March 21, 2026 • 35 mins
Retired U.S. Army Europe commander Ben Hodges joins the show to deliver a bracing reality check: the next war won’t look like the last one, and it may already be underway. Drawing on his book Future War and the Defense of Europe, Hodges explains how cheap drones, energy choke points, maritime sabotage, and Arctic maneuvering are reshaping the battlefield faster than politicians can draft talking points. From Ukraine’s stubborn resilience to Iran’s shadow play and Russia’s pipeline pressure tactics, this episode maps the fault lines beneath today’s uneasy peace. Sobering, sharp, and uncomfortably plausible, it’s essential listening for anyone who prefers foresight to surprise.
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SPEAKER_00 (00:00):
Hello and welcome back to the News Items Podcast.
I'm John Ellis.
I'm the founder and editor oftwo Substack newsletters.
One is called News Items, theother is called Political News
Items.
You can find them both atnews-items.com.
We have a new website, so weencourage you to go there.
(00:20):
It's a lot of work, but it's alot of fun.
Our guest today is LieutenantGeneral Ben Hodges, who is now
retired.
He's the former commandinggeneral of U.S.
Army Europe.
He now consults for severalcompanies on Europe, NATO, and
the European Union.
He is co-author of a great bookcalled Future War and the
Defense of Europe, which waspublished by the Oxford
(00:42):
University Press.
General, thank you very much forjoining us today.
SPEAKER_01 (00:46):
Well, John, thank you.
And thanks for this privilege.
Of course, I read new news itemsevery day when it comes out.
You know, lots of people puttogether articles, but the ones
you always do seem to be uh themost relevant and the best in
the qualities, which is why Iagreed to do this, of course.
So this book, Future War in theDefense of Europe, is the first
(01:07):
book project uh of which I wasever a part.
And thankfully, my co-authors,Professor Julian Lindley French,
who's British, and then GeneralJohn Allen, who you and your
audience will know are retiredMarine Four star.
That was a writing team.
And Julian, who had writtenseveral books before, he really
guided us.
And my role was to help make itAmerican and to offer, you know,
(01:30):
useful army sort of land warfareinsights to the work.
But just to make sure Juliandeserves the lion's share of the
credit, I learned so much in thein the writing of this book, it
was much harder.
There was more to it than I'dever imagined, both the actual
research and the writing and thegoing through the whole
editorial process, but alsofinding uh publishers.
(01:52):
I mean, this book was publishedafter Russia had invaded Ukraine
in 2014 before the large-scaleinvasion.
So just not a lot of interest indigging into defense topics.
So it was a different time.
SPEAKER_00 (02:07):
I wanted to ask you about the status of the Ukraine
war.
Obviously, the Ukrainians havefought gallantly and with
extraordinary uh, I guess,innovation.
Where do you think we are?
Where do you think it stands?
SPEAKER_01 (02:20):
I am convinced there's no way that Russia can
defeat Ukraine.
I mean, it's just not going tohappen.
This this war started in 2014.
So here we are after 12 yearswith Russia having every
advantage.
Uh, they still only controlabout 20% of Ukraine, well over
a million casualties, enormousexpenditure, and um with really
(02:40):
not too much to show for it.
Now, clearly, Ukraine alsocannot knock Russia out of the
war.
I think we missed ouropportunity to do that a couple
of years ago by failing to evenmake that an objective.
So we're at a situation nowwhere uh the Ukrainians have
figured out how to stop Russianland forces, and I don't see
anything coming that would giveme reason to think that that
(03:02):
will change, that Russia willsomehow eventually overpower or
break through Ukrainiandefenses.
Uh it's just not going tohappen.
On the other hand, the uhRussians are continuing their
onslaught every night withdrones and missiles against
civilian targets all overUkraine.
The power grid, of course, is abig part of that, but it's also,
(03:23):
you know, apartment buildingsand schools and hospitals and
where people live.
That's what they're targeting.
It's the it's the modernequivalent of strategic bombing
that you know we did in WorldWar II, we did it in Vietnam, we
did it in other places, othernations have tried it, and it
never works.
It never breaks the will of apopulation, and that's what's
(03:44):
happening with Ukraine.
Even though I I spoke to aUkrainian friend of mine a few
weeks ago who's in who's in thearmy, we've known each other for
many years.
I said, Well, how's your family?
He said, Well, they're they'reliving in Kyiv, my wife and
daughter, it's you know sevendegrees in their apartment.
And uh he said, but it'll bespring in just a few more weeks.
So I mean that's the that's theattitude of Ukrainians.
(04:05):
Now, another domain of the war,of course, is the uh maritime
domain, and here the Ukrainianshave completely stopped the
Russians.
The Russian Navy, the greatBlack Sea fleet, is is hardly a
factor.
They've been chased out of theirbase in Sevastopol.
They just are not able tooperate in any way that
contributes to Russian success.
And then this is by Ukraine thatdoesn't have a Navy in the
(04:28):
traditional sense, you know,with surface warfare and all
that.
It's mostly maritime drones andlong-range anti-ship missiles.
And then finally, the I don'twant to overstate Ukraine's
capability.
I mean, obviously they havemanpower challenges, they have
financial challenges, but itseems to me that they have
developed or discovered a pathto victory, which would be the
(04:50):
destruction of Russia's abilityto export oil and gas.
And that's a combination ofstrikes against the uh
refineries uh as they developmore and more long-range
precision capability that canreach that far.
If Europe and the United Statesand others would stop the Shadow
Fleet vessels that are carryingoil, Russian oil, out of the
Baltic Sea and the Black Sea,then I think the Russians'
(05:13):
economy and their ability tocontinue the war would come to a
screeching halt pretty quick.
SPEAKER_00 (05:18):
Is the the fact that we have running down, I guess,
uh munitions, uh you might say,does that make Ukraine more
vulnerable, I guess, uh toRussia?
Or does their unbelievableinnovation in drone warfare uh
make not you know leaves that tobe not too much of uh
difference?
SPEAKER_01 (05:39):
Aaron Ross Powell, it it certainly doesn't help
Ukraine that uh we are are goingthrough so much of our air and
missile defense capability, themunitions, that sort of thing,
long-range precision strike.
But the fact is, over the pastyear, the current administration
had significantly reduced whatit was actually providing to
Ukraine, even reducing what itwas selling to European
(06:00):
countries to give to Ukraine.
So there's just not as muchleft, whatever, however, it gets
to them.
So this is this is the timewhere Ukrainians, but also
European countries who recognizethat for them, Iran is not their
priority, but helping Ukraine istheir priority to help fill in
the gap somewhat.
Now, nobody can nobody else canmake patriot, but there are
(06:22):
other weapon systems that can bemade, produced and provided to
Ukraine, and also investing inUkrainian defense industry.
You've nailed it, theirinnovation, their ability to to
test, their willingness to testand do new things is, I think,
unsurpassed, but they're not yetwhere they can produce it to
scale, to make the quantities ofwhat's needed to really have
(06:44):
that decisive effect.
And so I think here's whereEuropean countries and European
companies could invest inUkraine as well as providing to
them what's needed.
So it doesn't help, but it it'snot I don't I don't think this
is going to doom Ukraine.
Quite the opposite.
SPEAKER_00 (07:02):
Can Putin do a deal ceasefire?
Is that really possible givenhis status at home?
If he does a ceasefire, I thinkuh he has to say to the, you
know, the Russian right, so tospeak, that it's only for a time
and he'll restart the war uh,you know, uh after a quote
(07:24):
decent interval.
Is that is your sense that Putinnecessarily has to continue the
war?
Because otherwise it'll createsort of an existential threat to
him?
SPEAKER_01 (07:34):
So it's a very good point and uh an important one.
He has no incentive to stop.
I mean, clearly he's notaffected by casualties, and the
Russians are still looking forpotential bodies to put into the
armed forces to continue whatthey're doing to try and wear
down the Ukrainians and tomaintain this narrative somehow
that unfortunately the the U.S.
(07:56):
administration um has acceptedthat Russian victory is
inevitable.
