New reports are revealing more information about the sinking of the Manawanui.
The inquiry into the sinking has found it was the result of a series of human errors, including not realising the auto-pilot had been left on.
US Merchant Marine Academy adjunct professor Dr. Salvatore R. Mercogliano explains what went wrong.
LISTEN ABOVE
See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:09):
You're listening to a podcast from Newstalk SEDB. Follow this
and our wide range of podcasts now on iHeartRadio.
Speaker 2 (00:16):
I'm excited about this, Doctor Sale. Mr Cogliano is a
maritime historian at Campbell University, North Carolina, a former merchant
mariner and host of the Water Is Going On was
Shipping on YouTube. We reached out to him after enjoying
his international analysis of the Manawan Nui autopilot disaster. Good Afternoon,
sal Good afternoon, Na Sally. Manowan Nui was originally a
(00:39):
commercial vessel converted for the Navy. Do you think that
had a bearing on the sinking?
Speaker 3 (00:44):
I think it did. The commercial vassel, the Ada Farm,
was designed for use up in the North Sea by
the Norwegians, and as such it has a very unique
propulsion system. It uses a series of what's called azipods,
and unlike conventional Navy vessels that have propellers and rudders,
as a pas require a lot of training to be
(01:06):
very proficient in their use. Plus, it has a sophisticated
autopilot system that requires familiarity with it. And it appears
from the inter report given by the Admiral in Charge
of Navy that there was a lacking of knowledge in
how to effectively shift from autopilot back into manual control.
Speaker 4 (01:27):
Can you just explain a little bit about how the
azipods system works compeded to a traditional navy vessel.
Speaker 3 (01:33):
Sure, So in a traditional vessel you would have a
propeller and a rudder, turn the wheel and you kick
the stern out of the vessel with as a pods.
When you actually have individual control of the two as
a pods, and the propellers are kind of suspended below
the vessel and spin three hundred and sixty three hundred
(01:54):
and sixty degrees around so that you don't actually throw
a rudder per se. You can control the azipods individually,
or you can slay them together and put them on
single control through a knob. So it's a very unique system.
It takes a lot of familiarity to know how to
operate the systems. It provides extremely precision maneuvering. It provides
(02:20):
the ability to stop the vessel almost immediately. But it
is an elaborate system and requires a lot of training
to be proficient in them.
Speaker 2 (02:29):
Yes, so these are two independents. They're thrusters, aren't they.
But they're independent. They can be operated independently. But when
you go into the autopilot mode, you've set of course,
you've set what you wanted to do, and the azipods
are controlled by the navigation system.
Speaker 3 (02:45):
Well, it actually depends on the type of autopilot system
that is on board the ship. Commercially, it had a
very sophisticated what's called dynamic positioning system that allowed you
to really input into a computer the track line basically
where you want the vessel to go. But when the
ship was converted from commercial over to the Royal New
(03:07):
Zealand Navy, there is a question about was the full
dynamic positioning system carried over or was there a modified
autopilot system put on board. Autopilots can do a variety
of things. They can set your course and you follow
a straight course line. They can do waypoints, so you
set up, you know, go a line and come back,
(03:29):
and during survey operations you really want to be on
autopilot because you want to have the straightest course available.
What was clear from the briefing was that the ship
had shifted between manual and autopilot a few times. And
what was clear is that they did not understand that
they had put the ship into autopilot, at least a
(03:49):
modified form of autopilot that allowed them to have throttle control.
They sped up on the vessel, but they couldn't turn
the acid pods to change course.
Speaker 2 (04:00):
Yeah, so is that normal? Because if you look at
the path that traveling along and then they go out
of all a pilot and then they they execute a
turn away from the reef, and then they go back
into autopilot. So what you're saying is, in a full
autopilot system, you would just set it up to scan
that reef on its own and execute all the tunes
itself without going in and out of autopilot.
Speaker 3 (04:23):
Right on an autopilot system, it's almost like a car
with automatic lane changes or changing the speed. It will
do it for you. You can program in the course change,
put in the limits to how much rudder you want
to use, or how much azipods you want to use,
and it will make those changes for you. It was
strange to me that they kept popping in and out
(04:43):
of that mode because it led obviously to the disaster
that you saw, and more importantly, it put them into
a mode where they had throttle control. They can make
the ship go faster or slower, but they didn't have
helm control where they can steer it.
Speaker 2 (04:57):
Well, it looks like the autopilot was on for teen
minutes before it was turned off. How easily can you
check that a ship like the Mono Annui has its
autopilot on? Is there a is then?
