November 24, 2025 • 53 mins
Tonight on The Brian Crombie Hour, Brian is joined by Peter Dickinson, Ukraine Editor at the Atlantic Council, for a candid breakdown of the leaked U.S. peace proposal for Ukraine, a document that looks far more Moscow-made than Washington-led. Together, they unpack a “U.S. plan” written in Russian-style diplomatic language, negotiations happening largely between the U.S. and Russia without Ukraine, and proposed territorial concessions in Donetsk. Other topics of conversation include weak security guarantees Ukraine cannot trust, the real situation on the battlefield, why Russia is pushing for a deal, and what this means for Europe, NATO, and global security.
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Speaker 1 (00:00):
The views expressed in the following program are those of
the participants and do not necessarily reflect the views of
SAGA nine sixty am or its management.
Speaker 2 (00:18):
Good evening, everyone, and welcome to the Brian Crimey Radio.
So what's going on in Ukraine with this Ukraine peace
proposal from the United States? I wanted to check in
with Peter Dickinson, who is the Ukraine editor for the
Atlantic Council. We've had the privilege of chatting with him
several times before about the Russian invasion, about what's going on,
you know, his attitudes toward Putin, his sense of what's
(00:41):
Putin's agenda is, etc.
Speaker 3 (00:42):
But it just.
Speaker 2 (00:43):
Seems Peter like, you know, there's lots of different issues,
you know. I've read some things that this plan is
Russian translated into English, and you can tell by way
of the mangled English, you can tell that people have
said this is, you know, the the envoy Trump's envoy
that is off on a flyer round himself. I've heard
(01:05):
that this is a complete capitulation. I've heard that this
is the right solution. Tell us what's going on and
what do you think is going to happen this week?
Speaker 3 (01:14):
Well, yeah, I mean, I think you're right to set
the tone of chaos basically because it is very hard
to know what's going on. There are all sorts of
different messages. I mean, if we just go sort of
step by step, you know what we can say with
any sort of any sort of certainty. I think the
first point would be, you know, to confirm your your
your introduction there that this this document as it's been
(01:36):
presented to the public or has been leaked in English,
is clearly it's clearly a translation from a Russian original.
Any knowledge of the Russian language and the kind of
terminology that the Kremlin uses in its official documents and
its official speech, it's amasi. Anyone who knows the Russian
it's immediately recognizable that this was a Russian document that's
(01:59):
been translated largely, if not entirely, into English from the
Russian So, you know, we can say that with a
pretty high degree of confidence. You know, then the question
emerges of you know, well, so does that mean it's
simply a Russian document or you know, it could have
been a document that was discussed by the Russians and Americans,
and the Russians rolled it up and sent it and
(02:20):
said Okay, this is what we've come up with based
on your comments. You know, it doesn't necessarily mean that
this is just simply the Americans pushing the Russian narrative. However,
it is a very strongly pro Russian document. It's very
much in line with Russias with a lot of Russia's
key messages and key positions on the wall that they've
(02:40):
consistently sought. But there are areas where there's some room
for perhaps you know, some that they're perhaps encouraging or
slightly not disastrous, let's say, terms for Ukraine. So there
are areas where it could be potentially discussed. There are
(03:00):
areas where it's very very problematic. I think that we're
going to see some some give and take over the
over the coming days. There's now talk. I mean, I
wanted to ask, actually, this is Will this interview be
broadcast on Monday? Is that the plan? Yes? Yes, so
it's someday today. I don't know if we're going to
(03:22):
just go behind you know, behind the curtain. A lot
of this could be out of date by the time
it gets out right. I mean, this is the reality,
this is, this is where we are. I would imagine
might at this point, my prediction would be there's going
to be some give and take. There's going to be
some back and forth about the key points of the plan.
The key points of the plan as I see them,
are security guarantees, and the nature of those security guarantees
(03:46):
for Ukraine absolutely central. And then the second part, the
second key part would be territorial concessions by Ukraine. You
know how that would look in practice, what that would entail,
how that how it be accomplished in practice, and what
status areas that are left under the Russian control would have.
(04:06):
So these are going to be discussed, I think, I think,
you know, the initial the initial positioning that we saw
from from the Americans essentially was a kind of take
it or leave it. On Friday, that was certainly the
impression that I'd got, and I think a lot of
people had, and Celelensky came out and made a very
powerful speech that that that confirmed thoughts or reinforced that
(04:27):
that perception that the Americans were saying, look, you signed this,
or we're done, you know, and your fate will be
very very uncertain. Then now it seems that the American
position is well, you know, let's see, it's a talking point.
It's a start. You know, we're just looking to get
the conversation going, which is a very very different position.
So I imagine the story is going to move more.
But yeah, it's it. It's a very very strange, i
(04:50):
would say, diplomatic process. And at the moment, the overriding
impression I get is of a kind of lack of
coordination on the American side and the lack of claric
about where they even really stand.
Speaker 2 (05:02):
It seems like the Americans didn't even speak with their
allies or with NATO and newrous different European countries and
I think Canada and again this all could change in
a minute, have all come out against the plan. Is
that what you're hearing?
Speaker 3 (05:15):
Yeah? Again, I think that. I think that's one of
the few things we can say with with with a
high degree of confidence. Again, you know, like the fact
that the document appears to have been the original, appears
to have been written in Russian. It does not appear
to that does not appear to have been any meaningful
consultation with the Canadians, or the Europeans or any American allies.
And for that matter, there doesn't appear to have been
(05:35):
any really significant consultation with Ukraine either. I think the
Ukrainians perhaps were involved in some parallel discussions. I don't
think they were directly involved in sitting down and saying, okay,
let's hammer out these twenty eight points. They were certainly,
you know, if they were involved, they were perhaps consulted
on some specific issues at some point in the discussion.
(05:56):
This seems to have been a bilateral process between Erica
in Russia. Others have been simply ignored. Yeah, so that's that.
That seems to be very clearly the case.
Speaker 2 (06:08):
I've also, you know, heard many comments that this is
I think the gentleman's name is Steve Winkoff and the
Trump envoy, uh special envoy on this issue, that this
was all him, and it wasn't the State Department, it
wasn't Marco Rubio, wasn't all the experts on Russia that
were involved. It was just you know, one guy that
was doing a flyer. What's your sense of that? Is
(06:28):
that just a criticism or is that anywhere close to
the truth?
Speaker 3 (06:31):
Do you think? Well, that again, that's the that's the
impression we have that wick Cooff seems to be trying
to handle this in his own very specific way. Wickcoff
is not a professional diplomat. He has no training or
or or significantly long term experience in the field of
international relations or diplomacy. He's a real estate He is
(06:53):
a real estate investor who was a friend of Trump,
a personal friend of Trumps. He plays golf with Trump,
and they've been friends and colleagues for decades. And that's
what this is, you know, That's where his role comes from. Now.
Wikkov has been a prominent figure in talks with Russia
since the start of Trump's second presidency and certainly since
(07:14):
the spring of this year, and he's made a number
of very very high profile blunders in his first big
media forays, first big media comments. In the spring of
this year, he gave an interview to Tucker Carlson in
which he praised pulled In as a great guy and legitimized,
essentially legitimized the sort of Stylin style referendums that Russia
(07:39):
had held in occupied Ukraine to try and to try
and legitimize their occupation. And these referendums were roundly rejected
by the international community. And I think any country, not
even the likes of China, were prepared to come out
and support what was obviously a farce. It was obviously
a criminal endeavor. It literally held that gun point, you know,
(08:01):
a captive population sort of frog march to the polls
to try and add a veneer of respectability to Rush's occupation.
And and Wikov came out and said, well, look, they
all voted in a referendum, so they want to be
part of Russia. And this was this was flabbergasting. This
is absolutely stunning incompetence or or a lack of a
lack of any sort of you know, moral bankruptcy essentially,
(08:25):
and that there's something that no, no, not not even
the American, no one in the world had it actually
gone that far before. So Wikkov has a record for
being someone who is prone to very very damaging gaffs,
but also he seems to feel that he is a
very competent figure and going into you do things on
his own. He's he's he's has a direct relationship with
(08:47):
Kiril Dmitriev, who is the Russian point man. He's basically
opposite number in the Kremlin, and the two of them
appear to have cooked this up together. Ruby the the
American that the Trump's administration has tried to position this
as a collective effort and that Rubio has been involved
throughout the process. Rubio's comments recently, as have been reported
(09:13):
by members of the Senate, suggest that's not the case
at all. But he wasn't involved at all in this process.
We don't know. I certainly don't know. I'm inclined to
think that that Rubio wouldn't be making the statements he's
been making, and that he said that his colleagues in
the Senate if he was, if he felt that he'd
been involved in this, it seems like it is a
a wick Off show, a Wickcoff one man show.
Speaker 2 (09:34):
Basically, the counter to your comments about these farce referendums
that we hear, particularly from the right wing media and
you know, social media posts that you never know exactly
where they're coming from here in North America, are that, well,
these were the parts of Ukraine that voted in favor
of joining Russia or for Russian oriented presidents for Ukraine
(10:01):
in the past, that it was primarily Russian speaking, that
it was very populated by a lot of Russian people,
that it was part of Russia. How do you counter
that argument that these territories were leaning very Russian.
Speaker 3 (10:15):
Well, all of Ukraine was and is Russian speaking to
a degree, you know, to a lect to a greater
or lesser degree, because it was ruled by Russia. And
so the same way that in the same way that
America is English speaking, or that Mexico is Spanish speaking,
or that the large parts of the Middle East Arabic speaking.
You know, that is the dom that is the lingua
franc are imposed by the dominant political power of the region.
(10:37):
And that was the case with Russian. So, you know,
the use of the Russian language is no indicator of
political affiliation. It never has been, and it certainly isn't today.
Pultin has tried to equate the use of the Russian
language with with with with associations with Russia. But frankly speaking,
it's it's a bizarre it's a bizarre and nonsensical argument.
(11:00):
Kiev is the largest Russian speaking city outside of the
Russia itself. It's also the capital of Ukraine, in a
very patriotic, proud capital that no Russian would claim is
you know, is a bastion of pro Russian sentiment. It's
clearly not. It's clearly a city where, on the contrary,
has been at the very heart of Ukraine's efforts to
(11:20):
emerge as a nation over the last last thirty years
since its country gained independence and as sort of consolidated
it's sovereignty and independence. You know, Kiev has been the
driving force behind that throughout that period. And yet you know,
you still will hear in Russian spoken widely Kim and
again it's you know, it's the biggest Russian speaking city
in the world outside of Russia itself, and yet with
(11:44):
a very strong anti Kremlin sentiment. So you know, the
whole argument about Russian speakers and the Russian languages has
always been always been very, very misleading and exploited by
the Kremlin. In terms of the historical aspect of it, again,
you know, all of Ukraine was ruled by was ruled
(12:05):
was ruled by Russia except the west of the country
for centuries and centuries. The west was incorporated into the
Soviet Union, which is essentially the Russian Russian Empire by
a different name in the after World War II. Prior
to that, the rest of Ukraine had been under Russian
control since the city earlieress in the late seventeenth century
(12:25):
early eighteenth century, so you know, there was a long,
long colonial history of Russian influence. And yet in nineteen
ninety one, when the Soviet Union began to sort of
fray at the scenes and it seemed to be an
opportunity to claim independence, Ukrainians voted overwhelmingly the entire country.