So he has no incentive to stop,especially if he sees that the
American president is not reallygonna put serious pressure on
him, and if he if he thinks thatthe Europeans are not really
willing to do what's necessaryto help Ukraine see this
through.
As long as he believes that,then I think he's gonna
(08:18):
continue.
What would cause him torecalculate would be the
destruction or significantdegradation of his oil and gas
exports.
If he can't do that anymore,then it does really become a
problem.
This so-called war economy thatthey're doing, it is
artificially propped up and theyare using all of their
(08:38):
resources.
And so there's an it's not aneconomy that the population, I
think, is willing to put upwith.
I know I hear this mythologythat Russians can suffer more
than anybody.
And it's true they have suffereda lot, but it's because that's
all they've ever had from thetime of the czars.
It's not like they had to theymade a big choice to give up a
lot for the army.
(08:58):
It's the opposite.
So I think another disincentivethat Putin has to end this war
is that if they haven't carriedaccomplished all the objectives
he set out and talked about thatwere so important for Mother
Russia, then he's gonna have amillion unhappy veterans
returning home to an economythat is in shambles.
(09:19):
It'll be a mess.
And uh you're talking aboutpeople who will have been
through terrible, nightmarishcombat situations.
And uh, you know, the Russianarmy is not famous for having a
deep concern about the welfareof their troops.
And so I think he doesn't wantto have that.
So there's another disincentiveto keep this going.
So until either the UnitedStates and or Europe does what's
(09:43):
necessary to really stop Putin'sability to continue fighting the
war, then I think this can thiswill continue certainly
throughout the rest of 2026 andon into 27.
SPEAKER_00 (09:55):
One of the new narratives is that the Iran war
or really the shutting down ofthe strait of or moves,
obviously it has raised theprice of oil and gas, and
everybody says that this is uhbonanza for Mr.
Putin.
Is is that true?
Is that uh you know actuallytrue?
SPEAKER_01 (10:17):
It certainly is true.
And I think from a purelyfinancial standpoint, it's a
bonanza for him.
I mean, I've seen differentestimates about how many
hundreds of millions of uhdollars have already gone into
uh Russian coffers as a resultof this ability to export more
oil.
Now, I'm anxious to see if theadministration follows through
(10:40):
on what they said, and after 30days, the amount of time that
Treasury Secretary Bessant saidum that this the sanctions would
be lifted, do they go back ineffect at the 30-day mark?
I think this will be importantto watch.
I have to say, unfortunately,I'm skeptical that they will
actually put those back intoeffect.
(11:01):
And this, of course, has reallyannoyed the Europeans because
the Europeans have been notperfect, but they have sanctions
in place.
And so here's the American sidenow relieving sanctions on the
Russians.
And this is a dream for theRussians.
Their dream has always been toput a wedge between the United
States and Europe, but to breakapart NATO.
(11:21):
And so these are the kind ofthings that contribute to the
erosion of that cohesion that isso important.
And it's an objective of theRussians, and we're doing it for
them.
SPEAKER_00 (11:30):
There was uh you know, the Strait of Hormuz, you
know, it says that it's 20 mileswide, but actually uh it's sort
of a dredged canal, probably amile wide, and if you have
tankers going through there, youcan't have them passing each
other.
You have to go up uh in thecanal, so to speak.
(11:51):
Do you think it's feasible thatan armada from President uh
Trump said yesterday that Europehad to provide ships for opening
up the strait?
Is that is that a feasiblething?
Can you actually open thestrait?
SPEAKER_01 (12:06):
This this is a difficult question because it's
not just yes or no.
As long as the Iranians retainthe ability to either put mines
out there frequently oroccasionally, and as long as
they retain some sort of abilityto launch drones that could
strike uh a tanker, then youwon't you really can't say that
the strait strait is open.
(12:28):
I think that the the historicalexample I think of, and
historical examples are notalways great, but I think about
the Gallipoli campaign in theFirst World War, where the
Allies, you know, were theBritish and the French believed
that if they just sailed theirfleet up the Dardanelles, it
would appear opposite uhStambul, and the Ottoman Empire
(12:48):
would collapse, and that wouldknock the Ottomans out of the
war.
Well, of course, uh the Ottomanshad very well prepared shore
batteries along both sides ofthe Dardanelle, and which comes
from the Aegean up through thetowards Stambul and the
direction of the Black Sea.
And they also had naval mines.
So you had intrepid Ottomansailors were able to get out
(13:10):
there and put mines in the waterthat sank at least three
different ships of the combinedAllied fleet, and the Allies
realized, okay, now we've got uswe've got to secure the land if
we're gonna do this, and thusstarted the Gallipoli campaign,
which of course was a disasterthat lasted about a year.
That doesn't mean it will alwaysbe a disaster, but it's a
challenge.
And so you're talking abouthaving to secure the Iranian
(13:33):
side of the strait so that theycan't have small boats bringing
mines out there or launch dronesfrom inside Iran.
And I think you could do some ofthis with uh you know to have
what General McChrystal calledthe unblinking eye, constant
surveillance, looking for everytime they saw a vessel going out
there, but this would becomevery, very manpower intensive
(13:56):
very quickly, in my view, aslong as the Iranians believed
that they could stop one or twoof these tankers, and as long as
the insurance companies believedthat that threat was still
there, and and the captains ofthe tankers believed it, this
would be a challenge.
Yeah.
SPEAKER_00 (14:10):
I I mean one thing I think about is if you had if you
were able to hit a tanker and itcaught fire and you know, leaked
oil or dumped oil into thestrait, you could send somebody
out in the speedboat andessentially have a cigarette
lighter and set the whole thingon fire, right?
SPEAKER_01 (14:29):
Well, uh certainly the Iranians have been preparing
this for for decades, just likeour great Navy has been thinking
through the challenges of whatwould you do?
And you know, the differenttypes of sea mines, as we're all
learning about now.
You've got some.
The one the popular image frommovies is the big round ball
with the spikes on it that youcan see on the surface.
(14:50):
But then you've got others thatare tethered to an anchor of
some sort on the bottom that arebelow the surface, and then
you've got some that literallylay on the surface, on the bed
of the strait, and then you'vegot other types of weapons that
could be employed.
And the reporting I've seen fromDefense Intelligence Agency was
that they had about 6,000different types of mines.
(15:14):
I don't know how many havealready been destroyed.
I would imagine that our Navyhas been looking diligently for
these things, the boats as wellas the actual mines themselves.
So I think if you if you'rewilling to apply enough
resources to it and you and youhave the time, then eventually
our great Navy and other forceswill be able to do it.
But then you've you still got toprevent the Iranians from
(15:37):
launching drones against atanker that especially one I
could imagine that would beparticularly combustible, and
what a massive problem thatwould create in the strait,
depending on where it was hit.
Trevor Burrus, Jr.
SPEAKER_00 (15:50):
So the Iranian strategy seems to be two things.
One is horizontal escalation,meaning they ship drones or they
fire drones at other nations andallies of the U.S.
at Saudi Arabia, Oman, etcetera.
And the second is a sort of verysophisticated uh asymmetric
campaign.
(16:11):
If you were looking at this fromthe uh from the Iranian
perspective, is that enough todraw out the war so that
President Trump, thinking aboutthe midterm elections, decides
that the best thing to do isdeclare victory and go home?
Aaron Ross Powell, Jr.
SPEAKER_01 (16:27):
Well, certainly the Iranians will be very aware of
our electoral calendar and thedomestic pressures that are out
there, as well as pressures fromother Gulf countries, from
China, from Europe, and so on.
So I think that they they willhave thought through a lot of
this.
I think you've identified thestrategy that they are using,
(16:47):
and frankly, it seems plausiblebased on what we have seen so
far that the uh U.S.
administration and you know, andthis is why I'm sure Richard and
and others with whom you speak,we all talk about the importance
of having a clearly definedobjective.
What is the purpose?
What are we trying toaccomplish?
And if you don't clearlyidentify the strategic objective
(17:08):
before you go into a war orbefore you start using force,
then you can we know fromhistory that the enemy always
gets a vote, that things willnot go exactly as you had
imagined they would.
