Defending New Zealand 1 - Armed Neutral and Long Range

This is the first episode in a series that discusses New Zealand's defence needs and a brief insight into current shortfalls. While acknowledging that the people within the current New Zealand Defence Force are as good or better than those who have gone before, Simon Ewing-Jarvie bluntly points out that, in a war of commitment such as the defence of the country, the NZDF would cease to be a functional fighting force in a matter of hours without allied assistance. This episode discusses long range requirements.

The model that this series is premised on is the author's own. Establishing the national security requirements as an armed neutral state then subtracting current capabilities derives the GROSS National Security Deficit. By then factoring in the capabilities that can be relied upon from allies leaves the NET National Security Deficit. It is acknowledged that this will vary between risk scenarios.

To succeed, New Zealand's defensive posture must be based on an interlocking set of principles:

1. Self Reliance - Being able to produce or have sufficient stocks of essentials in time of conflict
2. Deterrence - Making the cost of an attack on New Zealand not worth any potential gains
3. Detection - Generating situational awareness in all domains
4. Interdiction - Both strategic and tactical
5. CADDO - The author's own model of Continuous, Asymmetric, Disconnected Defensive Operations (What some would call resistance to an occupying force).

Importantly, these discussions are about defending all 6 million New Zealanders (7 million by 2050) which includes the 1 million currently living overseas - rather than the continental defence of the country.