Dr Geoffrey Miller: geopolitical analyst on Luxon and Modi signing a Strategic Partnership during Indian PM's visit

A word of caution as New Zealand forges closer defence ties with India. 

Prime Minister Chris Luxon's signed a Strategic Partnership with Narendra Modi - during the Indian Prime Minister's whirlwind visit. 

He's also agreed to strengthen maritime cooperation and carry out more bilateral naval activity. 

Geopolitical analyst Geoffrey Miller says the relationship's come a long way in a short space of time - but we need to be careful we're not moving too fast. 

"It is positive to broaden the relationship from trade, I just think New Zealand needs to be careful in what it is signing up to, because it has the potential to impact on international relations more generally." 

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Episode Transcript

Speaker 1 (00:06):
You're listening to the Sunday Session podcast with Francesca Rudkin
from News talksedb SO.

Speaker 2 (00:13):
A new strategic partnership with India has been unlocked. The
agreement was announced during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's twenty
four hour trip to New Zealand. The partnership crosses many areas,
from business, defense to culture. Here is Prime Minister Christopher Luckson.

Speaker 1 (00:27):
This provides a stronger platform for practical cooperation in prosperity,
security and people to people connections.

Speaker 2 (00:36):
To talk us through the new partnership and its significance.
Geopolitical analyst doctor Jeffrey Miller is with me now.

Speaker 3 (00:41):
Good morning, Good morning, Francesca.

Speaker 2 (00:44):
Is this a significant partnership for New Zealand.

Speaker 1 (00:48):
It is?

Speaker 3 (00:49):
And look the New Zealand and their relationship has come
an awfully long way in a very short space of time.
It was only four years ago I wrote a piece
saying that New Zealand really wasn't taking India very seriously.
And now you couldn't make that claim at all with
both this free trade agreement, the very high profile visit
from Lourendromodi over the last couple of days and this

(01:12):
new strategic partnership, which is really tagging the relationship beyond trade.
It has been quite remarkable.

Speaker 2 (01:18):
As I say, Jeffrey, maybe you could just touch on
why didn't why weren't we taking the relationship seriously?

Speaker 3 (01:25):
Well, it was a good question. I mean, I think
we were coming out of that COVID period and I
think a lot of that had to do with that.
And obviously there were a lot of balls in the
air and that COVID period around twenty twenty to twenty
twenty two, and the government at the time had a
lot of focus areas and India just wasn't one of them.

(01:47):
Then we had the change of government in twenty twenty
three and India really became an election issue back in
twenty twenty three, as the listeners may recall, and Christopher
Luxeen made that pledge to have a free trading agreement
with India by the end of this turn, which he's achieved.
At that point also I think began to take India

(02:09):
more seriously and also pledged to do more with the relationship.
And since then it's sort of become a bidding war
in a sense. And Christopher Luxeen has come out now
with the success of the free trade agreement now motives
visit and a new strategic partnership.

Speaker 2 (02:26):
So this strategic partnership, how different is it from what
we've had in the past.

Speaker 3 (02:31):
Well, it's quite radical, I think in many ways. I
encourage listeners to go online and have a look at this.
You can find it on the Behive website. The text
of it is very comprehensive, very detailed, and very much
focused on defense and security. It's the second item there.
It comes ahead of trade, for example, and there are

(02:53):
some quite specific commitments that New Zealand is making as
part of it, including bilateral naval exercises with India, including
an annual maritime security summit in New Zealand, and signing
up to something called the Indo Pacific Ocean's Initiative. I
have to say, look, I follow these things reasonably closely,
but that was kind of new to me what this

(03:16):
was and searching for it. It was initiative that MODI
launched back in twenty nineteen, and it seems really it's
an Indian initiative that New Zealand is signing up to here.
And I have to say, reading through a lot of
this statement, it does feel like an Indian statement that
New Zealand is signing its name to rather than a

(03:36):
genuine joint statement, and as an example of one of
the commitments in this roadmap, if you like, New Zealand
is going to support a permanent membership for India on
the UN Security Council. I find it quite interesting that
just how detailed and how specific a lot of the
messaging is in this roadmap. In the strategic partnership, it's

(04:01):
very different to say, the ad joint statement that was
made on a stretching comprehensive strategic partnership with China that
New Zealand signed way back in twenty fourteen, which was
much more general and own without the level of specificity,
and there was just a single sentence for example, on
defense cooperation in that agreement back in twenty fourteen with China.

