April 30, 2026 • 21 mins
What does it really feel like when the stock market crashes? In this episode, the Einstein of Wall Street Peter Tuchman— the longest-standing broker on the New York Stock Exchange — takes us inside Black Monday 1987 and the crash of 1929 with stories that will give you chills.
Peter and Tsvetta dive deep into the moments that defined Wall Street history: orders flying out of machines faster than anyone could handle, stocks of household names dropping 50% in hours, and entire market-making firms disappearing before the closing bell. Peter breaks down exactly what consumer signals and market dynamics triggered each crash — and why no two crashes ever look the same.
🎙 Hosts:
Peter Tuchman — NYSE Floor Trader, Einstein of Wall Street
Tsvetta Kaleynska — Consumer Data & Social Listening Expert
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Tsvetta Kaleynska (00:00):
Welcome to the Money Signal podcast with
Einstein of Wall Street andTsvetta, where we talk about
everything from money to ideas,entrepreneurship, history, and
everything else.
So, Peter, today I would loveto talk to you about the history
of you as a trader on the floorof the New York Stock Exchange.
You are the only person who hasbeen here for 41 years, which
(00:22):
is crazy to think about.
And you have seen everythingfrom big plummets to obviously
like the biggest conspirationrallies.
You've seen wars.
You have been here through somehistoric days like 9-11 and
others.
You've seen presidents getelected, they've come here,
shook hands with you, and you'veseen it all.
So I actually today for thisepisode, I want to talk to you
(00:45):
about the history of thoseevents.
And there are several key onesthat I'd love to hear about.
Okay.
Um so before we even getstarted, like I definitely
wanted to hear about what iswhat does it mean to you to be
the longest standing stockbroker here at the stock
exchange, but I haven't doneresearch.
I would assume you're probablythe longest standing stock
(01:06):
broker in the world.
I would assume.
What does it mean to you?
Peter Tuchman (01:10):
So, you know, it's funny funny because I mean
I look back at 41 years.
First of all, thank you forhaving me, and I'm thrilled to
be here.
And you know, I've I've oftenvery I've often spoken about the
fact that I've I've probablythe only stockbroker who's ever
traded every one of the crashesor crises that we've had over
the last 40 years.
And uh and I've also I'm theonly broker who's ever sort of
really has been able to go backhistorically and can talk about
(01:33):
what it was like to trade in theopen outcry days, auction
markets, and all the way nowinto the deep technology of
2026.
Uh, you know, each one of thecrises that we've seen, even
going back to 1929, which I wasnot around for, just to clear
the slate, um, is that each oneof these crises, sell-offs, uh
uh uh crashes, right?
(01:55):
And I don't use that wordlightly, right?
We've literally only had ahandful of crashes, if that.
Uh the different componentsthat made up those crashes is
significant.
You know, that we recentlyinterviewed Andrew Rossirkin,
right, who talked about thecrash of 1929 as the greatest
crash of all time, as being oneof the only crashes where
actually stocks were uhimplicated in the crash.
(02:18):
Wow.
Now, so what does that mean?
I mean, obviously, if there arecrashes in the stock market,
it's got to relate to stocks.
In fact, not so the case.
So each one of the crashes hashad different components that
made it happen, right?
So now obviously the crash of1929, what we heard when we
interviewed Andrew Osirkin wasthat in 1928 the market was
very, very exclusive, a lot ofgatekeeping.
(02:39):
It was really basically for the1% of the 1%.
Wealthy people were invested inthe stock market.
And they came up with an ideathat, well, you know, maybe we
should uh open the doors to uhto the rest of the world, right?
People were starting to makemoney in 1925 and 26, a bit of
an industrial revolution.
Uh people started making money,business companies were being
built, you know, companies weregoing public, right?
(03:01):
And so what ended up happeningwas a couple of guys from Wall
Street decided they were goingto democratize the investment
and trading community, basicallysaying that, you know what,
we're gonna let uh anybody whowants to get involved in the
market to uh buy stocks, right?
And so what they ended up doingwas they set up these little
kiosks all over New York in barson street corners connected to
(03:23):
banks.
And basically, it was as if youwalked up to the kiosk and you
said you give them one dollar,they will then give you ten
dollars back as long as you gaveit back to them to invest in
the market.
Wow.
So they were kind of trying touh build their own, fulfill
their own prophecy, as it were.
They were sort of creating abit of a bubble, like a 10 to 1.
(03:45):
But if you give them a dollar,they'll give you $10 back as
long as you give it back to themto invest in the market.
Wow.
So they were opening the doorsto everybody to invest in the
stock market.
And uh, of course, everybodysaid, Oh, I'll happily do that.
I have a dollar, I'd love $10worth of stock in exchange for
my dollar.
And so uh, you know, itactually fueled this wild surge
(04:06):
on Wall Street.
The next year the market was upa hundred percent uh as a
direct function of this thinghappening.
Now, think of it, it's a lot ofit was all it was all on
margin, right?
It was a 10 to 1 margin call,really, basically.
But it was it was, and and whydo they say that it relates to
stocks?
Because basically $1 got you$10, $10 got you $10 worth of
(04:28):
stock, and then suddenlyeverybody was involved in the
stock market.
What ended up happening wasonce the next year, which the
market was up 100% that year, uhhappened, and a couple of
people decided, you know what?
Wow, I now suddenly have someskin in the game.
My stock is up 10% 100% fromwhere it was when I bought it.