(12:47):
In December nineteen ninety one, they held a referendum, and
the entire country, every single region, including the East, including
areas that Russia claims now have always been Russian, including Crimea,
all voted by strong majorities for independence, to leave Russia,
to leave the Kremlin essentially, and to have an independent country. So,
you know, to give you some idea of what we're
(13:08):
talking about here, the regions in the East don Excandloguants,
which the Russians have occupied since twenty fourteen and now
claimed to be, you know, historically ancestral Russian lands. They
voted by a margin of around eighty to twenty five percent.
I believe to become independent countries, to lead them to
become an independent country, excuse me, to leave Russia. So
(13:30):
you know, the idea that these areas were always Russian,
and that they were sort of they were sort of
you know, struggling under the yoke of Ukrainian depression is
laughable really, and it's detainitely not supported by any ofsticle evidence.
It is true that these regions, traditionally in Ukraine, in
independent Ukraine, voted largely for pro Russian political parties, but
(13:54):
that's largely an extent of their desire to have good
ties with Russia, have good relations with Russia. There was
never any sense of a separatist movement or a desire
to join Russia, you know, And I would caution there
that there's a huge difference between someone saying, you know,
we want to have good relations with Russia and someone
saying we want to be Russian, we want to join Russia.
You know, that's a huge that's a huge sort of
(14:16):
oceans across. And there was never any hint that anyone
in those regions, apart perhaps some marginal like that few
percentages perhaps who actually wanted to join Russia. There was
never there was never any political movement to join Russia.
There was never any secretist movement that was all artificially
created or instigated by the Russians themselves. In twenty fourteen,
(14:41):
we're going.
Speaker 2 (14:41):
To take a break for some messages and come back
in two minutes with Peter Dickinson, the Ukrainian editor for
the Atlantic Council, And I'm going to go through some
of this peace plan peace part by part, and ask Peter,
you know what he thinks about the territorial claims, what
he thinks about the security guarantees, what does he think
about some of the other you know parts, Green never
to join NATO, et cetera. Say with this said one,
(15:02):
we'll be just back in two minutes talking about this
peace plant that seems to have come out of nowhere.
Speaker 1 (15:08):
Back into no Radio, No problem stream is live on
SAGA nineteen sixty am dot CAA.
Speaker 2 (15:29):
Come back everyone to the Brian crimeby radio or I've
got Peter Dickinson with us tonight. He's actually in Kiev,
but we've had the pleasure of chatting with him a
few times before. He is the Ukraine editor for the
Atlantic Council. He's a I think you're a brit aren't
you that found yourself in Ukraine and fell in love
with Ukraine and now you're trying to comment and publicize
what's going on in Ukraine to the world. I really
(15:50):
appreciate the role that you're playing.
Speaker 3 (15:52):
Yeah, yeah, yeah, I'm British. I'm from Liverpool Division Leona,
but I've been crying since the late nineteen nineties and
I've called it home for most of that period. You know,
I settled here and it's a wonderful place which is
going for a very difficult time.
Speaker 2 (16:08):
So happy to share my scene that makes me God
going through a very difficult time. Peter, talk about the
territorial lines that are in this piece plant if you could,
you know, I think you know, we've all seen the
maps have been publicized in the newspapers and things like that.
It seems like Russia's actually taking more land than they
(16:29):
actually have have occupied right now, and with natural fortifications
that it ends up being sort of a very permanent
kind of border that they're trying to create. Is it justified?
And you know, what's the alternative? It appears that Russia
is making headway, maybe foot by foot, meter by meter,
(16:53):
But do you think there's any hope that that Ukraine
can can kick Russia out of eastern Ukraine?
Speaker 3 (17:00):
Well, I mean the main aspect of the of the
territorial settlement that's proposed in this peace plan is to
essentially to recognize the current status quote, the current realities
on the ground, as it were the front line. So
that would mean Ukraine and the international community as a
whole recognizing that the areas currently under rocky Russian occupation
(17:23):
are de facto under Russian control, under Kremlin control, and
will remain.
Speaker 4 (17:28):
So.
Speaker 3 (17:29):
Now that's not the same as dejure. That doesn't mean
that they would be legally part of Russia. It wouldn't
be recognized, for example, by within with the international law
or by most countries as Russian sovereign territory. But they
would be recognized as being administered by Russia, as being
within Russia's purvey as it were de facto. So that
(17:51):
would be the most significant aspect of the territorial settlement,
which would be a you know, a very very major
victory for the Russians. It would essentially that Russia got
to keep, you know, the fruits of its invasion, you know,
it got to keep its gains. The Russians have been
pushing for a legal recognition, you know, for Ukraine to
officially see this territory and to redraw the map of Europe.
(18:14):
Ukraine has said that they will not do that under
any circumstances, and this peace deal as it stands doesn't
opbly to them or anyone else to do that. It's
all about, you know, it's about this very specific legal
difference between djure and de facto. So they're saying, okay,
we're going to recognize that the Russia holds this territory
and Ukraine will forego the right to take it back
(18:35):
by force. So they're basically saying, we're not going to
continue trying to fight for it. We will we will
retain our claim to it. So it'll be a bit
like East Germany after ninety after the Night after World
War two, when you know the Germans still sought unification
at some future date, or the Baltic States, I think
is a very specific and very very apt parallel, where
(18:56):
the Baltic States will recognize as de facto part of
the Soviet Union but not legally part of the Soviet Union.
And they were never fully reaped, they were always regarded
under international and certainly western most Western countries, they were
always regarded as occupied throughout the Soviet period after World
War II, and then they've gained independence in the in
(19:17):
nineteen ninety I think all three of them at which
point they were seem to have been regaining independence, reasserting
their independence, which is you know, they've never lost They
always had embassies in the West, Exilmple. So you know,
that's the legal that's the legal issue around the broad
territorial settlement the real and Ukraine has essentially said they
accept that. They've been saying that, They've said that for
(19:37):
a long time now because they recognize that in order
to liberate all of the areas occupied by the Russians,
you know, militarily, they would need a lot of support
from the West that they're simply not getting, and it
will be a huge, huge art for them to fight
against a much more you know, more numerically stronger, much richer,
(19:58):
much more powerful adversary that's deeply now entrenched on their land.
You know, to kick them out would be a you know,
even in the best of circumstances, would be a massive
military undertaking. You know that maybe you know, a power
an alliance like NATA could achieve, but a single country
like Ukraine that's already you know, very hip of heavily
you know, worn down by this war, it's a tall order.
(20:20):
So essentially, Ukraine said, okay, we don't like it, obviously,
we don't accept it. Legally, we're not going to see
the land, but we accept that this is the reality.
Speaker 2 (20:28):
Now.
Speaker 3 (20:29):
That's where we are now, and this is what the
piece still essentially lays out. But this is going to
be the de facto settlement. The big point of contention
is one part of the front in the in the
Donetsk region in East Ukraine. Now, this is part of
the Donetsk region, is part of the don Bats which
is the industrial Donbass region. This is the East Ukrainian heartlands.
This was this is this was the area that the
(20:51):
that the Russians that are put In has claimed from
the very early stages of the invasion in twenty fourteen
as as Russian and he's managed to expand the invasion
over the last almost four years now. They held don
K City itself in twenty fourteen, they occupied that and
(21:12):
an area around that. They held around I think around
one third of the Donetsk region in twenty fourteen. Now
since then they've added another half of it approximately. So
what you've got left is a little bit a little,
fairly small slither of Donetsk to the northeast of this region,
which I think is just under twenty percent around twenty
(21:33):
percent of don Etsk region. Now that's the area that
the Russians are now demanding that Ukraine hands over. Simply
that territory is in Ukrainian hands today. Ukrainians have been
fighting for it, defending it very fiercely for now for more,
not just the last four years, but the last eleven years,
(21:54):
that's twenty fourteen. It's a very heavily fortive region. It's
a region with a population that probably now after people
have been of course displaced or left because of the
terrible living conditions, there probably still has a civilian population
numbering in one hundreds of thousands. Again, that often gets forgotten.
So I've an area that's heavily fortified. There's a number
(22:17):
of big cities there sort of linked up in a
chain of fortifications. There's a big civilian population, there's a
big military and administrative population as well. So this is
really a center of it's a bastion of Ukrainian defense
in the East Russia. If it wants to take it militarily,
most people anticipate that it would take years to achieve that,
(22:41):
and it would cost them hundreds of thousands of troops.
In terms of casualties maybe more. You know, the cities
that are in question there, the cities there, not only
are they more fortified, they're much bigger than anything Russia
has taken in the last three years. You know, Russia
has been fighting over towns of the population of maybe five, ten,
twenty thousand, and it's taking them each time, you know,
(23:03):
months and months to get to take the take over
these essentially ruins. We're talking about cities here with pre
war populations of hundreds of thousands. They're on a different scale.
They're much bigger. So if Russia were to take this territory,
it would take them years and be extremely costing for
them now and then. So that's one aspect of the debate.
(23:23):
The other aspect, of course, is why does Russia need
this territory? Why is it so important for them? It's
a symbolic value that they've claimed that this is the
region that's part of Russia and they must be the
Congress of this region. That's one, but also two, it's
very it's very well defended, and it's very well defensible
in terms of the geography of the region. If Russia
(23:45):
takes this region, then beyond that, there are no defenses.
Really there's no natural obvious defenses or defensive lines. So
the great fear in Ukraine is that if Russia took
this territory, not only would it be a massive psychological
blow to see Ukraine handover land that the Ukrainian army
defended successfully from more in a decade, and to hand
(24:06):
over this large chunk of Ukraine to the Russians essentially
without a fight. Also it would potentially serve as a
gateway and leave the way open for Russia then to
sweep into central Ukraine and to dramatically expand the invasion
you know in the future. You know, maybe maybe in
the coming months, maybe in the coming years, but it
(24:27):
would be a springboard or a gateway for that and
Ukraine's defense, you know, the main focal point of view
defenses would basically be gone. So that is a relatively
small area compared to the broader area that's under Russian occupation,
but it's extremely important from a military, strategic and also
a psychological point of view. And the messaging from Ukraine
(24:50):
is like, there's no way they're going to hand it
over now. Of course, you never know, there maybe some
within negotiations they may change that stance. But I think
even if Zelensky said, yeah, you know what, we can
hand you over, there'd be massive backlash from the Ukrainians,
massive backlash.
Speaker 2 (25:05):
So what's the justification for this demand? Just that we
want it?
Speaker 3 (25:11):
Yeah, basically, yeah, we want it. I mean the justification
I think the argument, the argument is we're going to
take it anyway. You can let us take it over
the next few years and watch, you know, hundreds of
thousands of people be slaughtered, including Ukrainians of course, Ukrainians
and Russians. You know, we can we can go through
that process if you wish, and let you know, let's say,
(25:31):
let's say half a million could could potentially be people
just slaughtered, or you can hand it over an animal,
sign a piece steel, you know. So they're trying to
position it in this way. And this is what as
I understand that the Americans are basically saying, look, you're
going to lose this over time. You may you know,
the Russians are advancing, They're advancing at an absolute glacial pace.
(25:53):
You know, it will be a matter of years by
in all likelihood. But in a war of a tree
with two sides just hammering away at each other, Russia
will win eventually. You know, Russia is a much much
larger country, has a population approximately four times the size
of Ukraine. As an economy, maybe ten to fifteen times
(26:14):
the size of Ukraine, maybe more. It has you know,
huge amounts of natural resources. It can draw on allies
like North Korea who are not squeamish like the Europeans are,
or many Western many of Ukraine, Western Alisa are simply
pouring armaments and missiles and even soldiers to the Russian
war effort. The Chinese are very supportive as well, and
(26:34):
so on. So you know, the idea is, if we
just let this war drag on, the odds are stacked
in Russia's favor. So the argument here, the counter argument
to Ukraine fetish saying you know, no way, is like, well,
it's going to happen anyway, so you may, you know,
it would be it would be the right thing to
do from a humanitarian point of view, from a perhaps
(26:57):
in a strategic point of view, to just hand this
out of a gate down and then make that deal,
make the deal, and then we'll, you know, then we'll
have we'll have peace, and then Ukraine can rebuild as
a country and hope for the best, I suppose.
