November 29, 2023 • 41 mins
Robert and Mia discuss a recent Washington Post article arguing that a Gen Z political divide will destroy marriage and take a look at the actual political trends in Gen Z.
See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:01):
All media.
Speaker 2 (00:08):
Oh boy, howdy, welcome back to it could happen here
a podcast about about those wacky gen Z kids and
how all of the things that the mainstream media used
to say about millennials I have now embraced to say
about gen Z who are destroying the world through their
(00:29):
through their greed and evilness and good knees comparatively. Yeah, Miah,
how are you doing? You're you're gen Z?
Speaker 3 (00:39):
Right?
Speaker 1 (00:40):
Yeah, so I'm on okay, I am on the exact
borderline of I am either the oldest Zoomer or the
youngest millennial.
Speaker 2 (00:50):
So you're you're a day walker, right like you're the
you're the Blade of gen Z. Yeah, yeah, okay, so
you could go out in the sub onions, but you
still blood. Yeah, I get it, I get it. Yeah,
who's the Chris Christal I guess I'm the Chris Christofferson.
If we're doing the original Blade movie, which I watched
over Thanksgiving break pretty good. I hadn't seen it in
(01:13):
like fucking twenty years, but solid movie, solid movie.
Speaker 1 (01:17):
I feel like it's kind of downhill from the Blood Rave.
But the Blood Rave is pretty sick. It's all every
everything in culture was downhill from blood rave. But yeah,
it's got some it's got some good bits to it. Still,
you know what doesn't have good bits to it.
Speaker 4 (01:34):
The institution of marriage.
Speaker 2 (01:36):
That I mean, I don't disagree with that, but I
was going to say the Washington Post editorial board, Ah,
you know, yeah, so we are talking is that this
is an episode about some gin z panic shit that
came out recently. That thought I felt was worth digging
into because of the pretty interesting ways in which it's
(01:57):
wrong if you were, you know, celebrating being with your family,
eating turkey or just shooting up Heroin alone in the bathroom.
Last week, on November twenty second, twenty twenty three, the
Washington Post Editorial Board published an opinion column with the
provocative title, if attitudes don't shift, a political dating mismatch
will threaten marriage.
Speaker 4 (02:18):
Hell yeah, yeah, I love this. Vitally destroy the institution?
Speaker 2 (02:24):
Yeah yeah, we're doing this through a political dating mismatch.
Speaker 4 (02:28):
Now.
Speaker 2 (02:28):
I think an article with roughly this premise drops every year,
sometimes a couple of times a year, on a couple
of different places. This time it came in through the
Washington Post editorial Board, and the basic premise of this
specific article is that gen Z and millennial men are
growing more conservative while women are growing more progressive. This
(02:52):
threatens marriage as an institution because all these closed minded
gen Z lib broads won't date report opplicans. Right. That
is literally like the point of the article is a
gen Z liberal women, they are less willing to date
outside of their political beliefs, and men are getting more conservative.
So it's really a danger for marriage.
Speaker 4 (03:13):
Now.
Speaker 2 (03:14):
I understand if your first impulse is to say something like, well,
when has the Washington Post editorial board ever been right
about a single goddamn thing? And that is a correct
attitude to have.
Speaker 1 (03:24):
Sometimes they make the decision not to publish an article.
There are some days where they don't write anything.
Speaker 2 (03:31):
Yeah, you have to, that is a good decision. If
they made that decision every day, I would be fully
supportive of the Washington Post editorial board. And if they'll
hire me, I can make that decision for them every day.
I'm very good at not doing anything. That said, even
though it is correct to say the Washington Post editorial
boarder basically always wrong, I've still run into overwhelming numbers
(03:55):
of my peers who think this article is silly but
still buy into the basic point in this piece. This
is generally married to a widespread belief which is actually
cited in the article, that toxic male influencers like Andrew
Tate have tilted huge numbers of young men to the right.
So even though people will be like, well, it's stupid
to expect people to date, you know, folks who believe
(04:16):
horrible political things that would hurt them, it's true that
men are getting more young men are getting more conservative right,
and this is I think generally down to this belief
that has I don't think people examine often. They just
sort of like they get concerned about the popularity of
guys like Tate, which is valid, he's concerning, but assume
(04:37):
that does mean that like, yeah, we're losing the young men.
They've all been tilted towards these guys. And so, without
discounting the damage of dudes like Tate, I wanted to
give a breakdown of how common the so called right
word tilt of young men actually is because spoilers, this
is a pernicious bit of disinformation, and I think it
(04:57):
kind of blackpills a lot of people unnecessari Let's start
with the obvious point here. Young men are not growing
more conservative across the board than men of other generations.
So first off, I want to read you a quote
from this Post editorial. Since mister Trump's election in twenty sixteen,
the percentage of young women ages eighteen to thirty who
identify as liberal has shot up from slightly over twenty
(05:20):
percent to thirty two percent. Young men have not followed suit.
If anything, they have grown more conservative. Now that claim
is based, you want to guess, did they cite a
bunch of different sources to prove like that it's a
really widespread problem, or do they have a single statorial.
Speaker 4 (05:38):
Board they have?
Speaker 1 (05:40):
Those people could not find a second study if you
nailed it to their face, they share, couldn't they share?
Couldn't they googled real quickly? Or I'm not even going
to give them credit for googling. One of their friends
who works at a right wing think tank sent them
a survey from that right wing think tank, because that
the entire statistical base of that claim is a study
(06:01):
by the American Enterprise Institute, which is a center right
think tank that tends to produce center rights surveys. And
even then, the study that they are actually citing doesn't show.
With the Post editorial Board claims again, their claim is
young men have not followed suit. If anything, they have
grown more conservative, right, young men. So they are talking
(06:23):
across the board about gen Z and millennial males. Right,
I'm going to quote from that study. Previous research identified
a growing gap and ideological orientation between young men and women.
The gender gap in liberal identity is notable among members
of Generation Z, but it's relatively modest. Forty three percent
of gen Z women identify as liberal compared to thirty
(06:45):
five percent of gen Z men. However, the gender divide
among white, non Hispanic gen Z adults is considerable, close
to half. Forty six percent of gen Z women are liberal,
a far greater share than white gen Z men, among
whom only twenty eight percent identify liberal. Among gen Z adults,
white men are significantly more likely than white women to
identify as politically conservative thirty six percent versus twenty six percent.
(07:08):
So you see what number one of the study is
doing there is it's saying forty three percent of gen
Z women, all gen Z women identify as liberal, whereas
and then it goes to thirty six percent of white
gen Z men identify as an app it's switching it
on them.
Speaker 4 (07:23):
Right.
Speaker 2 (07:24):
And while it does eventually acknowledge the differences, where because
it says that like across the board, all gen Z
men thirty five percent or conservative, forty three percent of
gen Z women are liberal. That's not a massive gap, right.
The Washington Post editorial board just makes the claim that
young men have grown more conservative, which is not supported
by the study. And also the study is specifically talking
(07:46):
about how gen Z white men have gotten more conservative. Right,
very different things being claimed here. So the Post just
ignored what was actually in the survey to claim all
young men, not just young white men, are more conservative,
not just Z white men are more conservative. Now, this
is weird. But even if you take the study, which
is misrepresented by the editorial board at its face value,
(08:09):
that study does not gel with all of the other
data that we have. Now, when I went through this,
it was hard to find good data on just gen
Z men that is not broken down in most of
the studies that we get. But we do have some
information on how gen Z adult men voted as a
group in the twenty twenty two midterms, and that data
(08:30):
is telling based on the twenty twenty two midterms seventy
one percent of young women. That's a that's gen Z
mostly gen Z eighteen to twenty nine. So I think
gen Z taps out at twenty six right now. So
presumably a percentage of the people in this are technically millennials,
but they're like you, they're day walkers.
Speaker 1 (08:49):
Yeah, that's like what, like, oh my god, I can't
I can't do math live on air.
Speaker 2 (08:56):
I think it's like twenty seven to forty something is
the millennials.
Speaker 4 (09:00):
But I'm going to say it's close enough to this.
This is closes.
Speaker 1 (09:03):
It's only like three years of people right exactly, and
they're the three years that are that are right in
the middle.
Speaker 2 (09:09):
But of that of these voters in the twenty twenty
two midterms, seventy one percent of young women voted for Democrats,
twenty six percent voted for Republicans, fifty three percent of
young men voted for Democrats, forty two percent voted for Republicans.
And among LGBT, and again this is not broken down
male or female, ninety three percent voted for Democrats, and overall,
(09:32):
among non LGBT youth, fifty eight percent voted for Democrats,
thirty eight percent voted for Republicans. So again, not massive
discrepancies here. And one thing that may help to explain
this that again is not really broken down in the
Washington Post editorial is that while gen Z white men
(09:52):
have are more conservative compared to like gen Z millennial
white men, gen Z itself is a lot less white
prior generations, which means overall gen Z men are not
really getting more conservative. About fifty five percent of gen
Z is white compared to about seventy percent of boomers. Right,
So this is one major reason why. Again because again
(10:16):
if you actually factor in all of gen Z, there's
not this huge worry about like a marriage discrepancy as
long as you assume that people. You know that interracial
dating is not a problem for most people the way
it is for apparently the Washington Post editorial board. Now
there's a couple of caveats here. One is that midterm
(10:36):
voters are historically more engaged and educated than voters of
other generations. However, that may not necessarily hold true with
gen Z or millennial voters today due to a variety
of factors. One worthwhile point is that young people tend
to be driven far more by what they encounter through
social media, which is probably part of why gen Z
and millennial voters consider abortion to be a more important
(10:59):
thing to vote on than the economy by a margin
that bears no resemblance to older generations. This is why
we've actually seen unless for elections, soaring youth voter turnout,
particularly during the midterms, record levels of youth voting, Which
doesn't mean it's completely wrong that midterm voters may be
a bit more engaged and educated, but that's probably less
of a factor for young voters than it is for
(11:21):
older generations. Right, some of the conventional wisdom about who
votes when is not as accurate when we're talking about
younger people. This is not something that you can prove objectively,
but there's significant, sort of circumstantial evidence around this. Speaking
of circumstances, you know what circumstances get me to spend
(11:41):
my money?