Speaker 4 (05:08):
No?
Speaker 2 (05:08):
I mean, when are you talking about lane change in
the car? It's pretty clear when it's on. You can
see it on the screen. Is it not a light
flashing saying you're on autopilot?
Speaker 3 (05:18):
It depends on the system. Again, we know that it
had a very sophisticated system on board when it was
a commercial vessel. It's not clear that that same system
was carried over and so familiarity with the system would
be a paramount. I mean, they should have indications for
when that system is engaged, and even if when it's
engaged in a limited fashion as it appeared to be here,
(05:41):
it's you know, leaving it in autopilot mode. Again, one
of the things that came up in the briefing was
the crew did not believe that they were in autopilot.
They thought they had a thruster failure, and so they
started handling it like a thruster failure, and so they
did not assume that it was locked into autopilot. It's
only later ten minutes later, when probably other crew members
(06:03):
came up to the bridge, senior crew members came up,
did they realize that they were locked into auto pilot.
Speaker 4 (06:09):
And your experience was that a significant lack of training.
The fact that when they tried to divert course will
slow the vessel down, they ended up picking up speed.
Is that just a drastic lack of training.
Speaker 3 (06:21):
It is a clear lack of familiarity with the system.
And you know, there was a very similar occasion in
twenty seventeen when the USS McCain was maneuvering going into Singapore,
and that was due to a lack of familiarity with
this system and how to switch between modes and when
(06:41):
you're operating close to a reef as they were, familiarity
was really keen. I mean, I'm really at a loss
to understand why they didn't just stay in manual mode
until they were on the core setting they wanted to.
Speaker 2 (06:55):
Yeah, because what you've got here is they accelerate from
six knots to ten knots towards the reef, which looks
like they've increased thrust. Is that because they were assuming
that the azipods were one eighty degrees in the other
direction than what they expected. So using the azipods to
slow themselves down, they actually used them to speed themselves
(07:17):
up by increasing the thrust.
Speaker 3 (07:18):
Right, what I would envision they did was was spin
the azipods. They assumed the azipods were rotating and actually
on on on Menawanui, it actually has propellers on both
front and halt of the azipods, and so it actually
there's a video of the dry docking of her, and
so she actually has props on both ends of the azipods.
(07:41):
And so they envisioned that they were reversing the props,
they were getting a spin around and actually backing down
on it. And what was clear is they didn't, and
that the speed up should have told them that they
should have been watching the gauges to tell them that
they were accelerating, not decelerating. The biggest thing they could
have done was take speed off period, just slow down,
(08:03):
you know, that would have at least mitigated the potential
of running as hard up on the reef as they did.
Speaker 2 (08:08):
Yeah, when they started spading up towards the RAF. They
would have been quite a moment for them. During a
RAF scanning maneuval like this, would the commander of the
ship normally be on the bridge.
Speaker 3 (08:19):
You know, it depends on the standard operating procedure for
the ship. They were doing that, that survey for twenty
two hours, so I mean that's obviously a long protracted
period of time to have the ship's cap on the bridge,
But it wouldn't be unusual to have you know, maybe
the captain or the executive officer on the bridge if
they deemed it as dangerous operation. You know, the fact
(08:41):
that they weren't up there tells me they didn't view
it as a hazardous operation. They were running lines, you know,
basically mowing the grass, trying to do their survey operations.
But as they were getting closer and closer towards the reef,
that may have you know, it may have caused more
concern and hazard for the crew. But you know, the
(09:04):
captains will set their standard procedures for a vessel. It
seems as if the captain here did not do that,
or the officer on watch neglected to call the captain
for a hazardous maneuver. We just don't know. There's not
enough information for us to make that call yet.
Speaker 4 (09:21):
Silent was mentioned in the report that there were critical
eras that were identified, training, planning, supervision, risk assessment and readiness.
With all of those elements that have been identified, that's
probably not a good look for the command, or is it.
Speaker 3 (09:36):
I think that's damning of not just the captain, but
potentially the entire Royal New Zealand Navy. If if this
is an issue across the board, that is areas, I mean,
those are critical areas you know to operate a.
Speaker 2 (09:49):
Vessel, training, planning, supervision, assessment and readiness. They all seem
pretty key.
Speaker 3 (09:55):
Yeah, I mean those those are almost every area you
can envision. And so this is either very damning for
the ship's captain or it's very damning across the entire fleet.
