November 26, 2025 • 50 mins
After three years of war, could a Ukraine peace plan really be within reach? In this episode of TrumpWorld, we break down President Trump’s controversial 28-point peace proposal and the shockwaves it’s sending through Kyiv, Europe and Moscow. We look closely at the security guarantees being floated, but at what cost for Ukraine? And will the new revelations from Witkoff’s Ukraine leaks jeopardise progress?
Matt Frei also speaks with Fiona Hill, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and former senior director for European and Russian affairs on the U.S. National Security Council during Trump’s first term. She explains why, in her view, this peace plan is still entirely beholden to Putin’s demands.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
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(00:00):
If you put all that together, you know the the impatience of
Trump, the need to get his bloody Nobel Peace Prize, you
know, the OK genuine desire to stop the killing, the
transactional nature of diplomacy, the weakness of of
Ukraine after almost four years of war, and Russia not really
giving an inch on its red lines.All that I have to say doesn't
(00:20):
spell anything positive for the future of Ukraine, but also
possibly Europe. Hello, and welcome to Trump
WORLD. I'm Matt Fry in London, and
happy Thanksgiving. Now, Anushka isn't with us this
week. She's celebrating Thanksgiving.
She's getting ready for the big Turkey meal at home.
(00:41):
So I'm very happy to say that sitting in her place, we have
Lindsay Hilsum, our international editor.
Lindsay, welcome to Trump WORLD.Thank you very much.
It's a joy to be here. And a joy to have you.
And so much to discuss, especially when it comes to
America, Europe and Ukraine. Now strange things have been
going on in the last week. We had, you know, the leaked 28
(01:02):
point plan that was loved by theRussians but rejected by the
Ukrainians and by the Europeans.Now we've got AI think is at a
19 or 20 point plan, which is a slightly different version.
We'll go into the mechanics of all that, but everyday stuff is
coming out and we'll try and, you know, give you the bigger
picture. When we talk to Fiona Hill later
in the programme, she of course was one of the most senior
(01:24):
advisors on Ukraine, Europe and Russia in three successive
administrations. Bush, Obama and Trump won.
So you'll hear that conversationlater on.
But let's first of all unpack the the latest developments,
which was this extraordinary leak on Bloomberg about a
conversation between Steve Witkopf, Trump's envoy to
everywhere and everything, and Yuri Ushakov, who is Putin's
(01:48):
kind of senior foreign policy adviser.
Lindsay, tell us about this leak.
What does it say? Well, what's extraordinary is
first there's a very sort of chummy chit chat sort of feeling
about it. And then what Witkoff does is he
advises Ushikov on how to deal with Trump, that basically he
and his boss, Mr. Putin, should show their respect to President
(02:11):
Trump as a man of peace. And so basically, he's telling
him how to butter up and and splatter Trump.
And then there's the other extraordinary business.
He says, well, you know, I know that Donetsk and the land swap
is going to be in there somewhere.
Well, hang on, this is not a real estate deal, Steve.
This is something different. And the idea that he should be
(02:33):
advising the Russians or saying to them, yeah, yeah, it's going
to be this thing where you give it, where the Ukrainians have to
give away Donetsk. No, hang on.
That is not what the Ukrainians are going to have to do.
That is an issue to be negotiated.
And the other thing is that he suggested that Trump and Putin
(02:54):
should have a call before Trump met Zelensky.
And we all know that when Trump talks to Putin before meeting
Zelensky, what he comes out with, he's he's very, you know,
open to what Putin says. And he just sort of comes out
with all the the Russian talkingpoints.
And so I think you have to put all this in the context of when
(03:15):
Steve Witkoff, do you remember when Steve Witkoff first met
Putin, he didn't actually botherto have the State Department
translator. He used the Kremlin translator
as if that, you know, wasn't an issue.
And whatever Steve Witkov is, heis not a Kremlinologist.
He doesn't seem to understand that the Russians will have very
(03:38):
detailed personality profiles oneverybody involved.
He doesn't seem to have talked to other people who've
negotiated with the Russians. Well, I have, and I know, you
know, and you know how incredibly detailed the Russians
are. And you can't just sort of throw
out these ideas. You know, the other thing we
(03:58):
should make me think of is how, you know, in the past, see what
Cover sort of talked about Putinand suggested that there was
real warmth between him and President Trump, warmth from
President Putin. I mean, Putin is about us, as
warm as a frozen Turkey before Thanksgiving, isn't he?
(04:19):
The impression that I've had from the very beginning, you
know, there've been several constants in this sort of
journey that we've all been on when it comes to what is called
still vaguely a peace process over Ukraine.
Number one, Trump is impatient. You know, he was the guy who
declared, declared even before he was elected, he was going to
solve it all in 24 hours. Well, obviously that didn't
quite work out that way. But he's still very impatient.
(04:42):
And he showed the impatience last week #2 they don't really
care that much about Ukraine's sovereignty and it's self
determination. That's something that was borne
out in the campaign by people like JD Vance.
That's something that, you know,you, you get the drift of that
in the conversations, including the one that we just talked
about between American delegatesand their Russian counterparts
(05:05):
#3 they don't really care that much about European security
either. And you know, the, and the
Europeans always, some of the process is this.
The Americans talk to the Russians.
The Russians give them a list ofthings that they really want.
The Americans sign off in it. They present this to the
Europeans and the Ukrainians. They say, you've got to be
kidding. The thing is then amended, they
(05:26):
go back to the Russians who say,niet.
And I kind of think that's wherewe are at the moment.
But before we discuss how that works and, and what it is about
this sort of diplomacy of envoysas opposed to diplomats that is
proving troublesome, let's just listen to what Trump had to say.
And, and it really gives you a sense of the of the impatience
of the man. We're having good talks.
(05:49):
We started with Russia. We're having some talks with
Russia. Ukraine is doing well.
I think they're pretty happy about it.
They'd like to see it end. And we won't know for a little
while, but we'll, we're making progress.
You said, what are the big things you said on 8 Wars?
And I thought this would be one of the easier ones because of my
relationship with President Putin.
(06:11):
But this is probably one of the more difficult ones.
There's a lot of hatred. OK, well, well, there is a lot
of hatred. And after almost four years of
war, there's also a lot of death, as Donald Trump would put
it. I mean, the casualty numbers are
monstrous. And in the Channel House of
eastern Ukraine, they are mounting every week.
And I think we have to give Trump some credit for genuinely,
(06:31):
I think, authentically wanting to stop all the killing.
But the question Lindsay, of course, is at what cost?
Pretty much everyday I message afriend who lives in Kramatowsk
in Donetsk, and the reason I message him is to check he's
still alive and he doesn't usually come back to me on the
same day because there's no power, there's no Internet, it's
(06:54):
freezing cold, it's pretty hellish.
People in Donetsk and the rest of Ukraine are desperate for
this to stop, but not at any cost.
And in this 1st 28 point plan, the idea was that Kramer Tusk,
which has been defended very bravely, would just be handed
over, as would Slavyansk and other towns in Donetsk, which
(07:18):
Ukrainian soldiers have defendedfiercely from the beginning.
And many of them have lost theirlives doing so.
So the cost sickly within Ukraine of just giving up that
territory which the Russians haven't won is immense.
And I think that when we come back to Steve Witkoff saying,
Oh, well, they're just going to have to give up on his doesn't
(07:38):
understand that. Whereas there is an
understanding certainly amongst the political class in Ukraine
that the that the lines might have to be frozen and that there
will be a de facto understandingthat Ukraine is not going to get
back the territory that they have lost initially.
That is completely different from giving away territory that
(08:00):
the Russians have not won on battlefield.
So I think that that is really that is, is really significant.
The other thing is it's the, it's the back to front nature of
diplomacy. So normally, so yes, you can
argue that the State Department or British diplomats or European
(08:20):
diplats in general have failed in many cases in the past.
However, there, there is a way of doing diplomacy which is
understood, which is that you, you generally start with some
talks which lead to a ceasefire.And then once you've got a
ceasefire, then you can have some more talks.
And then eventually you get to the point where you have a
document and that document may be tweaked or negotiated.
(08:42):
But the, the Sherpas, the peoplewho are the diplomats who know
about these things are the ones who started.
And the way the Trump administration does is
completely the way around. They start with a random
document which seems to be all Russian talking points, and then
we go backwards into negotiations and we're still
nowhere near a ceasefire becauseall the time the Russians are
(09:07):
pummelling Ukraine and putting the lights out.
I'd love to know who actually leaked the 28 point plan because
this leak came out of time when arguably Zelenski what was at
his weakest point ever. And that is an engulfed in the
middle of a very tawdry corruption scandal which
involves $100 million or so of money that should have been gone
(09:30):
towards building shelters and securing nuclear substations.
This has gone into the pockets of some people who are quite
close to Zelensky, not Zelensky himself, but people in his
circle. And the Ukrainian population was
outraged by this scandal, which is, by the way, not just read
out by the, you know, anti corruption agency in the form of
an indictment or, you know, a press conference.
(09:53):
It was leaked in the kind of Netflix style series that popped
up on people's phones that was very slickly produced.
And so this is a real problem for Zelensky.
I mean, it is still a problem for Zelensky.
But into the middle of this scandal pops a leak of this
plan, which then allows Zelenskyto once again in the style of
February 2022, you know, turn upin front of, you know, I think
(10:17):
St. Sapphire Cathedral in Kiev and
then give an incredibly powerfulspeech.
We, the Ukrainian people have arrived at A at a very critical
juncture. We either choose our dignity or
we, you know, and and lose our partner America, or we keep the
Americans on side. But we suffer capitulation more
or less. And if the the the nation
(10:37):
momentarily was distracted from the corruption scandal and
rallied behind him. Yeah.
So you have to think so who? So whose advantage was the leak?
Well, it wasn't to the advantageof the Russians, and it wasn't
to the advantage of the Americanadministration.
It was to the advantage of Republicans and others within
(10:58):
Congress who actually support Ukraine and think that what the
White House is doing is a travesty.
And it was to the advantage of those four of the United
diplomats in the State Department who are being totally
sidelined by this personal diplomacy, which is what what
(11:19):
Trump favours with his son-in-law and, you know, his
old real estate mate, Steve Witkoff.
So you know what, within Americaor within the American system,
there are many who would have been very, very unhappy about,
about this. Now, on the Ukrainian corruption
scandal, yes, absolutely. You know, this was blow after
(11:41):
blow. I, I was in Ukraine in July when
the government did this weird thing of trying to close down
Nabu. Nabu is the corruption
investigation Department, which is independent of the of the
administration. And people came out on the
(12:02):
streets and it was extraordinaryto be there with people coming
out on the streets because what people were saying was we are
fighting our sons and brothers. And it mainly was brothers
because these were young people on the streets.
We are fighting to be a democracy.
We are not fighting to have thiskind of corruption which they
have in Russia. We're fighting against that kind
(12:24):
of system. And Zelensky was elected on that
ticket. Wasn't he on an anti corruption
ticket? Absolutely he was.
And they said we totally supportZelensky and we totally support
the war and this is a horror andhe had to reverse it.
But what has come out was that one of the reasons that there
were people who wanted to close it down, which he acquiesced to,
(12:47):
they wanted to close it down because they knew that there was
a corruption scandal coming thatwas getting close to him.
And by close to him, I don't mean to him.
I mean, to people who he knows well and are his friends.
So yes, this has weakened him tremendously.
