CLAUSEWITZ - ON WAR - V. MILITARY FORCES - Carl von Clausewitz (1873) - HQ Full Book - SECRETS OF POWER: Masters of Politics, Strategy & War

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Speaker 1 (00:00):
Karl von Klausowitz on War Book five Military Forces, Chapter
one General Scheme. We shall consider military forces one as
regards their numerical strength and organization, two in their state
independent of fighting, three in respect of their maintenance, and

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lastly four in their general relations to country and ground.
Thus we shall devote this book to the consideration of
things appertaining to an army, which only come under the
head of necessary conditions of fighting, but do not constitute
the fight itself. They stand in more or less close
connection with and react upon the fighting, and therefore in

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considering the application of the combat they must often appear.
But we must first consider each by itself as a whole,
in its essence and peculiarities. Chapter two Theater of war
Army campaign. The nature of the thing does not allow
of a completely satisfactory definition of these three factors, denoting respectively, space, mass,

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and time in war, but that we may not sometimes
be quite misunderstood, we must try to make somewhat plainer
the usual meaning of these terms, to which we shall
in most cases adhere one. Theater of war. This term
denotes properly such a portion of the space over which
war prevails, as has its boundaries protected, and thus possesses

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a kind of independence. This protection may consist in fortresses
or important natural obstacles presented by the country, or even
in its being separated by a considerable distance from the
rest of the space embraced in the war dot. Such
a portion is not a mere piece of the whole,
but a small hole complete in itself. And consequently, it
is more or less in such a condition that changes

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which take place at other points in the seat of
war have only an indirect and no direct influence upon it.
To give an adequate idea of this, we may suppose
that on this portion an advance is made whilst in
another quarter or retreat is taking place, or that upon
the one an army is acting defensively whilst an offensive
is being carried on upon the other. Such a clearly

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defined idea, as this is not capable of universal application.
It is here used merely to indicate the line of
distinction two army. With the assistance of the conception of
a theater of war, it is very easy to say
what an army is. It is, in point of fact,
the mass of troops in the same theater of war.

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But this plainly does not include all that is meant
by the term in its common usage. Blucher and Wellington
commanded each a separate army in eighteen fifteen, although the
two were in the same theater of war. The chief
command is therefore another distinguishing sign for the conception of
an army. At the same time, this sign is very

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nearly allied to the preceding, For where things are well organized,
there should only exist one supreme command in a theater
of war, and the commander in chief in a particular
theater of war should always have a proportionate degree of independence.
The mere absolute numerical strength of a body of troops
is less decisive on the subject than might at first appear.

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For where several armies are acting under one command and
upon one and the same theater of war, they are
called armies not by reason of their strength, but from
the relations antecedent to the war eighteen thirteen, the Silesian Army,
the Army of the North, et cetera. And although we
should divide a great mass of troops intended to remain
in the same theater into corps, we should never divide

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them into armies. At least such a division would be
contrary to what seems to be the meaning which is
universally attached to the term. On the other hand, it
would certainly be pedantry to apply the term army to
each band of irregular troops acting independently in a remote province. Still,
we must not leave unnoticed that it surprises no one

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when the army of the Vendeans in the Revolutionary War
is spoken of, and yet it was not much stronger.
The conceptions of army and theater of war, therefore, as
a rule, go together and mutually include each other. Free campaign.
Although the sum of all military events which happen in
all the theaters of war in one year is often

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called a campaign. Still, however, it is more usual, more exact,
to understand by the term the events in one single
theatre of war. But it is worse still to connect
the notion of a campaign with the period of one year,
For wars no longer divide themselves naturally into campaigns of
a year's duration, by fixed and long periods in winter quarters. As, however,

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the events in a theatre of war of themselves form
certain great chapters. If, for instance, the direct effects of
some more or less great catastrophe cease and new combinations
begin to develop themselves. Therefore, these natural subdivisions must be
taken into consideration in order to allot to each year
campaign its complete share of events. No one would make

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the campaign of eighteen twelve terminated Memmel where the armies
were on the January first, and transfer the further retreat
of the French until they recrossed the Elbe to the
campaign of eighteen thirteen, as that further retreat was plainly
only a part of the whole retreat from Moscow. That
we cannot give these conceptions any greater degree of distinctness
is of no consequence, because they cannot be used as

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philosophical definitions for the basis of any kind of propositions.
They only serve to give a little more clearness and
precision to the language we use Chapter three, Relation of Power.
In the eighth chapter of the third book, we have
spoken of the value of superior numbers in battles, from
which follows, as a consequence, the superiority of numbers in

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general in strategy. So far the importance of the relations
of power is established, we shall now add a few
more detailed considerations on the subject. An unbiased examination of
modern military history leads to the conviction that the superiority
in numbers becomes every day more decisive. The principle of
assembling the greatest possible numbers for a decisive battle may

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therefore be regarded as more important than ever. Courage and
the spirit of an army have in all ages multiplied
its physical powers, and will continue to do so equally
in future. But we find also that at certain periods
in history a superiority in the organization and equipment of
an army has given a great moral preponderance. We find

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that at other periods a great superiority in mobility had
a like effect. At one time we see a new
system of tactics brought to light. At another we see
the art of war developing itself in an effort to
make a skillful use of ground on great general principles,
and by such means, Here and there we find one
general gaining great advantages over another. But even this tendency

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has disappeared, and wars now go on in a simpler
and more natural manner. Dot If divesting ourselves of any
prisconceived notions, we look at the experiences of recent wars,
we must admit that there are but little traces of
any of the above influences, either throughout any whole campaign
or in engagements of a decisive character, that is the

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great battle, respecting which term we refer to the second
chapter of the preceding book. Armies are in our days
so much on a par in regard to arms, equipment,
and drill, that there is no very notable difference between
the best and the worst in these things. A difference
may still be observed resulting from the superior instruction of

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the scientific corps, but in general it only amounts to this,
that one is the inventor and introducer of improved appliances
which the other immediately imitates. Even the subordinate generals, leaders
of corps and divisions in all that comes within the
scope of their sphere, have in general everywhere the same
ideas and methods, so that except the talent of the

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commander in chief, a thing entirely dependent on chance and
not bearing a constant relation to the standard of education
amongst the people and the army, there is nothing now
but habituation to war which can give one army a
decided superiority over another. The nearer we approach to a
state of equality, In all these things, the more decisive

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becomes the relation in point of numbers. The character of
modern battles is the result of this state of equality. Take,
for instance, the Battle of Borodino, where the first army
in the world, the French, measured its strength with the Russian,
which in many parts of its organization and in the
education of its special branches, might be considered the furthest behindhand.

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In the whole battle, there is not one single trace
of superior art or intelligence. It is a mere trial
of strength between the respective armies throughout, and as they
were nearly equal in that respect, the result could not
be otherwise than a gradual turn of the scale in
favor of that side, where there was the greatest energy
on the part of the commander and the most experience
in war on the part part of the troops. We

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have taken this battle as an illustration because in it
there was an equality in the numbers on each side
such as is rarely to be found. We do not
maintain that all battles exactly resemble this, but it shows
the dominant tone of most of them. In a battle
in which the forces try their strength on each other
so leisurely and methodically, an excess of force on one

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side must make the result in its favor much more certain.
And it is a fact that we may search modern
military history in vain for a battle in which an
army has beaten another double its own strength, an occurrence,
by no means uncommon in former times. Bonaparte, the greatest
general of modern times, in all his great victorious battles,

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with one exception that of Dresden eighteen thirteen, had managed
to assemble an army superior in numbers, or at least
very little inferior to that of his opponent. And when
it was impossible for him to do so, as at Leipsic,
Brienne Leon and Bellelion, he was beaten. The absolute strength is,
in strategy generally a given quantity which the commander cannot alter.

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But from this it by no means follows that it
is impossible to carry on a war with a decidedly
inferior force. War is not always a voluntary act of
state policy, and least of all is it so when
the forces are very unequal. Consequently, any relation of forces
is imaginable in war, and it would be a strange
theory of war which would wish to give up its

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office just where it is most wanted. However, desirable theory
may consider a proportionate force. Still it cannot say that
no use can be made of the most disproportionate. No
limits can be prescribed in this respect. The weaker the force,
the more moderate must be the object it proposes to itself.
And the weaker the force, the shorter time it will last.

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In these two directions, there is a field for weakness
to give way. If we may use this expression of
the changes which the measure of the force produces is
in the conduct of war. We can only speak by
degrees as these things present themselves. At present. It is
sufficient to have indicated the general point of view, But
to complete that we shall add one more observation. The

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more that an army involved in an unequal combat falls
short of the number of its opponents, the greater must
be the tension of its powers, the greater its energy
when danger presses. If the reverse takes place, and instead
of heroic desperation, a spirit of despondency ensues, then certainly
there is an end to every art of war. If
with this energy of powers is combined a wise moderation

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in the object proposed. Then there is that play of
brilliant actions and prudent forbearance which we admire in the
wars of Frederick the Great. But the less that this
moderation and caution can affect, the more must the tension
and energy of the forces become predominant. When the disproportion
of forces is so great that no modification of our
own object can ensure us safety from a catastrophe, or

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where the probable cant ttinuance of the danger is so
great that the greatest economy of our powers can no
longer suffice to bring us to our object, then the
tension of our powers should be concentrated for one desperate blow.
He who is pressed on all sides, expecting little help
from things which promise none, will place his last and
only reliance in the moral ascendency which despair gives to courage,

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and look upon the greatest daring as the greatest wisdom.
At the same time employ the assistance of subtle stratagem,
and if he does not succeed, will find in an
honorable downfall the right to rise. Hereafter chapter four relation
of the three Arms, we shall only speak of the
three principal arms infantry, cavalry and artillery. We must be

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excused for making the following analysis, which belongs more to tactics,
but is necessary to give distinctness to our ideas. The
combat is of two kinds which are essentially different, the
destructive principle of fire and the hand to hand or
personal combat. This ladder, again is either attack or defense.

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As we here speak of elements, attack and defense are
to be understood in a perfectly absolute sense. Artillery obviously
acts only with the destructive principle of fire, cavalry only
with personal combat. Infantry with both in close combat. The
essence of defense consists in standing firm as if rooted

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to the ground. The essence of the attack is movement.
Cavalry is entirely deficient in the first quality. On the
other hand, it possesses the latter in an especial manner.
It is therefore only suited for attack. Infantry has especially
the property of standing firm, but is not altogether without mobility.

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From this division of the elementary forces of war into
different arms, we have, as a result, the superiority and
general utility of infantry as compared with the other two arms.
From its being the only arm which unites in its
celse all the three elementary forces. A further deduction to
be drawn is that the combination of the three arms
leads to a more perfect use of the forces by

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affording the means of strengthening a pleasure either the one
or the other of the principles which are united in
an unalterable manner. In infantry, the destructive principle of fire
is in the wars of the present time plainly beyond
measure the most effective. Nevertheless, the close combat man to
man is just as plainly to be regarded as the
real basis of combat. For that reason, therefore, an army

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of artillery only would be an absurdity in war, but
an army of cavalry is conceivable only it would possess
very little intensity of force, and army of infantry alone
is not only conceivable, but also much the strongest of
the three. The three arms therefore stand in this order
in reference to independent value infantry, cavalry, artillery. But this

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order does not hold good if applied to the relative
importance of each arm when they are all three acting
in conjunction, as the destructive principle is much more effective
than the principle of motion. Therefore, the complete want of
cavalry would weaken an army less than the total want
of artillery. An army consisting of infantry and artillery alone
would certainly find itself in a disagreeable position if opposed

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to an army composed of all three arms. But if
what it lacked in cavalry was compensated for by a
proportionate increase of infantry, it would still, by a somewhat
different mode of acting, be able to do very well
with its tactical economy. Its outpost service would cause some embarrassment.
It would never be able to pursue a beaten enemy
with great vivacity, and it must make a retreat with

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greater hardships and efforts. But these inconveniences would still never
be sufficient in themselves to drive it completely out of
the field. Dot On the other hand, such an army
opposed to one composed of infantry and cavalry only would
be able to play a very good part, while it
is hardly conceivable that the latter could keep the field
at all against an army made up of all three arms.

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Of course, these reflections on the relative importance of each
single arm result only from a consideration of the generality
of events in war, where one case compensates another, and
therefore it is not our intention to apply the truth
thus ascertained to each individual case of a particular combat.
A battalion on outpost service or on a retreat may

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perhaps choose to have with it a squadron in preference
to a couple of guns. A body of cavalry with
horse artillery sent in rapid pursuit of or to cut
off a flying enemy wants no infantry, et cetera, et cetera.
If we summarize the results of these considerations, they amount
to this one that infantry is the most independent of

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the three arms. Two artillery is quite wanting an independence.
Three infantry is the most important In the combination of
the three arms. Four cavalry can the most easily be
dispensed with five. A combination of the three arms gives
the greatest strength. Now, if the combination of the three

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gives the greatest strength, it is natural to inquire what
is the best absolute proportion of each. But that is
a question which it is almost impossible to answer. If
we could form a comparative estimate of the cost of
organizing in the first instance, and then provisioning and maintaining
each of the three arms, and then again of the
relative amount of service rendered by each in war. We

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should obtain a definite result which would give the best
proportion in the abstract. But this is little more than
a play of the imagination. The very first term in
the comparison is difficult to determine. That is to say,
one of the factors, the cost in money, is not
difficult to find, but another, the value of men's lives,
is a computation which no one would readily try to

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solve by figures. Also, the circumstance that each of the
three arms chiefly depends on a different legs of strength
in the state infantry, on the number of the male
population cavalry, on the number of horses artillery, on available
financial means, introduces into the calculation some heterogeneous conditions, the
overruling influence of which may be plainly observed in the

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great outlines of the history of different people at various periods.
As However, for other reasons, we cannot altogether dispense with
some standard of comparison. Therefore, in place of the whole
of the first term, of the comparison, we must take
only that one of its factors which can be ascertained,
namely the cost in money. Now on this point it

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is sufficient for our purpose to assume that, in general,
a squadron of one hundred and fifty horsemen, a battalion
of infantry eight hundred strong, a battery of artillery consisting
of eight six pounders cost nearly the same, both as
respects the expense of formation and of maintenance. With regard
to the other member of the comparison, that is, how

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much service the one arm is capable of rendering as
can compaired with the others, it is much less easy
to find any distinct quantity. The thing might perhaps be
possible if it depended merely on the destroying principle. But
each arm is destined to its own particular use, therefore
has its own particular sphere of action, which again is
not so distinctly defined that it might not be greater

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or less through modifications only in the mode of conducting
the war without causing any decided disadvantage. We are often
told of what experience teaches on this subject, and it
is supposed that military history affords the information necessary for
a settlement of the question. But every one must look
upon all that is nothing more than a way of talking, which,
as it is not derived from anything of a primary

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and necessary nature, does not deserve attention in an analytical examination. Now,
although a fixed ratio as representing the best proportion between
the three arms is conceivable, but is an x which
it is impossible to find a mere imaginary quantity, Still
it is possible to appreciate the effects of han having
a great superiority or a great inferiority in one particular

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arm as compared with the same arm in the enemy's army.
Artillery increases the destructive principle of fire. It is the
most redoubtable of arms, and its want therefore diminishes very
considerably the intensive force of an army. On the other hand,
it is the least movable, consequently makes an army more unwieldy. Further,

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it always requires a force for its support, because it
is incapable of close combat. If it is too numerous,
so that the troops appointed for its protection are not
able to resist the attacks of the enemy at every point,
it is often lost, and from that follows a fresh disadvantage.
Because of the three arms it is the only one which,
in its principal parts, that is, guns and carriages, the

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enemy can soon use against us. Cavalry increases the principle
of mobility in an army. If too few in number,
the brisk flame of the elements of war is thereby weakened.
Because everything must be done slower on foot, everything must
be organized with more care. The rich harvest of victory,
instead of being cut with a scythe can only be

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reaped with a sickle. An excess of cavalry can certainly
never be looked upon as a direct diminution of the
combatant force, as an organic disproportion, but it may certainly
be so indirectly on account of the difficulty of feeding
that arm. And also if we reflect that instead of
a surplus of ten thousand horsemen not required, we might
have fifty thousand infantry. These peculiarities arising from the preponderance

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of one arm are the more important to the art
of war in its limited sense, as that art teaches
the use of whatever forces are forthcoming. And when forces
are placed under the command of a general, the proportion
of the three arms is also commonly already settled without
his having had much voice in the matter. If we
would form an idea of the character of warfare modified

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by the preponderance of one or other of the three arms,
it is to be done in the following manner. An
excess of our tipsillery leads to a more defensive and
passive character in our measures. Our interest will be to
seek security in strong positions, great natural obstacles of ground,
even in mountain positions, in order that the natural impediments
we find in the ground may undertake the defense and

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protection of our numerous artillery, and that the enemy's forces
may come themselves and seek their own destruction. The whole
war will be carried on in a serious formal minuet step.
On the other hand, a want of artillery will make
us prefer the offensive. The active, the mobile principle, marching, fatigue,
exertion become our special weapons. Thus the war will become

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more diversified, more lively, rougher. Small change is substituted for
great events. With a very numerous cavalry. We seek wide
plains and take to great movements at a greater distance
from the enemy. We enjoy more rest and greater conveniences
without conferring the same advantages on our adversary, we may

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venture on bolder measures to outflank him, and on more
daring movements. Generally, as we have command over space. In
as far as diversions and invasions are true auxiliary means
of war, we shall be able to make use of
them with greater facility. A decided want of cavalry diminishes
the force of mobility in an army without increasing its

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destructive power. As an excess of artillery does. Prudence and
method become then the leading characteristics of the war. Always
to remain near the enemy in order to keep him
constantly in view, no rapid, still less hurried movements everywhere,
a slow pushing on of well concentrated masses, a preference
for the defensive and for broken country. And when the

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offensive must be resorted to the shortest road direct to
the center of force in the enemy's army, These are
the natural tendencies or principles in such cases. These different
forms which warfare takes according as one or other of
the three arms preponderates, seldom have an influence so complete
and decided as a loan or chiefly to det determine

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the direction of a whole undertaking whether we shall act
strategically on the offensive or defensive. The choice of a
theater of war, the determination to fight a great battle
or adopt some other means of destruction, are points which
must be determined by other more essential considerations. At least,
if this is not the case, it is much to
be feared that we have mistaken minor details for the

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chief consideration. But although this is so, although the great
questions must be decided before on other grounds, there still
always remains a certain margin for the influence of the
preponderating arm. For in the offensive we can always be
prudent and methodical, In the defensive bold and enterprising, et cetera,
et cetera, through all the different stages and gradations of

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the military life. On the other hand, the nature of
a war may have a notable influence on the proportions
of the three arms. First, a national war kept up
by militia and a general levy lands term must naturally
bring into the field of vers very numerous infantry. For
in such wars there is a greater want of the
means of equipment than of men, And as the equipment

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consequently is confined to what is indisputably necessary. We may
easily imagine that for every battery of eight pieces, not
only one, but two or three battalions might be raised. Second,
if a weak state opposed to a powerful one cannot
take refuge in a general call of the male population
to regular military service, or in a malicious system resembling it,

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then the increase of its artillery is certainly the shortest
way of bringing up its weak army nearer to an
equality with that of the enemy, for it saves men
and intensifies the essential principle of military force, that is,
the destructive principle. Any Way, such a state will mostly
be confined to a limited theater, and therefore this arm

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will be better suited to it. Frederick the Great adopted
this means in the later period of the Seven Years War. Third,
cavalry is the arm for movement and great decisions. Its
increase beyond the ordinary proportions is therefore important if the
war extends over a great space, if expeditions are to
be made in various directions, and great and decisive blows

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are intended. Buonaparte is an example of this. That the
offensive and defensive do not properly in themselves exercise an
influence on the proportion of cavalry. Will only appear plainly
when we come to speak of these two methods of
acting in war. In the meantime, we shall only remark
that both assailant and defender as a rule traversed the
same spaces in war, and may have also, at least

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in many cases, the same decisive intentions. We remind our
readers of the campaign of eighteen twelve. It is commonly
believed that in the Middle Ages cavalry was much more
numerous in proportion to infantry, and that the difference has
been gradually on the decrease ever since. Yet this is
a mistake, at least partly. The proportion of cavalry was,

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according to numbers, on the average, perhaps not much greater.
Of this, we may convince ourselves by tracing through the
history of the Middle Ages the detailed statements of the
armed forces then employed. Let us only think of the
masses of men on foot who composed the armies of
the Crusaders, or the masses who followed the emperors of
Germany on their Roman expeditions. It was in reality the

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importance of the cavalry which was so much greater. In
those days it was the stronger arm composed of the
flower of the people, so much so that although always
very much weaker actually in numbers, it was still always
looked upon as the chief thing. Infantry was little valued,
hardly spoken of. Hence has arisen the belief that its
numbers were few. No doubt, it happened oftener than it

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does now, that in incursions of small importance in France,
Germany and Italy a small army was composed entirely of cavalry,
as it was the chief arm There is nothing inconsistent
in that. But these cases decide nothing if we take
a general view, as they are greatly outnumbered by cases
of greater armies of the period constituted differently, it was

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only when the obligations to military service imposed by the
feudal laws had ceased and wars were carried on by
soldiers enlisted, hired and paid, when therefore wars depended on
money and enlistment, that is, at the time of the
Thirty Years War and the wars of Louis the fourteenth
dot that this employment of great masses of almost useless

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infantry was checked. And perhaps in those days they might
have fallen into the exclusive use of cavalry, if infantry
had not just then risen in importance through the improvements
in firearms, by which means it maintained its numerical superiority
in proportion to cavalry. At this period, if infantry was weak,
the proportion was as one to one, if numerous as

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three to one. Since then, cavalry has always decreased in
importance according as improvements in the use of firearms have advanced.
This is intelligible enough in itself, but the improve movement
we speak of does not relate solely to the weapon
itself and the skill in handling it. We advert also
to greater ability in using troops armed with this weapon.