Speaker 2 (27:12):
So, you know, it seems from what we read in
the Western media that as you say, the Russia is
winning but at glacial pace, foot by foot, nothing more
than that, uh, And that they're almost desperate in the
attacks on residential areas in Ukraine versus Ukraine seems strategic,
(27:32):
and its destruction of of Russian oil refineries and distribution
and pipelines and things like that, that the the access
to long range armaments that the United States has allowed
them is working, and that the increased sanctions are working.
And so you know, I guess we're frustrated to like
why out you know, maybe you're right that over a
(27:55):
decade Russia will win, but it seems like it's going
to take a long long time. So, you know, this
seems inconsistent with at least the reports that we get
in the media of very slow, if not impossibly slow,
Russian advances versus Ukraine actually making some victories with destruction
of Russian infrastructure.
Speaker 3 (28:17):
Well, I think that's that's that is that that is
an excellent you know that the question of why now
is an is an excellent question that I think more
people need to be asking now because this has literally
come out of nowhere. I mean, of course there's been
talks going on, presumably for weeks. I've got months about this,
this this proposal, but it did come out of nowhere,
so to speak, and it has been, now, you know,
(28:38):
sort of rushed in, like we have to have a
decision now. It's got to be done now, you know.
So you know why now, But also you know why
the rush? Why are they so hurried about this? Now
is it? Why is it all of a sudden got
to be decided now now? I would suggest my personal
feeling on this is that the sense of urgency is
coming from the Russians, not I mean, the Americans are
(29:01):
voicing it, are articulating its sense of urgency, but it's
coming from the Russians because the Russian sense that their
position is deteriorating. Yes, on the battlefield, they're doing well, yes,
relatively speaking. I mean, they're not losing the war on
the battlefield, but they're winning it in a very costly
manner at an extremely slow pace. So yes, if they're
(29:25):
you know, all other things being equal, they could you know, theoretically,
and perhaps you know, in all likelihood you grind their
way slowly to a victory over you know, in years
to come. But in parallel to that, we are seeing
now a very very concerted Ukrainian campaign to bomb Russia's
energy industry. Ukraine clearly has the you know, a very
(29:47):
advanced capabilities to do so. It has the technologies, it
has the long range drones, it has the wherewithal to
get through Russia's defenses or Russia's car'd defense simply, and
that's already had a significant impact. We're also seeing Ukraine
developing its own domestic missile program. There are a number
(30:09):
of a number of Ukrainian cruise missiles and long range
missiles now either being used or in development and close
to the point where they can be used in a
regular basis. Now once that comes online, more we're talking
about a whole different level of destruction of the Russian
energy sector. So if a drone, you know, drones essentially
can cause some damage, but that can be repaired in
(30:31):
most cases within a matter of weeks. If we're talking
about cruise missiles going into these all refineries and thoughts
and whatnot, they could be put out of action permanently
or certainly for a matter of months and months and
then the task of repairing the damage becomes much more
complex for Russia. You know, Agin, I'm not an expert
on the ail and gas industry, but as far as
I understood, you know, there are if the damage gets
(30:53):
to a certain level, it may actually come to the
point where they have to close down certain oil fields.
It may come to the point where they cannot where
they can't be maintained anymore. You know. So for Russia,
this is this is this is Putin's Achilles heel, and
Ukraine is demonstrating that it can hit it. So you know,
why are we suddenly seeing this, this this sense of
urgency and this pressure on Ukraine to just sign up
(31:14):
to this piece deal as quickly as possible. Well, I
would suggest it's because the Russians see the writing on
the wall and understand that if the war is allowed
to continue at this current pace, with their very very
slow gains, and as Ukraine becomes much more adept at
hitting hard inside Russia, situation is going to start looking
much more, much more precarious for Pultin and it's going
(31:37):
to be much harder for him to maintain the situation
economically and the stability with inside Russia they're already experiencing
petrol shortages across Russia. The economy in Russia is is
in fairly bad shape. But at the moment it's manageable.
But you know, will it be manageable next year, Will
it be manageable by the spring? Not clear at all.
(31:57):
So you know, I mean, I would say, is a
general rule. When someone comes to you and says, you know,
we've got a great deal, but you've got to do it,
and now we've got to do it immediately, that's usually
suspicious behavior. Usually it's usually caused for suspicion. And that's
exactly what we're seeing now from Trump. You know, this
sense of urgency, this this rush, this this hurry to
get things done, where there's no really obvious reason behind it.
(32:21):
So I would suggest, if you want to understand why
this is coming from I think it's because Russia recognizes
that this position is actually a lot weaker than the
Kremin would like us to believe, and they understand it.
They've got to, you know, they need to wrap this
up now.
Speaker 2 (32:34):
And if you're right, which I think you are, this
is the worst time for us to to give in
and for Ukraine to give in. So I think that
we need to stand tall. Anyway. We're going to take
a break for some messages and come back in two
minutes with Peter and I. We're going to talk about
these security guarantees. That's I think the other big issue
that Ukraine needs and I wonder if this is strong enough.
(32:55):
Stay with us, everyone back in two minutes.
Speaker 1 (33:01):
Stream us live at SAGA nine sixty am dot C.
Speaker 2 (33:04):
A welcome back everyone to the Brankrymbry Ride war. We've
got Peter Dickinson with us tonight. He's coming to us
from Kiev. He's he's the Ukrainian editor for the Atlantic Council.
(33:25):
He's a British citizen that has been living in Ukraine
for a couple of decades and we've had the privilege
of chatting with him a few times in the past
about what's going on in Ukraine. Peter, security guarantees are
they strong enough? You know? We you and I have
talked previously about, you know, different accords that have been
written that people didn't honor in the past, and other
(33:47):
examples of security guarantees like Article five of NATO. You're
not getting Ukraine's not getting that in this We're not
allowing if this peace planet is accepted, Ukraine to join it,
or isn't getting a guarantee equal to your Article five?
Are these guarantees strong enough for? What do you think about,
(34:08):
you know, not joining NATO, not joining the EU, you know,
being sort of independent but not not being able to
join Europe? Tell me is this strong enough?
Speaker 3 (34:17):
Well? I mean the short answer, I mean, I think
is we don't know at this stage. The comments, the
comments that I've seen from the from the proposed you know,
the draft piece plan, the twenty eight points are very
very vague. There are some amendments to that or further
details that have been published which would suggest, yeah, a
(34:38):
slightly more plausible approach, you know than the term that
you see uses you know, NATO style or NATO level,
but it's not clear exactly what you know, how how
how watertight that is. There is also a number of
of of of clauses which would which would basically annull
(35:00):
any security guarantees, you know, rather strange courses I would say,
you know, in terms of if Ukraine fire fires rockets
at St. Petersburg or Moscow, they would then annull any
any security guarantees. If Ukraine invades Russia or so on,
you know, and that is worrying in the sense that
you know, Russia is is you know, widely accused and
(35:24):
widely believed to engage in false flag operations on a
regular basis. You know, a lot. No, there've been an absolute,
absolute avalanche of accusations and evidence of Russia doing that
here in Ukraine, and Russia bombing communities, civilians and then saying,
look what the Ukrainians have been doing. You know, so
it wouldn't be it would certainly not be a surprise
(35:44):
for anyone here if you know, if some sort of
agreement were reached and then all of a sudden a
missile were to appear in Moscow or some peters Burg
or somewhere else, and the Russians were saying, well, look
at this, the Ukrainians have just done this. Therefore there
are no more security guarantees. Yeah, so that's one small,
minor aspect of it, but there's a lot of you know,
the devil is in the details. I mean, I think
(36:05):
if we take a step back, you know, Ukraine fundamentally,
you know, the Ukrainians believe that Russia's goal is to
is to end Ukrainian statement is to incorporate Ukraine into Russia.
But that's put in his overall objective. He's never really
speaking Speedish Russian audience. He's never really made a secret
of that. He's been very clear that he doesn't believe
(36:26):
Ukraine has the right to exist as an independent country.
He doesn't believe Ukrainians have the right to have a
separate national identity and a separate nation. You know, they
should be you know, Ukraine and Ukrainian ukrainianness so to speak,
can exist within the broader Russian world, as they did
under the Soviets, and they did to it to an
(36:47):
extent in a very controlled sense under the Czars as well.
But the idea of a separate Ukrainian nation, a separate
Ukrainian culture, a separate Ukrainian history, and so on is
absolutely anathema to put In. It is a important regards
that as an existential threat to Russia itself, and he
can't tolerate that. So, you know, the idea is that Russia,
(37:09):
even whatever terms they may agree today tomorrow, are they
going to come back and try and finish the job
they have to, because that's the entire basis of Russia's
Russia's imperial ideology and put into personal world view. So Ukraine,
you know, Ukraine needs to have absolutely credible, water tight
security guarantees that are of the you know, of a
(37:30):
level of later because that's the only thing that can
keep the Russians from continuing this invasion. Now that is,
you know, the fact that this is included in this,
in this, in this, this proposal, it is encouraging the
fact that they're even talking about it, and the fact
that they're talking about these these these security guarantees being
provided by the Americans, because Trump's been very cagey about
(37:54):
what he isn't and it isn't prepared to do. Now
all of a sudden, apparently we're seeing that they are
prepared to provide the sort of the sort of guarantees.
But frankly speaking, Trump's credibility is very low. Now. The
idea that people would that Ukraine would put their faith
in Donald Trump and believe that he would act in
(38:15):
the circumstances if Russia were to renew its invasion and
would go to war with Russia, essentially, because that's what
we're being asked, that's what they would be asked to do.
They would need to go to war. I think that
a lot of people will have difficulty believing that. So
even if the wording is good, even if the framing
is credible and it's positioned as essentially a NATO standard
(38:39):
security guarantee, a lot of people are going to be
very skeptical of it.
Speaker 4 (38:43):
A lot of people in Ukraine, but also I think
a lot of people in America, a lot of people
across Europe and Canada will all be very very skeptical
with good reason. And I think crucially the Russians also
will be prepared to say, yeah, okay, whatever, you know,
that's nice, you know, the Americans because what they want,
But the Russians will feel I'm sure that when push
(39:04):
comes to shove, if they do renew their invasion, the
worst that can happen is that Trump would come back
to where we are today.
Speaker 3 (39:12):
He would provide you praying with weapons, he would impose
sanctions on the Russians, and perhaps increase the American military
presidency at East in Europe, Center of Europe, something along
those lines. The idea that America or anyone else is
going to fight Russia on behalf of Ukraine remains really
really far fetched. And that's that's fundamental because ultimately, when
(39:36):
we talk about a security guarantee, that's what we mean,
you know, that's what NATO means, we mean, you know,
you attack on one is an attack on all. That's
what people mean when they talk about NATO's standard security guarantees.
And unless that is the case, it won't be enough
to prefect Ukraine. And frankly, I don't believe that anyone's
going to fight for Ukraine, and I don't think anyone
in Ukraine believes it. I don't think anyone in Russia
(39:58):
believes it either. So it's good that this conversation is happening.
And these these guarantees, whatever they may be, will certainly
be better than nothing, because they would obliged, they would
they would bring a certain degree of military support if
nothing else, and sanctions and so on. But yeah, it's
not a guarantee, you know, if the terminology security to
polyns leading it because it's not a guarantee.