The corruption scandal, at least100 million if not more, is
about money which was siphoned off that should have been spent
(13:10):
on on the power grid and nuclearpower.
And you know, nothing is closer to Ukrainians hearts at the
moment than power because they are without electricity so much
of the time. I mean, I cannot imagine the
anger that people all over Ukraine feel that this money's
been siphoned off. And I think it's worth pointing
out just quickly, Lindsay, that within the diplomatic camps on
(13:32):
the both the American side and the Russian side, there are,
it's not all sweet sweetness andlight.
I mean, there is a there is a Fisher there between Rubio,
who's a slightly more traditional diplomat diplomat
than JD Vance, and his henchman,one of whom was in Kiev the
other day. Dan Driscoll, who is the US Army
(13:52):
secretary, suddenly seems to have got involved.
Yeah, where did he come from? Yeah, exactly.
Well, where he came from was being close to JD Vance and Jay.
And in the administration, the person who dislikes Ukraine the
most, I think is the vice president, JD Vance.
And if you go back to the MunichSecurity Conference the year
(14:12):
before this administration got into office and listened to JD
Vance on a panel. And at that point, he's not even
the running mate or anything. He's just a senator and talking
about Ukraine. And he is very clear.
He says the Europeans are completely deluded.
There is no way Ukraine can win.America has no interest in this
(14:33):
fight. We have no in it.
And you should just or and if you add up all the numbers of
what it would take, the number of missiles, the number, you
know, all of the munitions it would take when it's a complete
waste of time, you should give up now and let it go.
So JD Vance has an almost personal crusade against Ukraine
and against this war. And he really doesn't care if
(14:55):
Russia wins, right? He just doesn't get it.
And of course, that goes along with JD Vance's hostility to
Europe, which was borne out in the Munich after they did get
office. So Driscoll is his man.
And So what we're seeing at the moment from the American side is
this Witkoff, this envoy, he seems to be very naive and very
(15:18):
pro Russia. Then JD Vance's man and then
poor old Marco Rubio trying to do a bit more of traditional
diplomacy coming in at the last minute.
Well, see what this looks like from Moscow and from Kiev, from
Moscow, it looks like a bonanza because they are so brilliant at
negotiating and they know how tomanipulate everybody and
(15:39):
everything. And this lot are just easy.
To play with. Although having said that,
Lindsay, we should just interject quickly that there are
a few wrinkles in the Russian side as well, although not as
serious. You've got Sergey, lover of the
the veteran growly diplomat, youknow, who's been there for
decades, the foreign minister, you know, who thinks he's in
charge of these negotiations. And then you've got KIRO
(16:01):
Dmitriev, who's the head of the Russian sovereign wealth fund,
who was educated at Stanford at Harvard Business School, went to
high school in California for a couple of years as well.
Very, very smart guy. But he was the bloke who was
flown to Miami in October, you know, for long negotiations with
Witkoff, where they came up withthis 28 point plan that everyone
(16:22):
calls it a capitulation document.
But Lavrov hates Dmitriev because he thinks that rather
like, you know, Rubio and Witkoff, he thinks that Dmitriev
is stealing his diplomatic Thunder.
So there was a wonderful scene at one of the summits where they
discussed Ukraine, I think it was a meeting in Saudi Arabia.
And Lavrov had Dmitriev's chair literally removed from the
(16:46):
table. And Dimitrov arrives.
There's no chair for me. Where's the plus wall?
I'm not sitting anywhere. He's very upset.
So he calls his wife, who's a very close friend of Putin's
daughter, because they run a foundation together.
Putin's daughter calls Putin. Putin then rings up Lavrov and
said, put the bloody chair back and Dimitrov is sitting back at
the table. But the point about him is that
because he's a business guy, rather like Witkoff for those
(17:09):
two, they're on a different, they're in a different Galaxy.
Here. It's about deals, making deals.
And one of the things that really upset the German
Chancellor last week for KurdishMats, who was one of the
proponents of using Russia's frozen assets, $350 billion,
whatever it is, you know, to basically rebuild Ukraine after
the destruction caused by the people who used to own that
(17:30):
money, was that, you know, one of the points of the plan, 100
billion of those frozen assets would be kind of invested in
Ukraine, but 50% of the profits would go to the Americans
without them putting out any money.
I mean, it's basically someone called it, you know, a Chatham
House, you know, which is a verysober kind of think tank here in
London, as you know, Lindsay, because you spend a lot of time
(17:51):
there. Their conclusion was mafia style
extortion. And I think that's something
that, you know, many Europeans would agree with.
So there's the sort of financialaspect, the trading aspect of
this whole deal that is always there in the background that
drives a lot of what Trump and his administration are trying to
do. And if you put all that
together, you know, the, the, the impatience of Trump, the
need to get his bloody Nobel Peace Prize, you know, the OK
(18:15):
genuine desire to stop the killing, the transactional
nature of diplomacy, the weakness of of Ukraine after
almost four years of war and Russia not really giving an inch
on its red lines. All that I have to say doesn't
spell anything positive for the future of Ukraine, but also
possibly Europe. Well, let's come back to that.
Let's come back to what it's actually like in Ukraine.
(18:36):
So we've talked about the policy, the internal politics of
all of these three countries, but on these this the original
document which understand now has been changed.
America giving away things whichare not.
It's to give away, you know, Ukrainian territory does not
belong to the US. And so Ukrainian and so although
Ukrainian people understand there's going to have to be
(18:57):
compromised, to be given away inthis way as if they have no
agency of their own is completely unacceptable.
But yes, it is very hard to, it will be very hard for Ukrainians
to live through another winter with what they get, what they
are enduring now. And of course, the other aspect
of it is the possibility of America cutting off intelligence
(19:20):
and weapon supplies. Now, at the moment, the
Europeans are buying American weapons to supply Ukraine.
To some extent, that has become less of an issue because Ukraine
has so many of its own weapons, particularly advanced drones and
unmanned ground vehicles, which,you know, I've reported on
several Times Now. But American intelligence is
(19:45):
still absolutely critical. And one of the most difficult
things at the moment is the missiles and phones that come in
from America and are taking out civilian infrastructure across
the cities. And the Patriot missiles, which
the Americans originally supplied.
The ammunition is running short.But the so every, every time
(20:08):
they fire, it counts and it costs a lot of money.
And they need the American intelligence to know where the
Russian missiles are coming in. And without that intelligence,
then they're firing, firing blind.
So that is where the Ukrainians are extremely are extremely
vulnerable and extremely weak. And so that is why the
(20:28):
Ukrainians are going to have to compromise and they're going to
have to deal with this very thisadministration that goes by by
whim and not by knowledge. Well, Lindsay, thank you so much
for your insights. It's always great to talk to
you, whether it's the Middle East or Russia and Ukraine and
the United States, of course, you know, really fascinating
(20:51):
stuff, and I hope we can do it again.
So, Lindsay, happy Thanksgiving to you, and thank you very much
for coming on Trombol. Well, I'm very happy to say that
we're going to bring in Fiona Hill.
She's very rare as not just a Russia expert, but also someone
who worked for three administrations, Bush, Obama and
Trump won. So she knows how the White House
works. She knows how American foreign
(21:13):
policy can work, and she knows an awful lot about Russia and of
course, currently the situation between Russia and Ukraine and
Europe's response to all this. Fiona, welcome to the program.
Oh. Thanks, Mark.
Great to be with you. There's a lot of stuff going on.
There are lots of moving parts. But if you if you look at today
and you look at where we are andyou compare that to the rest of
(21:35):
the year, do you see a pattern here?
A kind of farango, a dance wherethe Americans talk to the
Russians, or rather Steve Witkoff talks to his friend
Kiril Dmitri. If they agree something, the
Ukrainians and the Europeans throw their hands up in despair.
It goes back to the drawing board.
And then the Russians say no. Yes, I mean, I think at this
(21:56):
point that pattern, that choreography is very apparent.
And, you know, it works very much in Vladimir Putin's favour
because, you know, he feels thatthis is a win, win, win
situation in the terms of, you know, incremental success in the
battlefield, on the front lines in Ukraine, all this success in
(22:16):
the propaganda and information war, the other battlefields
with, you know, Europe and the world writ large.
He's constantly, you know, setting the tone and the tempo
for this, for this dance of thischoreography.
And then, you know, the other win is that, you know, he he
really feels that he's got Trumpwhere he wants him.
I mean, every time Vladimir Putin, you know, calls a dance
move, Trump, you know, gets out there.
(22:37):
I mean, I like that, you know, analogy and that in a metaphor
you've been using though, and comes and dances along with him
and Putin, you know, can kind ofmaneuver him around the dance
floor. Now.
He doesn't always, you know, getto take centre stage here
because again, there's also other people rushing in here,
you know, kind of a sort of European mosh pit changing the,
the whole, you know, more stately choreography here.
But Putin definitely feels, you know, that for him he is on the
(23:02):
front foot where everybody else is on the back foot.
Maybe we've taken that metaphor as far as we can.
By the way, I. Think I think we've.
Exhausted. I have anyway.
We'll try and find. We'll try and find another one
that fits. But but, I mean, you know, we
were all shocked, weren't we, atthe beginning of the second
Trump administration with that very long phone call between
Trump and Putin? And the suspicion was that he
was, that Trump was very much onPutin's side.
(23:23):
Then we had that disastrous meeting in the Oval Office with
Zelensky where Zelensky was mauled by Vance and by Trump.
And then after that, things seemed to move further in
Ukraine's direction. I just wondered where, whether
actually, honestly, nothing has really changed in the last 10
months, whether Trump is still where he was at the beginning of
his second term, more on Putin'sside than Ukraine's side.
(23:45):
Well, of course, lots of things have changed on the battlefields
in horrific fashion, and both Ukraine and Russia are hurting.
I mean Ukraine obviously in visible ways that we can all
see. Just the grinding horror of this
war that we would all like to see end.
And for Putin, things have become uncomfortable.
I mean, people have forgotten now that he had actually an
insurrection against him at one point, you know, during the war
(24:07):
by Yevgeny Pregozian. The late Yevgeny Pregozian.
Very late Yevgeny Pregozian, because of the mass slaughter of
people that he'd recruited the front.
And that has continued unabated.And every incremental gain that
the Russians have made have beenat massive cost.
But as far as the other part of your question is concerned, but
Trump, nothing really has changed.
(24:28):
He has been on Russia's side. And so far as he thinks that
Russia is a great power, Putin is a great man.
He's a strong man. He's somebody that Trump wants
the approval of, just like he wants the same for President Xi.
He doesn't want there just to bea kind of a, a, a dual bromance
there with she and Putin in all of the other world for he wants
(24:49):
that part of the action, you know, for himself.
And Zelensky and Ukraine are an incumbrance.
Zelensky is a lesser being. He's not a wartime president in
Trump's view. He's inevitant.
And he wants to get rid of him just as much as Putin does.
Trump wants to get on with the main action, which is him, you
know, basically dealing with thebig guys on the world stage,
(25:10):
which for him, you know, rather strangely is still Russia, but
also, you know, more evidently also China, most evidently
China. I mean, I think for for Trump,
his idea of what is strong, whatis powerful, you know, and where
he should be putting all of his attention is, you know, slightly
off kilter. When we do a, you know, full
(25:30):
assessment of where things are in the world.
I mean, other major players, be it the Brazilians, the South
Africans, the Indians, you know,Indonesians, you know, many
others would actually say that Russia is a spent force.
