April 16, 2025 • 58 mins
What happens when a single switch left in the wrong position turns a routine flight into one of aviation's most haunting tragedies? Join Alice and Zach as they explore the mysterious case of a Boeing 737 that continued flying on autopilot through the clear Mediterranean sky while something invisible and deadly was happening inside. Discover the cascade of small errors and misunderstandings that led to this unique disaster, and learn about the aviation safety changes implemented in its aftermath. Buckle up for one of the eeriest aviation mysteries in recent history.
Sources:
Mayday: Air Disaster documentary series, Season 4, Episode 10
Out of Oxygen! The Tragic Story of Helios Airways Flight 522 by Mentour Pilot
Official accident investigation report
Find FINAL BOARDING CALL online:
Website: finalboardingcallpodcast.com
Instagram: @FinalBoardingCallPod
Facebook: Final Boarding Call
Credits:
Final Boarding Call is hosted by Alice Stern and Zach Stemas, researched and written by Alice Stern, produced and edited by Alice Stern and Zach Stemas.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
(00:00):
Picture this, a Boeing 7 37cruising silently through the
(00:05):
clear blue Mediterranean sky.
From the outside, everythingappears completely normal,
but inside that aircraft andinvisible killer has been at work.
The passengers sitmotionless in their seats.
Oxygen masks dangling in the cockpitboth pilots slump unconscious at their
(00:30):
controls, yet the plane continues tofly empty of conscious life guided
only by its automated systems.
We're about to experience what happenswhen a single switch left in the wrong
position turns a routine flight into oneof aviation's most haunting tragedies.
(00:51):
So stow your tray tables, fastenyour seat belts, and prepare for
some extreme turbulence becausethis is final boarding call.
Hello and welcome to Final Boarding Call.
I am your disaster obsessed host, Alice.
And as always, I am joined by myreluctant homebody husband, Zach.
(01:15):
Hello everybody.
Before we dive in, a quickreminder to our listeners.
Please rate, review and subscribewherever you get your podcasts.
All right, Zach, please buckle up becausetoday's story is really one of the
eeriest aviation disasters in history.
What makes this case so unsettling ishow gradually and quietly it unfolded.
(01:38):
This was not a sudden violent end.
It was really an invisible killerthat did its work over hours while
the plane continued flying, lookingperfectly normal from the outside.
This episode is based on research from afew sources, but primarily you guys know
(01:59):
I love a good Mayday Air disaster episode.
So this was season four, episode10 and an analysis from aviation
Expert Monte pilot and the officialaccident investigation report.
Zach, are you ready for our story?
I'm ready.
What do we have on tap tonight?
The air still holds the warmth ofthe day as the night settles over,
(02:24):
AKA International Airport in Cyprus.
It's August 13th, 2005.
A Boeing 7 37 operated by Helio Airwayshas just landed after a flight from
London and passengers stream through thecabin door into the Mediterranean night.
Thoughts already turning totheir vacations or homecomings.
(02:48):
As the cabin empties, a flightattendant pauses mid check.
She cocks her head listening.
There it is again, an unusual bangingsound coming from the rear service
door on the right side of the aircraft.
She calls over a colleague andtogether they investigate What
they discover is concerning.
(03:08):
The door seal has frozen, which shouldn'thappen during normal operations.
It immediately raises questions aboutthe plane's pressurization system.
Imagine the aircraft as anenormous aluminum can, which is
often what I call planes becausethey really are just tin cans.
(03:32):
And they're designed to carryhumans safely through an environment
where we cannot naturally survive
at cruising altitude.
Which, do you know what a typicalcruising altitude is, Zach?
I think it depends on the kindof travel that you're doing.
But isn't it somewhere around 27,000 feet?
(03:53):
Oh, excellent.
It is typically around 30,000.
We will take 27.
That is excellent.
And the air outside at thataltitude is quite thin.
And if a human is suddenly exposed to it.
Their lungs could an extraction ofoxygen to keep our brains functioning.
(04:13):
We would lose consciousness in secondsand we would die within minutes.
Unless you are Tim Lancaster from ourfirst episode, it would just, oh man, , if
you have not listened to that episode,you gotta go back 'cause it's legendary.
It kind of makes you question, if hewas able to get through it just fine,
(04:34):
and he was fairly lucid for a large partof it, how wrong could the science be?
How many people could breathe upthere for a longer period of time?
Oh, I don't know.
I don't wanna, I don't wanna test it.
I mean, you think about people thatclimb like, you know, crazy Kilimanjaro
or Everest and you know, most ofthem, many of them need supplemental
(05:00):
oxygen once you get up high enough.
I think there are freaky people thatdo it without supplemental oxygen,
but I do not think that's recommended.
Yeah.
I'm not sure what the vertical limitwould be for somebody's breathing.
Well, in any case, sciencerecommends that you don't hang out
at 30,000 feet, and that is why anaircraft is pressurized, because it
creates an artificial atmosphere.
(05:22):
Now here's a question, Zach,if you can remember this.
What is a cabin typicallypressurized to inside of an aircraft?
We mentioned this on our, on our firstepisode, man, I can remember a lot of
things, but I think that was like 6.1.
(05:43):
That was very, very specific.
So you're pretty close.
It typically is around sevento 8,000 feet above sea level.
So it's similar to our elevation.
It's really typical tothe Rocky Mountains.
So that is critical because, you know,spoiler alert, something really bad
happens in this episode and it pertainsto an issue with pressurization.
(06:06):
So back at the airport, the pilotsdutifully note the door seal issue
in the aircraft's logbook, and theypersonally alert Alan Irwin, who is
the British ground engineer on duty.
It's now around one 30 in the morningas Irwin begins his investigation.
And nothing good happensafter one in the morning.
(06:29):
That is way, way too late and orearly to be checking out a plane.
In my humble opinion, I thought it wasnothing good happens after 2:00 AM.
You get a bonus hour for me.
It's nothing good happensafter 9:00 PM but you know me.
I love my sleep.
Alright, picture this scene.
(06:49):
The terminal has grown.
Quiet.
Most flights long sincearrived or departed.
The vast interior of the empty 7 37.
Echoes with Irwin's footstepsas he works alone methodically
checking the pressurization system.
To test it properly, he needs tomanually pressurize the cabin,
something that you can only dowhile the plane is on the ground.
(07:14):
By using a special mode in thesystem, Irwin flips the pressurization
selector switch from its normalauto position to manual, allowing
him to control the system directly.
In this position, he can simulatethe pressure changes the aircraft
would experience during a flight.
(07:34):
He moves through the cabin listeningcarefully for unusual sounds,
checking gauges and indicators,but everything seems fine.
No leaks, no strange noises.
The frozen door seal appears tohave been a one-off random issue.
Satisfied Erwin signs off on theaircraft as air worthy clearing
(07:57):
it for the next day's flight.
But in the dimly lit cockpit, onecrucial detail goes overlooked.
The pressurization selector switchremains in the manual position.
This tiny oversight.
A single switch left in the wrong positionwill very soon lead to catastrophe.
(08:23):
Dawn breaks over Cyprus on August 14th,2005, the sky is clear, promising.
Another beautiful Mediterranean Day.
At the airport, ground crews preparethe Boeing 7 37 for its morning flight
to Prague with a scheduled stopoverin Athens, the aircraft gleams in the
(08:44):
early morning sun is 115 passengersmake their way across the tarmac.
I mean, they are familiesgoing on vacation.
This is children, parents,couples are holding hands.
Elderly people.
Think of all of the people that makeup an average flight in the cockpit.
(09:07):
Captain Hans Jurgen Merton.
A 59-year-old German pilot, and if thatis not a German name, then I dunno,
there's never been a German name ifthat's not one, I, I may have butchered
that, but like that's, there's allkinds of like, dots and dashes and all
(09:28):
kinds of things on this name, but I'm,I'm doing the best I can here folks.
I'm gonna tell you about Hans Hans Gruber.
I am, I'm gonna tell youabout this guy, Hans.
Hans Hergan.
Do you know who Hans Gruber is?
Uh, no.
I don't know who diehard.
(09:49):
Oh my goodness gracious.
Okay.
Jake and Jake Alza would'veknown who Hans Gruper is.
I'm sorry I let you down.
Let me tell you about our Hans.
Our Captain Hans, is a German pilotwith 35 years of flying experience,
and he is reviewing the flight plan.
Beside him, sits his co-pilot,51-year-old pompous Char Lambrose.
(10:14):
Charas a CBRT National.
Between them, they have over 24,000hours of flying time, more than two
and a half years spent in the air.
They are veterans, they're professionalswho have done this countless times before.
As the passengers settle into theirseats, the pilots run through
(10:35):
their pre-flight checklist, which,you know, covers 80 separate items.
Eight of those involvethe pressurization panel.
The checks are designed to catchany potential issues before takeoff.
Yet somehow the mispositionedpressurization mode selector that's
(10:57):
in manual currently goes unnoticed.
Perhaps it's the early hour.
Perhaps it's the routine natureof the flight, or perhaps it's
human error, whatever the reason.
Both pilots end up missingthis critical detail.
With all checks apparently completed,the pilots start the engines.
(11:20):
The familiar wine of the turbines spoolup and the aircraft pushes back from
the gate and taxis towards the runway.
At 9:07 AM local time heus flight5 2 2 thunders down the runway.
It lifts into the morning sky and itbegins what should have been an extremely
routine three hour journey to Athens.
As the aircraft climbs steadily towardsits cruising altitude of 34,000 feet.
(11:45):
No one realizes that witheach passing minute, a very
serious problem is developing.
With each foot of altitude gained,the cabin is failing to pressurize
well, that's not exactlywhat you'd want there.
No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no.
(12:06):
It's about to get really bad.
Even before we dive into all that.
Yeah.
You know, we've already said that.
There are five different parts of thechecklist that are all on this panel.
Eight.
Eight or eight.
Yes.
Eight different things.
Eight.
And like one, the guy servicingit probably is supposed to
put it back exactly as it was.
(12:26):
Oh, our buddy Erwin.
Dammit.
Erwin.
And two, how the pilotsdon't see this switch.
I don't know how many switches thereare specifically for pressurization,
but there can't be more than Iwould think, 10 or 12 for it.
There are eight checks that are specificto the pressurization panel, but there
(12:50):
are 80 separate items on this checklist.
Obviously when you're flying aplane, there's a lot of shit to
check and you wanna check your shit.
Um, but 80 is a lot.
And if you have done that thousands oftimes, you know, at some point I'm sure
that it's just like, check, check, check.
We've flown this plane a bajilliontimes and we've never had an issue.
(13:13):
So beep, beep, boop, boop.
We're good.
Done.
I'm sure that's completely fair.
I mean, we're all supposed to Yeah.
Check the oil in our carsand check the tire pressure.
Yeah.
Before we go driving too.
But we just drove it the day before.
We know that.
It's fine.
Mm-hmm.
Exactly.
Yes.
Except this is a planewith 121 passengers.
Just five minutes into the flight,as the aircraft climbs through
(13:37):
12,000 feet, a warning hornsuddenly blares in the cockpit.
The sound is sharp and urgent.
