October 27, 2025 • 43 mins
James is joined by Andrew and Michael Paarlberg to discuss the Trump administration’s campaign of drone strikes against boats in the Caribbean and the regional response.
Sources:
https://newsday.co.tt/2025/10/20/trinidad-and-tobago-stands-firm-with-us-on-regional-security/
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Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:01):
All Zone Media.
Speaker 2 (00:06):
Hi everyone, and welcome to it could happen here. It's
a very special round table podcast today where we're going
to discuss the United States ongoing campaign of bombing small
boats in the Caribbean. I'm joined by Michael Pahlberg, an
associate professor of political science at Virginior Commonwealth University and
a fellow at the Center for National Policy. Hi Michael,
(00:29):
thanks for joining us.
Speaker 3 (00:30):
Hi, thanks for having me.
Speaker 2 (00:32):
And Andrew is also here. Listeners of the show will
be familiar with Andrew's work. He joins very often, but
in this instance, Andrew is talking as someone who is
from Trinidad and Tobago, which of course is very much
being impacted by this.
Speaker 3 (00:46):
Hey, Andy, what's going on?
Speaker 2 (00:49):
Not much? Well, let's talk about what's going on, because
something quite perfstantial is going on. What's going on is
that the United States is carrying out a campaign of
drone strikes against small vessels in the Caribbean. As far
as we know, there have been seven strikes. At least
thirty two people have been killed, two people have been
(01:12):
detained and then repatriated, and a number of vessels have
been struck. The US it's bringing its war on terrorism
logic to the Western Hemisphere rate, it's claiming that it's
fighting narco terrorism, and it's claiming that these boats are
for the most part carrying Venezuelan nationals coming out of Venezuela.
(01:33):
We've heard from Colombia that one Colombian national has been killed.
The two people who had detained were Ecuadorian and Colombian
to Trinidadian or Trinidad and Tobago nationals have been killed
as well. And this has sparked something of a and
what it was a war of words, now it seems
to be a war of more than that, tariffs and
(01:56):
sanctions and if Columbia has withdrawn their diplomat from DC
as of today or yesterday, so it sparks significant political
turmoil in the Western hemisphere. I think we have a
really good panel to talk about that. So to begin with,
I guess we should start Michael. Can you explain their
accusation here right is that these people are members of trend,
(02:17):
Deer Ragua or potentially some other cartels that the term
administration likes to talk about. We've talked about the prevalence
of those groups, but can you explain very briefly what
they are, and I suppose the function that they have
in Venezuela or what they're doing there versus what's been
claimed that they're doing.
Speaker 4 (02:35):
So sure, I do research on organized crime in Latin America,
and Rene de Ragua is a real organized criminal group
in Venezuela and now all over Latin America. It is
a street gang that started out as a prison gang.
It does not primarily engage in international drug trafficking, moving
large quantities of drugs across national borders or across oceans.
(03:00):
It is primarily engaged in human trafficking.
Speaker 3 (03:03):
And extortion rackets.
Speaker 4 (03:05):
And it primarily follows the Venezuelan and Niascara people who
have left Venezuela. And at this point it's an incredible
twenty percent of the population over the last ten years
of Maduro's presidency, so nearly eight million people. Wherever they
go and they take advantage of them, They extort them
for money. They will also take money to move them
(03:26):
across borders. But they're not a cartel in the way
that we traditionally think about cartels like the Sinalo cartel
or some of the Columbian cartels that are engaged in
international cocaine trafficking, and so it's highly unlikely that if
the Trump administration is striking boats that they claim to
(03:50):
be vessels transporting cocaine or vensional, which is not made
in Venezuela. It's primarily made in Mexico using precursors from China,
and increasingly it's actually in the United States. Even that
it's a tilt synthetic drug, that's possible, and Venezuela, of
course is not one of the countries where coca is
grown and therefore cocaine comes from. If they are indeed
(04:12):
striking drug boats, then they probably wouldn't be traded Aaga,
and if they're striking boats with Brenda Arragua, they would
be most likely striking migrant smuggling vessels, in which case
the death account would likely be much higher.
Speaker 3 (04:24):
Yeah.