It hasn't been able to, you know, get what it wants in the
time that it's set for itself onthe battlefield in Ukraine.
It's getting its ass kicked, youknow, irrespective of how this,
you know, comes out. And all the time we see power
(25:52):
shifting not just to the East interms of East Asia and China,
but to the Middle East and to the fact that all of these
issues of war and peace are now being resolved by players like
Qatar or UAE. Everything is happening in Dubai
or Doha or, you know, Saudi Arabia and the Saudi, you know,
Crown Prince MBS, you know, being the person who's holding
(26:14):
court and holding influence here.
So the United States has ceded so much also of its own power
and influence and respect because Trump has made what I
think is a, you know, pretty fatal miscalculation on where
power lies in the international system.
That's really interesting. I mean, I was in Alaska for that
weird summit. And, you know, Trump only spoke
(26:36):
for three minutes and 25 seconds.
And even his staunchest supporters thought that he
wasn't at the top of his talkinggame or weaving game or any
game. And he must have known after
that that Putin was playing him.So I wonder what you think Trump
thinks is in it for him by beingnice to Vladimir Putin?
Well, look, he thinks again thatPutin is his counterpart.
(26:59):
He can't admit to himself that he's being played.
And you notice that whenever that's pointed out, he gets very
angry and he personally berates anybody who asks him that
question, particularly people who thinks there's a lesser
mortals. And that's journalists,
particularly women journalists. We've seen the way that he
behaves when he's asked uncomfortable questions in other
settings, be it on Air Force One, you know, in the White
(27:21):
House. It's other world leaders who,
you know, he expects to kiss up to him as all the time and to
flatter him and to thank him forfrankly doing something that
doesn't bear thanks at all. I mean, he's actually making
life much more difficult and more uncomfortable for everyone
else. So no, there's no way that he
could possibly admit to himself that he's being played by Putin,
(27:41):
wants more than anything else the adulation, the respect and
the attention of Vladimir Putin.I mean, look, he's rushing to go
to Beijing and to host XI. He wants the spectacle of being
able to do that and being mined and dying bubbly and all of that
golded, gilted splendor of the Kremlin and being able to bring,
you know, Putin to show him, youknow, his kind of equivalent.
(28:04):
Now in the White House. He's playing on a totally
different front. He's playing a game of backroom
politics, deals and splendor andbig state dinners and ballrooms,
and he's not playing on the grubby, dirty battlefield that
everybody else is being, you know, forced to engage on.
I think it was Steve Witkoff when he met Vladimir Putin at
(28:26):
one of his earlier meetings. He said that the Winter Palace
in Saint Petersburg really reminded him of Mara Lago, which
I thought was rather indicative.Yes.
Which came first? Yeah, Which came on?
Well, that Mary Meatherweather post had an obsession with
Russian culture, so maybe, you know, there's no coincidence
there. Mary Meatherweather Post had a
huge collection of Russian art and, you know, built up, you
(28:46):
know, Hillwood Museum, which is based on, you know, basically
what she saw there. So.
But Steve Witkopf wasn't wrong. It's just that he didn't get
understand the context. So when you worked for Trump,
did did the things that you havejust described, the things that
motivate him, did that was that obvious?
And give me some examples of that being obvious.
It became obvious over time. I think, you know, we all can
(29:07):
see now how constrained Trump felt, you know, obviously
fettered, chained, you know, in that first administration, he
was chafing, you know, the bit of being controlled by the HR
McMaster, John Bolton, Rex Tillerson, you know, John Kelly,
you know, you name all the people who have been long
forgotten in many respects, you know, from that first.
He hates, and who hates him? Yes, yes, because they stopped
(29:30):
him from doing what he wants to do and now he has everyone who
is enabling all of his inner instincts.
This is for him. All of this is a transaction in
a deal. And I think it's extraordinarily
evident now when we look back atthe past that, you know, you
look at that original 28 point planner, though I don't know how
original it was and exactly who drew it, but drew it up.
(29:50):
But it was all geared towards making Trump look good as well,
not just of Russian interests ofthe peace board that Trump is
supposed to preside over. I mean, why pick that title
unless you've got the Nobel Peace Prize in mind?
The idea of Trump mediating somehow between NATO and and
Russia, that was in that weird. It's just that the US is no
(30:12):
longer part of NATO, which in Trump's mind has been trying to
get out of from the first round as well.
And when we're seeing this coming to fruition, you know,
now and again, all of these ideas that the frozen assets,
instead of going towards Ukraineand reconstruction, should be
put into some kind of fund that the US and Russia would jointly
(30:33):
preside over. That's very similar to the
minerals deal and everything else that's been put on the
table. And all I'm just saying is you
can see in contrast with where we are now to where it was at
the beginning that all of those attempts to do similar sorts of
things early on were very much constrained, although they were,
you know, basically counter checked, counteracted by people
(30:53):
around him in the first administration.
So we see all the things that hewould have liked to have done
the first time around. And in fact, you know, when we
look back to the infamous phone call that sparked off the first
impeachment, that parallel process that people pointed out
of envoys and emissaries and others doing backdoor deals is
(31:13):
now the main process. It's not in the shadows.
It's out in front. So Trump, you know, has been
given credit by a lot of people,and I think even by you for
getting the ball rolling. But of course, the ball has
rolled mostly in Russia's direction.
Then it rolls back again a little bit in Ukraine and
Europe's direction. Do you think that the
Ukrainians, and indeed the Europeans by extension, would
(31:36):
have been better off if Trump hadn't done anything at all?
Well, look, I mean, these are the kinds of counterfactual kind
of questions that we'll probablyhave a bit more attempt at being
able to answer years from now, you know, when we we get
actually more of a sense of exactly what's happened.
I mean, right now we're all in the fog of war.
I mean, it is very important to find a way of ending this war.
So, you know, and I think that Trump is probably one of the
(31:59):
main people on the world stage who genuinely wants to end the
slaughter. Putin doesn't.
I mean, the Ukrainians obviouslydo.
But, you know, as they said, notat the expense of their survival
and as a country in their dignity and respect and all the
rest of it. But the problem is that Trump is
always driving this for his own priorities and his own timeline.
(32:20):
He's not got the interests of the Ukrainians uppermost apart
from obviously the the the deathon the battlefield.
And he's certainly not thinking about the long term implications
for European or, you know, larger global security and about
what it might mean if Putin is able to show that war wins, that
you can be successful no matter how high the cost at pursuing a
(32:41):
war to what you want to be its logical conclusion.
That's a terrible message, you know, to send at a time when
there are so many wars raging half the time that we're not
even paying attention to, you know, in Africa.
And you know, we're seeing all the, you know, slaughter there
place like Sudan and elsewhere. And when you're thinking about
what the implications of this might be for other places, and
if you're AUS ally at this point, if you're South Korea, if
(33:04):
you're Japan, if you're Taiwan, that is in that, you know,
strange, ambiguous, you know, position and you're looking what
the US is doing here. You've got to think, well, the
US is never going to have my interests at heart.
He's that's always or under Trump going to bow towards the
interests of the bigger power. And then and Trump's through,
there are only two other big powers in the world, and that's
China and Russia, which is, again, is somewhat odd because
(33:27):
Russia isn't in that position anymore.
It's not the Soviet Union. But Trump still thinks of it
like that. So he doesn't really have any
understanding or empathy for theidea of a sovereign,
independent, viable Ukrainian nation state.
Is that, is that the fundamentalproblem here?
And that if anyone you know who disagrees with them on that
front, like the Europeans, for instance, we also have
(33:47):
geographical skin in the game. He brushes them aside from being
a bunch of freeloaders. I think that's correct because
I'm look and and part of this isEuropeans faults as well since
World War One and the initial, you know, bailing out, as the
Americans would put it or Trump would put it anywhere of, of
Europe after the the 1st war of German invasions and very much
(34:09):
so even more after the Second World War where the United
States took full responsibility for the security and
reconstruction of Europe. You know, the viewpoint is that
Europe hasn't really, you know, had any skin in the game, even
if it might have Geo, you know, political and geographical skin.
But in terms of stepping up on its own security and, you know,
really creating proper independence of being able to
(34:33):
defend themselves. So Trump is of the same view
that Vladimir Putin is about Europe and anywhere else.
You only have sovereignty if youare capable of defending it for
yourself. And the irony of calls is the
Ukraine has been prepared to defend its own sovereignty.
Admittedly, it's needed, you know, a lot of armaments from
other countries. But the Ukrainians have been
tenacious in this, you know, in ways that ought to be
(34:54):
recognised. They're just as fierce and just
as dedicated to the battle as the Russians are.
There's just a complete and utter disproportion in terms of
the power, the manpower, etcetera.
But Trump always moves in the direction of who has, in his
view, the preponderance of power.
And power for him is always defined as a military power and
(35:16):
then also economic and financialpower.
And he looks at Ukraine, says, well, you don't have that.
Right. And I remembered actually
Zelensky when I interviewed and told me nobody likes a loser.
And he he's suddenly spoken English when he said that line.
And that was before Trump was elected.
It was almost, you know, premonition of what was to come.
But I just wonder on Europe, Fiona, I mean, doesn't Trump
have a point on Europe? Not only have there been kind
(35:38):
of, you know, piggybacking in terms of security of the
Americans for a long time, but also even now with Trump
breathing down their neck, you know, with, with Putin on their
doorstep, they're incapable of speaking with one voice.
They can't even get the arms industry to be more coordinated.
They don't have a single line when it comes to the frozen
Russian assets. I mean, this is pretty
(35:59):
disastrous, isn't it? Well, it could be.
I still think there's a chance, but I think you can't get, you
know, to the kind of situation that we're looking for here,
which is again, of Europeans in some formulation getting their
act together. If you start from the top.
And basically what you need to do is get a coalition not just
as the willing but of the capable.
(36:20):
And I think we can look at our Scandinavian counterparts, the
the Baltic states, Poland, thereare a group of countries.
Look you Italy as well, you know, has a very important arms
industry. And we've seen, you know, some
different positions from GiorgioMaloney.
I mean, she is actually seeing here that, you know, maybe
things are not as simple as she herself and her populist guys
(36:40):
would have put things that thereare a lot of risks to the
sovereignty of European countries coming from this.
So I think what you have to do is you have to get a group of
countries that are actually capable of taking action
together in support of Ukraine, but in support of themselves, in
support of Europe. I think there's a joint
Expeditionary force. I've mentioned this, you know,
before in discussions, which, you know, the UK leagues along
(37:00):
with the Scandinavian counterparts.
There is a lot of capability on a smaller scale within Europe
that needs to be tapped into. But I think, you know, the big
problem is now people are in thethrall of both Trump and Putin.
The propaganda war against Europe is coming from 2 fronts
right now from and, and, and China isn't really doing this
(37:22):
and North Korea and Iran, to theextent frankly, that Russia and
the United States are, they're both interfering in European
politics in similar ways and forsimilar ends in so far as Trump
wants to best position U.S. economic, financial and in
industrial interest tech. The tech Bros, you know, kind of
in a way that they can dominate in Europe and wants to have
(37:44):
European populist far right political parties in his own
mold as just, you know, somehow subsidiaries of the US MAGA
movement. And Putin is doing similar sorts
of things, but obviously to completely weaken Europe and for
Russia to be able to dominate and flex it's muscle wherever it
wants to military muscle and, you know, kind of political
(38:05):
muscle. And I think, you know, that what
Trump is not seeing here is it'sstill a battle for Europe, but
Europeans have to gun a rise up here and battle for themselves
as the Ukrainians because Putin and Trump are both interested in
spheres of influence. And right now, I think what
Trump isn't seeing is that Putinwants to call the shots in all
of Europe, not just in Eastern Europe.