I'd like to maybe sell some ofit.
(04:48):
And so they went ahead to tryand sell it.
And in fact, they weren't ableto.
They weren't able to tie downwhere that stock was, what stock
they bought.
All those particulars were kindof lost in this in this web of
smoke and mirrors.
And they kind of realized,like, wow, well, was that a real
thing?
Was that a real deal?
Or did I just get kind ofbamboozled?
Right.
(05:09):
And uh it was a bit of abamboozle, it was a bit of a
margin, uh, a bit of a bubblewas created.
And basically, the minute oneperson said, Hold it, I want to
sell my stock that I bought ayear ago, yeah, they weren't
able to do it.
They were not able to actuallytie down what they bought, when
they bought it, how much it wasworth.
And so they suddenly said,Well, wait a minute, this isn't
right.
And so there was suddenly asurge on the banks, right?
(05:31):
Because they went to the banksthat had backdropped this whole
scenario.
And they said, Well, like,where's that stock I bought?
We want to sell it.
Well, you know, and they werenot getting straight answers.
And so what ended up happeningwas it was a run on the banks,
then it was a run on the market,and then basically that's what
fueled the crash of 1929 wasthis bubble that they created, a
(05:52):
lot of smoke and mirrors, a 10to 1 margin, and no
transparency, right?
No, you know, people were feltlike they had been kind of
screwed over.
And so uh what you know, howhow do you have a crash happen
uh as it relates to stocks iswhen some or banks is when
somebody who's invested in themarket or invested in a bank is
told you can't take your moneyout.
(06:14):
That's the worst thing you canhear, right?
You go back to the it's awonderful life story, right?
You remember that movie withJimmy Stewart?
Like, well, the minute thatpeople were told, you know, you
can't take your money out,right?
If you remember, he kept thebanks open just because there's
that fear, right?
We saw it happen in Greece abunch a number of years ago when
there was a when there was somefinancial crisis there.
The worst thing you can do toany individual is say to them,
(06:36):
you know what, I'm sorry, thebank is you go to the bank,
banks close.
Your money's not available.
Yeah.
Right.
And so that's what started thecrash of 29.
And it was very real.
It was major, it was multiplepercentages.
I think the market lost, Ithink, 39 plus percent on
Thursday, Friday.
Apparently, the market wouldthey calmed the market down by
putting out some news releasesthat wait a minute, everybody,
(06:58):
we will we will get clean on onwhat we'll make good on our
promise.
And then apparently on Monday,nobody believed them.
And again, and then there was aanother massive sell-off
because people not only weretrying to sell the stocks they
had bought in this little smokeand mirrors game, but they
decided, wait a minute, maybethe whole smart stock market is
(07:19):
a bunch of smoke and mirrors.
I want out.
And people just started sellingand selling and dumping and
dumping, and the market lost 40,50, 60 percent of its value.
And so people were just runningfor the hills.
And that's why you ended uphaving that crash where people
were jumping out of windows.
Tsvetta Kaleynska (07:33):
So everything that you just said um about the
1925 period to 1929 iscompletely fascinating.
I mean, I never knew about it.
But I actually want to move younow to a different era, and
that's the era when you started.
So you started on March 28th,1985, right?
Yep.
And then the biggest eventright after was the Black Monday
(07:54):
1987, which is when, I mean,when my 401k drops like 1%, I
freak out.
I'm sure that day must havebeen completely chaotic with
what they dropped, the marketdropped uh 22.6% or something
like that.
So where were you that?
Were you here that day?
Peter Tuchman (08:09):
I was, I was, I was.
So I started in March, right?
I was started as a teletypist,right?
By June, by by this, the oncethe summer, and it was just like
the minute I walked on thefloor, I knew I had arrived.
I loved the energy and thechaos and the adrenaline.
It was perfect.
And I kind of, you know, I worea suit every day and I sort of
I took the job very seriously.
And I kind of fit in, right?
I was uh, you know, but I wasalways looking, I was looking
(08:32):
into the future.
I knew that the this was morethan just a summer job to me.
It was something that this wasthe beginning of a longer
journey.
So uh by the time August camearound, I was already starting
to set myself up to get a realjob, right?
Because this was kind of whereI put all I put my eggs in this
basket.
And so uh, you know,mid-August, I had gone to the
boss and who I befriended quitewell, and everybody, we were all
(08:55):
really super close.
We worked right under thepodium, booth double-A.
There was Cowan and Company,which is the company I worked
for.
There was uh uh Abel Nosier, itwas one person sitting in the
corner.
There was Somala, which wasIman Boski's company, uh, which
will went on, he went on laterto be indicted for insider
trading.
And then there was DeanWhitter.
(09:15):
So the way the booths were setup was one firm, two firms,
three firms, four firms.
And so um, and I worked at theend.
So there was clerk, clerk,clerk, and then teletypist, and
that was it.
And so I was in the middle ofit and I was loving, I loved the
energy, and I was always tryingto get better and do better.
And so uh when August camearound, I started setting myself
(09:36):
up for like a real job.
I said, guys, you know, I'vereally enjoyed this summer job,
but I want to I want to workhere forever.
I think I've found my call.
And they said, uh, okay, aftera couple of weeks, they said, we
will uh love to offer you a jobas an option clerk.
Now, an option clerk isbasically what happens is
companies have, you know, equitybusiness and option business,
and there's a thing calledoption layoff business.