If this isn't, you know, an issue across the entire fleet,
then it raises into question of the ability of other vessels. Again.
Manawanui is a very unique type ship. It's common out
(10:17):
in the commercial industry, but within navies it's very unique.
Although we do see navies adopting the use of this
type vessel. The Royal Navy has brought a very similar
vessel in and the US Navy has brought a very
similar vessel into the fleet.
Speaker 2 (10:32):
We're talking to doctor sel mccagliano, Professa at the US
Merchant Marine Academy about the manoanuis thinking, how real globally
is it for a naval ship to sink in peace time?
Speaker 3 (10:48):
Well, I mean, you've you've had issues like the von
Hamer Schard in San Diego catching fire and you know,
basically being not thinking but being a constructive total loss
of The US Navy lost a minesweeper aground in the
South China Sea about a decade ago. It's not a
rare occurrent. It's not a common occurrence, but it does happen.
(11:10):
I mean, operating on the high seas is always a risk.
And one of the big questions I have is why
was Mano Aanui performing such a very delicate operation as
close to shore when you could use autonomous vehicles, you
can use a variety of different platforms to do it. Granted,
the Royal New Zealand Navy doesn't have the money and
(11:33):
capabilities of many other navies, and that may have been
the reason that it was being done. Economy of scale.
Speaker 4 (11:39):
Here you mentioned in your analysis, So that sources have
told you that our government did not pay the money
to get the full dynamic position system, that the autopilot
is highly likely to be incomplete. Would you expect that
to come out of the Court of Inquiry that is
currently underway.
Speaker 3 (11:57):
I would hope the Court of Inquiry would talk to
the Classification Society, that is the third party entity that
certifies Bethel, and when Manoanue was a commercial lessole, the
Classification Society would have ensured that the ship had a
system suitable for use in operation so that it could
(12:17):
be properly insured. I would think that the Court of
Inquiry would discuss the autopilot system in detail, what type
of system. When we look at what happened on board
USS McCain in twenty seventeen, the helm system was a
major function that was looked at because the operating crew,
(12:37):
the personnel using that system, we're not familiar with it.
They had come over from another ship that had a
different system and therefore they were unfamiliar with it. So
I would think it would be a major issue within
the Court of inquiry.
Speaker 2 (12:53):
Yeah, well, what if an autopilot system they have or
on other ships. I think it'd be good to infast
in a big flashing light that sees autopilot on at
any given times, so I know what's going on.
Speaker 3 (13:04):
There's also concern that you knock a ship out of
autopilot did not know about it. There, there's there, there's
there's a reason to have kind of redundancy in your
auto pilot system so that it can't be inadvertently knocked
out of auto pilot. The airline industry learned that to
their detriment, when you know, you could just bump the
controller and the ship comes out of auto pilot and
(13:26):
then all of a sudden you have a plane descending
without the pilots being aware of that. So, I mean,
there's reasons for for the creation of systems. It's it's
it's usually an accident of some kind that that is
the underlying cause.
Speaker 2 (13:42):
Finally, would you describe this as a humiliating incident for
the Royal New Zealand Navy.
Speaker 3 (13:48):
I don't like to use that phrase because I think
it's an accident, and accidents will always happen as long
as you have humans interfacing with machinery, especially at sea,
you're going to use lose vessels. Just being at sea
on a flat, Colm day, is a risky proposition. The
sea always is trying to kill you, and it's a
way to see it. Yeah, it looks calm and inviting,
(14:10):
but you're always fighting that. Unfortunately, when you let your
guard down is typically when the sea wins. And so
I don't consider it a humiliating lass. I hope if anything,
like many events, we learn from it. So hopefully there's
a there's a lesson learned from it.
Speaker 2 (14:27):
Yeah, well, I mean for New Zealand, it's a bit
of a problem because it's twelve point five percent of
parents or a navy fleet, so.
Speaker 3 (14:34):
I know it's the big partyler.
Speaker 2 (14:40):
Yeah that was doctor cel Mircogliano. If you want to
see a full analysis of his thoughts on the MANOANUI
autopilot disaster, then look up the what is going On
and Shipping channel on YouTube. Very interesting man.
Speaker 1 (14:56):
For more from news talks, it'd be listen live on
air or online and keep our shows with you wherever
you go with our podcast on iHeartRadio
You're listening to a podcast from Newstalk SEDB. Follow this
and our wide range of podcasts now on iHeartRadio.