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At the Battle of Malwitz, the Prussian army had brought
the fire of their infantry to such a state of
perfection that there has been no improvement since then in
that sense. On the other hand, the use of infantry
in broken ground and as skirmishers has been introduced more recently,
and is to be looked upon as a very great
advance in the art of destruction. Our opinion is, therefore,

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that the relation of cavalry has not much changed as
far as regards numbers, but as regards its importance there
has been a great alteration. This seems to be a contradiction,
but is not so in reality. The infantry of the
Middle Ages, although forming the greater proportion of an army,
did not attain to that proportion by its value as
compared to cavalry. But because all that could not be

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appointed to the very costly cavalry were handed over to
the infantry, this infantry was therefore or merely a last resource.
And if the number of cavalry had depended merely on
the value set on that arm it could never have
been too great. Thus we can understand how cavalry, in
spite of its constantly decreasing importance, may still perhaps have

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importance enough to keep its numerical relation at that point
which it has hitherto so constantly maintained. It is a
remarkable fact that, at least since the wars of the
Austrian Succession, the proportion of cavalry to infantry has changed
very little, the variation being constantly between a fourth, a fifth,
or a sixth. This seems to indicate that those proportions

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meet the natural requirements of an army, and that these
numbers give the solution which it is impossible to find
in a direct manner. We doubt, however, if this is
the case, and we find the principal instances of the
employment of a numerous cavalry sufficiently accounted for by other causes,
Austria and Russia are states which have kept up a

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numerous cavalry because they retain in their political condition the
fragments of a tartar organization. Buonaparte, for his purposes, could
never be strong enough in cavalry. When he had made
use of the conscription as far as possible. He had
no ways of strengthening his armies but by increasing the
auxiliary arms, as they cost him more in money than
in men. Besides this, it stands to reason that in

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military enterprises of such enormous extent as his, cavalry must
have a greater value than in ordinary cases. Frederick the
Graded is well known reckon carefully every recruit that could
be saved to his country. It was his great business
to keep up the strength of his army as far
as possible, at the expense of other countries. His reasons

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for this are easy to conceive if we remember that
his small dominions did not then include Prussia and the
Westphalian provinces. Cavalry was kept complete by recruitment more easily
than infantry, irrespective of fewer men being required. In addition
to which his system of war was completely founded on
the mobility of his army, And thus it was that

(32:02):
while his infantry diminished in number, his cavalry was always
increasing itself till the end of the Seven Years War. Still,
at the end of that war it was hardly more
than a fourth of the number of infantry that he
had in the field at the period referred to. There
is no want of instances also of armies entering the
field unusually weak in cavalry, and yet carrying off the victory.

(32:24):
The most remarkable is the Battle of gross Corsan. If
we only count the French divisions which took part in
the battle, Buonaparte was one hundred thousand strong, of which
five thousand were cavalry ninety thousand infantry. The Allies had
seventy thousand, of which twenty five thousand were cavalry in
forty thousand infantry. Thus, in place of the twenty thousand

(32:47):
cavalry on the side of the Allies, in excess of
the total of the French cavalry. Buonaparte had only fifty
thousand additional infantry when he ought to have had one
hundred thousand. As he gained the battle with that superiority
in infantry, we may ask whether it was at all
likely that he would have lost it if the proportions
had been one hundred forty thousand to forty thousand. Certainly,

(33:07):
the great advantage of our superiority in cavalry was shown
immediately after the battle, for Buonaparte gained hardly any trophies
by his victory. The gain of a battle is therefore
not everything, but is it not always the chief thing?
If we put together these considerations, we can hardly believe
that the numerical proportion between cavalry and infantry which has

(33:29):
existed for the last eighty years is the natural one
found it solely on their absolute value. We are much
rather inclined to think that after many fluctuations, the relative
proportions of these arms will change further in the same
direction as hitherto, and that the fixed number of cavalry
at last will be considerably less. With respect to artillery,

(33:50):
the number of guns has naturally increased since its first invention,
and according as it has been made lighter and otherwise
improved still since the time of Frederick the Great, it
has also so kept very much to the same proportion
of two or three guns per one thousand men. We
mean that the commencement of a campaign, for during its
course artillery does not melt away as fast as infantry. Therefore,

(34:12):
at the end of a campaign the proportion is generally
notably greater, perhaps three, four or five guns per one
thousand men. Whether this is the natural proportion, or that
the increase of artillery may be carried still further without
prejudice to the whole conduct of war, must be left
for experience to decide. The principal results we obtain from

(34:35):
the whole of these considerations are one that infantry is
the chief arm to which the other two are subordinate.
Two that by the exercise of great skill and energy
in command, the want of the two subordinate arms may
in some measure be compensated for, provided that we are
much stronger in infantry, and the better the infantry, the

(34:56):
easier this may be done. Three that it is more
difficult to dispense with artillery than with cavalry, because it
is the chief principle of destruction, and its mode of
fighting is more amalgamated with that of infantry, for that
artillery being the strongest arm as regards destructive action, and
cavalry the weakest in that respect. The question must in

(35:18):
general arise, how much artillery can we have without inconvenience?
And what is the least proportion of cavalry we require?
Chapter five, Order of battle of an army. The order
of battle is that division and formation of the different
arms into separate parts or sections of the whole army,
and that form of general position or disposition of those parts,

(35:39):
which is to be the norm throughout the whole campaign
or war. It consists therefore, in a certain measure of
an arithmetical and a geometrical element, the division and the
form of disposition. The first proceeds from the permanent peace
organization of the army adopts as units certain parts, such
as battalions, squadrons and batteries, and with them forms units

(36:02):
of a higher order up to the highest of all
the whole army, according to the requirements of predominating circumstances.
In like manner, the form of disposition comes from the
elementary tactics in which the army is instructed and exercised
in time of peace, which must be looked upon as
a property in the troops that cannot be essentially modified

(36:22):
at the moment war breaks out. The disposition connects these
tactics with the conditions which the use of the troops
in war and enlarge masses demands, and thus it settles,
in a general way, the rule or norm in conformity
with which the troops are to be drawn up for battle.
This has been invariably the case when great armies have
taken a field, and there have been times when this

(36:44):
form was considered as the most essential part of the battle.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the improvements in
the firearms of infantry occasioned a great increase of that
arm and allowed of its being deployed in such long,
thin lines. The order of battle was thereby simplified, but
at the same time it became more difficult and more
artificial in the carrying out. And as no other way

(37:06):
of disposing of cavalry at the commencement of a battle
was known, but that of posting them on the wings,
where they were out of the fire and had room
to move. Therefore, in the order of battle, the army
always became a closed, inseparable hole. If such an army
was divided in the middle, it was like an earthworm
cut in two. The wings had still life and the
power of motion, but they had lost their natural functions.

(37:30):
The army lay therefore, in a manner under a spell
of unity, and whenever any parts of it had to
be placed in a separate position, a small organization and
disorganization became necessary. The marches, which the whole army had
to make, were a condition in which, to a certain extent,
it found itself out of rule. If the enemy was

(37:50):
at hand, the march had to be arranged in the
most artificial manner, and in order that one line or
one wing might be always at the prescribed distance from
the other, the true troops had to scramble over everything.
Marches had also constantly to be stolen from the enemy,
and this perpetual theft only escaped severe punishment through one circumstance,
which was that the enemy lay under the same ban. Hence,

(38:14):
when in the latter half of the eighteenth century it
was discovered that cavalry would serve just as well to
protect a wing if it stood in rear of the army,
as if it were placed on the prolongation of the line,
and that besides this it might be applied to other
purposes than merely fighting a duel with the enemy's cavalry.
A great step in advance was made, because now the army,

(38:35):
in its principal extension or front, which is always the
breadth of its order of battle position, consisted entirely of
homogeneous members, so that it could be formed of any
number of parts at pleasure, each part like another and
like the whole. In this way it ceased to be
one single piece and became an articulated hole. Consequently pliable

(38:56):
and manageable. The parts might be separated from the whole
and then join on again without difficulty. The order of
battle always remained the same. Dot thus arose the corps
consisting of all arms. That is, thus such an organization
became possible, for the want of it had been felt
long before that all this relates to the combat is
very natural. The battle was formerly the whole war, and

(39:19):
will always continue to be the principal part of it.
But the order of battle belongs generally more to tactics.
Than strategy, and it is only introduced here to show
how tactics in organizing the whole into smaller holes, made
preparations for strategy. The greater armies become, the more they
are distributed over wide spaces, and the more diversified the
action and reaction of the different parts amongst themselves, the

(39:42):
wider becomes the field of strategy, and therefore than the
order of battle in the sense of our definition, must
also come into a kind of reciprocal action with strategy,
which manifests itself chiefly at the extreme points where tactics
and strategy meet. That is, at those moments when the
general distribution of the combatant forces passes into the special

(40:04):
dispositions for the combat We now turn to those three points,
the division, combination of arms, an order of battle disposition
in a strategic point of view, one division. In strategy,
we must never ask what is to be the strength
of a division or a corps, but how many corps
or division an army should have. There is nothing more

(40:27):
unmanageable than an army divided into three parts, except it
be one divided into only two, in which case the
chief command must be almost neutralized. To fix the strength
of great and small coreps, either on the grounds of
elementary tactics or on higher grounds, leaves an incredibly wide
field for arbitrary judgment, and heaven knows what strange modes

(40:48):
of reasoning have sported in this wide field. On the
other hand, the necessity of forming an independent whole army
into a certain number of parts is a thing as
obvious as it is positive, and this idea furnishes real
strategic motives for determining the number of the greater divisions
of an army consequently their strength, whilst the strength of
the smaller divisions such as companies, battalions, et cetera, is

(41:12):
left to be determined by tactics. We can hardly imagine
the smallest independent body in which there are not at
least three parts to be distinguished. That one part may
be thrown out in advance and another part be left
in rear. That four is still more convenient follows of itself,
if we keep in view that the middle part, being
the principal division, ought to be stronger than either of

(41:34):
the others. In this way we may proceed to make
out aid, which appears to us to be the most
suitable number for an army, if we take one part
for an advance guard as a constant necessity, three for
the main body, that is a right wing, center and
left wing, two divisions for reserve, and one to detach
to the right, one to the left. Without pedantically ascribing

(41:57):
a great importance to these numbers and figures, we so
believe that they represent the most usual and frequently recurring
strategic disposition, and on that account, one that is convenient. Certainly,
it seems that the supreme direction of an army, and
the direction of every whole must be greatly facilitated if
there are only three or four subordinates to command, But

(42:17):
the commander in chief must pay dearly for this convenience
in a twofold manner. In the first place, an order
loses in rapidity, force an exactness if the gradation ladder
down which it has to descend is long, and this
must be the case if there are core commanders between
the division leaders and the chief. Secondly, the chief loses
generally in his own proper power and efficiency the wider

(42:40):
the spheres of action of his immediate subordinates. Become a
general commanding one hundred thousand men in eight divisions exercises
a power which is greater in intensity than if the
one hundred thousand men were divided into only three corps.
There are many reasons for this, but the most important
is that each commander looks upon himself as how having
a kind of proprietary right in his own cores, and

(43:03):
always opposes the withdrawal from him of any portion of
it for a longer or shorter time. A little experience
of war will make this evident to any one. But
on the other hand, the number of divisions must not
be too great, otherwise disorder will ensue. It is difficult
enough to manage eight divisions from one head quarter, and
the number should never be allowed to exceed ten. But

(43:26):
in a division in which the means of circulating orders
are much less, the smaller normal number four or at
most five may be regarded as the more suitable. If
these factors five and ten will not answer, that is,
if the brigades are too strong, then cor d army
must be introduced. But we must remember that by so

(43:46):
doing a new power is created, which at once very
much lowers all other factors. But now what is too
strong a brigade? The custom is to make them from
two thousand to five thousand men strong, and there appear
to be two reasons for making the latter number the limit.
The first is that a brigade is supposed to be
a subdivision which can be commanded by one man directly,

(44:08):
that is, through the compass of his voice. The second
is that any larger body of infantry should not be
left without artillery, and through this first combination of arms,
a special division of itself is formed. We do not
wish to involve ourselves in these tactical subtleties. Neither shall
we enter upon the disputed point wherein in what proportions

(44:29):
the combination of all three arms should take place, whether
with divisions of eight thousand to twelve thousand men or
with corps which are twenty thousand to thirty thousand men strong.
The most decided opponent of these combinations will scarcely take
exception at the mere assertion that nothing but this combination
of the three arms can make a division independent, and

(44:49):
that therefore, for such as are intended to be frequently
detached separately, it is at least very desirable an army
of two hundred thousand men in ten divisions. The division
composed of five brigades each would give brigades four thousand strong.
We see here no disproportion. Certainly, this army might also
be divided into five corps, the corps into four divisions,

(45:13):
and the division into four brigades, which makes the brigade
two thousand, five hundred men strong. But the first distribution
looked at in the abstract, appears to us preferable, for
besides that in the other there is one more gradation
of rank. Five parts are too few to make an
army manageable, for divisions in like manner are too few
for a corps, and two thousand, five hundred men is

(45:35):
a weak brigade, of which in this manner there are eighty,
whereas the first formation has only fifty, and is therefore simpler.
All these advantages are given up merely for the sake
of having only to send orders to half as many generals.
Of course, the distribution into krps is still more unsuitable
for smaller armies. This is the abstract view of the case.

(46:00):
The particular case may present good reasons for deciding otherwise. Likewise,
we must admit that although eight or ten divisions may
be directed when united in a level country, in widely
extended mountain positions, the thing might perhaps be impossible. A
great river which divides an army into halves, makes a
commander for each half indispensable. In short, there are a

(46:23):
hundred local and particular objects of the most decisive character,
before which all rules must give way. But still experience
teaches us that these abstract grounds come most frequently into use,
and are seldom or overruled by others than we should
perhaps suppose. We wish further to explain clearly the scope
of the foregoing considerations by a simple outline, for which

(46:46):
purpose we now place the different points of most importance
next to each other. As we mean by the term
numbers or parts of a whole, only those which are
made by the primary. Therefore the immediate division. We say One,
if a whole has too few members, it is unwieldy. Two,
if the parts of a whole body are too large,

(47:07):
the power of the superior will is thereby weakened. Three.
With every additional step through which an order has to pass,
it is weakened in two ways. In one way by
the loss of force which it suffers in its passage
through an additional step. In another way, by the longer
time in its transmission. The tendency of all this is
to show that the number of co ordinate divisions should

(47:29):
be as great and the gradational steps as few as possible.
And the only limitation to this conclusion is that in armies,
no more than from eight to ten, and in subordinate
corps no more than from four or at most six
subdivisions can be conveniently directed two combination of arms. For strategy,

(47:49):
the combination of the three arms in the order of
battle is only important in regard to those parts of
the army which, according to the usual order of things,
are likely to be frequently employed in a detack position,
where they may be obliged to engage in an independent combat. Now,
it is in the nature of things that the members
of the first class, and for the most part only these,

(48:10):
are destined for detached positions, because, as we shall see elsewhere,
detached positions are most generally adopted upon the supposition in
the necessity of a body independent in itself. In a
strict sense, strategy would therefore only require a permanent combination
of arms in army corps or where these do not
exist in divisions, leaving it to circumstances to determine when

(48:33):
a provisional combination of the three arms shall be made
in subdivisions of an inferior order. But it is easy
to see that when corps are of considerable size, such
as thirty thousand or forty thousand men, they can seldom
find themselves in a situation to take up a completely
connected position in mass. With corps of such strength, a

(48:53):
combination of the arms in the divisions is therefore necessary.
No one who has had any experience in war will
treat lightly the delay which occurs when pressing messages have
to be sent to some other, perhaps distant point before
cavalry can be brought to the support of infantry, to
say nothing of the confusion which takes place. The details
of the combination of the three arms, how far it

(49:16):
should extend, how low down it should be carried, what
proportions should be observed, the strength of the reserves of
each to be set apart, These are all purely tactical
considerations free the disposition. The determination as to the relations
in space according to which the parts of an army
amongst themselves are to be drawn up in order of battle,

(49:37):
is likewise completely a tactical subject. Referring solely to the battle.
No doubt, there is also a strategic disposition of the parts,
but it depends almost entirely on determinations and requirements of
the moment, and what there is in it of the
rational does not come within the meaning of the term
order of battle. We shall therefore treat of it in

(49:57):
the following chapter under the head of disposition of an army.
The order of battle of an army is therefore the
organization and disposition of it in mass ready prepared for battle.
Its parts are united in such a manner that both
the tactical and strategical requirements of the moment can be
easily satisfied by the employment of single parts drawn from

(50:17):
the general mass. When such momentary exigency has passed over,
these parts resume their original place, and thus the order
of battle becomes the first step to and principal foundation
of that wholesome methodicism, which, like the beat of a pendulum,
regulates the work in war, and of which we have
already spoken in the fourth chapter of the second book,

(50:38):
Chapter six, General Disposition of an Army. Between the moment
of the first assembling of military forces and that of
the solution arrived at maturity. When strategy has brought the
army to the decisive point, and each particular part has
had its position and role pointed out by tactics, there
is in most cases a long interval. It is the
same between one decisive, candid catastrophe and another. Formerly, these intervals,

(51:03):
in a certain measure, did not belong to war at all. Take,
for example, the manner in which Luxembourg encamped and marched.
We single out this general because he is celebrated for
his camps and marches, and therefore may be considered a
representative general of his period, and from the histward de
la flander Militaire, we know more about him than about

(51:24):
other generals of the time. The camp was regularly pitched
with its rear close to a river or morass, or
a deep valley, which in the present day would be
considered madness. The direction in which the enemy lay had
so little to do with determining the front of the
army that cases are very common in which the rear
was towards the enemy and the front towards their own country.

(51:47):
This now unheard of mode of proceeding is perfectly unintelligible
unless we suppose that in the choice of camps, the
convenience of the troops was the chief, indeed almost the
only consideration, And therefore look upon the state of being
in camp as a state outside of the action of war,
a kind of withdrawal behind the seams, where one is
quite at ease. The practice of always resting the rear

(52:09):
upon some obstacle may be reckoned. The only measure of security,
which was then taken, of course, in the sense of
the mode of conducting war in that day, for such
a measure was quite inconsistent with the possibility of being
compelled to fight in that position. But there was little
reason for apprehension on that score, because the battles generally
depended on a kind of mutual understanding, like a duel,

(52:31):
in which the parties repaired to a convenient rendezvous. As armies,
partly on account of their numerous cavalry, which in the
decline of its splendor, was still regarded, particularly by the French,
as the principal arm partly on account of the unwieldy
organization of their order of battle, could not fight in
every description of country. An army in a close broken

(52:51):
country was, as it were, under the protection of a
neutral territory, and as it could itself make but little
use of broken ground. Therefore it was deemed preferable to
go to meet an enemy seeking battle. We know, indeed,
that Luxembourg's battles at floris Steinkirk and near Winden were
conceived in a different spirit. But this spirit had only

(53:13):
just then under this great general freed itself from the
old method, and it had not yet reacted on the
method of encampment. Alterations in the art of war originate
always in matters of a decisive nature, and then lead
by degrees to modifications in other things. The expression I
l v a al la guerre, used in reference to
a partisan setting out to watch the enemy, shows how

(53:36):
little the state of an army in camp was considered
to be a state of real warfare. It was not
much otherwise with the marches, for the artillery then separated
itself completely from the rest of the army in order
to take advantage of better and more secure roads, and
the cavalry on the wings generally took the right alternately,
that each might have in turn its share of the
honor of marching on the right. At present, that is

(54:00):
chiefly since the Silesian wars, the situation out of battle
is so thoroughly influenced by its connection with battle that
the two states are in intimate correlation, and the one
can no longer be completely imagined without the other. Formerly,
in a campaign, the battle was the real weapon, the situation,
at other times only the handle. The former the steel blade,

(54:20):
the other the wooden halft glued to it. The whole
therefore composed of heterogeneous parts. Now the battle is the edge,
the situation out of the battle the back of the blade,
the whole to be looked upon as metal completely welded together,
in which it is impossible any longer to distinguish where
the steel ends and the iron begins. This state in
war outside of the battle is now partly regulated by

(54:43):
the organization and regulations with which the army comes prepared
from a state of peace, partly by the tactical and
strategic arrangements of the moment. The three situations in which
an army may be placed are in quarters, on a march,
or in camp. All three belong as much to si
tactics as to strategy, and these two branches, bordering on

(55:03):
each other here in many ways, often seem to or
actually do incorporate themselves with each other, so that many
dispositions may be looked upon at the same time as
both tactical and strategic. We shall treat of these three
situations of an army outside of the combat in a
general way before any special objects come into connection with them.