It is the cabin altitude warning,a critical alert telling the pilots
that the air pressure inside of theplane has dropped to the equivalent
of 10,000 feet above sea level,which is beyond the safe threshold.
(14:00):
Instead of recognition, there'sconfusion on the Boeing 7 37.
This warning horn sounds identicalto another alert, the takeoff
configuration warning, which goesoff if pilots try to take off without
properly configuring the aircraft.
(14:21):
You cannot make this shit up, folks.
You're already flying.
It's not that one, but like howinsane is it that there are two very
important alerts that sound exactlythe same, like we couldn't have
come up with any other alert sound.
(14:42):
You are kidding me.
They have the exact same alert sound.
Well picture that there's three majoralert sounds that humans will hear.
You have police trucks and ambulancesand cop cars, and not everybody can
tell which is which when you can'tsee it from, you know, a mile away
(15:03):
when you first start hearing it.
Yeah.
But it's also not like your professionaljob to know that it is these pilot's
jobs to know the alerts that arehappening inside of the plane.
Is the sound actuallyidentical or is it just close?
Oh no, it's identical.
So if we put ourselves in thesepilots position just for a moment,
(15:25):
we have had a normal takeoff.
We are well into our climb, and suddenlyan alarm sounds that to our ears is
associated with a takeoff problem.
It would be like hearing yourmorning alarm in the middle of the
afternoon and it would be verycognitively confusing and alarming.
(15:46):
I have had it happen where sometimes Iwill set my alarm on accident for 6:00
PM instead of 6:00 AM and then at 6:00 PMmy alarm goes off and it is very jarring.
That's an issue whenyou're piloting a plane.
Confusion is deadly.
Instead of recognizing the warning forwhat it actually is, an alert about
dangerous cabin pressure levels, thepilots focus on trying to understand why
(16:10):
they're hearing what they fully believeis a takeoff configuration alarm going off
at a time when it shouldn't be possible.
Minutes later, more warnings appear.
Two equipment cooling lights labeledoff illuminate on the cockpit panel.
The master caution light also comes on.
(16:31):
God, this is likethey're driving a Subaru.
She's like, every lighton that dash is going off.
Folks, I can say that'cause I erase a Super s St.
I, so I'm in it.
These are further symptoms ofthe pressurization problem.
The low air density is affectingthe cooling systems for
(16:52):
the aircraft's electronics.
By now, the aircraft is passingthrough 16,000 feet and Captain
Merton is concerned enough to contactHelios Airways Dispatch for help.
Over the audio, he explains thata takeoff configuration warning is
sounding and that there's an issuewith the equipment cooling system.
(17:16):
The dispatcher unable tosolve this technical problem
connects Merton to Alan Irwin.
Who's Alan Irwin?
The same guy that said everything isfine and then left the switch in manual.
The same, the same guy who isthe, cause you know, we don't
(17:36):
wanna put blame, but I, okay.
Anyways, they're now connected.
This is a crucial conversation and it istaking place as the aircraft continues to
climb higher and higher into thinner air.
Captain Hans Jurgen Merton, whosefirst language is not English,
(18:01):
is trying to explain the issue.
This is a quote, the takeoffconfiguration warning.
And the equipment cooling lights are off.
That's his direct quote.
The takeoff configuration warning andthe equipment cooling lights are off.
Well, that's not the job thatI have, but it sounds like
(18:22):
he's saying everything is fine.
What's going on?
we have a communication issue forsure, because what he probably means
is that the warning lights labeled offare illuminated, indicating a problem.
But what it comes across as, and whatErwin kind of understands is exactly
(18:45):
what you said, Zach, that like thecooling lights are off, which is good.
That's their normal state.
So confused.
Irwin asked for clarification.
Can you confirm exactlywhat the problem is?
Merton Responds, theyare not switched off.
(19:07):
His meaning is still unclearas precious minutes tick by.
During this confusing exchange,something very critical happens
that nobody notices the aircraft ispassing 14,000 feet and the cabin
oxygen masks automatically deploy,dropping down in front of very startled
(19:29):
passengers because this is a very.
Smooth, normal flight.
Could you imagine?
You're just in an airplane.
It is cruising around.
It's climbing, it's gaining altitude.
There is no turbulence.
There is no indication thatanything wrong and then just like
surprise the oxygen masks drop.
(19:50):
Yeah, even me in that situation,I would probably wouldn't think
to put it on, I feel fine.
Everything's going fine.
Just be like, huh, what happened?
A hundred percent?
You would probably assume that it'sjust like a weird bloop a warning
light labeled pass oxy on illuminateson the overhead panel, but in the
(20:10):
confusion of dealing with the otherwarnings, the pilots don't see it.
The big pass oxy on.
Illuminated sign.
What the pilots also don't realizeis that they are already experiencing
the effects of hypoxia, which is avery fancy word for oxygen starvation.
(20:31):
When you can't get enough oxygen intoyour bloodstream, bad things happen in
your body, because we need oxygen and yourbrain is affected first and most severely.
The truly terrifying thing abouthypoxia is how it undermines your
ability to recognize what is happening.
(20:53):
So it doesn't really announce itselfwith pain, with super obvious symptoms.
It literally is.
Basically like you're kind of drunk,you get impaired judgment, confusion,
you have difficulty with complex tasks.
I don't know, does it turn,turn you into a toddler?
(21:14):
It sounds like our two yearolds, would you say that flying
is in fact a complex task?
I would say that flying islike a hella complex task.
So basically our pilot's brainsare slowly shutting down, and
they are losing their ability torecognize that anything is wrong.
(21:35):
It is similar to carbon monoxide poisoningin that it is silent, it is completely
painless, and it is absolutely deadly.
So the aircraft is continuing to climb.
It's still gaining elevation andthe oxygen situation in the cockpit
is deteriorating extremely rapidly.
(21:58):
Suspecting that the pilots mightbe looking at the wrong indicator,
Erwin asks a very crucial question.
Can you confirm that the pressurizationmode selector is set to auto?
Do you think this guyhad like a gut feeling?
'cause that feels like a weirdYeah, I mean there hasn't been
(22:18):
that much to directly point to it.
It's almost like he realizedwhat had happened and he's
like, Hey, kind of thing.
Just wanna make sure.
Yeah, I'm wondering if hekind of had an oh shit moment.
which is terrifying.
This would be like if I set Zach out ontrack at one of his drift events and.
When he's driving, I am in chargeof changing his wheels out.
(22:41):
And this would be like me sendinghim out and then realizing I
didn't twerk any of his luck nuts.
And he's just out there ripping andI'm like, Ooh, that wheel's about
to just pop right off the car.
Oh, that works out.
Except there are a ton ofpassengers in this plane.
This question, which might have savedeverybody on board if it was properly
(23:03):
addressed, never receives an answer.
Captain Merton, his thinkingalready compromised by
hypoxia, completely ignores it.
Instead, he asks Irwin where the equipmentcooling circuit breakers are located.
It is very clear that his cognitiveabilities are severely impaired.
(23:24):
He is fixating on the wrong issuewhile missing the critical one.
Meanwhile, the aircraft continues.
Its relentless climb.
Okay, so guess whataltitude we're at right now?
I'm gonna guess somewhere around 19,000.
We are at 29,000 feet.
(23:45):
Wait, weren't we just at 17?
Confused?
Yeah, but they've been havingall these conversations.
Okay.
And they're still gainingelevation during this whole thing.
I mean, the oxygen masks havepopped everybody's disoriented.
So we are now at 29,000 feet, and thecabin altitude is somewhere between
(24:06):
24,020 6,000 feet, which is whatmountaineers call the death zone.
It is where human life absolutelycannot be sustained for long
without supplemental oxygen.
You know, If we try to kind of putourselves inside of this aircraft,
most of the passengers having seenthe oxygen masks drop would've
(24:27):
put them on as instructed, right?
You stated that you probablywould just be like, what?
Like everything's fine.
I don't.
Oh, that's weird.
That seems really odd.
But many passengers probably wouldhave actually put on the oxygen
masks if they fell in front of them.
(24:47):
Some are probably panicking.
Others trying to help familymembers or seat mates.
Flight attendants would be movingthroughout the cabin, assisting
where needed while using theirown portable oxygen supplies.
So this is actually really cool, andI did not know about this before I
researched this episode, but flightattendants have portable oxygen supplies.
(25:11):
During emergencies, it's probably handy.
It makes so much sense and Ijust never thought about that.
So now you know, but those passengeroxygen masks are only designed
to provide 12 minutes of oxygen,
This is a theme that keeps comingback that's really critical.
They are not forever oxygen masks.
(25:32):
They are only supposed to provideenough oxygen to bring the
airplane down to an elevation.
Yeah, exactly.
Where people can breathe.
Again it is supplemental oxygen.
However, our flight continues toclimb the autopilot, guiding it to its
(25:54):
programmed cruising altitude of 34,000feet in the cockpit tragedy unfolds.
Captain Merton apparently attemptingto locate the circuit breaker Irwin
mentioned, gets out of his seat, butimmediately collapses from oxygen
(26:15):
deprivation before he can do anythingfirst Officer Shari Lambos loses
consciousness around the same time,still strapped into his seat by 9:30
AM roughly 20 minutes after takeoff,the aircraft reaches 34,000 feet.
And levels off.
Continuing on its programmedroute towards Athens.
(26:39):
Air traffic controllers tryrepeatedly to contact the flight,
but they receive no response.
The autopilot oblivious to the unfoldingdisaster continues to guide the silent
aircraft across the Mediterranean.
When flight 5 2 2 reaches Athens,it doesn't begin descending for
(27:01):
the scheduled stopover withoutmanual input from the pilots
the autopilot maintains altitudeand begins to circle in a holding
pattern over the island of Kia, about65 kilometers southeast of Athens.
This is a passenger jet flying in perfectcircles at 34,000 feet, making loop after
(27:27):
loop in the clear blue sky while airtraffic controllers grow increasingly
alarmed at the lack of communication.
By this time, most of thepeople on board have likely lost
consciousness due to hypoxia.
The only sounds in the cabin wouldbe the steady hum of the engines
and the hiss of rushing air.
(27:49):
This is not a plane that I wanna be on.
No, this is truly terrifying.
Obviously, air traffic control, justseeing a plane looping and looping
and looping and not doing anythingelse they're going to realize
that something is wrong prettyquickly and nobody's responding.
(28:09):
Nobody wants to stay in a holding pattern.
Mm.
Especially at thatelevation for that long.
Normally, by the time you roll in nearan airport where you would circle, I
would guess you would already be droppeddown somewhere in the low twenties.
Oh yeah, a hundred percent.
We are now in Greek territory, obviously.
So Greek authorities they notice thisvery bizarre behavior in an aircraft.
(28:33):
This is post nine 11.
What do you think their thoughts are?
Somebody has hijacked the plane 100%.
It immediately raises redflags for a terrorism concern.
And they are.
Very close to a major population center.
So the clock is ticking as they needto decide how to respond to this.
(28:53):
So now it is 11:00 AMand it's Sunday morning.
We're checking in on our plane, andnearly two hours has gone by where
the Helio flight has been flying onautopilot, completely unresponsive
(29:14):
to any communication attempts.
