The Book of Joe: Dodgers Repeat as World Champions!

Hosts Joe Maddon and Tom Verducci recap the Dodgers Game 7 win over the Blue Jays. Joe notes how 'off-script' the last few games went and how both teams adjusted and delivered an entertaining series. Tom explores the biggest play of the series and believes a huge mistake was made.  Tom and Joe highlight some of the side stories and blink moments from the World Series!

The Book of Joe Podcast is a production of iHeart Radio.  

#fsr

See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Episode Transcript

Speaker 1 (00:04):
The Book of Joe Podcast is a production of iHeartRadio.

Speaker 2 (00:15):
Hey there, and.

Speaker 1 (00:16):
Welcome back to the Book of Joe podcast. It's me
Tom Berducci with Joe Madden and Joe. We are going
to recap one of the greatest Game sevens of the
World Series there has ever been. Now listen, it's hard
for me to top I'm sure for you Game seven
of twenty sixteen. I gotta let the dust settle on

(00:37):
this one before I make a final decision which one
was quote unquote better.

Speaker 2 (00:42):
But that's beside the point.

Speaker 1 (00:43):
We just saw an absolute classic, Dodgers defending their championship
with an unbelievable eleven inning game win Game seven.

Speaker 2 (00:52):
Win.

Speaker 1 (00:54):
Your quick thoughts, Joe on how the Dodgers won the
World Series, Well.

Speaker 3 (00:59):
The one based on their I think experience. I think
they went based on their their ability to remain calm
and really crappy situations, and then and then they were
the beneficiaries of some really strong baseball luck. And it happens,
I mean during the course of a season. I've always
referenced baseball luck where a ball stays fair by an

(01:21):
inch or six inches or goes ftyle by an inch
or six inches. Things you can control that are really,
honestly the luck of the draw. Who knows why the
baseball gods choose to do those kinds of things. But
the plays they made, the double play with the second
and third, the base running by Barger, and all the
different things, the ball that gets lodged, the great catch

(01:42):
by pa has if he's not in that game, I
don't think the other center fielder makes that play because
I don't think you would have been aggressed as aggressive
making that play. And then of course Paul is coming in,
like inning in progress, Why wasn't he there from the
beginning of the inning? Did somebody remind somebody? Did somebody
miss it in the beginning? Did it get caught up
with at the end. There's also much little nuance to that.
And then the part of it that I like the most,

(02:04):
I think was you had at some point in those games,
in the latter part of a lot of those games,
where managerial intuition took over experience began to become important.
The fact that it was off script. Everything went off
script everywhere. When you have to piece together that many
relief pictures Putney Paaus in the game, all of a

(02:25):
suddenly all this stuff is based on baseball acumen.

Speaker 4 (02:30):
So I really liked that.

Speaker 3 (02:32):
I think both managers did a really good job filling
in the blanks as the game got deeper, based on
the fact that theory and reality were not meshing whatsoever.
So I think it's I think, and that was part
of why I thought everybody really enjoyed it so much.
This series, that is, I think it got off script
to the point where it became more fluid, natural, and
the flexibility was based on people reacting to moments. So

(02:55):
I don't even know if that's been talked about a
reported upon, but that was my take on it. So anyway,
that's what I saw, man, and I think that's why
so interesting entertaining. And from the Canadian perspective, my god,
you talk about crushing the world. Series was in hand
several times they just snatched the way and you know,

(03:16):
the Canadian people, very proud group, very just nice, nice
people that are went home and the heart and the
hand and it was really difficult to watch all that.
So it was just it was chock full of so
many different things. I thought. Overall, I thought the Blue
Jays outplayed the Dodgers in a seven game series but
lost the World Series.

Speaker 1 (03:37):
One hundred percent. I agree with you. They certainly out
hit and outplayed the Dodgers. The Dodgers hit what two
six in the series. They struck out a World Series
record seventy two times. But they did hit more home
runs and it really was a difference in the game.
They hit five home runs from the seventh inning on
that were series deciding home runs, you know, starting with

(03:58):
show Hey Otani in Game three, Freddy Freeman to win
that game in eight team with a home run, and
then of course the two home runs tying and winning
home runs in Game seven.

Speaker 2 (04:07):
One swing of the bat.

Speaker 1 (04:08):
I hate to say it, because we all loved watching
the Toronto Blue Jays play offensive baseball.

Speaker 2 (04:13):
It was a thrill watching that team, and I agree
with you, Joe.

Speaker 1 (04:15):
You have to feel for the team, the franchise, the
country for the gut punch they took losing that series.

Speaker 2 (04:21):
But man, they gave us an unbelievable show.

Speaker 1 (04:23):
What was so amazing about this World Series, and especially
Game seven, is that there are so many pivot points, Joe,
where it could have gone either way. It's not like
there was one swing of emotions, one pivot where the
game was won or lost.

Speaker 2 (04:36):
It seesawed. Yo, yo, we call it whatever you want,
back and forth. How about this.

Speaker 1 (04:43):
It take every play in World Series history, and there's
something called championship win probability added. That sounds like a
fancy number of bogus number, but what basically does is
it measures the swing in the game depending on the
result of that play, basically how clutch or important that

(05:03):
play was. There were three plays in Game seven alone
that rank among the top ten win probably added plays
in World Series history. No other game in any World
Series has more than two three top ten plays in
the history of the World Series, which has been around

(05:24):
one hundred and twenty one years.

Speaker 2 (05:26):
That is crazy.

Speaker 1 (05:28):
Those three plays, of course, the game ending double play
by Alejandro Kirk, the game tying home run by Miguel
Rojas to the ninth inning, and the game winning home
run by Will Smith in the eleventh. We'll get into
all of those, but Joe, we have to start with
the base running play.

Speaker 2 (05:45):
The world is talking about.

Speaker 1 (05:46):
Isaiah Kiner Fileffa on third base, bases loaded, one out,
bottom of the ninth inning.

Speaker 2 (05:53):
What a situation.

Speaker 1 (05:54):
The Toronto Blue Jays can win the World Series just
get Ikf.

Speaker 2 (05:58):
In from third base.

Speaker 1 (05:59):
Dodgers have the infield in Yamamoto on the mound Dalton
Bar show.

Speaker 2 (06:03):
It's a ground ball to Miguel Rojas at second base.

Speaker 1 (06:06):
He stumbles completes a throw to the plate and barely,
I mean so barely they had to go to replay
to confirm this call. They get Ikf at the plate.
A lot has been said about Ikf's lead, his break, slide,
you name it, everything except you know, how he was
breathing at third base has been criticized here. I think

(06:26):
he's getting far too much criticism. I think he does
deserve some criticism. First of all, I'm gonna ask for
your take on this, Joe Madden, and then I'll give
you mine.

Speaker 3 (06:36):
Well, I was I saw the overhead replay of the
whole thing, and I in the beginning I didn't even
realize all this. I saw it in a later moment.
I saw the video replay and all the controversy around it.
The first thing that stood out to me was the
distance that he was off the bag versus the distance
the third baseman was off the bag.