(55:24):
But we must first of all consider the general disposition
of the forces, because that is a superior and more
comprehensive measure determining as respects camps, cantonments, and marches. If
we look at the disposition of the forces in a
general way, that is, leaving out of sight any special object,
we can only imagine it as a unit, that is,

(55:45):
as a whole intended to fight altogether, for any deviation
from this simplest form would imply a special object. Thus
arises therefore the conception of an army, let it be
small or large. Further, when there is an absence of
any special end, there only remains as the sole object
the preservation of the army itself, which of course includes

(56:07):
its security. That the army shall be able to exist
without inconvenience, and that it shall be able to concentrate
without difficulty for the purpose of fighting. Are therefore the
two requisite conditions from these result as desirable. The following
points more immediately applying to subjects concerning the existence and
security of the army. One facility of subsistence, two facility

(56:33):
of providing shelter for the troops. Free, security of the rear. Four,
an open country in front, five the position itself in
a broken country. Six strategic points to Pui seven the
suitable distribution of the troops. Our elucidation of these several

(56:55):
points is as follows. The first two lead us to
seek out cultivated disastricts and great towns and roads. They
determine measures in general rather than in particular. In the
chapter on lines of communication, will be found what we
mean by security of the rear. The first and most
important point in this respect is that the center of

(57:16):
the position should be at a right angle, with the
principal line of retreat adjoining the position. Respecting the fourth point,
an army certainly cannot look over an expanse of country
in its front, as it overlooks the space directly before
it when in a tactical position for battle. But the
strategic eyes are the advanced guard, scouts and patrols sent
forward spies et. Cetera, et cetera. And the service will

(57:40):
naturally be easier for these in and open than in
an intersected country. The fifth point is merely the reverse
of the fourth. Strategical points to tweed differ from tactical
in these two respects, that the army need not be
in immediate contact with them, and that, on the other hand,
they must be of greater extent. Because of this is that,

(58:01):
according to the nature of the thing, the relations to
time and space in which strategy moves are generally on
a greater scale than those of tactics. If therefore, an
army posts itself at a distance of a mile from
the sea coast or the banks of a great river,
it leans strategically on these obstacles. For the enemy cannot
make use of such a space as this to affect

(58:22):
a strategic turning movement within its narrow limits. He cannot
adventure on marches miles in length, occupying days and weeks.
On the other hand, in strategy, a lake of several
miles in circumference is hardly to be looked upon as
an obstacle in its proceedings. A few miles to the
right or left are not of much consequence, fortresses will

(58:45):
become strategic points to Pui according as they are large
and afford a wide sphere of action for offensive combinations.
The disposition of the army in separate masses may be
done with a view either to special objects and requirements
or to those of a general nature. Here we can
only speak of the latter. The first general necessity is

(59:05):
to push forward the advanced guard and the other troops
required to watch the enemy. The second is that with
very large armies, the reserves are usually placed several miles
in rear and consequently occupy a separate position. Lastly, the
covering of both wings of an army usually requires a
separate disposition of particular corps. By this covering, it is

(59:28):
not at all meant that a portion of the army
is to be detached to defend the space round its
wings in order to prevent the enemy from approaching these
weak points, as they are called. Who would then defend
the wings of these flanking corps. This kind of idea,
which is so common, is complete nonsense. The wings of
an army are in themselves not weak points of an army,

(59:49):
for this reason that the enemy also has wings and
cannot menace ours without placing his own in jeopardy. It
is only if circumstances are unequal, if the enemies army
is larger than ours, if his lines of communication are
more secure see lines of communication. It is only then
that the wings become weak parts. But of these special

(01:00:10):
cases we are not now speaking, therefore, neither of a
case in which a flanking corps is appointed in connection
with other combinations to defend effectually the space on our wings.
For that no longer belongs to the category of general dispositions.
But although the wings are not particularly weak parts, still
they are particularly important because here, on account of flanking movements,

(01:00:31):
the defense is not so simple as in front measures
are more complicated and require more time and preparation. For
this reason, it is necessary in the majority of cases
to protect the wings, specially against unforeseen enterprises on the
part of the enemy, And this is done by placing
stronger masses on the wings than would be required for
mere purposes of observation. To press heavily these masses, even

(01:00:54):
if they oppose no very serious resistance, more time is required,
and the stronger they the more the enemy must develop
his forces and his intentions, And by that means the
object of the measure is attained. What is to be
done further depends on the particular plans of the moment.
We may therefore regard corps placed on the wings as
lateral advanced guards, intended to retard the advance of the

(01:01:17):
enemy through the space beyond our wings and give us
time to make dispositions to counteract his movement. If these
corps are to fall back on the main body in
the latter is not to make a backward movement at
the same time, then it follows of itself that they
must not be in the same line with the front
of the main body, but thrown out somewhat forwards, because
when a retreat is to be made, even without being

(01:01:38):
preceded by a serious engagement, they should not retreat directly
on the side of the position. From these reasons of
a subjective nature, as they relate to the inner organization
of an army, there arises a natural system of disposition
composed of four or five parts, according as the reserve
remains with the main body or not. As the subsistence

(01:01:59):
and she alter of the troops partly decide the choice
of a position in general, so also they contribute to
a disposition in separate divisions. The attention which they demand
comes into consideration along with the other considerations above mentioned,
and we seek to satisfy the one without prejudice to
the other. In most cases, by the division of an

(01:02:19):
army into five separate corps, the difficulties of subsistence in
quartering will be overcome, and no great alteration will afterwards
be required. On their account. We have still to cast
a glance at the distances at which these separated corps
may be allowed to be placed, if we are to
retain in view the advantage of mutual support, and therefore

(01:02:40):
of concentrating for battle. On this subject, we remind our
readers of what is said in the chapters on the
duration decision of the combat, according to which no absolute distance,
but only the most general, as it were, average rules
can be given. Because absolute and relative strength of arms
and country have a great influence of the advance guard

(01:03:01):
is the easiest to fix, as in retreating it falls
back on the main body of the army, and therefore
may be at all events at a distance of a
long day's march, without incurring the risk of being obliged
to fight an independent battle, but it should not be
sent further in advance than the security of the army requires,
because the further it has to fall back, the more

(01:03:21):
it suffers, respecting corps on the flanks. As we have
already said, the combat of an ordinary division of eight
thousand to ten thousand men usually lasts for several hours,
even for half a day before it is decided. On
that account, therefore, there need be no hesitation in placing
such a division at a distance of some leagues or
one or two miles. And for the same reason, corps

(01:03:43):
of three or four divisions may be detached a day's
march or a distance of three or four miles from
this natural and general disposition of the main body in
four or five divisions at particular distances. A certain method
has arisen of dividing an army in a macare manner
whenever there are no strong special reasons against this ordinary method.

(01:04:05):
But although we assume that each of these distinct parts
of an army shall be competent to undertake an independent combat,
and it may be obliged to engage in one, it
does not, therefore, by any means, follow that the real
object of fractioning an army is that the parts should
fight separately. The necessity for this distribution of the army
is mostly only a condition of existence imposed by time.

(01:04:27):
If the enemy approaches our position to try the fate
of a general action, the strategic period is over. Everything
concentrates itself into the one moment of the battle, and
therewith terminates and vanishes the object of the distribution of
the army. As soon as the battle commences, considerations about
quarters and subsistence are suspended. The observation of the enemy

(01:04:48):
before our front and on our flanks has fulfilled the
purpose of checking his advance by a partial resistance, and
now all resolves itself into the one great unit, the
great battle. The best criterion of skill in the disposition
of an army lies in the proof that the distribution
has been considered merely as a condition, as a necessary evil,
but that united action in battle has been considered the

(01:05:10):
object of the disposition. Chapter seven Advanced Guard and outposts.
These two bodies belong to that class of subjects into
which both the tactical and strategic threads run simultaneously. On
the one hand, we must reckon them amongst those provisions
which give form to the battle and ensure the execution
of tactical plans. On the other hand, they frequently lead

(01:05:33):
to independent combats, and, on account of their position more
or less distant from the main body, they are to
be regarded as links in the strategic chain. And it
is this very feature which obliges us to supplement the
preceding chapter by devoting a few moments to their consideration.
Every body of troops, when not completely in readiness for battle,
requires an advanced guard to learn the approach of the

(01:05:56):
enemy and to gain further particulars respecting his force before
he comes in sight. For the range of vision, as
a rule, does not go much beyond the range of firearms.
But what sort of man would he be who could
not see farther than his arms can reach. The four
posts are the eyes of the army, as we have
already said. The want of them, however, is not always

(01:06:18):
equally great. It has its degrees. The strength of armies
and the extent of ground they cover. Time, place, contingencies,
the method of making war, even chance are all points
which have an influence in the matter. And therefore we
cannot wonder that military history, instead of furnishing any definite
in simple outlines of the method of using advanced guards

(01:06:40):
and outposts only presents the subject in a kind of chaos.
Of examples of the most diversified nature, Sometimes we see
the security of an army intrusted to a corps regularly
appointed to the duty of advanced guard. At another time
a long line of separate outposts. Sometimes both these arrangements coexist,
neither one nor the other. At one time there is

(01:07:02):
only one advance guard in common for the whole of
the advancing columns. At another time, each column has its
own advance guard. We shall endeavor to get a clear
idea of what the subject really is, and then see
whether we can arrive at some principles capable of application.
If the troops are on the march, a detachment of
more or less strength forms its van or advance guard,

(01:07:25):
and in case of the movement of the army being reversed,
this same detachment will form the regard. If the troops
are in cantonments or camp, an extended line of weak
posts forms the vanguard the outposts. It is essentially in
the nature of things that when the army is halted,
a greater extent of space can and must be watched

(01:07:46):
than when the army is in motion, and therefore, in
the one case, the conception of a chain of posts,
in the other, that of a concentrated corps arises of itself.
The actual strength of an advance guard, as well as
of outposts, ranges from a considerable corps composed of an
organization of all three arms, to a regiment of hussars,
and from a strongly entrenched defensive line occupied by portions

(01:08:09):
of troops from each arm of the service, to mere
outlying pickets and their supports detached from the camp. The
services assigned to such vanguards range also from those of
mere observation to an offer of opposition or resistance to
the enemy. And this opposition may not only be to
give the main body of the army the time which
it requires to prepare for battle, but also to make

(01:08:31):
the enemy develop his plans and intentions, which consequently makes
the observation far more important. According as more or less
time is required to be gained. According as the opposition
to be offered is calculated upon and intended to meet
the special measures of the enemy, so accordingly must the
strength of the advanced guard and outposts be proportioned Frederick

(01:08:52):
the Great, a general above all others, ever ready for battle,
and who almost directed his army in battle by word
of command, never require strong outposts. We see him therefore
constantly encamping close under the eyes of the enemy, without
any great apparatus of outposts, relying for his security at
one place on a hussar regiment, at another on a

(01:09:13):
light battalion, or perhaps on the pickets and supports furnished
from the camp. On the march, a few thousand horse
generally furnished by the cavalry on the flanks of the
first line formed his advance guard, and at the end
of the march rejoined the main body. He very seldom
had any corps permanently employed as advanced guard. When it

(01:09:33):
is the intention of a small army, by using the
whole weight of its mass, with great vigor and activity,
to make the enemy feel the effect of its superior
discipline and the greater resolution of its commander, than almost
everything must be done sue la barbde l enemy in
the same way as Frederick the Great did. When opposed
to dawn, a system of holding back from the enemy

(01:09:54):
and a very formal and extensive system of outposts would
neutralize all the advantages of the above kind of superiority.
The circumstance that an error of another kind and the
carrying out Frederick's system too far may lead to a
battle of Hotchkirch is no argument against this method of acting.
We should rather say that, as there was only one

(01:10:15):
battle of Hotchkirch in all the Silesian War, we ought
to recognize in this system a proof of the king's
consummate ability. Napoleon, however, who commanded an army not deficient
in discipline and firmness, and who did not want for
resolution himself, never moved without a strong advanced guard. There
are two reasons for this. The first is to be

(01:10:37):
found in the alteration in tactics. A whole army is
no longer led into battle as one body by mere
word of command, to settle the affair like a great duel,
by more or less skill and bravery. The combatants on
each side now ranged their forces more to suit the
peculiarities of the ground and circumstances, so that the order
of battle, and consequently the battle itself, is a whole

(01:10:59):
made up of men any parts from which there follows
that this simple determination to fight becomes a regularly formed plan,
and the word of command a morare less long. Preparatory
arrangement for this time and data are required. The second
cause lies in the great size of modern armies. Frederick

(01:11:20):
brought thirty or forty thousand men into battle Napoleon from
one to two hundred thousand. We have selected these examples
because every one will admit that two such generals would
never have adopted any systematic mode of proceeding without some
good reason. Upon the whole, there has been a general
improvement in the use of advanced guards and outposts in

(01:11:40):
modern wars, not that every one acted as Frederic, even
in the Silesian Wars, for at that time the Austrians
had a system of strong outposts and frequently sent forward
a corps as advance guard, for which they had sufficient
reason from the situation in which they were placed. Just
in the same way we find differences enough in the
mode of care rying on war in more modern times.

(01:12:02):
Even the French marshals MacDonald in Silesia Utnot and Nay
in the Mark Brandenburg advanced with armies of sixty or
seventy thousand men, without our reading of their having had
any advanced guard dot. We have hitherto been discussing advanced
guards and outposts in relation to their numerical strength. But
there is another difference which we must settle. It is

(01:12:23):
that when an army advances or retires on a certain
breadth of ground, it may have a van and rear
guard in common for all the columns which are marching
side by side, or each column may have won for itself.
In order to form a clear idea on this subject,
we must look at it in this way. The fundamental
conception of an advanced guard, when a corps is so

(01:12:45):
specially designated, is that its mission is the security of
the main body or center of the army. If this
main body is marching upon several contiguous roads so close
together that they can also easily serve for the advance guard,
and therefore becover by it, then the flank columns naturally
require no special covering. But those cores which are moving

(01:13:06):
at great distances in reality as detached cores, must provide
their own vanguards. The same applies also to any of
those corps which belong to the central mass, and, owing
to the direction that the roads may happen to take,
are too far from the center column. Therefore there will
be as many advanced guards as there are columns virtually

(01:13:27):
separated from each other. If each of these advance guards
is much weaker than one general one would be, then
they fall more into the class of other tactical dispositions,
and there is no advance guard in the strategic tableau.
But if the main body or center has a much
larger core for its advanced guard, then that core will
appear as the advance guard of the whole, and will

(01:13:47):
be so in many respects. But what can be the
reason for giving the center of vanguard so much stronger
than the wings The following three reasons. One because the
mass of troops composing the center is usually much more considerable.
Two because plainly, the central point of a strip of
country along which the front of an army is extended

(01:14:10):
must always be the most important point, as all the
combinations of the campaign relate mostly to it, and therefore
the field of battle is also usually nearer to it
than to the wings. Three because although a corps thrown
forward in front of the center does not directly protect
the wings as a real vanguard, it still contributes greatly
to their security. Indirectly. For instance, the enemy cannot, in

(01:14:33):
ordinary cases pass by such a corps within a certain
distance in order to effect any enterprise of importance against
one of the wings, because he has to fear an
attack in flank and rear. Even if this check which
a corps thrown forward in the center imposes on the
enemy is not sufficient to constitute complete security for the wings,
it is at all events sufficient to relieve the flanks

(01:14:54):
from all apprehension. In a great many cases, the vanguard
of the center, if much stronger than that of a wing,
that is to say, if it consists of a special
corps as advance guard as then not merely the mission
of a vanguard intended to protect the troops in its
rear from sudden surprise. It also operates in more general
strategic relations as an army corps thrown forward in advance.

(01:15:18):
The following are the purposes for which such a corps
may be used, and therefore those which determine its duties
in practice. One to ensure a stouter resistance and make
the enemy advance with more caution. Consequently, to do the
duties of a vanguard on a greater scale. Whenever our
arrangements are such as to require time before they can

(01:15:38):
be carried into effect. Two, if the central mass of
the army is very large, to be able to keep
this unwieldy body at some distance from the enemy while
we still remain close to him with a more movable
body of troops. Three, that we may have a corps
of observation close to the enemy. If there are any
other reasons which require us to keep the principal mass

(01:16:00):
of the army at a considerable distance, the idea that
weaker lookout posts mere partisan corps might answer just as well.
For this observation is set aside at once if we
reflect how easily a weak corps might be dispersed, and
how very limited also are its means of observation as
compared with those of a considerable corps. Four. In the

(01:16:20):
pursuit of the enemy, a single corps as advance guard,
with the greater part of the cavalry attached to it,
can move quicker, arriving later at its bivouac and moving
earlier in the morning than the whole mass. Five. Lastly,
on a retreat as rear guard, to be used in
defending the principal natural obstacles of ground In this respect also,

(01:16:43):
the center is exceedingly important. At first sight, it certainly
appears as if such a rear guard would be constantly
in danger of having its flanks turned. But we must
remember that even if the enemy succeeds in overlapping the
flanks to some extent, he is still to march the
whole way from them there to the center before he
can seriously threaten the central mass, which gives time to

(01:17:04):
the rear guard of the center to prolong its resistance
and remain in rear somewhat longer. On the other hand,
the situation becomes at once critical. If the center falls
back quicker than the wings, there is immediately an appearance
as if the line had been broken through, and even
the very idea or appearance of that is to be dreaded.
At no time is there a greater necessity for concentration

(01:17:27):
in holding together, and at no time is this more
sensibly felt by every one than on a retreat. The
intention always is that the wings, in case of extremity,
should close upon the center, And if, on account of
subsistence and roads, the retreat has to be made on
a considerable width of country, still the movement generally ends
by a concentration on the center. If we add to

(01:17:49):
these considerations also this one that the enemy usually advances
with his principal force in the center, and with the
greatest energy against the center, we must perceive that the
rear goard part of the center is of special importance. Accordingly,
therefore a special court should always be thrown forward as
an advanced guard in every case where one of the
above relations occurs. These relations almost fall to the ground

(01:18:14):
if the center is not stronger than the wings. As
for example, MacDonald when he advanced against Blucher in Silesia
in eighteen thirteen, and the latter when he made his
movement towards the Elba. Both of them had three corps,
which usually moved in three columns by different roads, the
heads of the columns in line. On this account, no

(01:18:35):
mention is made of their having had advanced guards. But
this disposition in three columns of equal strength is one
which is by no means to be recommended, partly on
that account, and also because the division of a whole
army into three parts makes it very unmanageable, as stated
in the fifth chapter of the Third Book, When the
whole is formed into a center with two wings separate

(01:18:57):
from it, which we have represented in the preceding chapter
as the most natural formation, as long as there is
no particular object for any other. The corps forming the
advanced guard, according to the simplest notion of the case,
will have its place in front of the center, and
therefore before the line which forms the front of the wings.
But as the first object of corps thrown out on
the flanks is to perform the same office for them,

(01:19:20):
besides as the advanced guard for the front, it will
very often happen that these corps will be in line
with the advanced guard, or even still further thrown forward
according to circumstances. With respect to the strength of an
advanced guard, we have little to say, as now very properly.
It is the general custom to detail for that duty
one or more component parts of the army of the

(01:19:40):
first class, reinforced by part of the cavalry, so that
it consists of a corps. If the army is formed
in corps of a division. If the organization is in divisions,
it is easy to perceive that in this respect also
the great number of higher members or divisions is an advantage.
How far the advanced guards should be pushed to the

(01:20:01):
front must entirely depend on circumstances. There are cases in
which it may be more than a day's march in advance,
and others in which it should be immediately before the
front of the army. If we find that in most
cases between one and three miles is the distance chosen,
that shows certainly that circumstances have usually pointed out this
distance as the best. But we cannot make of it

(01:20:23):
a rule by which we are to be always guided.
In the foregoing observations, we have lost sight altogether of outposts,
and therefore we must now return to them again. In
saying at the commencement that the relations between outposts and
stationary troops is similar to that between advanced guards and
troops in motion, our object was to refer the conceptions

(01:20:44):
back to their origin and keep them distinct in future.
But it is clear that if we confine ourselves strictly
to the words, we should get little more than a
pedantic distinction. If an army on the march halts at
night to resume the march next morning, the advance guard
must naturally do the same aim and always organize the
outpost duty required both for its own security and that

(01:21:05):
of the main body, without, on that account, being changed
from an advance guard into a line of outposts. To
satisfy the notion of that transformation, the advance guard would
have to be completely broken up into a chain of
small posts, having either only a very small force or
none at all, in a form approaching to a mass.
In other words, the idea of a line of outposts

(01:21:27):
must predominate over that of a concentrated corps. The shorter
the time of rest of the army, the less complete
does the covering of the army required to be, for
the enemy has hardly time to learn from day to
day what is covered and what is not. The longer
the halt is to be, the more complete must be
the observation and covering of all points of approach. As

(01:21:48):
a rule, therefore, when the halt is long, the vanguard
becomes always more and more extended into a line of posts.
Whether the change becomes complete or whether the idea of
a concer traded corps shall continue uppermost, depends chiefly on
two circumstances. The first is the proximity of the contending armies.
The second is the nature of the country if the

(01:22:11):
armies are very close in comparison to the width of
their front, then it will often be impossible to post
a vanguard between them, and the armies are obliged to
place their dependence on a chain of outposts. A concentrated corps,
as it covers the approaches to the army less directly,
generally requires more time and space to act efficiently. And therefore,

(01:22:32):
if the army covers a great extent of front, as
in cantonments, and a core standing in mass is to
cover all the avenues of approach, it is necessary that
we should be at a considerable distance from the enemy.
On this account, winter quarters, for instance, are generally covered
by a cordon of posts. The second circumstance is the
nature of the country, where, for example, any formidable obstacle

(01:22:56):
of ground affords the means of forming a strong line
of posts with but few troops, we should not neglect
to take advantage of it. Lastly, in winter quarters, the
rigor of the season may also be a reason for
breaking up the advanced guard into a line of posts,
because it is easier to find shelter for it. In
that way, the use of a reinforced line of outposts

(01:23:17):
was brought to great perfection by the Anglo Dutch Army
during the campaign of seventeen ninety four and seventeen ninety
five in the Netherlands, when the line of defense was
formed by brigades composed of all arms in single posts
and supported by a reserve. Sharnhorst, who was with that army,
introduced this system into the Prussian Army on the Passage

(01:23:38):
in eighteen o seven. Elsewhere, in modern times it has
been little adopted, chiefly because the wars have been too
rich in movement. But even when there has been occasion
for its use, it has been neglected, as for instance
by marat At Taratino, a wider extension of his defensive
line would have spared him the loss of thirty pieces

(01:23:59):
of artillery in a combat of outposts. It cannot be
disputed that in certain circumstances great advantages may be derived
from this system. We propose to return to the subject
on another occasion. Chapter eight. Mode of action of advanced corps.
We have just seen how the security of the army

(01:24:19):
is expected from the effect which an advanced guard and
flank corps produce on an advancing enemy. Such corps are
always to be considered as very weak whenever we imagine
them in conflict if the main body of the enemy,
and therefore a peculiar mode of using them, is required,
that they may fulfill the purpose for which they are
intended without incurring the risk of the serious loss which

(01:24:40):
is to be feared from this disproportion in strength. The
object of a core of this description is to observe
the enemy and to delay his progress. For the first
of these purposes, a smaller body would never be sufficient,
partly because it would be more easily driven back, partly
because its means of observation, that is, its eye could
not reach as far. But the observation must be carried

(01:25:04):
to a high point. The enemy must be made to
develop his whole strength before such a corps, and thereby reveal,
to a certain extent, not only his force but also
his plans. For this, its mere presence would be sufficient,
and it would only be necessary to wait and see
the measures by which the enemy seeks to drive it back,
and then commence its retreat at once. But further, it

(01:25:26):
must also delay the advance of the enemy, and that
implies actual resistance. Now, how can we conceive this waiting
until the last moment, as well as this resistance without
such a core being in constant danger of serious loss,
chiefly in this way that the enemy himself is preceded
by an advance guard, and therefore does not advance at

(01:25:47):
once with all the outflanking and overpowering weight of his
whole force. Now, if this advance guard is also from
the commencement superior to our advanced corps, as we may
naturally suppose it is intended it should be. And if
the enemy's main body is also nearer to his advanced
guard than we are to ours, and if that main body,
being already on the march, will soon be on the

(01:26:09):
spot to support the attack of his advance guard with
all his strength. Still, this first act, in which our
advanced corps has to contend with the enemy's advanced guard,
that is, with a force not much exceeding its own,
insures at once a certain gain of time, and thus
allows of our watching the adversary's movements for some time
without endangering our own retreat. But even a certain amount

(01:26:31):
of resistance which such a corps can offer in a
suitable position, is not attended with such disadvantage as we
might anticipate in other cases through the disproportion in the
strength of the forces engaged. The chief danger in a
contest with a superior enemy consists always in the possibility
of being turned and placed in a critical situation by
the enemy enveloping our position. But in the case to

(01:26:53):
which our attention is now directed, a risk of this
description is very much less, owing to the advancing enemy
never ever knowing exactly how near there may be support
from the main body of his opponent's army itself, which
may place his advanced column between two fires. The consequence
is that the enemy in advancing keeps the heads of
his single columns as nearly as possible in line, and

(01:27:16):
only begins very cautiously to attempt to turn one or
other wing after he has sufficiently reconnoitered our position. While
the enemy is thus feeling about and moving guardedly, the
corps we have thrown forward has time to fall back
before it is in any serious danger. As for the
length of the resistance which such a corps should offer
against the attack in front, or against the commencement of

(01:27:38):
any turning movement, that depends chiefly on the nature of
the ground and the proximity of the enemy supports. If
this resistance is continued beyond its natural measure, either from
one of judgment or from a sacrifice being necessary in
order to give the main body the time it requires,
the consequence must always be a very considerable loss. It

(01:27:58):
is only in rare instance, and more especially when some
local obstacle is favorable, that the resistance actually made in
such a combat can be of importance, And the duration
of the little battle of such a core would in
itself be hardly sufficient to gain the time required. That
time is really gained in a threefold manner, which lies
in the nature of the thing. One by the more

(01:28:20):
cautious and consequently slower advance of the enemy, two by
the duration of the actual resistance offered, Three by the
retreat itself. This retreat must be made as slowly as
is consistent with safety. If the country affords good positions,
they should be made use of, as that obliges the

(01:28:40):
enemy to organize fresh attacks and plans for turning movements,
and by that means more time is gained, perhaps in
a new position, a real combat even may again be fought.
We see that the opposition to the enemy's progress by
actual fighting and the retreat are completely combined with one another,
and that the shortness of the duration of the fights
must be made up for by their frequent repetition. This

(01:29:04):
is the kind of resistance which an advanced corps should offer.
The degree of effect depends chiefly on the strength of
the core and the configuration of the country, next on
the length of the road which the core has to
march over and the support which it receives. A small body,
even when the forces on both sides are equal, can
never make as long as stand as a considerable core.