Speaker 2 (04:25):
Yeah, So we should talk about the other Caribbean nations now,
I guess I want to talk about Trindent Tobago, but
we should probably cover Columbia first, right, because we've seen
significant pushback from Petro, president of Columbia, and then we've
recently seen the President of the United States accused Petro,
who is again president of Columbia, of being a drug
(04:47):
trafficker himself, which is a fairly ludicrous claim on the
face of it. But let's talk about Petro because he
has some background in opposition to organize crime and drug smuggling. Actually, right,
like he's in this for a while. Can you explain
a little bit of his career and then his recent stances.
Speaker 4 (05:05):
Yeah, So Petro is a mercurial figure in Columbian politics,
has been for a long time. He is known for
starting his career as a gorilla with a minor anti
government guerrilla movement called the M nineteen movement. Now, this
is the movement which I don't know, maybe Western audiences
(05:25):
are familiar with from the Netflix series Narcos, for having
participated carried out the Palace of Justice siege at the
Columbian Supreme Court, which was a major disaster in which
the Columbian military went in guns blazing to rescue hostages,
Supreme Court justices and other people just employed in the
(05:49):
Palace of Justice, and most everyone died in a fire
as a result. Petro was not involved in that operation
as far as anyone knows. He was not involved in
eight violent confrontations and this organization, unlike the fark and
the ln never really got on the cocaine money train
and therefore didn't last as long as those other organizations did.
(06:10):
They did demobilize, they did turn to peaceful politics, and
Petro began his political career at the local level Bogota
and then eventually reached the presidency. So he is someone
with a long political career and does have a constituency,
does have a base, and he is the first truly
left wing leader of Colombia, country that has been famously
(06:32):
both ruled by the right and also very closely allied
to the US.
Speaker 3 (06:36):
It's really the US.
Speaker 4 (06:37):
It is top ally in Latin America, well in South America,
at least specifically on security, given Plan Colombia and the
long history of US giving as much as ten billion
dollars over time to beef up Colombia's counterinsurgency and counter
narcotics fights on our behalf.
Speaker 2 (06:58):
Get to acuse of president of being a dry kraft
is fairly ludicrous, Like he's been like even in time
as a senator, right he was like I think he
was sharing some like investigations or committees that looked to
drug smuggling if I remember correctly.
Speaker 4 (07:13):
Yeah, and so I would say Petro has been very
critical of the war on drugs approach generally, but he
does still inherit this long standing, deep relationship with the
United States, and he's not exactly a full on peacenick
when it comes to his own internal security. He did
come it off as promising what he called total peace possibibal,
(07:36):
a platform that was meant to put an end to
all armed in certainties in the country by making a
deal with the remaining combatant groups, namely the ELN, the
dissident bar guerrillas, those who did not agree to the
peace deal signed by Santos in twenty sixteen, and what's
(07:57):
in different terms called the Klandel GORGEPO or the AGC
the Guy Thomas to self defense Forces, but one of
the largest national narco paramilitary group that descends from the
old AUC. And he has failed in that and talks
have broken off with.
Speaker 3 (08:15):
Those other armed groups.
Speaker 4 (08:17):
Colombia has gone back to war against them. The ELN
has engaged in some pretty horrific violence, including a suicide
car bombing the police barracks and the distant FARC as
well taking down a helicopter and a drone attack. So
there has been a return to fairly high level, you know,
(08:38):
armed insurgency in Colombia, even if it's nowhere near the
level it was from the late nineties and early two thousands.
Speaker 2 (08:45):
Right, Yeah, And all of this is happening in the Caribbean,
which is not a vast ocean, right, It's not a
massive area of space. And Sandra and I were talking
about before we recorded. This has impacted other Caribbean nations,
nations which are not the target of the Trump administration's aggression,
(09:05):
but nonetheless are being subjected to it. Do you want
to talk Andrew, Trinida and Tobago's in a particularly kind
of interesting the right word. It's not a great situation, right,
because Trinidadian people are being killed, at least two and
the government is apparently completely unconcerned with this.
Speaker 5 (09:27):
Yes, I suppose I should provide some context. So there
have been seven strikes to date, and the fifth strike
resulted in the deaths of two fishermen from the village
of Las Guavas in Trinantobago being claimed among the victims.