He wants to have, you know, thatrecognition that Churchill gave
(38:29):
at Yalta of Eastern Europe beinga a no go zone.
But you know, frankly, that still includes all of the
countries that were formerly in the Eastern Bloc that Putin
would still like to have leverage over.
And he already has it over Hungary and Slovakia.
You can see that very clearly tosome degree to Romania.
And he's putting pressure on theBaltic States and Poland and
(38:50):
also on Finland. We've just got to recognise
what's happening here. And I don't think that the
United States, or at least this isn't the United States, this is
Trump and the people around him fully appreciate that you give
up on Europe. You're kind of basically taking
the US, you know, out of a broader game.
Maybe. I think that's what they want to
do, certainly what JD Vance wants to do.
(39:11):
But it will be to the detriment of the United States, you know,
economically as well as politically.
They're not isolationists in thesense that we think they are,
but they want to play a totally different game.
They want to dominate their own,the Western Hemisphere, be that
Canada, Greenland or, you know, as we've seen what's happening
in Venezuela and they're just kind of, you know, are almost
giving up the ghost, the ghost of America past in Europe at
(39:33):
this particular time. But again, as you said, this is
Trump and JD Vanson their mates.But what about the Republicans
in Congress? What about the Democrats?
I mean, do you think that he hasshifted the debate fundamentally
away from Europe, or are there still Americans out there who
are saying no, no, no, no, this is a really bad idea and
ultimately, we're going to have to get involved again to sort
out the mess. Well, there are, but the problem
(39:54):
is that they've got a mess at home.
So I mean, America is in big trouble at the moment.
I think that's obvious to everyone.
And there's a battle for Americaas well going on.
And it's not just about. You know, ideological left or
right, Democrats versus Republican, It's about the whole
idea of what America is, who areAmericans.
So people like me who are naturalized citizens, Americans
(40:15):
or, you know, do we have to comeoff the Mayflower?
JD Vance, who's, you know, family obviously came at
different points, you know, to Appalachia from different parts
of the United Kingdom and elsewhere, and who's married to
someone, you know, whose family are naturalized, you know, is
basically saying that, you know,you have to have these multiple
generations, you know, going back in America to be an
American. There's a redefinition of what
America is going on right now. There is a battle for America.
(40:38):
And that's kind of where the Democrats and Republicans, who,
you know, might have different views on foreign policy are
finding themselves caught up as well.
I was just recently in Concord, MA, and there are signs all over
Concord, you know, ahead of the 2200 and 50th anniversary of the
American Revolution and independence, basically saying
(41:00):
now it's time it's our turn to fight tyranny.
And it's got, you know, it's the, the, the, the, the image of
the minuteman from the statue from the bridge in Concord.
And I was like, well, OK, I haven't seen those anywhere
else. But it's part of by, you know,
the citizens of Concord, Mass, because this is kind of where we
are 250 years on. The soul of America has been
(41:20):
fought for again. So I think, you know, for the
Europeans and the UK, you're going to have to get on with,
you know, getting your own housein order at this point.
Yeah, but that's easier said than done, isn't it, Because
you've got similar battles goingon in European countries.
You know, they've got the populist right, you know, on the
verge of power in France. They're already in power in
Italy. They might get into power in
Germany. And these are essentially, you
(41:42):
know, forget about whether they're right or left, whether
they're populist or just popular.
These are countries. These are people, parties,
potentially governments that believe in nation states, which
is kind of what Trump believes in as well, what Putin believes
in. And then you're, you know,
you're back to the 19th century across the board.
Exactly. Look, and I think, you know, for
(42:02):
people who would like to live in, you know, kind of more 21st
century States and which we kindof recognize that the world is
much more complex. I mean, it really is very
important to stand up and speak out in these context.
I mean, the whole definition of a nation state is being redrawn
as well. I mean, there, you know, there
there was lots of academic, you know, thinking about these, that
these are all imagined communities.
(42:24):
I felt that about a lot during, you know, my recent, you know,
trips back to North East Englandand looking at, you know, kind
of the flag of Saint George everywhere, you know, for
example, what is England? I mean, that is, that's what's
up, you know, for contention at the moment.
Very lively debate happening. Right.
This is a very lively debate. When you have devolution to
Scotland, you have, you know, cultural autonomy and a bit more
devolution to Wales and, you know, Northern Ireland as well
(42:48):
as, you know, home rule. You know, what is England in
that kind of context? And every country, as you point
out, is going through that, but so is Russia.
And what Russia is trying to do is to define that on the
battlefield in Ukraine and telling Ukrainians that they are
also Russians. So that is also the battle for
who gets the right to define a nation state.
And Europe said we're not doing that again.
(43:09):
We're not going back to these 30years, 60 years, 100 years wars
or that cycle from World War Oneto World War 2, you know, post
imperial fighting for a nation steps.
We've already made our minds up that we're going to move into
somewhere else. So that's, you know, basically
what people are being channelled, challenged to do.
And that's what's happening on Ukraine, on those front lines,
just as much as happening in America and everywhere else.
(43:32):
Yeah. I mean, if you could wear a
T-shirt about wars, it would have been there, done that,
written on it. And what's become obvious from
this conversation is that this is about much more than just
Ukraine. And we get lost in the weeds of
a 28 point plan or a 19 point plan.
But this really is a test case for what kind of Europe, what
kind of world, under what kind of security umbrella we want to
(43:53):
live in. It is absolutely and it's a test
that we've been failing, I wouldsay in large part for the last
100 years because the the very first time that Ukraine got
independence was at the end of World War One.
You know, we and then we cycled through World War 2 and, you
know, we thought we had, you know, things at least just
frozen in place with the Cold War.
(44:13):
And then when we, we get out of the Cold War, we have that whole
idea. You know, we've, we've talked so
many times of the cliche of the end of history, but it wasn't,
it was basically a reversion, you know, to where we'd started
before. This is another chance to get
this right. And, and unfortunately, again,
we look like for all the reasonsthat you've laid out, that we're
going to fail that test again, all that we can hope for, you
(44:35):
know, with the kinds of things that we've done in the passage
is just freeze things in place. And that's what this peace deal
really is. It's about creating buffer
stones. It's creating, you know, the
kind of standoff that is ultimately unstable that we had
for that whole period of the Cold War that we've had, you
know, in various previous pointsin the 19th and 18th centuries.
So look, we've got a chance now to do things different.
(44:56):
And the reason we've got the rise of populism is because
people are unhappy, you know, they're filled with grievance
about, you know, how politics has gone in their individual
countries, that it's not delivering for them.
But look, the message that we all should get, which the
Ukrainians have absolutely got, is you've got to actually deal
with things yourself. You might get some help from the
top or from the outside, but ultimately it's up to you, you
(45:19):
know, to basically decide how things go.
And I think that, again, you know, what we're all going to
have to do is dig deep in all kinds of different levels and
realize that one guy, you know, kind of 1 peace deal, one
anything, is not going to fix things.
It's going to be a tough time ahead for all of us, but we're
just going to have to face up toit.
It's not like, again, as you said, being there, done that.
We've definitely been there before.
(45:40):
And what or who can make Vladimir Putin realize that
actually, ultimately, this mightnot even be in his interest?
I mean, this will end in tears even for him.
Well, a lot of that is up to people inside of Russia as well,
but it is up to all of us to show that he can't go any
further. People have got to stop, you
know, taking bribes. People have got to stop just
(46:02):
taking Russian propaganda and information and American as
well. You know, on face value, stop,
you know, these walls, you know,internally with each other and
and try to actually get kind of some sense of the moment that
we're in and, you know, a bit ofpatriotism about their own
countries and, you know, trying to dig in.
And if Putin thinks that he actually can't manipulate
(46:24):
everybody anymore, it's not justgoing to be about sanctions.
But if he can't just, you know, win the fight for our minds, you
know, and he can't really go anyfurther and he's just making
these incremental gains on the battlefield, you know, maybe he
can be induced to stop. Well, it's going to take a lot
of effort by everyone, not just,you know, one set of people, you
(46:44):
know, in Qatar or UAE or Geneva or wherever it is they've or
Miami, wherever they decided to to meet at the moment.
It's going to take a concerted effort by a lot more people to
really, you know, stop Putin in his tracks.
Trump famously called you the Deep State.
What was it? What did he use?
Stiff with a nice accent. The deep state stiff with a nice
(47:05):
accent. You could argue with a couple of
things in that statement. I'm sure you could.
But, but I mean, the I just wonder as someone who, you know,
was born in this country, then you, you know, you made your
life in your career in the United States.
You still work over here occasionally.
I mean, do you feel completely rootless in this very fragmented
(47:25):
and rather chaotic world? No, I don't actually.
And I I think that that's, you know, obviously, I mean you're
not saying it because of that, but it's usually something that,
you know, people throw out people when they want to kind of
basically say that you don't have a stick.
You know, I know exactly where I'm from.
I'm from the North East of England, you know, which brings
not baggage, but actually, I think a very clear sense of, you
(47:46):
know, kind of what's what and where you are.
And definitely been there, done that before.
And I've been here in the UnitedStates since 1989.
And, you know, I've made a commitment, you know, to stand
up for, you know, what I think is important here because the
United States was a beacon. It was a place that people could
come to and to look to, you know, for eventually, after, you
know, so much machination comingout on the, you know, at least
(48:08):
attempting to come out the rightside of history.
And so many people here in civilsociety, actually in the US
government in all of its, you know, varied forms, we're
actually really striving to improve things and to, you know,
work together with others. And Trump is just tossing all of
that away. And, you know, I think it's very
important at this particular moment to say where your roots
(48:29):
are and what you're trying to stand up for.
And it's just. You're not a citizen of nowhere,
Fiona Hill, You're a citizen of somewhere.
I'm a citizen of two very definitive places.
I'm a dual citizen. And, you know, I think that both
the UK and, you know, the UnitedStates do have a shared history.
So many people have their origins in the UK, not just the
Founding Fathers, but Trump himself, JD Vance.
(48:52):
Many of these are the. I mean, look at the last names
of all of these people who are revolving around Trump.
Perhaps not Witkoff, whose family probably came from
Imperial Russia at some point. But many of the other people
have names of, you know, of the British Isles writ large, be
Irish or Scots or English or Welsh.
You know, here, you know, we're tied together with tethered, you
know, together in history, you know, whether we are, you know,
(49:14):
quite so closely in the future. Sure.
And that famous Cambrian? Marco Rubio, of course.
Well, yes, there's there's that.But anyway, but well, look, I
mean, I think he knows himself also, you know, where he's from.
And and that's what you actuallyhave to remember that America is
a complex place. Perhaps it's not the melting pot
that it was before, but people bring all kinds of different
perspectives as well as heritages to like that has made
(49:37):
it strong in the past. For this effort to get people
to, you know, buy into a whole different view of what America
is, I think it's going to diminish America as we look
forward. That is not its strength.
That is a great weakness. We'll leave it there.
Fiona Hill, thank you very much for your time and happy
Thanksgiving. Thanks so much, Matt.
(49:58):
Some really interesting insightsthere from Fiona Hill, and of
course, before that from LindsayHilson, my international editor
as well. Thanks very much for listening
this week. We'd love to hear your comments.