Speaker 2 (40:19):
So please remind us there were somewhat guarantees in the
agreement that was reached when Ukraine gave up its nuclear
weapons and no one lived up to that. Is that
not correct?
Speaker 3 (40:29):
Yes? Correct? But again, you know, the devil was in
the details then, very much so and very painfully so.
So that was in nineteen ninety four. That was the
Buddha Pest Memorandum that was signed between the Ukrainians and
the Americans, the Brits and the Russians. Later on the
French and the Chinese added their added their signatures, I believe,
(40:50):
But essentially this was this was this was this was
an agreement by which Ukraine agreed to hand over its
entire nuclear arsenal. At the time, because of Ukraine's geographical
position close to close to Europe, because of Ukraine's very
sophisticated military industrial complex, which was the heart of the
(41:14):
Soviet military industrial machine, a large portion of the Soviet
Union's nuclear weapons had been been based in Ukraine, you know,
so when the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine inherited I forget
the exact numbs are a thousand I think nuclear weapons,
but at the time it was the third largest nuclear
arsenal in the world. It was a very very big deal. Now,
(41:38):
the actual keys to fire these weapons, the codes as
it were, were in Moscow. Ukraine didn't have the wherewithal
at that point to use the weapons. But you know,
necessity is the mother of invention, one would assume that
they could have perhaps found a way to do that.
There's also there were also questions about Ukraine's ability then
to maintain this large arsenal because it cost a lot
(41:59):
of money to so Ukraine at the time was completely
in economic crisis, was flat broke, you know. So there
were practical reasons why it made sense to Ukraine to
get rid of this arsenal. But of course it was
it was a key part of their national security. It
was there. It was their security guarantee. Let's say, it
was a very very very very serious security guarantee, and
(42:19):
they gave it up under a lot of pressure, it
should be said, in the Americans, a lot of pressure.
And when they did so, the Budapest Memorandum contained what
they called security assurances, so they weren't guarantees. They weren't
even labeled as guarantees. Now, the Ukrainians, some Ukrainians, still
(42:40):
maintained to this day that they were told they were guarantees.
That in the Ukrainian language version of the text, they're
referred to as such, that it is implied that they
are secured. They are native style guarantees. Certainly in the
English language version, the Russian version, they are Ukrainian. Sorry,
they are security assurances. Essentially, that means that each country
(43:02):
said we won't attack Ukrainie. You know, so the Brits
say we won't attack. The American said, well, we will
never attack. The Russians said, well, of course we won't attack.
But they didn't say if someone else attacks, we're going
to come and fight for you. They said, if there's
someone else attacks, we're going to have consultations, We're going
to have talks. We might do this, we might do that,
we might do a lot of things. But there were
(43:22):
no guarantees in it. So it was it was a
flawed document from day one. I would say, you know,
the signatories on the Ukrainian side have often tried to
defend it by saying it or we were led to believe.
You know, they've played the role of essentially saying we
were misled. You know, whether that's the case or not,
you know, it's difficult to ascertain from this distance, but
(43:43):
clearly it didn't work. You know. So when Russia invaded
Ukraine in twenty fourteen and seized Crimea and went into
East Ukraine, and the Ukrainians turned around and said well
what about the wood First Memorandum, the other signatories being well,
the Russians first of all said well, you know, you know,
that's life, sorry, tough luck, basically, and the Brits and
the Americans said, yeah, well, we didn't invade, you know,
(44:06):
that's basically what you know. Will give you the consultations
that we agreed on, you know, and they wouldn't be
held to it either. So the whole thing was a
very very painful mess, not only for Ukraine but for
anyone who who is told by you know, global superpowers
or don't worry, give up these weapons, we'll give you security,
you know, assurances. So now this conversation is coming around again.
(44:28):
Of course Ukrainians are very very conscious that they've got
to a they've got to make sure that they read
the small print night really carefully, but also be I
think fundamentally they're like, well, we don't believe a word
of it. We've been here before. This is just another
bullhetpest memorandum. It's not going to work. And so, you know,
a huge amount of cynicism about this idea of Western
(44:49):
security guarantees, largely because of Ukraine's very very very painful experience.
Speaker 2 (44:56):
Peri Dickinson, thank you so much for joining us. I
really appreciate it. One quick last question, if I could.
We've only got a minute left. My social media has
blown up saying this is Munich all over again, this
is Chamberlain, this is appeasement.
Speaker 3 (45:06):
What do you think, Yeah, I was the obvious comparison.
I mean, I would say, actually, it may it made
me worse. I mean I think I think at the
time of at the time of Munich, the the Western Powers, Chamberlain,
certainly they knew that the you know, war with Hitler
was likely, so to such a certain degree they were
buying time. You know, whilst Munich was taking place, and
before Munich, and certainly after Munich, the British were very
(45:28):
very actively re arming. They were re energy, was re
energizing their their military industries. They were massively producing warplanes,
and that that proved to be decisive. Eventually they won
the Battle of Britain because of that, because of the
warplanes they were able to produce, and you know, so
they were they were they were they were doing sort
of very very shameful deals with Hitler, but at the
same time they knew that it was likely they'd have
(45:50):
to fight him, and they were preparing for that. We're
doing the shameful deals now, but I don't know if
we're preparing to face the Russians. I don't know if
the West is preparing. And that's the big problem here.
They're still you know, we're still sleepwalking and not understanding
that this is not going to go away. If we
do this deal with Putin now and hand him essentially
victory in Ukraine, you know, the idea that he's just
(46:12):
going to stop is delusional. He will be emboldened, he
will be empowered, and he will go further. And Europe
is certainly not ready. I'm not sure if the West,
ritt large is ready either, and that's that's deeply alarming.
Speaker 2 (46:24):
Sure is Thank you so much for joining us and
giving us that warning that we're sleepwalking, because I agree
with you, and I think we've got to wake up
to the reality of Russia and particularly Putin's desires for
this new greater Russia. And he's not going to stop here,
particularly if we give him victory, because he's going to
learn his lesson that he can do it. Stay with us, everybody,
(46:45):
as we continue to follow what's going on and thank
you Peter for joining us again. Please check in again
and please stay safe, stay with us. Everyone back in
two minutes.
Speaker 1 (46:59):
New Radio No Problem stream is live on SAGA ninety
sixty am dot C.
Speaker 2 (47:04):
A welcome back to the Brian Cromby Radio Hour tonight.
I want to close with a message that goes beyond politics.
It's beyond diplomacy, it's beyond any single country. It's the
(47:25):
message about history and whether we've learned anything from it.
This past weekend, something deeply unsettled unfolded in Washington, a
sort of leaked US peace proposal for the Ukraine, a
twenty eight point plan that is outlining territorial concessions and
supposed security guarantees, which ignited a political firestone. But it
(47:46):
wasn't just the content of the document to shock people,
it was the chaos surrounding it. Within an hour, senior
American officials contradicted one another about where the plan came from,
what it meant, and even whether the United States completely
supported it. Were told one thing on private phone calls,
the State Department said the opposite publicly, and then senators
issued new statements walking back their original claims. It was
(48:08):
diplomacy by confusion. It was the improvisation on matters where
improvisation is dangerous. On my show today, I spoke with
Peter Dickinson of the Atlantic Council, and together we tried
to make sense of it all. What emerged we tried
to figure out was a disturbing piece, a disturbing picture
of a peace plan that in its language, logic and
(48:29):
objectives sounded far more like a Russian document translated into
English than a genuine American proposal. But here's the part
that concerns me most. The assumption was spoken by some
in Washington that Ukraine can't simply hand over a slice
of dun Esque or some occupied region and then a
chief piece. It's the same assumption that Nevill Chamberlain made
(48:51):
in nineteen thirty eight, and it is just as naive
today as it was then, because we have seen repeatedly
what happens when you try to buy the goodwill of
a dictator with someone else's territory. You don't get peace,
you get more war. And Ukraine understands this better than anyone.
For those who believe that life under Russian occupation is
(49:12):
simply life under a different flag, that people will just
pay taxes to Moscow and carry on. That remind you
of a story shared with me by a Ukrainian friend,
Vladimir Kushonenko, The story of the Morara. In eighteen thirty five,
Morawi warriors arrived on the Chatham Islands. The Moray, peaceful welcoming,
nonviolent for centuries, received them with open arms. They tried coexistence.
(49:36):
What followed was genocide. The Morari were hunted, killed and
slaved and forcibly assimilated. Their language was wiped out, their
sacred places defiled. Not in ancient times, but in the
mid nineteenth century. When an invading force does not recognize
your right to exist, peace becomes the mask worn by extermination.
(49:58):
Ukraine has lived its own version of this. After being
absorbed by the Civit Union. Ukraine endured the Halamidor Up
to seven million people starved to death. Its intellectuals were executed,
its language was banned, its culture was target targeted for erasure,
and today in Russian occupied territories, Ukrainians arrested by speaking
their own language. Teachers in Buka were executed simply by
(50:20):
teaching Ukrainian literature and history. Russia has shown us repeatedly
that it does not want land, it wants identity, it
wants dominance, it wants submission. This is why Ukrainians fight,
not because they're stubborn, not because the alternative is annihilation.
And this is why the twenty eight point peace plan matters,
because a true peace planet, real peace plan, has to
(50:42):
include the withdrawal of Russian forces, the restoration of Ukraine's borders,
the return of abducted children, and accountability for genocide and
war crimes, and binding securities guarantees so this never happens again.
But the Leak proposal, it looks like appeasement, which brings
me back to Munich. We all know the story. We've
(51:03):
written it, we've read it in our history books. In
nineteen thirty eight, Nevil Chamberlain returned from his meeting in
Munich with Hitler, waving a piece of paper declaring peace
for our time. He had handed over part of Czechoslovakia
in the hope of satisfying a dictator. Winston Churchill saw
through it instantly. His words echo today. We were given
(51:25):
the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor, and
you'll still have the war. Chamberlain's appeasement didn't prevent war,
it guaranteed it because it made Hitler stronger. And today
we see that same temptation creeping back into Western policy,
the idea that giving Putin part of Ukraine will somehow
(51:45):
tame him, that if we just sacrifice a little freedom
somewhere else, we can secure stability at home. But dictators
don't stop. They advance until they are stopped. Give Putin
Denesque and he'll ask for Odessa. Give him Odessa, and
Moldova is next. Given Moldova, and the Baltics become vulnerable,
and if nature fractures, the entire post war security order collapses.
(52:09):
This is not alarmism, This is history. My deepest concern
is that the United States intentionally are not is drifting
toward another Munich. And the world does not need another Chamberlain.
But the world needs now is another Churchill, a leader
who understands that you cannot negotiate away another's nation sovereignty.
(52:29):
You cannot deter aggression by indulging it. You cannot build
peace by rewarding genocide. Ukraine is not asking America to
fight its war. It's asking America not to help Putin
win it. If we choose dishonor today, we will face
greater danger tomorrow. If we choose strength, we preserve stability,
not just for Ukraine, but for Europe and for the
(52:50):
Western world and the whole world. The lesson is as
old as history. Weakness invites war, strength prevents it. This
moment is a test not just of American policy, but
of whether we have learned anything at all from the
twentieth century, whether we remember Munich, whether we remember Churchill,
whether we remember how quickly peace collapses when democracies abandon
(53:13):
those on the front lines. We stand again today at
a crossroads between dishonor and resolve, between appeasement and leadership,
between repeating history and learning from it. My hope, my plea,
is that we don't choose the path of Munich, of Chamberlain,
but the path of Winston Churchill. I'm Brian Crombie and
(53:35):
that's what I think today. We need, the world needs
for Churchill. That's our show for tonight, everybody, Thank you
for joining us.