Speaker 2 (00:16):
I'm excited about this, Doctor Sale. Mr Cogliano is a
maritime historian at Campbell University, North Carolina, a former merchant
mariner and host of the Water Is Going On was
Shipping on YouTube. We reached out to him after enjoying
his international analysis of the Manawan Nui autopilot disaster. Good Afternoon,
sal Good afternoon, Na Sally. Manowan Nui was originally a
(00:39):
commercial vessel converted for the Navy. Do you think that
had a bearing on the sinking?
Speaker 3 (00:44):
I think it did. The commercial vassel, the Ada Farm,
was designed for use up in the North Sea by
the Norwegians, and as such it has a very unique
propulsion system. It uses a series of what's called azipods,
and unlike conventional Navy vessels that have propellers and rudders,
as a pas require a lot of training to be
(01:06):
very proficient in their use. Plus, it has a sophisticated
autopilot system that requires familiarity with it. And it appears
from the inter report given by the Admiral in Charge
of Navy that there was a lacking of knowledge in
how to effectively shift from autopilot back into manual control.
Speaker 4 (01:27):
Can you just explain a little bit about how the
azipods system works compeded to a traditional navy vessel.
Speaker 3 (01:33):
Sure, So in a traditional vessel you would have a
propeller and a rudder, turn the wheel and you kick
the stern out of the vessel with as a pods.
When you actually have individual control of the two as
a pods, and the propellers are kind of suspended below
the vessel and spin three hundred and sixty three hundred
(01:54):
and sixty degrees around so that you don't actually throw
a rudder per se. You can control the azipods individually,
or you can slay them together and put them on
single control through a knob. So it's a very unique system.
It takes a lot of familiarity to know how to
operate the systems. It provides extremely precision maneuvering. It provides
(02:20):
the ability to stop the vessel almost immediately. But it
is an elaborate system and requires a lot of training
to be proficient in them.
Speaker 2 (02:29):
Yes, so these are two independents. They're thrusters, aren't they.
But they're independent. They can be operated independently. But when
you go into the autopilot mode, you've set of course,
you've set what you wanted to do, and the azipods
are controlled by the navigation system.
Speaker 3 (02:45):
Well, it actually depends on the type of autopilot system
that is on board the ship. Commercially, it had a
very sophisticated what's called dynamic positioning system that allowed you
to really input into a computer the track line basically
where you want the vessel to go. But when the
ship was converted from commercial over to the Royal New
(03:07):
Zealand Navy, there is a question about was the full
dynamic positioning system carried over or was there a modified
autopilot system put on board. Autopilots can do a variety
of things. They can set your course and you follow
a straight course line. They can do waypoints, so you
set up, you know, go a line and come back,
(03:29):
and during survey operations you really want to be on
autopilot because you want to have the straightest course available.
What was clear from the briefing was that the ship
had shifted between manual and autopilot a few times. And
what was clear is that they did not understand that
they had put the ship into autopilot, at least a
(03:49):
modified form of autopilot that allowed them to have throttle control.
They sped up on the vessel, but they couldn't turn
the acid pods to change course.
Speaker 2 (04:00):
Yeah, so is that normal? Because if you look at
the path that traveling along and then they go out
of all a pilot and then they they execute a
turn away from the reef, and then they go back
into autopilot. So what you're saying is, in a full
autopilot system, you would just set it up to scan
that reef on its own and execute all the tunes
itself without going in and out of autopilot.
Speaker 3 (04:23):
Right on an autopilot system, it's almost like a car
with automatic lane changes or changing the speed. It will
do it for you. You can program in the course change,
put in the limits to how much rudder you want
to use, or how much azipods you want to use,
and it will make those changes for you. It was
strange to me that they kept popping in and out
(04:43):
of that mode because it led obviously to the disaster
that you saw, and more importantly, it put them into
a mode where they had throttle control. They can make
the ship go faster or slower, but they didn't have
helm control where they can steer it.
Speaker 2 (04:57):
Well, it looks like the autopilot was on for teen
minutes before it was turned off. How easily can you
check that a ship like the Mono Annui has its
autopilot on? Is there a is then?
Speaker 4 (05:08):
No?
Speaker 2 (05:08):
I mean, when are you talking about lane change in
the car? It's pretty clear when it's on. You can
see it on the screen. Is it not a light
flashing saying you're on autopilot?