Speaker 4 (11:43):
Is it being served products and services?
Speaker 2 (11:46):
It's well, it's when those products and services advertise on
this podcast and only this podcast. So check that shit out, homies.
Speaker 3 (12:07):
Dah and we're back.
Speaker 2 (12:09):
So yeah. One of the overall points to make that
I think goes against this kind of panic a lot
of people have that gen Z is somehow being like
pilled away from progressive politics is that as a result
of stuff primarily abortion, gen Z voters supported Democrats over
Republicans in the midterm elections by and astonishing twenty seven points.
(12:30):
This is again a large part of this came down
to abortion, which gen Z voters prioritize by a higher
amount than any other generation. One of the things that
was noted in one of the studies I found is
like a potential line of hope for Republicans is that
while this and this is part of where I think
some of the fear mongering and the these Washington Post
(12:50):
articles comes from, although I don't think it says what
they think. It says is that lower numbers of young
people support specific parties. Right, so only about thirty percent
of gen zs align with Democrats compared to twenty four
percent of Republicans. And if you just look at that,
that's way less of that seems like you're seeing like
(13:11):
these numbers sort of kind of tighten up. But again,
they still voted over Democrats of Republicans by twenty seven points.
It's just that gen Z is less loyal to political parties,
which doesn't necessarily mean that progressivism is in danger just
means that most young people hate the Democrats too, and.
Speaker 1 (13:28):
That could and the other thing is like the thing
that actually legit and I think this is legitimately. A
part of it is like, well, okay, so what happened,
what's happening to all those people? And the answer is
they're becoming socialists And it's like, well that doesn't help
the Republicans either, yeah.
Speaker 2 (13:40):
So yeah, and it's it's I mean, part of it
is that more young people identify with like kind of
more politically radical chunks of progressivism. Part of it is
that a lot more of them identify as independent and
may not may not identify themselves super much as a
specific political chunk, but in general, like they vote progressive,
(14:01):
they just don't have any faith in like the ossified
political structures in our society, which is a rational thing
to do as a young person.
Speaker 3 (14:09):
Right.
Speaker 2 (14:10):
So I also want to address kind of the elephant
in the room with this piece, which is that the
Washington Post editorial Board's obsession with political divide among the young,
harming marriage specifically, is also kind of gay panicky, right,
because one of the reasons why there seems to be
this divide that they see as like this threatens marriage,
is that a higher percentage of Gen Z kids are
(14:32):
less interested in straight marriage. And these gen Z kids,
male and female, are not getting more conservative, but they're
also presumably not going to do the kind of marriage
that the Washington Post editorial board was right. I'm going
to quote from a Time magazine rite up here. In
late twenty twenty and early twenty twenty one, gen Z
was the only US generation in which a majority believed
(14:53):
there are more than two genders. As recently as the
first half of twenty twenty, this was a minority opinion
even among Gen zs, remarkable amount of change over just
six months. In contrast, there was only a small uptick
in this belief among older generations. That type of data
is finally available. Starting in June twenty twenty one, the
US Census Bureau offered four options on its Household Pulse
(15:13):
survey question about gender male, female, transgender, and none of
these The last a rough gage of those who identify
as non binary, gender fluid, or another gender identity.
Speaker 4 (15:23):
With that more a terrible way of phrasing that court
It's not a great way.
Speaker 2 (15:26):
It's better than nothing, but yeah, it's not God more
than With more than a million respondents, the survey is
large enough to provide accurate estimates. The results are clear.
Gen Z young adults are much more likely to report
identifying as either trans or non binary than other generations.
Will Only one out of a thousand boomers report they
are transgender one tenth of one percent. Twenty three out
(15:48):
of one thousand gen Z young adults two point three
percent identify as trans, twenty times more. By this estimate,
there are now more TRANSI young adults in the US
than the number of people living in Boston, which is
great because I have long felt that what we need
to do is arm trans people to take over the
city of Boston. I believe this for years, and I
think we can finally make it happen.
Speaker 1 (16:09):
Okay, but here's the problem, though, you still have to
live in Boston afterward. Well, I guess we could take
the city.
Speaker 4 (16:14):
Of Boston and live somewhere else and then sort of like, yeah, you.
Speaker 2 (16:17):
Can use from it, Yeah, presumably, yeah you could. You
could basically become like collectively the landlords of Boston and
then use it to afford rented in a better place.
Speaker 4 (16:29):
This is viable, I believe. I believe in our lifetime.
Speaker 2 (16:32):
So we can tell this and this will finally increase
gen z's like home ownership numbers. Right if collectively all
of the transnd non binary people own Boston. Yeah, this
is a workable plan. I think I'm gonna continue that quote.
Fewer than one percent of boomers identify as non binary,
compared to more than three percent of gen Z young adults.
Combined with the more than two percent to our trans
(16:53):
that means one out of eighteen young adults identified as
something other than male or female in twenty twenty one
or twenty twenty two, which is again, it's not true
because half of Note that's not it's not it's not
the time because again two percent are trans, which presumably,
based on this survey and how it's asked, presumably means
identifies either male or female, whereas three percent are non
(17:14):
binary of some sort, may not, may not identify as
either mail or It doesn't say that this is this
is this is not well written, but the data is interesting.
It suggests five to six percent of gen Z are
trans are non binary, which is a wild departure from
previous generations. Right, And also that's a significant chunk of
this these gen Z numbers that are not being included
(17:36):
in this Washington Post because presumably a decent chunk of
these people will want to get married.
Speaker 4 (17:40):
They just don't.
Speaker 2 (17:40):
I identify in a way that the gen Z that
the Washington Post editorial board respects.
Speaker 1 (17:46):
Right.
Speaker 2 (17:46):
And again, one of the things that's interesting about this,
and contra to all this fearmongering about Andrew Tates destroying
all the men, is that male or female gen Z
and millennial voters overwhelmingly support LGBT rights more than they
support almost anything else. And this is consistent across the board,
and markedly higher than it is for other generations.
Speaker 4 (18:07):
Right.
Speaker 2 (18:07):
Presumably this seems to include even like more independent or
even more conservative gen Z and millennial voters.
Speaker 4 (18:13):
Right, They're just.
Speaker 2 (18:14):
Across the board less shitty on this, I'm guessing presumably
because a lot of their friends are our trands or
non binary or just queer, and that that makes them
less bigoted about this stuff. And again doesn't really fit
into this this narrative. Right, And this is again part
of why I'm not as doomor about you know, there's
(18:37):
this there's this big fear, oh, you know, progressives are
desert young people are deserting progressivism, which is going to
do must electorally, and I'm just not seeing that in
the numbers.
Speaker 1 (18:47):
Now.
Speaker 2 (18:47):
Again, everything that's been going on with like the Biden
administration's you know, support of Israel certainly may and probably
will have an impact politically, but it's not necessarily, it's
not very clear, not a result of young people getting
pilled by Andrew Tate, Right, that's not why that's happened.
Speaker 1 (19:05):
And there's there's a thing I wanted to talk about
with the Andrew Tate stuff too, because like everyone's treating
this as like a completely new phenomena and it's like
most of the people who are talking about this should
be old enough to remember gamer Gate, Like this stuff
has all happened before, and it was like, yeah, like
gamer Date did produce a bunch of fascists and also
the millennials were still unbelievably further left than like the
(19:28):
generations that came before them.
Speaker 4 (19:29):
Yeah, so like it's like this is this.
Speaker 1 (19:31):
Is this is just a thing, Like every generation has
a a giant thing where there's like a bunch of
right wing like yeah, push yeah.
Speaker 4 (19:42):
Yeah, it's like this just happens periodically it's just like
a part of it. It's a part of Baltics. It sucks,
it's bad, but it's also like not a thing to
be humored about. No.
Speaker 2 (19:51):
I do think another thing that is happening here is
that the kind of people who become members of the
Washington Post editorial board have this, have this brainworm, the
sickness that infects members of the American media worse than
almost anyone else, which is like they're always looking for ah,
contrary to popular wisdom. You think this, but the reality,
(20:12):
you know, it's it's Malcolm Gladwell syndrome, right where you've
got to come up with some like clever thing that
shows that you're smart because you know, buy into the
standard wisdom, which is always wrong. And there's that, and
so that they have to believe that whatever is really
happening is the opposite of what's obviously happening, right, which
is why this Actually young men are getting more conservative,
(20:35):
and it's I'm the only one who realizes, and I've
got to warn every one of the danger to marriage.