Speaker 4 (06:53):
That is the role of thumb.

Speaker 3 (06:56):
However, if you get too far off the bag, there
in that situation and you got to catch that can throw.
There is an opportunity to pick a third out all
the under the circumstances, it's hard for a catcher to
want to make that throw and possibly throw the ball away.
From my perspective, I've always told my guys, if it's
the right baseball play to do, go ahead and do it,

(07:17):
and if it doesn't work, then it doesn't work. However,
under these circumstances, it might be a little bit more
difficult to go ahead and attempt to pick up just
under the set of circumstances.

Speaker 4 (07:27):
So that to me was not good, I thought.

Speaker 3 (07:31):
And then secondly, the secondaryly was non existent, which I
couldn't understand.

Speaker 4 (07:35):
So that's it. I mean, I from.

Speaker 3 (07:37):
A technical perspective, teaching base running for so many years
watching that unfold, there was a couple of things he
did not do properly, and yeah, it could have led
to the difference between being safe for out. I think
it probably would have been more of a safe call
had it been more aggressive on telling you if that
was Jason Heyward at third or Hovey Bias at third.
Kids keep naming guys that I've had, I really think

(07:59):
they would have been safe. So that was my take
on what I saw.

Speaker 1 (08:02):
Yeah, I went back and I got the data from
Major League Baseball player tracking data. So I'm not thumbnailing,
you know, rule of thumb here or eyeballing anything here.

Speaker 2 (08:12):
I'll give you the sheer numbers.

Speaker 1 (08:14):
Max Munsey was fifteen point two feet away from third base.
I believe this is the rule of and I know
people talk about, oh, go as far as the third baseman. No,
not with less than two outs. I'm sorry. You cannot
be doubled off the base. Okay, that's the end of
your season. If you're doubled off third base. Essentially you

(08:37):
should go three quarters of where the third basement is.
Two outs, go ahead and knock yourself out.

Speaker 2 (08:43):
Go as far as third baseman. Ikf was eight and
a half feet off of third base.

Speaker 1 (08:49):
Now, ideally he should have been eleven almost eleven and
a half feet off the bag, because Munsey is fifteen
point two feet away, his lead is too short. But again,
I think people who are criticizing him for not being
as far as the third basement, you're wrong.

Speaker 2 (09:03):
There's and two outs.

Speaker 1 (09:04):
We already saw Andre Simenez at a line drive to
Muncie at third base. In this series, it can happen,
and it can happen at third base. So you've got
that secondary lead. I do not want my guy hauling
butt down the third base line with less than two
outs with a super aggressive lead. Now, all of a sudden,
there is a line drive, and that's where you see

(09:25):
guys falling their butt, stumble, try to get back and
change direction when the momentum is going too hard towards home.

Speaker 2 (09:32):
I want a controlled secondary lead.

Speaker 1 (09:34):
I don't want getting out over the first over your
front leg so hard that you stumble getting back. I've
seen too many guys doubled up that way. Can't blame
him for that. Don't tell me he should stand up
scoring a run. Show me some kind of video where
somebody is standing up scoring a run at home plate
on a force play. I've never seen it. I'm not
saying it doesn't exist. Guys are not taught that way.

(09:56):
You're also taught make sure if there is a play
at the plate that you break up a double play,
you need to slide there. So the criticism that he
should stand up and score that's bogus as well. Now
let me go back to the size of the lead.
I think this is the one fatal mistake here. Okay,
you have to be conservative. If you look at the overhead,

(10:17):
it's almost hilarious that Alejandro Kirk at first base and
obviously that ren doesn't mean anything literally is on the base.
I mean, it's little league baseball where you can't take
a lead. There's no way he can get doubled up.
They overcorrected. Yes, you take a conservative lead in that
situation to guard against the line drive. No, you don't

(10:38):
go as short as he did. That being said, don't
put it all in IKF. Before the pitch is thrown,
Carlos Feblis, the third base coach, spoke with IKF about
having a short lead, don't get doubled up. And if
you watch their cell phone video this from the stands,
after the first pitch, Carlos Feblus walks out to the

(11:00):
baseline and with his right foot draws a line in
the dirt. And that is as far as IKF took
his lead. So the criticism for IKF, I think is
way overblown. The criticism should be the Jays got too
conservative with the lead. He should have been a foot
or two easily more and that's the difference between the

(11:20):
Jays winning the World Series or not. As one manager
told me, that video will be shown in spring training
in thirty camps. The difference between winning the World Series
are not is that attention to detail. It is that narrow.

Speaker 2 (11:36):
It is that thin in terms of winning or losing
the World Series.

Speaker 4 (11:39):
No argument, great explanation.

Speaker 3 (11:42):
Yeah, And from my perspective, what is more likely to
happen that line drive that takes Muncie to the third
base bag or something put on the ground to the
rest of the field. I think for me it would
have been the ladder. The fact that it might have
been moved somewhere other than there. But the points about
the line drive the third base, especially with that hitter,
is absolutely valid. However, I still I didn't realize you

(12:06):
had the measurements, which are great. I still want a
better secondary lead. I still want to weight on the
right foot. I still want the third base. The runner
on third base, they get as close to foul territory
as he possibly can, his toes practically on the line.
As soon as the ball passes, the hitter gets to
the catcher's glove's coming back hard to third base on
the fair territory side looking at the third basement. So

(12:28):
that's for the potential pickoff. So yeah, there's there's a
different factors working right there. I didn't realize that Felis
had drawn the line in the sand. I didn't know that.
That's kind of interesting. Also, God, you can look at
it so many different ways. But your other point about
running through home plate, that's I know, somebody suggested just
beating the forest.

Speaker 4 (12:46):
That's no.

Speaker 3 (12:47):
I agree with you that you're gonna slide right there.
And there's the potentiality of breaking up a double play too. There's,
like you said, there's so many things here. I just
in spring trainings, I'm so I mean, I've been a
base running instructor many years and I'm so big on this.
We're talking about exactly right now, and the conversation for me,
the third base coach is just wired looking in at

(13:08):
the third basement, I mean the third basement.

Speaker 4 (13:10):
He's just wired. As you're taking your lead, he's not
necessarily looking at you.

Speaker 3 (13:13):
He's looking at the third basement for any movement coming
towards the bag and the hitter's the third base runners
responsibility is to obviously watch the balls that approaches the
plate and react accordingly.

Speaker 4 (13:24):
So a lot of menu tay going on here.

Speaker 3 (13:26):
Really great discussion, but the biggest part are, or is
the little things when I have spring trainings and I
run through this. I used to be the instructor specifically
for this throughout the Angel minor league system, running instructional
league spring trainings, and then when I got to the
Rays and the Cubs, I'd have meetings with the coaches.
Brian Butterfield will take care of a lot of this
and specifically about this stuff because we did. You know

(13:50):
right now, the contact play is kind of popular when
I was starting this when I came, because it's coming
through the Angel organization. We're always into it. Get to
the Rays, get to the Cubs, and eventually they're not
so keen on the contact play because you know, a
couple of guys get thrown, all of a sudden you
don't want to do it. Then analytics shifts and all
of a sudden it's the right thing to do, especially

(14:10):
as a one out play, maybe not so much as
zero outplay. Dude, all this stuff is covered covered, and
you just told me. Is the fact that the third
base coach not only asked him, told him not to
exceed that line. They're in Elijah difference possibly between winning
and actually losing.

