Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:00):
It's been a crazy week in that AI space because
we've seen open AI's latest model attack another platform get
out of its sandbox environment where it shouldn't have been
able to just solve a problem, and attacked another platform
to try and find answers to that problem. Now, this
is crazy because a lot of the methods that AI
(00:22):
model used is what is being used to attack the
crypto protocols, bridges and validators out there at the moment.
So this could very well have a massive impact to
the crypto industry, and I think it's been downplayed and
underestimated at the moment. So if you haven't caught up
to the latest news, this is a bit of a
(00:44):
summary here. This platform called hugging Face got attacked by
open AI's latest model, which was placed into a sandbox
environment which it shouldn't have been able to get out of,
but it slowly went through, found a weakness of vulnerability,
got out one way, continuously found more and more different
ways to get out of its environment. Once it did,
(01:05):
it tried to find another platform where it could possibly
find the answers to its problem that was trying to solve,
and thought hugging Face was a perfect place where it
could possibly find those answers. So then it breached hugging
Faces platform using weak passwords or leaked passwords that it
found online, and then continuously started to probe deeper and
(01:26):
deeper until it got into hugging Faces infrastructure. So that's
the situation there, and considering that AI just continuously works
in the background looking for multiple different vectors of attack
to get into another platform is insane and crazy. And
of course these platforms have lots of resources and funding
to protect themselves against these type of.
Speaker 2 (01:47):
Attacks, but they still get attacked and probed.
Speaker 1 (01:51):
So where does that lead us in regards to the
crypto space? And this is where things get really crazy.
And this particle here from coin Desk points out a
couple of things that we should be aware of. So
let me just read out these points here.
Speaker 2 (02:07):
Much of the crypto.
Speaker 1 (02:07):
Attacks happened before the funds move attack is scan code,
test passwords, search for exposed credentials, analyze signing setups, and
look for a path into administrator accounts. That's even discord
environments and anything that's you use to communicate with your
crypto community.
Speaker 2 (02:26):
They're all possible attack vectors.
Speaker 1 (02:29):
So it's really important that all these projects take security
to the utmost, and you know, bring on board a
moderator or something like that could expose the entire project.
So there's a lot of things that we need to
look into here. Now the weak point may not be
a smart contract and may be a developer's laptop, a
poisoned software package, or a bridge validata. So there's multiple
(02:51):
different ways to get into a particular platform, and the
smart contracts aren't always the point. If we have a
look here on some previous attacks, Drift for two hundred
and eighty five million, that was a six month social
engineering campaign to get into the credentials and gain privileged access.
This other one here, kelp do out for two hundred
and ninety two million, was a bridge loss and it
(03:14):
attacked a single verify floor within their system. And the
list goes on and on, and I really do think
if you have a look at this headline here, that
the artificial intelligence threat to crypto is definitely being underestimated.
I'll put links to all these articles in the show
notes down below. And while I've got your attention, don't
(03:35):
forget to tear that thumbs up like subscribe notification bell.
My name is Peter, and I'll keep you guys up
to date with everything that's happening in the crypto space.
So if we go back to here and have a
look at what's happening in the Cadano space at the moment,
this latest one chain bridge could have very well been
another exploit due to AI probing and looking for various
(03:58):
attack vectors to gain access to the bridge's assets. And
this was very unfortunate to see. But this isn't the
only bridge hack that we saw this week. This week alone,
coin Burry put out this We've got afx Trade for
twenty four point one five million, We've got Versus for
seven point five to five We've got B two Network
(04:21):
for another three point eighty six million, So the list
goes on and on. And the unfortunate thing with Versus
here is that they had a follow up attack for
another seven point five to three million. So this is
an insane, insane amount of attacks that are happening at
the moment, and we're just seeing more and more of
these ramp up. The problem with the bridges is that
(04:43):
the way the bridge works is that people will bring
in assets from one chain and then lock it into
a smart contract on that chain itself. The assets are
just sitting there. They are a sitting target. So when
an attacker comes along, they'll be looking at those sitting
targets and saying, that's an easy place to exploit because
(05:03):
if I can get into one, I can get into
a lot of the other assets that potentially are being
locked up on that bridge. So bridges are and have
always been a honeypot for attackers because of the amount
of assets and liquidity that they hold within their ecosystems.