Speaking of which, here's a quote another quote from that
Washington Post article. In another era, political or ideological differences
might have had less impact on marriage rates, but increasingly
the political is personal. A twenty twenty one survey of
college students found that seventy one percent of Democrats would
(20:57):
not date someone with opposing views. There is i'm logic
to this marriage across religious or political lines. If either
partner considers those things to be central with their identity,
can be associated with lower levels of life satisfaction, and
politics is becoming more central to people's identity. This mismatch
means that someone will need to compromise, As the researchers
Limonstone and Brad Wilcox have noted, about one in five
(21:20):
young singles will have little choice but to marry someone
outside of their ideological tribe. The other option is that
they decline to get married at all. Not an ideal
outcome considering the data showing that marriage is good for
the health of societies and individuals alike. And again, this
is only the case that one to five number is
ignoring queer people. Yeah, largely ignoring non white people, right,
(21:42):
Like it's just not accurate, Like, yeah, maybe a lot
more young white men are going to be single, and
there's problems that will occur due to that. Right because,
for one thing, that's the group that tends to like
load up on guns and shoot up public places, not
saying it's not a problem, but it doesn't mean that
our society is doomed because no one's getting married. Is
that there's some serious problems with young white men that
(22:02):
we need to deal with.
Speaker 1 (22:03):
Yeah, well, and there's there's there's two other things that
I think are interesting there. One is, Okay, you can
tell when these people like formed their political beliefs because
they're complaining about the personal is political, which is this
is ninety shit like that is that is like that
is like like old school ass like this is this
is like stuff people were like, I don't know, it's
(22:25):
it's like, uh, it's like political correctness where it's like
it's the previous version of the same panic that everyone's
having now, but this is from the nineties, and so
it's like all of these people are just like absolute
dinosaurs who they've like dragged out to write this like.
Speaker 4 (22:39):
Weird fearmongering thing.
Speaker 1 (22:40):
And the second thing is I think is interesting too
is like just the the deep, ingrained, sort of very
conservative assumption here, which is that marriage is good for society,
which I don't think is anywhere near as straightforward a proposition,
as to Washington Post is making it seem like and
you know, and they have racistical arguments. I mean, the
(23:02):
cistics that I've seen, like you know, just just sort
of likeasistics that I've seen based on American society is
that like, women who aren't married are way happier than
they are in marriages, and you know, like men do worse.
But like, you know, but like I mean, this is
one of these things there's like we don't know, like
there has not been a version of America where we
haven't where the institution of marriage wasn't like our thing
(23:24):
that hasn't existed for like two or three hundred years.
Speaker 4 (23:28):
Right, Yeah, we don't know.
Speaker 1 (23:29):
The Washington Post doesn't know what an American society without,
like where people don't get married. Looks like like they
have no idea, but they're just sort of assuming that
it's like the apocalypse because they're weird conservatives in the nineties.
Speaker 2 (23:41):
Yeah, and a lot of I mean, and again, a
massive part of what's we're seeing here is less it's
objectively good, like marriage is the result of all of
these kind of positive mental health outcomes and more well,
when people are like have relationships and loved ones and
like a family system supporting them. They're less likely to
(24:03):
commit suicide, they're more likely to have someone notice if
they take ill. They're just like healthier in general. But
that doesn't that doesn't necessarily mean that it's marriage specifically,
and more like yeah, not being alone. Right, Yeah, Anyway,
I want to continue and just kind of go through.
I think we've trashed this article enough, but I did
find a lot of interesting stuff about gen Z and
(24:25):
young voters that I wanted to get into. But first,
here's some more fucking ads. You pigs, you filthy mongrels.
Slop it up, suck it down. Anyway, we'll be back
in a.
Speaker 3 (24:36):
Minute, and we're back.
Speaker 2 (24:48):
So one interesting thing I found. I tried to stick
to just stuff from like twenty twenty one or later
for this, in part because of the Andrew Tait of it.
All Right, I wanted to like try to find stuff
that was like, Okay, since that guy came onto the scene,
has there been some sudden shift because people treat him
like the pied piper of fucking fascism, which, again, he's
(25:08):
a problem, but I don't think that's broadly accurate. So
one of the studies I found was a twenty twenty
one survey from MTV AP and o RC right, and
it was interesting because it showed something I didn't real
something I had kind of bought into, was at least
less supported by the evidence than I might have thought,
which is like the level of Doumerism and young people politics.
(25:32):
Gen Z actually shows optim like that they are more
optimistic than a lot of older people, both in the
state of the world and their role in improving it.
Two thirds of gen Z feels like their generation is
motivated to make positive change in the country. Part of
I think where we get some of the feelings of
dumerism is that only about fourteen percent think that they
(25:53):
can have an impact on what the government does.
Speaker 1 (25:56):
Yeah, I mean that isn't higherly reasonable assessment of I
mean just like looking at polling data on Palestine or like.
Speaker 2 (26:05):
Absolutely no, we had a very rational take actually.
Speaker 1 (26:10):
Yeah, yeah, it's like we had we had an entire uprising,
like people people fought the Secret Service at the gates
of the White House, and the product of it was
the government was like, no, we should give more money
to cops. Yeah, it's like, yeah, it's like, Okay, we're
like defunding the New York Public Library System to buy
encrypted radio like things for police units. Like it's like, yeah,
like this is objectively true that you have very little
(26:30):
influence over the government.
Speaker 2 (26:32):
Like a perfectly reasonable thing to say. Yeah, but yeah
about uh it is interesting too. Another thing that I
was kind of surprised me. It's about half of Gen
Z people think their standard of living is better than
their parents, but about half also think that the world
their generation is facing is worse than what most other
people most other generations have dealt with. So like they
(26:54):
think that their problems are are worse than like what
boomers and Gen X and millennials we're dealing with, but
they think they're about half of them think they're living
better lives. This is pretty similar to how millennials feel.
Gen X feels very different. Gen X or is the
most pessimistic generation about the state of the world, which
actually makes kind of sense if you realize that like
(27:14):
a lot of Gen Z kids are the children of
Gen X people, right, So like they think their standard
of living is better than their parents because Gen X
is miserable. Yeah, which you know, interesting. Gen Z and
Millennials are more accepting than Gen X of depictions of
same sex couples in media, and hold more positive views
of LGBT people, which again, Gen X is the worst generation.
(27:38):
We all have to agree on that one.
Speaker 4 (27:40):
Just terrible.
Speaker 2 (27:41):
It really really didn't work out.
Speaker 4 (27:44):
In two thousands.
Speaker 2 (27:44):
Were just a disaster, calamity, calamity. So I wanted to
kind of break down some stuff from this survey that
was interesting, just kind of on how the generations support
various policies. So, in terms of their support for prohibiting
work place discrimination on the basis of gender identity, sixty
two percent of Gen Z and sixty two percent of
(28:05):
millennials support that, only fifty three percent of Gen X does,
which is still actually not like a massive gap, right
when it comes to this is interesting when it comes
to requiring Americans to mask in public places like stores
and restaurants, fifty four percent of millennials support that, fifty
three percent of Gen X do but does, but fifty
two percent of Gen Z does, which is all potentially
(28:27):
within kind of a margin of err, yeah, that's us
like noise, Like, yeah, that might just be noise. It's
about equivalent, right, It's pretty most of this is actually
pretty for all of our shitting on gen X, most
of this is actually pretty close. For acquiring vaccinations, Millennials
seem to support it higher than anyone else forty nine percent,
gen Z at forty three percent, which is significant. Kind
(28:47):
of gen X is right in the middle at forty
five When it comes to supporting a nationwide ban on
air fifteens and other similar semi automatic rifles, gen Z
and gen X are at forty two percent for gen
X forty four percent for GIN, whereas millennials are at
forty seven percent. Now, a lot of this breakdown, because
I dug into the actual numbers, is the difference between
men and women, and conservative men and liberal women right
(29:10):
who are liberal women are a lot more common and
more likely to support these kinds of bands, whereas conservative
men aren't, But that drags the overall numbers down. It's
just interesting to me that there seems to be less
support with gen Z over that they're closer to gen X.
Increasing security at the border fifty This is where there's
a huge gap. Fifty five percent of gen X for
increasing border security. Millennials and gen Z are at thirty
(29:33):
eight and thirty seven percent. So that's really like gen
X really seems to buy into the we need more
border security, whereas de utes are like, no, fuck that shit.
Speaker 3 (29:44):
Yeah yeah.
Speaker 2 (29:45):
Gen X or gen Z and millennials both tied at
forty eight percent support for a universal basic income. Only
thirty six percent of gen X supports this, again, another
significant gap. One interesting thing is that gen X and
millennials at eight and thirty six percent support reducing regulations
on businesses. Only thirty one percent of gen Z supports this.
(30:07):
That's a significant difference. I find that kind of interesting.
Speaker 4 (30:10):
Yeah, I wonder how much of that.
Speaker 1 (30:11):
Also is just like like like you are okay, you
are in, You're a zumer, You're never are you over
owning a business?
Speaker 2 (30:21):
Like first off, thank you? I under what circumstances I
think it may it may be and I don't I
don't know that this has been studied. It may be
that because gen Z are so so many of them
want to be influencers to do some other kind of
job and like internet content creation that and a lot
of them have done kind of work, made some amount
(30:41):
of money in that field that tends to be independent
contractor work. And there's some pretty onerous tax regulations. You know,
if you've ever been an independent contract about how you've
got to pay taxes, it may have something to do
with that. I don't know though, Like I this hasn't
been broken down like granularly that I've seen, but I
did find that kind of entry. And then here's kind
(31:03):
of depressing but interesting reducing funding for law enforcement agencies.
Thirty four percent of millennials support that. Thirty percent of
gen Z supports that, which is enough of a gap
to suggest like might be somewhat less popular among gen
Z the millennials. Only eighteen percent of gen X feels
the same, which is a huge gap, and that is
(31:24):
kind of interesting to me. So yeah, yeah, well that's all.