And if you don't have thatclearly defined instinct, then
you start trying to uh come upwith new policies or different
things, or you start bringing innew forces because you're having
to deal with a situation forwhich you were not prepared.
(17:31):
I don't believe that they didn'tthink about the strait being
closed.
I guarantee you that the Admiraland all the Central Command
staff, because that that's theirdaily life.
I mean, they stare at that.
They know that's a possibility.
I just think that there wasprobably some belief that, you
know, if we did this, you know,we bombed the hell out of them,
then they'll quit and there'llbe an uprising, and we'll have
(17:52):
another Venezuela type situationsomehow.
I don't think I certainly, I'mgonna say it differently.
I did not really appreciate theresilience of the IRGC and the
regime, whoever it is that'sactually in charge.
I don't think the former SupremeLeader was actually in charge.
I think it's more people insidethe uh Revolutionary Guards
(18:16):
Corps that are the ones,whoever's still left, and
they're operating on that kindof a concept.
SPEAKER_00 (18:22):
Right after the first Iraq war, one of the
generals or one of the toppeople in uh in the U.S.
Air Force said that the futureof the warfare was aerial, that
if you own the skies, you wouldeventually be successful.
We have not, obviously,committed ground troops.
What's your view of is this warwinnable just with you know air
(18:47):
superiority?
Aaron Ross Powell, Jr.
SPEAKER_01 (18:48):
Yeah, not not based on what I've seen so far.
And that's no reflection on ourpilots.
I mean, nobody loves air powermore than the U.S.
Army because we have alwaysbenefited for decades of having
our Navy, our Air Forcecontrolling the skies overhead,
and uh we never had to worryabout the enemy's ability to
attack our rear area or attackus from the air.
(19:11):
Until now, of course, droneshave have changed that.
I think uh you know, the ideathat you could that air power
will eventually solveeverybody's problem assumes that
everybody has the same problem.
When in fact, you know, the theenemy that we're dealing with
now is not the same enemy as theyou know when we invaded Iraq or
Afghanistan or or other places.
(19:32):
And so understanding the thenature of the conflict that
you're entering before you doit, that's kind of the first
duty of the diplomat as well asthe general.
And I think if we if we reallytruly understood how the
Iranians are reacting now, thenthe and the particularly their
leadership, what's left of theirleadership, I don't think you
(19:53):
could come ca you could come tothe conclusion that you could
just bomb them into submission.
SPEAKER_00 (19:58):
Aaron Powell My last podcast with Richard Haas, uh we
made the title of it, It TakesThree to Tango.
If you look at the from this orlook at this from the uh Israeli
perspective, how do you thinkthey've look at it and what are
they trying to achieve?
SPEAKER_01 (20:14):
Aaron Ross Powell So you know, the Israeli side, I I
have to believe that they seethis as an opportunational
opportunity, where Iran is asweak as it has been in decades.
And so you can imagine thattheir desire to eradicate the
threat uh of Iran's uh abilityto have a nuclear weapon to ever
(20:37):
really threaten Israel fordecades to come, as well as to
eliminate Iran's uh support forHezbollah and any other proxies.
So the temptation for theIsraelis has got to be do as
much as they possibly can aslong as the uh Americans are
willing to stay to continuedoing it.
I think that's that's a part ofit.
(20:58):
You know, there's a lot of a lotof people believe that uh Prime
Minister Netanyahu also does nothave uh an incentive to end the
war either, not only because ofthe popular support he's got.
It typically happens in Israel,regardless of how unpopular the
Prime Minister may be, ifthey're at war, almost everybody
supports it.
So he's able to uh address someof his domestic challenges as
(21:21):
long as they're bombing Iran oror Hezbollah.
What's interesting to me, I'mtrying to figure out at what
point do the American objectivesand the Israeli objectives begin
to separate.
I've spoken to two uh retiredsenior Israeli guys in the last
two weeks, and uh I got theimpression from them that they
believe that Prime MinisterNetanyahu would do whatever
(21:44):
President Trump said, that hewould quit when Trump said,
Okay, that's it.
That may be the case, but I Ican't tell yet if they if the
objectives are fully aligned.
SPEAKER_00 (21:54):
Yeah.
President Trump is vastly morepopular in Israel than in So in
theory, if Trump says no more,uh and BB's re-election campaign
really depends on, you know,being in sync with uh President
Trump, then it is it seems to mepossible that the Israelis will
(22:17):
stand down.
On the other hand, you know, asyou say, it's a
once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.
And I think they'll do everyeverything possible to keep the
war going.
Is that accurate?
SPEAKER_01 (22:28):
Yeah, I I think as long as they have the logistics
to continue doing that.
I mean, they give them credit.
They have launched thousands ofsorties, they have used an
enormous amount of ammunition,they've taken a lot of incoming
strikes from Iran.
So, I mean, there is a limitlogistically to what they can
do, but that they will have athey will have their finger on
(22:49):
that.
And so I just I just don't know,of course, where that is.
Gaza is still is not stillunfinished business.
Hezbollah, Houthis, so there's alot to be done.
I think that they're gonna,exactly as you said it, uh John,
is get rid of as much Iraniancapability as they possibly can,
and then they'll have to resumedoing the mowing the grass type
(23:11):
uh approach to to contain it,which I think is their forever
fate anyway.
SPEAKER_00 (23:16):
Aaron Powell One of the things that's come up is
that there would be a largespecial forces team that would
go in and get the material, thenuclear material in whatever
sites they think uh the nuclearmaterial is.
Is that realistic to put thoseboots on the ground, if you
will?
SPEAKER_01 (23:34):
Well, of course, as we have seen over the past
years, the our specialoperators, both the people who
fly them in and extract them,the ones who communicate for
them that support them, thewomen and men that do all this
are, I mean, it's unbelievablewhat they're able to do.
And of course, the intelligenceon which they rely is essential.
I'm gonna guess that uh theyhave for the longest time since
(23:57):
last summer have been trying topinpoint the location of where
do we think the enriched uraniummight be, whether it's in one
place or if it's beendistributed, hidden.
This is not gonna be a biggigantic semi-attractor trailer
with a sign on it.
I mean, it's gonna be difficultto find.
But I imagine they've beenlooking for it.
But of course, the Iranianswould know that either U.S.
(24:18):
or the Israelis or somebodywould be out there looking for
it.
And so this will be an extremelydangerous and and difficult
mission.
If it can be done, these are thepeople that that can do it.
But for me, the key would behaving the confidence of the
intelligence that you know whereit is and and what's protecting
it.
I think that'll be the key.
(24:39):
And that's ascertainable, if youwill, by DIA and CIA and Israeli
intelligence and I think youknow um we we have learned over
the last several months that thefrom public sour open sources,
how much the Israelis hadpenetrated the the Iranian side
and the government and IRGC andmilitary.
(25:00):
I mean, they really theincredible fidelity of
intelligence that they've had onuh Iran for over the past year,
which is what enabled so many uhsuccessful strikes.
As always, intelligence is neverone thing.
It's it's a combination ofsignals, human intelligence,
imagery, various other means ofdetecting what is you think is
(25:23):
out there, and then trying topick through all of this to form
a picture and and have a levelof confidence that you would be
willing to commit our specialoperators to to go in and get
that.
I think they they probably havebeen working on this for months
as a possibility.
So yes, it's feasible that theywould have some sense of where
it is, but the ones who arelooking for it would know that
(25:45):
the Iranians would be trying tomake it impossible for them to
find the President Trump, uh Iguess two weeks ago said that uh
the Iranians should surrenderand lay down their arms.
SPEAKER_00 (25:57):
The response to that was no way, and we expect
reparations, which is sort of aum hot button with the American
right wing.
Who who can if you look at thisfrom you know the point of view
of China, the Arab states in theGulf, is it possible, I guess,
(26:17):
to get them to commit a vast sumof money to help Iran rebuild in
return for uh their agreeing toa secession of the conflict?
SPEAKER_01 (26:28):
Yeah, that certainly is feasible.
I mean, uh the Iranian side,whoever actually is is in charge
will have an interest in numberone, staying in power and being
able to control theirpopulation.
But at some point they're gonnahave to generate income.