(04:23):
It's very different to the big laundry list of commitments
that New Zealand signing up to.

Speaker 2 (04:28):
Here, Jeffrey. If you look though, it's in particular at
the defense and the security cooperation, is it a good
thing for New Zealand.

Speaker 3 (04:37):
I think New Zealand has to be very very careful here.
I wonder whether New Zealand is simply going too fast
at this point and signing up to a lot of
things that I may regret later. I think a lot
of this will be seen as quite antagonistic by China,
which remember is New Zealand's biggest trading partner by far

(04:59):
forty three billion dollars in two way trade. The India
relationship is under four billion, so it's under ten percent
of that share. And some of these lines here we
talk here, in the statement and the joint Statement, and
in this strategic Partnership document seem to be coded to
be antagonistic to China. When we talk about free, open,

(05:19):
free and open indoor Pacific, for example, that language is
typically read by China is being very much against it.
So I think New Zealand has to be very careful
here signing up to India on these very detailed security
commitments and just the implications of this. So I just

(05:41):
wonder whether because Christopher Luxen was very eager to hostnar
Andrew Moody, perhaps he has agreed to an awful lot
of very specific commitments that New Zealand ended up regretting later.
That said, it is non binding. At the bottom there
is a statement saying it is binding and maybe we

(06:01):
should be grateful for that. But I think you're in
New Zealand has gone for quite a walker's positioning and
I'm not sure that that will be to bet New
Zealand's benefit in the long term. And New Zealand has
traditionally had this independent foreign policy approach going back forty years,
and we've seen some quite radical changes over the last
few years that New Zealand SEMs to be stepping away

(06:22):
from that towards a more ally like approach. We've saw
this new announcement just over the past few days on
an Ocean of Peace Ocean of Peace alliance between Australia
and Fiji, and New Zealand is looking to potentially join
that as well. These are quite radical shifts and I
think this is just one more piece of the puzzle,
this new strategic partnership with India.

Speaker 2 (06:45):
You mentioned eager to hosts and I also wonder whether
eager to really move forward with the trade and economic
cooperation which is on the table as well. Do you
think that that could also be having an impact as
to you know, the enthusiasm towards this strategic partnership.

Speaker 3 (07:04):
Look, the bottom line is New Zealand has got this
free trade agreement. There are a lot of benefits to
New Zealand from that, despite the fact that the airy
is largely excluded. The reality is that India wanted something
in return. We've heard about the US twenty billion dollars
an investment that New Zealand is supposed to be making
in India. We've heard about migration and the components are

(07:25):
in the FTA. I think security and defense cooperation is
that third component, and New Zealand is giving itself or
lending its good name and good reputation to Narendromody here.
That's very valuable and I think that is what New
Zealand most can often India the most is it's good name,
good reputation. The fact that New Zealand internationally is so

(07:48):
well thought of, very very useful to a big superpower
like India. I think it really is in that superpower
category now and will only be growing in stature and
strength in the years and decades to come. So that
is what the big benefit, the big payoff that Narendra
Modi is getting from this arrangement. Quite apart from the

(08:09):
specific I mean, let's be honest, I mean New Zealand's
defense force. When it comes to joint naval exercises with India,
you know it's going to be still relatively small because
New Zealand's military is relatively small. But the reputation, the
name that New Zealand has its status in the international community,

(08:30):
that is very, very valuable, and I think that's probably
the biggest payoff for Narentromodi here.

Speaker 2 (08:35):
Thank you so much. That was doctor Jeffrey Miller. There
Joe Political Analyst.

Speaker 1 (08:40):
For more from the Sunday session with Francesca Rudkin, listen
live to News Talks it'd be from nine am Sunday,
or follow the podcast on iHeartRadio.