Speaker 1 (31:29):
I think There's one I think there's one like last
kind of interesting thing about this is that those numbers,
the numbers on like police funding and a lot of
the sort of like if you just look at the
graphs that were in the Washington Post article, a lot
of that is it looks a lot like there's there's
(31:49):
there's a giant spike dream the uprising, and then it
sort of like tails off after it. Yeah, and so
that's the thing that I think is like like that
I don't, you know, And this is I think a
thing I think is kind of important is like this,
this stuff is all malleable, and moment something happens, everyone,
everyone's beliefs change really quickly. Yeah, and that's the thing,
and like like that, that's that's the thing with these
(32:09):
sort of like you know, with with the sort of
Juambers and right Andrew Tates like yeah, like but people,
people's actual political beliefs and what they're willing to do
for them can change very very very quickly in moments
where they're sort of you know, I mean there's there's
a bunch of people getting shot by cops in the
street right right like that that that changes people really
really quickly.
Speaker 2 (32:29):
And I think that's why the gap is so high
both between overall Americans, which are at twenty eight percent
for defunding police, and between Gen X and Gen Z millennials.
Is that a lot more Gen Z millennials people got
like beaten by the cops in twenty twenty, and that
this does show well, again it's an uphill battle. Most Americans,
(32:51):
a super majority of Americans do not support that way.
More young Americans do, and it's probably because so many
of us got our asses, yecked.
Speaker 1 (32:59):
And I also I want to like, like, like if
if you look at what was like the numbers dream
the uprising, right, like the number of people who supported
the burning of the third presink was like fifty percent. Yeah,
so like these are things that change really quickly in
the moments too, and now we're in the sort of
long backlash and that's you know, and that's that's driving
like some of these numbers. But yeah, yeah, like don't it,
don't don't be cynical things. Things can and will get better.
Speaker 2 (33:22):
Yeah, yes they will, and they there's a pretty dramatic difference.
Maybe it'll take a couple more of the general uprisings
where people get they're natiskick, which is not great to
think about, but like, these are pretty stark differences in
the generations, and I think that that's kind of worth
noting and I don't know, celebrating maybe the wrong term,
but I don't think it's pessimistic now in terms of
(33:44):
stuff that is pessimistic. I want to end on a
note of like where I kind of think some of
the lazy, dumb ass pundit brain on this is coming from,
and I maybe I'm wrong about this. But I have
a little conspiracy theory that involves AI because I did
kind of at the end of digging up a bunch
of these studies, reading through I don't know, like fifteen
articles or whatnot, and you know, the actual like entirety
(34:07):
of three or four different big surveys, I decided just
to hop onto one of the AI search engines that
I use occasionally that is usually not helpful, just to
see what it said. And I asked, like, what is
the most recent data on how young gen z men
are voting right? And it gave me mostly useless shit,
(34:27):
Like the resources were bad. But one of the things
that said, because it breaks down the different sources and
like summarizes them for you. So it says here the
Atlantic is kind of one of the sources. It recommends
the Atlantic Reporter that gen Z and millennials are more
likely to vote Republican. This could indicate a shift in
political leadings among these demographics. Now, the article that it
is linking there is an article called is gen Z
(34:50):
coming for the GOP? Not all young people are Democrats?
By Ronald Brownstein, And it does not say that, It
does not say anything like that. It certainly does not say,
and I will tell you what it fucking says, right,
because it's wildly fucking different. An analysis of previously unpublished
election data from Catalyst, a democratic targeting firm, by Michael
pod Orzer, a former political director for the AFLCIO, shows
(35:13):
that even the emergence of these new voters may not
break the larger political stalemate that has partitioned the country
in a seemingly immovable blocks of bread and blue states.
Podewzer's analysis of the Catalyst data, shared exclusively with The Atlantic,
found that over the past four elections, gen Z voters
have broken heavily for Democrats and blue states and provided
the party's solid margins and closely contested swing states. But
in red states with a few prominent exceptions, Podhorzer surprisingly
(35:35):
found that even gen Z voters are mostly supporting Republicans. Now,
when you dig into the data, first off, that does
not show that gen Z people are voting more for Republicans.
It's the opposite of that. The vast majority of them
are voting for Democrats, but in red states the number
and it's not finding in red states that gen Z
are more likely to support Republicans than previous generations. They
are more progressive than previous generations. They're just still majority
(35:58):
supporting Republicans in deep red states. Now again, if you
read that quote, it's also saying there are some red
states where gen z are voting overwhelmingly for Democrats, and
in purple states they are wildly progressive compared to previous generations.
It is, again the opposite of what that AI summary
is wondering how many lazy pundits are doing this because
(36:19):
they suck at shit and we're just like, oh, well,
the Atlantic says they're more republican. It's like, no, if
you read the article, it does not say that. It's
a pretty good article.
Speaker 1 (36:27):
Yeah, well, and this is actually there's one thing I
want to mention about that polling data too, which is
that the twenty twenty two election was really weird because
the twenty twenty two election was supposed to be it
was supposed to be a red wave election, and yeah,
there actually was one, but it was it only happened.
It happened in deep red states. Yes, and it happened
in New York. And that that has to do with
(36:48):
the New York media market, which is part of also
why all these people's brains have been completely destroyed. Yes,
but I don't actually like it's actually genuinely unclear to
me that this is even predictive of how those same
people in deep red states are going to vote in
like the next like four to eight years, because that
was because again this this this, this was a mid
term election with a Democratic president. That is, when you're
(37:10):
supposed to have the opposition like win a bunch of
seats and stuff like that, and like it didn't go
the way it was supposed to and so and so
I think it's actually even that part is more is
more like even the tiny note of it where they're
like more like gen Z people voted Republicans, Like I,
I don't know, I don't even know if that's gonna
(37:31):
hold in the long run now, but all of these
pun like.
Speaker 4 (37:35):
Yeah, the fact that they probably are just reading.
Speaker 2 (37:37):
AIS, Yeah, I wonder just like coming across that dog
shit suthing like just completely wrong, very funny, made me
feel a little bit better about the computers coming for us.
All made me feel a little bit worse about the
intelligence of pundits. But yeah, it's you know, and one
of the things that is kind of if you're concerned
(37:57):
about twenty twenty four. That is a worthwhile concern, and
that is a real problem is that while young people
are overwhelmingly progressive as voters, this is not evenly distributed
across the country, and a lot of the gains in
voters that progressives have seen are going to be clustered
in states that were already overwhelmingly blue, and when it
(38:18):
comes to an a presidential election, those are wasted votes, right,
And a lot like that this and this is a
problem that the Republicans dealt with a lot during the
Obama years, right where there would be massively more Republican voters,
but they would be clustered in these areas that dims
were never going to win, and so it didn't help
them electorally.
Speaker 1 (38:36):
Right.
Speaker 2 (38:37):
That is kind of worth noting. It's potentially a thing.
Although a lot of the gains when people are freaking
out about like, oh, you know, Biden's numbers among non
white voters have gotten worse, that is probably true, almost
certainly true to some extent, But a lot of those
vote gains are clustered in areas that were so heavily
read it may not have any impact on the health.
Speaker 4 (38:58):
Of all electorals.
Speaker 2 (39:00):
The one.
Speaker 1 (39:00):
The one place for that matter, actually does matter is Michigan, yesca.
And Michigan has his huge Muslim population who are unbelievably
pissed at Biden for you know, offering them the deal
We're going to murder your family and also you have
to vote for us, which is.
Speaker 4 (39:13):
Like I'm not doing the Will Stancil thing and saying
there's nothing worry about. No, I'm saying there are places
where it does matter yere.
Speaker 2 (39:20):
But like, yeah, yeah, it's unclear, and a lot of
what may be happen, well, a lot of what is
certainly happening, although this doesn't mean that there won't be
because I think there's a good chance there will be
an electoral impact. But a lot of what is objectively happening,
both on the left and the right, is increasing numbers
of voters who are in states that would never, never
going to be in play electoral Yeah, right, the electoral
(39:42):
college is bullshit, you know.
Speaker 4 (39:43):
Yeah.
Speaker 1 (39:43):
It's like like I've I've lived in Illinois my entire life.
It is not possible for me to cast a vote
that matters. Yeah, Like it just isn't. It's just how
the system works, right, It's like it's a great great,
great job, great job.
Speaker 4 (39:55):
Yeah, he wrote the Constitution.
Speaker 2 (39:57):
So anyway, Uh, I think that's that's about enough to
get into. I hope this has been edifying and useful
to people. Uh Mia, you got anything else to say
before we roll out here?
Speaker 1 (40:09):
Uh Molotov twenty twenty four, just like Molotov twenty twenty
Uh yeah, don't the Washington Post.
Speaker 4 (40:18):
Okay.
Speaker 1 (40:18):
I want to close in the note that the Washington
Post editorial board managed to find the one socialist in
the entire US who's anti abortion maker, a stat maker,
a writer for them.
Speaker 2 (40:28):
So last yeah, but who are you speaking for? Why
is it important that we have this voice of a
person like fucking hell?
Speaker 1 (40:39):
Yeah?
Speaker 2 (40:39):
God, it's tiring. Speaking of tiring, I'm tired. So now
we're done. Goodbye.
Speaker 4 (40:50):
It could Happen here as a production of cool Zone Media.
Speaker 2 (40:53):
For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website
cool zonemedia dot com, or check us out on the
iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to podcasts.
You can find sources for It Could Happen Here, updated
monthly at coolzonemedia dot com slash sources.
Speaker 4 (41:07):
Thanks for listening,
All media.
Speaker 2 (00:08):
Oh boy, howdy, welcome back to it could happen here
a podcast about about those wacky gen Z kids and
how all of the things that the mainstream media used
to say about millennials I have now embraced to say
about gen Z who are destroying the world through their
(00:29):
through their greed and evilness and good knees comparatively. Yeah, Miah,
how are you doing? You're you're gen Z?
