points,
but the rule changes that are being implemented, it's very
vital to the game of baseball that we come out
on the other side when the publicity wise, and how
we're appealing to the younger group or even though you
established group, and as we move this thing forward. So

(48:09):
right now we're trying to kind of rewrite it or
write it and see where this all takes it. So
I'm really curious, and it's gonna it's gonna play out well,
I believe it's gonna play out. Well, there's gonna be
some nuanced adaptations. I'll tell you one thing before we
go to I mean, like you were talking about early
with relief pictures, I thought, even from a clock perspective,
why not add a second or two from like the
eighth inning off to the clock that when you get

(48:30):
into box as a hitter and as a pitcher, maybe
the clock readjust for a second or two. Just because
of the reason you have talked about. I don't think
anybody would argue with that. I would. Okay, I don't
like it. We'll talk about that next time, because I've
heard players talk about that, and yeah, I'm going to
resist that. But in the meantime, history is written by

(48:51):
the winners. That's right. Thank you Churchill. Yes, and thank
you Joe. You got her brother. Thank you. The Book
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(49:12):
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