(09:56):
So when they're upstairs makingmarkets in options, they need
to hedge themselves by by buyingand selling equities, right?
Uh so if they're long, I don'tknow, long uh, you know, uh 50
contracts of Johnson andJohnson, you know, 107 calls.
Well, they need to hedge byselling some short stock.
And so uh so September 15th, Istarted my my regular job.
(10:18):
Oh wow, there was nointerruption.
I went straight out of summerjob into a real job.
Uh and uh and it was justincredibly exciting.
I just I I felt like I hadarrived.
My father took me out to to uhto Gallagher's for dinner, that
was a big deal.
And then because it will, youknow, a summer internship was a
summer internship, but actuallygetting a job on Wall Street, he
kind of set the stage for youto like this is uh something I
(10:40):
was committing to.
So uh the option clerk, retailclerk, institutional clerk, and
teletypist.
So I had moved my way up in theranks and I was sitting on the
edge of the edge of the booth,right?
And you know, but I was youknow, you know, the way the
booths are set up on the outsideof the room are brokerage
firms, then they're marketmakers.
And so, you know, I felt like Iwas more in the mix, right?
(11:01):
I was part of the company.
And so the order flow, thestuff I was getting was like buy
500 shares uh in 102, cancel200, leaves 300.
Okay, cancel that and sell 500shares, sell 200, leaves 300.
It was this constant flow oforders being added to, being
canceled, being on the otherside and flipping.
And I just loved it.
It was just like I was in it, Ifelt like I was significant,
(11:24):
and so uh I did that.
I probably was an option clerkfor six months, you know, and
then somebody who was the uhretail clerk.
So I was standing literally infront of a bank of phones, and
there were probably 40 numbers,and you would hit these little
white dots, right?
It would be all the differentspots up in the company, right?
It would be the retail spot,the institutional spot, it would
(11:44):
be the option room, whatever itwas.
And I mean, just stand there.
You didn't do anything else.
You stood facing the thing,you'd hit the button, pick up
the phone.
It was no time for anything butfocus.
Tsvetta Kaleynska (11:54):
Wow.
Peter Tuchman (11:54):
And so, you know, with my ADD and my
hyper-focusedness, I was perfectat it.
I mean, I also was alreadystarting to like, you know,
looking at, you know, paying,paying attention to everybody
else's business besides myself.
And so I would probably, Idon't really know the timeline,
but I would probably say withinsix months, uh, I guess I think
the option the retail guy leftand they said, you know, we have
an opportunity to to move youup uh a rank.
(12:17):
And I said, guys, wherewhenever you have that
opportunity, I'm I'm in it.
You know, you have my my youhave me have my full uh
undaunted uh uh attention here.
And so they moved me up tobeing a retail clerk.
Tsvetta Kaleynska (12:27):
Wow.
Peter Tuchman (12:27):
So a retail clerk was connected to the retail
desk.
It was basically, we were just,you know, this is small order
flow, buy 200 shares, buy 300shares, buy 500 shares, buy a
thousand shares, uh, you know,and and there were a little bit
of instructions along with it.
So I started to learn thebusiness more, right?
You know, I needed they had alimit order, a market order, and
work the order.
You know, I would get theorder, I would beep one of the
(12:49):
brokers, they would come in, Iwould give them the order with a
little bit of instructions.
They would run out to thecrowd, they would buy 300,
leaves 200, I would report that.
Johnny, uh Johnny Cremontanowas the guy's name.
And uh he taught he had a heavylisp.
He talked like this.
It was really very funnybecause I didn't understand him.
And uh and uh, but he waswonderful.
(13:09):
We were friends for many, manyyears.
And so uh that was great forme.
That was really cutting myteeth.
I mean, I learned the business,I learned how to trade, and uh,
you know, and then there wouldbe a quotron machine here.
So when you got the order, youhit up the stock and it would
give you the the market in thestock.
So you had to, when you calledthe $2 broker in or the house
broker to give him the order,you had to do uh your own, you
(13:31):
had to do your due diligence sothat he doesn't just, you know,
uh just throw the broker inthere blind.
You'd say to him, okay, youknow, whoever my my Marty Sherk
was one of my two dollarbrokers.
I said, Marty, just it's 500shares, just buy it, or it's a
thousand shares, buy 500, atleast 500.
The guy wants to be aggressive,he wants to be uh, you know,
passive, whatever it is.
So I always sort of went outout of my way to give him just a
(13:54):
little bit more.
And then uh, and then it was Idid that for another six months,
and it may have been a year andsix months, I'm sure it didn't
happen that fast.
So I was probably optionclerking for eight months, I was
retail clerking probably foreight months, and then it was
January 21st, 1980.
(14:15):
I was still a clerk, 87.
So I was, I think I was the reI was the retail clerk.
We the first part of the day,so it was Black Friday.
Tsvetta Kaleynska (14:28):
Black Friday was October 1987.
Peter Tuchman (14:31):
Right, October 1987.
We came into work.
Now, the crash of 87 was veryunusual in that the the the the
the components that made up thiscrash, there was some insurance
things involved, there was sometechnology stuff involved, you
know.
Each crash has a different adifferent you know feel to it,
right?
You know, obviously the bubbleof 2000 was a bubble.
(14:52):
It was not a lot to do withstocks.
The uh, you know, 0708 was apredatory lending uh thing.
COVID was a health crisis.
Uh, you know, so each one ofthe crashes had different
components to it that made ithave a certain different flavor
and a way had different them, itaffected the market.