The situation has escalated to the highestlevel of Greek government, so inside of
air traffic control center in Athens,controllers stare intently at radar
screens showing the aircraft's methodicalcircles like freakishly perfect circles.
Bones are ringing.
(29:35):
Military civilian authorities.
Everybody's super concerned andeverybody knows that something is wrong
with this flight, but nobody knowsexactly what is wrong, so they decide
that they need to get eyes in the air.
They send two F 16 fighter jets fromthe niaa, Ankylos Air base with orders
(30:00):
to intercept the mysterious flight.
The fighters thunder into the sky.
The pilots receiving theirusual mission briefing.
It's giving top gun.
Especially with the Fsixteens, I mean, come on.
If this is not Maverick and Goose,well now Rooster, their briefing is
(30:22):
to locate and identify the airliner,assess the situation, and be prepared
to take further action if necessary.
Which is so scary.
Does that mean that theywould shoot down this plane?
Like if they confirmed that itwas a, if they confirmed it was
terrorists, I'm sure they would.
Oh my God, that is terrifyingin a whole nother way.
(30:43):
20 minutes later, the F sixteens reachedthe Boeing 7 37, which is beginning
its sixth loop in the holding pattern.
The fighters take up positionaround the airliner, one behind it.
Ready to respond if necessary.
Again, that makes me nervous.
The other, moving in closerfor a visual assessment.
(31:05):
Here's what the fighterpilots were thinking.
Option one a hijacking thatis what they're prepared for a
terrorist attack or a hijacking.
Option.
Two, a technical failure.
I don't think they wereprepared for option three.
Well, I think with all the safetychecklist, that's just not even something
that they really thought possible.
(31:26):
The fighter pilot signals hispresence to the seven 30 sevens
crew, but there is no reaction.
He checks the exterior of theaircraft looking for any signs
of damage, but there is none.
The plane appears perfectly intact.
Moving and even closer.
Close enough to see throughthe cockpit windows.
(31:46):
I mean, remember this guy's inan F 16, so he's got the power
he looks inside of the aircraft.
I am about to describe what he saw.
And, I just wanna give a fair warning.
This is pretty chilling.
The cockpit is dark except for theglow of instrument panels and the first
officer's seat sits a motionless figureslumped forward against his restraints.
(32:12):
The captain's seat appearsempty behind them in the cabin.
Oxygen masks dangle from the ceilingswaying gently with the aircraft's
movement through the passenger windows.
The fighter pilot can make outseveral passengers completely still.
Some wearing oxygen masks, others,not all apparently unconscious.
(32:39):
That's definitely a rough visual.
It's horrible.
And this is really the momentwhen the intercepting pilots fully
understand what they are witnessing.
It's a ghost plane, an aircraftflying completely on autopilot while
everyone aboard is incapacitatedor possibly already dead.
They immediately radio this discoveryto their base for another 14 minutes.
(33:08):
The F sixteens shadow theairliner as it continues its
circular pattern through the sky.
The fighter pilots know whatwill eventually happen, what's
gonna eventually happen, Zach.
Can you take a guess?
Eventually that plane is gonna runout of fuel and come crashing down.
That's unfortunately exactlywhat is going to happen.
(33:29):
So really all that they can do ismonitor the flight path and ensure
that it doesn't threaten populatedareas when the inevitable occurs.
But then at 11:49 AMsomething unexpected happens.
One of the F 16 pilots noticesmovement in the cockpit.
(33:52):
What, I apologize if you canhear the pit bull snoring.
He just loves being part of this podcast.
Someone has entered andtaken the captain's seat.
Well, now I'm a little bit more hooked.
Were you bored before?
No, it's just I was certainthat I knew exactly where it was
(34:16):
going, and then suddenly there'ssomebody that's still conscious.
It's unbelievable.
But yes, this person has what appearsto be a portable oxygen bottle
and mask, and seems to be tryingto take control of the aircraft.
This unbelievable development would laterbe identified as the actions of Andreas
(34:40):
promo, a 25-year-old flight attendant.
Somehow Andreas had managed to remainconscious throughout the ordeal by
using portable oxygen bottles meantfor cabin crew during emergencies.
What makes this moment especiallyjust unbelievable, is that apparently
(35:01):
he had some flight experience.
He held a private pilot's license, and hedreamed of becoming a commercial pilot.
In this moment of crisis, hewas attempting to use that
limited knowledge to save theaircraft and everyone on board.
Well, big stoked for Andreas.
Let's do this.
Yes, big stoked for Andreas, however.
(35:24):
Fate is cruel.
Just as Andreas takes the controls,the aircraft's, left engine flames out.
It has run out of fuel.
After nearly three hours of flight,with only one engine providing thrust,
the plane begins to turn and descend.
(35:47):
Andreas with his minimal trainingand in such dire circumstances,
faces an almost impossible task.
I do not wanna put myself inthe guise to, because this is
the worst situation to be in.
We apologize, guys.
The, the hippos getting booted fromthe bed because he's a snorty boy.
(36:08):
It's all right.
He has a memory foam dog bed.
Don't feel too bad, but it's not the same.
It's not the same.
This story is so sad and sofrustrating, but the worst person
to be on this flight is Andreas.
100%.
I would much rather be past the F out,like in the plane, having no idea that
(36:36):
my life is about to end rather thanthis poor guy who has full comprehension
of exactly what's about to happen.
I just wanna know.
I mean, they were in the airfor what, three hours total?
Yeah.
Yeah.
What I mean he clearly had an idea ofwhat was going on because most people
(36:56):
were having some pretty serious issues.
20 to 30 minutes in what tookhim so long to go to the cockpit.
I dunno.
And as you will find out, we will notbe able to question him, because this
story does not have a happy ending.
Within minutes, the 7 37 crosses over theGreek island of Evia descending rapidly.
(37:23):
So one of the F sixteensdraws close and witnesses.
Andreas apparently trying to rouse theunconscious first officer without success.
So yeah, his brain shut down.
He's not waking up.
No, he is absolutely not waking up.
So shortly after that, theaircraft's right engine also
(37:45):
runs outta fuel and shuts down.
So now it is gliding.
It does not have power.
It begins to descend quite rapidly.
And in this moment.
Andreas acknowledges the nearby fighterpilot for the first time, responding
to a hand signal with a gesture ofhis own pointing downward, indicating
(38:06):
that the aircraft is going down andthere is nothing that he can do.
That's a rough spot to be in.
I just, like you said, I mean, he hasthe worst position of anybody right now.
Sure.
But that feeling of beinghelpless is just terrible.
Oh my God.
It's horrible.
I feel so bad for this guy.
The F 16 pilot signals for him actually tofollow to the airport, but it's too late.
(38:31):
The aircraft now crossing back ontomainland Greece, turns sharply to the
left heading along the coast, northeastof Athens, realizing that a crash is
imminent, the f sixteens pull away.
And in the final moments, flight datasuggests that Andreas attempted to pull
up just before impact, perhaps hopingto ease the aircraft into the ground.
(38:56):
But there's no engine power.
So there's, there's no reversethrust, no wing breaks.
No, you got nothing.
There's nothing.
You are literally in afalling can with wings.
At 12:04 PM roughly three hours aftertakeoff Helios flight, 5, 2 2 slams
into a hillside near the village ofgrammatical, about 40 kilometers northeast
(39:22):
of Athens, and it bursts into flames.
The F 16 pilots radio in thecrash location and emergency
services rushed to the scene.
Despite the very quick responseby fire crews and ambulances,
there are no survivors.
All 115 passengers and six crewmembers have perished either from
(39:47):
hypoxia long before the crash,which God, I, I hope because that.
It's a much better way to goout or from the crash itself.
That's just, that's such a largenumber of people to be gone from
what seems like such a silly error.
Oh yeah.
This is an aviation disaster.
(40:09):
It's so horrific.
The ghost plane has completed its tragicjourney in the aftermath of the crash.
Investigators from Greece, Cyprus, theUnited States and Boeing, all converged
on the wreckage site to begin thepainstaking process of determining.
What went so terriblywrong with flight 5, 2, 2.
(40:34):
I mean, the crash scenescorched a hillside.
It was strewn with debris.
Emergency workers were carefullydocumenting and collecting
evidence, investigators examiningevery piece of wreckage for clues.
And of course, their firstpriority is to find what
(40:54):
the black box.
Yes.
And what color is a black box?
Not black.
It's typically orange.
Yeah.
Yes.
That's a memory on me right there.
No, that's a fun trivia factthat everybody can bring
to their next happy hour.
So it is critical that they find thatblack box, so the flight data recorder.
(41:18):
Confirms the aircraft's path and the pathwas a normal climb after takeoff level,
flight at 34,000 feet, and then of course,the fatal descent after fuel exhaustion.
The cockpit voice recorder providessomething even more valuable, the
sounds and conversations from thecockpit, including that critical
(41:43):
exchange between the pilots and ourmaintenance engineer, Alan Erwin.
You probably picked up the differencesin their voices too, as they were just
kinda getting drowsy and out a it.
Yes, yes.
That is exactly whatthey're going to discover.
So they listen repeatedly to the cabinaltitude warning horns sounding at 9:12
AM just five minutes after takeoff,they hear the confusion in the pilot's
(42:09):
voices as they misinterpret the warning.
They listen to the back and forthwith Erwin, noting how the captain
ignores the crucial question aboutthe pressurization mode selector.
And finally near the end of therecording, they hear several mayday
calls, presumably made by Andreasduring his desperate attempt to save
(42:33):
the aircraft in its final minutes.
As they examine the wreckage,investigators focus primarily on the
aircraft's pressurization system.
The position of the pressurizationmode selector switch became a
key point of debate engineer.
Alan Irwin claims that he reset it toauto after the maintenance check, but
(42:53):
the physical evidence suggests otherwise.
No, you didn't, guy.
Nobody wants to be that guy who'slike, yeah, I swear I did it.
Swear the bolts were the right size.
I swear.
What's so scary as we dive more and moreinto episodes is just how like these tiny
minute details can be so catastrophic.
(43:17):
One switch.
This is one switch in the airplaneand everyone died when they
recover the switch, it is found,turned past the manual position.
So this raises questions, didit twist during the impact?
But the data from the electronicpressure control system provides
purely conclusive evidence.
(43:37):
The outflow valve had been fullyopen from takeoff, preventing
crab end pressurization.
So think of this like a balloon.
So the outflow valve is essentially acontrolled leak that regulates how much
air stays inside the balloon, right?
(44:00):
That's my balloon soundin a automatically.
That was the worst balloon sound.
Get off me guy.
In automatic mode, the systemcarefully adjusts this valve to
maintain just the right pressure asthe aircraft climbs and descends.
But in manual mode with the valveopen, it is like trying to inflate a
(44:23):
balloon that has a gigantic hole in it.
It's not possible
Digging deeper.
Investigators discoversomething else troubling.
This aircraft in particularhad experienced pressurization
issues in the past.
This system's memory stored data fromprevious 74 flights revealing a pattern
of excessive leakage, consistentwith the crew reports of problems
(44:47):
with the right rear service door.
Do you remember the door?
That was weird.