I mean, they're gonna have tohave financial resources to do
basic stuff.
And uh they were already indeep, deep trouble of water in
(26:50):
Tehran before this even started.
So, I mean, they're gonna haveto be able to do certain things.
And I could imagine that some ofthe enormous wealth that is in
the region could be used to helpfind a way towards a a
settlement where everybody'sable to declare some sort of
victory and you get things goingagain.
(27:12):
Yeah, you know, no nuclearweapons, no support for
terrorism, oil's allowed to go,so no disruption of that, all of
these kinds of things.
And the the loser in all ofthis, of course, are the Iranian
people, because their life isnot going to get any better.
They'll just be dealing with theaftermath, a lot of destruction
and probably some retributionfrom the whoever's still left in
(27:33):
charge.
But this because the war hasescalated horizontally, uh I
like your phrase, you know,you've got enormous damage
that's been done in Lebanon nowbecause the Israelis have really
gone after Hezbollah as a branchof this operation.
The the Gulf states, you know,that have been seen,
particularly the Emirates, as asafe, reliable place to put your
(27:55):
money, to get energy, even to goon holiday, you know, that their
reputation has been severelydamaged.
So they'll be they'll have aninterest in some sort of return
to normalcy if there is such athing, but also being able to
protect themselves in thefuture.
I can imagine the Chineseplaying a uh significant role
here because obviously, as allyour listeners know, that the
(28:17):
Chinese depend for much of theirenergy comes through the strait.
And with the president scheduledto go to Beijing here, I think
in two more weeks or so.
SPEAKER_00 (28:26):
That's right.
SPEAKER_01 (28:27):
If he still goes.
I guess last night he said hemay delay it.
SPEAKER_00 (28:31):
Right.
SPEAKER_01 (28:32):
So we'll see.
I mean that that's that's a afactor as well.
SPEAKER_00 (28:35):
So one thing uh as you point out, water is almost
as important as as uh oil andgas for existence, really, both
for Iran and for, say, SaudiArabia.
If the Iranians blow up uh thedesalinization capability that
they that they have in SaudiArabia and that provides I don't
(28:59):
know what it is, like eighty oreighty-five percent of their
water, if the Iranians blow thatup, then everybody in Rihad has
to leave because there will beno water.
And same sort of applies to thesame does apply uh to Iran.
If you bust up those two damsthat that bring the water to
(29:21):
Tehran, then everybody in uhTehran has to leave as well.
Is is that something that eitherside can really do, or is that
sort of the one place that noone will go?
SPEAKER_01 (29:33):
It's it's clear to me that both sides have the
capability to do it.
But uh you know, if you're i ifyou're in a war, you're you
should be thinking always whatum what objective am I trying to
accomplish and what do I want itto look like when this is all
over?
And so for the Iranians, is itgonna be better for them if
Saudi Arabia loses its water?
(29:55):
I mean, even though obviouslythe Saudis and the Iranians have
hated each other forever.
I mean that that's a differentkind of you do that, then it
creates a different sort of setof circumstances.
And and it I think that worksboth ways.
That's why the US, for thelongest time, has refrained from
attacking uh Carg Island,because you always needed that
(30:17):
everybody needed the oil thatthe Iranians pumped through that
place or shipped through thatplace, and you still need a
viable Iran when this is allsaid and done.
So there's been a they'verefrained.
Uh the Israelis, the US haverefrained from destroying the
oil infrastructure there.
So I think I would say the samething about the water.
(30:38):
Now, you know, these these areuh these are the Iranians are
they support for the mostheinous terrorist uh
organizations on the planet.
So it's not like they'd be outof pity for the poor Arabs, they
wouldn't do it.
But I think from a strategicstandpoint, do they really
benefit from doing that?
And I don't think so.
SPEAKER_00 (30:55):
You know Europe as as well as anyone, I guess.
How are the Europeans looking atall this?
What's their take, if you will?
SPEAKER_01 (31:04):
I think first of all, there's uh a recognition
that Iran has been the source ofproblems for pretty much
everybody over the past decades.
So there's a acknowledgementthat somehow we we had to do
something about Iran.
You couldn't just let it keepdoing what it was doing, partly
because of what they were doingto their own people, as well as
the work they were doing on on anuclear weapon or the belief
(31:27):
that they were doing that, andthen the constant combat against
Israel either directly orthrough proxies.
So European countries havealways been concerned about
that.
On the other hand, almost everyEuropean news source I read or
hear, or European with whom Ispeak, are very frustrated with
the United States right now thatuh the U.S.
would would start a war thatwould have knock on effect with
(31:50):
everybody else because of theshock to the oil and gas that
everybody else depends on.
And so they're not happy aboutthat, obviously.
And then for the president tosay, hey, you guys have got to
take part in uh opening thestreets up.
And they're like, wait a minute.
You've been you've been tellingus how terrible we are for the
past year.
You've insulted us, showndisdain for our soldiers who
(32:12):
served alongside your soldiersin Afghanistan, and now you you
want us to just send our Navy tohelp open the strait.
You know, you're not invited tothe party, but you're invited to
the cleanup.
I mean, that's kind of how it uhit looks.
And I think there's one otherthing that has really caused
frustration, and I think we, theU.S., we're going to end up
regretting this.
We've taken for granted that thebases we have in Europe, that we
(32:35):
could just kind of come and goand use them when and how we
want.
And all of these bases, whetherit's in UK or Spain or Italy or
Germany, Greece, Turkey, theseare all sovereign territory of
allies.
And I think the administrationhas taken for granted that we
could just do whatever we wantedin and from these bases.
And uh I think I don't know thatwe should be taking that for
(32:56):
granted.
SPEAKER_00 (32:57):
The last time we did a podcast, you said that, and
I'm asking you this questionbecause our largest uh uh group
of uh of subscribers to newsitems are, as it turns out,
Norwegian.
We have over 150 Norwegiansubscribers.
But the last time we did apodcast, you said that northern
(33:20):
Norway was vulnerable to aRussian attack.
Do you do you still hold thatview?
SPEAKER_01 (33:26):
I do.
It was a former Norwegian armychief.
I was talking to him when I wasstill in the army, and I said,
uh Odin, of of course his namewas Odin.
I said, Odin, what is the uhwhat's the most important
strategic part of Norway?
What do you worry about?
And he quickly drew like alittle cartoon map of
Scandinavia uh and the uh thehigh north, and then he drew a
(33:48):
circle around the top 10% ofNorway that that right there is
the part.
If the Russians ever got controlof that very northern part, it
would enable them tosignificantly affect shipping
through the from the Atlantic upinto the Arctic, and vice versa,
with long-range weapons, withair defense weapons, it would it
would change the strategicsituation in the Arctic.
(34:10):
And he said that's why they payso much attention to it up
there.
And of course, Norway hasSvalbard Islands, which are
several hundred kilometers northof the northern part of mainland
Norway, but this is Norwegianterritory.
And there's some sort of anagreement with the Russians that
they can be there, but it isNorwegian sovereign territory.
And of course, the Russians areconstantly pushing the limits of
(34:33):
what they're doing there.
And there are plenty ofindications that cables have
been cut going to Svalbart andinterference with the various
types of communicationsequipment that are up there.
So to me, this is a veryplausible scenario where the
Russians conducting gray zoneoperations might make an attempt
to even seize Svalbart, whichcould change the geometry of the
(34:56):
Arctic.
And uh now you're talking aboutsovereign territory of a NATO
ally being seized by theRussians, and the Russians then
daring us.
Would you really want to get ina nuclear war over this pile of
rock with a very tiny populationcalled Svalbard?
And and I think the Norwegiansrecognize that this is a a
vulnerability, and it's why thealliance is waking up to the
(35:18):
need for a coherent Arcticsecurity posture.
SPEAKER_00 (35:22):
General, we've I think taken up more than we
promised of your time.
But we thank you very much.
We will mention again your book,Future War in the Defense of
Europe.
And I guess are you're inFrankfurt, right?
SPEAKER_01 (35:36):
That's correct.
I live in Frankfurt, Germany.
I I stayed here after I retiredeight years ago.