So my memory of this was thatliterally I we were we were very
(15:14):
big in a stock called digitalequipment.
It was one of the firstcomputer companies.
The stock opened at $146.50 andit closed at $44.
So it was down a hundreddollars.
The market closed down, Ithink, of six hundred and eight
points.
Because I remember looking atthe quoton that we had, and
people were taking pictures ofit, right?
(15:35):
Because they had never seen amarket down that much.
And no, you're good.
Tsvetta Kaleynska (15:42):
What did you go in here?
No problem.
Peter Tuchman (15:45):
Um and so uh I you know I um uh my memory was
that we had we had gotten thesethings called the dot machine,
right?
It was a dot operating systemwhere orders were being not only
not all the orders were comingdown through the phone, they
were being spit out by thislittle printed machine.
Yeah, buy 500, sell 200, buy300, buy a thousand, small
(16:06):
retail flow.
And that I remember that daythat the orders were just being
spitting out of the machine sofast you didn't know what to do.
And so I just literally wouldstand there and I'd rip them,
rip them, and I would have astack like this.
And I would beep my $2 broker,and uh I had Marty Shirk, I had
Tony Zego, I had uh a bunch ofthem, then we had our house
(16:27):
brokers.
And basically, I um I would get50 orders would spit out at me,
and I grabbed them and I'd putup the broker and I would just
hand him 50 orders and I go,Marty, just do the best you can.
By around 11 o'clock, you couldtell that the market was
already turning really, reallysouth.
Didn't happen right out of thegate, but uh you could tell
there was fear in themarketplace.
(16:48):
You know, we were everybody waslike wondering like what's
going on, something really badis happening.
And um uh I just remember bythe end of the day, you know, we
were just we we we couldn'twait for that bell to ring
because it was horrifying to seestocks that were down, you
know, Ford, uh JP Morgan, WellsFargo, you know, names of some
(17:11):
of the greatest IBM was down $30or $40.
You know, some of the stockswere down 30, 40, 50 percent.
Tsvetta Kaleynska (17:18):
That's crazy.
Peter Tuchman (17:19):
And uh, you know, you basically you'd see these
crowds, and basically peoplewould just walk in and they'd go
sell.
You know, it was not even likea matter of like what's the
market in the stock, like youwould do now.
It was basically I got I gotfive dollars to sell, and they'd
give me a price down twodollars.
You know, that was kind of howit was.
And uh that probably was stillto this date one of the scariest
(17:43):
days I've ever experienced onWall Street, just because um it
it the the the fear, theanxiety, uh, you know, I mean
you could just feel that moneywas just value of everything was
just being cut in half.
Okay, I think the mostimportant thing to note about
the crash of 87 was first ofall, many firms went bankrupt at
(18:03):
night.
Because at the end of the day,market making firms have to
come, they have to, they have tohave the money to support
whatever positions they have.
And so when a stock, you know,when when when the public
starts, though, the marketmaker, in the absence of the
public buying it, the marketmaker has to buy it.
And when a stock opens at 160and it closes at 60, that means
that probably about 70 or 80dollars, the the public stopped
(18:26):
buying it, and the market makerswere buying stock all the way
down.
Wow.
And so what happened that daywas many firms went under, many
firms had to merge with otherfirms uh uh to just to get
through the day, you know, andthen there were many takeovers
because there were some firmsthat were still fluid, that had
money.
And they, you know, theyobviously didn't want these
companies to fold.
(18:47):
And so, you know, there was noway for uh most of the market
making companies when I gothere, there were 70
market-making firms.
I would say we lost 20 of themthat day.
Wow.
And so the fear and the uh thethe the the adrenaline that day
was unmatched, even throughCOVID, through any other crash,
in my opinion, for me, not onlythat I was a youngster here and
(19:08):
it was new, and even though Iwas a clerk because I was right
in the middle of it.
I mean, I've had some crazytrading days as a broker, but
just having only been here for acouple of days, the nature of
that crash was was so much fear.
The percentage value of theloss, I think, was the biggest
in history, right?
That's my gut.
Um, because the market was onlytrading at like 5,000 or
something, but now it was at5,000.
(19:30):
Uh the SP, I don't even knowwhat the SP was trading at.
But the percentage loss thatday was so significant.
And the fact was that stockswere down so much as a
percentage of their total uh,you know, uh value that uh I
just remember looking, we tookpictures of of the quote machine
(19:50):
and we circulated them.
That was like a famous pictureto own of the market down 608
points.
It was the biggest time,biggest drop in history.
You know, the fact that therewere stocks that were $60 stocks
that were down $40.
You know, there were $20 stocksthat closed at three.
You know, there were stocks ofmajor value, companies that we
knew that were part of our life,you know, that were trading on
(20:11):
20 cents on the dollar by theend of that day.
And so I, you know, I justremember everybody at the end of
the day literally just droppedto the floor, you know, and just
looked at each other.
I don't think, I mean, westayed around till probably
seven or eight o'clock at night,you know, just kind of
shivering and shaking because wehad never seen anything like
that.
And I don't people, I don'tthink people really knew what
had gone on and what washappening.
(20:32):
But I would say, you know, ofall the crashes in in history,
that was the most significant.
Tsvetta Kaleynska (20:37):
I would love to continue this conversation.
I mean, I'm shaking just byhearing the story because you
never shake yourself.
I know, I know.