Speaker 3 (53:42):
Good night.
Speaker 1 (53:47):
Stream us live at SAGA nine at CA
The views expressed in the following program are those of
the participants and do not necessarily reflect the views of
SAGA nine sixty am or its management.
Speaker 2 (00:18):
Good evening, everyone, and welcome to the Brian Crimey Radio.
So what's going on in Ukraine with this Ukraine peace
proposal from the United States? I wanted to check in
with Peter Dickinson, who is the Ukraine editor for the
Atlantic Council. We've had the privilege of chatting with him
several times before about the Russian invasion, about what's going on,
you know, his attitudes toward Putin, his sense of what's
(00:41):
Putin's agenda is, etc.
Speaker 3 (00:42):
But it just.
Speaker 2 (00:43):
Seems Peter like, you know, there's lots of different issues,
you know. I've read some things that this plan is
Russian translated into English, and you can tell by way
of the mangled English, you can tell that people have
said this is, you know, the the envoy Trump's envoy
that is off on a flyer round himself. I've heard
(01:05):
that this is a complete capitulation. I've heard that this
is the right solution. Tell us what's going on and
what do you think is going to happen this week?
Speaker 3 (01:14):
Well, yeah, I mean, I think you're right to set
the tone of chaos basically because it is very hard
to know what's going on. There are all sorts of
different messages. I mean, if we just go sort of
step by step, you know what we can say with
any sort of any sort of certainty. I think the
first point would be, you know, to confirm your your
your introduction there that this this document as it's been
(01:36):
presented to the public or has been leaked in English,
is clearly it's clearly a translation from a Russian original.
Any knowledge of the Russian language and the kind of
terminology that the Kremlin uses in its official documents and
its official speech, it's amasi. Anyone who knows the Russian
it's immediately recognizable that this was a Russian document that's
(01:59):
been translated largely, if not entirely, into English from the
Russian So, you know, we can say that with a
pretty high degree of confidence. You know, then the question
emerges of you know, well, so does that mean it's
simply a Russian document or you know, it could have
been a document that was discussed by the Russians and Americans,
and the Russians rolled it up and sent it and
(02:20):
said Okay, this is what we've come up with based
on your comments. You know, it doesn't necessarily mean that
this is just simply the Americans pushing the Russian narrative. However,
it is a very strongly pro Russian document. It's very
much in line with Russias with a lot of Russia's
key messages and key positions on the wall that they've
(02:40):
consistently sought. But there are areas where there's some room
for perhaps you know, some that they're perhaps encouraging or
slightly not disastrous, let's say, terms for Ukraine. So there
are areas where it could be potentially discussed. There are
(03:00):
areas where it's very very problematic. I think that we're
going to see some some give and take over the
over the coming days. There's now talk. I mean, I
wanted to ask, actually, this is Will this interview be
broadcast on Monday? Is that the plan? Yes? Yes, so
it's someday today. I don't know if we're going to
(03:22):
just go behind you know, behind the curtain. A lot
of this could be out of date by the time
it gets out right. I mean, this is the reality,
this is, this is where we are. I would imagine
might at this point, my prediction would be there's going
to be some give and take. There's going to be
some back and forth about the key points of the plan.
The key points of the plan as I see them,
are security guarantees, and the nature of those security guarantees
(03:46):
for Ukraine absolutely central. And then the second part, the
second key part would be territorial concessions by Ukraine. You
know how that would look in practice, what that would entail,
how that how it be accomplished in practice, and what
status areas that are left under the Russian control would have.
(04:06):
So these are going to be discussed, I think, I think,
you know, the initial the initial positioning that we saw
from from the Americans essentially was a kind of take
it or leave it. On Friday, that was certainly the
impression that I'd got, and I think a lot of
people had, and Celelensky came out and made a very
powerful speech that that that confirmed thoughts or reinforced that
(04:27):
that perception that the Americans were saying, look, you signed this,
or we're done, you know, and your fate will be
very very uncertain. Then now it seems that the American
position is well, you know, let's see, it's a talking point.
It's a start. You know, we're just looking to get
the conversation going, which is a very very different position.
So I imagine the story is going to move more.
But yeah, it's it. It's a very very strange, i
(04:50):
would say, diplomatic process. And at the moment, the overriding
impression I get is of a kind of lack of
coordination on the American side and the lack of claric
about where they even really stand.
Speaker 2 (05:02):
It seems like the Americans didn't even speak with their
allies or with NATO and newrous different European countries and
I think Canada and again this all could change in
a minute, have all come out against the plan. Is
that what you're hearing?
Speaker 3 (05:15):
Yeah? Again, I think that. I think that's one of
the few things we can say with with with a
high degree of confidence. Again, you know, like the fact
that the document appears to have been the original, appears
to have been written in Russian. It does not appear
to that does not appear to have been any meaningful
consultation with the Canadians, or the Europeans or any American allies.
And for that matter, there doesn't appear to have been
(05:35):
any really significant consultation with Ukraine either. I think the
Ukrainians perhaps were involved in some parallel discussions. I don't
think they were directly involved in sitting down and saying, okay,
let's hammer out these twenty eight points. They were certainly,
you know, if they were involved, they were perhaps consulted
on some specific issues at some point in the discussion.
(05:56):
This seems to have been a bilateral process between Erica
in Russia. Others have been simply ignored. Yeah, so that's that.
That seems to be very clearly the case.
Speaker 2 (06:08):
I've also, you know, heard many comments that this is
I think the gentleman's name is Steve Winkoff and the
Trump envoy, uh special envoy on this issue, that this
was all him, and it wasn't the State Department, it
wasn't Marco Rubio, wasn't all the experts on Russia that
were involved. It was just you know, one guy that
was doing a flyer. What's your sense of that? Is
(06:28):
that just a criticism or is that anywhere close to
the truth?
Speaker 3 (06:31):
Do you think? Well, that again, that's the that's the
impression we have that wick Cooff seems to be trying
to handle this in his own very specific way. Wickcoff
is not a professional diplomat. He has no training or
or or significantly long term experience in the field of
international relations or diplomacy. He's a real estate He is
(06:53):
a real estate investor who was a friend of Trump,
a personal friend of Trumps. He plays golf with Trump,
and they've been friends and colleagues for decades. And that's
what this is, you know, That's where his role comes from. Now.
Wikkov has been a prominent figure in talks with Russia
since the start of Trump's second presidency and certainly since
(07:14):
the spring of this year, and he's made a number
of very very high profile blunders in his first big
media forays, first big media comments. In the spring of
this year, he gave an interview to Tucker Carlson in
which he praised pulled In as a great guy and legitimized,
essentially legitimized the sort of Stylin style referendums that Russia
(07:39):
had held in occupied Ukraine to try and to try
and legitimize their occupation. And these referendums were roundly rejected
by the international community. And I think any country, not
even the likes of China, were prepared to come out
and support what was obviously a farce. It was obviously
a criminal endeavor. It literally held that gun point, you know,
(08:01):
a captive population sort of frog march to the polls
to try and add a veneer of respectability to Rush's occupation.
And and Wikov came out and said, well, look, they
all voted in a referendum, so they want to be
part of Russia. And this was this was flabbergasting. This
is absolutely stunning incompetence or or a lack of a
lack of any sort of you know, moral bankruptcy essentially,
(08:25):
and that there's something that no, no, not not even
the American, no one in the world had it actually
gone that far before. So Wikkov has a record for
being someone who is prone to very very damaging gaffs,
but also he seems to feel that he is a
very competent figure and going into you do things on
his own. He's he's he's has a direct relationship with
(08:47):
Kiril Dmitriev, who is the Russian point man. He's basically
opposite number in the Kremlin, and the two of them
appear to have cooked this up together. Ruby the the
American that the Trump's administration has tried to position this
as a collective effort and that Rubio has been involved
throughout the process. Rubio's comments recently, as have been reported
(09:13):
by members of the Senate, suggest that's not the case
at all. But he wasn't involved at all in this process.
We don't know. I certainly don't know. I'm inclined to
think that that Rubio wouldn't be making the statements he's
been making, and that he said that his colleagues in
the Senate if he was, if he felt that he'd
been involved in this, it seems like it is a
a wick Off show, a Wickcoff one man show.
Speaker 2 (09:34):
Basically, the counter to your comments about these farce referendums
that we hear, particularly from the right wing media and
you know, social media posts that you never know exactly
where they're coming from here in North America, are that, well,
these were the parts of Ukraine that voted in favor
of joining Russia or for Russian oriented presidents for Ukraine
(10:01):
in the past, that it was primarily Russian speaking, that
it was very populated by a lot of Russian people,
that it was part of Russia. How do you counter
that argument that these territories were leaning very Russian.
Speaker 3 (10:15):
Well, all of Ukraine was and is Russian speaking to
a degree, you know, to a lect to a greater
or lesser degree, because it was ruled by Russia. And
so the same way that in the same way that
America is English speaking, or that Mexico is Spanish speaking,
or that the large parts of the Middle East Arabic speaking.
You know, that is the dom that is the lingua
franc are imposed by the dominant political power of the region.
(10:37):
And that was the case with Russian. So, you know,
the use of the Russian language is no indicator of
political affiliation. It never has been, and it certainly isn't today.
Pultin has tried to equate the use of the Russian
language with with with with associations with Russia. But frankly speaking,
it's it's a bizarre it's a bizarre and nonsensical argument.
(11:00):
Kiev is the largest Russian speaking city outside of the
Russia itself. It's also the capital of Ukraine, in a
very patriotic, proud capital that no Russian would claim is
you know, is a bastion of pro Russian sentiment. It's
clearly not. It's clearly a city where, on the contrary,
has been at the very heart of Ukraine's efforts to
(11:20):
emerge as a nation over the last last thirty years
since its country gained independence and as sort of consolidated
it's sovereignty and independence. You know, Kiev has been the
driving force behind that throughout that period. And yet you know,
you still will hear in Russian spoken widely Kim and
again it's you know, it's the biggest Russian speaking city
in the world outside of Russia itself, and yet with
(11:44):
a very strong anti Kremlin sentiment. So you know, the
whole argument about Russian speakers and the Russian languages has
always been always been very, very misleading and exploited by
the Kremlin. In terms of the historical aspect of it, again,
you know, all of Ukraine was ruled by was ruled
(12:05):
was ruled by Russia except the west of the country
for centuries and centuries. The west was incorporated into the
Soviet Union, which is essentially the Russian Russian Empire by
a different name in the after World War II. Prior
to that, the rest of Ukraine had been under Russian
control since the city earlieress in the late seventeenth century
(12:25):
early eighteenth century, so you know, there was a long,
long colonial history of Russian influence. And yet in nineteen
ninety one, when the Soviet Union began to sort of
fray at the scenes and it seemed to be an
opportunity to claim independence, Ukrainians voted overwhelmingly the entire country.
(12:47):
In December nineteen ninety one, they held a referendum, and
the entire country, every single region, including the East, including
areas that Russia claims now have always been Russian, including Crimea,
all voted by strong majorities for independence, to leave Russia,
to leave the Kremlin essentially, and to have an independent country. So,
you know, to give you some idea of what we're
(13:08):
talking about here, the regions in the East don Excandloguants,
which the Russians have occupied since twenty fourteen and now
claimed to be, you know, historically ancestral Russian lands. They
voted by a margin of around eighty to twenty five percent.