Speaker 3 (05:18):
It depends on the system. Again, we know that it
had a very sophisticated system on board when it was
a commercial vessel. It's not clear that that same system
was carried over and so familiarity with the system would
be a paramount. I mean, they should have indications for
when that system is engaged, and even if when it's
engaged in a limited fashion as it appeared to be here,
(05:41):
it's you know, leaving it in autopilot mode. Again, one
of the things that came up in the briefing was
the crew did not believe that they were in autopilot.
They thought they had a thruster failure, and so they
started handling it like a thruster failure, and so they
did not assume that it was locked into autopilot. It's
only later ten minutes later, when probably other crew members
(06:03):
came up to the bridge, senior crew members came up,
did they realize that they were locked into auto pilot.
Speaker 4 (06:09):
And your experience was that a significant lack of training.
The fact that when they tried to divert course will
slow the vessel down, they ended up picking up speed.
Is that just a drastic lack of training.
Speaker 3 (06:21):
It is a clear lack of familiarity with the system.
And you know, there was a very similar occasion in
twenty seventeen when the USS McCain was maneuvering going into Singapore,
and that was due to a lack of familiarity with
this system and how to switch between modes and when
(06:41):
you're operating close to a reef as they were, familiarity
was really keen. I mean, I'm really at a loss
to understand why they didn't just stay in manual mode
until they were on the core setting they wanted to.
Speaker 2 (06:55):
Yeah, because what you've got here is they accelerate from
six knots to ten knots towards the reef, which looks
like they've increased thrust. Is that because they were assuming
that the azipods were one eighty degrees in the other
direction than what they expected. So using the azipods to
slow themselves down, they actually used them to speed themselves
(07:17):
up by increasing the thrust.
Speaker 3 (07:18):
Right, what I would envision they did was was spin
the azipods. They assumed the azipods were rotating and actually
on on on Menawanui, it actually has propellers on both
front and halt of the azipods, and so it actually
there's a video of the dry docking of her, and
so she actually has props on both ends of the azipods.
(07:41):
And so they envisioned that they were reversing the props,
they were getting a spin around and actually backing down
on it. And what was clear is they didn't, and
that the speed up should have told them that they
should have been watching the gauges to tell them that
they were accelerating, not decelerating. The biggest thing they could
have done was take speed off period, just slow down,
(08:03):
you know, that would have at least mitigated the potential
of running as hard up on the reef as they did.
Speaker 2 (08:08):
Yeah, when they started spading up towards the RAF. They
would have been quite a moment for them. During a
RAF scanning maneuval like this, would the commander of the
ship normally be on the bridge.
Speaker 3 (08:19):
You know, it depends on the standard operating procedure for
the ship. They were doing that, that survey for twenty
two hours, so I mean that's obviously a long protracted
period of time to have the ship's cap on the bridge,
But it wouldn't be unusual to have you know, maybe
the captain or the executive officer on the bridge if
they deemed it as dangerous operation. You know, the fact
(08:41):
that they weren't up there tells me they didn't view
it as a hazardous operation. They were running lines, you know,
basically mowing the grass, trying to do their survey operations.
But as they were getting closer and closer towards the reef,
that may have you know, it may have caused more
concern and hazard for the crew. But you know, the
(09:04):
captains will set their standard procedures for a vessel. It
seems as if the captain here did not do that,
or the officer on watch neglected to call the captain
for a hazardous maneuver. We just don't know. There's not
enough information for us to make that call yet.
Speaker 4 (09:21):
Silent was mentioned in the report that there were critical
eras that were identified, training, planning, supervision, risk assessment and readiness.
With all of those elements that have been identified, that's
probably not a good look for the command, or is it.
Speaker 3 (09:36):
I think that's damning of not just the captain, but
potentially the entire Royal New Zealand Navy. If if this
is an issue across the board, that is areas, I mean,
those are critical areas you know to operate a.
Speaker 2 (09:49):
Vessel, training, planning, supervision, assessment and readiness. They all seem
pretty key.
Speaker 3 (09:55):
Yeah, I mean those those are almost every area you
can envision. And so this is either very damning for
the ship's captain or it's very damning across the entire fleet.
If this isn't, you know, an issue across the entire fleet,
then it raises into question of the ability of other vessels. Again.
Manawanui is a very unique type ship. It's common out
(10:17):
in the commercial industry, but within navies it's very unique.
Although we do see navies adopting the use of this
type vessel. The Royal Navy has brought a very similar
vessel in and the US Navy has brought a very
similar vessel into the fleet.
Speaker 2 (10:32):
We're talking to doctor sel mccagliano, Professa at the US
Merchant Marine Academy about the manoanuis thinking, how real globally
is it for a naval ship to sink in peace time?