Speaker 3 (00:39):
Right?
Speaker 1 (00:40):
Yeah, so I'm on okay, I am on the exact
borderline of I am either the oldest Zoomer or the
youngest millennial.
Speaker 2 (00:50):
So you're you're a day walker, right like you're the
you're the Blade of gen Z. Yeah, yeah, okay, so
you could go out in the sub onions, but you
still blood. Yeah, I get it, I get it. Yeah,
who's the Chris Christal I guess I'm the Chris Christofferson.
If we're doing the original Blade movie, which I watched
over Thanksgiving break pretty good. I hadn't seen it in
(01:13):
like fucking twenty years, but solid movie, solid movie.
Speaker 1 (01:17):
I feel like it's kind of downhill from the Blood Rave.
But the Blood Rave is pretty sick. It's all every
everything in culture was downhill from blood rave. But yeah,
it's got some it's got some good bits to it. Still,
you know what doesn't have good bits to it.
Speaker 4 (01:34):
The institution of marriage.
Speaker 2 (01:36):
That I mean, I don't disagree with that, but I
was going to say the Washington Post editorial board, Ah,
you know, yeah, so we are talking is that this
is an episode about some gin z panic shit that
came out recently. That thought I felt was worth digging
into because of the pretty interesting ways in which it's
(01:57):
wrong if you were, you know, celebrating being with your family,
eating turkey or just shooting up Heroin alone in the bathroom.
Last week, on November twenty second, twenty twenty three, the
Washington Post Editorial Board published an opinion column with the
provocative title, if attitudes don't shift, a political dating mismatch
will threaten marriage.
Speaker 4 (02:18):
Hell yeah, yeah, I love this. Vitally destroy the institution?
Speaker 2 (02:24):
Yeah yeah, we're doing this through a political dating mismatch.
Speaker 4 (02:28):
Now.
Speaker 2 (02:28):
I think an article with roughly this premise drops every year,
sometimes a couple of times a year, on a couple
of different places. This time it came in through the
Washington Post editorial Board, and the basic premise of this
specific article is that gen Z and millennial men are
growing more conservative while women are growing more progressive. This
(02:52):
threatens marriage as an institution because all these closed minded
gen Z lib broads won't date report opplicans. Right. That
is literally like the point of the article is a
gen Z liberal women, they are less willing to date
outside of their political beliefs, and men are getting more conservative.
So it's really a danger for marriage.
Speaker 4 (03:13):
Now.
Speaker 2 (03:14):
I understand if your first impulse is to say something like, well,
when has the Washington Post editorial board ever been right
about a single goddamn thing? And that is a correct
attitude to have.
Speaker 1 (03:24):
Sometimes they make the decision not to publish an article.
There are some days where they don't write anything.
Speaker 2 (03:31):
Yeah, you have to, that is a good decision. If
they made that decision every day, I would be fully
supportive of the Washington Post editorial board. And if they'll
hire me, I can make that decision for them every day.
I'm very good at not doing anything. That said, even
though it is correct to say the Washington Post editorial
boarder basically always wrong, I've still run into overwhelming numbers
(03:55):
of my peers who think this article is silly but
still buy into the basic point in this piece. This
is generally married to a widespread belief which is actually
cited in the article, that toxic male influencers like Andrew
Tate have tilted huge numbers of young men to the right.
So even though people will be like, well, it's stupid
to expect people to date, you know, folks who believe
(04:16):
horrible political things that would hurt them, it's true that
men are getting more young men are getting more conservative right,
and this is I think generally down to this belief
that has I don't think people examine often. They just
sort of like they get concerned about the popularity of
guys like Tate, which is valid, he's concerning, but assume
(04:37):
that does mean that like, yeah, we're losing the young men.
They've all been tilted towards these guys. And so, without
discounting the damage of dudes like Tate, I wanted to
give a breakdown of how common the so called right
word tilt of young men actually is because spoilers, this
is a pernicious bit of disinformation, and I think it
(04:57):
kind of blackpills a lot of people unnecessari Let's start
with the obvious point here. Young men are not growing
more conservative across the board than men of other generations.
So first off, I want to read you a quote
from this Post editorial. Since mister Trump's election in twenty sixteen,
the percentage of young women ages eighteen to thirty who
identify as liberal has shot up from slightly over twenty
(05:20):
percent to thirty two percent. Young men have not followed suit.
If anything, they have grown more conservative. Now that claim
is based, you want to guess, did they cite a
bunch of different sources to prove like that it's a
really widespread problem, or do they have a single statorial.
Speaker 4 (05:38):
Board they have?
Speaker 1 (05:40):
Those people could not find a second study if you
nailed it to their face, they share, couldn't they share?
Couldn't they googled real quickly? Or I'm not even going
to give them credit for googling. One of their friends
who works at a right wing think tank sent them
a survey from that right wing think tank, because that
the entire statistical base of that claim is a study
(06:01):
by the American Enterprise Institute, which is a center right
think tank that tends to produce center rights surveys. And
even then, the study that they are actually citing doesn't show.
With the Post editorial Board claims again, their claim is
young men have not followed suit. If anything, they have
grown more conservative, right, young men. So they are talking
(06:23):
across the board about gen Z and millennial males. Right,
I'm going to quote from that study. Previous research identified
a growing gap and ideological orientation between young men and women.
The gender gap in liberal identity is notable among members
of Generation Z, but it's relatively modest. Forty three percent
of gen Z women identify as liberal compared to thirty
(06:45):
five percent of gen Z men. However, the gender divide
among white, non Hispanic gen Z adults is considerable, close
to half. Forty six percent of gen Z women are liberal,
a far greater share than white gen Z men, among
whom only twenty eight percent identify liberal. Among gen Z adults,
white men are significantly more likely than white women to
identify as politically conservative thirty six percent versus twenty six percent.
(07:08):
So you see what number one of the study is
doing there is it's saying forty three percent of gen
Z women, all gen Z women identify as liberal, whereas
and then it goes to thirty six percent of white
gen Z men identify as an app it's switching it
on them.
Speaker 4 (07:23):
Right.
Speaker 2 (07:24):
And while it does eventually acknowledge the differences, where because
it says that like across the board, all gen Z
men thirty five percent or conservative, forty three percent of
gen Z women are liberal. That's not a massive gap, right.
The Washington Post editorial board just makes the claim that
young men have grown more conservative, which is not supported
by the study. And also the study is specifically talking
(07:46):
about how gen Z white men have gotten more conservative. Right,
very different things being claimed here. So the Post just
ignored what was actually in the survey to claim all
young men, not just young white men, are more conservative,
not just Z white men are more conservative. Now, this
is weird. But even if you take the study, which
is misrepresented by the editorial board at its face value,
(08:09):
that study does not gel with all of the other
data that we have. Now, when I went through this,
it was hard to find good data on just gen
Z men that is not broken down in most of
the studies that we get. But we do have some
information on how gen Z adult men voted as a
group in the twenty twenty two midterms, and that data
(08:30):
is telling based on the twenty twenty two midterms seventy
one percent of young women. That's a that's gen Z
mostly gen Z eighteen to twenty nine. So I think
gen Z taps out at twenty six right now. So
presumably a percentage of the people in this are technically millennials,
but they're like you, they're day walkers.
Speaker 1 (08:49):
Yeah, that's like what, like, oh my god, I can't
I can't do math live on air.
Speaker 2 (08:56):
I think it's like twenty seven to forty something is
the millennials.
Speaker 4 (09:00):
But I'm going to say it's close enough to this.
This is closes.
Speaker 1 (09:03):
It's only like three years of people right exactly, and
they're the three years that are that are right in
the middle.
Speaker 2 (09:09):
But of that of these voters in the twenty twenty
two midterms, seventy one percent of young women voted for Democrats,
twenty six percent voted for Republicans, fifty three percent of
young men voted for Democrats, forty two percent voted for Republicans.
And among LGBT, and again this is not broken down
male or female, ninety three percent voted for Democrats, and overall,
(09:32):
among non LGBT youth, fifty eight percent voted for Democrats,
thirty eight percent voted for Republicans. So again, not massive
discrepancies here. And one thing that may help to explain
this that again is not really broken down in the
Washington Post editorial is that while gen Z white men
(09:52):
have are more conservative compared to like gen Z millennial
white men, gen Z itself is a lot less white
prior generations, which means overall gen Z men are not
really getting more conservative. About fifty five percent of gen
Z is white compared to about seventy percent of boomers. Right,
So this is one major reason why. Again because again
(10:16):
if you actually factor in all of gen Z, there's
not this huge worry about like a marriage discrepancy as
long as you assume that people. You know that interracial
dating is not a problem for most people the way
it is for apparently the Washington Post editorial board. Now
there's a couple of caveats here. One is that midterm
(10:36):
voters are historically more engaged and educated than voters of
other generations. However, that may not necessarily hold true with
gen Z or millennial voters today due to a variety
of factors. One worthwhile point is that young people tend
to be driven far more by what they encounter through
social media, which is probably part of why gen Z
and millennial voters consider abortion to be a more important
(10:59):
thing to vote on than the economy by a margin
that bears no resemblance to older generations. This is why
we've actually seen unless for elections, soaring youth voter turnout,
particularly during the midterms, record levels of youth voting, Which
doesn't mean it's completely wrong that midterm voters may be
a bit more engaged and educated, but that's probably less
of a factor for young voters than it is for
(11:21):
older generations. Right, some of the conventional wisdom about who
votes when is not as accurate when we're talking about
younger people. This is not something that you can prove objectively,
but there's significant, sort of circumstantial evidence around this. Speaking
of circumstances, you know what circumstances get me to spend
(11:41):
my money?