Ladies and gentlemen, thank youso much for being with us for
another epic episode of theMoney Signal from Main Street to
Wall Street with the one andonly Einstein of Wall Street and
Sveta.
Make sure to follow us and staytuned for the next episode.
Peter Tuchman (20:57):
That's right.
Breaking news, the memories ofWall Street historically are
there's nobody else who canreally share those stories with
you.
And so we look forward tospending a lot of time giving
that and giving that historicbreakdown for you.
Einstein out.
Welcome to the Money Signal podcast with
Einstein of Wall Street andTsvetta, where we talk about
everything from money to ideas,entrepreneurship, history, and
everything else.
So, Peter, today I would loveto talk to you about the history
of you as a trader on the floorof the New York Stock Exchange.
You are the only person who hasbeen here for 41 years, which
(00:22):
is crazy to think about.
And you have seen everythingfrom big plummets to obviously
like the biggest conspirationrallies.
You've seen wars.
You have been here through somehistoric days like 9-11 and
others.
You've seen presidents getelected, they've come here,
shook hands with you, and you'veseen it all.
So I actually today for thisepisode, I want to talk to you
(00:45):
about the history of thoseevents.
And there are several key onesthat I'd love to hear about.
Okay.
Um so before we even getstarted, like I definitely
wanted to hear about what iswhat does it mean to you to be
the longest standing stockbroker here at the stock
exchange, but I haven't doneresearch.
I would assume you're probablythe longest standing stock
(01:06):
broker in the world.
I would assume.
What does it mean to you?
Peter Tuchman (01:10):
So, you know, it's funny funny because I mean
I look back at 41 years.
First of all, thank you forhaving me, and I'm thrilled to
be here.
And you know, I've I've oftenvery I've often spoken about the
fact that I've I've probablythe only stockbroker who's ever
traded every one of the crashesor crises that we've had over
the last 40 years.
And uh and I've also I'm theonly broker who's ever sort of
really has been able to go backhistorically and can talk about
(01:33):
what it was like to trade in theopen outcry days, auction
markets, and all the way nowinto the deep technology of
2026.
Uh, you know, each one of thecrises that we've seen, even
going back to 1929, which I wasnot around for, just to clear
the slate, um, is that each oneof these crises, sell-offs, uh
uh uh crashes, right?
(01:55):
And I don't use that wordlightly, right?
We've literally only had ahandful of crashes, if that.
Uh the different componentsthat made up those crashes is
significant.
You know, that we recentlyinterviewed Andrew Rossirkin,
right, who talked about thecrash of 1929 as the greatest
crash of all time, as being oneof the only crashes where
actually stocks were uhimplicated in the crash.
(02:18):
Wow.
Now, so what does that mean?
I mean, obviously, if there arecrashes in the stock market,
it's got to relate to stocks.
In fact, not so the case.
So each one of the crashes hashad different components that
made it happen, right?
So now obviously the crash of1929, what we heard when we
interviewed Andrew Osirkin wasthat in 1928 the market was
very, very exclusive, a lot ofgatekeeping.
(02:39):
It was really basically for the1% of the 1%.
Wealthy people were invested inthe stock market.
And they came up with an ideathat, well, you know, maybe we
should uh open the doors to uhto the rest of the world, right?
People were starting to makemoney in 1925 and 26, a bit of
an industrial revolution.
Uh people started making money,business companies were being
built, you know, companies weregoing public, right?
(03:01):
And so what ended up happeningwas a couple of guys from Wall
Street decided they were goingto democratize the investment
and trading community, basicallysaying that, you know what,
we're gonna let uh anybody whowants to get involved in the
market to uh buy stocks, right?
And so what they ended up doingwas they set up these little
kiosks all over New York in barson street corners connected to
(03:23):
banks.
And basically, it was as if youwalked up to the kiosk and you
said you give them one dollar,they will then give you ten
dollars back as long as you gaveit back to them to invest in
the market.
Wow.
So they were kind of trying touh build their own, fulfill
their own prophecy, as it were.
They were sort of creating abit of a bubble, like a 10 to 1.
(03:45):
But if you give them a dollar,they'll give you $10 back as
long as you give it back to themto invest in the market.
Wow.
So they were opening the doorsto everybody to invest in the
stock market.
And uh, of course, everybodysaid, Oh, I'll happily do that.
I have a dollar, I'd love $10worth of stock in exchange for
my dollar.
And so uh, you know, itactually fueled this wild surge
(04:06):
on Wall Street.
The next year the market was upa hundred percent uh as a
direct function of this thinghappening.
Now, think of it, it's a lot ofit was all it was all on
margin, right?
It was a 10 to 1 margin call,really, basically.
But it was it was, and and whydo they say that it relates to
stocks?
Because basically $1 got you$10, $10 got you $10 worth of
(04:28):
stock, and then suddenlyeverybody was involved in the
stock market.
What ended up happening wasonce the next year, which the
market was up 100% that year, uhhappened, and a couple of
people decided, you know what?
Wow, I now suddenly have someskin in the game.
My stock is up 10% 100% fromwhere it was when I bought it.
I'd like to maybe sell some ofit.
(04:48):
And so they went ahead to tryand sell it.
And in fact, they weren't ableto.
They weren't able to tie downwhere that stock was, what stock
they bought.
All those particulars were kindof lost in this in this web of
smoke and mirrors.
And they kind of realized,like, wow, well, was that a real
thing?
Was that a real deal?
Or did I just get kind ofbamboozled?
Right.