How many of the flights had issueswith it, or all of the last 74 were
conclusively showing some issue with it?
It may have been all 74 flights because itrevealed a pattern of excessive leakage.
(45:08):
A pattern, excessive leakage.
That's just another person that didn'tfeel like doing their job that day.
Yes.
This suggests that while theimmediate cause of the accident was
the mispositioned switch, there weresevere underlying maintenance issues
that were not properly addressed.
Every person that ever workedon that plane, you're fired.
(45:30):
I mean, it's really bad.
So the investigators are piecing togetherthe sequence of events and here are the
main things that caused this accident.
First, the routine checks before takeoff.
Number one, the pilots should havechecked and seen that the pressurization
(45:50):
mode selector was in manual.
How did two very experiencedpilots miss this?
Yeah.
What's the other thing?
That they are both veterans.
Yes.
You've been doing it that long.
You could almost just take a glanceat the panel and see something
different than what it usually is.
Second, when the cabin altitudewarning horns sounded after takeoff,
(46:12):
the pilots misinterpreted that asa takeoff configuration warning.
This confusion prevented themfrom taking the right action
immediately, putting on oxygen masksand descending to a safe altitude.
Was this a training issue or is it adesign flaw Having two identical sounding
(46:33):
warnings for very different emergencies?
I understand the theory for havingdifferent tones for different kinds
of emergencies, but in my opinion,if you hear a warning sound,
you check everything thoroughly.
Not just assume thatit's for this one thing.
I mean, I guess, but you know whatI'm learning, and as all these pilots,
(46:55):
please chime in and tell me I'm wrong,but what I'm, what I'm learning as I
research these episodes is that thereare different alarm sounds for different.
Issues.
And that is really importantbecause pilots are trained to
recognize the sounds and associatethem with different problems.
(47:15):
And the reason that that's importantis because you need to quickly
be able to react to something.
So if, you know, if you hear a wha,wha wha and that's 10 different things.
You don't have time tocheck 10 different things.
You need to know that WWWis this particular issue,
and go fix that immediately.
Does that make sense?
It it does.
(47:35):
It just makes me question, onceagain are the sounds actually
identical or are they just too close?
They are identical.
They're identical.
Identical.
Not close.
They are identical.
They're the same sounds.
Here's our next issue, Alan.
When he specifically askedabout the position of the
pressurization mode selectorduring the in-flight conversation.
(47:55):
Captain Merton failed tocheck this critical switch.
So one Alan probably should haveasked earlier in the conversation
two, by this point, it seemspretty likely that our captain was
already suffering from hypoxia.
Yeah, absolutely.
Yeah.
He was not coherent enough toreally, I mean, he completely
(48:16):
avoided the question, so, yeah.
And finally, the airlines trainingprocedures came under scrutiny.
Had the crew been adequatelyprepared to recognize and respond to
pressurization emergencies, particularlythe insidious symptoms of hypoxia,
could this issue have been prevented?
It's really hard to say that itcould have been prevented because.
(48:40):
Really there were multiple factorsthat contributed all to this one big
issue, and in theory, yes, it couldhave been prevented, but really I think
the key at that point is to be able todrop the altitude with the autopilot.
If it is recognizing that cabin pressuredrop, I think that should be a program.
(49:01):
Mm.
That's a really interesting thought.
Yeah, I mean that, that argument'sreally tough because it's one of
those things where it's like areyou supposed to recognize when
you are not thinking clearly?
Are you expected to have thecognitive ability to determine when
you are losing cognitive ability?
You need to be able to diagnose yourself.
(49:22):
Yeah.
While you're not able to think.
Yeah.
That's kind of a toughie.
That one's a tough one.
The investigation also examinedthe heroic, but ultimately
futile actions of Andreas.
What a hero that guy really was.
So evidence suggested that heused portable oxygen bottles
to maintain conscious muchlonger than others on board.
His presence in the cockpit in thefinal minutes showed remarkable
(49:45):
courage and presence of mind.
But obviously by then theaircraft was going down.
There was nothing that he could do.
So here is the final report.
The investigators made severalrecommendations to prevent similar
tragedies from happening in the future.
One key recommendation wasthat Boeing update, the 7 37
maintenance manual to ensure thatthe pressurization mode selector
(50:09):
is returned to auto after testing.
That's saying for like theengineer that comes on.
Mm-hmm.
So that wasn't something that he wasnecessarily supposed to do before he
was allowed to switch things, do histesting, and then however is left.
It's supposed to becaught in the checklist.
Yes.
But we're about to do kind of a measuretwice cut once fix here, where you
(50:31):
gotta check for auto two times.
So they also recommended installingdifferent sounding warning horns
for the takeoff configuration in thecabin altitude warnings to prevent
confusion between those critical alerts.
Highly logical choice.
Thank you.
Like that.
I could not be, whatever.
(50:52):
I couldn't believe it, but it's fine.
I mean, even cars don't have.
The same sounding horns.
Every car has two horns.
It's ridiculous.
The crash of the Helio Airways flight5 22 left deep scars, particularly
on Cyprus with 121 victims.
(51:13):
107 of them from Cyprus, 12 of themare from Greece the impact on the
small island nation was devastating.
In Laca that August evening, familieswho had waved goodbye to loved ones,
gathered at the airport, eventuallyreceiving the tragic confirmation
(51:35):
that there were no survivors.
The human toll was immense withentire families perishing together.
In a close knit community where almosteveryone knew someone who was affected.
For Helios Airways, the disastermarked the beginning of the end.
Cyrus's first private carrier facedintense scrutiny after the crash.
(51:58):
By November, 2006, just over a yearlater, it was restructured as aje
and then it fully shut down in 2007.
The legal aftermath was verycomplex, so several individuals
faced criminal charges, including,
including the engineer,Alan, Alan, including Alan.
(52:20):
You know, I'm terrible with names.
No, but that couldn't even possiblycome close Alan Irwin, however.
Alan was actually acquitted.
Four senior Helios officials wereinitially sentenced to 10 years.
Whoa.
Yes.
But it sounds hefty, butalso over a hundred people.
(52:42):
Oh yeah.
However, their convictionswere overturned in Greece.
Five defendants were found guiltyof manslaughter by negligence.
The prolonged legal battles highlightedthe difficulties of assigning individual
responsibility for systemic failures.
That's the thing is I have.
A hard time justifying Alan goingto prison as well, because like you
(53:08):
said, it was not in his requirements
to flip that switch back.
Mm-hmm.
So technically, because that is not inhis requirements, it wasn't his fault.
I mean technically you arecorrect, but people love
having someone to blame, right.
Like that is human nature is havingsomebody to be really mad at when
(53:29):
a really shitty thing happens.
Yeah.
And that's about as shitty as it gets.
I mean, whole families.
Yes.
Just gone.
Gone in one, one moment.
Gone One opportunity.
Oh, stop it.
Sorry, but I will say this and youknow, people can quote me on this, if
(53:50):
I am going to die in an airplane, thisis the way I would want to go out.
We will tell so many stories ofpeople very aware of the fact that
they're going to die in airplanes.
They are awake, the plane isfalling for sometimes minutes.
And when I am writing those episodesand those stories, that is what
(54:12):
terrifies me more than anything else.
I don't, I'm falling asleepand dying on a plane like.
Not right now.
Mom, if you're listening to this,I don't wanna die, but like if I'm
going to die on an airplane, that'sthe way that I want it to happen.
I don't wanna be aware of thefact that I am about to die.
Okay?
If I can take a moment to be dramatic,I think if I knew that our plane was
(54:37):
going down and there was no way tosave it, I would just rip open one
of the cabin doors and just jumpand just feel that air for a while.
Oh, you are so freaky.
I married the weirdest guy in the world.
All right, so let's talk about safetychanges, because obviously, with
these investigations, every single timesomething does change, something happens.
(55:02):
I don't think I'm ever going totell a story where a plane goes
down and there is, they're justlike, well, that's a bummer.
Um, so for this incident, theEuropean Aviation Safety Agency
reviewed its requirements.
Boeing implemented modificationsto the warning systems.
And the airlines enhanced trainingprograms to recognize hypoxia.
(55:25):
So many carriers now includepractical, hypoxia recognition
training for their pilots.
I think one of the goals of that is evenif you can't recognize it in yourself,
maybe you can recognize it in yourco-pilot or somebody else on board.
Yeah.
Even two people side by side.
Yeah.
You may not admit it to yourself.
(55:46):
You might be like, oh, I stood uptoo fast and I got like headed.
Yeah, but you're like, man,but instead the other pilot's
like, wait a minute, dude, what?
What you got going on?
You're acting weird.
The tragedy also brought attention toAndreas, whose heroic attempt to take
control of the final minutes has reallybecome a critical part of this story.
(56:06):
Like he is absolutely a hero.
There is a memorial to pay homage tothe victims of this plane crash, it
is in Greece, and families will gatherannually to remember their loved ones.
The legacy of Helios 5 22 lives on in theenhanced procedures, training and safety
(56:27):
systems that resulted from this disaster.
And obviously nothing can bring backthe 121 souls that were lost that day.
However, their deaths have potentiallysaved countless others through the lessons
learned, and that's the only thing reallythat we can take away from these horrible
stories is just that there is progressthat is made every time a plane goes down.
(56:51):
How long ago did you say itwas that this one happened?
This one was August, 2005.
Yeah.
Oh five.
I mean, it seems like foreverago, but that's 20 years.
And that is our story for today.
Zach, what'd you think?
Well, it was our firstone ending in tragedy.
Yeah.
And I'm not sure that I wasquite prepared for the dramatic
(57:13):
fashion of it all happening.
Like picturing being one of those F16 pilots who, you know, much like the
pilots of the airliner have flown amillion times and they're just watching,
knowing exactly what's gonna happen andthere's not a thing they can do about it.
For me, that would be a really hard thing.
You know, Alice says that I have a herocomplex, but seeing somebody knowing
(57:37):
that they're about to die and not beingable to help them from it is rough.
I mean, it's horrible.
It's really, really horrible.
Whew.
Okay.
If you enjoyed this episode,please rate, review and subscribe
wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also follow us on Instagramat Final Boarding Call POD for
behind the scenes content andupdates on future episodes.
(57:59):
And then we also have a final boardingcall, Facebook discussion group.
And you can find that if you justsearch final boarding call on Facebook,
and that's where you can share yourthoughts tell me how wrong I am.
Make recommendations for future episodes.
Yeah, if you know of a reallycool crash or non crash story and.
It's early in the series here.
(58:20):
So we've done three airplane episodes,but we are not just airplane travel.
Final boarding call is technicallyan aviation disaster podcast.
However, we will absolutely be dabblingin other transportation disasters.
We're talking planes, trainsand automobiles, planes,
trains and automobiles.
All of the above.
Even some parachutes.
We've got some yachtscoming up in the future.
(58:42):
If you got bucked offa horse, let me know.
Oh my gosh.
And that's the other thing, ifyou have survived something,
a transportation disaster.
My God, please let me know.
Oh, I've got a work buddyDave who I just adore.
He's Dave.
Yes.
He is just like thecoolest dad vibes ever.
He's really fun and he actually tookflying lessons for a little while.