(01:29:26):
For the larger the masses, the more time they require
to complete their action, of whatever kind it may be.
In a mountainous country, the mere marching is of itself slower,
the resistance in the different positions longer and attended with
less danger, and at every step favorable positions may be found.
As the distance to which a corp is pushed forward increases,

(01:29:47):
so will the length of its retreat, and therefore also
the absolute gain of time by its resistance. But as
such a corps by its position, has less power of
resistance in itself, and is less easily reinforced, its retreat
must be be made more rapidly in proportion than if
it stood nearer the main body and had a shorter
distance to traverse. The support and means of rallying afforded

(01:30:08):
to an advanced corps must naturally have an influence on
the duration of the resistance, as all the time that
prudence requires for the security of the retreat is so
much taken from the resistance and therefore diminishes its amount.
There is a marked difference in the time gained by
the resistance of an advanced corps when the enemy makes
his first appearance after midday. In such a case, the

(01:30:30):
length of the night is so much additional time gained,
as the advance is seldom continued throughout the night. Thus
it was that in eighteen fifteen, on the short distance
from Charleroi to Ligny not more than two miles, the
first Prussian corps under General Zethan, about thirty thousand strong,
against Buonaparte at the head of one hundred and twenty

(01:30:50):
thousand men, was enabled to gain twenty four hours for
the Prussian army then engaged in concentrating. The first attack
was made on General Zethan about nine o'clock on the
morning of June fifteenth, and the Battle of Ligny did
not commence until about two on the afternoon of sixteenth.
General Zeithan suffered, it is true very considerable loss, amounting

(01:31:11):
to five or six thousand men killed, wounded or prisoners,
if we refer to experience. The following are the results
which may serve as a basis in any calculations of
this kind. A division of ten or twelve thousand men,
with a proportion of cavalry a day's march of three
or four miles in advance in an ordinary country not

(01:31:32):
particularly strong, will be able to detain the enemy, including
time occupied in the retreat, about half as long again
as he would otherwise require to march over the same ground.
But if the division is only a mile in advance,
then the enemy ought to be detained about twice or
three times as long as he otherwise would be on
the march. Therefore, supposing the distance to be a march

(01:31:54):
of four miles, for which usually ten hours are required,
then from the moment that the enemy appears in force
in front of the advanced corps, we may reckon upon
fifteen hours before he is in a condition to attack
our main body. On the other hand, if the advance
guard is posted only a mile in advance, then the
time which will elapse before our army can be attacked

(01:32:15):
will be more than three or four hours, and may
very easily come up to double that, for the enemy
still requires just as much time to mature his first
measures against our advance guard, and the resistance offered by
that guard in its original position will be greater than
it would be in a position further forward. The consequence
is that in the first of these supposed cases, the

(01:32:36):
enemy cannot easily make an attack on our main body
on the same day that he presses back the advanced corps,
and this exactly coincides with the results of experience. Even
in the second case, the enemy must succeed in driving
our advanced guard from its ground in the first half
of the day to have the requisite time for a
general action as the night comes to our help. In

(01:32:57):
the first of these supposed cases, we see how much
time may be gained by an advanced guard thrown further forward.
With reference to corps placed on the sides or flanks
the object of which we have before explained. The mode
of action is in most cases more or less connected
with circumstances which belong to the province of immediate application.

(01:33:18):
The simplest way is to look upon them as advanced
guards placed on the sides, which, being at the same
time thrown out somewhat in advance, retreat in an oblique
direction upon the army. As these corps are not immediately
in the front of the army and cannot be so
easily supported as a regular advance guard, they would therefore
be exposed to greater danger if it was not that

(01:33:40):
the enemy's offensive power, in most cases is somewhat less
at the outer extremities of his line, and in the
worst cases, such corps have sufficient room to give way
without exposing the army so directly to danger as a
flying advanced guard would in its rapid retreat. The most
usual and best means of supporting an advanced corps is
by a conciit durable body of cavalry, for which reason,

(01:34:02):
when necessary, from the distance at which the corps is advanced,
the reserve cavalry is posted between the main body and
the advanced corps. The conclusion to be drawn from the
preceding reflections is that an advanced corps effects more by
its presence than by its efforts, less by the combats
in which it engages, than by the possibility of those
in which it might engage. That it should never attempt

(01:34:24):
to stop the enemy's movements, but only serve, like a
pendulum to moderate and regulate them, so that they may
be made matter of calculation. Chapter nine, Camps. We are
now considering the three situations of an army outside of
the combat only strategically, that is, so far as they
are conditioned by place, time, and the number of the

(01:34:45):
effective force. All those subjects which relate to the internal
arrangement of the combat and the transition into the state
of combat belong to tactics. The disposition in camps, under
which we mean every disposition of an army except in quarters,
whether it be intents, huts, or bivouac, is strategically completely

(01:35:05):
identical with the combat which is contingent upon such disposition. Tactically,
it is not so always, for we can, for many reasons,
choose a site for encamping which is not precisely identical
with the proposed field of battle. Having already said all
that is necessary on the disposition of an army, that is,
on the position of the different parts, we have only

(01:35:28):
to make some observations on camps in connection with their
history in former times, that is, before armies grew once
more to considerable dimensions, before wars became of greater duration
and their partial acts brought into connection with a whole
or general plan, and up to the time of the
War of the French Revolution, armies always used tents. This

(01:35:49):
was their normal state. With the commencement of the mild
season of the year, they left their quarters and did
not again take them up until winter set in. Winter
quarters at that time must to a certain extent be
looked upon as a state of no war, for in
them the forces were neutralized. The whole clockwork stopped. Quarters
to refresh an army which preceded the real winter quarters

(01:36:11):
and other temporary cantonments for a short time within contracted
limits were transitional and exceptional conditions. This is not the
place to inquire how such a periodical voluntary neutralization of
power consisted with or is now consistent with the object
and being of war. We shall come to that subject hereafter.
Enough that it was so since the wars of the

(01:36:33):
French Revolution, armies have completely done away with the tents
on account of the incumbrance they cause. Partly, it is
found better for an army of one hundred thousand men
to have in place of six thousand tent horses, five
thousand additional cavalry, or a couple of hundred extra guns. Partly,
it has been found that in great and rapid operations
a load of tents is a hindrance and of little use.

(01:36:57):
But this change is attended with two draws, viz. An
increase of casualties in the force and greater wasting of
the country. However slight the protection afforded by a roof
of common tent cloth, it cannot be denied that on
a long continuance it is great relief to the troops.
For a single day, the difference is small, because a

(01:37:18):
tent is little protection against wind and cold, and does
not completely exclude wet But this small difference, if repeated
two or three hundred times in a year, becomes important.
A greater loss through sickness is just a natural result.
How the devastation of the country is increased through the
want of tents for the troops requires no explanation. One

(01:37:40):
would suppose that, on account of these two reactionary influences,
that doing away with tents must have diminished again the
energy of war. In another way, that troops must remain
longer in quarters, and from want of the requisites for encampment,
must forego many positions which would have been possible had
tents been forthcoming. This would indeed have been the case
had there not been, in the same epoch of time

(01:38:02):
an enormous revolution in war generally, which swallowed up in
itself all these smaller subordinate influences. The elementary fire of
war has become so overpowering, its energy so extraordinary, that
these regular periods of rest also have disappeared, and every
power presses forward with persistent force towards the great decision,

(01:38:22):
which will be treated of more fully in the ninth book.
Under these circumstances, therefore, any question about effects on an
army from the discontinuance of the use of tents in
the field is quite thrown into the shade. Troops now
occupy huts or bivouac under the canopy of heaven, without
regard to season of the year, whether or locality, just

(01:38:43):
according as the general plan and object of the campaign require.
Whether war will in the future continue to maintain under
all circumstances and at all times, this energy is a question.
We shall consider hereafter where this energy is wanting. The
want of tents is calculate to exercise some influence on
the conduct of war. But that this reaction will ever

(01:39:04):
be strong enough to bring back the use of tents
is very doubtful, because now that much wider limits have
been opened for the elements of war, it will never
return within its old narrow bounds, except occasionally for a
certain time and under certain circumstances, only to break out
again with the all powerful force of its nature. Permanent
arrangements for an army must therefore be based only upon

(01:39:28):
that nature. Chapter ten marches. Marches are a mere passage
from one position to another under two primary conditions. The
first is the due care of the troops, so that
no forces shall be squandered uselessly when they might be
usefully employed. The second is precision in the movements, so
that they may fit exactly. If we marched one hundred

(01:39:50):
thousand men in one single column, that is, upon one
road without intervals of time, the rear of the column
would never arrive at the proposed destination on the same
day with the head of the column. We must either
advance at an unusually slow pace or the mass wood
like a thread of water, disperse itself in drops, and
this dispersion, together with the excessive exertion laid upon those

(01:40:12):
in rear owing to the length of the column, would
soon throw everything into confusion. If from this extreme we
take the opposite direction, we find that the smaller the
mass of troops in one column, the greater the ease
and precision with which the march can be performed. The
result of this is the need of a division, quite
irrespective of that division of an army in separate parts,

(01:40:33):
which belongs to its position. Therefore, although the division into
columns of march originates in the strategic disposition in general,
it does not do so in every particular case. A
great mass which is to be concentrated at any one
point must necessarily be divided for the march. But even
if a disposition of the army in separate parts causes

(01:40:54):
a march in separate divisions, sometimes the conditions of the
primitive disposition, sometimes those of them march are paramount. For instance,
if the disposition of the troops is one made merely
for rest, one in which a battle is not expected,
then the conditions of the march predominate, and these conditions
are chiefly the choice of good, well frequented roads. Keeping

(01:41:16):
in view this difference, we choose a road in the
one case on account of the quarters and camping ground.
In the other, we take the quarters and camps such
as they are on account of the road. When a
battle is expected and everything depends on our reaching a
particular point with a mass of troops, then we should
think nothing of getting to that point by even the
worst by roads, if necessary. If, on the other hand,

(01:41:39):
we are still on the journey to the theater of war,
then the nearest great roads are selected for the columns,
and we look out for the best quarters and camps
that can be got near them, whether the march is
of the one kind or the other. If there is
a possibility of a combat that is within the whole
region of actual war, it is an invariable rule in
the modern art of war or to organize the columns

(01:42:01):
so that the mass of troops composing each column is
fit of itself to engage in an independent combat. This
condition is satisfied by the combination of the three arms,
by an organized subdivision of the whole, and by the
appointment of a competent commander. Marches therefore have been the
chief cause of the new order of battle, and they

(01:42:21):
profit most by it. When in the middle of the
last century, especially in the theater of war in which
Frederick iiO was engaged, generals began to look upon movement
as a principle belonging to fighting, and to think of
gaining the victory by the effect of unexpected movements. The
want of an organized order of battle caused the most
complicated and laborious evolutions on a march. In carrying out

(01:42:46):
a movement near the enemy, an army ought to be
always ready to fight, but at that time they were
never ready to fight unless the whole army was collectively present.
Because nothing less than the army constituted a complete whole.
In a march to a flag, the second line, in
order to be always at the regulated distance, that is,
about a quarter of a mile from the first, had

(01:43:06):
to march up Hill and Downdale, which demanded immense exertion
as well as a great stock of local knowledge, for
where can one find two good roads running parallel at
a distance of a quarter of a mile from each other.
The cavalry on the wings had to encounter the same
difficulties when the march was direct to the front. There
was other difficulty with the artillery, which required a road

(01:43:28):
for itself protected by infantry. For the lines of infantry
required to be continuous lines, and the artillery increased the
length of their already long trailing columns still more, and
through all their regulated distances into disorder. It is only
necessary to read the dispositions for marches in Tempelhoff's History
of the Seven Years War to be satisfied of all

(01:43:50):
these incidents and of the restraints thus imposed on the
action of war. But since then the modern art of
war has subdivided armies on a regular principle, so that
each of the principal parts forms in itself a complete
whole of small proportions, but capable of acting in battle
precisely like the great whole, except in one respect, which
is that the duration of its action must be shorter.

(01:44:13):
The consequence of this change is that, even when it
is intended that the whole force should take part in
a battle, it is no longer necessary to have the
columns so close to each other that they may unite
before the commencement of the combat. It is sufficient now
if the concentration takes place in the course of the action.
The smaller body of troops, the more easily it can
be moved, and therefore the less it requires that subdivision,

(01:44:36):
which is not a result of the separate disposition, but
of the unwieldiness of the mass. A small body therefore
can march upon one road, and if it is to
advance on several lines, it easily finds roads near each other,
which are as good as it requires. The greater the mass,
the greater becomes the necessity for subdividing. The greater becomes

(01:44:57):
the number of columns, and the want of made roads
or even great high roads. Consequently, also the distance of
the columns from each other. Now, the danger of this
subdivision is arithmetically expressed in an inverse ratio to the
necessity for it. The smaller the parts are, the more
readily must they be able to render assistance to each other.

(01:45:17):
The larger they are, the longer they can be left
to depend on themselves. If we only call to mind
what has been said in the preceding book on this subject,
and also consider that in cultivated countries, at a few
miles distance from the main road, there are always other
tolerably good roads running in a parallel direction. It is
easy to see that in regulating a march there are

(01:45:38):
no great difficulties which make rapidity and precision in the
advance incompatible with the proper concentration of force. In a
mountainous country, parallel roads are both scarce and the difficulties
of communication between them great, But the defensive powers of
a single column are very much greater. In order to
make this idea clearer, let us look at it for

(01:45:59):
a moment in concrete form. A division of eight thousand men,
with its artillery in other carriages, takes up, as we
know by experience, in ordinary cases, a space of one league.
If therefore two divisions march one after the other on
the same road, the second arrives one hour after the first.
But now, as said in the sixth chapter of the

(01:46:21):
Fourth Book, a division of this strength is quite capable
of maintaining a combat for several hours, even against a
superior force. And therefore, supposing the worst, that is, supposing
there first had to commence a fight instantaneously, still the
second division would not arrive too late. Further within a

(01:46:41):
league right and left of the road on which we march.
In the cultivated countries of central Europe, there are generally
lateral roads which can be used for a march, so
that there is no necessity to go across country, as
was so often done in the Seven Years War. Again,
it is known by experience that the head of a
column composed of four divisions and a reserve of cavalry,

(01:47:02):
even on indifferent roads, generally gets over a march of
three miles in eight hours. Now, if we reckon for
each division one league in depth, and the same for
the reserve cavalry in artillery, then the whole march will
last thirteen hours. This is no great length of time,
and yet in this case forty thousand men would have
marched over the same road. But with such a mass

(01:47:24):
as this, we can make use of lateral roads, which
are to be found at a greater distance, and therefore
easily shorten the march. If the mass of troops marching
on the same road is still greater than above supposed,
then it is a case in which the arrival of
the whole on the same day is no longer indispensable.
For such masses never give battle now the moment they meet,

(01:47:45):
usually not until the next day. We have introduced these
concrete cases, not as exhausting considerations of this kind, but
to make ourselves more intelligible, and by means of this
glance at the results of experience, to show that in
the present mode of conducting war, the organization of marches
no longer offers such great difficulties. That the most rapid
marches executed with the greatest precision, no longer required either

(01:48:10):
that peculiar skill or that exact knowledge of the country,
which was needed for Frederick's rapid and exact marches in
the Seven Years War. Through the existing organization of armies.
They rather go on now almost of themselves, at least
without any great preparatory plans. In times past, battles were
conducted by mere word of command, but marches required a

(01:48:32):
regular plan. Now the order of battle requires the latter,
and for a march the word of command almost suffices.
As is well known, all marches are either perpendicular to
the front or parallel. The latter also called flank marches,
alter the geometrical position of the divisions. Those parts which

(01:48:52):
in position were in line will follow one another, and
vice versa. Now, although the line of march may be
at any angle with the front still, the order of
the march must decidedly be of one or other of
these classes. This geometrical alteration could only be completely carried
out by tactics, and by it only through the file march,

(01:49:13):
as it is called, which with great masses is impossible.
Far less is it possible for strategy to do it.
The parts which changed their geometrical relation in the old
order of battle were only the center and wings. In
the new they are the divisions of the first rank corps, divisions,
or even brigades, according to the organization of the army. Now.

(01:49:35):
The consequences above deduced from the new order of battle
have an influence here also, for as it is no
longer so necessary as formerly, that the whole army should
be assembled before action commences. Therefore the greater care is
taken that those troops which march together form one whole
a unit. If two divisions were so placed that one
formed the reserve to the other, and that they were

(01:49:57):
to advance against the enemy upon two roads, no one
would think of sending a portion of each division by
each of the roads. But a road would at once
be assigned to each division. They would therefore march side
by side, and each general of division would be left
to provide a reserve for himself in case of a combat.
Unity of command is much more important than the original

(01:50:18):
geometrical relation. If the divisions reach their new position without
a combat, they can resume their previous relations much less.
If two divisions standing together are to make a parallel
flank march upon two roads, should we think of placing
the second line reserve of each division on the rear road.
Instead of that, we should allot to each of the

(01:50:39):
divisions one of the roads, and therefore during the march
consider one division as forming the reserve to the other.
If an army in four divisions, of which three form
the front line and the fourth the reserve, is to
march against the enemy in that order, then it is
natural to assign a road to each of the divisions
in front and cause the reserve to follow the center.

(01:51:01):
If there are not three roads at a suitable distance apart,
then we need not hesitate at once to march upon
two roads, as no serious inconvenience can arise from so doing.
It is the same in the opposite case the flank march.
Another point is the march off of columns from the
right flank or left in parallel marches marches to a flank.

(01:51:24):
The thing is plain in itself. No one would march
off from the right to make a movement to the
left flank. In a march to the front or rear,
the order of march should properly be chosen according to
the direction of the lines of roads in respect to
the future line of deployment. This may also be done
frequently in tactics, as its spaces are smaller, and therefore

(01:51:46):
a survey of the geometrical relations can be more easily taken.
In strategy, it is quite impossible. And therefore, although we
have seen here and there a certain analogy brought over
into strategy from tactics, it was mere pedantry. Formerly the
whole order of march was a purely tactical affair, because
the army on a march remained always an indivisible hole

(01:52:08):
and looked to nothing but a combat of the whole. Yet, nevertheless, Schwerin,
for example, when he marched off from his position near
Brandeis on the fifth of May, could not tell whether
his future field of battle would be on his right
or left, And on this account he was obliged to
make his famous counter march. If an army in the
old order of battle advanced against the enemy in four columns.

(01:52:30):
The cavalry in the first and second lines on each
wing formed the two exterior columns. The two lines of
infantry composing the wings formed the two central columns. Now,
these columns could march off all from the right or
all from the left, or the right wing from the right,
the left wing from the left, or the left from
the right and the right from the left. In the

(01:52:51):
latter case it would have been called double column from
the center. But all these forms, although they ought to
have had a relation directly to the future deployment, were
really all quite indifferent in that respect. When Frederick the
Great entered on the Battle of Luthen, his army had
been marched off by wings from the right in four columns. Therefore,
the wonderful transition to a march off in order of battle,

(01:53:14):
as described by all writers of history, was done with
the greatest ease, because it happened that the king chose
to attack the left wing of the Austrians. Had he
wanted to turn their right, he must have countermarched his
army as he did at Prague. If these forms did
not meet that object in those days, they would be
mere trifling. As regards it now we know now just

(01:53:35):
as little as formerly. The situation of the future battle
field in reference to the road we take, and the
little loss of time occasioned by marching off in inverted order,
is now infinitely less important than formerly. The new order
of battle has further a beneficial influence in this respect
that it is now immaterial which division arrives first or
which brigade is brought under fire first. Under these circumstances,

(01:53:59):
the march from the right or left is of no
consequence now otherwise than that, when it is done alternately,
it tends to equalize the fatigue which the troops undergo. This,
which is the only object, is certainly an important one
for retaining both modes of marching off with large bodies.
The advance from the center, as a definite evolution, naturally

(01:54:20):
comes to an end on account of what has just
been stated, and can only take place accidentally. An advance
from the center by one and the same column in
strategy is in point of fact, nonsense, for it supposes
a double road. The order of march belongs moreover more
to the province of tactics than to that of strategy,

(01:54:40):
for it is the division of a whole into parts, which,
after the march are once more to resume the state
of a whole. As However, in modern warfare, the formal
connection of the parts is not required to be constantly
kept up during a march, but on the contrary, the
parts during the march may become further separated, and therefore
be left more to their own resources. Therefore, it is

(01:55:03):
much easier now for independent combats to happen, in which
the parts have to sustain themselves, and which therefore must
be reckoned as complete combats in themselves. And on that
account we have thought it necessary to say so much
on the subject. Further, an order of battle in three
parts in juxtaposition, being, as we have seen in the

(01:55:23):
second chapter of this book, the most natural, where no
special object predominates. From that results also that the order
of march in three columns is the most natural. It
only remains to observe that the notion of a column
in strategy does not found itself mainly on the line
of march of one body of troops. The term is
used in strategy to designate masses of troops marching on

(01:55:45):
the same road on different days as well. For the
division into columns is made chiefly to shorten and facilitate
the march, as a small number marches quicker and more
conveniently than large bodies. But this end may be it
retained by marching troops on different days, as well as
by marching them on different roads. Chapter eleven. Marches continued.