(05:09):
And uh it was a bit of abamboozle, it was a bit of a
margin, uh, a bit of a bubblewas created.
And basically, the minute oneperson said, Hold it, I want to
sell my stock that I bought ayear ago, yeah, they weren't
able to do it.
They were not able to actuallytie down what they bought, when
they bought it, how much it wasworth.
And so they suddenly said,Well, wait a minute, this isn't
right.
And so there was suddenly asurge on the banks, right?
(05:31):
Because they went to the banksthat had backdropped this whole
scenario.
And they said, Well, like,where's that stock I bought?
We want to sell it.
Well, you know, and they werenot getting straight answers.
And so what ended up happeningwas it was a run on the banks,
then it was a run on the market,and then basically that's what
fueled the crash of 1929 wasthis bubble that they created, a
(05:52):
lot of smoke and mirrors, a 10to 1 margin, and no
transparency, right?
No, you know, people were feltlike they had been kind of
screwed over.
And so uh what you know, howhow do you have a crash happen
uh as it relates to stocks iswhen some or banks is when
somebody who's invested in themarket or invested in a bank is
told you can't take your moneyout.
(06:14):
That's the worst thing you canhear, right?
You go back to the it's awonderful life story, right?
You remember that movie withJimmy Stewart?
Like, well, the minute thatpeople were told, you know, you
can't take your money out,right?
If you remember, he kept thebanks open just because there's
that fear, right?
We saw it happen in Greece abunch a number of years ago when
there was a when there was somefinancial crisis there.
The worst thing you can do toany individual is say to them,
(06:36):
you know what, I'm sorry, thebank is you go to the bank,
banks close.
Your money's not available.
Yeah.
Right.
And so that's what started thecrash of 29.
And it was very real.
It was major, it was multiplepercentages.
I think the market lost, Ithink, 39 plus percent on
Thursday, Friday.
Apparently, the market wouldthey calmed the market down by
putting out some news releasesthat wait a minute, everybody,
(06:58):
we will we will get clean on onwhat we'll make good on our
promise.
And then apparently on Monday,nobody believed them.
And again, and then there was aanother massive sell-off
because people not only weretrying to sell the stocks they
had bought in this little smokeand mirrors game, but they
decided, wait a minute, maybethe whole smart stock market is
(07:19):
a bunch of smoke and mirrors.
I want out.
And people just started sellingand selling and dumping and
dumping, and the market lost 40,50, 60 percent of its value.
And so people were just runningfor the hills.
And that's why you ended uphaving that crash where people
were jumping out of windows.
Tsvetta Kaleynska (07:33):
So everything that you just said um about the
1925 period to 1929 iscompletely fascinating.
I mean, I never knew about it.
But I actually want to move younow to a different era, and
that's the era when you started.
So you started on March 28th,1985, right?
Yep.
And then the biggest eventright after was the Black Monday
(07:54):
1987, which is when, I mean,when my 401k drops like 1%, I
freak out.
I'm sure that day must havebeen completely chaotic with
what they dropped, the marketdropped uh 22.6% or something
like that.
So where were you that?
Were you here that day?
Peter Tuchman (08:09):
I was, I was, I was.
So I started in March, right?
I was started as a teletypist,right?
By June, by by this, the oncethe summer, and it was just like
the minute I walked on thefloor, I knew I had arrived.
I loved the energy and thechaos and the adrenaline.
It was perfect.
And I kind of, you know, I worea suit every day and I sort of
I took the job very seriously.
And I kind of fit in, right?
I was uh, you know, but I wasalways looking, I was looking
(08:32):
into the future.
I knew that the this was morethan just a summer job to me.
It was something that this wasthe beginning of a longer
journey.
So uh by the time August camearound, I was already starting
to set myself up to get a realjob, right?
Because this was kind of whereI put all I put my eggs in this
basket.
And so uh, you know,mid-August, I had gone to the
boss and who I befriended quitewell, and everybody, we were all
(08:55):
really super close.
We worked right under thepodium, booth double-A.
There was Cowan and Company,which is the company I worked
for.
There was uh uh Abel Nosier, itwas one person sitting in the
corner.
There was Somala, which wasIman Boski's company, uh, which
will went on, he went on laterto be indicted for insider
trading.
And then there was DeanWhitter.
(09:15):
So the way the booths were setup was one firm, two firms,
three firms, four firms.
And so um, and I worked at theend.
So there was clerk, clerk,clerk, and then teletypist, and
that was it.
And so I was in the middle ofit and I was loving, I loved the
energy, and I was always tryingto get better and do better.
And so uh when August camearound, I started setting myself
(09:36):
up for like a real job.
I said, guys, you know, I'vereally enjoyed this summer job,
but I want to I want to workhere forever.
I think I've found my call.
And they said, uh, okay, aftera couple of weeks, they said, we
will uh love to offer you a jobas an option clerk.
Now, an option clerk isbasically what happens is
companies have, you know, equitybusiness and option business,
and there's a thing calledoption layoff business.
(09:56):
So when they're upstairs makingmarkets in options, they need
to hedge themselves by by buyingand selling equities, right?
Uh so if they're long, I don'tknow, long uh, you know, uh 50
contracts of Johnson andJohnson, you know, 107 calls.
Well, they need to hedge byselling some short stock.
And so uh so September 15th, Istarted my my regular job.
(10:18):
Oh wow, there was nointerruption.
I went straight out of summerjob into a real job.