(59:06):
He has survived two, notone, two aviation disasters.
And we are going to have him on to talk.
He wouldn't tell me what theywere because he's like, I gotta
tell you, live on the podcast.
So that's all I know isthat this guy survived too.
So if you are like, Dave,please reach out to us.
(59:29):
And finally, join us next timewhen we will be exploring another
transportation disaster story.
Until then, remember to stow your traytables, fasten your seat belts, and
prepare for the unexpected, because notevery trip reaches it's final destination.
(59:51):
Goodbye.
Picture this, a Boeing 7 37cruising silently through the
(00:05):
clear blue Mediterranean sky.
From the outside, everythingappears completely normal,
but inside that aircraft andinvisible killer has been at work.
The passengers sitmotionless in their seats.
Oxygen masks dangling in the cockpitboth pilots slump unconscious at their
(00:30):
controls, yet the plane continues tofly empty of conscious life guided
only by its automated systems.
We're about to experience what happenswhen a single switch left in the wrong
position turns a routine flight into oneof aviation's most haunting tragedies.
(00:51):
So stow your tray tables, fastenyour seat belts, and prepare for
some extreme turbulence becausethis is final boarding call.
Hello and welcome to Final Boarding Call.
I am your disaster obsessed host, Alice.
And as always, I am joined by myreluctant homebody husband, Zach.
(01:15):
Hello everybody.
Before we dive in, a quickreminder to our listeners.
Please rate, review and subscribewherever you get your podcasts.
All right, Zach, please buckle up becausetoday's story is really one of the
eeriest aviation disasters in history.
What makes this case so unsettling ishow gradually and quietly it unfolded.
(01:38):
This was not a sudden violent end.
It was really an invisible killerthat did its work over hours while
the plane continued flying, lookingperfectly normal from the outside.
This episode is based on research from afew sources, but primarily you guys know
(01:59):
I love a good Mayday Air disaster episode.
So this was season four, episode10 and an analysis from aviation
Expert Monte pilot and the officialaccident investigation report.
Zach, are you ready for our story?
I'm ready.
What do we have on tap tonight?
The air still holds the warmth ofthe day as the night settles over,
(02:24):
AKA International Airport in Cyprus.
It's August 13th, 2005.
A Boeing 7 37 operated by Helio Airwayshas just landed after a flight from
London and passengers stream through thecabin door into the Mediterranean night.
Thoughts already turning totheir vacations or homecomings.
(02:48):
As the cabin empties, a flightattendant pauses mid check.
She cocks her head listening.
There it is again, an unusual bangingsound coming from the rear service
door on the right side of the aircraft.
She calls over a colleague andtogether they investigate What
they discover is concerning.
(03:08):
The door seal has frozen, which shouldn'thappen during normal operations.
It immediately raises questions aboutthe plane's pressurization system.
Imagine the aircraft as anenormous aluminum can, which is
often what I call planes becausethey really are just tin cans.
(03:32):
And they're designed to carryhumans safely through an environment
where we cannot naturally survive
at cruising altitude.
Which, do you know what a typicalcruising altitude is, Zach?
I think it depends on the kindof travel that you're doing.
But isn't it somewhere around 27,000 feet?
(03:53):
Oh, excellent.
It is typically around 30,000.
We will take 27.
That is excellent.
And the air outside at thataltitude is quite thin.
And if a human is suddenly exposed to it.
Their lungs could an extraction ofoxygen to keep our brains functioning.
(04:13):
We would lose consciousness in secondsand we would die within minutes.
Unless you are Tim Lancaster from ourfirst episode, it would just, oh man, , if
you have not listened to that episode,you gotta go back 'cause it's legendary.
It kind of makes you question, if hewas able to get through it just fine,
(04:34):
and he was fairly lucid for a large partof it, how wrong could the science be?
How many people could breathe upthere for a longer period of time?
Oh, I don't know.
I don't wanna, I don't wanna test it.
I mean, you think about people thatclimb like, you know, crazy Kilimanjaro
or Everest and you know, most ofthem, many of them need supplemental
(05:00):
oxygen once you get up high enough.
I think there are freaky people thatdo it without supplemental oxygen,
but I do not think that's recommended.
Yeah.
I'm not sure what the vertical limitwould be for somebody's breathing.
Well, in any case, sciencerecommends that you don't hang out
at 30,000 feet, and that is why anaircraft is pressurized, because it
creates an artificial atmosphere.
(05:22):
Now here's a question, Zach,if you can remember this.
What is a cabin typicallypressurized to inside of an aircraft?
We mentioned this on our, on our firstepisode, man, I can remember a lot of
things, but I think that was like 6.1.
(05:43):
That was very, very specific.
So you're pretty close.
It typically is around sevento 8,000 feet above sea level.
So it's similar to our elevation.
It's really typical tothe Rocky Mountains.
So that is critical because, you know,spoiler alert, something really bad
happens in this episode and it pertainsto an issue with pressurization.
(06:06):
So back at the airport, the pilotsdutifully note the door seal issue
in the aircraft's logbook, and theypersonally alert Alan Irwin, who is
the British ground engineer on duty.
It's now around one 30 in the morningas Irwin begins his investigation.
And nothing good happensafter one in the morning.
(06:29):
That is way, way too late and orearly to be checking out a plane.
In my humble opinion, I thought it wasnothing good happens after 2:00 AM.
You get a bonus hour for me.
It's nothing good happensafter 9:00 PM but you know me.
I love my sleep.
Alright, picture this scene.
(06:49):
The terminal has grown.
Quiet.
Most flights long sincearrived or departed.
The vast interior of the empty 7 37.
Echoes with Irwin's footstepsas he works alone methodically
checking the pressurization system.
To test it properly, he needs tomanually pressurize the cabin,
something that you can only dowhile the plane is on the ground.
(07:14):
By using a special mode in thesystem, Irwin flips the pressurization
selector switch from its normalauto position to manual, allowing
him to control the system directly.
In this position, he can simulatethe pressure changes the aircraft
would experience during a flight.
(07:34):
He moves through the cabin listeningcarefully for unusual sounds,
checking gauges and indicators,but everything seems fine.
No leaks, no strange noises.
The frozen door seal appears tohave been a one-off random issue.
Satisfied Erwin signs off on theaircraft as air worthy clearing
(07:57):
it for the next day's flight.
But in the dimly lit cockpit, onecrucial detail goes overlooked.
The pressurization selector switchremains in the manual position.
This tiny oversight.
A single switch left in the wrong positionwill very soon lead to catastrophe.
(08:23):
Dawn breaks over Cyprus on August 14th,2005, the sky is clear, promising.
Another beautiful Mediterranean Day.
At the airport, ground crews preparethe Boeing 7 37 for its morning flight
to Prague with a scheduled stopoverin Athens, the aircraft gleams in the
(08:44):
early morning sun is 115 passengersmake their way across the tarmac.
I mean, they are familiesgoing on vacation.
This is children, parents,couples are holding hands.
Elderly people.
Think of all of the people that makeup an average flight in the cockpit.
(09:07):
Captain Hans Jurgen Merton.
A 59-year-old German pilot, and if thatis not a German name, then I dunno,
there's never been a German name ifthat's not one, I, I may have butchered
that, but like that's, there's allkinds of like, dots and dashes and all
(09:28):
kinds of things on this name, but I'm,I'm doing the best I can here folks.
I'm gonna tell you about Hans Hans Gruber.
I am, I'm gonna tell youabout this guy, Hans.
Hans Hergan.
Do you know who Hans Gruber is?
Uh, no.
I don't know who diehard.
(09:49):
Oh my goodness gracious.
Okay.
Jake and Jake Alza would'veknown who Hans Gruper is.
I'm sorry I let you down.
Let me tell you about our Hans.
Our Captain Hans, is a German pilotwith 35 years of flying experience,
and he is reviewing the flight plan.
Beside him, sits his co-pilot,51-year-old pompous Char Lambrose.
(10:14):
Charas a CBRT National.
Between them, they have over 24,000hours of flying time, more than two
and a half years spent in the air.
They are veterans, they're professionalswho have done this countless times before.
As the passengers settle into theirseats, the pilots run through
(10:35):
their pre-flight checklist, which,you know, covers 80 separate items.
Eight of those involvethe pressurization panel.
The checks are designed to catchany potential issues before takeoff.
Yet somehow the mispositionedpressurization mode selector that's
(10:57):
in manual currently goes unnoticed.
Perhaps it's the early hour.
Perhaps it's the routine natureof the flight, or perhaps it's
human error, whatever the reason.
Both pilots end up missingthis critical detail.
With all checks apparently completed,the pilots start the engines.
(11:20):
The familiar wine of the turbines spoolup and the aircraft pushes back from
the gate and taxis towards the runway.
At 9:07 AM local time heus flight5 2 2 thunders down the runway.
It lifts into the morning sky and itbegins what should have been an extremely
routine three hour journey to Athens.
As the aircraft climbs steadily towardsits cruising altitude of 34,000 feet.
(11:45):
No one realizes that witheach passing minute, a very
serious problem is developing.
With each foot of altitude gained,the cabin is failing to pressurize
well, that's not exactlywhat you'd want there.
No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no.
(12:06):
It's about to get really bad.
Even before we dive into all that.
Yeah.
You know, we've already said that.
There are five different parts of thechecklist that are all on this panel.
Eight.
Eight or eight.
Yes.
Eight different things.
Eight.
And like one, the guy servicingit probably is supposed to
put it back exactly as it was.
(12:26):
Oh, our buddy Erwin.
Dammit.
Erwin.
And two, how the pilotsdon't see this switch.
I don't know how many switches thereare specifically for pressurization,
but there can't be more than Iwould think, 10 or 12 for it.
There are eight checks that are specificto the pressurization panel, but there
(12:50):
are 80 separate items on this checklist.
Obviously when you're flying aplane, there's a lot of shit to
check and you wanna check your shit.
Um, but 80 is a lot.
And if you have done that thousands oftimes, you know, at some point I'm sure
that it's just like, check, check, check.
We've flown this plane a bajilliontimes and we've never had an issue.
(13:13):
So beep, beep, boop, boop.
We're good.
Done.
I'm sure that's completely fair.
I mean, we're all supposed to Yeah.
Check the oil in our carsand check the tire pressure.
Yeah.
Before we go driving too.
But we just drove it the day before.
We know that.
It's fine.
Mm-hmm.
Exactly.
Yes.
Except this is a planewith 121 passengers.
Just five minutes into the flight,as the aircraft climbs through
(13:37):
12,000 feet, a warning hornsuddenly blares in the cockpit.
The sound is sharp and urgent.
It is the cabin altitude warning,a critical alert telling the pilots
that the air pressure inside of theplane has dropped to the equivalent
of 10,000 feet above sea level,which is beyond the safe threshold.
(14:00):
Instead of recognition, there'sconfusion on the Boeing 7 37.
This warning horn sounds identicalto another alert, the takeoff
configuration warning, which goesoff if pilots try to take off without
properly configuring the aircraft.
(14:21):
You cannot make this shit up, folks.
You're already flying.
It's not that one, but like howinsane is it that there are two very
important alerts that sound exactlythe same, like we couldn't have
come up with any other alert sound.