Speaker 1 (14:29):
Yeah, listen, they just over corrected. They did the right thing.
You must take a conservative lead with one out.

Speaker 2 (14:35):
In that situation.

Speaker 1 (14:36):
Too out a different story, but they just overcorrected to
make sure he wasn't doubled up. So if you're getting
on IKF, I would say lay off him.

Speaker 2 (14:44):
He's following instructions here.

Speaker 1 (14:47):
You're looking for reasons if you want to criticize him
for not sliding, that just simply do not apply. Let's
take a quick break here, Joe, because I want to
talk about the biggest play in the game. According to
Championship win Probability added, that was the game ending double play.
And I will tell you about a huge mistake that
Jays made in that situation.

Speaker 2 (15:08):
We'll do that right after this. Welcome back to the
Book of Joe.

Speaker 4 (15:24):
All right, Joe.

Speaker 1 (15:25):
It's first and third, one out, bottom of the eleventh inning.
The Jays need one run to extend this game. Addison
Barger is the runner run first. The batter is Alejandro Kirk.
The pitcher the unbelievable Yeshnobu Yamamoto. It's crazy that this
guy is pitching it once again.

Speaker 2 (15:44):
In this World Series.

Speaker 1 (15:44):
He basically affected all four Dodger wins, warming up in
the bullpenning Game three and pitching in the other three wins.
The thing you have to avoid there, we know is
Alejandro Kirk hitting into a double play. Now people think
double plays happen all the time.

Speaker 2 (16:00):
They don't.

Speaker 1 (16:00):
The average when a double play is in order, the
average time it actually happens is nine point eight percent
of the time. If you put all handro Kirk in
the box, who is literally the slowest runner in baseball,
it happens almost twice as often, seventeen point eight percent
of the time. So you know this is a distinct possibility,
which is why yama Moto pitched around Edison Barger. Essentially,

(16:23):
it was an intentional walk through four pitches off the plate.

Speaker 2 (16:26):
Barger took them to get on base.

Speaker 1 (16:29):
So now all Kirk has to do, essentially, it's hit
the ball into the outfield, get the ball up in
the air.

Speaker 2 (16:34):
He's trying to do that. I get it. He hits
a ground ball double play on a splitter, by the.

Speaker 1 (16:39):
Way, is one of only four splitters that Yamamoto threw
all year to glove side to a right handed hitter
elevated slightly.

Speaker 2 (16:47):
He just doesn't.

Speaker 1 (16:48):
He throws all the splitters in the right handers somehow
got there, broke the back out of the ground ball.
But here's where the Jays went awry. Barger's on first base.
You'd know that double player is in an order. Yamamoto
is a plus ground ball pitcher. He's well above Major
League gt average throwing ground balls. So you got him
well above ground ball hitter, well above ground ball pitcher

(17:09):
on the mound. You know the double players in order.
That ball's on the ground, the series is over. Barger
has to run right there. I'm watching Barger take his
lead off first base, Joe. It's a short lead, and
he's essentially standing up, not showing any inclination that he's
even going to run to draw any kind of a throw.
And I'll tell you this, if you're Dave Roberts, are

(17:30):
you really throwing down the second base in that situation
with a tying run on third base? That's your priority
is the guy on third? Do you really want your
second basement to run and cover second base and open
up a hole for Kirk who's a ground ball hitter.
And that's how the World Series is tied because you
defended the trail runner and not the tying runner.

Speaker 2 (17:48):
I don't think the Dodgers are thrown through Joe.

Speaker 1 (17:51):
At the very minimum, Barger has to make a fake
break on the first pitch to see how the Dodgers
are defending this. And again, I don't think they're covering
second base balls mishandled, the tying runs scores, second basement vacates.
You're opening a hole for Kirk. I don't think the
Dodgers can take that chance. At least give me a

(18:11):
break to see what the Dodgers doing here. He's not
in any position to even threaten Yamamoto to make a
throw to first base. The Dodgers are unconcerned about Barger.
How does that happen to me? He's got to at
least take a fake break on the first pitch and go.

Speaker 2 (18:26):
You have to stay out of the double play. What
do you think?

Speaker 3 (18:29):
What else you as soon as you started talking about
I started writing my notes. First of all, Yama Moto
round ball pitch and number two? What is his time
to the plate? Number three? They would and throw to
second base anyway. There's no way, So I mean you're
right for me on all counts, he must run right there.
They did that specifically to set up the double play. Absolutely,
as a manager, I'm almost one hundred percent certain certain

(18:52):
I would not have thrown through right there.

Speaker 4 (18:54):
Who was the runner at third base? Do you remember?
I'm sure you meant Guerrero of base runner.

Speaker 3 (19:00):
Yeah, I'm not thrown through right there. I'm eating the
ball right there. Eventually I have to play the infield,
then I would, but you did set it up. You
put him out there the bargain so that the double
plays in order ground ball, pitch or slow runner.

Speaker 4 (19:13):
It all makes sense. That all adds up, no question.

Speaker 3 (19:16):
But then from the other side of things, just don't
give them everything that they want, meaning just sit back
and let the ground ball be hit. The percentages are interesting,
no doubt that they're doubled once this guy is hitting.
But everything he talked about is absolutely correct. He should
have been running right there. And I do like the
fake maybe on the first pitch, just to see if
there's coverage or not. Good infielders would know to even

(19:39):
deep that if there's got to be a sign like
you know, we're not going to cover, but at least
deak the coverage so that the side doesn't know what's
going to happen. But I think your assessments one hundred
percent accurate.

Speaker 1 (19:53):
Yeah, I think a lot of coaches managers are going
to say, we're worried about the line drive double play. Right,
you start the runner, Kirk hits the line drive, and
the World Series is over.

Speaker 4 (20:03):
I heard that all the time, right, Yeah.

Speaker 1 (20:04):
I looked up the numbers on this show first and
third situation of the major leagues.

Speaker 2 (20:09):
There was more than three thousand at bats.

Speaker 1 (20:12):
Right, The chances of a line drive double play are
less than one percent. It's eight tenths of one percent.
If you're managing a game.

Speaker 2 (20:23):
Out of fear of something that happens less.

Speaker 1 (20:25):
Than one percent of a time, you should not be
managing a major league game.

Speaker 3 (20:29):
Well, I just I already had written what is more
likely to happen? We were talking about the distance off
third base, the line drive to the third baseman.

Speaker 4 (20:35):
Or the ball on the ground. Agreed, I mean, what's
the most likely had happened when you're coming up. Back
in the day, that was a big thing.