So a lot of these bridges they've built very well,
(05:24):
they've had multiple security audits and whatnot, but somehow they're
still being attacked by these But somehow they're still being attacked.
And I really do think that AI is playing a
deep role at the moment to find these vulnerabilities and
attack these bridges. Now back to the one chain exploit
that happened earlier this week. Now, a lot of you
(05:46):
that watch my channel are in the Condona ecosystem, so
you're pretty interested in the details around this one here.
But this one here, it was a ten million US
dollar exploit that looked into the smart contract and how
the signing message was done. So the smart contract checked
assigned message by dropping fourteen variable length data fields into
(06:07):
one continuous bite string. They didn't include the delimiters or
length prefixes between the values, so essentially the hacker or
even AI model found a way to check for that
signed message. So the sign message is when something is
sent to the platform, you need a signature to verify
(06:30):
that this is correct and this should be done, and
it found a way to capture that from one transaction
and then reuse that again for a different transaction. So
the signing message here didn't include any delimiters or length
prefixes between its values. It should have been split up
into little chunks, but it didn't in this case, and
(06:51):
because it didn't, it ended up with the same hash
message at the end, the same size, so it treated
it as being valid. So when they managed to legitimately
sign a authorization of three thy one hundred and ten
night tokens by sliding the field boundaries around, they reused
that identical signature to extract two one hundred and three
(07:14):
million night tokens instead, So one signature that they used
in a previous transaction could be reused to extract even
more night tokens. So that's how they did it, So
that's a sixty five thousand x inflation by just mashing
the values together. So absolutely crazy what happened here, and
(07:35):
really really unfortunate. Some of you out there, I know,
took advantage of the situation and snapped up a lot
of night tokens at an extremely low price. So if
you did that, I'm happy for you. I didn't want
to take that type of risk. There is still a
lot of night Tokens yet to be dumped as well,
but it looks like the mitigation of this has been
(07:56):
good and a lot of the addresses that the hack
is trying to exit out of have been blocked, so
it may not be able to execute on a lot
of these trades, which is kind of a good thing
for the Night Midnight ecosystem and the Cardana ecosystem. Now,
the attacks don't just stop there on the one chain bridge.
(08:17):
Like I said, this is continuously happening, and this one
here at the Rosen Bridge. So rosen Bridge, for those
that don't know, they bridge Bitcoin over to the Kadano ecosystem,
so they have RSBTC moving back and forth between Bitcoin
and Kadano, and what they noticed was a continuous attack
attempts to try also to forge signed signatures on their platform,
(08:40):
but so far absolutely nothing has gotten through. Eighty four
attack attempts so far and still nothing is getting through.
Speaker 2 (08:47):
So that is really.
Speaker 1 (08:49):
Good testament to see how strong the rosen bridge is
at the moment in regards to their liquidity being brought
back and forth between Cadano and Bitcoin. That's bridges. Bridges
scare scary stuff. Mike Cornan put up this post and
I just want to read it out for you guys
who you are aware of what's happening. Guys, this one matters.
This isn't a joke. Since January, we process more than
(09:10):
one hundred and eighty six vulnerability reports and more than
thirty of them turned out to be legitimate vulnerabilities that
required intervention and fixes. That's on top of everything else
that has been happening behind the scenes to keep this
blockchain secure, most of which I can't really talk about.
And that's just the security side of what Intersect have
(09:32):
been doing. This work isn't optional, it's essential, and it
has to be done if we want Kadano to remain
secure and resilient. If you believe this work is worth continuing,
please consider voting yes. Now, this is all in regards
to the intersect proposals at the moment to withdraw funds
to actually do this type of work. And from what
(09:52):
I've heard from other people working this space, I've been
talking about Mythos, Ethropics, Mythos and Fable with other developers
and you know, finding out what they're doing. Oh, if
they got access to Mythos so they can actually secure
their applications and stuff. And it sounds like some people
have really high level access to be able to sort
(10:15):
this stuff out for the Kardana ecosystem. But of course
they can't talk about any of this because if any
of it got out, other AI models could jump in
and potentially attack the chain, et cetera, et cetera. And
it's not just Kadano, it's a theorem, it's Bitcoin, it's
all the other major chains out there that also have
potential access to these latest frontier models to be able
(10:37):
to audit their chains. Now, I've tried to audit my
own stuff with fable, and there are guardrails in place
blocking me from doing so. So you have to do
things in a really roundabout way to try and find
vulnerabilities and even last week there was one found for
my Cardano press plug in, which is kind of was legitimate,
(10:58):
but it took a lot of work to actually get
that vulnerability to happen. But we still patch that one anyway,
just in case something was happening. But this brought up
a very interesting conversation between various developers and people within
the ecosystem. And I just want to point out this
comment here that feel put up on this conversation thread. Unfortunately,
(11:22):
if you aren't on their list many massive open source
repositories without the right connections or even stars, you don't
get the benefits of this and are left to fend
off the sharks yourself. Is referring to being able to
access the latest frontier models to be able to protect
yourself from these attacks. It's imperative that we attempt to
(11:43):
get Cadino core repos and critical infra into these programs.