And we want you to subscribe as well because that really helps
us build up the the Trump World family to make that world even
bigger than it already is. Anushka will be back in the
(50:18):
chair next week. So from all of us here, thank
you very much. That's it from Trump World.
Happy Thanksgiving.
If you put all that together, you know the the impatience of
Trump, the need to get his bloody Nobel Peace Prize, you
know, the OK genuine desire to stop the killing, the
transactional nature of diplomacy, the weakness of of
Ukraine after almost four years of war, and Russia not really
giving an inch on its red lines.All that I have to say doesn't
(00:20):
spell anything positive for the future of Ukraine, but also
possibly Europe. Hello, and welcome to Trump
WORLD. I'm Matt Fry in London, and
happy Thanksgiving. Now, Anushka isn't with us this
week. She's celebrating Thanksgiving.
She's getting ready for the big Turkey meal at home.
(00:41):
So I'm very happy to say that sitting in her place, we have
Lindsay Hilsum, our international editor.
Lindsay, welcome to Trump WORLD.Thank you very much.
It's a joy to be here. And a joy to have you.
And so much to discuss, especially when it comes to
America, Europe and Ukraine. Now strange things have been
going on in the last week. We had, you know, the leaked 28
(01:02):
point plan that was loved by theRussians but rejected by the
Ukrainians and by the Europeans.Now we've got AI think is at a
19 or 20 point plan, which is a slightly different version.
We'll go into the mechanics of all that, but everyday stuff is
coming out and we'll try and, you know, give you the bigger
picture. When we talk to Fiona Hill later
in the programme, she of course was one of the most senior
(01:24):
advisors on Ukraine, Europe and Russia in three successive
administrations. Bush, Obama and Trump won.
So you'll hear that conversationlater on.
But let's first of all unpack the the latest developments,
which was this extraordinary leak on Bloomberg about a
conversation between Steve Witkopf, Trump's envoy to
everywhere and everything, and Yuri Ushakov, who is Putin's
(01:48):
kind of senior foreign policy adviser.
Lindsay, tell us about this leak.
What does it say? Well, what's extraordinary is
first there's a very sort of chummy chit chat sort of feeling
about it. And then what Witkoff does is he
advises Ushikov on how to deal with Trump, that basically he
and his boss, Mr. Putin, should show their respect to President
(02:11):
Trump as a man of peace. And so basically, he's telling
him how to butter up and and splatter Trump.
And then there's the other extraordinary business.
He says, well, you know, I know that Donetsk and the land swap
is going to be in there somewhere.
Well, hang on, this is not a real estate deal, Steve.
This is something different. And the idea that he should be
(02:33):
advising the Russians or saying to them, yeah, yeah, it's going
to be this thing where you give it, where the Ukrainians have to
give away Donetsk. No, hang on.
That is not what the Ukrainians are going to have to do.
That is an issue to be negotiated.
And the other thing is that he suggested that Trump and Putin
(02:54):
should have a call before Trump met Zelensky.
And we all know that when Trump talks to Putin before meeting
Zelensky, what he comes out with, he's he's very, you know,
open to what Putin says. And he just sort of comes out
with all the the Russian talkingpoints.
And so I think you have to put all this in the context of when
(03:15):
Steve Witkoff, do you remember when Steve Witkoff first met
Putin, he didn't actually botherto have the State Department
translator. He used the Kremlin translator
as if that, you know, wasn't an issue.
And whatever Steve Witkov is, heis not a Kremlinologist.
He doesn't seem to understand that the Russians will have very
(03:38):
detailed personality profiles oneverybody involved.
He doesn't seem to have talked to other people who've
negotiated with the Russians. Well, I have, and I know, you
know, and you know how incredibly detailed the Russians
are. And you can't just sort of throw
out these ideas. You know, the other thing we
(03:58):
should make me think of is how, you know, in the past, see what
Cover sort of talked about Putinand suggested that there was
real warmth between him and President Trump, warmth from
President Putin. I mean, Putin is about us, as
warm as a frozen Turkey before Thanksgiving, isn't he?
(04:19):
The impression that I've had from the very beginning, you
know, there've been several constants in this sort of
journey that we've all been on when it comes to what is called
still vaguely a peace process over Ukraine.
Number one, Trump is impatient. You know, he was the guy who
declared, declared even before he was elected, he was going to
solve it all in 24 hours. Well, obviously that didn't
quite work out that way. But he's still very impatient.
(04:42):
And he showed the impatience last week #2 they don't really
care that much about Ukraine's sovereignty and it's self
determination. That's something that was borne
out in the campaign by people like JD Vance.
That's something that, you know,you, you get the drift of that
in the conversations, including the one that we just talked
about between American delegatesand their Russian counterparts
(05:05):
#3 they don't really care that much about European security
either. And you know, the, and the
Europeans always, some of the process is this.
The Americans talk to the Russians.
The Russians give them a list ofthings that they really want.
The Americans sign off in it. They present this to the
Europeans and the Ukrainians. They say, you've got to be
kidding. The thing is then amended, they
(05:26):
go back to the Russians who say,niet.
And I kind of think that's wherewe are at the moment.
But before we discuss how that works and, and what it is about
this sort of diplomacy of envoysas opposed to diplomats that is
proving troublesome, let's just listen to what Trump had to say.
And, and it really gives you a sense of the of the impatience
of the man. We're having good talks.
(05:49):
We started with Russia. We're having some talks with
Russia. Ukraine is doing well.
I think they're pretty happy about it.
They'd like to see it end. And we won't know for a little
while, but we'll, we're making progress.
You said, what are the big things you said on 8 Wars?
And I thought this would be one of the easier ones because of my
relationship with President Putin.
(06:11):
But this is probably one of the more difficult ones.
There's a lot of hatred. OK, well, well, there is a lot
of hatred. And after almost four years of
war, there's also a lot of death, as Donald Trump would put
it. I mean, the casualty numbers are
monstrous. And in the Channel House of
eastern Ukraine, they are mounting every week.
And I think we have to give Trump some credit for genuinely,
(06:31):
I think, authentically wanting to stop all the killing.
But the question Lindsay, of course, is at what cost?
Pretty much everyday I message afriend who lives in Kramatowsk
in Donetsk, and the reason I message him is to check he's
still alive and he doesn't usually come back to me on the
same day because there's no power, there's no Internet, it's
(06:54):
freezing cold, it's pretty hellish.
People in Donetsk and the rest of Ukraine are desperate for
this to stop, but not at any cost.
And in this 1st 28 point plan, the idea was that Kramer Tusk,
which has been defended very bravely, would just be handed
over, as would Slavyansk and other towns in Donetsk, which
(07:18):
Ukrainian soldiers have defendedfiercely from the beginning.
And many of them have lost theirlives doing so.
So the cost sickly within Ukraine of just giving up that
territory which the Russians haven't won is immense.
And I think that when we come back to Steve Witkoff saying,
Oh, well, they're just going to have to give up on his doesn't
(07:38):
understand that. Whereas there is an
understanding certainly amongst the political class in Ukraine
that the that the lines might have to be frozen and that there
will be a de facto understandingthat Ukraine is not going to get
back the territory that they have lost initially.
That is completely different from giving away territory that
(08:00):
the Russians have not won on battlefield.
So I think that that is really that is, is really significant.
The other thing is it's the, it's the back to front nature of
diplomacy. So normally, so yes, you can
argue that the State Department or British diplomats or European
(08:20):
diplats in general have failed in many cases in the past.
However, there, there is a way of doing diplomacy which is
understood, which is that you, you generally start with some
talks which lead to a ceasefire.And then once you've got a
ceasefire, then you can have some more talks.
And then eventually you get to the point where you have a
document and that document may be tweaked or negotiated.
(08:42):
But the, the Sherpas, the peoplewho are the diplomats who know
about these things are the ones who started.
And the way the Trump administration does is
completely the way around. They start with a random
document which seems to be all Russian talking points, and then
we go backwards into negotiations and we're still
nowhere near a ceasefire becauseall the time the Russians are
(09:07):
pummelling Ukraine and putting the lights out.
I'd love to know who actually leaked the 28 point plan because
this leak came out of time when arguably Zelenski what was at
his weakest point ever. And that is an engulfed in the
middle of a very tawdry corruption scandal which
involves $100 million or so of money that should have been gone
(09:30):
towards building shelters and securing nuclear substations.
This has gone into the pockets of some people who are quite
close to Zelensky, not Zelensky himself, but people in his
circle. And the Ukrainian population was
outraged by this scandal, which is, by the way, not just read
out by the, you know, anti corruption agency in the form of
an indictment or, you know, a press conference.
(09:53):
It was leaked in the kind of Netflix style series that popped
up on people's phones that was very slickly produced.
And so this is a real problem for Zelensky.
I mean, it is still a problem for Zelensky.
But into the middle of this scandal pops a leak of this
plan, which then allows Zelenskyto once again in the style of
February 2022, you know, turn upin front of, you know, I think
(10:17):
St. Sapphire Cathedral in Kiev and
then give an incredibly powerfulspeech.
We, the Ukrainian people have arrived at A at a very critical
juncture. We either choose our dignity or
we, you know, and and lose our partner America, or we keep the
Americans on side. But we suffer capitulation more
or less. And if the the the nation
(10:37):
momentarily was distracted from the corruption scandal and
rallied behind him. Yeah.
So you have to think so who? So whose advantage was the leak?
Well, it wasn't to the advantageof the Russians, and it wasn't
to the advantage of the Americanadministration.
It was to the advantage of Republicans and others within
(10:58):
Congress who actually support Ukraine and think that what the
White House is doing is a travesty.
And it was to the advantage of those four of the United
diplomats in the State Department who are being totally
sidelined by this personal diplomacy, which is what what
(11:19):
Trump favours with his son-in-law and, you know, his
old real estate mate, Steve Witkoff.
So you know what, within Americaor within the American system,
there are many who would have been very, very unhappy about,
about this. Now, on the Ukrainian corruption
scandal, yes, absolutely. You know, this was blow after
(11:41):
blow. I, I was in Ukraine in July when
the government did this weird thing of trying to close down
Nabu. Nabu is the corruption
investigation Department, which is independent of the of the
administration. And people came out on the
(12:02):
streets and it was extraordinaryto be there with people coming
out on the streets because what people were saying was we are
fighting our sons and brothers. And it mainly was brothers
because these were young people on the streets.
We are fighting to be a democracy.
We are not fighting to have thiskind of corruption which they
have in Russia. We're fighting against that kind
(12:24):
of system. And Zelensky was elected on that
ticket. Wasn't he on an anti corruption
ticket? Absolutely he was.
And they said we totally supportZelensky and we totally support
the war and this is a horror andhe had to reverse it.
But what has come out was that one of the reasons that there
were people who wanted to close it down, which he acquiesced to,
(12:47):
they wanted to close it down because they knew that there was
a corruption scandal coming thatwas getting close to him.
And by close to him, I don't mean to him.
I mean, to people who he knows well and are his friends.
So yes, this has weakened him tremendously.
The corruption scandal, at least100 million if not more, is
about money which was siphoned off that should have been spent
(13:10):
on on the power grid and nuclearpower.
And you know, nothing is closer to Ukrainians hearts at the
moment than power because they are without electricity so much
of the time. I mean, I cannot imagine the
anger that people all over Ukraine feel that this money's
been siphoned off. And I think it's worth pointing
out just quickly, Lindsay, that within the diplomatic camps on
(13:32):
the both the American side and the Russian side, there are,
it's not all sweet sweetness andlight.