Speaker 3 (20:41):
But you just talked about not starting that runner in
that situation. Tool just in case the ball is hit
on a line drive, and I'm here to tell you
I never subscribed to that theory. I didn't realize the
actual percentages. But I would not not start a runner
based on the fact I was concerned about the ball
being hit on the line drive double play.

Speaker 4 (21:00):
I'd be more concerned like with that.

Speaker 3 (21:02):
Part of it would be from the first base runner's perspective.
You don't want the first base runner to ever get
farther off the bag than the first baseman in case
the line drive was hit. So even if he was
playing behind Kirk, which I probably was, Kirk doesn't get
off farther than him in case the balls hit back
towards the bag and he could beat him back to
the first base bag. That's the one key that you

(21:25):
would institute right there. But I would really not worry
about that hardly at all. Actually, and I was working
would be way more concerned about the momo to ground
ball because I would have that on my card. That
was one thing I always kept on my card was
the percentage of ground ball of the pitcher in general,
and then that picture versus that hitter. When I was

(21:45):
with the Kubbies who were able to generate this card,
that gave me ground ball percentages each guy in the
batting order versus the pitcher, whether it was a starter
or somebody that came off the bench.

Speaker 4 (21:57):
I love this thing. I love the ground ball fly
ball cards.

Speaker 3 (22:00):
I love the card I also had that attempted to
predict strikeouts and walks versus certain pictures. Love that stuff.
So all that would have been in play right there.
And then finally, it's hard ask your catcher to throw
through right there. Everything's got to be perfect. Everything's got
to be perfect. You might you might practice that play

(22:21):
in spring training. Might you will, but you probably have
not really utilized it all year. So it's really hard
to put on in that moment, in that situation where
you haven't really done it all year, and all of
a sudden you can put it in in the last
inning of World Series game.

Speaker 4 (22:36):
I doubt that would have happened.

Speaker 1 (22:37):
Yeah, it's a pet peeve of mine too, and I
see it especially in that situation where the runner looks
like he just dropped anchor. You got to show me
some aggressiveness, give me some body language that says there
might be something in play.

Speaker 2 (22:48):
I don't like that at all.

Speaker 1 (22:50):
Speaking of pet peeves, the next play we got to
talk about, and this is again one of these top
ten all time World Series swinging plays, is the home
run by Miguel Rojas the bottom of the ninth inning.
This is a real pet peeve of mind, Joe. There's
two outs. The Jays are two outs.

Speaker 2 (23:06):
Away from winning the World Series.

Speaker 1 (23:08):
So you have Rojas number nine, and show Hey Otani
on deck at number one. Obviously you cannot walk under
any circumstance, Miguel Rojas. If you walk to the number nine hit,
or you bring Otani to the plate as a potential
go ahead run in the ninth inning, there's no way
that can happen, right, So the count gets the three
and two Jeff Hoffman, the closer is on the mount.

(23:29):
My beef here, Joe, is I hate, hate, hate the
middle velocity breaking ball. When it has to be a
strike to strike breaking ball on a full count, and
in this case, it had to be in the strike zone.
You cannot throw your grade A slider which is strike
to ball, because you can't afford that he stays off it.

(23:49):
And it's ball four and now Otani is coming up.
You must, must, must throw a strike to Miguel Rojas
and Jeff Hoffman throws a slider, and if you watch
and you look at the numbers of this slider, it
was three hundred RPMs down from the first slider he
threw in the bat, which is a pretty good slider.

Speaker 2 (24:09):
It had way less movement.

Speaker 1 (24:11):
Essentially, it was a hanger because he knows he has
to throw this in the strikestone. You gave him a cookie.
The only pitch he could hit out of the ballpark
was a hanging slider. Mcguil rojas and Jeff Boppin throws
ninety six Since the middle of September, he had given
up one hit on his fastball, one hit. Mguil Rojas

(24:36):
has not hit a home run off a ninety six
mile an hour fastball.

Speaker 2 (24:39):
In six years.

Speaker 1 (24:41):
He hits two oh seven against the lead velocity, and
you're throwing him a slider and speeding up his bat,
and that's how the game is tied. That is an
all time terrible call. Right back to Dennis Sekresley throwing
a slider at the Kirk Gibson who could only hit
slider speed with the injuries that he had. And I've
checked the data on this, Joe, and it turns out

(25:02):
that my pet feb is absolute one hundred percent right
that when you throw a slider in the zone, it's
a much higher slug percentage with two strikes than a
fastball in the zone with two strikes.

Speaker 2 (25:17):
Hated the pitch cross the Jay's the World Series.

Speaker 3 (25:21):
When the guy's got a slider speed bat, he's got
a slider speed bat.

Speaker 4 (25:24):
It's pretty obvious.

Speaker 3 (25:26):
I would imagine part of the game plan there was
the fact that Rojas would chase a slider.

Speaker 4 (25:31):
Maybe they had some information. I don't know this, I'm
just a.

Speaker 3 (25:33):
Conjecture based on Like with Hobby, he will chase a
three to two slider. But you got to get it,
you know, down in the dirt, down in a way
out of the zone. It's got to be a strike ball.
But like you're suggesting, which is accurate, in a full
count situation with Showy on deck.

Speaker 1 (25:47):
You can't play it exact chase. You can't play for
a chase. He knows he's got to throw it right
down the middle, if not down the middle in the zone.

Speaker 4 (25:55):
Aimed it.

Speaker 3 (25:55):
I mean, if it had that lists RPMs, obviously he
just aimed it. He underestimated what this fella can do
there's like, you're right, there's so many wow, well different things,
like I'll take the flip side of it Pedro Strope,
who I loved. Stropie had like a ninety six ninety
seven min hour fastball, but the command wasn't great. But
his slider was like a wipeout slider for his whole career. Now,

(26:18):
in that situation, for me, if Stropie got beat on
a slider, I'd have been a lot better off or
felt better about it than getting beat on a fastball,
because I saw that happen with him so much, because
slider was his best pitch, it was his fastball. So
there's times I might disagree with that based on who
the picture is and me knowing them, But you're right,

(26:41):
I mean to speed up this guy's bat, and of
course you have the information regarding the last time he
hit a plus plus fastball had been a while, and
that was his only opportunity to be able to catch up.
Because when you do that, when you choose a pitch
and you're standing on the sideline and you know, like
you're suggesting, is the only pitch he was going to
be able to do that with. And that's what they

(27:02):
threw him. Yeah, that's when you really want to get upset.

Speaker 2 (27:06):
Yeah, I mean it's tough.

Speaker 1 (27:08):
I mean to get not beat, but essentially tied there
by a guy hitting in the ninth hole. But give
Dave Roberts credit again, Joe and you talked about this,
you know, after Game five he texted Miguel Rojas and
told him you're in the lineup for game six. Now, mcguil.
Rojas did not have a hit for thirty one days.
He essentially was a bench player who was rarely playing.