Uh and uh and it was justincredibly exciting.
I just I I felt like I hadarrived.
My father took me out to to uhto Gallagher's for dinner, that
was a big deal.
And then because it will, youknow, a summer internship was a
summer internship, but actuallygetting a job on Wall Street, he
kind of set the stage for youto like this is uh something I
(10:40):
was committing to.
So uh the option clerk, retailclerk, institutional clerk, and
teletypist.
So I had moved my way up in theranks and I was sitting on the
edge of the edge of the booth,right?
And you know, but I was youknow, you know, the way the
booths are set up on the outsideof the room are brokerage
firms, then they're marketmakers.
And so, you know, I felt like Iwas more in the mix, right?
(11:01):
I was part of the company.
And so the order flow, thestuff I was getting was like buy
500 shares uh in 102, cancel200, leaves 300.
Okay, cancel that and sell 500shares, sell 200, leaves 300.
It was this constant flow oforders being added to, being
canceled, being on the otherside and flipping.
And I just loved it.
It was just like I was in it, Ifelt like I was significant,
(11:24):
and so uh I did that.
I probably was an option clerkfor six months, you know, and
then somebody who was the uhretail clerk.
So I was standing literally infront of a bank of phones, and
there were probably 40 numbers,and you would hit these little
white dots, right?
It would be all the differentspots up in the company, right?
It would be the retail spot,the institutional spot, it would
(11:44):
be the option room, whatever itwas.
And I mean, just stand there.
You didn't do anything else.
You stood facing the thing,you'd hit the button, pick up
the phone.
It was no time for anything butfocus.
Tsvetta Kaleynska (11:54):
Wow.
Peter Tuchman (11:54):
And so, you know, with my ADD and my
hyper-focusedness, I was perfectat it.
I mean, I also was alreadystarting to like, you know,
looking at, you know, paying,paying attention to everybody
else's business besides myself.
And so I would probably, Idon't really know the timeline,
but I would probably say withinsix months, uh, I guess I think
the option the retail guy leftand they said, you know, we have
an opportunity to to move youup uh a rank.
(12:17):
And I said, guys, wherewhenever you have that
opportunity, I'm I'm in it.
You know, you have my my youhave me have my full uh
undaunted uh uh attention here.
And so they moved me up tobeing a retail clerk.
Tsvetta Kaleynska (12:27):
Wow.
Peter Tuchman (12:27):
So a retail clerk was connected to the retail
desk.
It was basically, we were just,you know, this is small order
flow, buy 200 shares, buy 300shares, buy 500 shares, buy a
thousand shares, uh, you know,and and there were a little bit
of instructions along with it.
So I started to learn thebusiness more, right?
You know, I needed they had alimit order, a market order, and
work the order.
You know, I would get theorder, I would beep one of the
(12:49):
brokers, they would come in, Iwould give them the order with a
little bit of instructions.
They would run out to thecrowd, they would buy 300,
leaves 200, I would report that.
Johnny, uh Johnny Cremontanowas the guy's name.
And uh he taught he had a heavylisp.
He talked like this.
It was really very funnybecause I didn't understand him.
And uh and uh, but he waswonderful.
(13:09):
We were friends for many, manyyears.
And so uh that was great forme.
That was really cutting myteeth.
I mean, I learned the business,I learned how to trade, and uh,
you know, and then there wouldbe a quotron machine here.
So when you got the order, youhit up the stock and it would
give you the the market in thestock.
So you had to, when you calledthe $2 broker in or the house
broker to give him the order,you had to do uh your own, you
(13:31):
had to do your due diligence sothat he doesn't just, you know,
uh just throw the broker inthere blind.
You'd say to him, okay, youknow, whoever my my Marty Sherk
was one of my two dollarbrokers.
I said, Marty, just it's 500shares, just buy it, or it's a
thousand shares, buy 500, atleast 500.
The guy wants to be aggressive,he wants to be uh, you know,
passive, whatever it is.
So I always sort of went outout of my way to give him just a
(13:54):
little bit more.
And then uh, and then it was Idid that for another six months,
and it may have been a year andsix months, I'm sure it didn't
happen that fast.
So I was probably optionclerking for eight months, I was
retail clerking probably foreight months, and then it was
January 21st, 1980.
(14:15):
I was still a clerk, 87.
So I was, I think I was the reI was the retail clerk.
We the first part of the day,so it was Black Friday.
Tsvetta Kaleynska (14:28):
Black Friday was October 1987.
Peter Tuchman (14:31):
Right, October 1987.
We came into work.
Now, the crash of 87 was veryunusual in that the the the the
the components that made up thiscrash, there was some insurance
things involved, there was sometechnology stuff involved, you
know.
Each crash has a different adifferent you know feel to it,
right?
You know, obviously the bubbleof 2000 was a bubble.
(14:52):
It was not a lot to do withstocks.
The uh, you know, 0708 was apredatory lending uh thing.
COVID was a health crisis.
Uh, you know, so each one ofthe crashes had different
components to it that made ithave a certain different flavor
and a way had different them, itaffected the market.
So my memory of this was thatliterally I we were we were very
(15:14):
big in a stock called digitalequipment.
It was one of the firstcomputer companies.
The stock opened at $146.50 andit closed at $44.
So it was down a hundreddollars.
The market closed down, Ithink, of six hundred and eight
points.
Because I remember looking atthe quoton that we had, and
people were taking pictures ofit, right?
(15:35):
Because they had never seen amarket down that much.