SPEAKER_00 (35:41):
What caused you to stay there?
SPEAKER_01 (35:42):
My wife is German American and she's very
influential.
SPEAKER_00 (35:48):
You do what she says.
Anyway, thanks so much for yourtime, and uh we look forward to
talking to you again.
SPEAKER_01 (35:55):
Thanks to you and Dale.
I appreciate the the privilege.
Hello and welcome back to the News Items Podcast.
I'm John Ellis.
I'm the founder and editor oftwo Substack newsletters.
One is called News Items, theother is called Political News
Items.
You can find them both atnews-items.com.
We have a new website, so weencourage you to go there.
(00:20):
It's a lot of work, but it's alot of fun.
Our guest today is LieutenantGeneral Ben Hodges, who is now
retired.
He's the former commandinggeneral of U.S.
Army Europe.
He now consults for severalcompanies on Europe, NATO, and
the European Union.
He is co-author of a great bookcalled Future War and the
Defense of Europe, which waspublished by the Oxford
(00:42):
University Press.
General, thank you very much forjoining us today.
SPEAKER_01 (00:46):
Well, John, thank you.
And thanks for this privilege.
Of course, I read new news itemsevery day when it comes out.
You know, lots of people puttogether articles, but the ones
you always do seem to be uh themost relevant and the best in
the qualities, which is why Iagreed to do this, of course.
So this book, Future War in theDefense of Europe, is the first
(01:07):
book project uh of which I wasever a part.
And thankfully, my co-authors,Professor Julian Lindley French,
who's British, and then GeneralJohn Allen, who you and your
audience will know are retiredMarine Four star.
That was a writing team.
And Julian, who had writtenseveral books before, he really
guided us.
And my role was to help make itAmerican and to offer, you know,
(01:30):
useful army sort of land warfareinsights to the work.
But just to make sure Juliandeserves the lion's share of the
credit, I learned so much in thein the writing of this book, it
was much harder.
There was more to it than I'dever imagined, both the actual
research and the writing and thegoing through the whole
editorial process, but alsofinding uh publishers.
(01:52):
I mean, this book was publishedafter Russia had invaded Ukraine
in 2014 before the large-scaleinvasion.
So just not a lot of interest indigging into defense topics.
So it was a different time.
SPEAKER_00 (02:07):
I wanted to ask you about the status of the Ukraine
war.
Obviously, the Ukrainians havefought gallantly and with
extraordinary uh, I guess,innovation.
Where do you think we are?
Where do you think it stands?
SPEAKER_01 (02:20):
I am convinced there's no way that Russia can
defeat Ukraine.
I mean, it's just not going tohappen.
This this war started in 2014.
So here we are after 12 yearswith Russia having every
advantage.
Uh, they still only controlabout 20% of Ukraine, well over
a million casualties, enormousexpenditure, and um with really
(02:40):
not too much to show for it.
Now, clearly, Ukraine alsocannot knock Russia out of the
war.
I think we missed ouropportunity to do that a couple
of years ago by failing to evenmake that an objective.
So we're at a situation nowwhere uh the Ukrainians have
figured out how to stop Russianland forces, and I don't see
anything coming that would giveme reason to think that that
(03:02):
will change, that Russia willsomehow eventually overpower or
break through Ukrainiandefenses.
Uh it's just not going tohappen.
On the other hand, the uhRussians are continuing their
onslaught every night withdrones and missiles against
civilian targets all overUkraine.
The power grid, of course, is abig part of that, but it's also,
(03:23):
you know, apartment buildingsand schools and hospitals and
where people live.
That's what they're targeting.
It's the it's the modernequivalent of strategic bombing
that you know we did in WorldWar II, we did it in Vietnam, we
did it in other places, othernations have tried it, and it
never works.
It never breaks the will of apopulation, and that's what's
(03:44):
happening with Ukraine.
Even though I I spoke to aUkrainian friend of mine a few
weeks ago who's in who's in thearmy, we've known each other for
many years.
I said, Well, how's your family?
He said, Well, they're they'reliving in Kyiv, my wife and
daughter, it's you know sevendegrees in their apartment.
And uh he said, but it'll bespring in just a few more weeks.
So I mean that's the that's theattitude of Ukrainians.
(04:05):
Now, another domain of the war,of course, is the uh maritime
domain, and here the Ukrainianshave completely stopped the
Russians.
The Russian Navy, the greatBlack Sea fleet, is is hardly a
factor.
They've been chased out of theirbase in Sevastopol.
They just are not able tooperate in any way that
contributes to Russian success.
And then this is by Ukraine thatdoesn't have a Navy in the
(04:28):
traditional sense, you know,with surface warfare and all
that.
It's mostly maritime drones andlong-range anti-ship missiles.
And then finally, the I don'twant to overstate Ukraine's
capability.
I mean, obviously they havemanpower challenges, they have
financial challenges, but itseems to me that they have
developed or discovered a pathto victory, which would be the
(04:50):
destruction of Russia's abilityto export oil and gas.
And that's a combination ofstrikes against the uh
refineries uh as they developmore and more long-range
precision capability that canreach that far.
If Europe and the United Statesand others would stop the Shadow
Fleet vessels that are carryingoil, Russian oil, out of the
Baltic Sea and the Black Sea,then I think the Russians'
(05:13):
economy and their ability tocontinue the war would come to a
screeching halt pretty quick.
SPEAKER_00 (05:18):
Is the the fact that we have running down, I guess,
uh munitions, uh you might say,does that make Ukraine more
vulnerable, I guess, uh toRussia?
Or does their unbelievableinnovation in drone warfare uh
make not you know leaves that tobe not too much of uh
difference?
SPEAKER_01 (05:39):
Aaron Ross Powell, it it certainly doesn't help
Ukraine that uh we are are goingthrough so much of our air and
missile defense capability, themunitions, that sort of thing,
long-range precision strike.
But the fact is, over the pastyear, the current administration
had significantly reduced whatit was actually providing to
Ukraine, even reducing what itwas selling to European
(06:00):
countries to give to Ukraine.
So there's just not as muchleft, whatever, however, it gets
to them.
So this is this is the timewhere Ukrainians, but also
European countries who recognizethat for them, Iran is not their
priority, but helping Ukraine istheir priority to help fill in
the gap somewhat.
Now, nobody can nobody else canmake patriot, but there are
(06:22):
other weapon systems that can bemade, produced and provided to
Ukraine, and also investing inUkrainian defense industry.
You've nailed it, theirinnovation, their ability to to
test, their willingness to testand do new things is, I think,
unsurpassed, but they're not yetwhere they can produce it to
scale, to make the quantities ofwhat's needed to really have
(06:44):
that decisive effect.
And so I think here's whereEuropean countries and European
companies could invest inUkraine as well as providing to
them what's needed.
So it doesn't help, but it it'snot I don't I don't think this
is going to doom Ukraine.
Quite the opposite.
SPEAKER_00 (07:02):
Can Putin do a deal ceasefire?
Is that really possible givenhis status at home?
If he does a ceasefire, I thinkuh he has to say to the, you
know, the Russian right, so tospeak, that it's only for a time
and he'll restart the war uh,you know, uh after a quote
(07:24):
decent interval.
Is that is your sense that Putinnecessarily has to continue the
war?
Because otherwise it'll createsort of an existential threat to
him?
SPEAKER_01 (07:34):
So it's a very good point and uh an important one.
He has no incentive to stop.
I mean, clearly he's notaffected by casualties, and the
Russians are still looking forpotential bodies to put into the
armed forces to continue whatthey're doing to try and wear
down the Ukrainians and tomaintain this narrative somehow
that unfortunately the the U.S.
(07:56):
administration um has acceptedthat Russian victory is
inevitable.
So he has no incentive to stop,especially if he sees that the
American president is not reallygonna put serious pressure on
him, and if he if he thinks thatthe Europeans are not really
willing to do what's necessaryto help Ukraine see this
through.
As long as he believes that,then I think he's gonna
(08:18):
continue.
What would cause him torecalculate would be the
destruction or significantdegradation of his oil and gas
exports.
If he can't do that anymore,then it does really become a
problem.