(27:29):
But as Dave Roberts explained to me, he said, this
guy has been such a great teammate and a glue
guy for us all year long. I was not going
to lose the World Series without giving him a chance
to play. I want his energy, I want what he
means to this team in the lineup. Now, give Dave
Roberts credit. I think he's been over criticized for basically

(27:50):
running the team the way the front office wants him
to run it, which is not true. And he did
go with his gut here that I got to get
this guy into the game. Another quick story about Rojas
for you. I talked with his wife Marianna after the game.
She talked about how after the Dodgers won the National
League Championship Series, Miguel Rojas said, my dream has always

(28:10):
been to hit a home run in the World Series.

Speaker 2 (28:12):
So every day he'd go to the ballpark.

Speaker 1 (28:15):
And Marianna would say, you're going to hit a home
run today, and he's like, yeah, right, I'm not even
playing well. Before Game seven, she said, listen, I really
mean it. I had a vision last night. God came
to me and I saw your number. The number eleven,
which has always been his favorite number. He wore it
in little league, and then when his mom and his

(28:35):
grandfather who basically was his coach, introduced him to the game,
passed away within the same week. Back in about three
years ago, he decided to wear number eleven, his little
league number, to honor them. Well, he goes to the Dodgers,
he's eleven, and they signed Roki Sasaki, who says, hey,
that's my number. And Rojas is such a good guy,
He's got a ton of service time.

Speaker 2 (28:57):
He gave up his number to a rookie Roki Sasaki.
That just doesn't happen.

Speaker 1 (29:02):
And then he went back to seventy two, the original
number with the Dodgers when he was basically a non
roster guy. Anyway, eleven is his number still, even though
he doesn't literally wear it with the Dodgers. So when
he came to the plate in the ninth inning against
Hoffman with one out, mari Anna looks up at the
digital clock at Rogers Center and in red numbers, the
numbers show eleven eleven, and he hads a home run.

Speaker 2 (29:26):
How about that?

Speaker 4 (29:28):
Yeah, you can't make that up.

Speaker 3 (29:29):
I mean, obviously astutely aware of the situation.

Speaker 4 (29:32):
She was that. I love that stuff.

Speaker 3 (29:36):
Listen, eleven eleven is always That's been something for me
in my past, not because I liked the number eleven,
but it would pop sometimes in really significant moments. It's interesting.
I really like this guy as a player. I liked
him a lot with Florida. I've always thought he was underestimated.
When the Dodgers acquired him, it did not surprise me
because they knew Andrew would do his homework of the

(29:57):
boys there, and eventually they did.

Speaker 4 (29:59):
They picked a winner. They picked out a winner man,
and that's that.

Speaker 3 (30:02):
He is a perfect example of why when you set
up your team, if in fact your intent is to
not only play and participate, but to go to the
playoffs and then to win the World Series. These are
the kind of guys that can make the difference.

Speaker 4 (30:14):
I e. David Ross.

Speaker 3 (30:15):
When we had David Ross with the Cubs, and then
of course uh Theo and Jet picking up Mickey Montero,
it almost seemed redundant, but both guys were like huge
and that and that win right there, Johnny Lackey coming
up late being part of it. Even going back with
the Rays, the year that the Rays became solvent was

(30:37):
two thousand and eight, when in the seven the acquisition
of Troy Percival, Eric Kinski and Cliff Floyd.

Speaker 4 (30:44):
Now you look at that, you go, why, you know,
why would they do that kind of a thing.

Speaker 3 (30:47):
I'm here to tell you, man, when you get you
talked to what we talked about the Glue guys and
what they mean to a group and and just their
ability to come through in big moments because they've been there,
done that kind of stuff is not lost on me.

Speaker 4 (30:59):
I love all of that.

Speaker 3 (31:00):
I mean, if I'm going into next season, and I
really hopefully more teams will consider themselves playoff and World
Series candidates as opposed to waiting to find out if
we are or not, and if you do actually believe
that in advance, you need to get people like this
on the roster and in the clubhouse. It just can't
always be chock full of potential and guys that you

(31:23):
may have developed in a minor leagues that you want
to see what they look like kind of thing. This
is all part of winning. Getting guys like Miguel Rojas.
I'm a big believer in that Pele used to do
that in the minor leagues. In the minor leagues when
I ran them in the Angels in the eighties, there
are certain teams you would want to place a guy
on that team because there was so many good young players.

(31:43):
You wanted somebody there with a little bit of baseball wisdom.

Speaker 4 (31:47):
And I'm just talking about like the crash.

Speaker 3 (31:49):
I crashed Davis kind of a dude, and I'm here
to tell you it mattered to a lot of guys
in those situations. So analytics data cannot truly identify these people.
This has got to be done with more a human technique.
And listen, if I go to spring training, am I'm
running anything, Man, I'm gonna make sure I got several

(32:10):
of these dudes there because I know how much they
could impact the season and the final result.

Speaker 1 (32:17):
Oh well said, And don't forget Rojas was the one
who made that unbelievable pick on that game ending double
play in Game six on the throw from Key k
Hernandez made the throw to save the World Series to
get ikf out at the plate, barely had another play,
bare handing a really hard hit, big one hopper. Yeah,
the glue guy came through for Dave Roberts. I thought

(32:39):
he had a great series. He moved Will Smith up
into the two hole because the Jays were walking show
Hey Otani so much. He actually was putting too much
pressure on Mookie Betts, and he said, I'm gonna put
my hottest hitter behind shoe Hey Otani. The one who
was swinging the bat the best. That was Will Smith.
He wins the Game of the eleventh. Shane Bieber, playing
the role of Charles Naggy in nineteen ninety seven, loses

(33:00):
the game two to oh slider.

Speaker 2 (33:02):
Another hang.

Speaker 1 (33:04):
By the way, all four home runs in that game
were splitters and sliders. It was a getting back to
Hoffin for one second.

Speaker 2 (33:11):
Joe.

Speaker 1 (33:12):
The World Series set a record by far the fewest
percentage of fastballs thrown, it was down under forty two
percent fastballs. If you go back just twelve years, it
was sixty.

Speaker 2 (33:24):
One percent fastballs.

Speaker 1 (33:26):
We went from sixty one percent fastballs to forty one
percent fastballs because everybody's afraid of throwing a fastball because
fastballs get hit.

Speaker 2 (33:34):
These guys can time a jet engine.

Speaker 1 (33:36):
And everything now is about pitching away from slug and
if you throw so many secondaries, you're bound to hang one.

Speaker 2 (33:43):
And we saw two actually three.

Speaker 1 (33:46):
You know, Trey Savage hung a splitter to Max Munsey
to make the score four to three, Hoffmann hung a
slider to Miguel Rojas to make it four to four,
and Bieber hung a slider to Will Smith to make
it five four.

Speaker 2 (34:01):
That's the World Series.

Speaker 4 (34:03):
Yeah, and it's it's.

Speaker 3 (34:03):
Incredible with the proliferation of velocity, right, I mean, you've
never seen velocity like we have it today, with so
many coming from so many different areas.

Speaker 4 (34:15):
I mean, I know what you're saying.