I believe to become independent countries, to lead them to
become an independent country, excuse me, to leave Russia. So
(13:30):
you know, the idea that these areas were always Russian,
and that they were sort of they were sort of
you know, struggling under the yoke of Ukrainian depression is
laughable really, and it's detainitely not supported by any ofsticle evidence.
It is true that these regions, traditionally in Ukraine, in
independent Ukraine, voted largely for pro Russian political parties, but
(13:54):
that's largely an extent of their desire to have good
ties with Russia, have good relations with Russia. There was
never any sense of a separatist movement or a desire
to join Russia, you know, And I would caution there
that there's a huge difference between someone saying, you know,
we want to have good relations with Russia and someone
saying we want to be Russian, we want to join Russia.
You know, that's a huge that's a huge sort of
(14:16):
oceans across. And there was never any hint that anyone
in those regions, apart perhaps some marginal like that few
percentages perhaps who actually wanted to join Russia. There was
never there was never any political movement to join Russia.
There was never any secretist movement that was all artificially
created or instigated by the Russians themselves. In twenty fourteen,
(14:41):
we're going.
Speaker 2 (14:41):
To take a break for some messages and come back
in two minutes with Peter Dickinson, the Ukrainian editor for
the Atlantic Council, And I'm going to go through some
of this peace plan peace part by part, and ask Peter,
you know what he thinks about the territorial claims, what
he thinks about the security guarantees, what does he think
about some of the other you know parts, Green never
to join NATO, et cetera. Say with this said one,
(15:02):
we'll be just back in two minutes talking about this
peace plant that seems to have come out of nowhere.
Speaker 1 (15:08):
Back into no Radio, No problem stream is live on
SAGA nineteen sixty am dot CAA.
Speaker 2 (15:29):
Come back everyone to the Brian crimeby radio or I've
got Peter Dickinson with us tonight. He's actually in Kiev,
but we've had the pleasure of chatting with him a
few times before. He is the Ukraine editor for the
Atlantic Council. He's a I think you're a brit aren't
you that found yourself in Ukraine and fell in love
with Ukraine and now you're trying to comment and publicize
what's going on in Ukraine to the world. I really
(15:50):
appreciate the role that you're playing.
Speaker 3 (15:52):
Yeah, yeah, yeah, I'm British. I'm from Liverpool Division Leona,
but I've been crying since the late nineteen nineties and
I've called it home for most of that period. You know,
I settled here and it's a wonderful place which is
going for a very difficult time.
Speaker 2 (16:08):
So happy to share my scene that makes me God
going through a very difficult time. Peter, talk about the
territorial lines that are in this piece plant if you could,
you know, I think you know, we've all seen the
maps have been publicized in the newspapers and things like that.
It seems like Russia's actually taking more land than they
(16:29):
actually have have occupied right now, and with natural fortifications
that it ends up being sort of a very permanent
kind of border that they're trying to create. Is it justified?
And you know, what's the alternative? It appears that Russia
is making headway, maybe foot by foot, meter by meter,
(16:53):
But do you think there's any hope that that Ukraine
can can kick Russia out of eastern Ukraine?
Speaker 3 (17:00):
Well, I mean the main aspect of the of the
territorial settlement that's proposed in this peace plan is to
essentially to recognize the current status quote, the current realities
on the ground, as it were the front line. So
that would mean Ukraine and the international community as a
whole recognizing that the areas currently under rocky Russian occupation
(17:23):
are de facto under Russian control, under Kremlin control, and
will remain.
Speaker 4 (17:28):
So.
Speaker 3 (17:29):
Now that's not the same as dejure. That doesn't mean
that they would be legally part of Russia. It wouldn't
be recognized, for example, by within with the international law
or by most countries as Russian sovereign territory. But they
would be recognized as being administered by Russia, as being
within Russia's purvey as it were de facto. So that
(17:51):
would be the most significant aspect of the territorial settlement,
which would be a you know, a very very major
victory for the Russians. It would essentially that Russia got
to keep, you know, the fruits of its invasion, you know,
it got to keep its gains. The Russians have been
pushing for a legal recognition, you know, for Ukraine to
officially see this territory and to redraw the map of Europe.
(18:14):
Ukraine has said that they will not do that under
any circumstances, and this peace deal as it stands doesn't
opbly to them or anyone else to do that. It's
all about, you know, it's about this very specific legal
difference between djure and de facto. So they're saying, okay,
we're going to recognize that the Russia holds this territory
and Ukraine will forego the right to take it back
(18:35):
by force. So they're basically saying, we're not going to
continue trying to fight for it. We will we will
retain our claim to it. So it'll be a bit
like East Germany after ninety after the Night after World
War two, when you know the Germans still sought unification
at some future date, or the Baltic States, I think
is a very specific and very very apt parallel, where
(18:56):
the Baltic States will recognize as de facto part of
the Soviet Union but not legally part of the Soviet Union.
And they were never fully reaped, they were always regarded
under international and certainly western most Western countries, they were
always regarded as occupied throughout the Soviet period after World
War II, and then they've gained independence in the in
(19:17):
nineteen ninety I think all three of them at which
point they were seem to have been regaining independence, reasserting
their independence, which is you know, they've never lost They
always had embassies in the West, Exilmple. So you know,
that's the legal that's the legal issue around the broad
territorial settlement the real and Ukraine has essentially said they
accept that. They've been saying that, They've said that for
(19:37):
a long time now because they recognize that in order
to liberate all of the areas occupied by the Russians,
you know, militarily, they would need a lot of support
from the West that they're simply not getting, and it
will be a huge, huge art for them to fight
against a much more you know, more numerically stronger, much richer,
(19:58):
much more powerful adversary that's deeply now entrenched on their land.
You know, to kick them out would be a you know,
even in the best of circumstances, would be a massive
military undertaking. You know that maybe you know, a power
an alliance like NATA could achieve, but a single country
like Ukraine that's already you know, very hip of heavily
you know, worn down by this war, it's a tall order.
(20:20):
So essentially, Ukraine said, okay, we don't like it, obviously,
we don't accept it. Legally, we're not going to see
the land, but we accept that this is the reality.
Speaker 2 (20:28):
Now.
Speaker 3 (20:29):
That's where we are now, and this is what the
piece still essentially lays out. But this is going to
be the de facto settlement. The big point of contention
is one part of the front in the in the
Donetsk region in East Ukraine. Now, this is part of
the Donetsk region, is part of the don Bats which
is the industrial Donbass region. This is the East Ukrainian heartlands.
This was this is this was the area that the
(20:51):
that the Russians that are put In has claimed from
the very early stages of the invasion in twenty fourteen
as as Russian and he's managed to expand the invasion
over the last almost four years now. They held don
K City itself in twenty fourteen, they occupied that and
(21:12):
an area around that. They held around I think around
one third of the Donetsk region in twenty fourteen. Now
since then they've added another half of it approximately. So
what you've got left is a little bit a little,
fairly small slither of Donetsk to the northeast of this region,
which I think is just under twenty percent around twenty
(21:33):
percent of don Etsk region. Now that's the area that
the Russians are now demanding that Ukraine hands over. Simply
that territory is in Ukrainian hands today. Ukrainians have been
fighting for it, defending it very fiercely for now for more,
not just the last four years, but the last eleven years,
(21:54):
that's twenty fourteen. It's a very heavily fortive region. It's
a region with a population that probably now after people
have been of course displaced or left because of the
terrible living conditions, there probably still has a civilian population
numbering in one hundreds of thousands. Again, that often gets forgotten.
So I've an area that's heavily fortified. There's a number
(22:17):
of big cities there sort of linked up in a
chain of fortifications. There's a big civilian population, there's a
big military and administrative population as well. So this is
really a center of it's a bastion of Ukrainian defense
in the East Russia. If it wants to take it militarily,
most people anticipate that it would take years to achieve that,
(22:41):
and it would cost them hundreds of thousands of troops.
In terms of casualties maybe more. You know, the cities
that are in question there, the cities there, not only
are they more fortified, they're much bigger than anything Russia
has taken in the last three years. You know, Russia
has been fighting over towns of the population of maybe five, ten,
twenty thousand, and it's taking them each time, you know,
(23:03):
months and months to get to take the take over
these essentially ruins. We're talking about cities here with pre
war populations of hundreds of thousands. They're on a different scale.
They're much bigger. So if Russia were to take this territory,
it would take them years and be extremely costing for
them now and then. So that's one aspect of the debate.
(23:23):
The other aspect, of course, is why does Russia need
this territory? Why is it so important for them? It's
a symbolic value that they've claimed that this is the
region that's part of Russia and they must be the
Congress of this region. That's one, but also two, it's
very it's very well defended, and it's very well defensible
in terms of the geography of the region. If Russia
(23:45):
takes this region, then beyond that, there are no defenses.
Really there's no natural obvious defenses or defensive lines. So
the great fear in Ukraine is that if Russia took
this territory, not only would it be a massive psychological
blow to see Ukraine handover land that the Ukrainian army
defended successfully from more in a decade, and to hand
(24:06):
over this large chunk of Ukraine to the Russians essentially
without a fight. Also it would potentially serve as a
gateway and leave the way open for Russia then to
sweep into central Ukraine and to dramatically expand the invasion
you know in the future. You know, maybe maybe in
the coming months, maybe in the coming years, but it
(24:27):
would be a springboard or a gateway for that and
Ukraine's defense, you know, the main focal point of view
defenses would basically be gone. So that is a relatively
small area compared to the broader area that's under Russian occupation,
but it's extremely important from a military, strategic and also
a psychological point of view. And the messaging from Ukraine
(24:50):
is like, there's no way they're going to hand it
over now. Of course, you never know, there maybe some
within negotiations they may change that stance. But I think
even if Zelensky said, yeah, you know what, we can
hand you over, there'd be massive backlash from the Ukrainians,
massive backlash.
Speaker 2 (25:05):
So what's the justification for this demand? Just that we
want it?
Speaker 3 (25:11):
Yeah, basically, yeah, we want it. I mean the justification
I think the argument, the argument is we're going to
take it anyway. You can let us take it over
the next few years and watch, you know, hundreds of
thousands of people be slaughtered, including Ukrainians of course, Ukrainians
and Russians. You know, we can we can go through
that process if you wish, and let you know, let's say,
(25:31):
let's say half a million could could potentially be people
just slaughtered, or you can hand it over an animal,
sign a piece steel, you know. So they're trying to
position it in this way. And this is what as
I understand that the Americans are basically saying, look, you're
going to lose this over time. You may you know,
the Russians are advancing, They're advancing at an absolute glacial pace.
(25:53):
You know, it will be a matter of years by
in all likelihood. But in a war of a tree
with two sides just hammering away at each other, Russia
will win eventually. You know, Russia is a much much
larger country, has a population approximately four times the size
of Ukraine. As an economy, maybe ten to fifteen times
(26:14):
the size of Ukraine, maybe more. It has you know,
huge amounts of natural resources. It can draw on allies
like North Korea who are not squeamish like the Europeans are,
or many Western many of Ukraine, Western Alisa are simply
pouring armaments and missiles and even soldiers to the Russian
war effort. The Chinese are very supportive as well, and
(26:34):
so on. So you know, the idea is, if we
just let this war drag on, the odds are stacked
in Russia's favor. So the argument here, the counter argument
to Ukraine fetish saying you know, no way, is like, well,
it's going to happen anyway, so you may, you know,
it would be it would be the right thing to
do from a humanitarian point of view, from a perhaps
(26:57):
in a strategic point of view, to just hand this
out of a gate down and then make that deal,
make the deal, and then we'll, you know, then we'll
have we'll have peace, and then Ukraine can rebuild as
a country and hope for the best, I suppose.