Also with the spects security by obfuscation. Indeed, keeping security
findings and patches private is certainly the meta, but that
isn't to say being closed source private. Closed source provides
a take benefits. LMS basically make closed source security entirely irrelevant.
(12:06):
They can perform perfect high level abstraction decomplication or even
more obfuscated executables. What's more important is the process for
responsible disclosure of most large open source reposts support private
issues for security reports. It's impartive that we attempt to
get Kadana's call repos and critical infra into these programs,
(12:26):
and I completely agree because if we can, then we
get access to the layers lmm's large language models and
we can use them to protect Kardana against these future
potential attacks. So definitely something that we do need access to,
and hopefully the teams are working in regards to all
of those levels of access. Now, with all of these
(12:47):
attacks out there, what can you do next? What should
you be doing or what are your options at least
that you can think about to help protect your crypto assets. So,
if you have any of your assets within your cold
wallet or whatever it is, maybe you should start thinking
about diversifying and de risking a single point of failure.
(13:09):
For example, a lot of people that invest their money
into crypto may also be diversifying their investments into different
investment classes such as index funds for a one ks
superannuation here in Australia, that's what we call it, or
even into property and other assets. So we have lots
(13:32):
of different ways that we can diversify our investment of
our money, and you do that to de risk yourself
so you're not exposed to one single point of failure
within the market. If you have all your money in
the property market during the GFC, we would have lost
a lot of money. If you have all your assets
now in AI and the AI of bubble pops, you
(13:53):
could also lose a lot of money. So taking that
kind of strategy, in that thought pattern into your crypto
storage holdings could be a very good tactic that you
could use to de risk yourself from being exposed for
one single point of failure. Maybe a hardware wallet provider
gets hacked in the future, or maybe that particular hardware
(14:16):
wallet provider has all your details leaked online and you
become a target of a wrench attack. All of these
things could happen and actually are happening around the world,
So large crypto holders are exposed and get kidnapped in
a particular country where they are. This happens. This is
(14:38):
very very common thing. So if you had your assets
diversified across multiple different ways, of storing your assets, such
as custody service, one particular cold wallet, another cold wallet,
paper wallet, a heart or hot wallet. There's lots of
way different ways that you can store your assets, and
diversifying that and spreading things out and making sure that
(15:01):
they're all secure is one way to ensure that your assets.
Speaker 2 (15:05):
Aren't lost in one single point of failure.
Speaker 1 (15:08):
So it's a scary world out there, guys, I know,
but have a look into how you can possibly store
your crypto assets in multiple different ways, multiple different hardware devices,
offline of the off the hot walllet environments, and off
exchanges as well or even partially on different types of exchanges,
multiple different exchanges, so that's you're not exposed to.
Speaker 2 (15:29):
One major failure and collapse.
Speaker 1 (15:31):
Anyway, guys, I've got some more information coming up about
the second fire attack. They've put up information about how
this attack potentially happened with a investigation from groom Lake,
so I will put that up in a follow up video.
Make sure you follow in the top right hand corner
there you can get to the video link there learn
more about what is having to second five and what
(15:53):
you can potentially do next. Anyway, guys, that's all I
have for this particular video update. If you've got something
out of it, actually you hit that thumbs up, like
subscribe notification bell YouTube memberships down below, buy me a
copy links there as well.
Speaker 2 (16:06):
Great way to support the channel. If you can't do any.
Speaker 1 (16:09):
Of that, just hit the thumbs up and I'll see
you guys. Well, stay positive and I'll see you guys
in the next minute.