Speaker 3 (34:16):
About the velocity fastball is getting hit, but there are
some guys that don't handle velocity well. And when you
feed them the breaking ball, you're actually feeding them an
opportunity to do things like we're talking about. This is
where I really do like analytics, and where it is
very strong is the break breaking down of hitters and
what they can and cannot do. And you already mentioned

(34:36):
where Rojas had not really caught up to a ninety
five plus heater in a while. To me, man, that's
really strong stuff. If I know my guy's got that,
then maybe the worst thing he's going to do is
bloop a ball the right field, but it ain't going
over the fence. It's just it's kind of like a counterintuitive.
Velocity is way up, I mean, from your starters, from
your believers, how they maintain it, whatever, and then we're

(34:58):
going to run away from velocity and we're going to
go to the to the old breaking ball. Now, I
know what you said, I hear what you just said,
and how fastballs get hit. I would like to see
a per batter breakdown of that specifically too, because there's
going to be some guys that you think and I need
to try to full or trick based on there's such
prolific hitters, but I've seen some really good hitters man

(35:21):
that if you a well located fastball is not going
to get crushed like something soft will, especially when it
comes to pitches down on the zone. Anyhow, There's a
lot going on there for me because I would sit
in the dugout and I know what's going on, and
I watched the hitter swing and I could see where
this guy is long or slow, late, whatever you want

(35:41):
to call it, and then we're going to feed him
something soft, and I want to go crazy. So you
just would just think with the way fastballs have as
send it, that that would be the more popular pitch
of the two.

Speaker 1 (35:53):
Yep, the two lowest fastballs percentages in the World Series
since two thousand and eight, and really it goes beyond
that because people were throwing a lot of fastballs way
before then. The Blue Jay is the lowest, the twenty
twenty five Dodgers the second lowest.

Speaker 2 (36:08):
They just stayed away from fastballs.

Speaker 1 (36:10):
We're gonna take a quick break on the Book of Joe.
When we get back Joe, we need to talk about
Yoshinobu Yamamoto. What lessons can we learn from the MVP
of the World Series. We'll dive into that right after
this on the Book of Joe. Welcome back to the

(36:38):
Book of Joe. How about blink moments for a manager. Joe,
you're managing a game and your ace comes up to
you in the course of a seventeen eighteen in game
and says, I want to pitch out of the bullpen
after you just throw a complete game two days earlier.
You have to decide then if you're actually going to
allow him to do that, because, let's face it, the
way teams treat pitching these days, and with governors and

(37:01):
care and extra rest, etc.

Speaker 4 (37:02):
Etc.

Speaker 2 (37:03):
That's not an automatic go ahead and knock yourself out.

Speaker 1 (37:07):
And Dave Roberts did, with the help of Mark Pryor, decide, Okay,
we're gonna get him up. There was actually a spot
in the eighteenth inning, the top of the eighteenth inning
where he wanted to use Yamamoto call down there, and
the word he got from the bullpen, believe it or not,
was that his stuff was excellent. They could not believe
how good his stuff was. But he wasn't quite ready
yet in terms of being warm, so they passed. But

(37:29):
he would have been in the game if there was
a nineteenth inning. But then we get to Game six.
He pitches ninety throws ninety six pitches in that game,
threw really well, wins again. Interestingly, after the game, he
did not celebrate the win. He went to the trainer's
room and he told the physical trainers, get me ready
for tomorrow. Let's start working on body recovery. He's already

(37:52):
thinking about game seven as soon as Game six is over.
He shows up at the park two o'clock on Saturday,
the day of Game seven, and he tells Mark Pryor,
I want to pitch today.

Speaker 2 (38:01):
I'm going to go to the outfield and throw. I'll
let you know.

Speaker 1 (38:04):
He goes out there, throws flat ground, throws long toss,
goes to Mark Pryor and says, I'm good. The only
thing I want is give me enough time to warm up.
But I can pitch today. I mean, this is crazy,
coming back after he threw ninety six pitches in game six.

Speaker 2 (38:18):
He's volunteering to pitch in seven, and he.

Speaker 1 (38:21):
Actually thought about it the night before, and of course, yeah,
he's in the game. And he actually threw more pitches
in six and seven than Randy Johnson did when he
did it in one with the Diamondbacks, and his stuff
was amazing in.

Speaker 2 (38:33):
Game number seven.

Speaker 1 (38:35):
So the will for this guy Joe to go out
there and want the ball to try to win. Listen,
He's won championships in Japan, He's won the WBC with Japan.

Speaker 2 (38:45):
He's won two World Series with the Dodgers.

Speaker 1 (38:47):
He's pitched a ton of big games and pitched well
in them. He's just cut differently besides having a six
pitch mix and can throw all of them for strikes.
I think his desire to take the ball and to
do whatever is necessary for the team and throw pitch
counts and rest and all these governors out the window

(39:08):
at this time of year. I'm not saying you do
that all year long. I think that's a lesson every
starting pitcher should look at and say, am I doing
enough to help my team win a championship?

Speaker 4 (39:21):
Yeah? Amen?

Speaker 3 (39:22):
Wow, obviously I was watching it too. First of all,
he's not that big of a guy. Really, Yeah, that really?
You know, that's so counterintuitive to any any organization drafting
signing of trying to develop a five foot ten right hander,
even left handers anywhere. But that doesn't normally happen. It
starts right there. So when I see that, the first

(39:44):
thing I think about is this or his or is
his training techniques? That's what I would really research, you know,
he could break down his armstroke, what that looks like,
and obviously they can do that through different high speed
camera techniques. But also I would take it beyond that.
What easy do training wise, I'm here, that's going to
be popular. I would bet that it's different somehow.

Speaker 1 (40:05):
I stop you there. It is extremely different. Yeah, there's
no one in the world who trains like this guy.
I mean he regularly throws javelins, not true javelins, but
essentially they're javelins that he throws. He's on his own program,
there's no question about it. And it's interesting. He won
the Samawara Award basically they're say young and Japan, and
then before the next season he actually changed his delivery

(40:28):
to get rid of his high lay kick and came
back with an even better year. And the explanation was,
I wanted it to be even more efficient his delivery.
So he trains like nobody else. So you're dead on
with that observation.

Speaker 4 (40:40):
Yeah, I would.

Speaker 3 (40:40):
And then the seat for me the quicker delivery, believe
it or not, I mean, everybody tries to get more
out of it by picking a leg up, being slower
deliver whatever. I think when you have a quickened up
your delivery a little bit, your flick, your leg gets
up and he gets down sooner. Thus your arm could
get through more quickly, and I believe not only a
better time to the plate, but also a more effective

(41:01):
delivery regarding throwing strikes and really being able to command
your fastball better.

Speaker 4 (41:05):
So that's part of it.

Speaker 3 (41:06):
Now back to the training techniques, the fact that he
did it, and the fact that prior and David we're
discussing whether to use him or not. I have to
believe when Leicster was some kind of communication with the
front office, somebody passed out in the in the in
the front office suite when they saw this dude get
up and started to somebody had to be revived at
that point, I think. So I'd be curious about that

(41:29):
and how much that was connected with other people regarding
the usage of him at that moment. But I agreed,
these are the kind of tectonic shifts where when a
guy does something like this, this can resonate through other groups.
And we're talking starting pitching specifically right near which I
agree to me has been.