Speaker 4 (11:43):
Is it being served products and services?
Speaker 2 (11:46):
It's well, it's when those products and services advertise on
this podcast and only this podcast. So check that shit out, homies.
Speaker 3 (12:07):
Dah and we're back.
Speaker 2 (12:09):
So yeah. One of the overall points to make that
I think goes against this kind of panic a lot
of people have that gen Z is somehow being like
pilled away from progressive politics is that as a result
of stuff primarily abortion, gen Z voters supported Democrats over
Republicans in the midterm elections by and astonishing twenty seven points.
(12:30):
This is again a large part of this came down
to abortion, which gen Z voters prioritize by a higher
amount than any other generation. One of the things that
was noted in one of the studies I found is
like a potential line of hope for Republicans is that
while this and this is part of where I think
some of the fear mongering and the these Washington Post
(12:50):
articles comes from, although I don't think it says what
they think. It says is that lower numbers of young
people support specific parties. Right, so only about thirty percent
of gen zs align with Democrats compared to twenty four
percent of Republicans. And if you just look at that,
that's way less of that seems like you're seeing like
(13:11):
these numbers sort of kind of tighten up. But again,
they still voted over Democrats of Republicans by twenty seven points.
It's just that gen Z is less loyal to political parties,
which doesn't necessarily mean that progressivism is in danger just
means that most young people hate the Democrats too, and.
Speaker 1 (13:28):
That could and the other thing is like the thing
that actually legit and I think this is legitimately. A
part of it is like, well, okay, so what happened,
what's happening to all those people? And the answer is
they're becoming socialists And it's like, well that doesn't help
the Republicans either, yeah.
Speaker 2 (13:40):
So yeah, and it's it's I mean, part of it
is that more young people identify with like kind of
more politically radical chunks of progressivism. Part of it is
that a lot more of them identify as independent and
may not may not identify themselves super much as a
specific political chunk, but in general, like they vote progressive,
(14:01):
they just don't have any faith in like the ossified
political structures in our society, which is a rational thing
to do as a young person.
Speaker 3 (14:09):
Right.
Speaker 2 (14:10):
So I also want to address kind of the elephant
in the room with this piece, which is that the
Washington Post editorial Board's obsession with political divide among the young,
harming marriage specifically, is also kind of gay panicky, right,
because one of the reasons why there seems to be
this divide that they see as like this threatens marriage,
is that a higher percentage of Gen Z kids are
(14:32):
less interested in straight marriage. And these gen Z kids,
male and female, are not getting more conservative, but they're
also presumably not going to do the kind of marriage
that the Washington Post editorial board was right. I'm going
to quote from a Time magazine rite up here. In
late twenty twenty and early twenty twenty one, gen Z
was the only US generation in which a majority believed
(14:53):
there are more than two genders. As recently as the
first half of twenty twenty, this was a minority opinion
even among Gen zs, remarkable amount of change over just
six months. In contrast, there was only a small uptick
in this belief among older generations. That type of data
is finally available. Starting in June twenty twenty one, the
US Census Bureau offered four options on its Household Pulse
(15:13):
survey question about gender male, female, transgender, and none of
these The last a rough gage of those who identify
as non binary, gender fluid, or another gender identity.
Speaker 4 (15:23):
With that more a terrible way of phrasing that court
It's not a great way.
Speaker 2 (15:26):
It's better than nothing, but yeah, it's not God more
than With more than a million respondents, the survey is
large enough to provide accurate estimates. The results are clear.
Gen Z young adults are much more likely to report
identifying as either trans or non binary than other generations.
Will Only one out of a thousand boomers report they
are transgender one tenth of one percent. Twenty three out
(15:48):
of one thousand gen Z young adults two point three
percent identify as trans, twenty times more. By this estimate,
there are now more TRANSI young adults in the US
than the number of people living in Boston, which is
great because I have long felt that what we need
to do is arm trans people to take over the
city of Boston. I believe this for years, and I
think we can finally make it happen.
Speaker 1 (16:09):
Okay, but here's the problem, though, you still have to
live in Boston afterward. Well, I guess we could take
the city.
Speaker 4 (16:14):
Of Boston and live somewhere else and then sort of like, yeah, you.
Speaker 2 (16:17):
Can use from it, Yeah, presumably, yeah you could. You
could basically become like collectively the landlords of Boston and
then use it to afford rented in a better place.
Speaker 4 (16:29):
This is viable, I believe. I believe in our lifetime.
Speaker 2 (16:32):
So we can tell this and this will finally increase
gen z's like home ownership numbers. Right if collectively all
of the transnd non binary people own Boston. Yeah, this
is a workable plan. I think I'm gonna continue that quote.
Fewer than one percent of boomers identify as non binary,
compared to more than three percent of gen Z young adults.
Combined with the more than two percent to our trans
(16:53):
that means one out of eighteen young adults identified as
something other than male or female in twenty twenty one
or twenty twenty two, which is again, it's not true
because half of Note that's not it's not it's not
the time because again two percent are trans, which presumably,
based on this survey and how it's asked, presumably means
identifies either male or female, whereas three percent are non
(17:14):
binary of some sort, may not, may not identify as
either mail or It doesn't say that this is this
is this is not well written, but the data is interesting.
It suggests five to six percent of gen Z are
trans are non binary, which is a wild departure from
previous generations. Right, And also that's a significant chunk of
this these gen Z numbers that are not being included
(17:36):
in this Washington Post because presumably a decent chunk of
these people will want to get married.
Speaker 4 (17:40):
They just don't.
Speaker 2 (17:40):
I identify in a way that the gen Z that
the Washington Post editorial board respects.
Speaker 1 (17:46):
Right.
Speaker 2 (17:46):
And again, one of the things that's interesting about this,
and contra to all this fearmongering about Andrew Tates destroying
all the men, is that male or female gen Z
and millennial voters overwhelmingly support LGBT rights more than they
support almost anything else. And this is consistent across the board,
and markedly higher than it is for other generations.
Speaker 4 (18:07):
Right.
Speaker 2 (18:07):
Presumably this seems to include even like more independent or
even more conservative gen Z and millennial voters.
Speaker 4 (18:13):
Right, They're just.
Speaker 2 (18:14):
Across the board less shitty on this, I'm guessing presumably
because a lot of their friends are our trands or
non binary or just queer, and that that makes them
less bigoted about this stuff. And again doesn't really fit
into this this narrative. Right, And this is again part
of why I'm not as doomor about you know, there's
(18:37):
this there's this big fear, oh, you know, progressives are
desert young people are deserting progressivism, which is going to
do must electorally, and I'm just not seeing that in
the numbers.
Speaker 1 (18:47):
Now.
Speaker 2 (18:47):
Again, everything that's been going on with like the Biden
administration's you know, support of Israel certainly may and probably
will have an impact politically, but it's not necessarily, it's
not very clear, not a result of young people getting
pilled by Andrew Tate, Right, that's not why that's happened.
Speaker 1 (19:05):
And there's there's a thing I wanted to talk about
with the Andrew Tate stuff too, because like everyone's treating
this as like a completely new phenomena and it's like
most of the people who are talking about this should
be old enough to remember gamer Gate, Like this stuff
has all happened before, and it was like, yeah, like
gamer Date did produce a bunch of fascists and also
the millennials were still unbelievably further left than like the
(19:28):
generations that came before them.
Speaker 4 (19:29):
Yeah, so like it's like this is this.
Speaker 1 (19:31):
Is this is just a thing, Like every generation has
a a giant thing where there's like a bunch of
right wing like yeah, push yeah.
Speaker 4 (19:42):
Yeah, it's like this just happens periodically it's just like
a part of it. It's a part of Baltics. It sucks,
it's bad, but it's also like not a thing to
be humored about. No.
Speaker 2 (19:51):
I do think another thing that is happening here is
that the kind of people who become members of the
Washington Post editorial board have this, have this brainworm, the
sickness that infects members of the American media worse than
almost anyone else, which is like they're always looking for ah,
contrary to popular wisdom. You think this, but the reality,
(20:12):
you know, it's it's Malcolm Gladwell syndrome, right where you've
got to come up with some like clever thing that
shows that you're smart because you know, buy into the
standard wisdom, which is always wrong. And there's that, and
so that they have to believe that whatever is really
happening is the opposite of what's obviously happening, right, which
is why this Actually young men are getting more conservative,
(20:35):
and it's I'm the only one who realizes, and I've
got to warn every one of the danger to marriage.
Speaking of which, here's a quote another quote from that
Washington Post article. In another era, political or ideological differences
might have had less impact on marriage rates, but increasingly
the political is personal. A twenty twenty one survey of
college students found that seventy one percent of Democrats would
(20:57):
not date someone with opposing views. There is i'm logic
to this marriage across religious or political lines. If either
partner considers those things to be central with their identity,
can be associated with lower levels of life satisfaction, and
politics is becoming more central to people's identity. This mismatch
means that someone will need to compromise, As the researchers
Limonstone and Brad Wilcox have noted, about one in five
(21:20):
young singles will have little choice but to marry someone
outside of their ideological tribe. The other option is that
they decline to get married at all. Not an ideal
outcome considering the data showing that marriage is good for
the health of societies and individuals alike. And again, this
is only the case that one to five number is
ignoring queer people. Yeah, largely ignoring non white people, right,
(21:42):
Like it's just not accurate, Like, yeah, maybe a lot
more young white men are going to be single, and
there's problems that will occur due to that. Right because,
for one thing, that's the group that tends to like
load up on guns and shoot up public places, not
saying it's not a problem, but it doesn't mean that
our society is doomed because no one's getting married. Is
that there's some serious problems with young white men that
(22:02):
we need to deal with.