Speaker 3 (10:48):
Well, I mean, you've you've had issues like the von
Hamer Schard in San Diego catching fire and you know,
basically being not thinking but being a constructive total loss
of The US Navy lost a minesweeper aground in the
South China Sea about a decade ago. It's not a
rare occurrent. It's not a common occurrence, but it does happen.
(11:10):
I mean, operating on the high seas is always a risk.
And one of the big questions I have is why
was Mano Aanui performing such a very delicate operation as
close to shore when you could use autonomous vehicles, you
can use a variety of different platforms to do it. Granted,
the Royal New Zealand Navy doesn't have the money and
(11:33):
capabilities of many other navies, and that may have been
the reason that it was being done. Economy of scale.
Speaker 4 (11:39):
Here you mentioned in your analysis, So that sources have
told you that our government did not pay the money
to get the full dynamic position system, that the autopilot
is highly likely to be incomplete. Would you expect that
to come out of the Court of Inquiry that is
currently underway.
Speaker 3 (11:57):
I would hope the Court of Inquiry would talk to
the Classification Society, that is the third party entity that
certifies Bethel, and when Manoanue was a commercial lessole, the
Classification Society would have ensured that the ship had a
system suitable for use in operation so that it could
(12:17):
be properly insured. I would think that the Court of
Inquiry would discuss the autopilot system in detail, what type
of system. When we look at what happened on board
USS McCain in twenty seventeen, the helm system was a
major function that was looked at because the operating crew,
(12:37):
the personnel using that system, we're not familiar with it.
They had come over from another ship that had a
different system and therefore they were unfamiliar with it. So
I would think it would be a major issue within
the Court of inquiry.
Speaker 2 (12:53):
Yeah, well, what if an autopilot system they have or
on other ships. I think it'd be good to infast
in a big flashing light that sees autopilot on at
any given times, so I know what's going on.
Speaker 3 (13:04):
There's also concern that you knock a ship out of
autopilot did not know about it. There, there's there, there's
there's a reason to have kind of redundancy in your
auto pilot system so that it can't be inadvertently knocked
out of auto pilot. The airline industry learned that to
their detriment, when you know, you could just bump the
controller and the ship comes out of auto pilot and
(13:26):
then all of a sudden you have a plane descending
without the pilots being aware of that. So, I mean,
there's reasons for for the creation of systems. It's it's
it's usually an accident of some kind that that is
the underlying cause.
Speaker 2 (13:42):
Finally, would you describe this as a humiliating incident for
the Royal New Zealand Navy.
Speaker 3 (13:48):
I don't like to use that phrase because I think
it's an accident, and accidents will always happen as long
as you have humans interfacing with machinery, especially at sea,
you're going to use lose vessels. Just being at sea
on a flat, Colm day, is a risky proposition. The
sea always is trying to kill you, and it's a
way to see it. Yeah, it looks calm and inviting,
(14:10):
but you're always fighting that. Unfortunately, when you let your
guard down is typically when the sea wins. And so
I don't consider it a humiliating lass. I hope if anything,
like many events, we learn from it. So hopefully there's
a there's a lesson learned from it.
Speaker 2 (14:27):
Yeah, well, I mean for New Zealand, it's a bit
of a problem because it's twelve point five percent of
parents or a navy fleet, so.
Speaker 3 (14:34):
I know it's the big partyler.
Speaker 2 (14:40):
Yeah that was doctor cel Mircogliano. If you want to
see a full analysis of his thoughts on the MANOANUI
autopilot disaster, then look up the what is going On
and Shipping channel on YouTube. Very interesting man.
Speaker 1 (14:56):
For more from news talks, it'd be listen live on
air or online and keep our shows with you wherever
you go with our podcast on iHeartRadio
Popular Podcasts
United States of Kennedy
United States of Kennedy is a podcast about our cultural fascination with the Kennedy dynasty. Every week, hosts Lyra Smith and George Civeris go into one aspect of the Kennedy story.
Stuff You Should Know
If you've ever wanted to know about champagne, satanism, the Stonewall Uprising, chaos theory, LSD, El Nino, true crime and Rosa Parks, then look no further. Josh and Chuck have you covered.
Dateline NBC
Current and classic episodes, featuring compelling true-crime mysteries, powerful documentaries and in-depth investigations. Follow now to get the latest episodes of Dateline NBC completely free, or subscribe to Dateline Premium for ad-free listening and exclusive bonus content: DatelinePremium.com