This so-called war economy thatthey're doing, it is
artificially propped up and theyare using all of their
(08:38):
resources.
And so there's an it's not aneconomy that the population, I
think, is willing to put upwith.
I know I hear this mythologythat Russians can suffer more
than anybody.
And it's true they have suffereda lot, but it's because that's
all they've ever had from thetime of the czars.
It's not like they had to theymade a big choice to give up a
lot for the army.
(08:58):
It's the opposite.
So I think another disincentivethat Putin has to end this war
is that if they haven't carriedaccomplished all the objectives
he set out and talked about thatwere so important for Mother
Russia, then he's gonna have amillion unhappy veterans
returning home to an economythat is in shambles.
(09:19):
It'll be a mess.
And uh you're talking aboutpeople who will have been
through terrible, nightmarishcombat situations.
And uh, you know, the Russianarmy is not famous for having a
deep concern about the welfareof their troops.
And so I think he doesn't wantto have that.
So there's another disincentiveto keep this going.
So until either the UnitedStates and or Europe does what's
(09:43):
necessary to really stop Putin'sability to continue fighting the
war, then I think this can thiswill continue certainly
throughout the rest of 2026 andon into 27.
SPEAKER_00 (09:55):
One of the new narratives is that the Iran war
or really the shutting down ofthe strait of or moves,
obviously it has raised theprice of oil and gas, and
everybody says that this is uhbonanza for Mr.
Putin.
Is is that true?
Is that uh you know actuallytrue?
SPEAKER_01 (10:17):
It certainly is true.
And I think from a purelyfinancial standpoint, it's a
bonanza for him.
I mean, I've seen differentestimates about how many
hundreds of millions of uhdollars have already gone into
uh Russian coffers as a resultof this ability to export more
oil.
Now, I'm anxious to see if theadministration follows through
(10:40):
on what they said, and after 30days, the amount of time that
Treasury Secretary Bessant saidum that this the sanctions would
be lifted, do they go back ineffect at the 30-day mark?
I think this will be importantto watch.
I have to say, unfortunately,I'm skeptical that they will
actually put those back intoeffect.
(11:01):
And this, of course, has reallyannoyed the Europeans because
the Europeans have been notperfect, but they have sanctions
in place.
And so here's the American sidenow relieving sanctions on the
Russians.
And this is a dream for theRussians.
Their dream has always been toput a wedge between the United
States and Europe, but to breakapart NATO.
(11:21):
And so these are the kind ofthings that contribute to the
erosion of that cohesion that isso important.
And it's an objective of theRussians, and we're doing it for
them.
SPEAKER_00 (11:30):
There was uh you know, the Strait of Hormuz, you
know, it says that it's 20 mileswide, but actually uh it's sort
of a dredged canal, probably amile wide, and if you have
tankers going through there, youcan't have them passing each
other.
You have to go up uh in thecanal, so to speak.
(11:51):
Do you think it's feasible thatan armada from President uh
Trump said yesterday that Europehad to provide ships for opening
up the strait?
Is that is that a feasiblething?
Can you actually open thestrait?
SPEAKER_01 (12:06):
This this is a difficult question because it's
not just yes or no.
As long as the Iranians retainthe ability to either put mines
out there frequently oroccasionally, and as long as
they retain some sort of abilityto launch drones that could
strike uh a tanker, then youwon't you really can't say that
the strait strait is open.
(12:28):
I think that the the historicalexample I think of, and
historical examples are notalways great, but I think about
the Gallipoli campaign in theFirst World War, where the
Allies, you know, were theBritish and the French believed
that if they just sailed theirfleet up the Dardanelles, it
would appear opposite uhStambul, and the Ottoman Empire
(12:48):
would collapse, and that wouldknock the Ottomans out of the
war.
Well, of course, uh the Ottomanshad very well prepared shore
batteries along both sides ofthe Dardanelle, and which comes
from the Aegean up through thetowards Stambul and the
direction of the Black Sea.
And they also had naval mines.
So you had intrepid Ottomansailors were able to get out
(13:10):
there and put mines in the waterthat sank at least three
different ships of the combinedAllied fleet, and the Allies
realized, okay, now we've got uswe've got to secure the land if
we're gonna do this, and thusstarted the Gallipoli campaign,
which of course was a disasterthat lasted about a year.
That doesn't mean it will alwaysbe a disaster, but it's a
challenge.
And so you're talking abouthaving to secure the Iranian
(13:33):
side of the strait so that theycan't have small boats bringing
mines out there or launch dronesfrom inside Iran.
And I think you could do some ofthis with uh you know to have
what General McChrystal calledthe unblinking eye, constant
surveillance, looking for everytime they saw a vessel going out
there, but this would becomevery, very manpower intensive
(13:56):
very quickly, in my view, aslong as the Iranians believed
that they could stop one or twoof these tankers, and as long as
the insurance companies believedthat that threat was still
there, and and the captains ofthe tankers believed it, this
would be a challenge.
Yeah.
SPEAKER_00 (14:10):
I I mean one thing I think about is if you had if you
were able to hit a tanker and itcaught fire and you know, leaked
oil or dumped oil into thestrait, you could send somebody
out in the speedboat andessentially have a cigarette
lighter and set the whole thingon fire, right?
SPEAKER_01 (14:29):
Well, uh certainly the Iranians have been preparing
this for for decades, just likeour great Navy has been thinking
through the challenges of whatwould you do?
And you know, the differenttypes of sea mines, as we're all
learning about now.
You've got some.
The one the popular image frommovies is the big round ball
with the spikes on it that youcan see on the surface.
(14:50):
But then you've got others thatare tethered to an anchor of
some sort on the bottom that arebelow the surface, and then
you've got some that literallylay on the surface, on the bed
of the strait, and then you'vegot other types of weapons that
could be employed.
And the reporting I've seen fromDefense Intelligence Agency was
that they had about 6,000different types of mines.
(15:14):
I don't know how many havealready been destroyed.
I would imagine that our Navyhas been looking diligently for
these things, the boats as wellas the actual mines themselves.
So I think if you if you'rewilling to apply enough
resources to it and you and youhave the time, then eventually
our great Navy and other forceswill be able to do it.
But then you've you still got toprevent the Iranians from
(15:37):
launching drones against atanker that especially one I
could imagine that would beparticularly combustible, and
what a massive problem thatwould create in the strait,
depending on where it was hit.
Trevor Burrus, Jr.
SPEAKER_00 (15:50):
So the Iranian strategy seems to be two things.
One is horizontal escalation,meaning they ship drones or they
fire drones at other nations andallies of the U.S.
at Saudi Arabia, Oman, etcetera.
And the second is a sort of verysophisticated uh asymmetric
campaign.
(16:11):
If you were looking at this fromthe uh from the Iranian
perspective, is that enough todraw out the war so that
President Trump, thinking aboutthe midterm elections, decides
that the best thing to do isdeclare victory and go home?
Aaron Ross Powell, Jr.
SPEAKER_01 (16:27):
Well, certainly the Iranians will be very aware of
our electoral calendar and thedomestic pressures that are out
there, as well as pressures fromother Gulf countries, from
China, from Europe, and so on.
So I think that they they willhave thought through a lot of
this.
I think you've identified thestrategy that they are using,
(16:47):
and frankly, it seems plausiblebased on what we have seen so
far that the uh U.S.
administration and you know, andthis is why I'm sure Richard and
and others with whom you speak,we all talk about the importance
of having a clearly definedobjective.
What is the purpose?
What are we trying toaccomplish?
And if you don't clearlyidentify the strategic objective
(17:08):
before you go into a war orbefore you start using force,
then you can we know fromhistory that the enemy always
gets a vote, that things willnot go exactly as you had
imagined they would.
And if you don't have thatclearly defined instinct, then
you start trying to uh come upwith new policies or different
things, or you start bringing innew forces because you're having
to deal with a situation forwhich you were not prepared.
(17:31):
I don't believe that they didn'tthink about the strait being
closed.
I guarantee you that the Admiraland all the Central Command
staff, because that that's theirdaily life.
I mean, they stare at that.
They know that's a possibility.