(01:56:09):
Respecting the length of a march and the time it requires,
it is natural for us to depend on the general
results of experience. For our modern armies. It has long
been settled that a march of three miles should be
the usual day's work, which on long distances may be
set down as an average distance of two miles per day,
allowing for the necessary rest days to make such repairs

(01:56:31):
of all kinds as may be required. Such a march
in a level country and on tolerable roads will occupy
a division of eight thousand men from eight to ten hours,
in a hilly country from ten to twelve hours. If
several divisions are united in one column, the march will
occupy a couple of hours longer. Without taking into account

(01:56:51):
the intervals which must elapse between the departure of the
first and succeeding divisions. We see, therefore that the day
is pretty well occupied with such a march, that the
fatigue endured by a soldier loaded with his pack for
ten or twelve hours is not to be judged of
by that of an ordinary journey of three miles on foot,
which a person on tolerable roads might easily get over

(01:57:13):
in five hours. The longest marches to be found in
exceptional instances are of five or at most six miles
a day for a continuance four a march of five
miles requires a halt for several hours, and a division
of eight thousand men will not do it, even on
a good road, in less than sixteen hours. If the

(01:57:34):
march is one of six miles, and that there are
several divisions in the column, we may reckon upon at
least twenty hours. We here mean the march of a
number of whole divisions at once from one camp to another,
for that is the usual form of marches made on
a theater of war. When several divisions are to march
in one column, the first division to move is assembled

(01:57:56):
and marched off earlier than the rest and therefore arrives
at its camping ground so much the sooner. At the
same time, this difference can still never amount to the
whole time, which corresponds to the depth of a division
on the line of march, and which is so well
expressed in French as the time it requires for its
decolment running down. The soldier is therefore saved very little

(01:58:18):
fatigue in this way, and every march is very much
lengthened in duration in proportion as the number of troops
to be moved increases. To assemble and march off the
different brigades of a division in like manner at different
times is seldom practicable, and for that reason we have
taken the division itself as the unit. In long distances,

(01:58:39):
when troops march from one cantonment into another and go
over the road in small bodies and without points of assembly,
the distance they go over daily may certainly be increased,
and in point of fact, it is so from the
necessary detours in getting to quarters. But those marches on
which troops have to assemble daily in divisions or perhaps

(01:58:59):
in and have an additional move to get into quarters,
take up the most time and are only advisable in
rich countries, and where the masses of troops are not
too large. As in such cases, the greater facilility of
subsistence and the advantage of the shelter which the troops
obtain compensate sufficiently for the fatigue of a longer march.
The Prussian Army undoubtedly pursued a wrong system in their

(01:59:22):
retreat in eighteen o six in taking up quarters for
the troops every night on account of subsistence. They could
have procured subsistence in bivouax, and the army would not
have been obliged to spend fourteen days in getting over
fifty miles of ground, which after all, they only accomplished
by extreme efforts if a bad road or a hilly

(01:59:43):
country has to be marched. Over All, these calculations as
to time and distance undergo such modifications that it is
difficult to estimate with any certainty in any particular case
the time required for a march. Much less then, can
any general theory be established. All that theory can do
is to direct attention to the liability to error with

(02:00:04):
which we are here beset. To avoid it, the most
careful calculation is necessary, and a large margin for unforeseen delays.
The influence of weather and condition of the troops also
come into consideration. Since the doing away with tents and
the introduction of the system of subsisting troops by compulsory
demands for provisions on the spot, the baggage of an

(02:00:26):
army has been very sensibly diminished, and as a natural
and most important consequence, we look first for an acceleration
in the movements of an army, and therefore, of course
an increase in the length of the day's march. This, however,
is only realized under certain circumstances. Marches within the theater
of war have been very little accelerated by this means,

(02:00:49):
for it is well known that for many years, whenever
the object required marches of unusual length, it has always
been the practice to leave the baggage behind or send
it on beforehand, and generally to keep it separate from
the troops during the continuance of such movements, and it
had in general no influence on the movement, because as
soon as it was out of the way and ceased
to be a direct impediment, no further trouble was taken

(02:01:13):
about it. Whatever damage it might suffer in that way,
marches therefore took place in the Seven Years War, which
even now cannot be surpassed. As an instance, we cite
Lassie's march in seventeen sixty, when he had to support
the diversion of the Russians on Berlin. On that occasion
he got over the road from Schweednitz to Berlin through Lusatia,

(02:01:33):
a distance of two hundred twenty five miles in ten days,
averaging therefore twenty two miles a day, which for a
corps of fifteen thousand would be an extraordinary march even
in these days. On the other hand, through the new
method of supplying troops, the movements of armies have acquired
a new retarding principle. If troops have partly to procure

(02:01:55):
supplies for themselves, which often happens, then they require more
time for their service of supply than would be necessary
merely to receive rations from provision wagons. Besides this, on
marches of considerable duration, troops cannot be encamped in such
large numbers at any one point. The divisions must be
separated from one another in order the more easily to

(02:02:17):
manage for them. Lastly, it almost always happens that it
is necessary to place part of the army, particularly the cavalry,
in quarters. All this occasions on the whole of sensible delay.
We find, therefore, that Buonaparte, in pursuit of the Prussians
in eighteen o six, with a view to cut off
their retreat, and Blucher in eighteen fifteen, in pursuit of

(02:02:40):
the French with a like object, only accomplished thirty miles
in ten days, a rate which Frederick the Great was
able to attain in his marches from Saxony to Silesia
and back, notwithstanding all the train that he had to
carry with him. At the same time, the mobility and handiness,
if we may use such an expression, of the parts
of an army, both great and small, on the theater

(02:03:02):
of war, have very perceptibly gained by the diminution of baggage,
partly inasmuch as while the number of cavalry and guns
is the same, there are fewer horses, and therefore there
is less forage required. Partly inasmuch as we are no
longer so much tied to any one position, because we
have not to be forever looking after a long train

(02:03:23):
of baggage dragging after us marches such as that which,
after raising the siege of Almuts seventeen fifty eight, Frederick
the Great made with four thousand carriages, the escort of
which employed half his army, broken up into single battalions
and companies, could not be effected. Now in presence of
even the most timid adversary on long marches, as from

(02:03:45):
the Tagus to the Niemen, that lightning of the army
is more sensibly felt. For although the usual measure of
the day's march remains the same on account of the
carriages still remaining, yet in cases of great urgency we
can exceed that usual measure at a less sacrifice. Generally,
the diminution of baggage tends more to a saving of
power than to the acceleration of movement. Chapter twelve, Marches continued.

(02:04:11):
We have now to consider the destructive influence which marches
have upon an army. It is so great that it
may be regarded as an active principle of destruction, just
as much as the combat. One single moderate march does
not wear down the instrument. But a succession of even
moderate marches is certain to tell upon it, and a
succession of severe ones will of course do so much

(02:04:33):
sooner at the actual scene of war. Want of food
and shelter, bad broken up roads, and the necessity of
being in a perpetual state of readiness for battle are
causes of an excessive strain upon our means by which men, cattle,
carriages of every description, as well as clothing are ruined.
It is commonly said that a long rest does not

(02:04:54):
suit the physical health of an army, that at such
a time there is more sickness than during moderate activity.
No doubt, sickness will and does occur if soldiers are
packed too close in confined quarters. But the same thing
would occur if these were quarters taken up on the march.
And the want of air and exercise can never be
the cause of such sicknesses, as it is so easy

(02:05:15):
to give the soldier both by means of his exercises.
Only think for a moment, when the organism of a
human being is in a disordered and fainting state, what
a difference it must make to him whether he falls
sick in a house or is seized in the middle
of a high road, up to his knees in mud,
under torrents of rain, and loaded with a knapsack on
his back. Even if he is in a camp, he

(02:05:37):
can soon be sent to the next village, and will
not be entirely without medical assistance. Whilst on a march
he must be for hours without any assistance, and then
be made to drag himself along for miles as a straggler.
How many trifling illnesses by that means become serious, How
many serious ones become mortal? Let us consider how an

(02:05:59):
ordinary marks in the dust and under the burning rays
of a summer sun may produce the most excessive heat,
in which state, suffering from intolerable thirst, the soldier then
rushes to the fresh spring of water to bring back
for himself sickness and death. It is not our object,
by these reflections, to recommend less activity in war. The
instrument is there for use, and if the use wears

(02:06:21):
away the instrument, that is only in the natural order
of things. We only wish to see everything put in
its right place, and to oppose that theoretical bombast according
to which the most astonishing surprises, the most rapid movements,
the most incessant activity, cost nothing, and are painted as
rich minds, which the indolence of the general leaves unworked.

(02:06:42):
It is very much the same with these minds, as
with those from which gold and silver are obtained. Nothing
is seen but the produce, and no one asks about
the value of the work which has brought this produce
to light. On long marches outside a theater of war,
the conditions under which the march is made are no
doubt usually easier, and the daily loss is smaller. But

(02:07:02):
on that account, men with the slightest sickness are generally
lost to the army for some time, as it is
difficult for convalescence to overtake an army constantly advancing. Amongst
the cavalry, the number of lame horses and horses with
sore backs rises in an increasing ratio, and amongst the
carriages many break down or require repair. It never fails, therefore,

(02:07:24):
that at the end of a march of one hundred
miles or more, an army arrives much weakened, particularly as
regards its cavalry in train. If such marches are necessary
on the theater of war, that is, under the eyes
of the enemy, then that disadvantage is added to the other,
and from the two combine the losses with large masses
of troops and under conditions otherwise unfavorable may amount to

(02:07:47):
something incredible. Only a couple of examples in order to
illustrate our ideas. When Buonaparte crossed the Niemen on June
twenty fourth, eighteen twelve, the enormous center of his army
with which he subsequently marched against Moscow numbered three hundred
and one thousand men. At Smolensk on the August fifteenth

(02:08:07):
he detached thirteen thousand, five hundred, leaving, it is to
be supposed two hundred eighty seven thousand, five hundred. The
actual state of his army, however, at that date was
only one hundred eighty two thousand. He had therefore lost
one hundred and five thousand. Bearing in mind that up
to that time only two engagements to speak of had
taken place, one between Devoust and Brigathian, the other between

(02:08:31):
Marat and tolstoyostermen, we may put down the losses of
the French army in action at ten thousand men at most,
and therefore the losses in sick and stragglers within fifty
two days on a march of about seventy miles direct
to his front amounted to ninety five thousand. That is
a third part of the whole army. Three weeks later,
at the time of the Battle of Borodino, the loss

(02:08:53):
amounted to one hundred forty four thousand, including the casualties
in the battle, and eight days after that again at
Moscoe the number was one hundred and ninety eight thousand.
The losses of this army in general were at the
commencement of the campaign at the rate of one slash
one fifty daily. Subsequently they rose to one slash one twenty,
and in the last period they increased to one nineteenth

(02:09:15):
of the original strength. The movement of Napoleon from the
passage of the Niemen up to Moscow certainly may be
called a persistent one. Still, we must not forget that
it lasted eighty two days, in which time he only
accomplished one hundred and twenty miles, and that the French army,
upon two occasions made regular halts, once at Wilna for
about fourteen days and the other time at Witepsk for

(02:09:38):
about eleven days, during which periods many stragglers had time
to rejoin. This fourteen weeks advance was not made at
the worst season of the year, nor over the worst
of roads, for it was summer, and the roads along
which they marched were mostly sand. It was the immense
mass of troops collected on one road, the want of
sufficient subsistence, and an enemy who was on the retreat

(02:10:01):
but by no means in flight, which were the adverse
conditions of the retreat of the French army from Moscow
to the Niemen. We shall say nothing but this we
may mention that the Russian army following them left Caluga
one hundred and twenty thousand strong and reached Wilna with
thirty thousand. Every one knows how few men were lost
in actual combats during that period. One more example from

(02:10:25):
Blucher's campaign of eighteen thirteen in Silesia and Saxony, a
campaign very remarkable, not for any long march, but for
the amount of marching to and fro York's Corps of
Blucher's Army began this campaign August sixteenth about forty thousand
strong and was reduced to twelve thousand at the Battle
of Leipzic October nineteenth. The principal combats which this corps

(02:10:48):
fought at Goldberg, Loenburg, on the Cat's Back, at Wartenberg
and Makern Leipzic cost it on the authority of the
best riders twelve thousand men. According to that their losses
from other causes in eight weeks amounted to sixteen thousand,
or two fifths of the whole. We must therefore make
up our minds to great wear and tear of our

(02:11:10):
own forces. If we are to carry on a war
rich in movements, we must arrange the rest of our
plan accordingly, and above all things the reinforcements which are
to follow Chapter thirteen cantonments. In the modern system of war,
cantonments have become again indispensable because neither tents nor a
complete military train make an army independent of them. Huts

(02:11:33):
and open air camps bivouacs as they are called. However
far such arrangements may be carried, can still never become
the usual way of locating troops without sickness, gaining the
upper hand and prematurely exhausting their strength sooner or later
according to the state of the weather or climate. The
campaign in Russia in eighteen twelve is one of the
few in which, in a very severe climate, the troops

(02:11:56):
during the six months that it lasted hardly ever lay
in canton but what was the consequence of this extreme effort,
which should be called an extravagance, if that term was
not much more applicable to the political conception of the enterprise.
Two things interfere with the occupation of cantonments, the proximity
of the enemy, and the rapidity of movement. For these reasons,

(02:12:19):
they are quitted as soon as the decision approaches, and
cannot be again taken up until the decision is over.
In modern wars that in all campaigns during the last
twenty five years which occurred to us at this moment,
the military element has acted with full energy. Nearly all
that was possible has generally been done in them as
far as regards activity and the utmost effort of force.

(02:12:42):
But all these campaigns have been of short duration. They
have seldom exceeded half a year, in most of them
a few months suffice to bring matters to a crisis,
that is, to a point where the vanquished enemy sought
himself compelled to sue for an armistice or at once
for peace, or to a point where on the conqueror's
part the impetus of victory had exhausted itself. During this

(02:13:04):
period of extreme effort, there could be little question of cantonments,
for even in the victorious march of the pursuer, if
there was no longer any danger, the rapidity of movement
made that kind of relief impossible. But when from any
cause the course of events is less impetuous, when a
more even oscillation balancing of forces takes place, then the
housing of troops must again become a foremost subject for attention.

(02:13:28):
This want has some influence even on the conduct of
war itself, partly in this way that we seek to
gain more time and security by a stronger system of outposts,
by a more considerable advanced guard thrown further forward, and
partly in this way that our measures are governed more
by the richness and fertility of the country than by
the tactical advantages which the ground affords in the geometrical

(02:13:50):
relations of lines and points. A commercial town of twenty
or thirty thousand inhabitants, a road thickly studded with large
villages or flourishing towns, give such facilities for the assembling
in one position large bodies of troops. And this concentration
gives such a freedom and such a latitude for movement
as fully compensate for the advantages which the better situation

(02:14:11):
of some point may otherwise present on the form to
be followed. In arranging cantonments. We have only a few
observations to make, As this subject belongs for the most
part to tactics. The housing of troops comes under two heads,
inasmuch as it can either be the main point or
only a secondary consideration. If the disposition of the troops

(02:14:32):
in the course of a campaign is regulated by grounds
purely tactical and strategical, and if, as is done more
especially with cavalry, they are directed for their comfort to
occupy the quarters available in the vicinity of the point
of concentration of the army, then the quarters are subordinate
considerations and substitutes for camps. They must therefore be chosen

(02:14:53):
within such a radius that the troops can reach the
point of assembly in good time. But if an army
takes quarters to rest and refresh, then the housing of
the troops is the main point, and other measures consequently
also the selection of the particular point of assembly will
be influenced by that object. The first question for examination

(02:15:14):
here is as to the general form of the cantonments
as a whole. The usual form is that of a
very long oval, a mere widening, as it were, of
the tactical order of battle. The point of assembly for
the army is in front the headquarters in rear. Now
these three arrangements are in point of fact adverse, indeed,

(02:15:34):
almost opposed to the safe assembly of the army on
the approach of the enemy. The more the cantonments form
a square, or rather a circle, the quicker the troops
can concentrate at one point, that is, the center. The
further the place of assembly is placed in rear, the
longer the enemy will be in reaching it, and therefore

(02:15:54):
the more time is left us to assemble. A point
of assembly in rear of the cantons can never be
in danger. And on the other hand, the farther the
head quarters are in advance, so much the sooner reports arrive. Therefore,
so much the better is the commander informed of everything.
At the same time, the first named arrangements are not

(02:16:16):
devoid of points which deserve some attention. By the extension
of cantonments in width, we have in view the protection
of the country which would otherwise be laid under contributions
by the enemy. But this motive is neither thoroughly sound,
nor is it very important. It is only sound as
far as regards the country on the extremity of the wings,

(02:16:37):
but does not apply at all to intermediate spaces existing
between separate divisions of the army if the quarters of
those divisions are drawn closer round their point of assembly,
for no enemy will then venture into those intervals of space.
And it is not very important, because there are simpler
means of shielding the districts in our vicinity from the
enemy's requisitions than scattering the army itself. The placing of

(02:17:01):
the point of assembly in front is with a view
to covering the quarters, for the following reasons. In the
first place, a body of troops suddenly called to arms
always leaves behind it in cantonments, a tale of stragglers,
sick baggage, provisions, et cetera, et cetera, which may easily
fall into the enemy's hands if the point of assembly
is placed in rear. In the second place, we have

(02:17:24):
to apprehend that if the enemy with some bodies of cavalry,
passes by the advance guard, or if it is defeated
in any way, he may fall upon scattered regiments or
battalions if he encounters a force drawn up in good order,
although it is weak and in the end must be overpowered,
still he is brought to a stop, and in that
way time is gained. As respects the position of the

(02:17:46):
head quarters, it is generally supposed that it cannot be
made too secure. According to these different considerations, we may
conclude that the best arrangement for districts of cantonments is
where they take an oblong form approaching the square where
or circle, have the point of assembly in the center,
and the headquarters placed on the front line, while protected
by considerable masses of troops. What we have said as

(02:18:09):
to covering of the wings in treating of the disposition
of the army in general applies here also. Therefore, core
detached from the main body right and left, although intended
to fight in conjunction with the rest, will have particular
points of assembly of their own in the same line
with the main body. Now, if we reflect that the
nature of a country, on the one hand, by favorable

(02:18:31):
features in the ground, determines the most natural point of assembly,
and on the other hand, by the positions of towns
and villages, determines the most suitable situation for cantonments. Then
we must perceive how very rarely any geometrical form can
be decisive in our present subject. But yet it was
necessary to direct attention to it, because, like all general laws,

(02:18:53):
it affects the generality of cases in a greater or
less degree. What now remains to be said as to
an atom sdvantageous position for cantonments is that they should
be taken up behind some natural obstacle of ground, affording
cover whilst the sides next the enemy can be watched
by small but numerous detached parties. Or they may be
taken up behind fortresses, which, when circumstances prevent any estimate

(02:19:16):
being formed of the strength of their garrisons, impose upon
the enemy a greater feeling of respect. And in caution
we reserve the subject of winter quarters covered by defensive
works for a separate article. The quarters taken up by
troops on a march differ from those called standing cantonments
in this way that, in order to save the troops

(02:19:36):
from unnecessary marching, cantonments on a march are taken up
as much as possible along the lines of march, and
are not at any considerable distance on either side of
these roads. If their extension in this sense does not
exceed a short day's march, the arrangement is not one
at all unfavorable to the quick concentration of the army
in all cases in presence of the enemy, according to

(02:19:58):
the technical phrase in us, that is, in all cases
where there is no considerable interval between the advance guards
of the two armies, respectively, the extent of the cantonments
and the time required to assemble the army determine the
strength and position of the advanced guard and outposts. But
when these must be suited to the enemy in circumstances, then,
on the contrary, the extent of the cantonments must depend

(02:20:21):
on the time which we can count upon by the
resistance of the advance guard. In the third chapter of
this book we have stated how this resistance in the
case of an advanced corps may be estimated. From the
time of that resistance, we must deduct the time required
for transmission of reports and getting the men under arms,
and the remainder only is the time available for assembling

(02:20:43):
at the point of concentration. We shall conclude here also
by establishing our ideas in the form of a result
such as is usual under ordinary circumstances, if the distance
at which the advance guard is detached is the same
as the radius of the cantonments, and the point of
assembly is fixed in the center of the cantonments, the
time which is gained by checking the enemy's advance would

(02:21:06):
be available for the transmission of intelligence in getting under arms,
and would in most cases be sufficient, even although the
communication is not made by means of signals, cannon shots,
et cetera, but simply by relays of orderlies, the only
really sure method. With an advanced guard pushed forward three
miles in front our cantonments might therefore cover a space

(02:21:28):
of thirty square miles. In a moderately peopled country, there
would be ten thousand houses in this space, which for
an army of fifty thousand after deducting the advance guard,
would be four men to a billet, therefore very comfortable quarters,
and for an army of twice the strength nine men
to a billet, therefore still not very close quarters. On

(02:21:48):
the other hand, if the advance guard is only one
mile in front, we could only occupy a space of
four square miles. For although the time gain does not
diminish exactly in proportion as the distance of the advanced
guard diminishes, and even with a distance of one mile
we may still calculate on a gain of six hours.
Yet the necessity for caution increases when the enemy is

(02:22:09):
so close. But in such a space an army of
fifty thousand men could only find partial accommodation, even in
a very thickly populated country. From all this we see
what an important part is played here by great or
at least considerable towns, which afford convenience for sheltering ten
thousand or even twenty thousand men almost at one point.