(14:42):
You are kidding me.
They have the exact same alert sound.
Well picture that there's three majoralert sounds that humans will hear.
You have police trucks and ambulancesand cop cars, and not everybody can
tell which is which when you can'tsee it from, you know, a mile away
(15:03):
when you first start hearing it.
Yeah.
But it's also not like your professionaljob to know that it is these pilot's
jobs to know the alerts that arehappening inside of the plane.
Is the sound actuallyidentical or is it just close?
Oh no, it's identical.
So if we put ourselves in thesepilots position just for a moment,
(15:25):
we have had a normal takeoff.
We are well into our climb, and suddenlyan alarm sounds that to our ears is
associated with a takeoff problem.
It would be like hearing yourmorning alarm in the middle of the
afternoon and it would be verycognitively confusing and alarming.
(15:46):
I have had it happen where sometimes Iwill set my alarm on accident for 6:00
PM instead of 6:00 AM and then at 6:00 PMmy alarm goes off and it is very jarring.
That's an issue whenyou're piloting a plane.
Confusion is deadly.
Instead of recognizing the warning forwhat it actually is, an alert about
dangerous cabin pressure levels, thepilots focus on trying to understand why
(16:10):
they're hearing what they fully believeis a takeoff configuration alarm going off
at a time when it shouldn't be possible.
Minutes later, more warnings appear.
Two equipment cooling lights labeledoff illuminate on the cockpit panel.
The master caution light also comes on.
(16:31):
God, this is likethey're driving a Subaru.
She's like, every lighton that dash is going off.
Folks, I can say that'cause I erase a Super s St.
I, so I'm in it.
These are further symptoms ofthe pressurization problem.
The low air density is affectingthe cooling systems for
(16:52):
the aircraft's electronics.
By now, the aircraft is passingthrough 16,000 feet and Captain
Merton is concerned enough to contactHelios Airways Dispatch for help.
Over the audio, he explains thata takeoff configuration warning is
sounding and that there's an issuewith the equipment cooling system.
(17:16):
The dispatcher unable tosolve this technical problem
connects Merton to Alan Irwin.
Who's Alan Irwin?
The same guy that said everything isfine and then left the switch in manual.
The same, the same guy who isthe, cause you know, we don't
(17:36):
wanna put blame, but I, okay.
Anyways, they're now connected.
This is a crucial conversation and it istaking place as the aircraft continues to
climb higher and higher into thinner air.
Captain Hans Jurgen Merton, whosefirst language is not English,
(18:01):
is trying to explain the issue.
This is a quote, the takeoffconfiguration warning.
And the equipment cooling lights are off.
That's his direct quote.
The takeoff configuration warning andthe equipment cooling lights are off.
Well, that's not the job thatI have, but it sounds like
(18:22):
he's saying everything is fine.
What's going on?
we have a communication issue forsure, because what he probably means
is that the warning lights labeled offare illuminated, indicating a problem.
But what it comes across as, and whatErwin kind of understands is exactly
(18:45):
what you said, Zach, that like thecooling lights are off, which is good.
That's their normal state.
So confused.
Irwin asked for clarification.
Can you confirm exactlywhat the problem is?
Merton Responds, theyare not switched off.
(19:07):
His meaning is still unclearas precious minutes tick by.
During this confusing exchange,something very critical happens
that nobody notices the aircraft ispassing 14,000 feet and the cabin
oxygen masks automatically deploy,dropping down in front of very startled
(19:29):
passengers because this is a very.
Smooth, normal flight.
Could you imagine?
You're just in an airplane.
It is cruising around.
It's climbing, it's gaining altitude.
There is no turbulence.
There is no indication thatanything wrong and then just like
surprise the oxygen masks drop.
(19:50):
Yeah, even me in that situation,I would probably wouldn't think
to put it on, I feel fine.
Everything's going fine.
Just be like, huh, what happened?
A hundred percent?
You would probably assume that it'sjust like a weird bloop a warning
light labeled pass oxy on illuminateson the overhead panel, but in the
(20:10):
confusion of dealing with the otherwarnings, the pilots don't see it.
The big pass oxy on.
Illuminated sign.
What the pilots also don't realizeis that they are already experiencing
the effects of hypoxia, which is avery fancy word for oxygen starvation.
(20:31):
When you can't get enough oxygen intoyour bloodstream, bad things happen in
your body, because we need oxygen and yourbrain is affected first and most severely.
The truly terrifying thing abouthypoxia is how it undermines your
ability to recognize what is happening.
(20:53):
So it doesn't really announce itselfwith pain, with super obvious symptoms.
It literally is.
Basically like you're kind of drunk,you get impaired judgment, confusion,
you have difficulty with complex tasks.
I don't know, does it turn,turn you into a toddler?
(21:14):
It sounds like our two yearolds, would you say that flying
is in fact a complex task?
I would say that flying islike a hella complex task.
So basically our pilot's brainsare slowly shutting down, and
they are losing their ability torecognize that anything is wrong.
(21:35):
It is similar to carbon monoxide poisoningin that it is silent, it is completely
painless, and it is absolutely deadly.
So the aircraft is continuing to climb.
It's still gaining elevation andthe oxygen situation in the cockpit
is deteriorating extremely rapidly.
(21:58):
Suspecting that the pilots mightbe looking at the wrong indicator,
Erwin asks a very crucial question.
Can you confirm that the pressurizationmode selector is set to auto?
Do you think this guyhad like a gut feeling?
'cause that feels like a weirdYeah, I mean there hasn't been
(22:18):
that much to directly point to it.
It's almost like he realizedwhat had happened and he's
like, Hey, kind of thing.
Just wanna make sure.
Yeah, I'm wondering if hekind of had an oh shit moment.
which is terrifying.
This would be like if I set Zach out ontrack at one of his drift events and.
When he's driving, I am in chargeof changing his wheels out.
(22:41):
And this would be like me sendinghim out and then realizing I
didn't twerk any of his luck nuts.
And he's just out there ripping andI'm like, Ooh, that wheel's about
to just pop right off the car.
Oh, that works out.
Except there are a ton ofpassengers in this plane.
This question, which might have savedeverybody on board if it was properly
(23:03):
addressed, never receives an answer.
Captain Merton, his thinkingalready compromised by
hypoxia, completely ignores it.
Instead, he asks Irwin where the equipmentcooling circuit breakers are located.
It is very clear that his cognitiveabilities are severely impaired.
(23:24):
He is fixating on the wrong issuewhile missing the critical one.
Meanwhile, the aircraft continues.
Its relentless climb.
Okay, so guess whataltitude we're at right now?
I'm gonna guess somewhere around 19,000.
We are at 29,000 feet.
(23:45):
Wait, weren't we just at 17?
Confused?
Yeah, but they've been havingall these conversations.
Okay.
And they're still gainingelevation during this whole thing.
I mean, the oxygen masks havepopped everybody's disoriented.
So we are now at 29,000 feet, and thecabin altitude is somewhere between
(24:06):
24,020 6,000 feet, which is whatmountaineers call the death zone.
It is where human life absolutelycannot be sustained for long
without supplemental oxygen.
You know, If we try to kind of putourselves inside of this aircraft,
most of the passengers having seenthe oxygen masks drop would've
(24:27):
put them on as instructed, right?
You stated that you probablywould just be like, what?
Like everything's fine.
I don't.
Oh, that's weird.
That seems really odd.
But many passengers probably wouldhave actually put on the oxygen
masks if they fell in front of them.
(24:47):
Some are probably panicking.
Others trying to help familymembers or seat mates.
Flight attendants would be movingthroughout the cabin, assisting
where needed while using theirown portable oxygen supplies.
So this is actually really cool, andI did not know about this before I
researched this episode, but flightattendants have portable oxygen supplies.
(25:11):
During emergencies, it's probably handy.
It makes so much sense and Ijust never thought about that.
So now you know, but those passengeroxygen masks are only designed
to provide 12 minutes of oxygen,
This is a theme that keeps comingback that's really critical.
They are not forever oxygen masks.
(25:32):
They are only supposed to provideenough oxygen to bring the
airplane down to an elevation.
Yeah, exactly.
Where people can breathe.
Again it is supplemental oxygen.
However, our flight continues toclimb the autopilot, guiding it to its
(25:54):
programmed cruising altitude of 34,000feet in the cockpit tragedy unfolds.
Captain Merton apparently attemptingto locate the circuit breaker Irwin
mentioned, gets out of his seat, butimmediately collapses from oxygen
(26:15):
deprivation before he can do anythingfirst Officer Shari Lambos loses
consciousness around the same time,still strapped into his seat by 9:30
AM roughly 20 minutes after takeoff,the aircraft reaches 34,000 feet.
And levels off.
Continuing on its programmedroute towards Athens.
(26:39):
Air traffic controllers tryrepeatedly to contact the flight,
but they receive no response.
The autopilot oblivious to the unfoldingdisaster continues to guide the silent
aircraft across the Mediterranean.
When flight 5 2 2 reaches Athens,it doesn't begin descending for
(27:01):
the scheduled stopover withoutmanual input from the pilots
the autopilot maintains altitudeand begins to circle in a holding
pattern over the island of Kia, about65 kilometers southeast of Athens.
This is a passenger jet flying in perfectcircles at 34,000 feet, making loop after
(27:27):
loop in the clear blue sky while airtraffic controllers grow increasingly
alarmed at the lack of communication.
By this time, most of thepeople on board have likely lost
consciousness due to hypoxia.
The only sounds in the cabin wouldbe the steady hum of the engines
and the hiss of rushing air.
(27:49):
This is not a plane that I wanna be on.
No, this is truly terrifying.
Obviously, air traffic control, justseeing a plane looping and looping
and looping and not doing anythingelse they're going to realize
that something is wrong prettyquickly and nobody's responding.
(28:09):
Nobody wants to stay in a holding pattern.
Mm.
Especially at thatelevation for that long.
Normally, by the time you roll in nearan airport where you would circle, I
would guess you would already be droppeddown somewhere in the low twenties.
Oh yeah, a hundred percent.
We are now in Greek territory, obviously.
So Greek authorities they notice thisvery bizarre behavior in an aircraft.
(28:33):
This is post nine 11.
What do you think their thoughts are?
Somebody has hijacked the plane 100%.
It immediately raises redflags for a terrorism concern.
And they are.
Very close to a major population center.
So the clock is ticking as they needto decide how to respond to this.
(28:53):
So now it is 11:00 AMand it's Sunday morning.
We're checking in on our plane, andnearly two hours has gone by where
the Helio flight has been flying onautopilot, completely unresponsive
(29:14):
to any communication attempts.
The situation has escalated to the highestlevel of Greek government, so inside of
air traffic control center in Athens,controllers stare intently at radar
screens showing the aircraft's methodicalcircles like freakishly perfect circles.
Bones are ringing.
(29:35):
Military civilian authorities.
Everybody's super concerned andeverybody knows that something is wrong
with this flight, but nobody knowsexactly what is wrong, so they decide
that they need to get eyes in the air.
They send two F 16 fighter jets fromthe niaa, Ankylos Air base with orders
(30:00):
to intercept the mysterious flight.