I just think that there wasprobably some belief that, you
know, if we did this, you know,we bombed the hell out of them,
then they'll quit and there'llbe an uprising, and we'll have
(17:52):
another Venezuela type situationsomehow.
I don't think I certainly, I'mgonna say it differently.
I did not really appreciate theresilience of the IRGC and the
regime, whoever it is that'sactually in charge.
I don't think the former SupremeLeader was actually in charge.
I think it's more people insidethe uh Revolutionary Guards
(18:16):
Corps that are the ones,whoever's still left, and
they're operating on that kindof a concept.
SPEAKER_00 (18:22):
Right after the first Iraq war, one of the
generals or one of the toppeople in uh in the U.S.
Air Force said that the futureof the warfare was aerial, that
if you own the skies, you wouldeventually be successful.
We have not, obviously,committed ground troops.
What's your view of is this warwinnable just with you know air
(18:47):
superiority?
Aaron Ross Powell, Jr.
SPEAKER_01 (18:48):
Yeah, not not based on what I've seen so far.
And that's no reflection on ourpilots.
I mean, nobody loves air powermore than the U.S.
Army because we have alwaysbenefited for decades of having
our Navy, our Air Forcecontrolling the skies overhead,
and uh we never had to worryabout the enemy's ability to
attack our rear area or attackus from the air.
(19:11):
Until now, of course, droneshave have changed that.
I think uh you know, the ideathat you could that air power
will eventually solveeverybody's problem assumes that
everybody has the same problem.
When in fact, you know, the theenemy that we're dealing with
now is not the same enemy as theyou know when we invaded Iraq or
Afghanistan or or other places.
(19:32):
And so understanding the thenature of the conflict that
you're entering before you doit, that's kind of the first
duty of the diplomat as well asthe general.
And I think if we if we reallytruly understood how the
Iranians are reacting now, thenthe and the particularly their
leadership, what's left of theirleadership, I don't think you
(19:53):
could come ca you could come tothe conclusion that you could
just bomb them into submission.
SPEAKER_00 (19:58):
Aaron Powell My last podcast with Richard Haas, uh we
made the title of it, It TakesThree to Tango.
If you look at the from this orlook at this from the uh Israeli
perspective, how do you thinkthey've look at it and what are
they trying to achieve?
SPEAKER_01 (20:14):
Aaron Ross Powell So you know, the Israeli side, I I
have to believe that they seethis as an opportunational
opportunity, where Iran is asweak as it has been in decades.
And so you can imagine thattheir desire to eradicate the
threat uh of Iran's uh abilityto have a nuclear weapon to ever
(20:37):
really threaten Israel fordecades to come, as well as to
eliminate Iran's uh support forHezbollah and any other proxies.
So the temptation for theIsraelis has got to be do as
much as they possibly can aslong as the uh Americans are
willing to stay to continuedoing it.
I think that's that's a part ofit.
(20:58):
You know, there's a lot of a lotof people believe that uh Prime
Minister Netanyahu also does nothave uh an incentive to end the
war either, not only because ofthe popular support he's got.
It typically happens in Israel,regardless of how unpopular the
Prime Minister may be, ifthey're at war, almost everybody
supports it.
So he's able to uh address someof his domestic challenges as
(21:21):
long as they're bombing Iran oror Hezbollah.
What's interesting to me, I'mtrying to figure out at what
point do the American objectivesand the Israeli objectives begin
to separate.
I've spoken to two uh retiredsenior Israeli guys in the last
two weeks, and uh I got theimpression from them that they
believe that Prime MinisterNetanyahu would do whatever
(21:44):
President Trump said, that hewould quit when Trump said,
Okay, that's it.
That may be the case, but I Ican't tell yet if they if the
objectives are fully aligned.
SPEAKER_00 (21:54):
Yeah.
President Trump is vastly morepopular in Israel than in So in
theory, if Trump says no more,uh and BB's re-election campaign
really depends on, you know,being in sync with uh President
Trump, then it is it seems to mepossible that the Israelis will
(22:17):
stand down.
On the other hand, you know, asyou say, it's a
once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.
And I think they'll do everyeverything possible to keep the
war going.
Is that accurate?
SPEAKER_01 (22:28):
Yeah, I I think as long as they have the logistics
to continue doing that.
I mean, they give them credit.
They have launched thousands ofsorties, they have used an
enormous amount of ammunition,they've taken a lot of incoming
strikes from Iran.
So, I mean, there is a limitlogistically to what they can
do, but that they will have athey will have their finger on
(22:49):
that.
And so I just I just don't know,of course, where that is.
Gaza is still is not stillunfinished business.
Hezbollah, Houthis, so there's alot to be done.
I think that they're gonna,exactly as you said it, uh John,
is get rid of as much Iraniancapability as they possibly can,
and then they'll have to resumedoing the mowing the grass type
(23:11):
uh approach to to contain it,which I think is their forever
fate anyway.
SPEAKER_00 (23:16):
Aaron Powell One of the things that's come up is
that there would be a largespecial forces team that would
go in and get the material, thenuclear material in whatever
sites they think uh the nuclearmaterial is.
Is that realistic to put thoseboots on the ground, if you
will?
SPEAKER_01 (23:34):
Well, of course, as we have seen over the past
years, the our specialoperators, both the people who
fly them in and extract them,the ones who communicate for
them that support them, thewomen and men that do all this
are, I mean, it's unbelievablewhat they're able to do.
And of course, the intelligenceon which they rely is essential.
I'm gonna guess that uh theyhave for the longest time since
(23:57):
last summer have been trying topinpoint the location of where
do we think the enriched uraniummight be, whether it's in one
place or if it's beendistributed, hidden.
This is not gonna be a biggigantic semi-attractor trailer
with a sign on it.
I mean, it's gonna be difficultto find.
But I imagine they've beenlooking for it.
But of course, the Iranianswould know that either U.S.
(24:18):
or the Israelis or somebodywould be out there looking for
it.
And so this will be an extremelydangerous and and difficult
mission.
If it can be done, these are thepeople that that can do it.
But for me, the key would behaving the confidence of the
intelligence that you know whereit is and and what's protecting
it.
I think that'll be the key.
(24:39):
And that's ascertainable, if youwill, by DIA and CIA and Israeli
intelligence and I think youknow um we we have learned over
the last several months that thefrom public sour open sources,
how much the Israelis hadpenetrated the the Iranian side
and the government and IRGC andmilitary.
(25:00):
I mean, they really theincredible fidelity of
intelligence that they've had onuh Iran for over the past year,
which is what enabled so many uhsuccessful strikes.
As always, intelligence is neverone thing.
It's it's a combination ofsignals, human intelligence,
imagery, various other means ofdetecting what is you think is
(25:23):
out there, and then trying topick through all of this to form
a picture and and have a levelof confidence that you would be
willing to commit our specialoperators to to go in and get
that.
I think they they probably havebeen working on this for months
as a possibility.
So yes, it's feasible that theywould have some sense of where
it is, but the ones who arelooking for it would know that
(25:45):
the Iranians would be trying tomake it impossible for them to
find the President Trump, uh Iguess two weeks ago said that uh
the Iranians should surrenderand lay down their arms.
SPEAKER_00 (25:57):
The response to that was no way, and we expect
reparations, which is sort of aum hot button with the American
right wing.
Who who can if you look at thisfrom you know the point of view
of China, the Arab states in theGulf, is it possible, I guess,
(26:17):
to get them to commit a vast sumof money to help Iran rebuild in
return for uh their agreeing toa secession of the conflict?
SPEAKER_01 (26:28):
Yeah, that certainly is feasible.
I mean, uh the Iranian side,whoever actually is is in charge
will have an interest in numberone, staying in power and being
able to control theirpopulation.
But at some point they're gonnahave to generate income.
I mean, they're gonna have tohave financial resources to do
basic stuff.
And uh they were already indeep, deep trouble of water in
(26:50):
Tehran before this even started.
So, I mean, they're gonna haveto be able to do certain things.
And I could imagine that some ofthe enormous wealth that is in
the region could be used to helpfind a way towards a a
settlement where everybody'sable to declare some sort of
victory and you get things goingagain.