Speaker 2 (27:12):
So, you know, it seems from what we read in
the Western media that as you say, the Russia is
winning but at glacial pace, foot by foot, nothing more
than that, uh, And that they're almost desperate in the
attacks on residential areas in Ukraine versus Ukraine seems strategic,
(27:32):
and its destruction of of Russian oil refineries and distribution
and pipelines and things like that, that the the access
to long range armaments that the United States has allowed
them is working, and that the increased sanctions are working.
And so you know, I guess we're frustrated to like
why out you know, maybe you're right that over a
(27:55):
decade Russia will win, but it seems like it's going
to take a long long time. So, you know, this
seems inconsistent with at least the reports that we get
in the media of very slow, if not impossibly slow,
Russian advances versus Ukraine actually making some victories with destruction
of Russian infrastructure.
Speaker 3 (28:17):
Well, I think that's that's that is that that is
an excellent you know that the question of why now
is an is an excellent question that I think more
people need to be asking now because this has literally
come out of nowhere. I mean, of course there's been
talks going on, presumably for weeks. I've got months about this,
this this proposal, but it did come out of nowhere,
so to speak, and it has been, now, you know,
(28:38):
sort of rushed in, like we have to have a
decision now. It's got to be done now, you know.
So you know why now, But also you know why
the rush? Why are they so hurried about this? Now
is it? Why is it all of a sudden got
to be decided now now? I would suggest my personal
feeling on this is that the sense of urgency is
coming from the Russians, not I mean, the Americans are
(29:01):
voicing it, are articulating its sense of urgency, but it's
coming from the Russians because the Russian sense that their
position is deteriorating. Yes, on the battlefield, they're doing well, yes,
relatively speaking. I mean, they're not losing the war on
the battlefield, but they're winning it in a very costly
manner at an extremely slow pace. So yes, if they're
(29:25):
you know, all other things being equal, they could you know, theoretically,
and perhaps you know, in all likelihood you grind their
way slowly to a victory over you know, in years
to come. But in parallel to that, we are seeing
now a very very concerted Ukrainian campaign to bomb Russia's
energy industry. Ukraine clearly has the you know, a very
(29:47):
advanced capabilities to do so. It has the technologies, it
has the long range drones, it has the wherewithal to
get through Russia's defenses or Russia's car'd defense simply, and
that's already had a significant impact. We're also seeing Ukraine
developing its own domestic missile program. There are a number
(30:09):
of a number of Ukrainian cruise missiles and long range
missiles now either being used or in development and close
to the point where they can be used in a
regular basis. Now once that comes online, more we're talking
about a whole different level of destruction of the Russian
energy sector. So if a drone, you know, drones essentially
can cause some damage, but that can be repaired in
(30:31):
most cases within a matter of weeks. If we're talking
about cruise missiles going into these all refineries and thoughts
and whatnot, they could be put out of action permanently
or certainly for a matter of months and months and
then the task of repairing the damage becomes much more
complex for Russia. You know, Agin, I'm not an expert
on the ail and gas industry, but as far as
I understood, you know, there are if the damage gets
(30:53):
to a certain level, it may actually come to the
point where they have to close down certain oil fields.
It may come to the point where they cannot where
they can't be maintained anymore. You know. So for Russia,
this is this is this is Putin's Achilles heel, and
Ukraine is demonstrating that it can hit it. So you know,
why are we suddenly seeing this, this this sense of
urgency and this pressure on Ukraine to just sign up
(31:14):
to this piece deal as quickly as possible. Well, I
would suggest it's because the Russians see the writing on
the wall and understand that if the war is allowed
to continue at this current pace, with their very very
slow gains, and as Ukraine becomes much more adept at
hitting hard inside Russia, situation is going to start looking
much more, much more precarious for Pultin and it's going
(31:37):
to be much harder for him to maintain the situation
economically and the stability with inside Russia they're already experiencing
petrol shortages across Russia. The economy in Russia is is
in fairly bad shape. But at the moment it's manageable.
But you know, will it be manageable next year, Will
it be manageable by the spring? Not clear at all.
(31:57):
So you know, I mean, I would say, is a
general rule. When someone comes to you and says, you know,
we've got a great deal, but you've got to do it,
and now we've got to do it immediately, that's usually
suspicious behavior. Usually it's usually caused for suspicion. And that's
exactly what we're seeing now from Trump. You know, this
sense of urgency, this this rush, this this hurry to
get things done, where there's no really obvious reason behind it.
(32:21):
So I would suggest, if you want to understand why
this is coming from I think it's because Russia recognizes
that this position is actually a lot weaker than the
Kremin would like us to believe, and they understand it.
They've got to, you know, they need to wrap this
up now.
Speaker 2 (32:34):
And if you're right, which I think you are, this
is the worst time for us to to give in
and for Ukraine to give in. So I think that
we need to stand tall. Anyway. We're going to take
a break for some messages and come back in two
minutes with Peter and I. We're going to talk about
these security guarantees. That's I think the other big issue
that Ukraine needs and I wonder if this is strong enough.
(32:55):
Stay with us, everyone back in two minutes.
Speaker 1 (33:01):
Stream us live at SAGA nine sixty am dot C.
Speaker 2 (33:04):
A welcome back everyone to the Brankrymbry Ride war. We've
got Peter Dickinson with us tonight. He's coming to us
from Kiev. He's he's the Ukrainian editor for the Atlantic Council.
(33:25):
He's a British citizen that has been living in Ukraine
for a couple of decades and we've had the privilege
of chatting with him a few times in the past
about what's going on in Ukraine. Peter, security guarantees are
they strong enough? You know? We you and I have
talked previously about, you know, different accords that have been
written that people didn't honor in the past, and other
(33:47):
examples of security guarantees like Article five of NATO. You're
not getting Ukraine's not getting that in this We're not
allowing if this peace planet is accepted, Ukraine to join it,
or isn't getting a guarantee equal to your Article five?
Are these guarantees strong enough for? What do you think about,
(34:08):
you know, not joining NATO, not joining the EU, you know,
being sort of independent but not not being able to
join Europe? Tell me is this strong enough?
Speaker 3 (34:17):
Well? I mean the short answer, I mean, I think
is we don't know at this stage. The comments, the
comments that I've seen from the from the proposed you know,
the draft piece plan, the twenty eight points are very
very vague. There are some amendments to that or further
details that have been published which would suggest, yeah, a
(34:38):
slightly more plausible approach, you know than the term that
you see uses you know, NATO style or NATO level,
but it's not clear exactly what you know, how how
how watertight that is. There is also a number of
of of of clauses which would which would basically annull
(35:00):
any security guarantees, you know, rather strange courses I would say,
you know, in terms of if Ukraine fire fires rockets
at St. Petersburg or Moscow, they would then annull any
any security guarantees. If Ukraine invades Russia or so on,
you know, and that is worrying in the sense that
you know, Russia is is you know, widely accused and
(35:24):
widely believed to engage in false flag operations on a
regular basis. You know, a lot. No, there've been an absolute,
absolute avalanche of accusations and evidence of Russia doing that
here in Ukraine, and Russia bombing communities, civilians and then saying,
look what the Ukrainians have been doing. You know, so
it wouldn't be it would certainly not be a surprise
(35:44):
for anyone here if you know, if some sort of
agreement were reached and then all of a sudden a
missile were to appear in Moscow or some peters Burg
or somewhere else, and the Russians were saying, well, look
at this, the Ukrainians have just done this. Therefore there
are no more security guarantees. Yeah, so that's one small,
minor aspect of it, but there's a lot of you know,
the devil is in the details. I mean, I think
(36:05):
if we take a step back, you know, Ukraine fundamentally,
you know, the Ukrainians believe that Russia's goal is to
is to end Ukrainian statement is to incorporate Ukraine into Russia.
But that's put in his overall objective. He's never really
speaking Speedish Russian audience. He's never really made a secret
of that. He's been very clear that he doesn't believe
(36:26):
Ukraine has the right to exist as an independent country.
He doesn't believe Ukrainians have the right to have a
separate national identity and a separate nation. You know, they
should be you know, Ukraine and Ukrainian ukrainianness so to speak,
can exist within the broader Russian world, as they did
under the Soviets, and they did to it to an
(36:47):
extent in a very controlled sense under the Czars as well.
But the idea of a separate Ukrainian nation, a separate
Ukrainian culture, a separate Ukrainian history, and so on is
absolutely anathema to put In. It is a important regards
that as an existential threat to Russia itself, and he
can't tolerate that. So, you know, the idea is that Russia,
(37:09):
even whatever terms they may agree today tomorrow, are they
going to come back and try and finish the job
they have to, because that's the entire basis of Russia's
Russia's imperial ideology and put into personal world view. So Ukraine,
you know, Ukraine needs to have absolutely credible, water tight
security guarantees that are of the you know, of a
(37:30):
level of later because that's the only thing that can
keep the Russians from continuing this invasion. Now that is,
you know, the fact that this is included in this,
in this, in this, this proposal, it is encouraging the
fact that they're even talking about it, and the fact
that they're talking about these these these security guarantees being
provided by the Americans, because Trump's been very cagey about
(37:54):
what he isn't and it isn't prepared to do. Now
all of a sudden, apparently we're seeing that they are
prepared to provide the sort of the sort of guarantees.
But frankly speaking, Trump's credibility is very low. Now. The
idea that people would that Ukraine would put their faith
in Donald Trump and believe that he would act in
(38:15):
the circumstances if Russia were to renew its invasion and
would go to war with Russia, essentially, because that's what
we're being asked, that's what they would be asked to do.
They would need to go to war. I think that
a lot of people will have difficulty believing that. So
even if the wording is good, even if the framing
is credible and it's positioned as essentially a NATO standard
(38:39):
security guarantee, a lot of people are going to be
very skeptical of it.
Speaker 4 (38:43):
A lot of people in Ukraine, but also I think
a lot of people in America, a lot of people
across Europe and Canada will all be very very skeptical
with good reason. And I think crucially the Russians also
will be prepared to say, yeah, okay, whatever, you know,
that's nice, you know, the Americans because what they want,
But the Russians will feel I'm sure that when push
(39:04):
comes to shove, if they do renew their invasion, the
worst that can happen is that Trump would come back
to where we are today.
Speaker 3 (39:12):
He would provide you praying with weapons, he would impose
sanctions on the Russians, and perhaps increase the American military
presidency at East in Europe, Center of Europe, something along
those lines. The idea that America or anyone else is
going to fight Russia on behalf of Ukraine remains really
really far fetched. And that's that's fundamental because ultimately, when
(39:36):
we talk about a security guarantee, that's what we mean,
you know, that's what NATO means, we mean, you know,
you attack on one is an attack on all. That's
what people mean when they talk about NATO's standard security guarantees.
And unless that is the case, it won't be enough
to prefect Ukraine. And frankly, I don't believe that anyone's
going to fight for Ukraine, and I don't think anyone
in Ukraine believes it. I don't think anyone in Russia
(39:58):
believes it either. So it's good that this conversation is happening.
And these these guarantees, whatever they may be, will certainly
be better than nothing, because they would obliged, they would
they would bring a certain degree of military support if
nothing else, and sanctions and so on. But yeah, it's
not a guarantee, you know, if the terminology security to
polyns leading it because it's not a guarantee.
Speaker 2 (40:19):
So please remind us there were somewhat guarantees in the
agreement that was reached when Ukraine gave up its nuclear
weapons and no one lived up to that. Is that
not correct?