Speaker 1 (22:03):
Yeah, well, and there's there's there's two other things that
I think are interesting there. One is, Okay, you can
tell when these people like formed their political beliefs because
they're complaining about the personal is political, which is this
is ninety shit like that is that is like that
is like like old school ass like this is this
is like stuff people were like, I don't know, it's
(22:25):
it's like, uh, it's like political correctness where it's like
it's the previous version of the same panic that everyone's
having now, but this is from the nineties, and so
it's like all of these people are just like absolute
dinosaurs who they've like dragged out to write this like.
Speaker 4 (22:39):
Weird fearmongering thing.
Speaker 1 (22:40):
And the second thing is I think is interesting too
is like just the the deep, ingrained, sort of very
conservative assumption here, which is that marriage is good for society,
which I don't think is anywhere near as straightforward a proposition,
as to Washington Post is making it seem like and
you know, and they have racistical arguments. I mean, the
(23:02):
cistics that I've seen, like you know, just just sort
of likeasistics that I've seen based on American society is
that like, women who aren't married are way happier than
they are in marriages, and you know, like men do worse.
But like, you know, but like I mean, this is
one of these things there's like we don't know, like
there has not been a version of America where we
haven't where the institution of marriage wasn't like our thing
(23:24):
that hasn't existed for like two or three hundred years.
Speaker 4 (23:28):
Right, Yeah, we don't know.
Speaker 1 (23:29):
The Washington Post doesn't know what an American society without,
like where people don't get married. Looks like like they
have no idea, but they're just sort of assuming that
it's like the apocalypse because they're weird conservatives in the nineties.
Speaker 2 (23:41):
Yeah, and a lot of I mean, and again, a
massive part of what's we're seeing here is less it's
objectively good, like marriage is the result of all of
these kind of positive mental health outcomes and more well,
when people are like have relationships and loved ones and
like a family system supporting them. They're less likely to
(24:03):
commit suicide, they're more likely to have someone notice if
they take ill. They're just like healthier in general. But
that doesn't that doesn't necessarily mean that it's marriage specifically,
and more like yeah, not being alone. Right, Yeah, Anyway,
I want to continue and just kind of go through.
I think we've trashed this article enough, but I did
find a lot of interesting stuff about gen Z and
(24:25):
young voters that I wanted to get into. But first,
here's some more fucking ads. You pigs, you filthy mongrels.
Slop it up, suck it down. Anyway, we'll be back
in a.
Speaker 3 (24:36):
Minute, and we're back.
Speaker 2 (24:48):
So one interesting thing I found. I tried to stick
to just stuff from like twenty twenty one or later
for this, in part because of the Andrew Tait of it.
All Right, I wanted to like try to find stuff
that was like, Okay, since that guy came onto the scene,
has there been some sudden shift because people treat him
like the pied piper of fucking fascism, which, again, he's
(25:08):
a problem, but I don't think that's broadly accurate. So
one of the studies I found was a twenty twenty
one survey from MTV AP and o RC right, and
it was interesting because it showed something I didn't real
something I had kind of bought into, was at least
less supported by the evidence than I might have thought,
which is like the level of Doumerism and young people politics.
(25:32):
Gen Z actually shows optim like that they are more
optimistic than a lot of older people, both in the
state of the world and their role in improving it.
Two thirds of gen Z feels like their generation is
motivated to make positive change in the country. Part of
I think where we get some of the feelings of
dumerism is that only about fourteen percent think that they
(25:53):
can have an impact on what the government does.
Speaker 1 (25:56):
Yeah, I mean that isn't higherly reasonable assessment of I
mean just like looking at polling data on Palestine or like.
Speaker 2 (26:05):
Absolutely no, we had a very rational take actually.
Speaker 1 (26:10):
Yeah, yeah, it's like we had we had an entire uprising,
like people people fought the Secret Service at the gates
of the White House, and the product of it was
the government was like, no, we should give more money
to cops. Yeah, it's like, yeah, it's like, Okay, we're
like defunding the New York Public Library System to buy
encrypted radio like things for police units. Like it's like, yeah,
like this is objectively true that you have very little
(26:30):
influence over the government.
Speaker 2 (26:32):
Like a perfectly reasonable thing to say. Yeah, but yeah
about uh it is interesting too. Another thing that I
was kind of surprised me. It's about half of Gen
Z people think their standard of living is better than
their parents, but about half also think that the world
their generation is facing is worse than what most other
people most other generations have dealt with. So like they
(26:54):
think that their problems are are worse than like what
boomers and Gen X and millennials we're dealing with, but
they think they're about half of them think they're living
better lives. This is pretty similar to how millennials feel.
Gen X feels very different. Gen X or is the
most pessimistic generation about the state of the world, which
actually makes kind of sense if you realize that like
(27:14):
a lot of Gen Z kids are the children of
Gen X people, right, So like they think their standard
of living is better than their parents because Gen X
is miserable. Yeah, which you know, interesting. Gen Z and
Millennials are more accepting than Gen X of depictions of
same sex couples in media, and hold more positive views
of LGBT people, which again, Gen X is the worst generation.
(27:38):
We all have to agree on that one.
Speaker 4 (27:40):
Just terrible.
Speaker 2 (27:41):
It really really didn't work out.
Speaker 4 (27:44):
In two thousands.
Speaker 2 (27:44):
Were just a disaster, calamity, calamity. So I wanted to
kind of break down some stuff from this survey that
was interesting, just kind of on how the generations support
various policies. So, in terms of their support for prohibiting
work place discrimination on the basis of gender identity, sixty
two percent of Gen Z and sixty two percent of
(28:05):
millennials support that, only fifty three percent of Gen X does,
which is still actually not like a massive gap, right
when it comes to this is interesting when it comes
to requiring Americans to mask in public places like stores
and restaurants, fifty four percent of millennials support that, fifty
three percent of Gen X do but does, but fifty
two percent of Gen Z does, which is all potentially
(28:27):
within kind of a margin of err, yeah, that's us
like noise, Like, yeah, that might just be noise. It's
about equivalent, right, It's pretty most of this is actually
pretty for all of our shitting on gen X, most
of this is actually pretty close. For acquiring vaccinations, Millennials
seem to support it higher than anyone else forty nine percent,
gen Z at forty three percent, which is significant. Kind
(28:47):
of gen X is right in the middle at forty
five When it comes to supporting a nationwide ban on
air fifteens and other similar semi automatic rifles, gen Z
and gen X are at forty two percent for gen
X forty four percent for GIN, whereas millennials are at
forty seven percent. Now, a lot of this breakdown, because
I dug into the actual numbers, is the difference between
men and women, and conservative men and liberal women right
(29:10):
who are liberal women are a lot more common and
more likely to support these kinds of bands, whereas conservative
men aren't, But that drags the overall numbers down. It's
just interesting to me that there seems to be less
support with gen Z over that they're closer to gen X.
Increasing security at the border fifty This is where there's
a huge gap. Fifty five percent of gen X for
increasing border security. Millennials and gen Z are at thirty
(29:33):
eight and thirty seven percent. So that's really like gen
X really seems to buy into the we need more
border security, whereas de utes are like, no, fuck that shit.
Speaker 3 (29:44):
Yeah yeah.
Speaker 2 (29:45):
Gen X or gen Z and millennials both tied at
forty eight percent support for a universal basic income. Only
thirty six percent of gen X supports this, again, another
significant gap. One interesting thing is that gen X and
millennials at eight and thirty six percent support reducing regulations
on businesses. Only thirty one percent of gen Z supports this.
(30:07):
That's a significant difference. I find that kind of interesting.
Speaker 4 (30:10):
Yeah, I wonder how much of that.
Speaker 1 (30:11):
Also is just like like like you are okay, you
are in, You're a zumer, You're never are you over
owning a business?
Speaker 2 (30:21):
Like first off, thank you? I under what circumstances I
think it may it may be and I don't I
don't know that this has been studied. It may be
that because gen Z are so so many of them
want to be influencers to do some other kind of
job and like internet content creation that and a lot
of them have done kind of work, made some amount
(30:41):
of money in that field that tends to be independent
contractor work. And there's some pretty onerous tax regulations. You know,
if you've ever been an independent contract about how you've
got to pay taxes, it may have something to do
with that. I don't know though, Like I this hasn't
been broken down like granularly that I've seen, but I
did find that kind of entry. And then here's kind
(31:03):
of depressing but interesting reducing funding for law enforcement agencies.
Thirty four percent of millennials support that. Thirty percent of
gen Z supports that, which is enough of a gap
to suggest like might be somewhat less popular among gen
Z the millennials. Only eighteen percent of gen X feels
the same, which is a huge gap, and that is
(31:24):
kind of interesting to me. So yeah, yeah, well that's all.
Speaker 1 (31:29):
I think There's one I think there's one like last
kind of interesting thing about this is that those numbers,
the numbers on like police funding and a lot of
the sort of like if you just look at the
graphs that were in the Washington Post article, a lot
of that is it looks a lot like there's there's
(31:49):
there's a giant spike dream the uprising, and then it
sort of like tails off after it. Yeah, and so
that's the thing that I think is like like that
I don't, you know, And this is I think a
thing I think is kind of important is like this,
this stuff is all malleable, and moment something happens, everyone,
everyone's beliefs change really quickly. Yeah, and that's the thing,
and like like that, that's that's the thing with these
(32:09):
sort of like you know, with with the sort of
Juambers and right Andrew Tates like yeah, like but people,
people's actual political beliefs and what they're willing to do
for them can change very very very quickly in moments
where they're sort of you know, I mean there's there's
a bunch of people getting shot by cops in the
street right right like that that that changes people really
really quickly.