The fighters thunder into the sky.
The pilots receiving theirusual mission briefing.
It's giving top gun.
Especially with the Fsixteens, I mean, come on.
If this is not Maverick and Goose,well now Rooster, their briefing is
(30:22):
to locate and identify the airliner,assess the situation, and be prepared
to take further action if necessary.
Which is so scary.
Does that mean that theywould shoot down this plane?
Like if they confirmed that itwas a, if they confirmed it was
terrorists, I'm sure they would.
Oh my God, that is terrifyingin a whole nother way.
(30:43):
20 minutes later, the F sixteens reachedthe Boeing 7 37, which is beginning
its sixth loop in the holding pattern.
The fighters take up positionaround the airliner, one behind it.
Ready to respond if necessary.
Again, that makes me nervous.
The other, moving in closerfor a visual assessment.
(31:05):
Here's what the fighterpilots were thinking.
Option one a hijacking thatis what they're prepared for a
terrorist attack or a hijacking.
Option.
Two, a technical failure.
I don't think they wereprepared for option three.
Well, I think with all the safetychecklist, that's just not even something
that they really thought possible.
(31:26):
The fighter pilot signals hispresence to the seven 30 sevens
crew, but there is no reaction.
He checks the exterior of theaircraft looking for any signs
of damage, but there is none.
The plane appears perfectly intact.
Moving and even closer.
Close enough to see throughthe cockpit windows.
(31:46):
I mean, remember this guy's inan F 16, so he's got the power
he looks inside of the aircraft.
I am about to describe what he saw.
And, I just wanna give a fair warning.
This is pretty chilling.
The cockpit is dark except for theglow of instrument panels and the first
officer's seat sits a motionless figureslumped forward against his restraints.
(32:12):
The captain's seat appearsempty behind them in the cabin.
Oxygen masks dangle from the ceilingswaying gently with the aircraft's
movement through the passenger windows.
The fighter pilot can make outseveral passengers completely still.
Some wearing oxygen masks, others,not all apparently unconscious.
(32:39):
That's definitely a rough visual.
It's horrible.
And this is really the momentwhen the intercepting pilots fully
understand what they are witnessing.
It's a ghost plane, an aircraftflying completely on autopilot while
everyone aboard is incapacitatedor possibly already dead.
They immediately radio this discoveryto their base for another 14 minutes.
(33:08):
The F sixteens shadow theairliner as it continues its
circular pattern through the sky.
The fighter pilots know whatwill eventually happen, what's
gonna eventually happen, Zach.
Can you take a guess?
Eventually that plane is gonna runout of fuel and come crashing down.
That's unfortunately exactlywhat is going to happen.
(33:29):
So really all that they can do ismonitor the flight path and ensure
that it doesn't threaten populatedareas when the inevitable occurs.
But then at 11:49 AMsomething unexpected happens.
One of the F 16 pilots noticesmovement in the cockpit.
(33:52):
What, I apologize if you canhear the pit bull snoring.
He just loves being part of this podcast.
Someone has entered andtaken the captain's seat.
Well, now I'm a little bit more hooked.
Were you bored before?
No, it's just I was certainthat I knew exactly where it was
(34:16):
going, and then suddenly there'ssomebody that's still conscious.
It's unbelievable.
But yes, this person has what appearsto be a portable oxygen bottle
and mask, and seems to be tryingto take control of the aircraft.
This unbelievable development would laterbe identified as the actions of Andreas
(34:40):
promo, a 25-year-old flight attendant.
Somehow Andreas had managed to remainconscious throughout the ordeal by
using portable oxygen bottles meantfor cabin crew during emergencies.
What makes this moment especiallyjust unbelievable, is that apparently
(35:01):
he had some flight experience.
He held a private pilot's license, and hedreamed of becoming a commercial pilot.
In this moment of crisis, hewas attempting to use that
limited knowledge to save theaircraft and everyone on board.
Well, big stoked for Andreas.
Let's do this.
Yes, big stoked for Andreas, however.
(35:24):
Fate is cruel.
Just as Andreas takes the controls,the aircraft's, left engine flames out.
It has run out of fuel.
After nearly three hours of flight,with only one engine providing thrust,
the plane begins to turn and descend.
(35:47):
Andreas with his minimal trainingand in such dire circumstances,
faces an almost impossible task.
I do not wanna put myself inthe guise to, because this is
the worst situation to be in.
We apologize, guys.
The, the hippos getting booted fromthe bed because he's a snorty boy.
(36:08):
It's all right.
He has a memory foam dog bed.
Don't feel too bad, but it's not the same.
It's not the same.
This story is so sad and sofrustrating, but the worst person
to be on this flight is Andreas.
100%.
I would much rather be past the F out,like in the plane, having no idea that
(36:36):
my life is about to end rather thanthis poor guy who has full comprehension
of exactly what's about to happen.
I just wanna know.
I mean, they were in the airfor what, three hours total?
Yeah.
Yeah.
What I mean he clearly had an idea ofwhat was going on because most people
(36:56):
were having some pretty serious issues.
20 to 30 minutes in what tookhim so long to go to the cockpit.
I dunno.
And as you will find out, we will notbe able to question him, because this
story does not have a happy ending.
Within minutes, the 7 37 crosses over theGreek island of Evia descending rapidly.
(37:23):
So one of the F sixteensdraws close and witnesses.
Andreas apparently trying to rouse theunconscious first officer without success.
So yeah, his brain shut down.
He's not waking up.
No, he is absolutely not waking up.
So shortly after that, theaircraft's right engine also
(37:45):
runs outta fuel and shuts down.
So now it is gliding.
It does not have power.
It begins to descend quite rapidly.
And in this moment.
Andreas acknowledges the nearby fighterpilot for the first time, responding
to a hand signal with a gesture ofhis own pointing downward, indicating
(38:06):
that the aircraft is going down andthere is nothing that he can do.
That's a rough spot to be in.
I just, like you said, I mean, he hasthe worst position of anybody right now.
Sure.
But that feeling of beinghelpless is just terrible.
Oh my God.
It's horrible.
I feel so bad for this guy.
The F 16 pilot signals for him actually tofollow to the airport, but it's too late.
(38:31):
The aircraft now crossing back ontomainland Greece, turns sharply to the
left heading along the coast, northeastof Athens, realizing that a crash is
imminent, the f sixteens pull away.
And in the final moments, flight datasuggests that Andreas attempted to pull
up just before impact, perhaps hopingto ease the aircraft into the ground.
(38:56):
But there's no engine power.
So there's, there's no reversethrust, no wing breaks.
No, you got nothing.
There's nothing.
You are literally in afalling can with wings.
At 12:04 PM roughly three hours aftertakeoff Helios flight, 5, 2 2 slams
into a hillside near the village ofgrammatical, about 40 kilometers northeast
(39:22):
of Athens, and it bursts into flames.
The F 16 pilots radio in thecrash location and emergency
services rushed to the scene.
Despite the very quick responseby fire crews and ambulances,
there are no survivors.
All 115 passengers and six crewmembers have perished either from
(39:47):
hypoxia long before the crash,which God, I, I hope because that.
It's a much better way to goout or from the crash itself.
That's just, that's such a largenumber of people to be gone from
what seems like such a silly error.
Oh yeah.
This is an aviation disaster.
(40:09):
It's so horrific.
The ghost plane has completed its tragicjourney in the aftermath of the crash.
Investigators from Greece, Cyprus, theUnited States and Boeing, all converged
on the wreckage site to begin thepainstaking process of determining.
What went so terriblywrong with flight 5, 2, 2.
(40:34):
I mean, the crash scenescorched a hillside.
It was strewn with debris.
Emergency workers were carefullydocumenting and collecting
evidence, investigators examiningevery piece of wreckage for clues.
And of course, their firstpriority is to find what
(40:54):
the black box.
Yes.
And what color is a black box?
Not black.
It's typically orange.
Yeah.
Yes.
That's a memory on me right there.
No, that's a fun trivia factthat everybody can bring
to their next happy hour.
So it is critical that they find thatblack box, so the flight data recorder.
(41:18):
Confirms the aircraft's path and the pathwas a normal climb after takeoff level,
flight at 34,000 feet, and then of course,the fatal descent after fuel exhaustion.
The cockpit voice recorder providessomething even more valuable, the
sounds and conversations from thecockpit, including that critical
(41:43):
exchange between the pilots and ourmaintenance engineer, Alan Erwin.
You probably picked up the differencesin their voices too, as they were just
kinda getting drowsy and out a it.
Yes, yes.
That is exactly whatthey're going to discover.
So they listen repeatedly to the cabinaltitude warning horns sounding at 9:12
AM just five minutes after takeoff,they hear the confusion in the pilot's
(42:09):
voices as they misinterpret the warning.
They listen to the back and forthwith Erwin, noting how the captain
ignores the crucial question aboutthe pressurization mode selector.
And finally near the end of therecording, they hear several mayday
calls, presumably made by Andreasduring his desperate attempt to save
(42:33):
the aircraft in its final minutes.
As they examine the wreckage,investigators focus primarily on the
aircraft's pressurization system.
The position of the pressurizationmode selector switch became a
key point of debate engineer.
Alan Irwin claims that he reset it toauto after the maintenance check, but
(42:53):
the physical evidence suggests otherwise.
No, you didn't, guy.
Nobody wants to be that guy who'slike, yeah, I swear I did it.
Swear the bolts were the right size.
I swear.
What's so scary as we dive more and moreinto episodes is just how like these tiny
minute details can be so catastrophic.
(43:17):
One switch.
This is one switch in the airplaneand everyone died when they
recover the switch, it is found,turned past the manual position.
So this raises questions, didit twist during the impact?
But the data from the electronicpressure control system provides
purely conclusive evidence.
(43:37):
The outflow valve had been fullyopen from takeoff, preventing
crab end pressurization.
So think of this like a balloon.
So the outflow valve is essentially acontrolled leak that regulates how much
air stays inside the balloon, right?
(44:00):
That's my balloon soundin a automatically.
That was the worst balloon sound.
Get off me guy.
In automatic mode, the systemcarefully adjusts this valve to
maintain just the right pressure asthe aircraft climbs and descends.
But in manual mode with the valveopen, it is like trying to inflate a
(44:23):
balloon that has a gigantic hole in it.
It's not possible
Digging deeper.
Investigators discoversomething else troubling.
This aircraft in particularhad experienced pressurization
issues in the past.
This system's memory stored data fromprevious 74 flights revealing a pattern
of excessive leakage, consistentwith the crew reports of problems
(44:47):
with the right rear service door.
Do you remember the door?
That was weird.
How many of the flights had issueswith it, or all of the last 74 were
conclusively showing some issue with it?
It may have been all 74 flights because itrevealed a pattern of excessive leakage.
(45:08):
A pattern, excessive leakage.
That's just another person that didn'tfeel like doing their job that day.
Yes.
This suggests that while theimmediate cause of the accident was
the mispositioned switch, there weresevere underlying maintenance issues
that were not properly addressed.
Every person that ever workedon that plane, you're fired.
(45:30):
I mean, it's really bad.
So the investigators are piecing togetherthe sequence of events and here are the
main things that caused this accident.