I mean, there is a there is a Fisher there between Rubio,
who's a slightly more traditional diplomat diplomat
than JD Vance, and his henchman,one of whom was in Kiev the
other day. Dan Driscoll, who is the US Army
(13:52):
secretary, suddenly seems to have got involved.
Yeah, where did he come from? Yeah, exactly.
Well, where he came from was being close to JD Vance and Jay.
And in the administration, the person who dislikes Ukraine the
most, I think is the vice president, JD Vance.
And if you go back to the MunichSecurity Conference the year
(14:12):
before this administration got into office and listened to JD
Vance on a panel. And at that point, he's not even
the running mate or anything. He's just a senator and talking
about Ukraine. And he is very clear.
He says the Europeans are completely deluded.
There is no way Ukraine can win.America has no interest in this
(14:33):
fight. We have no in it.
And you should just or and if you add up all the numbers of
what it would take, the number of missiles, the number, you
know, all of the munitions it would take when it's a complete
waste of time, you should give up now and let it go.
So JD Vance has an almost personal crusade against Ukraine
and against this war. And he really doesn't care if
(14:55):
Russia wins, right? He just doesn't get it.
And of course, that goes along with JD Vance's hostility to
Europe, which was borne out in the Munich after they did get
office. So Driscoll is his man.
And So what we're seeing at the moment from the American side is
this Witkoff, this envoy, he seems to be very naive and very
(15:18):
pro Russia. Then JD Vance's man and then
poor old Marco Rubio trying to do a bit more of traditional
diplomacy coming in at the last minute.
Well, see what this looks like from Moscow and from Kiev, from
Moscow, it looks like a bonanza because they are so brilliant at
negotiating and they know how tomanipulate everybody and
(15:39):
everything. And this lot are just easy.
To play with. Although having said that,
Lindsay, we should just interject quickly that there are
a few wrinkles in the Russian side as well, although not as
serious. You've got Sergey, lover of the
the veteran growly diplomat, youknow, who's been there for
decades, the foreign minister, you know, who thinks he's in
charge of these negotiations. And then you've got KIRO
(16:01):
Dmitriev, who's the head of the Russian sovereign wealth fund,
who was educated at Stanford at Harvard Business School, went to
high school in California for a couple of years as well.
Very, very smart guy. But he was the bloke who was
flown to Miami in October, you know, for long negotiations with
Witkoff, where they came up withthis 28 point plan that everyone
(16:22):
calls it a capitulation document.
But Lavrov hates Dmitriev because he thinks that rather
like, you know, Rubio and Witkoff, he thinks that Dmitriev
is stealing his diplomatic Thunder.
So there was a wonderful scene at one of the summits where they
discussed Ukraine, I think it was a meeting in Saudi Arabia.
And Lavrov had Dmitriev's chair literally removed from the
(16:46):
table. And Dimitrov arrives.
There's no chair for me. Where's the plus wall?
I'm not sitting anywhere. He's very upset.
So he calls his wife, who's a very close friend of Putin's
daughter, because they run a foundation together.
Putin's daughter calls Putin. Putin then rings up Lavrov and
said, put the bloody chair back and Dimitrov is sitting back at
the table. But the point about him is that
because he's a business guy, rather like Witkoff for those
(17:09):
two, they're on a different, they're in a different Galaxy.
Here. It's about deals, making deals.
And one of the things that really upset the German
Chancellor last week for KurdishMats, who was one of the
proponents of using Russia's frozen assets, $350 billion,
whatever it is, you know, to basically rebuild Ukraine after
the destruction caused by the people who used to own that
(17:30):
money, was that, you know, one of the points of the plan, 100
billion of those frozen assets would be kind of invested in
Ukraine, but 50% of the profits would go to the Americans
without them putting out any money.
I mean, it's basically someone called it, you know, a Chatham
House, you know, which is a verysober kind of think tank here in
London, as you know, Lindsay, because you spend a lot of time
(17:51):
there. Their conclusion was mafia style
extortion. And I think that's something
that, you know, many Europeans would agree with.
So there's the sort of financialaspect, the trading aspect of
this whole deal that is always there in the background that
drives a lot of what Trump and his administration are trying to
do. And if you put all that
together, you know, the, the, the impatience of Trump, the
need to get his bloody Nobel Peace Prize, you know, the OK
(18:15):
genuine desire to stop the killing, the transactional
nature of diplomacy, the weakness of of Ukraine after
almost four years of war and Russia not really giving an inch
on its red lines. All that I have to say doesn't
spell anything positive for the future of Ukraine, but also
possibly Europe. Well, let's come back to that.
Let's come back to what it's actually like in Ukraine.
(18:36):
So we've talked about the policy, the internal politics of
all of these three countries, but on these this the original
document which understand now has been changed.
America giving away things whichare not.
It's to give away, you know, Ukrainian territory does not
belong to the US. And so Ukrainian and so although
Ukrainian people understand there's going to have to be
(18:57):
compromised, to be given away inthis way as if they have no
agency of their own is completely unacceptable.
But yes, it is very hard to, it will be very hard for Ukrainians
to live through another winter with what they get, what they
are enduring now. And of course, the other aspect
of it is the possibility of America cutting off intelligence
(19:20):
and weapon supplies. Now, at the moment, the
Europeans are buying American weapons to supply Ukraine.
To some extent, that has become less of an issue because Ukraine
has so many of its own weapons, particularly advanced drones and
unmanned ground vehicles, which,you know, I've reported on
several Times Now. But American intelligence is
(19:45):
still absolutely critical. And one of the most difficult
things at the moment is the missiles and phones that come in
from America and are taking out civilian infrastructure across
the cities. And the Patriot missiles, which
the Americans originally supplied.
The ammunition is running short.But the so every, every time
(20:08):
they fire, it counts and it costs a lot of money.
And they need the American intelligence to know where the
Russian missiles are coming in. And without that intelligence,
then they're firing, firing blind.
So that is where the Ukrainians are extremely are extremely
vulnerable and extremely weak. And so that is why the
(20:28):
Ukrainians are going to have to compromise and they're going to
have to deal with this very thisadministration that goes by by
whim and not by knowledge. Well, Lindsay, thank you so much
for your insights. It's always great to talk to
you, whether it's the Middle East or Russia and Ukraine and
the United States, of course, you know, really fascinating
(20:51):
stuff, and I hope we can do it again.
So, Lindsay, happy Thanksgiving to you, and thank you very much
for coming on Trombol. Well, I'm very happy to say that
we're going to bring in Fiona Hill.
She's very rare as not just a Russia expert, but also someone
who worked for three administrations, Bush, Obama and
Trump won. So she knows how the White House
works. She knows how American foreign
(21:13):
policy can work, and she knows an awful lot about Russia and of
course, currently the situation between Russia and Ukraine and
Europe's response to all this. Fiona, welcome to the program.
Oh. Thanks, Mark.
Great to be with you. There's a lot of stuff going on.
There are lots of moving parts. But if you if you look at today
and you look at where we are andyou compare that to the rest of
(21:35):
the year, do you see a pattern here?
A kind of farango, a dance wherethe Americans talk to the
Russians, or rather Steve Witkoff talks to his friend
Kiril Dmitri. If they agree something, the
Ukrainians and the Europeans throw their hands up in despair.
It goes back to the drawing board.
And then the Russians say no. Yes, I mean, I think at this
(21:56):
point that pattern, that choreography is very apparent.
And, you know, it works very much in Vladimir Putin's favour
because, you know, he feels thatthis is a win, win, win
situation in the terms of, you know, incremental success in the
battlefield, on the front lines in Ukraine, all this success in
(22:16):
the propaganda and information war, the other battlefields
with, you know, Europe and the world writ large.
He's constantly, you know, setting the tone and the tempo
for this, for this dance of thischoreography.
And then, you know, the other win is that, you know, he he
really feels that he's got Trumpwhere he wants him.
I mean, every time Vladimir Putin, you know, calls a dance
move, Trump, you know, gets out there.
(22:37):
I mean, I like that, you know, analogy and that in a metaphor
you've been using though, and comes and dances along with him
and Putin, you know, can kind ofmaneuver him around the dance
floor. Now.
He doesn't always, you know, getto take centre stage here
because again, there's also other people rushing in here,
you know, kind of a sort of European mosh pit changing the,
the whole, you know, more stately choreography here.
But Putin definitely feels, you know, that for him he is on the
(23:02):
front foot where everybody else is on the back foot.
Maybe we've taken that metaphor as far as we can.
By the way, I. Think I think we've.
Exhausted. I have anyway.
We'll try and find. We'll try and find another one
that fits. But but, I mean, you know, we
were all shocked, weren't we, atthe beginning of the second
Trump administration with that very long phone call between
Trump and Putin? And the suspicion was that he
was, that Trump was very much onPutin's side.
(23:23):
Then we had that disastrous meeting in the Oval Office with
Zelensky where Zelensky was mauled by Vance and by Trump.
And then after that, things seemed to move further in
Ukraine's direction. I just wondered where, whether
actually, honestly, nothing has really changed in the last 10
months, whether Trump is still where he was at the beginning of
his second term, more on Putin'sside than Ukraine's side.
(23:45):
Well, of course, lots of things have changed on the battlefields
in horrific fashion, and both Ukraine and Russia are hurting.
I mean Ukraine obviously in visible ways that we can all
see. Just the grinding horror of this
war that we would all like to see end.
And for Putin, things have become uncomfortable.
I mean, people have forgotten now that he had actually an
insurrection against him at one point, you know, during the war
(24:07):
by Yevgeny Pregozian. The late Yevgeny Pregozian.
Very late Yevgeny Pregozian, because of the mass slaughter of
people that he'd recruited the front.
And that has continued unabated.And every incremental gain that
the Russians have made have beenat massive cost.
But as far as the other part of your question is concerned, but
Trump, nothing really has changed.
(24:28):
He has been on Russia's side. And so far as he thinks that
Russia is a great power, Putin is a great man.
He's a strong man. He's somebody that Trump wants
the approval of, just like he wants the same for President Xi.
He doesn't want there just to bea kind of a, a, a dual bromance
there with she and Putin in all of the other world for he wants
(24:49):
that part of the action, you know, for himself.
And Zelensky and Ukraine are an incumbrance.
Zelensky is a lesser being. He's not a wartime president in
Trump's view. He's inevitant.
And he wants to get rid of him just as much as Putin does.
Trump wants to get on with the main action, which is him, you
know, basically dealing with thebig guys on the world stage,
(25:10):
which for him, you know, rather strangely is still Russia, but
also, you know, more evidently also China, most evidently
China. I mean, I think for for Trump,
his idea of what is strong, whatis powerful, you know, and where
he should be putting all of his attention is, you know, slightly
off kilter. When we do a, you know, full
(25:30):
assessment of where things are in the world.
I mean, other major players, be it the Brazilians, the South
Africans, the Indians, you know,Indonesians, you know, many
others would actually say that Russia is a spent force.
It hasn't been able to, you know, get what it wants in the
time that it's set for itself onthe battlefield in Ukraine.