And no, you're good.
Tsvetta Kaleynska (15:42):
What did you go in here?
No problem.
Peter Tuchman (15:45):
Um and so uh I you know I um uh my memory was
that we had we had gotten thesethings called the dot machine,
right?
It was a dot operating systemwhere orders were being not only
not all the orders were comingdown through the phone, they
were being spit out by thislittle printed machine.
Yeah, buy 500, sell 200, buy300, buy a thousand, small
(16:06):
retail flow.
And that I remember that daythat the orders were just being
spitting out of the machine sofast you didn't know what to do.
And so I just literally wouldstand there and I'd rip them,
rip them, and I would have astack like this.
And I would beep my $2 broker,and uh I had Marty Shirk, I had
Tony Zego, I had uh a bunch ofthem, then we had our house
(16:27):
brokers.
And basically, I um I would get50 orders would spit out at me,
and I grabbed them and I'd putup the broker and I would just
hand him 50 orders and I go,Marty, just do the best you can.
By around 11 o'clock, you couldtell that the market was
already turning really, reallysouth.
Didn't happen right out of thegate, but uh you could tell
there was fear in themarketplace.
(16:48):
You know, we were everybody waslike wondering like what's
going on, something really badis happening.
And um uh I just remember bythe end of the day, you know, we
were just we we we couldn'twait for that bell to ring
because it was horrifying to seestocks that were down, you
know, Ford, uh JP Morgan, WellsFargo, you know, names of some
(17:11):
of the greatest IBM was down $30or $40.
You know, some of the stockswere down 30, 40, 50 percent.
Tsvetta Kaleynska (17:18):
That's crazy.
Peter Tuchman (17:19):
And uh, you know, you basically you'd see these
crowds, and basically peoplewould just walk in and they'd go
sell.
You know, it was not even likea matter of like what's the
market in the stock, like youwould do now.
It was basically I got I gotfive dollars to sell, and they'd
give me a price down twodollars.
You know, that was kind of howit was.
And uh that probably was stillto this date one of the scariest
(17:43):
days I've ever experienced onWall Street, just because um it
it the the the fear, theanxiety, uh, you know, I mean
you could just feel that moneywas just value of everything was
just being cut in half.
Okay, I think the mostimportant thing to note about
the crash of 87 was first ofall, many firms went bankrupt at
(18:03):
night.
Because at the end of the day,market making firms have to
come, they have to, they have tohave the money to support
whatever positions they have.
And so when a stock, you know,when when when the public
starts, though, the marketmaker, in the absence of the
public buying it, the marketmaker has to buy it.
And when a stock opens at 160and it closes at 60, that means
that probably about 70 or 80dollars, the the public stopped
(18:26):
buying it, and the market makerswere buying stock all the way
down.
Wow.
And so what happened that daywas many firms went under, many
firms had to merge with otherfirms uh uh to just to get
through the day, you know, andthen there were many takeovers
because there were some firmsthat were still fluid, that had
money.
And they, you know, theyobviously didn't want these
companies to fold.
(18:47):
And so, you know, there was noway for uh most of the market
making companies when I gothere, there were 70
market-making firms.
I would say we lost 20 of themthat day.
Wow.
And so the fear and the uh thethe the the adrenaline that day
was unmatched, even throughCOVID, through any other crash,
in my opinion, for me, not onlythat I was a youngster here and
(19:08):
it was new, and even though Iwas a clerk because I was right
in the middle of it.
I mean, I've had some crazytrading days as a broker, but
just having only been here for acouple of days, the nature of
that crash was was so much fear.
The percentage value of theloss, I think, was the biggest
in history, right?
That's my gut.
Um, because the market was onlytrading at like 5,000 or
something, but now it was at5,000.
(19:30):
Uh the SP, I don't even knowwhat the SP was trading at.
But the percentage loss thatday was so significant.
And the fact was that stockswere down so much as a
percentage of their total uh,you know, uh value that uh I
just remember looking, we tookpictures of of the quote machine
(19:50):
and we circulated them.
That was like a famous pictureto own of the market down 608
points.
It was the biggest time,biggest drop in history.
You know, the fact that therewere stocks that were $60 stocks
that were down $40.
You know, there were $20 stocksthat closed at three.
You know, there were stocks ofmajor value, companies that we
knew that were part of our life,you know, that were trading on
(20:11):
20 cents on the dollar by theend of that day.
And so I, you know, I justremember everybody at the end of
the day literally just droppedto the floor, you know, and just
looked at each other.
I don't think, I mean, westayed around till probably
seven or eight o'clock at night,you know, just kind of
shivering and shaking because wehad never seen anything like
that.
And I don't people, I don'tthink people really knew what
had gone on and what washappening.
(20:32):
But I would say, you know, ofall the crashes in in history,
that was the most significant.
Tsvetta Kaleynska (20:37):
I would love to continue this conversation.
I mean, I'm shaking just byhearing the story because you
never shake yourself.
I know, I know.
Ladies and gentlemen, thank youso much for being with us for
another epic episode of theMoney Signal from Main Street to
Wall Street with the one andonly Einstein of Wall Street and
Sveta.
Make sure to follow us and staytuned for the next episode.
Peter Tuchman (20:57):
That's right.
Breaking news, the memories ofWall Street historically are
there's nobody else who canreally share those stories with
you.
And so we look forward tospending a lot of time giving
that and giving that historicbreakdown for you.
Einstein out.
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