First, the routine checks before takeoff.
Number one, the pilots should havechecked and seen that the pressurization
(45:50):
mode selector was in manual.
How did two very experiencedpilots miss this?
Yeah.
What's the other thing?
That they are both veterans.
Yes.
You've been doing it that long.
You could almost just take a glanceat the panel and see something
different than what it usually is.
Second, when the cabin altitudewarning horns sounded after takeoff,
(46:12):
the pilots misinterpreted that asa takeoff configuration warning.
This confusion prevented themfrom taking the right action
immediately, putting on oxygen masksand descending to a safe altitude.
Was this a training issue or is it adesign flaw Having two identical sounding
(46:33):
warnings for very different emergencies?
I understand the theory for havingdifferent tones for different kinds
of emergencies, but in my opinion,if you hear a warning sound,
you check everything thoroughly.
Not just assume thatit's for this one thing.
I mean, I guess, but you know whatI'm learning, and as all these pilots,
(46:55):
please chime in and tell me I'm wrong,but what I'm, what I'm learning as I
research these episodes is that thereare different alarm sounds for different.
Issues.
And that is really importantbecause pilots are trained to
recognize the sounds and associatethem with different problems.
(47:15):
And the reason that that's importantis because you need to quickly
be able to react to something.
So if, you know, if you hear a wha,wha wha and that's 10 different things.
You don't have time tocheck 10 different things.
You need to know that WWWis this particular issue,
and go fix that immediately.
Does that make sense?
It it does.
(47:35):
It just makes me question, onceagain are the sounds actually
identical or are they just too close?
They are identical.
They're identical.
Identical.
Not close.
They are identical.
They're the same sounds.
Here's our next issue, Alan.
When he specifically askedabout the position of the
pressurization mode selectorduring the in-flight conversation.
(47:55):
Captain Merton failed tocheck this critical switch.
So one Alan probably should haveasked earlier in the conversation
two, by this point, it seemspretty likely that our captain was
already suffering from hypoxia.
Yeah, absolutely.
Yeah.
He was not coherent enough toreally, I mean, he completely
(48:16):
avoided the question, so, yeah.
And finally, the airlines trainingprocedures came under scrutiny.
Had the crew been adequatelyprepared to recognize and respond to
pressurization emergencies, particularlythe insidious symptoms of hypoxia,
could this issue have been prevented?
It's really hard to say that itcould have been prevented because.
(48:40):
Really there were multiple factorsthat contributed all to this one big
issue, and in theory, yes, it couldhave been prevented, but really I think
the key at that point is to be able todrop the altitude with the autopilot.
If it is recognizing that cabin pressuredrop, I think that should be a program.
(49:01):
Mm.
That's a really interesting thought.
Yeah, I mean that, that argument'sreally tough because it's one of
those things where it's like areyou supposed to recognize when
you are not thinking clearly?
Are you expected to have thecognitive ability to determine when
you are losing cognitive ability?
You need to be able to diagnose yourself.
(49:22):
Yeah.
While you're not able to think.
Yeah.
That's kind of a toughie.
That one's a tough one.
The investigation also examinedthe heroic, but ultimately
futile actions of Andreas.
What a hero that guy really was.
So evidence suggested that heused portable oxygen bottles
to maintain conscious muchlonger than others on board.
His presence in the cockpit in thefinal minutes showed remarkable
(49:45):
courage and presence of mind.
But obviously by then theaircraft was going down.
There was nothing that he could do.
So here is the final report.
The investigators made severalrecommendations to prevent similar
tragedies from happening in the future.
One key recommendation wasthat Boeing update, the 7 37
maintenance manual to ensure thatthe pressurization mode selector
(50:09):
is returned to auto after testing.
That's saying for like theengineer that comes on.
Mm-hmm.
So that wasn't something that he wasnecessarily supposed to do before he
was allowed to switch things, do histesting, and then however is left.
It's supposed to becaught in the checklist.
Yes.
But we're about to do kind of a measuretwice cut once fix here, where you
(50:31):
gotta check for auto two times.
So they also recommended installingdifferent sounding warning horns
for the takeoff configuration in thecabin altitude warnings to prevent
confusion between those critical alerts.
Highly logical choice.
Thank you.
Like that.
I could not be, whatever.
(50:52):
I couldn't believe it, but it's fine.
I mean, even cars don't have.
The same sounding horns.
Every car has two horns.
It's ridiculous.
The crash of the Helio Airways flight5 22 left deep scars, particularly
on Cyprus with 121 victims.
(51:13):
107 of them from Cyprus, 12 of themare from Greece the impact on the
small island nation was devastating.
In Laca that August evening, familieswho had waved goodbye to loved ones,
gathered at the airport, eventuallyreceiving the tragic confirmation
(51:35):
that there were no survivors.
The human toll was immense withentire families perishing together.
In a close knit community where almosteveryone knew someone who was affected.
For Helios Airways, the disastermarked the beginning of the end.
Cyrus's first private carrier facedintense scrutiny after the crash.
(51:58):
By November, 2006, just over a yearlater, it was restructured as aje
and then it fully shut down in 2007.
The legal aftermath was verycomplex, so several individuals
faced criminal charges, including,
including the engineer,Alan, Alan, including Alan.
(52:20):
You know, I'm terrible with names.
No, but that couldn't even possiblycome close Alan Irwin, however.
Alan was actually acquitted.
Four senior Helios officials wereinitially sentenced to 10 years.
Whoa.
Yes.
But it sounds hefty, butalso over a hundred people.
(52:42):
Oh yeah.
However, their convictionswere overturned in Greece.
Five defendants were found guiltyof manslaughter by negligence.
The prolonged legal battles highlightedthe difficulties of assigning individual
responsibility for systemic failures.
That's the thing is I have.
A hard time justifying Alan goingto prison as well, because like you
(53:08):
said, it was not in his requirements
to flip that switch back.
Mm-hmm.
So technically, because that is not inhis requirements, it wasn't his fault.
I mean technically you arecorrect, but people love
having someone to blame, right.
Like that is human nature is havingsomebody to be really mad at when
(53:29):
a really shitty thing happens.
Yeah.
And that's about as shitty as it gets.
I mean, whole families.
Yes.
Just gone.
Gone in one, one moment.
Gone One opportunity.
Oh, stop it.
Sorry, but I will say this and youknow, people can quote me on this, if
(53:50):
I am going to die in an airplane, thisis the way I would want to go out.
We will tell so many stories ofpeople very aware of the fact that
they're going to die in airplanes.
They are awake, the plane isfalling for sometimes minutes.
And when I am writing those episodesand those stories, that is what
(54:12):
terrifies me more than anything else.
I don't, I'm falling asleepand dying on a plane like.
Not right now.
Mom, if you're listening to this,I don't wanna die, but like if I'm
going to die on an airplane, that'sthe way that I want it to happen.
I don't wanna be aware of thefact that I am about to die.
Okay?
If I can take a moment to be dramatic,I think if I knew that our plane was
(54:37):
going down and there was no way tosave it, I would just rip open one
of the cabin doors and just jumpand just feel that air for a while.
Oh, you are so freaky.
I married the weirdest guy in the world.
All right, so let's talk about safetychanges, because obviously, with
these investigations, every single timesomething does change, something happens.
(55:02):
I don't think I'm ever going totell a story where a plane goes
down and there is, they're justlike, well, that's a bummer.
Um, so for this incident, theEuropean Aviation Safety Agency
reviewed its requirements.
Boeing implemented modificationsto the warning systems.
And the airlines enhanced trainingprograms to recognize hypoxia.
(55:25):
So many carriers now includepractical, hypoxia recognition
training for their pilots.
I think one of the goals of that is evenif you can't recognize it in yourself,
maybe you can recognize it in yourco-pilot or somebody else on board.
Yeah.
Even two people side by side.
Yeah.
You may not admit it to yourself.
(55:46):
You might be like, oh, I stood uptoo fast and I got like headed.
Yeah, but you're like, man,but instead the other pilot's
like, wait a minute, dude, what?
What you got going on?
You're acting weird.
The tragedy also brought attention toAndreas, whose heroic attempt to take
control of the final minutes has reallybecome a critical part of this story.
(56:06):
Like he is absolutely a hero.
There is a memorial to pay homage tothe victims of this plane crash, it
is in Greece, and families will gatherannually to remember their loved ones.
The legacy of Helios 5 22 lives on in theenhanced procedures, training and safety
(56:27):
systems that resulted from this disaster.
And obviously nothing can bring backthe 121 souls that were lost that day.
However, their deaths have potentiallysaved countless others through the lessons
learned, and that's the only thing reallythat we can take away from these horrible
stories is just that there is progressthat is made every time a plane goes down.
(56:51):
How long ago did you say itwas that this one happened?
This one was August, 2005.
Yeah.
Oh five.
I mean, it seems like foreverago, but that's 20 years.
And that is our story for today.
Zach, what'd you think?
Well, it was our firstone ending in tragedy.
Yeah.
And I'm not sure that I wasquite prepared for the dramatic
(57:13):
fashion of it all happening.
Like picturing being one of those F16 pilots who, you know, much like the
pilots of the airliner have flown amillion times and they're just watching,
knowing exactly what's gonna happen andthere's not a thing they can do about it.
For me, that would be a really hard thing.
You know, Alice says that I have a herocomplex, but seeing somebody knowing
(57:37):
that they're about to die and not beingable to help them from it is rough.
I mean, it's horrible.
It's really, really horrible.
Whew.
Okay.
If you enjoyed this episode,please rate, review and subscribe
wherever you get your podcasts.
You can also follow us on Instagramat Final Boarding Call POD for
behind the scenes content andupdates on future episodes.
(57:59):
And then we also have a final boardingcall, Facebook discussion group.
And you can find that if you justsearch final boarding call on Facebook,
and that's where you can share yourthoughts tell me how wrong I am.
Make recommendations for future episodes.
Yeah, if you know of a reallycool crash or non crash story and.
It's early in the series here.
(58:20):
So we've done three airplane episodes,but we are not just airplane travel.
Final boarding call is technicallyan aviation disaster podcast.
However, we will absolutely be dabblingin other transportation disasters.
We're talking planes, trainsand automobiles, planes,
trains and automobiles.
All of the above.
Even some parachutes.
We've got some yachtscoming up in the future.
(58:42):
If you got bucked offa horse, let me know.
Oh my gosh.
And that's the other thing, ifyou have survived something,
a transportation disaster.
My God, please let me know.
Oh, I've got a work buddyDave who I just adore.
He's Dave.
Yes.
He is just like thecoolest dad vibes ever.
He's really fun and he actually tookflying lessons for a little while.
(59:06):
He has survived two, notone, two aviation disasters.
And we are going to have him on to talk.
He wouldn't tell me what theywere because he's like, I gotta
tell you, live on the podcast.
So that's all I know isthat this guy survived too.
So if you are like, Dave,please reach out to us.
(59:29):
And finally, join us next timewhen we will be exploring another
transportation disaster story.
Until then, remember to stow your traytables, fasten your seat belts, and
prepare for the unexpected, because notevery trip reaches it's final destination.
(59:51):
Goodbye.
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