Speaker 4 (41:49):
Totally nurtured in the incorrect way.

Speaker 3 (41:52):
The fact that this guy is showing you what is
possible if in fact you kind of maybe even push
these guys a little bit, maybe connected to this or not.

Speaker 4 (42:02):
One of the things that I've been thinking thinking about
a lot.

Speaker 3 (42:05):
Even though there's a watered down version of the minor leagues,
the way it's set up, anymore than numbers involved, I
would go the opposite way in the minor leagues regarding,
you know, watching how many pitches a guy throws, how
many innings he throws, I'd be more concerned about before
you could be at bashroom a ball to double a
or double a to triple a, whatever you have to

(42:25):
be able to pitch through the third time to the
batting leader effectively. I would find that to be really interesting.
I know it's doable. I've seen it. I've seen it
for years without hurting people. If you really want to
have a stellar bullpen, annually have your starters pick up
more innings and more effective innings, and then learn how
do you get this hit or out the third time

(42:47):
he sees them through the bag and make that part
of the training process. Just like you're working on delivery,
you're working on grip, you're working on a pitch shape.

Speaker 4 (42:56):
Whatever you want to work on.

Speaker 3 (42:57):
We're also going to work on the mental part of
this game, which is how do I get Tom bradushout
the third time?

Speaker 4 (43:02):
I see him?

Speaker 3 (43:03):
And he's really good a lefty, I'm right handed. My
splits really are traditional. I'm really actually better against Rydei's
than lefties. What do we have to do to get
him out the third time through? It? I feel strong
about it, comfortable with it, and so does the people.
So do the people that are making decisions. I'd like
to see that become more part of the fabric as
opposed to running away from it.

Speaker 2 (43:23):
Great ideas. I'm all for that, Joe.

Speaker 1 (43:25):
Something needs to change and that's a good place to
start getting these guys the third time through in the
minor leagues. Dave Roberts I thought, actually both managers I
thought had great series. First of all, congrats to John
Schneider and the J's. I mean, the way that they
bought into playing team baseball is a credit to the
manager and the front office as well.

Speaker 2 (43:45):
So unselfish, you know, put the ball in play.

Speaker 1 (43:48):
I just loved watching the Toronto Blue Jays play baseball,
and that's the credit to John Schneider.

Speaker 2 (43:53):
And Dave Roberts, as I mentioned, had a heck of
a series.

Speaker 1 (43:56):
Now, yeah, I think you said at the top, Joey,
the Dodgers basically out talented.

Speaker 2 (44:01):
In the end the Blue Jays, right.

Speaker 1 (44:03):
I mean, Dave Roberts used four starting pitchers in Game
seven who are playing under contracts worth one point three
billion dollars. There's nobody else on the planet who has
these resources. But I thought the way he deployed those
resources was really, really good. I think in past years

(44:24):
you could criticize the Dodgers for being a little too
quick to move on to the next picture.

Speaker 2 (44:28):
That was not the case in the series.

Speaker 1 (44:30):
I thought he gave his starting pitchers that third time
through for the most part, and it worked out really well. Now,
it was hard for him to take somebody out of
his bullpen who he thought was better than one of
his starters, Don't get me wrong, but I thought his
timing on moves, his ability to let the game play
out and not be so proactive making moves, I think

(44:50):
that played out in the end. But listen, you've got
Will Smith, one of the best catchers in the game,
coming through with the home run, and especially Yamamoto, who's
just right now. If you need to win a game
and you can pick anybody in the world to start
at that game, he would be the guy. And he's
on the mound with the World Series and the balance
bases loaded, one out gets out of it, and the

(45:13):
door was closed at that point for the Jays. The
Dodgers were going to win the game and did latter day.

Speaker 3 (45:18):
Bob Gibson absolutely, And the other point you're making there,
I don't know how much this was interconnected. I would
imagine there was some, but the deficiencies of the Dodger
bull on paper actually you know, somewhat performed better than
you think, and they were missing was it Vessio's was
not there, So that was really that makes it incredibly different.

(45:39):
But when you have a bullpen that you don't really
trust as much, it creates patients with the manager. You
just have to keep the seat belt on sometimes and
you think about this, talk about it before the game
with everybody. I mean, that's something I wouldn't just like
all of a sudden spring on somebody. As a manager,
there's something I would discuss with my analytical department, my

(46:00):
GM and of course my pitching coach and bullpen coach,
et cetera. That conversation is worth having. You want to
be on the same page with situations like this, because
when things don't go right, particularly talking about your bullpen's
not up to speed, you got to get more innings
out of your starters. And if you try to make
a unilateral decision in today's world like that and it
doesn't go right, that's.

Speaker 4 (46:21):
Where I can get ugly.

Speaker 3 (46:22):
So you would really need like to build a co
op right there and all agree that this is the
right way to go about this, and then speaking from
a manager's seat, again, especially in today's climate, you do
that with more confidence, which is a big deal. It's
a big deal because when you feel fully invested in
confident in making a decision, knowing that it's going to

(46:44):
be supported, you can be more creative, you can be
more on time, you can be more bold in when
you're trying to do knowing that, and I think that's important.
So again the point is when your bullpen is not
what you'd like it to be, these are the kind
of discussions I would have prior to because even the
strongest among it, so you're still going to have self

(47:05):
doubt when you make potentially controversial moves. So when you
have a unified approach, it really does make a big difference.

Speaker 1 (47:13):
One last point, Joe, and this is something no one
has heard about until now. In the course of the game,
if you notice, and this is the first time I've
seen this, maybe ever, certainly in years, the third base
coaches were entirely in the third base coaches boxes throughout
the game. They were ordered to be in the box. Now,

(47:34):
I'm a big fan of this before I can tell
you before. As this postseason began, Michael Hill, who's vice
president of onfield baseball Operations, and the umpires would meet
with the front office of the managers. This is routine
before a series, just to go over ground rules and whatnot.
They made it known that as a point of emphasis
they were going to enforce rule number five point oh three,

(47:56):
which is that the coaches must be in the coaching
box other than when they're giving specific instructions to slide
or get back to a base while the ball is
in play. Now, this is the most abused rule in
baseball because coaches wander all over the place, and we
saw during this season most of the times when teams
are getting signals from tells on the pitcher. It's the

(48:18):
base coaches who are getting it by looking into the glove,
the position of the hands, whatnot, and relaying it to
the runner who relays it to the batter. So it
creates a lot of Shenanigan's going on it. Personally, I
don't like it's a sideshow going out there. And now
we have runners out there giving signs or looks like
they're landing airplanes, and sometimes they're just phony signs because

(48:40):
they want to get inside your head. We don't need
that kind of stuff, right, So they said this is
a point of emphasis during the postseason, but once the
game started, they really didn't crack down on it. Different
story in Game seven, Game seven, it was made once
again a major point of emphasis before Game seven. Baseball
didn't want this side show in a Game seven, and
I get it, and I applaud them for it. During

(49:02):
the game, it was after the third inning, Crew Chief
Mark Wegner went into the dugouts, I know at least
to the Dodger side, and said, listen, we're enforcing this rule.