The government Transbigo has not made a statement about it,
and the families have not really been contacted or provide
(09:50):
any sort of support. Now for those who are listening
who may not know where Trinaans Bigle is. It is
an independent Twin Ireland republic the Caribbean, and it's actually
geographically an extension of South America. There's a gulf that
separates it, but it's about eleven kilometers away from Venezuela
itself and our elections. It took place this year led
(10:14):
to the removal of the incumbent party and the return
of the United National Congress, the political party led by
Camera Posa Prossessor, claiming the government in a sweep landslide. Really,
but despite that landslide, it wasn't really the result of
popular support for the United National Congress. It was more
(10:37):
so the lack of support for the previous party, the
People's National Movement, which lost I believe two hundred thousand
or so of their usual voters just didn't show up
to vote for them this election, so the opposition party
came into power. When the opposition party wasn't the opposition
(10:57):
They in many ways appeared to just oppose for pose
and sake. They were in power previously from twenty ten
to twenty fifteen, but they were voted out due to,
among other things corruption, and since then the party has
further evolved into a sort of personality cult centered around
came proser prosessor, and her politics have also evolved in
(11:20):
that time to align further and further toward the United
States position. She's become something of a Trump Stan you know,
she was kind of touring his line on a lot
of issues. She supported Guido Juan Guido as the president
of Venezuela and actually went so far while she was
a oposition leader to call on the United States to
(11:43):
sanction Trinan Tobago after the Vice President of Venezuela had
made a visit to the country to meet with the
then Prime Minister Keith Rowley. So she has made her
pro Washington stands clear for a very long time. And
as she's come into power, she has divuted our alignment
(12:03):
with our regional bloc, the Caribbean Community cara COM and
their call for the Caribbean to remain a zone of peace,
and emphasized her continued endorsement for the US military's deployment
outside of Venezuela's territorial waters. But still very much belligerent
(12:24):
in her approach to this issue. You know, we have
gone from a state that was respected as a non
aligned entity that was able to approach various diplomatic partners
from the US to China to the eute in Yale
to Venezuela as well. And we've gone from that sort
(12:46):
of diplomatic approach to a very clear pro West stance
that has really alienated US from the rest of the
region and really placed US almost in the position of
being alite state for US policy. You know, she's been
inviting the US military if they want to base the
(13:06):
operations Auto Turinaud. She has opened our doors to that.
She has called for the US to kill them all violently,
extraditionally and stated that she is quivoctly aligned with what
the US is doing in the region despite its flagrant
violations of international law.
Speaker 2 (13:28):
Yeah, as you said earlier, right that them in this
instance includes at least two of her own citizens.
Speaker 5 (13:35):
And I will say that this sort of zone of
peace designation for the Caribbean, it is something that I
would this is my personal opinion, and consider more of
a hopeful ideal rather than the reality. You know, the
trafficking that takes place in the region does visit a
lot of violence upon people. Is you know, by no
(13:56):
means in reality a zone of peace, even before the
US is in the region. However, though we may not
fit that postcard perfect perception of tropical paradise, it is
still necessary, i think, for US to stand in solidarity
(14:16):
as a region, to speak with one voice when it
comes to these issues, especially as a continued existence depends
on the observation of international law. The respect for the
UN Charter as small islands or safety is really in numbers.
And for the Prime Minister to deviate from that solidarity
(14:38):
in such a blatant way, it's it's really quite sad,
but it shouldn't come as a surprise because there have
been efforts by the US to divide cara Con in
the past. During his first term, Trump had pulled some
cara Con countries into the LIMA Group, which was a
US promoted coalition of right being governments that was pushing
(15:02):
for regime change in Venezuela. And he's not doing the
same thing with trying to get some Caracom governments to
facilitate his actions towards Venezuela. They approached Grenado recently to
try and get Grenada's assistance in basing a satellite there
(15:22):
on the island, and it's really ironic that they would
approach Grenada, which is also quite close to Venezuela, because
Grenado is famously one of the countries that the United
States invaded in October of nineteen eighty three.