(02:22:31):
From this result, it follows that if we are not
very close to the enemy and have a suitable advanced guard,
we might remain in cantonments even if the enemy is concentrated,
as Frederick the Great did at Breslau in the beginning
of the year seventeen sixty two and Buonaparte at Witepsk
in eighteen twelve. But although by preserving a right distance
and by suitable arrangements, we have no reason to fear

(02:22:54):
not being able to assemble in time, even opposite an
enemy who is concentrated. Yet we must not forget that
an army engaged in assembling itself in all haste can
do nothing else in that time. That it is therefore,
for a time at least not in a condition to
avail itself in an instant of fortuitous opportunities, which deprives
it of the greater part of its really efficient power.

(02:23:16):
The consequence of this is that an army should only
break itself up completely in cantonments under some one or
other of the three following cases. One if the enemy
does the same, two if the condition of the troops
makes it unavoidable. Three if the more immediate object with
the army is completely limited to the maintenance of a

(02:23:37):
strong position, and therefore the only point of importance is
concentrating the troops at that point in good time. The
campaign of eighteen fifteen gives a very remarkable example of
the assembly of an army from cantonments. General Zethan, with
Blucher's advance guard thirty thousand men, was posted at Charleroi,
only two miles from Sambreath, the place appoints for the

(02:24:00):
assembly of the army. The farthest cantonments of the army
were about eight miles from Sombreth. That is, on the
one side, beyond Signe and on the other near Leege.
Notwithstanding this, the troops cantoned about Signe were assembled at
Ligny several hours before the battle began, and those near
Liege Beulah's corps would have been also had it not

(02:24:22):
been for accident and faulty arrangements in a communication of
orders and intelligence. Unquestionably, proper care for the security of
the Prussian army was not taken. But in explanation we
must say that the arrangements were made at a time
when the French army was still dispersed over widely extended cantonments,
and that the real fault consisted in not altering them

(02:24:43):
the moment the first news was received that the enemy's
troops were in movement and that Buonaparte had joined the army. Still,
it remains noteworthy that the Prussian army was able in
any way to concentrate at Sombreth before the attack of
the enemy. Certainly, on the night of the fourteenth, that is,
twelve hours before Zeithan was actually attacked, Blucher received information

(02:25:05):
of the advance of the enemy and began to assemble
his army. But on the fifteenth, at nine in the morning,
Zeithan was already hotly engaged, and it was not until
the same moment that General Thielmann at Signe first received
orders to march to Nomur. He had therefore then to
assemble his divisions and to march six and a half
miles to Sambreth, which he did in twenty four hours.

(02:25:28):
General Beulah would also have been able to arrive about
the same time if the order had reached him, as
it should have done. But Buonaparte did not resolve to
make his attack on Ligny until two in the afternoon
of the sixteenth. The apprehension of having Wellington on the
one side of him and Blucher on the other, in
other words, the disproportion in the relative forces, contributed to

(02:25:50):
this slowness. Still we see how the most resolute commander
may be detained by the cautious feeling of the way,
which is always unavoidable in cases which are to a
certain degree complicated. Some of the considerations here raised are
plainly more tactical than strategic in their nature, but we
have preferred rather to encroach a little than to run
the risk of not being sufficiently explicit. Chapter fourteen subsistence.

(02:26:15):
This subject has acquired much greater importance in modern warfare
from two causes, in particular, first, because the armies in
general are now much greater than those of the Middle
Ages and even those of the Old World. For although
formerly armies did appear here and there which equaled or
even surpassed modern ones in size, still these were only

(02:26:35):
rare in transient occurrences. Whilst in modern military history since
the time of Louis the fourteenth armies have always been
very strong in number. But the second cause is still
more important and belongs entirely to modern times. It is
the very much closer inner connection which our wars have
in themselves, the constant state of readiness for battle of

(02:26:57):
the belligerents engaged in carrying them on. Almost all old
wars consist of single, unconnected enterprises, which are separated from
each other by intervals during which the war in reality
either completely rested and only still existed in a political sense,
or when the armies at least had removed so far
from each other that each, without any care about the

(02:27:17):
army opposite, only occupied itself with its own wants. Modern wars,
that is, the wars which have taken place since the
peace of Westphalia have through the efforts of respective governments,
taken a more systematic connected form. The military object in
general predominates everywhere, and demands also that arrangements for subsistence

(02:27:38):
shall be on an adequate scale. Certainly, there were long
periods of inaction in the wars of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, almost amounting to a cessation of war. These
are the regular periods passed in cantonments. Still, even those
periods were subordinate to the military object. They were caused
by the inclemency of the season, not by any necessity

(02:27:58):
arising out of the subsistence of the troops, and as
they regularly terminated with the return of summer. Therefore we
may say at all events uninterrupted action was the rule
of war during the fine season of the year. As
the transition from one situation or method of action to
another always takes place gradually, so it was in the
case before us in the wars against Louis the fourteen

(02:28:23):
the Allies used still to send their troops into winter
cantonments in distant provinces in order to subsist them the
more easily. In the Silesian War, that was no longer done.
This systematic and connected form of carrying on war only
became possible when states took regular troops into their service
in place of the feudal armies. The obligation of the

(02:28:44):
feudal law was then commuted into a finer contribution. Personal
service either came to an end enlistment being substituted, or
it was only continued amongst the lowest classes, as the
nobility regarded the furnishing a quota of men, as is
still done in Russia and Hungary, as a kind of
tribute a tax in men. In every case, as we

(02:29:05):
have elsewhere observed, armies became henceforward an instrument of the cabinet,
their principal basis being the treasury or the revenue of
the government. Just the same kind of thing which took
place in the mode of raising in keeping up an
establishment of troops, could not but follow in the mode
of subsisting them. The privileged classes, having been released from

(02:29:25):
the first of these services on payment of a contribution
in money, the expense of the latter could not be
again imposed on them quite so easily. The cabinet and
the treasury had therefore to provide for the subsistence of
the army, and could not allow it to be maintained
in its own country at the expense of the people.
Administrations were therefore obliged to look upon the subsistence of

(02:29:47):
the army as an affair for which they were specially responsible.
The subsistence thus became more difficult in two ways, first
because it was an affair belonging to government, and next
because the forces required to be pre dominently embodied to
confront those kept up in other states. Thus arose a
separate military class in the population, with an independent organization

(02:30:08):
provided for its subsistence and carried out to the utmost
possible perfection. Not only were stores of provisions collected either
by purchase or by deliveries in kind from the landed
estates dominionly Efhringen, consequently from distant points and lodged in magazines,
but they were also forwarded from these by means of
special wagons baked near the quarters of the troops, and

(02:30:31):
ovens temporarily established, and from thence again carried away at
last by the troops by means of another system of
transport attached to the army itself. We take a glance
at this system, not merely from its being characteristic of
the military arrangements of the period, but also because it
is a system which can never be entirely done away,
some parts of it must continually reappear. Thus military organization

(02:30:55):
strove perpetually towards becoming more independent of people and country.
The consequence was that in this manner, war became certainly
a more systematic and more regular affair, and more subordinated
to the military that is the political object. But it
was at the same time also much straightened and impeded
in its movement, and infinitely weakened in energy. For now

(02:31:17):
an army was tied to its magazines, limited to the
working powers of its transport service. And it naturally followed
that the tendency of everything was to economize the subsistence
of the troops. The soldier fed on a wretched pittance
of bread, moved about like a shadow, and no prospect
of a change for the better comforted him under his privations.

(02:31:37):
Whoever treats this miserable way of feeding soldiers as a
matter of no moment, and points to what Frederick the
Great did with soldiers subsisted in this manner only takes
a partial view of the matter. The power of enduring
privations is one of the finest virtues in a soldier,
and without it no army is animated with the true
military spirit. But such privation must be of a temporary kind,

(02:32:00):
commanded by the force of circumstances, and not the consequence
of a wretchedly bad system, or of a parsimonious, abstract
calculation of the smallest ration that a man can exist upon.
When such is the case, the powers of the men
individually will always deteriorate physically and morally. What Frederick the
Great managed to do with his soldiers cannot be taken

(02:32:21):
as a standard for us, partly because he was opposed
to those who pursued a similar system, partly because we
do not know how much more he might have effected
if he had been able to let his troops live
as Buonaparte allowed his, whenever circumstances permitted. The feeding of
horses by an artificial system of supply is, however, an
experiment which has not been tried, because forage is much

(02:32:43):
more difficult to provide on account of its bulk. A
ration for a horse weighs about ten times as much
as one for a man. And the number of horses
with an army is more than one tenth the number
of men. At present it is one fourth to one third,
and formerly it was one third to one half. There For,
the weight of the forage required is three, four or

(02:33:03):
five times as much as that of the soldier's rations
required for the same period of time. On this account,
the shortest and most direct means were taken to meet
the wants of an army in this respect, that is,
by foraging expeditions. Now, these expeditions occasioned great inconvenience in
the conduct of war in other ways, first by making
it a principal object to keep the war in the

(02:33:25):
enemy's country, and next because they made it impossible to
remain very long in one part of the country. However,
at the time of the Silesian War, foraging expeditions were
much less frequent. They were found to occasion a much
greater drain upon the country and much greater waste than
if the requirements were satisfied by means of requisitions and imposts.

(02:33:47):
When the French Revolution suddenly brought again upon the war
stage a national army, the means which governments could command
were found insufficient, and the whole system of war, which
had its origin in the limited extent of these means,
and found again its security in this limitation, fell to pieces,
and of course, in the downfall of the whole was
included that of the branch of which we are now

(02:34:08):
speaking the system of subsistence without troubling themselves about magazines,
and still less about such an organization as the artificial
clockwork of which we have spoken, by which the different
divisions of the transport service went round like a wheel.
The leading spirits of the revolution sent their soldiers into
the field, forced their generals to fight, subsisted, reinforced their armies,

(02:34:30):
and kept alive the war by a system of exaction,
and of helping themselves to all they required by robbery
and plunder. Between these two extremes, the war under Buonaparte
and against him preserved a sort of medium. That is
to say, it just made use of such means as
suited it best amongst all that were available. And so
it will be also in future. The modern method of

(02:34:52):
subsisting troops, that is, seizing everything which is to be
found in the country, without regard to Miamiti tuum, may
be carried out in four different ways, that is, subsisting
on the inhabitant contributions, which the troops themselves look after,
general contributions, and magazines. All four are generally applied together,
one generally prevailing more than the others. Still, it sometimes

(02:35:16):
happens that only one is applied entirely by itself, one
living on the inhabitants or on the community, which is
the same thing. If we bear in mind that in
a community consisting, even as it does in great towns
of consumers only, there must always be provisions enough to
last for several days, we may easily see that the

(02:35:36):
most densely populated place can furnish food and quarters for
a day, for about as many troops as there are inhabitants,
and for a less number of troops for several days,
without the necessity of any particular previous preparation. In towns
of considerable size, this gives a very satisfactory result, because
it enables us to subsist a large force at one point.

(02:35:58):
But in smaller towns, or even in villages, the supply
would be far from sufficient. For a population of three
thousand or four thousand in a square mile, which would
be large in such a space would only suffice to
feed three thousand or four thousand soldiers, and if the
whole mass of troops is great, they would have to
be spread over such an extent of country at this

(02:36:18):
rate as would hardly be consistent with other essential points.
But in level countries and even in small towns, the
quantity of those kinds of provisions which are essential in
war is generally much greater. The supply of bread which
a peasant has is generally adequate to the consumption of
his family for several, perhaps from eight to fourteen days.
Meat can be obtained daily. Vegetable productions are generally forthcoming

(02:36:41):
in sufficient quantity to last till the following crop. Therefore,
in quarters which have never been occupied, there is no
difficulty in subsisting troops three or four times the number
of the inhabitants for several days, which again is a
very satisfactory result. According to this, where the population is
about two thousand or three thousand per square mile, and

(02:37:02):
if no large town is included, a column of thirty
thousand would require about four square miles, which would be
a length of side of two miles. Therefore, for an
army of ninety thousand, which we may reckon at about
seventy five thousand combatants. If marching in three columns contiguous
to each other, we should require to take up a
front six miles in breadth, in case three roads could

(02:37:24):
be found within that breath. If several columns follow one
another into these cantonments, then special measures must be adopted
by the civil authorities, And in that way there can
be no great difficulty in obtaining all that is required
for a day or two more. Therefore, if the above
ninety thousand are followed the day after by a like number,
even these last would suffer no want. This makes up

(02:37:47):
the large number of one hundred fifty thousand combatants. Forage
for the horses occasions still less difficulty, as it neither
requires grinding nor baking, and as there must be forage
forthcoming in sufficient quantity to last the horses in the
country until next harvest. Therefore, even where there is little
stall feeding, still there should be no want. Only the

(02:38:07):
deliveries of forage should certainly be demanded from the community
at large, not from the inhabitants individually. Besides, it is
supposed that some attention is of course paid to the
nature of the country in making arrangements for a march,
so as not to send cavalry mostly into places of
commerce and manufactures, and into districts where there is no forage.

(02:38:29):
The conclusion to be drawn from this hasty glance is therefore,
that in a moderately populated country, that is, a country
of from two thousand to three thousand souls per square mile,
an army of one hundred and fifty thousand combatants may
be subsisted by the inhabitants and community for one or
two days within such a narrow space as will not
interfere with its concentration for battle. That is, therefore, that

(02:38:52):
such an army can be subsisted on a continuous march,
without magazines or other preparation. On this result were based
the enterprises of the French army in the Revolutionary War
and under Buonaparte. They marched from the oddi Ja to
the lower Danube, and from the Rhine to the Vistula,
with little means of subsistence except upon the inhabitants, and

(02:39:13):
without ever suffering want, as their undertakings depended on moral
and physical superiority, as they were attended with certain results
and were never delayed by indecision or caution. Therefore, their
progress in the career of victory was generally that of
an uninterrupted march. If circumstances are less favorable, if the
population is not so great, or if it consists more

(02:39:36):
of artisans than agriculturists, if the soil is bad, the
country already several times overrun, then of course the results
will fall short of what we have supposed. Still, we
must remember that if the breadth of the front of
a column is extended from two miles to three, we
get a superficial extent of country more than double in size.
That is, instead of four, we command nine square miles.

(02:39:59):
And that this is still an extent which in ordinary
cases will always admit of concentration for action. We see
therefore that even under unfavorable circumstances, this method of subsistence
will still be always compatible with a continuous march. But
if a halt of several days takes place, then great
distress must ensue if preparations have not been made beforehand

(02:40:20):
for such an event. In other ways, now these preparatory
measures are of two kinds, and without them a considerable
army even now cannot exist. The first is equipping the
troops with a wagon train, by means of which bread
or flour, as the most essential part of their subsistence,
can be carried with them for a few that is,

(02:40:40):
for three or four days. If to this we add
three or four days rations which the soldier himself can carry,
then we have provided what is most indispensable in the
way of subsistence for eight days. The second arrangement is
that of a regular commissariat, which, whenever there is a
moment's halt, gathers provisions from distant localities, so that at
any moment we can pass over from the system of

(02:41:03):
quartering on the inhabitants to a different system. Subsisting in
cantonments has the immense advantage that hardly any transport is required,
and that it is done in the shortest time. But
certainly it supposes as a prior condition that cantonments can
be provided for all the troops. Two subsistence through exactions
enforced by the troops themselves. If a single battalion occupies

(02:41:26):
a camp, this camp may be placed in the vicinity
of some villages, and these may receive notice to furnish subsistence.
Then the method of subsistence would not differ essentially from
the preceding mode. But, as is most usual, if the
mass of troops to be encamped at some one point
is much larger, there is no alternative but to make
a collection in common within the circle of districts marked

(02:41:48):
out for the purpose collecting sufficient for the supply of
one of the parts of the army, a brigade or division,
and afterwards to make a distribution from the common stock
thus collected. The first glance shows that by such a
mode of preceding, the subsistence of a large army would
be a matter of impossibility. The collection made from the
stores in any given district in the country will be

(02:42:10):
much less than if the troops had taken up their
quarters in the same district. For when thirty or forty
men take possession of a farmer's house, they can, if necessary,
collect the last mouthful. But one officer sent with a
few men to collect provisions has neither time nor means
to hunt out all the provisions that may be stored
in a house. Often also, he has not the means
of transport. He will therefore only be able to collect

(02:42:33):
a small proportion of what is actually forthcoming. Besides, in camps.
The troops are crowded together in such a manner at
one point that the range of country from which provisions
can be collected in a hurry is not of sufficient
extent to furnish the whole of what is required. What
could be done in the way of supplying thirty thousand
men within a circle of a mile in diameter, or

(02:42:55):
from an area of three or four square miles. Moreover,
would seldom be possible to collect even what there is,
for the most of the nearest adjacent villages would be
occupied by small bodies of troops who would not allow
anything to be removed. Lastly, by such a measure, there
would be the greatest waste, because some men would get
more than they required, whilst a great deal would be

(02:43:18):
lost and of no benefit to any one. The result is, therefore,
that the subsistence of troops by forced contributions in this
manner can only be adopted with success when the bodies
of troops are not too large, not exceeding a division
of eight thousand or ten thousand men, And even then
it is only to be resorted to as an unavoidable evil.

(02:43:39):
It cannot, in general be avoided in the case of
troops directly in front of the enemy, such as advanced
guards and outposts when the army is advancing, because these
bodies must arrive at points where no preparations could have
been made, and they are usually too far from the
stores collected for the rest of the army. Further in
the case of movable columns acting independently, and last in

(02:44:00):
all cases whereby chance there is neither time nor means
to procure subsistence in any other way. The more troops
are accustomed to live by regular requisitions, the more time
and circumstances permit the adoption of that way of subsisting,
then the more satisfactory will be the result. But time
is generally wanting, for what the troops get for themselves

(02:44:21):
directly is got much quicker free by regular requisitions. This
is unquestionably the simplest and most efficacious means of subsisting troops,
and it has been the basis of all modern wars.
It differs from the preceding way chiefly by its having
the cooperation of the local authorities. The supply in this

(02:44:42):
case must not be carried off forcibly just from the
spot where it is found, but be regularly delivered according
to an equitable division of the burden. This division can
only be made by the recognized official authorities of the country.
In this all depends on time. The more time there is,
the more general can the division be made, the less

(02:45:03):
will it press on individuals, and the more regular will
be the result. Even purchases may be made with ready
money to assist, in which way it will approach the
mode which follows next in order magazines. In all assemblages
of troops in their own country, there is no difficulty
in subsisting by regular requisitions. Neither, as a rule, is

(02:45:23):
there any in retrograde movements. On the other hand, in
all movements into a country of which we are not
in possession, there is very little time for such arrangements
sell them more than the one day which the advanced
Guard is in the habit of preceding the army. With
the advanced guard. The requisitions are sent to the local
officials specifying how many rations they are to have ready

(02:45:45):
at such and such places, as these can only be
furnished from the immediate neighborhood, that is, within a circuit
of a couple of miles round each point. The collections
so made in haste will never be merely sufficient for
an army of considerable strength, and consequently, if the troops
do not carry with them enough for several days, they
will run short. It is therefore the duty of the

(02:46:08):
Commissariat to economize what is received, and only to issue
to those troops who have nothing. With each succeeding day, however,
the embarrassment diminishes. That is to say, if the distances
from which provisions can be procured increase in proportion to
the number of days, then the superficial area over which
the contributions can be levied increases as the squares of

(02:46:29):
the distance is gained. If on the first day only
four square miles have been drawn upon on the next day,
we shall have sixteen, on the third thirty six. Therefore,
on the second day twelve more than on the first,
and on the third day twenty more than on the second.
Of course, this is a mere rough estimate of what
may take place, subject to many modifying circumstances which may intervene,

(02:46:53):
of which the principle is that one district may not
be capable of contributing like another. But on the other hand,
we must also remember that the radius within which we
can levy may increase more than two miles a day,
in width perhaps three or four, or in many places
still more. The due execution of these requisitions is enforced
by detachments placed under the orders of the official functionaries,

(02:47:16):
but still more by the fear of responsibility, punishment and
ill treatment, which in such cases, like a general weight,
presses on the whole population. However, it is not our
intention to enter into details into the whole machinery of
commissariat and army subsistence. We have only results in view.
The result to be derived from a common sense view

(02:47:38):
of all the circumstances in general, and the view which
the experience of the wars since the French Revolution tends
to confirm, is that even the largest army, if it
carries with it provisions for a few days, may undoubtedly
be subsisted by contributions which, commencing at the moment of
entering a country, effect at first only the districts in
the immediate vicinity of the army, but afterwards, in the

(02:48:00):
course of time, are levied on a greater scale over
a range of country, always increasing and with an ever
increasing weight of authority. This resource has no limits except
those of the exhaustion, impoverishment, and devastation of the country.
When the stay of an invading army is of some duration,
the administration of this system at last is handed over

(02:48:23):
to those in the highest official capacity, and they naturally
do all they can to equalize its pressure as much
as possible, and to alleviate the weight of the tax
by purchases. At the same time, even an invader, when
his study is prolonged in his enemy's country, is not
usually so barbarous and reckless as to lay upon that
country the entire burden of his support. Thus, the system

(02:48:45):
of contributions of itself gradually approaches to that of magazines
at the same time, without ever ceasing altogether or sensibly
losing any of that influence which it exercises on the
operations of the war. For there is a wide difference
between a case in which some of the resources which
have been drawn from a country are replaced by supplies
brought from more distant parts, the country, however, still remaining

(02:49:09):
substantially the source on which the army depends for its supplies,
and the case of an army which, as in the
eighteenth century, provides for all its wants from its own resources,
the country in which it is operating, contributing as a
rule nothing towards its support. The great difference consists in
two things, namely the employment of the transport of the