Speaker 2 (49:10):
And the violation.

Speaker 1 (49:11):
If you violate the rule and the coaches out of
the box, the penalty is ejection from the game. I mean, listen,
nobody wants to get thrown out of Game seven, but
that's the penalty. And if you watch this game and
some of the highlights, pay attention because the coaches are
entirely in the box.

Speaker 2 (49:26):
And I applaud this. I hope it's the way going forward.

Speaker 1 (49:30):
Let the players play, let the coaches coach, and get
the Shenanigans out of the game that are not happening
in between the white lines.

Speaker 4 (49:40):
You know why.

Speaker 3 (49:41):
This speaks to why I have my lead bull meeting
and I don't like to have any or a glut
of rules and regulations because if you do, you have
to enforce them.

Speaker 4 (49:52):
That's it.

Speaker 3 (49:52):
I mean, if that is a rule and a regulation,
then it needs to be enforced. When I was a
young manager at the Angel organization, Larry Hymes was the
scouting director and farm director simultaneously, and Larry was big
on his raised by the Cincinnati Reds, we had to
show an inch of red on the back.

Speaker 4 (50:11):
Of our socks. With the pants.

Speaker 3 (50:13):
It just can't pull your stirrups up and show no red.
So I mean, I had I don't know thirty guys
on my rookie league team, and you have so many.

Speaker 4 (50:22):
No coaches, just you.

Speaker 3 (50:24):
You're throwing all the VP whatever, coaching third watching the workouts,
so you don't Sometimes I just screw it, you know.

Speaker 4 (50:31):
That's just another thing.

Speaker 3 (50:33):
He comes into town and he read me the Riot
Act because I was not doing that. I was not
enforcing the inch of red in the back. You don't
create a rule or a regulation unless you're gonna enforce it.

Speaker 4 (50:44):
It's very simple.

Speaker 3 (50:45):
If you don't want it, then you just take it
away their base coaches could stand wherever they want, just
make that the rule. But if it's in fact they
have to stay in the coach's box for a variety
of different reasons, then you enforce it.

Speaker 4 (50:59):
It's real simple.

Speaker 3 (51:02):
One time in we're playing ol Passo Midland angels A
Passo and Terry Bevington is the manager of El Paso
and his brother Zach is the home plate umpire. Now
these guys got along like oil and water man. They
were just they was never con mix. So it's a
cold night in Midland and Chris Bosio happened to be

(51:24):
on the Ol Paso team. So this was eighty five,
eighty six, eighty five, and so Boz came out to
coach for a space with a jacket on, and Zach
Bevington homeplate umpire immediately said, no, you can't wear a jacket.
It's only because he hated his brother Terry the manager.
Take the jacket off or you can't coach first base.

(51:47):
So they took the jacket off, stayed out there about
three inneks later. Boss comes back out with the jacket
on again, and immediately Zach ejects.

Speaker 4 (51:58):
Bozzio from the game and here comes Terry.

Speaker 3 (52:00):
I'm not kidding, there was at least I wish I
had a time at least a fifteen to twenty minute
argument between Terry and Zach behind home played at Midland,
and I'm telling you that the kind of language that
was being thrown back between brothers was incredible.

Speaker 4 (52:16):
But the point was it was a role. It was
a role that you.

Speaker 3 (52:18):
Can't wear a jacket while you're coaching base in the
Texas League at that time. So these are the kind
of things that made an impression on me. When you listen,
I'm one too stretch roles. I guess I'm not going
to deny that, but under these circumstances, either take the
role out of play completely. We're just legislate something new
and different or enforce it. I'm absolutely into that.

Speaker 2 (52:41):
That was a great story.

Speaker 1 (52:42):
By the way, I can't I'm just patrel thanksgving Day
table at the Bevington House.

Speaker 4 (52:49):
And then Sam's please.

Speaker 3 (52:51):
I was in at ten and Sammy was like a
rover for the Brewers, was a Brewer team and I'm thinking,
I swear to god, I thought I thought Terry's going
to get fired after this.

Speaker 4 (52:58):
It was that bad.

Speaker 3 (53:00):
It went on that long. The language was so dirty.
I'm just sitting there in a dugout listening to the
whole thing. It was outstanding.

Speaker 1 (53:06):
Well, it was an amazing world series, an amazing Game seven,
an amazing week. By the way, because Bad Company was
also chosen to be in the Rock and Roll Hall
of Fame, Joe overdue tribute to Bad Company. But you
are our Yashinobu Yamamoto, our big game pitcher. We want
them ball in your hands at the end, which is

(53:28):
where we have arrived. So what do you have to
take us home?

Speaker 3 (53:32):
Incredible? You went with the music reference today. Incredible because
mine has that tie in also from Semi Sonic talking
about the end of the season and what happens at
the end of a baseball season, already going into next year.
And the song was closing Time, which they used to
play all the time when Perceval Troy used to come

(53:53):
in to close a ball game. And right, it comes
from Seneca. Every new beginning comes from some other beginning's end.
And that's what's happening right now. There's new beginnings all
over the place, and hope's already springing eternal going into
next season. And you see the new managerial hires and

(54:13):
other things that are happening here in Tampa. The Tampa
Bay Rays have new ownership. There's all kinds of interesting
things at work. So wow, I mean that you bring
that up, and I thought that was perfect. Any other part,
there's one other and something I used to talk to
my players about my staff about all the time. The
beginning is the most important part of the work, and
that comes from Plato. And today I wrote everything on

(54:35):
a plate, by the way, which is incredible that it happened,
but I didn't have any paper here. But the beginning
is the most important part of the work, and I
really believe that when you lay it out. I mean,
that's not of course, you're always going to remain flexible.
And I think that's a huge part of being successful,
is open minded and being flexible to whatever it.

Speaker 4 (54:54):
Is that you do.

Speaker 3 (54:55):
But the beginning is wow, it's so important that you
lay it out right or at least get the foundation
really spread out in a way that's going to to
be supportive to the whole group.

Speaker 4 (55:05):
So the beginning.

Speaker 3 (55:07):
There's a new beginning going on for a lot of
groups right now. And when you're doing that, understand one
thing that the beginning is the most important part of
the work. As you start creating this new structure that's
hopefully going to get you to the World Series next
year and play the last game of the year and
win it. I want to hear more teams talk about
that as opposed to reacting during the course of the year.

Speaker 1 (55:27):
Oh awesome stuff, Great stuff, Joe, And this has been
a lot of fun, great World series, great work here
on the Book of Joe and we will see you
next time.

Speaker 4 (55:37):
Take care, tell me a nice job, brother.

Speaker 1 (55:46):
The Book of Joe podcast is a production of iHeartRadio.
For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts,
or wherever you get your podcasts.