Speaker 2 (32:29):
And I think that's why the gap is so high
both between overall Americans, which are at twenty eight percent
for defunding police, and between Gen X and Gen Z millennials.
Is that a lot more Gen Z millennials people got
like beaten by the cops in twenty twenty, and that
this does show well, again it's an uphill battle. Most Americans,
(32:51):
a super majority of Americans do not support that way.
More young Americans do, and it's probably because so many
of us got our asses, yecked.
Speaker 1 (32:59):
And I also I want to like, like, like if
if you look at what was like the numbers dream
the uprising, right, like the number of people who supported
the burning of the third presink was like fifty percent. Yeah,
so like these are things that change really quickly in
the moments too, and now we're in the sort of
long backlash and that's you know, and that's that's driving
like some of these numbers. But yeah, yeah, like don't it,
don't don't be cynical things. Things can and will get better.
Speaker 2 (33:22):
Yeah, yes they will, and they there's a pretty dramatic difference.
Maybe it'll take a couple more of the general uprisings
where people get they're natiskick, which is not great to
think about, but like, these are pretty stark differences in
the generations, and I think that that's kind of worth
noting and I don't know, celebrating maybe the wrong term,
but I don't think it's pessimistic now in terms of
(33:44):
stuff that is pessimistic. I want to end on a
note of like where I kind of think some of
the lazy, dumb ass pundit brain on this is coming from,
and I maybe I'm wrong about this. But I have
a little conspiracy theory that involves AI because I did
kind of at the end of digging up a bunch
of these studies, reading through I don't know, like fifteen
articles or whatnot, and you know, the actual like entirety
(34:07):
of three or four different big surveys, I decided just
to hop onto one of the AI search engines that
I use occasionally that is usually not helpful, just to
see what it said. And I asked, like, what is
the most recent data on how young gen z men
are voting right? And it gave me mostly useless shit,
(34:27):
Like the resources were bad. But one of the things
that said, because it breaks down the different sources and
like summarizes them for you. So it says here the
Atlantic is kind of one of the sources. It recommends
the Atlantic Reporter that gen Z and millennials are more
likely to vote Republican. This could indicate a shift in
political leadings among these demographics. Now, the article that it
is linking there is an article called is gen Z
(34:50):
coming for the GOP? Not all young people are Democrats?
By Ronald Brownstein, And it does not say that, It
does not say anything like that. It certainly does not say,
and I will tell you what it fucking says, right,
because it's wildly fucking different. An analysis of previously unpublished
election data from Catalyst, a democratic targeting firm, by Michael
pod Orzer, a former political director for the AFLCIO, shows
(35:13):
that even the emergence of these new voters may not
break the larger political stalemate that has partitioned the country
in a seemingly immovable blocks of bread and blue states.
Podewzer's analysis of the Catalyst data, shared exclusively with The Atlantic,
found that over the past four elections, gen Z voters
have broken heavily for Democrats and blue states and provided
the party's solid margins and closely contested swing states. But
in red states with a few prominent exceptions, Podhorzer surprisingly
(35:35):
found that even gen Z voters are mostly supporting Republicans. Now,
when you dig into the data, first off, that does
not show that gen Z people are voting more for Republicans.
It's the opposite of that. The vast majority of them
are voting for Democrats, but in red states the number
and it's not finding in red states that gen Z
are more likely to support Republicans than previous generations. They
are more progressive than previous generations. They're just still majority
(35:58):
supporting Republicans in deep red states. Now again, if you
read that quote, it's also saying there are some red
states where gen z are voting overwhelmingly for Democrats, and
in purple states they are wildly progressive compared to previous generations.
It is, again the opposite of what that AI summary
is wondering how many lazy pundits are doing this because
(36:19):
they suck at shit and we're just like, oh, well,
the Atlantic says they're more republican. It's like, no, if
you read the article, it does not say that. It's
a pretty good article.
Speaker 1 (36:27):
Yeah, well, and this is actually there's one thing I
want to mention about that polling data too, which is
that the twenty twenty two election was really weird because
the twenty twenty two election was supposed to be it
was supposed to be a red wave election, and yeah,
there actually was one, but it was it only happened.
It happened in deep red states. Yes, and it happened
in New York. And that that has to do with
(36:48):
the New York media market, which is part of also
why all these people's brains have been completely destroyed. Yes,
but I don't actually like it's actually genuinely unclear to
me that this is even predictive of how those same
people in deep red states are going to vote in
like the next like four to eight years, because that
was because again this this this, this was a mid
term election with a Democratic president. That is, when you're
(37:10):
supposed to have the opposition like win a bunch of
seats and stuff like that, and like it didn't go
the way it was supposed to and so and so
I think it's actually even that part is more is
more like even the tiny note of it where they're
like more like gen Z people voted Republicans, Like I,
I don't know, I don't even know if that's gonna
(37:31):
hold in the long run now, but all of these
pun like.
Speaker 4 (37:35):
Yeah, the fact that they probably are just reading.
Speaker 2 (37:37):
AIS, Yeah, I wonder just like coming across that dog
shit suthing like just completely wrong, very funny, made me
feel a little bit better about the computers coming for us.
All made me feel a little bit worse about the
intelligence of pundits. But yeah, it's you know, and one
of the things that is kind of if you're concerned
(37:57):
about twenty twenty four. That is a worthwhile concern, and
that is a real problem is that while young people
are overwhelmingly progressive as voters, this is not evenly distributed
across the country, and a lot of the gains in
voters that progressives have seen are going to be clustered
in states that were already overwhelmingly blue, and when it
(38:18):
comes to an a presidential election, those are wasted votes, right,
And a lot like that this and this is a
problem that the Republicans dealt with a lot during the
Obama years, right where there would be massively more Republican voters,
but they would be clustered in these areas that dims
were never going to win, and so it didn't help
them electorally.
Speaker 1 (38:36):
Right.
Speaker 2 (38:37):
That is kind of worth noting. It's potentially a thing.
Although a lot of the gains when people are freaking
out about like, oh, you know, Biden's numbers among non
white voters have gotten worse, that is probably true, almost
certainly true to some extent, But a lot of those
vote gains are clustered in areas that were so heavily
read it may not have any impact on the health.
Speaker 4 (38:58):
Of all electorals.
Speaker 2 (39:00):
The one.
Speaker 1 (39:00):
The one place for that matter, actually does matter is Michigan, yesca.
And Michigan has his huge Muslim population who are unbelievably
pissed at Biden for you know, offering them the deal
We're going to murder your family and also you have
to vote for us, which is.
Speaker 4 (39:13):
Like I'm not doing the Will Stancil thing and saying
there's nothing worry about. No, I'm saying there are places
where it does matter yere.
Speaker 2 (39:20):
But like, yeah, yeah, it's unclear, and a lot of
what may be happen, well, a lot of what is
certainly happening, although this doesn't mean that there won't be
because I think there's a good chance there will be
an electoral impact. But a lot of what is objectively happening,
both on the left and the right, is increasing numbers
of voters who are in states that would never, never
going to be in play electoral Yeah, right, the electoral
(39:42):
college is bullshit, you know.
Speaker 4 (39:43):
Yeah.
Speaker 1 (39:43):
It's like like I've I've lived in Illinois my entire life.
It is not possible for me to cast a vote
that matters. Yeah, Like it just isn't. It's just how
the system works, right, It's like it's a great great,
great job, great job.
Speaker 4 (39:55):
Yeah, he wrote the Constitution.
Speaker 2 (39:57):
So anyway, Uh, I think that's that's about enough to
get into. I hope this has been edifying and useful
to people. Uh Mia, you got anything else to say
before we roll out here?
Speaker 1 (40:09):
Uh Molotov twenty twenty four, just like Molotov twenty twenty
Uh yeah, don't the Washington Post.
Speaker 4 (40:18):
Okay.
Speaker 1 (40:18):
I want to close in the note that the Washington
Post editorial board managed to find the one socialist in
the entire US who's anti abortion maker, a stat maker,
a writer for them.
Speaker 2 (40:28):
So last yeah, but who are you speaking for? Why
is it important that we have this voice of a
person like fucking hell?
Speaker 1 (40:39):
Yeah?
Speaker 2 (40:39):
God, it's tiring. Speaking of tiring, I'm tired. So now
we're done. Goodbye.
Speaker 4 (40:50):
It could Happen here as a production of cool Zone Media.
Speaker 2 (40:53):
For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website
cool zonemedia dot com, or check us out on the
iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to podcasts.
You can find sources for It Could Happen Here, updated
monthly at coolzonemedia dot com slash sources.
Speaker 4 (41:07):
Thanks for listening,
It Could Happen Here News
Hosts And Creators
Robert Evans
Garrison Davis
James Stout
Show Links
AboutPopular Podcasts
Stuff You Should Know
If you've ever wanted to know about champagne, satanism, the Stonewall Uprising, chaos theory, LSD, El Nino, true crime and Rosa Parks, then look no further. Josh and Chuck have you covered.
24/7 News: The Latest
The latest news in 4 minutes updated every hour, every day.
Dateline NBC
Current and classic episodes, featuring compelling true-crime mysteries, powerful documentaries and in-depth investigations. Follow now to get the latest episodes of Dateline NBC completely free, or subscribe to Dateline Premium for ad-free listening and exclusive bonus content: DatelinePremium.com