(27:12):
Yeah, you know, no nuclearweapons, no support for
terrorism, oil's allowed to go,so no disruption of that, all of
these kinds of things.
And the the loser in all ofthis, of course, are the Iranian
people, because their life isnot going to get any better.
They'll just be dealing with theaftermath, a lot of destruction
and probably some retributionfrom the whoever's still left in
(27:33):
charge.
But this because the war hasescalated horizontally, uh I
like your phrase, you know,you've got enormous damage
that's been done in Lebanon nowbecause the Israelis have really
gone after Hezbollah as a branchof this operation.
The the Gulf states, you know,that have been seen,
particularly the Emirates, as asafe, reliable place to put your
(27:55):
money, to get energy, even to goon holiday, you know, that their
reputation has been severelydamaged.
So they'll be they'll have aninterest in some sort of return
to normalcy if there is such athing, but also being able to
protect themselves in thefuture.
I can imagine the Chineseplaying a uh significant role
here because obviously, as allyour listeners know, that the
(28:17):
Chinese depend for much of theirenergy comes through the strait.
And with the president scheduledto go to Beijing here, I think
in two more weeks or so.
SPEAKER_00 (28:26):
That's right.
SPEAKER_01 (28:27):
If he still goes.
I guess last night he said hemay delay it.
SPEAKER_00 (28:31):
Right.
SPEAKER_01 (28:32):
So we'll see.
I mean that that's that's a afactor as well.
SPEAKER_00 (28:35):
So one thing uh as you point out, water is almost
as important as as uh oil andgas for existence, really, both
for Iran and for, say, SaudiArabia.
If the Iranians blow up uh thedesalinization capability that
they that they have in SaudiArabia and that provides I don't
(28:59):
know what it is, like eighty oreighty-five percent of their
water, if the Iranians blow thatup, then everybody in Rihad has
to leave because there will beno water.
And same sort of applies to thesame does apply uh to Iran.
If you bust up those two damsthat that bring the water to
(29:21):
Tehran, then everybody in uhTehran has to leave as well.
Is is that something that eitherside can really do, or is that
sort of the one place that noone will go?
SPEAKER_01 (29:33):
It's it's clear to me that both sides have the
capability to do it.
But uh you know, if you're i ifyou're in a war, you're you
should be thinking always whatum what objective am I trying to
accomplish and what do I want itto look like when this is all
over?
And so for the Iranians, is itgonna be better for them if
Saudi Arabia loses its water?
(29:55):
I mean, even though obviouslythe Saudis and the Iranians have
hated each other forever.
I mean that that's a differentkind of you do that, then it
creates a different sort of setof circumstances.
And and it I think that worksboth ways.
That's why the US, for thelongest time, has refrained from
attacking uh Carg Island,because you always needed that
(30:17):
everybody needed the oil thatthe Iranians pumped through that
place or shipped through thatplace, and you still need a
viable Iran when this is allsaid and done.
So there's been a they'verefrained.
Uh the Israelis, the US haverefrained from destroying the
oil infrastructure there.
So I think I would say the samething about the water.
(30:38):
Now, you know, these these areuh these are the Iranians are
they support for the mostheinous terrorist uh
organizations on the planet.
So it's not like they'd be outof pity for the poor Arabs, they
wouldn't do it.
But I think from a strategicstandpoint, do they really
benefit from doing that?
And I don't think so.
SPEAKER_00 (30:55):
You know Europe as as well as anyone, I guess.
How are the Europeans looking atall this?
What's their take, if you will?
SPEAKER_01 (31:04):
I think first of all, there's uh a recognition
that Iran has been the source ofproblems for pretty much
everybody over the past decades.
So there's a acknowledgementthat somehow we we had to do
something about Iran.
You couldn't just let it keepdoing what it was doing, partly
because of what they were doingto their own people, as well as
the work they were doing on on anuclear weapon or the belief
(31:27):
that they were doing that, andthen the constant combat against
Israel either directly orthrough proxies.
So European countries havealways been concerned about
that.
On the other hand, almost everyEuropean news source I read or
hear, or European with whom Ispeak, are very frustrated with
the United States right now thatuh the U.S.
would would start a war thatwould have knock on effect with
(31:50):
everybody else because of theshock to the oil and gas that
everybody else depends on.
And so they're not happy aboutthat, obviously.
And then for the president tosay, hey, you guys have got to
take part in uh opening thestreets up.
And they're like, wait a minute.
You've been you've been tellingus how terrible we are for the
past year.
You've insulted us, showndisdain for our soldiers who
(32:12):
served alongside your soldiersin Afghanistan, and now you you
want us to just send our Navy tohelp open the strait.
You know, you're not invited tothe party, but you're invited to
the cleanup.
I mean, that's kind of how it uhit looks.
And I think there's one otherthing that has really caused
frustration, and I think we, theU.S., we're going to end up
regretting this.
We've taken for granted that thebases we have in Europe, that we
(32:35):
could just kind of come and goand use them when and how we
want.
And all of these bases, whetherit's in UK or Spain or Italy or
Germany, Greece, Turkey, theseare all sovereign territory of
allies.
And I think the administrationhas taken for granted that we
could just do whatever we wantedin and from these bases.
And uh I think I don't know thatwe should be taking that for
(32:56):
granted.
SPEAKER_00 (32:57):
The last time we did a podcast, you said that, and
I'm asking you this questionbecause our largest uh uh group
of uh of subscribers to newsitems are, as it turns out,
Norwegian.
We have over 150 Norwegiansubscribers.
But the last time we did apodcast, you said that northern
(33:20):
Norway was vulnerable to aRussian attack.
Do you do you still hold thatview?
SPEAKER_01 (33:26):
I do.
It was a former Norwegian armychief.
I was talking to him when I wasstill in the army, and I said,
uh Odin, of of course his namewas Odin.
I said, Odin, what is the uhwhat's the most important
strategic part of Norway?
What do you worry about?
And he quickly drew like alittle cartoon map of
Scandinavia uh and the uh thehigh north, and then he drew a
(33:48):
circle around the top 10% ofNorway that that right there is
the part.
If the Russians ever got controlof that very northern part, it
would enable them tosignificantly affect shipping
through the from the Atlantic upinto the Arctic, and vice versa,
with long-range weapons, withair defense weapons, it would it
would change the strategicsituation in the Arctic.
(34:10):
And he said that's why they payso much attention to it up
there.
And of course, Norway hasSvalbard Islands, which are
several hundred kilometers northof the northern part of mainland
Norway, but this is Norwegianterritory.
And there's some sort of anagreement with the Russians that
they can be there, but it isNorwegian sovereign territory.
And of course, the Russians areconstantly pushing the limits of
(34:33):
what they're doing there.
And there are plenty ofindications that cables have
been cut going to Svalbart andinterference with the various
types of communicationsequipment that are up there.
So to me, this is a veryplausible scenario where the
Russians conducting gray zoneoperations might make an attempt
to even seize Svalbart, whichcould change the geometry of the
(34:56):
Arctic.
And uh now you're talking aboutsovereign territory of a NATO
ally being seized by theRussians, and the Russians then
daring us.
Would you really want to get ina nuclear war over this pile of
rock with a very tiny populationcalled Svalbard?
And and I think the Norwegiansrecognize that this is a a
vulnerability, and it's why thealliance is waking up to the
(35:18):
need for a coherent Arcticsecurity posture.
SPEAKER_00 (35:22):
General, we've I think taken up more than we
promised of your time.
But we thank you very much.
We will mention again your book,Future War in the Defense of
Europe.
And I guess are you're inFrankfurt, right?
SPEAKER_01 (35:36):
That's correct.
I live in Frankfurt, Germany.
I I stayed here after I retiredeight years ago.
SPEAKER_00 (35:41):
What caused you to stay there?
SPEAKER_01 (35:42):
My wife is German American and she's very
influential.
SPEAKER_00 (35:48):
You do what she says.
Anyway, thanks so much for yourtime, and uh we look forward to
talking to you again.
SPEAKER_01 (35:55):
Thanks to you and Dale.
I appreciate the the privilege.
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