(02:49:31):
country and its ovens. In this way, that enormous burden
of any army, that incubus, which is always destroying its
own work a military transport train, is almost got rid of.
It is true that even now no army can do
entirely without some subsistence wagons, but the number is immensely diminished,
and little more is required than sufficient to carry the

(02:49:53):
surplus of one day on until the next. Peculiar circumstances,
as in Russia in eighteenth Ts twelve, may even again
compel an army to carry an enormous train and also
field ovens. But in the first place, these are exceptional cases.
For how seldom will it happen that three hundred thousand
men make a hostile advance of one hundred and thirty
miles upon almost a single road, and that through countries

(02:50:16):
such as Poland and Russia, and shortly before the season
of harvest. And in the next place, any means of
supply attached to an army in such cases may be
looked upon as only in assistance in case of need,
the contributions of the country being always regarded as the
groundwork of the whole system of supply. Since the first

(02:50:36):
campaigns of the French Revolutionary War, the requisition system has
formed constantly the mainstay of their armies. The armies opposed
to them were also obliged to adopt the same system,
and it is not at all likely that it will
ever be abandoned. There is no other which can be
substituted for it with the same results, both as regards
its simplicity and freedom from restraint, and also as respects

(02:50:58):
energy in the prosecution of the war. As an army
is seldom distressed for provisions during the first three or
four weeks of a campaign whatever direction it takes, and
afterwards can be assisted by magazines, we may very well
say that by this method war has acquired the most
perfect freedom of action. Certainly, difficulties may be greater in

(02:51:19):
one direction than in another, and that may carry weight
in preliminary deliberation. But we can never encounter an absolute impossibility,
and the attention which is due to the subject of
subsistence can never decide a question imperatively to this. There
is only one exception, which is a retreat through an
enemy's country. In such a case, many of the inconveniences

(02:51:40):
connected with subsistence meet together. The operation is one of
a continuous nature, generally carried on without a halt worth
speaking of. There is therefore no time to procure provisions.
The circumstances under which the operation commences are generally unfavorable.
It is therefore necessary to keep the troops in masses,
and a dispersion in cantonments or even any considerable extension

(02:52:03):
in the width of the column cannot be allowed. The
hostile feeling of the country precludes the chance of any
collection of contributions by mere orders issued without the support
of a force capable of executing the order. And lastly,
the moment is most auspicious for the inhabitants to give
vent to their feelings by acts of hostility. On account

(02:52:24):
of all this, an army so situated is generally obliged
to confine itself strictly to its previously prepared lines of
communication and retreat. When Buonaparte had to retreat in eighteen twelve,
it was impossible for him to do so by any
other line, but the one upon which he had advanced
on account of the subsistence of his army, And if
he had attempted any other, he would only have plunged

(02:52:45):
into more speedy in certain destruction. All the censure therefore
passed on him by even French writers, as well as
by others with regard to this point, is sheer nonsense.
For subsistence from magazines. If we are to make a
job generic distinction between this method of subsisting troops and
the preceding it must be by an organization such as

(02:53:06):
existed for about thirty years at the close of the
seventeenth and during the eighteenth century. Can this organization ever reappear?
Certainly we cannot conceive how it can be dispensed with
if great armies are to be bound down for seven,
ten or twelve years long to one spot, as they
have been formerly in the Netherlands, on the Rhine, in

(02:53:26):
Upper Italy, Silesia and Saxony. For what country can continue
for such a length of time to endure the burden
of two great armies, making it the entire source of
their supplies, without being utterly ruined in the end, and
therefore gradually becoming unable to meet the demands. But here
naturally arises the question, shall the war prescribe the system

(02:53:47):
of subsistence or shall the latter dictate the nature of
the war. To this we answer, the system of subsistence
will control the war in the first place, as far
as the other conditions on which it depends permit. But
when the latter are encroached upon, the war will react
on the subsistent system, and in such case determine the same.

(02:54:07):
A war carried on by means of the system of
requisitions and local supplies furnished on the spot has such
an advantage over one carried on in dependence on issues
from magazines that the latter does not look at all
like the same instrument. No state will therefore venture to
encounter the former with the latter. And if any war
minister should be so narrow minded and blind to circumstances

(02:54:28):
as to ignore the real relation which the two systems
bear to each other, by sending an army into the
field to live upon the old system, the force of
circumstances would carry the commander of that army along with
it in its course, and the requisition system would burst
forth of itself. If we consider, besides that the great
expense attending such an organization must necessarily reduce the extent

(02:54:50):
of the armament in other respects, including, of course, the
actual number of combatant soldiers. As no state has a
superbundance of wealth, then there seems no point probability of
any such organization being again resorted to, unless it should
be adopted by the belligerents by mutual agreement, an idea
which is a mere play of the imagination. Wars therefore

(02:55:11):
may be expected henceforward always to commence with the requisition system.
How much one or other government will do to supplement
the same by an artificial organization to spare their own country,
et cetera, et cetera, remains to be seen that it
will not be over much, we may be certain, for
at such moments the tendency is to look to the
most urgent wants, and an artificial system of subsisting troops

(02:55:33):
does not come under that category. But now, if a
war is not so decisive in its results, if its
operations are not so comprehensive as is consistent with its
real nature, then the requisition system will begin to exhaust
the country in which it is carried on to that
degree that either peace must be made or means must
be found to lighten the burden on the country and

(02:55:54):
to become independent of it for the supplies of the army.
The latter was the case of the French each army
under Buonaparte in Spain, but the first happens much more frequently.
In most wars. The exhaustion of the state increases to
that degree that instead of thinking of prosecuting the war
at a still greater expense, the necessity for peace becomes
so urgent as to be imperative. Thus, from this point

(02:56:18):
of view, the modern method of carrying on war has
a tendency to shorten the duration of wars. At the
same time, we shall not positively deny the possibility of
the old system of subsistence reappearing in future wars. It
will perhaps be resorted to by belligerents hereafter, where the
nature of their mutual relations urge them to it, and
circumstances are favorable to its adoption. But we can never

(02:56:40):
perceive in that system a natural organization. It is much
rather an abnormal growth permitted by circumstances, but which can
never spring from war. In its true sense. Still less
can we consider that form or system as any improvement
in war on the ground of its being more humane,
For war itself is not a humane proceeding. Whatever method

(02:57:01):
of providing subsistence may be chosen, it is but natural
that it should be more easily carried out in rich
and well peopled countries than in the midst of a
poor and scanty population. That the population should be taken
into consideration lies in the double relation which that element
bears to the quantity of provisions to be found in
a country, First, because where the consumption is large, the

(02:57:23):
provision to meet that consumption is also large. And in
the next place, because as a rule, a large population
produces also largely. From this, we must certainly accept districts
peopled chiefly by manufacturers, particularly when, as is often the case,
such districts lie in mountain valleys surrounded by unproductive land.

(02:57:43):
But in the generality of cases, it is always very
much easier to feed troops in a well populated than
in a thinly inhabited country. An army of one hundred
thousand men cannot be supported on four hundred square miles
inhabited by four hundred thousand people, as well as it
would be on four hundred square mins ailes with a
population of two million inhabitants, even supposing the soil equally

(02:58:04):
good in the two cases. Besides, the roads and means
of water carriage are much better in rich countries and
afford a greater choice. Being more numerous, the means of
transport are more abundant, the commercial relations easier and more certain.
In a word, there is infinitely less difficulty in supporting
an army in Flanders than in Poland. The consequence is

(02:58:27):
that war, with its manifold suckers, fixes itself by preference
along high roads near populous towns, in the fertile valleys
of large rivers, or along such sea coasts as are
well frequented. This shows clearly how the subsistence of troops
may have a general influence upon the direction and form
of military undertakings, and upon the choice of a theater

(02:58:48):
of war and lines of communication. The extent of this
influence what weight shall attach to the facility or difficulty
of provisioning the troops. All that, in the calculation depends
very much on the way in which the war is
to be conducted. If it is to be carried on
in its real spirit, that is, with the unbridled force,
which belongs to its element, with a constant pressing forward

(02:59:11):
to or seeking for the combat and decisive solution. Then
the sustenance of the troops, although an important, is but
a subordinate affair. But if there is to be a
state of equilibrium during which the armies move about here
and there in the same province for several years, then
the subsistence must often become the principal thing. The intendant
there commander in chief, and the conduct of the war

(02:59:33):
and administration of wagons. There are numberless campaigns of this
kind in which nothing took place, the plans miscarried, the
forces were used to no purpose, the only excuse being
the plea of a want of subsistence. On the other hand,
Buonaparte used to say cool on enemy Parl pot of Ivras. Certainly,
that general in the Russian campaign proved that such recklessness

(02:59:55):
may be carried too far. For not to say that
perhaps his whole campaign was ruined and through the cause alone,
which at best would be only a supposition. Still, it
is beyond doubt that to his want of regard to
the subsistence of his troops. He was indebted for the
extraordinary melting away of his army on his advance and
for its utter ruin on the retreat. But while fully
recognizing in Buonaparte the eager gambler who ventures on many

(03:00:18):
a mad extreme, we may justly say that he and
the revolutionary generals who preceded him, dispelled a powerful prejudice
in respect to the subsistence of troops, and showed that
it should never be looked upon in any other light
than as a condition of war, never as an object. Besides,
it is with privation in war, just as with physical
exertion and danger, the demands which the general can make

(03:00:41):
on his army are without any defined bounds. An iron
character demands more than a feeble sensitive man. Also, the
endurance of an army differs in degree according his habit,
military spirit, confidence in an affection towards the commander, or
enthusiasm for the cause of fatherland sustain the will and
energy of the soldier. But this we may look upon

(03:01:03):
as an established principle that privation and want, however far
they may be carried, should never be otherwise regarded than
as transition states, which should be succeeded by a state
of abundance, indeed, even by superfluity. Can there be anything
more touching than the thought of so many thousand soldiers,
badly clothed with packs on their backs, weighing thirty or

(03:01:24):
forty pounds, toiling over every kind of road, in every
description of weather, for days and days continually on the march,
health and life forever in peril, and for all that
unable to get a sufficiency of dry bread. Any One
who knows how often this happens in war is at
a loss to know how it does not, oftener lead
to a refusal of the will and powers to submit

(03:01:45):
any longer to such exactions, And how the mere bent
constantly given to the imagination of human beings in one
direction is capable of first calling forth and then supporting
such incredible efforts. Let any one, then, who imposes great
privations on his men, because great objects demand such a
trial of endurance, always bear in mind, as a matter

(03:02:06):
of prudence, if not prompted to it by his own feelings,
that there is a recompense for such sacrifices, which he
is bound to pay at some other time. We have
now to consider the difference which takes place in respect
to the question of subsistence in war, according as the
action is offensive or defensive, the defensive is in a
position to make uninterrupted use of the subsistence which he

(03:02:29):
has been able to lay in beforehand, as long as
his defensive act continues. The defensive side, therefore can hardly
be in one of the necessaries of life, particularly if
he is in his own country. But even in the
enemies this holds good. The offensive, on the other hand,
is moving away from his resources, and as long as
he is advancing, and even during the first weeks after

(03:02:50):
he stops, must procure from day to day what he requires,
and this can very rarely be done without want and
inconvenience being felt. This difficult is felt in its fullest
force at two particular periods. First, in the advance before
the decision takes place. Then the supplies of the defensive
side are all at hand. Whilst the assailant has been

(03:03:11):
obliged to leave his behind, he is obliged to keep
his masses concentrated, and therefore cannot spread his army over
any considerable space. Even his transport cannot keep close to him.
When he commences his movements preliminary to a battle. If
his preparations have not been very well made, it may
easily happen at this moment that his army may be
in want of supplies for several days before the decisive battle,

(03:03:34):
which certainly is not a means of bringing them into
the fight in the highest state of efficiency. The second
time a state of want arises is at the end
of a victorious career, if the lines of communication begin
to be too long, especially if the war is carried
on in a poor, sparsely populated country, and perhaps also
in the midst of a people whose feelings are hostile.

(03:03:56):
What an enormous difference between a line of communication from
Wilnet to Moscow, on which every carriage must be forcibly seized,
and a line from Cologne by Liege Louvain, Brussels, Mons
and Valenciennes to Paris where a mercantile contract, where a
bill of exchange would suffice to procure millions of rations.
Frequently has the difficulty we are now speaking of resulted

(03:04:18):
in obscuring the splendor of the most brilliant victories, reduced
the powers of the victorious army, rendered retreat necessary, and
then by degrees ended in producing all the symptoms of
a real defeat forage, of which, as we have before said,
there is usually at first the least deficiency will run
short soonest if a country begins to become exhausted, for

(03:04:40):
it is the most difficult supply to procure from a
distance on account of its bulk, and the horse feels
the effect of low feeding much sooner than the man.
For this reason, an over numerous cavalry and artillery may
become a real burden and an element of weakness to
an army. Chapter fifteen. Base of operations. If an army

(03:05:01):
sets out on any expedition, whether it be to attack
the enemy in his theater of war or to take
post on its own frontier, it continues in a state
of necessary dependence on the sources from which it draws
its subsistence and reinforcements, and must maintain its communication with them,
as they are the conditions of its existence and preservation.
This dependence increases in intensity and extent in proportion to

(03:05:24):
the size of the army. But now it is neither
always possible nor requisite that the army should continue in
direct communication with the whole of its own country. It
is sufficient if it does so with that portion immediately
in its rear, and which is consequently covered by its
position in this portion of the country, then as far
as necessary, special depots of provisions are formed, and arrangements

(03:05:47):
are made for regularly forwarding reenforcements and supplies. This strip
of territory is therefore the foundation of the army and
of all its undertakings, and the two must be regarded
as forming in connection only one. If the supplies for
their greater security are lodged in fortified places, the idea
of a base becomes more distinct. But the idea does

(03:06:09):
not originate in any arrangement of that kind, and in
a number of cases no such arrangement is made. But
a portion of the enemy's territory may also become a
base for our army, or at least form part of it.
For when an army penetrates into an enemy's land, a
number of its wants are supplied from that part of
the country which has taken possession of. But it is

(03:06:29):
then a necessary condition that we are completely masters of
this portion of territory, that is certain of our orders
being obeyed within its limits. This certainty, however, seldom extends
beyond the reach of our ability to keep the inhabitants
in awe by small garrisons and detachments moving about from
place to place, and that is not very far. In general.

(03:06:51):
The consequence is that in the enemy's country, the part
of territory from which we can draw supplies is seldom
of sufficient extent to furnish all the supply we require,
and we must therefore still depend on our own land
for much. And this brings us back again to the
importance of that part of our territory immediately in rear
of our army, as an indispensable portion of our base.

(03:07:13):
The wants of an army may be divided into two classes,
first those which every cultivated country can furnish, and next,
those which can only be obtained from those localities where
they are produced. The first are chiefly provisions, the second
the means of keeping an army complete in every way.
The first can therefore be obtained in the enemy's country,

(03:07:33):
the second, as a rule, can only be furnished by
our own country. For example, men, arms, and almost all
munitions of war. Although there are exceptions to this classification
in certain cases, still they are few and trifling, and
The distinction we have drawn is of standing importance, and
proves again that the communication with our own country is indispensable.

(03:07:56):
Depots of provisions and forage are generally formed in open towns,
both in the enemies and in our own country, because
there are not as many fortresses as would be required
for these bulky stores continually being consumed and wanted, sometimes here,
sometimes there, and also because their loss is much easier
to replace. On the other hand, stores to keep the

(03:08:16):
army complete, such as arms, munition of war, and articles
of equipment, are never lodged in open places in the
vicinity of the theater of war, if it can be avoided,
but are rather brought from a distance, and in the
enemy's country never stored anywhere but in fortresses. From this
point again, it may be inferred that the base is

(03:08:37):
of more importance in relation to supplies intended to refit
an army than in relation to provisions for food. Now,
the more means of each kind are collected together in
great magazines before being brought into use, the more therefore
all separate streams unite in great reservoirs. So much the
more may these be regarded as taking the place of
the whole country, and so much the more will the

(03:08:59):
cons perception of a base fix itself upon these great
depots of supply. But this must never go so far
that any such place becomes looked upon as constituting a
base in itself alone. If these sources of supply and
refitment are abundant, that is, if the tracts of territory
are wide and rich, if the stores are collected in

(03:09:19):
great depots to be more speedily brought into use. If
these depots are covered in a military sense in one
way or another, if they are in close proximity to
the army, inaccessible by good roads, if they extend along
a considerable width in the rear of the army, or
surrounded in part as well, then follows a greater vitality
for the army, as well as a greater freedom in

(03:09:41):
its movements. Attempts have been made to sum up all
the advantages which an army derives from being so situated
in one single conception, that is, the extent of the
base of operations, by the relation which this base bears
to the object of the undertakings, by the angle which
its extremities make with this object, supposed as a point.

(03:10:02):
It has been attempted to express the whole sum of
the advantages and disadvantages which accrue to an army from
the position and nature of its sources of supply and equipment.
But it is plain this elegant piece of geometrical refinement
is merely a play of fancy, as it is founded
on a series of substitutions which must all be made
at their expense of truth. As we have seen, the

(03:10:24):
base of an army is a triple formation in connection
with the situation in which an army is placed, the
resources of the country adjacent to the position of the army,
the depots of stores which have been made at particular points,
and the province from which these stores are derived or collected.
These three things are separated in space and cannot be
collected into one whole. And least of all, can we

(03:10:47):
substitute for them a line which is to represent the
width of the base, a line which is generally imagined
in a manner perfectly arbitrary, either from one fortress to another,
or from one capital of a province to another, or
along a political boundary of a country. Neither can we
determine precisely the mutual relation of these three steps in
the formation of a base, for in reality they blend

(03:11:09):
themselves with each other, always more or less. In one case,
the surrounding country affords largely the means of refitting an
army with things which otherwise could only be obtained from
a long distance. In another case, we are obliged to
get even food from a long distance. Sometimes the nearest
fortresses are great arsenals, ports, or commercial cities, which contain

(03:11:31):
all the military resources of a whole state. Sometimes they
are nothing but old, feeble ramparts, hardly sufficient for their
own defense. The consequence is that all deductions from the
length of the base of operations and its angles, and
the whole theory of war founded on these data, as
far as its geometrical phase, have never met with any
attention in real war, and in theory they have only

(03:11:54):
caused wrong tendencies. But as the basis of this chain
of reasoning is a truth, and only the conclusions drawn
are false, this same view will easily and frequently thrust
itself forward again. We think, therefore, that we cannot go
beyond acknowledging generally the influence of a base on military enterprises,
that at the same time. There are no means of

(03:12:16):
framing out of this maxim any serviceable rules by a
few abstract ideas, but that in each separate case, the
whole of the things which we have specified must be
kept in view together. When once arrangements are made within
a certain radius to provide the means of subsisting an
army in keeping it complete in every respect, and with
a view to operations in a certain direction, then even

(03:12:37):
in our own country, this district only is to be
regarded as the base of the army. And as any
alteration of a base requires time and labor, therefore an
army cannot change its base every day, even in its
own country, and this again limits it always more or
less in the direction of its operations. If, then, in

(03:12:58):
operating against an enemy's country, we take the whole line
of our own frontier, where it forms a boundary between
the two countries, as our base, we may do so
in a general sense, in so far that we might
make those preparations which constitute a base anywhere on that frontier.
But it will not be a base at any moment
if preparations have not been already made everywhere. When the

(03:13:19):
Russian army retreated before the French in eighteen twelve. At
the beginning of the campaign, the whole of Russia might
have been considered as its base, the more so because
the vast extent of the country offered the army abundance
of space in any direction it might select. This is
no illusory notion, as it was actually realized at a
subsequent time when other Russian armies from different quarters entered

(03:13:41):
the field. But still at every period throughout the campaign
the base of the Russian army was not so extensive.
It was principally confined to the road on which the
whole train of transport to and from their army was organized.
This limitation prevented the Russian army, for instance, from making
the further retreat which became necessary after the three days

(03:14:01):
fighting at Smolensk, in any direction but that of Moscow,
and so hindered their turning suddenly in the direction of Caluga,
as was proposed in order to draw the enemy away
from Moscow. Such a change of direction could only have
been possible by having been prepared for long beforehand. We
have said that the dependence on the base increases in
intensity and extent with the size of the army, which

(03:14:24):
is easy to understand. An army is like a tree.
From the ground out of which it grows, it draws
its nourishment. If it is small, it can easily be transplanted,
but this becomes more difficult as it increases in size.
A small body of troops has also its channels from
which it draws the sustenance of life, but it strikes

(03:14:44):
route easily where it happens to be. Not so a
large army. When therefore we talk of the influence of
the base on the operations of an army, the dimensions
of the army must always serve as the scale by
which to measure the magnitude of that influence. Further, it
is consistent with the nature of things that for the
immediate wants of the present hour, the subsistence is the

(03:15:06):
main point. But for the general efficiency of the army
through a long period of time, the refitment and recruitment
are the more important, because the latter can only be
done from particular sources, while the former may be obtained
in many ways. This again defines still more distinctly the
influence of the base on the operations of the army.
However great that influence may be, we must never forget

(03:15:28):
that it belongs to those things which can only show
a decisive effect after some considerable time, and that therefore
the question always remains what may happen in that time.
The value of a base of operations will seldom determine
the choice of an undertaking. In the first instance, mere
difficulties which may present themselves in this respect must be
put side by side and compared with other means actually

(03:15:51):
at our command. Obstacles of this nature often vanish before
the force of decisive victories. Chapter sixteen. Lines of communication.
The roads which lead from the position of an army
to those points in its rear where its depots of
supply and means of recruiting and refitting its forces are
principally united, and which it also, in all ordinary cases

(03:16:12):
chooses for its retreat, have a double signification. In the
first place, they are its lines of communication for the
constant nourishment of the combatant force, and next they are
roads of retreat. We have said in the preceding chapter
that although according to the present system of subsistence, an
army is chiefly fed from the district in which it
is operating, it must still be looked upon as forming

(03:16:34):
a whole with its base. The lines of communication belong
to this whole. They form the connection between the army
and its base, and are to be considered as so
many great vital arteries. Supplies of every kind, convoys of munitions,
detachments moving backwards and forwards, posts, orderlies, hospitals, depots, reserves

(03:16:55):
of stores, agents of administration. All these objects are constantly
making use of these roads, and the total value of
these services is of the utmost importance to the army.
These great channels of life must therefore neither be permanently severed,
nor must they be of two great length or beset
with difficulties, because there is always a loss of strength

(03:17:16):
on a long road, which tends to weaken the condition
of an army. By their second purpose, that is, as
lines of retreat, they constitute in a real sense, the
strategic rear of the army. For both purposes, the value
of these roads depends on their length, their number, their situation,
that is, their general direction, and their direction specially as

(03:17:37):
regards the army, their nature as roads, difficulties of ground,
the political relations and feeling of local population, and lastly,
on the protection they derive from fortresses or natural obstacles
in the country. But all the roads which lead from
the point occupied by an army to its sources of
existence and power are not, on that account, necessarily lines

(03:17:58):
of communication for that pay army. They may no doubt
be used for that purpose, and may be considered as
supplementary of the system of communication, but that system is
confined to the lines regularly prepared for the purpose. Only
those roads on which magazines, hospitals, stations, posts for dispatches
and letters are organized under common dance with police and

(03:18:21):
garrisons can be looked upon as real lines of communication.
But here a very important difference between our own and
the enemy's army makes its appearance, one which is often overlooked.
An army, even in its own country, has its prepared
lines of communication, but it is not completely limited to them,
and can, in case of need, change its line, taking

(03:18:42):
some other which presents itself, for it is everywhere at
home as officials in authority and the friendly feeling of
the people. Therefore, although other roads may not be as
good as those at first selected, there is nothing to
prevent their being used, and the use of them is
not to be regarded as impossible in case the army
is turned and obliged to change its front. An army

(03:19:04):
in an enemy's country, on the contrary, can as a rule,
only look upon those roads as lines of communication upon
which it has advanced and hence arises through small and
almost invisible causes a great difference in operating. The army
in the enemy's country takes under its protection the organization which,
as it advances it necessarily introduces to form its lines

(03:19:25):
of communication, and in general, inasmuch as terror and the
presence of an enemy's army in the country invests these
measures in the eyes of the inhabitants with all the
weight of unalterable necessity. The inhabitants may even be brought
to regard them as an alleviation of the evils inseparable
from war. Small garrisons left behind in different places support

(03:19:46):
and maintain this system. But if these commissaries, common dance
of stations, police field posts, and the rest of the
apparatus of administration were sent to some distant road upon
which the army had not been seen, the inhabitan and
then would look upon such measures as a burden which
they would gladly get rid of. And if the most
complete defeats and catastrophes had not previously spread terror throughout

(03:20:09):
the land, the probability is that these functionaries would be
treated as enemies and driven away with very rough usage. Therefore,
in the first place, it would be necessary to establish
garrisons to subjugate the new line, and these garrisons would
require to be of more than ordinary strength. And still
there would always be a danger of the inhabitants rising

(03:20:30):
and attempting to overpower them. In short, an army marching
into an enemy's country is destitute of the mechanism through
which obedience is rendered. It has to institute its officials
into their places, which can only be done by a
strong hand, And this cannot be effected thoroughly without sacrifices
and difficulties, nor is it the work of a moment.