It's getting its ass kicked, youknow, irrespective of how this,
you know, comes out. And all the time we see power
(25:52):
shifting not just to the East interms of East Asia and China,
but to the Middle East and to the fact that all of these
issues of war and peace are now being resolved by players like
Qatar or UAE. Everything is happening in Dubai
or Doha or, you know, Saudi Arabia and the Saudi, you know,
Crown Prince MBS, you know, being the person who's holding
(26:14):
court and holding influence here.
So the United States has ceded so much also of its own power
and influence and respect because Trump has made what I
think is a, you know, pretty fatal miscalculation on where
power lies in the international system.
That's really interesting. I mean, I was in Alaska for that
weird summit. And, you know, Trump only spoke
(26:36):
for three minutes and 25 seconds.
And even his staunchest supporters thought that he
wasn't at the top of his talkinggame or weaving game or any
game. And he must have known after
that that Putin was playing him.So I wonder what you think Trump
thinks is in it for him by beingnice to Vladimir Putin?
Well, look, he thinks again thatPutin is his counterpart.
(26:59):
He can't admit to himself that he's being played.
And you notice that whenever that's pointed out, he gets very
angry and he personally berates anybody who asks him that
question, particularly people who thinks there's a lesser
mortals. And that's journalists,
particularly women journalists. We've seen the way that he
behaves when he's asked uncomfortable questions in other
settings, be it on Air Force One, you know, in the White
(27:21):
House. It's other world leaders who,
you know, he expects to kiss up to him as all the time and to
flatter him and to thank him forfrankly doing something that
doesn't bear thanks at all. I mean, he's actually making
life much more difficult and more uncomfortable for everyone
else. So no, there's no way that he
could possibly admit to himself that he's being played by Putin,
(27:41):
wants more than anything else the adulation, the respect and
the attention of Vladimir Putin.I mean, look, he's rushing to go
to Beijing and to host XI. He wants the spectacle of being
able to do that and being mined and dying bubbly and all of that
golded, gilted splendor of the Kremlin and being able to bring,
you know, Putin to show him, youknow, his kind of equivalent.
(28:04):
Now in the White House. He's playing on a totally
different front. He's playing a game of backroom
politics, deals and splendor andbig state dinners and ballrooms,
and he's not playing on the grubby, dirty battlefield that
everybody else is being, you know, forced to engage on.
I think it was Steve Witkoff when he met Vladimir Putin at
(28:26):
one of his earlier meetings. He said that the Winter Palace
in Saint Petersburg really reminded him of Mara Lago, which
I thought was rather indicative.Yes.
Which came first? Yeah, Which came on?
Well, that Mary Meatherweather post had an obsession with
Russian culture, so maybe, you know, there's no coincidence
there. Mary Meatherweather Post had a
huge collection of Russian art and, you know, built up, you
(28:46):
know, Hillwood Museum, which is based on, you know, basically
what she saw there. So.
But Steve Witkopf wasn't wrong. It's just that he didn't get
understand the context. So when you worked for Trump,
did did the things that you havejust described, the things that
motivate him, did that was that obvious?
And give me some examples of that being obvious.
It became obvious over time. I think, you know, we all can
(29:07):
see now how constrained Trump felt, you know, obviously
fettered, chained, you know, in that first administration, he
was chafing, you know, the bit of being controlled by the HR
McMaster, John Bolton, Rex Tillerson, you know, John Kelly,
you know, you name all the people who have been long
forgotten in many respects, you know, from that first.
He hates, and who hates him? Yes, yes, because they stopped
(29:30):
him from doing what he wants to do and now he has everyone who
is enabling all of his inner instincts.
This is for him. All of this is a transaction in
a deal. And I think it's extraordinarily
evident now when we look back atthe past that, you know, you
look at that original 28 point planner, though I don't know how
original it was and exactly who drew it, but drew it up.
(29:50):
But it was all geared towards making Trump look good as well,
not just of Russian interests ofthe peace board that Trump is
supposed to preside over. I mean, why pick that title
unless you've got the Nobel Peace Prize in mind?
The idea of Trump mediating somehow between NATO and and
Russia, that was in that weird. It's just that the US is no
(30:12):
longer part of NATO, which in Trump's mind has been trying to
get out of from the first round as well.
And when we're seeing this coming to fruition, you know,
now and again, all of these ideas that the frozen assets,
instead of going towards Ukraineand reconstruction, should be
put into some kind of fund that the US and Russia would jointly
(30:33):
preside over. That's very similar to the
minerals deal and everything else that's been put on the
table. And all I'm just saying is you
can see in contrast with where we are now to where it was at
the beginning that all of those attempts to do similar sorts of
things early on were very much constrained, although they were,
you know, basically counter checked, counteracted by people
(30:53):
around him in the first administration.
So we see all the things that hewould have liked to have done
the first time around. And in fact, you know, when we
look back to the infamous phone call that sparked off the first
impeachment, that parallel process that people pointed out
of envoys and emissaries and others doing backdoor deals is
(31:13):
now the main process. It's not in the shadows.
It's out in front. So Trump, you know, has been
given credit by a lot of people,and I think even by you for
getting the ball rolling. But of course, the ball has
rolled mostly in Russia's direction.
Then it rolls back again a little bit in Ukraine and
Europe's direction. Do you think that the
Ukrainians, and indeed the Europeans by extension, would
(31:36):
have been better off if Trump hadn't done anything at all?
Well, look, I mean, these are the kinds of counterfactual kind
of questions that we'll probablyhave a bit more attempt at being
able to answer years from now, you know, when we we get
actually more of a sense of exactly what's happened.
I mean, right now we're all in the fog of war.
I mean, it is very important to find a way of ending this war.
So, you know, and I think that Trump is probably one of the
(31:59):
main people on the world stage who genuinely wants to end the
slaughter. Putin doesn't.
I mean, the Ukrainians obviouslydo.
But, you know, as they said, notat the expense of their survival
and as a country in their dignity and respect and all the
rest of it. But the problem is that Trump is
always driving this for his own priorities and his own timeline.
(32:20):
He's not got the interests of the Ukrainians uppermost apart
from obviously the the the deathon the battlefield.
And he's certainly not thinking about the long term implications
for European or, you know, larger global security and about
what it might mean if Putin is able to show that war wins, that
you can be successful no matter how high the cost at pursuing a
(32:41):
war to what you want to be its logical conclusion.
That's a terrible message, you know, to send at a time when
there are so many wars raging half the time that we're not
even paying attention to, you know, in Africa.
And you know, we're seeing all the, you know, slaughter there
place like Sudan and elsewhere. And when you're thinking about
what the implications of this might be for other places, and
if you're AUS ally at this point, if you're South Korea, if
(33:04):
you're Japan, if you're Taiwan, that is in that, you know,
strange, ambiguous, you know, position and you're looking what
the US is doing here. You've got to think, well, the
US is never going to have my interests at heart.
He's that's always or under Trump going to bow towards the
interests of the bigger power. And then and Trump's through,
there are only two other big powers in the world, and that's
China and Russia, which is, again, is somewhat odd because
(33:27):
Russia isn't in that position anymore.
It's not the Soviet Union. But Trump still thinks of it
like that. So he doesn't really have any
understanding or empathy for theidea of a sovereign,
independent, viable Ukrainian nation state.
Is that, is that the fundamentalproblem here?
And that if anyone you know who disagrees with them on that
front, like the Europeans, for instance, we also have
(33:47):
geographical skin in the game. He brushes them aside from being
a bunch of freeloaders. I think that's correct because
I'm look and and part of this isEuropeans faults as well since
World War One and the initial, you know, bailing out, as the
Americans would put it or Trump would put it anywhere of, of
Europe after the the 1st war of German invasions and very much
(34:09):
so even more after the Second World War where the United
States took full responsibility for the security and
reconstruction of Europe. You know, the viewpoint is that
Europe hasn't really, you know, had any skin in the game, even
if it might have Geo, you know, political and geographical skin.
But in terms of stepping up on its own security and, you know,
really creating proper independence of being able to
(34:33):
defend themselves. So Trump is of the same view
that Vladimir Putin is about Europe and anywhere else.
You only have sovereignty if youare capable of defending it for
yourself. And the irony of calls is the
Ukraine has been prepared to defend its own sovereignty.
Admittedly, it's needed, you know, a lot of armaments from
other countries. But the Ukrainians have been
tenacious in this, you know, in ways that ought to be
(34:54):
recognised. They're just as fierce and just
as dedicated to the battle as the Russians are.
There's just a complete and utter disproportion in terms of
the power, the manpower, etcetera.
But Trump always moves in the direction of who has, in his
view, the preponderance of power.
And power for him is always defined as a military power and
(35:16):
then also economic and financialpower.
And he looks at Ukraine, says, well, you don't have that.
Right. And I remembered actually
Zelensky when I interviewed and told me nobody likes a loser.
And he he's suddenly spoken English when he said that line.
And that was before Trump was elected.
It was almost, you know, premonition of what was to come.
But I just wonder on Europe, Fiona, I mean, doesn't Trump
have a point on Europe? Not only have there been kind
(35:38):
of, you know, piggybacking in terms of security of the
Americans for a long time, but also even now with Trump
breathing down their neck, you know, with, with Putin on their
doorstep, they're incapable of speaking with one voice.
They can't even get the arms industry to be more coordinated.
They don't have a single line when it comes to the frozen
Russian assets. I mean, this is pretty
(35:59):
disastrous, isn't it? Well, it could be.
I still think there's a chance, but I think you can't get, you
know, to the kind of situation that we're looking for here,
which is again, of Europeans in some formulation getting their
act together. If you start from the top.
And basically what you need to do is get a coalition not just
as the willing but of the capable.
(36:20):
And I think we can look at our Scandinavian counterparts, the
the Baltic states, Poland, thereare a group of countries.
Look you Italy as well, you know, has a very important arms
industry. And we've seen, you know, some
different positions from GiorgioMaloney.
I mean, she is actually seeing here that, you know, maybe
things are not as simple as she herself and her populist guys
(36:40):
would have put things that thereare a lot of risks to the
sovereignty of European countries coming from this.
So I think what you have to do is you have to get a group of
countries that are actually capable of taking action
together in support of Ukraine, but in support of themselves, in
support of Europe. I think there's a joint
Expeditionary force. I've mentioned this, you know,
before in discussions, which, you know, the UK leagues along
(37:00):
with the Scandinavian counterparts.
There is a lot of capability on a smaller scale within Europe
that needs to be tapped into. But I think, you know, the big
problem is now people are in thethrall of both Trump and Putin.
The propaganda war against Europe is coming from 2 fronts
right now from and, and, and China isn't really doing this
(37:22):
and North Korea and Iran, to theextent frankly, that Russia and
the United States are, they're both interfering in European
politics in similar ways and forsimilar ends in so far as Trump
wants to best position U.S. economic, financial and in
industrial interest tech. The tech Bros, you know, kind of
in a way that they can dominate in Europe and wants to have
(37:44):
European populist far right political parties in his own
mold as just, you know, somehow subsidiaries of the US MAGA
movement. And Putin is doing similar sorts
of things, but obviously to completely weaken Europe and for
Russia to be able to dominate and flex it's muscle wherever it
wants to military muscle and, you know, kind of political
(38:05):
muscle. And I think, you know, that what
Trump is not seeing here is it'sstill a battle for Europe, but
Europeans have to gun a rise up here and battle for themselves
as the Ukrainians because Putin and Trump are both interested in
spheres of influence. And right now, I think what
Trump isn't seeing is that Putinwants to call the shots in all
of Europe, not just in Eastern Europe.