Speaker 3 (40:29):
Yes? Correct? But again, you know, the devil was in
the details then, very much so and very painfully so.
So that was in nineteen ninety four. That was the
Buddha Pest Memorandum that was signed between the Ukrainians and
the Americans, the Brits and the Russians. Later on the
French and the Chinese added their added their signatures, I believe,
(40:50):
But essentially this was this was this was this was
an agreement by which Ukraine agreed to hand over its
entire nuclear arsenal. At the time, because of Ukraine's geographical
position close to close to Europe, because of Ukraine's very
sophisticated military industrial complex, which was the heart of the
(41:14):
Soviet military industrial machine, a large portion of the Soviet
Union's nuclear weapons had been been based in Ukraine, you know,
so when the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine inherited I forget
the exact numbs are a thousand I think nuclear weapons,
but at the time it was the third largest nuclear
arsenal in the world. It was a very very big deal. Now,
(41:38):
the actual keys to fire these weapons, the codes as
it were, were in Moscow. Ukraine didn't have the wherewithal
at that point to use the weapons. But you know,
necessity is the mother of invention, one would assume that
they could have perhaps found a way to do that.
There's also there were also questions about Ukraine's ability then
to maintain this large arsenal because it cost a lot
(41:59):
of money to so Ukraine at the time was completely
in economic crisis, was flat broke, you know. So there
were practical reasons why it made sense to Ukraine to
get rid of this arsenal. But of course it was
it was a key part of their national security. It
was there. It was their security guarantee. Let's say, it
was a very very very very serious security guarantee, and
(42:19):
they gave it up under a lot of pressure, it
should be said, in the Americans, a lot of pressure.
And when they did so, the Budapest Memorandum contained what
they called security assurances, so they weren't guarantees. They weren't
even labeled as guarantees. Now, the Ukrainians, some Ukrainians, still
(42:40):
maintained to this day that they were told they were guarantees.
That in the Ukrainian language version of the text, they're
referred to as such, that it is implied that they
are secured. They are native style guarantees. Certainly in the
English language version, the Russian version, they are Ukrainian. Sorry,
they are security assurances. Essentially, that means that each country
(43:02):
said we won't attack Ukrainie. You know, so the Brits
say we won't attack. The American said, well, we will
never attack. The Russians said, well, of course we won't attack.
But they didn't say if someone else attacks, we're going
to come and fight for you. They said, if there's
someone else attacks, we're going to have consultations, We're going
to have talks. We might do this, we might do that,
we might do a lot of things. But there were
(43:22):
no guarantees in it. So it was it was a
flawed document from day one. I would say, you know,
the signatories on the Ukrainian side have often tried to
defend it by saying it or we were led to believe.
You know, they've played the role of essentially saying we
were misled. You know, whether that's the case or not,
you know, it's difficult to ascertain from this distance, but
(43:43):
clearly it didn't work. You know. So when Russia invaded
Ukraine in twenty fourteen and seized Crimea and went into
East Ukraine, and the Ukrainians turned around and said well
what about the wood First Memorandum, the other signatories being well,
the Russians first of all said well, you know, you know,
that's life, sorry, tough luck, basically, and the Brits and
the Americans said, yeah, well, we didn't invade, you know,
(44:06):
that's basically what you know. Will give you the consultations
that we agreed on, you know, and they wouldn't be
held to it either. So the whole thing was a
very very painful mess, not only for Ukraine but for
anyone who who is told by you know, global superpowers
or don't worry, give up these weapons, we'll give you security,
you know, assurances. So now this conversation is coming around again.
(44:28):
Of course Ukrainians are very very conscious that they've got
to a they've got to make sure that they read
the small print night really carefully, but also be I
think fundamentally they're like, well, we don't believe a word
of it. We've been here before. This is just another
bullhetpest memorandum. It's not going to work. And so, you know,
a huge amount of cynicism about this idea of Western
(44:49):
security guarantees, largely because of Ukraine's very very very painful experience.
Speaker 2 (44:56):
Peri Dickinson, thank you so much for joining us. I
really appreciate it. One quick last question, if I could.
We've only got a minute left. My social media has
blown up saying this is Munich all over again, this
is Chamberlain, this is appeasement.
Speaker 3 (45:06):
What do you think, Yeah, I was the obvious comparison.
I mean, I would say, actually, it may it made
me worse. I mean I think I think at the
time of at the time of Munich, the the Western Powers, Chamberlain,
certainly they knew that the you know, war with Hitler
was likely, so to such a certain degree they were
buying time. You know, whilst Munich was taking place, and
before Munich, and certainly after Munich, the British were very
(45:28):
very actively re arming. They were re energy, was re
energizing their their military industries. They were massively producing warplanes,
and that that proved to be decisive. Eventually they won
the Battle of Britain because of that, because of the
warplanes they were able to produce, and you know, so
they were they were they were they were doing sort
of very very shameful deals with Hitler, but at the
same time they knew that it was likely they'd have
(45:50):
to fight him, and they were preparing for that. We're
doing the shameful deals now, but I don't know if
we're preparing to face the Russians. I don't know if
the West is preparing. And that's the big problem here.
They're still you know, we're still sleepwalking and not understanding
that this is not going to go away. If we
do this deal with Putin now and hand him essentially
victory in Ukraine, you know, the idea that he's just
(46:12):
going to stop is delusional. He will be emboldened, he
will be empowered, and he will go further. And Europe
is certainly not ready. I'm not sure if the West,
ritt large is ready either, and that's that's deeply alarming.
Speaker 2 (46:24):
Sure is Thank you so much for joining us and
giving us that warning that we're sleepwalking, because I agree
with you, and I think we've got to wake up
to the reality of Russia and particularly Putin's desires for
this new greater Russia. And he's not going to stop here,
particularly if we give him victory, because he's going to
learn his lesson that he can do it. Stay with us, everybody,
(46:45):
as we continue to follow what's going on and thank
you Peter for joining us again. Please check in again
and please stay safe, stay with us. Everyone back in
two minutes.
Speaker 1 (46:59):
New Radio No Problem stream is live on SAGA ninety
sixty am dot C.
Speaker 2 (47:04):
A welcome back to the Brian Cromby Radio Hour tonight.
I want to close with a message that goes beyond politics.
It's beyond diplomacy, it's beyond any single country. It's the
(47:25):
message about history and whether we've learned anything from it.
This past weekend, something deeply unsettled unfolded in Washington, a
sort of leaked US peace proposal for the Ukraine, a
twenty eight point plan that is outlining territorial concessions and
supposed security guarantees, which ignited a political firestone. But it
(47:46):
wasn't just the content of the document to shock people,
it was the chaos surrounding it. Within an hour, senior
American officials contradicted one another about where the plan came from,
what it meant, and even whether the United States completely
supported it. Were told one thing on private phone calls,
the State Department said the opposite publicly, and then senators
issued new statements walking back their original claims. It was
(48:08):
diplomacy by confusion. It was the improvisation on matters where
improvisation is dangerous. On my show today, I spoke with
Peter Dickinson of the Atlantic Council, and together we tried
to make sense of it all. What emerged we tried
to figure out was a disturbing piece, a disturbing picture
of a peace plan that in its language, logic and
(48:29):
objectives sounded far more like a Russian document translated into
English than a genuine American proposal. But here's the part
that concerns me most. The assumption was spoken by some
in Washington that Ukraine can't simply hand over a slice
of dun Esque or some occupied region and then a
chief piece. It's the same assumption that Nevill Chamberlain made
(48:51):
in nineteen thirty eight, and it is just as naive
today as it was then, because we have seen repeatedly
what happens when you try to buy the goodwill of
a dictator with someone else's territory. You don't get peace,
you get more war. And Ukraine understands this better than anyone.
For those who believe that life under Russian occupation is
(49:12):
simply life under a different flag, that people will just
pay taxes to Moscow and carry on. That remind you
of a story shared with me by a Ukrainian friend,
Vladimir Kushonenko, The story of the Morara. In eighteen thirty five,
Morawi warriors arrived on the Chatham Islands. The Moray, peaceful welcoming,
nonviolent for centuries, received them with open arms. They tried coexistence.
(49:36):
What followed was genocide. The Morari were hunted, killed and
slaved and forcibly assimilated. Their language was wiped out, their
sacred places defiled. Not in ancient times, but in the
mid nineteenth century. When an invading force does not recognize
your right to exist, peace becomes the mask worn by extermination.
(49:58):
Ukraine has lived its own version of this. After being
absorbed by the Civit Union. Ukraine endured the Halamidor Up
to seven million people starved to death. Its intellectuals were executed,
its language was banned, its culture was target targeted for erasure,
and today in Russian occupied territories, Ukrainians arrested by speaking
their own language. Teachers in Buka were executed simply by
(50:20):
teaching Ukrainian literature and history. Russia has shown us repeatedly
that it does not want land, it wants identity, it
wants dominance, it wants submission. This is why Ukrainians fight,
not because they're stubborn, not because the alternative is annihilation.
And this is why the twenty eight point peace plan matters,
because a true peace planet, real peace plan, has to
(50:42):
include the withdrawal of Russian forces, the restoration of Ukraine's borders,
the return of abducted children, and accountability for genocide and
war crimes, and binding securities guarantees so this never happens again.
But the Leak proposal, it looks like appeasement, which brings
me back to Munich. We all know the story. We've
(51:03):
written it, we've read it in our history books. In
nineteen thirty eight, Nevil Chamberlain returned from his meeting in
Munich with Hitler, waving a piece of paper declaring peace
for our time. He had handed over part of Czechoslovakia
in the hope of satisfying a dictator. Winston Churchill saw
through it instantly. His words echo today. We were given
(51:25):
the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor, and
you'll still have the war. Chamberlain's appeasement didn't prevent war,
it guaranteed it because it made Hitler stronger. And today
we see that same temptation creeping back into Western policy,
the idea that giving Putin part of Ukraine will somehow
(51:45):
tame him, that if we just sacrifice a little freedom
somewhere else, we can secure stability at home. But dictators
don't stop. They advance until they are stopped. Give Putin
Denesque and he'll ask for Odessa. Give him Odessa, and
Moldova is next. Given Moldova, and the Baltics become vulnerable,
and if nature fractures, the entire post war security order collapses.
(52:09):
This is not alarmism, This is history. My deepest concern
is that the United States intentionally are not is drifting
toward another Munich. And the world does not need another Chamberlain.
But the world needs now is another Churchill, a leader
who understands that you cannot negotiate away another's nation sovereignty.
(52:29):
You cannot deter aggression by indulging it. You cannot build
peace by rewarding genocide. Ukraine is not asking America to
fight its war. It's asking America not to help Putin
win it. If we choose dishonor today, we will face
greater danger tomorrow. If we choose strength, we preserve stability,
not just for Ukraine, but for Europe and for the
(52:50):
Western world and the whole world. The lesson is as
old as history. Weakness invites war, strength prevents it. This
moment is a test not just of American policy, but
of whether we have learned anything at all from the
twentieth century, whether we remember Munich, whether we remember Churchill,
whether we remember how quickly peace collapses when democracies abandon
(53:13):
those on the front lines. We stand again today at
a crossroads between dishonor and resolve, between appeasement and leadership,
between repeating history and learning from it. My hope, my plea,
is that we don't choose the path of Munich, of Chamberlain,
but the path of Winston Churchill. I'm Brian Crombie and
(53:35):
that's what I think today. We need, the world needs
for Churchill. That's our show for tonight, everybody, Thank you
for joining us.
Speaker 3 (53:42):
Good night.
Speaker 1 (53:47):
Stream us live at SAGA nine at CA
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