(03:20:50):
From this, it follows that a change of the system
of communication is much less easy of accomplishment in an
enemy's country than in our own, where it is at
least possible in It also follows that the army is
more restricted in its movements, and must be much more
sensitive about any demonstrations against its communications. But the choice
and organization of lines of communication is from the very

(03:21:13):
commencement subject also to a number of conditions by which
it is restricted. Not only must they be, in a
general sense good high roads, but they will be the
more serviceable, the wider they are, the more populous and
wealthy towns they pass through, the more strong places there
are which afford them protection. Rivers also as means of
water communication, and bridges as points of passage have a

(03:21:36):
decisive weight in the choice. It follows from this that
the situation of a line of communication, and consequently the
road by which an army proceeds to commence the offensive,
is only a matter of free choice up to a
certain point, its situation being dependent on certain geographical relations.
All the foregoing circumstances taken together, determine the strength or

(03:21:58):
weakness of the communication of an army with its base,
and this result, compared with one similarly obtained with regard
to the enemy's communications, decides which of the two opponents
is in a position to operate against the other's lines
of communication, or to cut off his retreat, that is,
in technical language, to turn him. Setting aside all considerations

(03:22:19):
of moral or physical superiority, that party can only effectually
accomplish this whose communications are the strongest of the two,
for otherwise the enemy saves himself in the shortest mode
by a counter stroke. Now this turning can, by reason
of the double signification of these lines, have also two purposes.
Either the communications may be interfered with and interrupted that

(03:22:42):
the enemy may melt away by degrees from want and
thus be compelled to retreat. Or the object may be
directly to cut off the retreat. With regard to the first,
we have to observe that a mere momentary interruption will
seldom have any effect. While armies are subsisted as they
now are, a certain time time is requisite to produce
an effect in this way, in order that the losses

(03:23:03):
of the enemy by frequent repetition may compensate in number
for the small amount he suffers. In each case, one
single enterprise against the enemy's flank, which might have been
a decisive stroke in those days when thousands of bread
wagons traverse the lines of communication, carrying out the systematized
method then in force for subsisting troops, would hardly produce

(03:23:23):
any effect. Now, if ever so successful, one convoy at
most might be seized, which would cause the enemy some
partial damage, but never compel him to retreat. The consequence
is that enterprises of this description on a flank, which
have always been more in fashion in books than in
real warfare, now appear less of a practical nature than ever.

(03:23:44):
And we may safely say that there is no danger
in this respect to any lines of communication, but such
as are very long and otherwise unfavorably circumstanced, more especially
by being exposed everywhere and at any moment to attacks
from an insurgent population. With respect to the cutting off
an enemy's retreat, we must not be over confident in

(03:24:05):
this respect, either of the consequences of threatening or closing
the enemy's lines of retreat, as recent experience has shown
that when troops are good and their leader resolute, it
is more difficult to make them prisoners than it is
for them to cut their way through the force opposed
to them. The means of shortening and protecting long lines
of communication are very limited the seizure of some fortresses

(03:24:27):
adjacent to the position taken up by the army and
on the roads leading to the rear, or, in the
event of there being no fortresses in the country, the
construction of temporary defenses at suitable points, the kind treatment
of the people of the country, strict discipline on the military, roads,
good police, and active measures to improve the roads are
the only means by which the evil may be diminished,

(03:24:49):
But it is one which can never be entirely removed. Furthermore,
what we said when treating of the question of subsistence
with respect to the roads which the army should chose
by preference, applies also particularly to lines of communication. The
best lines of communication are roads leading through the most
flourishing towns and the most important provinces. They ought to

(03:25:11):
be preferred, even if considerably longer, and in most cases
they exercise an important influence on the definitive disposition of
the army Chapter seventeen on country and ground. Quite irrespective
of their influence as regards the means of subsistence of
an army, country and ground bear another most intimate and
never failing relation to the business of war, which is

(03:25:34):
their decisive influence on the battle, both upon what concerns
its course, as well as upon the preparation for it
and the use to be made of it. We now
proceed to consider country and ground in this phase, that is,
in the full meaning of the French expression terrain. The
way to make use of them is a subject which
lies mostly within the province of tactics, but the effects

(03:25:56):
resulting from them appear in strategy. A battle in the
mountains is, in its consequences as well as in itself,
quite a different thing from a battle on a level plane.
But until we have studied the distinction between offensive and
defensive and examined the nature of each separately and fully,
we cannot enter upon the consideration of the principal features
of the ground in their effects. We must, therefore, for

(03:26:18):
the present confine ourselves to an investigation of its general properties.
There are three properties through which the ground has an
influence on action in war. That is, as presenting an
obstacle to approach, as an obstacle to an extensive view,
and as protection against the effect of firearms. All other
effects may be traced back to these three. Unquestionably, this

(03:26:40):
threefold influence of ground has a tendency to make warfare
more diversified, more complicated, and more scientific, For there are
plainly three more quantities which enter into military combinations. A
completely level plane quite open at the same time, that is,
a tract of country which cannot influence war at all,
has no existence except in relation to small bodies of troops,

(03:27:04):
and with respect to them only for the duration of
some given moment of time. When larger bodies are concerned,
and a longer duration of time, accidents of ground mix
themselves up with the action of such bodies, and it
is hardly possible, in the case of a whole army,
to imagine any particular moment, such as a battle, when
the ground would not make its influence felt. This influence

(03:27:26):
is therefore never in abeyance, but it is certainly stronger
or weaker according to the nature of the country. If
we keep in view the great mass of topographical phenomena,
we find that countries deviate from the idea of perfectly
open level plains principally in three ways. First by the
form of the ground, that is, hills and valleys, than
by woods, marshes and lakes as natural features, and lastly

(03:27:50):
by such changes as have been introduced by the hand
of man. Through each of these three circumstances, there is
an increase in the influence of ground on the operations
of war. If we trace them up to a certain distance,
we have mountainous country a country little cultivated and covered
with woods and marshes, and the well cultivated. The tendency

(03:28:11):
in each case is to render war more complicated and
connected with art. The degree of influence which cultivation exercises
is greater or less according to the nature of the cultivation.
The system pursued in Flanders, Holstein and some other countries
where the land is intersected in every direction with ditches, dikes, hedges,
and walls, interspersed with many single dwellings and small woods,

(03:28:34):
has the greatest effect on war. The conduct of war
is therefore of the easiest kind in a level moderately
cultivated country. This, however, only holds good in quite a
general sense, leaving entirely out of consideration the use which
the defensive can make of obstacles of ground. Each of
these three kinds of ground has an effect in its

(03:28:55):
own way on movement, on the range of sight, and
in the cover it affords. In a thickly wooded country,
the obstacle to site preponderates. In a mountainous country, the
difficulty of movement presents the greatest obstacle to an enemy
in countries very much cultivated. Both these obstacles exist in
a medium degree. As thick woods render great portions of

(03:29:17):
ground in a certain manner impracticable for military movements, and
as besides the difficulty which they oppose to movement, they
also obstruct the view, thereby preventing the use of means
to clear a passage. The result is that they simplify
the measures to be adopted on one side in proportion
as they increase the difficulties with which the other side
has to contend. Although it is difficult practically to concentrate

(03:29:40):
forces for action in a wooded country, still a partition
of forces does not take place to the same extent
as it usually does in a mountainous country, or in
a country very much intersected with canals, rivers, et cetera.
In other words, the partition of forces in such a
country is more unavoidable, but not so great. In the mountains,

(03:30:00):
the obstacles to movement preponderate and take effect in two ways,
because in some parts the country is quite impassable, and
where it is practicable, we must move slower and with
greater difficulty. On this account, the rapidity of all movements
is much diminished in mountains, and all operations are mixed
up with a larger quantity of the element of time.

(03:30:21):
But the ground in mountains has also the special property
peculiar to itself, that one point commands another. We shall
devote the following chapter to the discussion of the subject
of commanding heights generally, and shall only here remark that
it is this peculiarity which causes the great partition of
forces in operations carried on amongst mountains. For particular points

(03:30:42):
thus acquire importance from the influence they have upon other points,
in addition to any intrinsic value which they have in themselves.
As we have elsewhere observed, each of these three kinds
of ground, in proportion as its own special peculiarity, has
a tendency to an extreme, has in the same degree
a tendency to lower, or the influence of the supreme
command increasing in like manner the independent action of subordinates

(03:31:05):
down to the private soldier. The greater the partition of
any force, the less an undivided control is possible. So
much the more are subordinates left to themselves. That is
self evident. Certainly, when the partition of a force is
greater than through the diversity of action and greater scope
in the use of means, the influence of intelligence must increase,

(03:31:26):
and even the commander in chief may show his talents
to advantage under such circumstances. But we must here repeat
what has been said before that in war the sum
total of single results decides more than the form or
method in which they are connected. And therefore, if we
push our present considerations to an extreme case and suppose
a whole army extended in a line of skirmishers, so

(03:31:48):
that each private soldier fights his own little battle, more
will depend on the sum of single victories gained than
on the form in which they are connected. For the
benefit of good combinations can only follow from positive results,
not from negative. Therefore, in such a case, the courage,
the dexterity, and the spirit of individuals will prove decisive.

(03:32:08):
It is only when two opposing armies are on a
par as regards military qualities, or that their peculiar properties
hold the balance even that the talent and judgment of
the commander become again decisive. The consequence is that national
armies and insurgent levies, etc. Et cetera, in which at
least in the individual the warlike spirit is highly excited,

(03:32:30):
although they are not superior in skill and bravery, are
still able to maintain a superiority by a great dispersion
of their forces favored by a difficult country, and that
they can only maintain themselves for a continuance upon that
kind of system, because troops of this description are generally
destitute of all the qualities and virtues which are indispensable

(03:32:50):
when tolerably large numbers are required to act as a
united body. Also, in the nature of forces, there are
many gradations between one of these extremes and n the other.
For the very circumstance of being engaged in the defense
of its own country gives to even a regular standing
army something of the character of a national army, and
makes it more suited for a war waged by an

(03:33:11):
army broken up into detachments. Now, the more these qualifications
and influences are wanting in an army, the greater they
are on the side of its opponent. So much the
more will it dread being split into fractions, the more
it will avoid a broken country. But to avoid fighting
in such a description of country is seldom a matter
of choice. We cannot choose a theater of war like

(03:33:32):
a piece of merchandise from amongst several patterns. And thus
we find generally that armies, which from their nature fight
with advantage in concentrated masses, exhaust all their ingenuity in
trying to carry out their system as far as possible
in direct opposition to the nature of the country. They must,
in consequence submit to other disadvantages, such as scanty and

(03:33:53):
difficult subsistence for the troops, bad quarters, and in the
combat numerous attacks from all sides, but the disadvantage of
giving up their own special advantage would be greater. These
two tendencies in opposite directions, the one to concentration, the
other to dispersion of forces, prevail more or less according
as the nature of the troops engaged incline them more

(03:34:14):
to one side or the other. But, however decided the tendency,
the one side cannot always remain with his forces concentrated,
neither can the other expect success by following his system
of warfare in scattered bodies. On all occasions, the French
were obliged to resort to partitioning their forces in Spain,
and the Spaniards, whilst defending their country by means of

(03:34:36):
an insurgent population were obliged to try the fate of
great battles in the open field with part of their forces.
Next to the connection which country and ground have with
the general, and especially with the political composition of the
forces engaged, the most important point is the relative proportion
of the three arms in all countries which are difficult

(03:34:56):
to traverse. Whether the obstacles are mountains, forests, or a
peculiar cultivation, a numerous cavalry is useless. That is plain
in itself. It is just the same with artillery. In
wooded countries there will probably be a want of room
to use it, with effect of roads to transport it,
and a forage for the horses for this arm. Highly

(03:35:17):
cultivated countries are less disadvantageous, and least of all, a
mountainous country both no doubt afford cover against its fire,
and in that respect they are unfavorable to an arm
which depends entirely on its fire. Both also often furnish
means for the enemy's infantry to place the heavy artillery
in jeopardy, as infantry can pass anywhere. But still in

(03:35:39):
neither is there, in general any want of space for
the use of a numerous artillery, And in mountainous countries.
It has this great advantage that its effects are prolonged
and increased in consequence of the movements of the enemy
being slower. But it is undeniable that infantry has a
decided advantage over every other arm in difficult country, and

(03:35:59):
that therefore, in such a country its number may considerably
exceed the usual proportion. Chapter eighteen. Command of ground. The
word command has a charm in the art of war
peculiar to itself, and in fact to this element belongs
a great part, perhaps half, the influence which ground exercises
on the use of troops. Here many of the sacred

(03:36:21):
relics of military erudition have their route, as for instance,
commanding positions, key positions, strategic maneuvers, et cetera. We shall
take as clear a view of the subject as we
can without prolixity, and pass and review the true and
the false, reality and exaggeration. Every exertion of physical force,

(03:36:42):
if made upwards, is more difficult than if it is
made in the contrary direction downwards. Consequently, it must be
so in fighting, and there are three evident reasons why
it is so. First, every height may be regarded as
an obstacle to approach. Secondly, although the range is not
perceptibly greater in shooting down from a height, yet all

(03:37:02):
geometrical relations being taken into consideration, we have a better
chance of hitting than in the opposite case. Thirdly, an
elevation gives a better command of view. How all these
advantages unite themselves together in battle, we are not concerned with. Here.
We collect the sum total of the advantages which tactics
derives from elevation of position, and combine them in one hole,

(03:37:23):
which we regard as the first strategic advantage. But the
first and last of these advantages that have been enumerated
must appear once more as advantages of strategy itself. For
we march and reconnoiter in strategy as well as in tactics.
If therefore, an elevated position is an obstacle to the
approach of those on lower ground, that is, the second

(03:37:43):
and the better command of view which this elevated position
affords is the third advantage which strategy may derive in
this way. Of these elements is composed the power of dominating, overlooking. Commanding.
From these sources springs the sense of superiority and security
which is felt in standing on the brow of a
hill and looking at the enemy below, and the feeling

(03:38:04):
of weakness and apprehension which pervades the minds of those below.
Perhaps the total impression made is at the same time
stronger than it ought to be, because the advantage of
the higher ground strikes the senses more than the circumstances
which modify that advantage. Perhaps the impression made surpasses that
which the truth warrants, in which case the effect of

(03:38:24):
imagination must be regarded as a new element which exaggerates
the effect produced by an elevation of ground. At the
same time, the advantage of greater facility of movement is
not absolute and not always in favor of the side
occupying the higher position. It is only so when his
opponent wishes to attack him. It is not if the
combatants are separated by a great valley, and it is

(03:38:46):
actually in favor of the army on the lower ground
if both wish to fight in the plain battle of Hohenfriedberg. Also,
the power of overlooking or command of view has likewise
great limitations. Country in the valley below, and often the
very masses of the mountains themselves on which we stand
obstruct the vision Countless are the cases in which we

(03:39:09):
might seek, in vain on the spot for those advantages
of an elevated position which a map would lead us
to expect, and we might often be led to think
we had only involved ourselves in all kinds of disadvantages,
the very opposite of the advantages we counted upon. But
these limitations and conditions do not abrogate or destroy the
superiority which the more elevated position confers both on the

(03:39:31):
defensive and offensive. We shall point out in a few
words how this is the case with each out of
the three strategic advantages of the more elevated ground, the
greater tactical strength, the more difficult approach, and the better view.
The first two are of such a nature that they
belong really to the defensive, only for it is only

(03:39:52):
in holding firmly to a position that we can make
use of them, whilst the other side, offensive, in moving,
cannot remove them and take them with hid. But the
third advantage can be made use of by the offensive
just as well as by the defensive. From this it
follows that the more elevated ground is highly important to
the defensive, and as it can only be maintained in

(03:40:12):
a decisive way in mountainous countries. Therefore, it would seem
to follow as a consequence that the defensive has an
important advantage in mountain positions. How it is that through
other circumstances this is not so. In reality, we shall
show in the chapter on the defensive mountains. We must
first of all make a distinction if the question relates

(03:40:33):
merely to commanding ground at one single point, as for example,
a position for an army. In such case, the strategic
advantages rather merge in the tactical one of a battle
fought under advantageous circumstances. But if now we imagine a
considerable tract of country, suppose a whole province as a
regular slope, like the declivity at a general watershed, so

(03:40:55):
that we can make several marches and always hold the
upper ground, then there strategic advantages become greater, because we
can now use the advantages of the more elevated ground
not only in the combination of our forces with each
other for one particular combat, but also in the combination
of several combats with one another. Thus it is with
the defensive as regards the offensive, it enjoys to a

(03:41:19):
certain extent the same advantages as the defensive from the
more elevated ground. For this reason that the strategetic attack
is not confined to one act like the tactical. The
strategic advance is not the continuous movement of a piece
of wheel work. It is made in single marches with
a longer or shorter interval between them, and at each
halting point, the assailant is just as much acting on

(03:41:40):
the defensive as his adversary. Through the advantage of a
better view of the surrounding country. An elevated position confers
in a certain measure on the offensive as well as
the defensive. A power of action which we must not
omit to notice it is the facility of operating with
separate masses. For each portion of a force separately derives

(03:42:00):
the same advantages which the whole derives from this more
elevated position. By this, a separate core, let it be
strong or weak in numbers, is stronger than it would
otherwise be, and we can venture to take up a
position with less danger than we could if it had
not that particular property of being on an elevation. The
advantages which are to be derived from such separate bodies

(03:42:21):
of troops is a subject, for another place, if the
possession of more elevated ground is combined with other geographical
advantages which are in our favor. If the enemy finds
himself cramped in his movements from other causes, as for instance,
by the proximity of a large river, such disadvantages of
his position may prove quite decisive, and he may feel

(03:42:42):
that he cannot too soon relieve himself from such a position.
No army can maintain itself in the valley of a
great river if it is not in possession of the
heights on each side by which the valley is formed.
The possession of elevated ground may therefore become virtually command
and we can by no means deny that this idea
represents a reality. But nevertheless, the expressions commanding ground sheltering

(03:43:07):
position key of the country, in so far as they
are founded on the nature of heights and descents, are
hollow shells without any sound kernel. These imposing elements of
theory have been chiefly resorted to in order to give
a flavor to the seeming commonplace of military combinations. They
have become the darling themes of learned soldiers, the magical
wands of adepts in strategy, and neither the emptiness of

(03:43:30):
these fanciful conceits, nor the frequent contradictions which have been
given to them by the results of experience, have sufficed
to convince authors and those who read their books, that
with such phraseology they are drawing water in the leaky
vessel of the Danaides. The conditions have been mistaken for
the thing itself, the instrument. For the hand, The occupation

(03:43:52):
of such and such a position or space of ground
has been looked upon as an exercise of power, like
a thrust or a cut, the ground or position itself
as a substantive quantity. Whereas the one is like the
lifting of the arm, the other is nothing but the
lifeless instrument, a mere property which can only realize itself
upon an object, a mere sign of plus or minus,

(03:44:13):
which wants the figures or quantities. This cut and thrust,
this object, this quantity is a victorious battle. It alone
really counts. With it only can we reckon, and we
must always have it in view as well in giving
a critical judgment in literature as in real action in
the field. Consequently, if nothing but the number and value

(03:44:34):
of victorious combats decides in war. It is plain that
the comparative value of the opposing armies and ability of
their respective leaders again ranked as the first points for consideration,
and that the part which the influence of ground plays
can only be one of an inferior grade.

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CLAUSEWITZ - ON WAR - V. MILITARY FORCES - Carl von Clausewitz (1873) - HQ Full Book

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