He wants to have, you know, thatrecognition that Churchill gave
(38:29):
at Yalta of Eastern Europe beinga a no go zone.
But you know, frankly, that still includes all of the
countries that were formerly in the Eastern Bloc that Putin
would still like to have leverage over.
And he already has it over Hungary and Slovakia.
You can see that very clearly tosome degree to Romania.
And he's putting pressure on theBaltic States and Poland and
(38:50):
also on Finland. We've just got to recognise
what's happening here. And I don't think that the
United States, or at least this isn't the United States, this is
Trump and the people around him fully appreciate that you give
up on Europe. You're kind of basically taking
the US, you know, out of a broader game.
Maybe. I think that's what they want to
do, certainly what JD Vance wants to do.
(39:11):
But it will be to the detriment of the United States, you know,
economically as well as politically.
They're not isolationists in thesense that we think they are,
but they want to play a totally different game.
They want to dominate their own,the Western Hemisphere, be that
Canada, Greenland or, you know, as we've seen what's happening
in Venezuela and they're just kind of, you know, are almost
giving up the ghost, the ghost of America past in Europe at
(39:33):
this particular time. But again, as you said, this is
Trump and JD Vanson their mates.But what about the Republicans
in Congress? What about the Democrats?
I mean, do you think that he hasshifted the debate fundamentally
away from Europe, or are there still Americans out there who
are saying no, no, no, no, this is a really bad idea and
ultimately, we're going to have to get involved again to sort
out the mess. Well, there are, but the problem
(39:54):
is that they've got a mess at home.
So I mean, America is in big trouble at the moment.
I think that's obvious to everyone.
And there's a battle for Americaas well going on.
And it's not just about. You know, ideological left or
right, Democrats versus Republican, It's about the whole
idea of what America is, who areAmericans.
So people like me who are naturalized citizens, Americans
(40:15):
or, you know, do we have to comeoff the Mayflower?
JD Vance, who's, you know, family obviously came at
different points, you know, to Appalachia from different parts
of the United Kingdom and elsewhere, and who's married to
someone, you know, whose family are naturalized, you know, is
basically saying that, you know,you have to have these multiple
generations, you know, going back in America to be an
American. There's a redefinition of what
America is going on right now. There is a battle for America.
(40:38):
And that's kind of where the Democrats and Republicans, who,
you know, might have different views on foreign policy are
finding themselves caught up as well.
I was just recently in Concord, MA, and there are signs all over
Concord, you know, ahead of the 2200 and 50th anniversary of the
American Revolution and independence, basically saying
(41:00):
now it's time it's our turn to fight tyranny.
And it's got, you know, it's the, the, the, the, the image of
the minuteman from the statue from the bridge in Concord.
And I was like, well, OK, I haven't seen those anywhere
else. But it's part of by, you know,
the citizens of Concord, Mass, because this is kind of where we
are 250 years on. The soul of America has been
(41:20):
fought for again. So I think, you know, for the
Europeans and the UK, you're going to have to get on with,
you know, getting your own housein order at this point.
Yeah, but that's easier said than done, isn't it, Because
you've got similar battles goingon in European countries.
You know, they've got the populist right, you know, on the
verge of power in France. They're already in power in
Italy. They might get into power in
Germany. And these are essentially, you
(41:42):
know, forget about whether they're right or left, whether
they're populist or just popular.
These are countries. These are people, parties,
potentially governments that believe in nation states, which
is kind of what Trump believes in as well, what Putin believes
in. And then you're, you know,
you're back to the 19th century across the board.
Exactly. Look, and I think, you know, for
(42:02):
people who would like to live in, you know, kind of more 21st
century States and which we kindof recognize that the world is
much more complex. I mean, it really is very
important to stand up and speak out in these context.
I mean, the whole definition of a nation state is being redrawn
as well. I mean, there, you know, there
there was lots of academic, you know, thinking about these, that
these are all imagined communities.
(42:24):
I felt that about a lot during, you know, my recent, you know,
trips back to North East Englandand looking at, you know, kind
of the flag of Saint George everywhere, you know, for
example, what is England? I mean, that is, that's what's
up, you know, for contention at the moment.
Very lively debate happening. Right.
This is a very lively debate. When you have devolution to
Scotland, you have, you know, cultural autonomy and a bit more
devolution to Wales and, you know, Northern Ireland as well
(42:48):
as, you know, home rule. You know, what is England in
that kind of context? And every country, as you point
out, is going through that, but so is Russia.
And what Russia is trying to do is to define that on the
battlefield in Ukraine and telling Ukrainians that they are
also Russians. So that is also the battle for
who gets the right to define a nation state.
And Europe said we're not doing that again.
(43:09):
We're not going back to these 30years, 60 years, 100 years wars
or that cycle from World War Oneto World War 2, you know, post
imperial fighting for a nation steps.
We've already made our minds up that we're going to move into
somewhere else. So that's, you know, basically
what people are being channelled, challenged to do.
And that's what's happening on Ukraine, on those front lines,
just as much as happening in America and everywhere else.
(43:32):
Yeah. I mean, if you could wear a
T-shirt about wars, it would have been there, done that,
written on it. And what's become obvious from
this conversation is that this is about much more than just
Ukraine. And we get lost in the weeds of
a 28 point plan or a 19 point plan.
But this really is a test case for what kind of Europe, what
kind of world, under what kind of security umbrella we want to
(43:53):
live in. It is absolutely and it's a test
that we've been failing, I wouldsay in large part for the last
100 years because the the very first time that Ukraine got
independence was at the end of World War One.
You know, we and then we cycled through World War 2 and, you
know, we thought we had, you know, things at least just
frozen in place with the Cold War.
(44:13):
And then when we, we get out of the Cold War, we have that whole
idea. You know, we've, we've talked so
many times of the cliche of the end of history, but it wasn't,
it was basically a reversion, you know, to where we'd started
before. This is another chance to get
this right. And, and unfortunately, again,
we look like for all the reasonsthat you've laid out, that we're
going to fail that test again, all that we can hope for, you
(44:35):
know, with the kinds of things that we've done in the passage
is just freeze things in place. And that's what this peace deal
really is. It's about creating buffer
stones. It's creating, you know, the
kind of standoff that is ultimately unstable that we had
for that whole period of the Cold War that we've had, you
know, in various previous pointsin the 19th and 18th centuries.
So look, we've got a chance now to do things different.
(44:56):
And the reason we've got the rise of populism is because
people are unhappy, you know, they're filled with grievance
about, you know, how politics has gone in their individual
countries, that it's not delivering for them.
But look, the message that we all should get, which the
Ukrainians have absolutely got, is you've got to actually deal
with things yourself. You might get some help from the
top or from the outside, but ultimately it's up to you, you
(45:19):
know, to basically decide how things go.
And I think that, again, you know, what we're all going to
have to do is dig deep in all kinds of different levels and
realize that one guy, you know, kind of 1 peace deal, one
anything, is not going to fix things.
It's going to be a tough time ahead for all of us, but we're
just going to have to face up toit.
It's not like, again, as you said, being there, done that.
We've definitely been there before.
(45:40):
And what or who can make Vladimir Putin realize that
actually, ultimately, this mightnot even be in his interest?
I mean, this will end in tears even for him.
Well, a lot of that is up to people inside of Russia as well,
but it is up to all of us to show that he can't go any
further. People have got to stop, you
know, taking bribes. People have got to stop just
(46:02):
taking Russian propaganda and information and American as
well. You know, on face value, stop,
you know, these walls, you know,internally with each other and
and try to actually get kind of some sense of the moment that
we're in and, you know, a bit ofpatriotism about their own
countries and, you know, trying to dig in.
And if Putin thinks that he actually can't manipulate
(46:24):
everybody anymore, it's not justgoing to be about sanctions.
But if he can't just, you know, win the fight for our minds, you
know, and he can't really go anyfurther and he's just making
these incremental gains on the battlefield, you know, maybe he
can be induced to stop. Well, it's going to take a lot
of effort by everyone, not just,you know, one set of people, you
(46:44):
know, in Qatar or UAE or Geneva or wherever it is they've or
Miami, wherever they decided to to meet at the moment.
It's going to take a concerted effort by a lot more people to
really, you know, stop Putin in his tracks.
Trump famously called you the Deep State.
What was it? What did he use?
Stiff with a nice accent. The deep state stiff with a nice
(47:05):
accent. You could argue with a couple of
things in that statement. I'm sure you could.
But, but I mean, the I just wonder as someone who, you know,
was born in this country, then you, you know, you made your
life in your career in the United States.
You still work over here occasionally.
I mean, do you feel completely rootless in this very fragmented
(47:25):
and rather chaotic world? No, I don't actually.
And I I think that that's, you know, obviously, I mean you're
not saying it because of that, but it's usually something that,
you know, people throw out people when they want to kind of
basically say that you don't have a stick.
You know, I know exactly where I'm from.
I'm from the North East of England, you know, which brings
not baggage, but actually, I think a very clear sense of, you
(47:46):
know, kind of what's what and where you are.
And definitely been there, done that before.
And I've been here in the UnitedStates since 1989.
And, you know, I've made a commitment, you know, to stand
up for, you know, what I think is important here because the
United States was a beacon. It was a place that people could
come to and to look to, you know, for eventually, after, you
know, so much machination comingout on the, you know, at least
(48:08):
attempting to come out the rightside of history.
And so many people here in civilsociety, actually in the US
government in all of its, you know, varied forms, we're
actually really striving to improve things and to, you know,
work together with others. And Trump is just tossing all of
that away. And, you know, I think it's very
important at this particular moment to say where your roots
(48:29):
are and what you're trying to stand up for.
And it's just. You're not a citizen of nowhere,
Fiona Hill, You're a citizen of somewhere.
I'm a citizen of two very definitive places.
I'm a dual citizen. And, you know, I think that both
the UK and, you know, the UnitedStates do have a shared history.
So many people have their origins in the UK, not just the
Founding Fathers, but Trump himself, JD Vance.
(48:52):
Many of these are the. I mean, look at the last names
of all of these people who are revolving around Trump.
Perhaps not Witkoff, whose family probably came from
Imperial Russia at some point. But many of the other people
have names of, you know, of the British Isles writ large, be
Irish or Scots or English or Welsh.
You know, here, you know, we're tied together with tethered, you
know, together in history, you know, whether we are, you know,
(49:14):
quite so closely in the future. Sure.
And that famous Cambrian? Marco Rubio, of course.
Well, yes, there's there's that.But anyway, but well, look, I
mean, I think he knows himself also, you know, where he's from.
And and that's what you actuallyhave to remember that America is
a complex place. Perhaps it's not the melting pot
that it was before, but people bring all kinds of different
perspectives as well as heritages to like that has made
(49:37):
it strong in the past. For this effort to get people
to, you know, buy into a whole different view of what America
is, I think it's going to diminish America as we look
forward. That is not its strength.
That is a great weakness. We'll leave it there.
Fiona Hill, thank you very much for your time and happy
Thanksgiving. Thanks so much, Matt.
(49:58):
Some really interesting insightsthere from Fiona Hill, and of
course, before that from LindsayHilson, my international editor
as well. Thanks very much for listening
this week. We'd love to hear your comments.
And we want you to subscribe as well because that really helps
us build up the the Trump World family to make that world even
bigger than it already is. Anushka will be back in the
(50:18):
chair next week. So from all of us here, thank
you very much. That's it from Trump World.
Happy Thanksgiving.
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