Speaker 2 (15:37):
Yeah, I think, I know I say this a lot,
but if you've listened to the song Washington Bullets by
the Clash, and then you go to the border, you
can kind of join up all the people from all
the countries mentioned there and the outcome of US policy
and what that does to migration over time. We should
(16:03):
talk about the Venezuelan opposition. I guess, Michael, would you
give I've done a pretty in depth discussion of Venezuela,
a place where I have spent a decent amount of time,
Like I wanted to see that revolution myself when I
was like nineteen and I was studying political science that
I wanted to see what this like pink Tide was about.
(16:26):
And I have reported a lot on Venezuela migrants. People
who are new to the show, I guess the series
I did from the Darien Gap would be where I
would point you for my discussion of Venezuela and Venezuelan people.
I still speak to people of Venezuela almost every day,
but I think people could do micro with like a
like a high level overview of the Venezuelan opposition. I
(16:48):
guess we can talk about that about prize as well, which,
despite what Donald Trump is saying, was not awarded to
him this year.
Speaker 3 (16:54):
Yeah.
Speaker 4 (16:54):
So the big news is that Maria Quida Machado, who
is be leader of the Venezuelan opposition as we as
we know it today, was awarded of the Nobel Prize,
which was a bit of a surprise and from a
very US centric analysis. One idea that has been floated
is that the Nobel Committee didn't want to award Trump
(17:15):
the prize, but thought that maybe awarding it to an
ally of Trump, would we be away to modify Trump
also possibly to encourage him to take a more peaceful
approach at a time that the US is threatening armed
intervention in some way in Venezuela, whether that is a
counter arcotects operation or more likely a regime change operation
(17:37):
of some kind, even though it's very unclear how they
would get to regime change from blowing up votes, even
blowing up people.
Speaker 2 (17:44):
Maybe we should pause and talk about regime change, actually
because I like it's such a problematic idea, right, we
have attempted regime changes. My career for the last several
years has been reporting on the United States failed attempts
to facilitate regime james all over the world, right, Like,
it's not something we're very good at. I don't think
(18:07):
that the United States is going to invade maybe do
you think differently? But I think we probably agree that
the United States is sound likely to do it, like
an Iraq style invasion of Venezuela. Can you explain the couple,
like why I suppose just just for people who you know,
think that that's what's happening in the Caribbean at the
moment with this concentration of forces.
Speaker 4 (18:28):
Well, it's unlikely to happen because well, it's a very
large country and it would take a lot more troops
than what are currently deployed, which is approaching ten thousand now.
But that's actually that includes all sorts of logistical support.
The actual fighting force, the Marine Expeditionary Unit is actually
much smaller. I've lived in Panama as a kid, and
I was not old enough to be there for the
(18:50):
invasion but I live there some years after that. That's
probably the closest analog to this, at least the way
that the Drum administration is promoting this, which is to say,
a regime change operation that is disguised as a counter
narcotics operation. Famously, nor Diega, it was not a war.
It was an arrest of a foreign leader who was
(19:14):
indeed involved in drug trafficking. And we knew that because
he was literally a CIA asset whose drug trafficking was
being protected as long as he was allied with the
US against Cuban backed rebel groups in Central America. But
at some point later he became too much of embarrassment
for the US. Was genuinely a brutal guy, pulled off
(19:37):
the torture, murder of who was spotifort, all.
Speaker 3 (19:39):
Sorts of nasty things.
Speaker 4 (19:41):
But the big difference is at that time and when
I lived there, the US had multiple military basis in Panama.
Panama was the headquarters of the US Southern Command, the
Western Hemisphere, headquarters of the Pentagon. We had thirteen thousand
troops already there ready to go. I think they doubled
that for the invasion, which was officially termed Operation just
(20:02):
cause usually called Operation Bluespone, but they had to come
with the sex.
Speaker 3 (20:05):
Of your name.
Speaker 4 (20:06):
And of course Panama is a tiny country and Venezuela
is twenty times larger than Panama.
Speaker 2 (20:12):
Yeah, it's fuss, so it's very odd.
Speaker 4 (20:13):
It's obviously they have deployed many more troops and a
much larger fleet than its necessary for a counter narcotics operation. Incidentally,
it's the US Coast Guard that carries out counter narcotics
interdictions and does it very effectively, and incidentally does it
with the cooperation of other countries which coordinate intelligence or
(20:37):
just simply surveillance of suspicious ships or boats or planes
and tip off the US Coast Guard. Even the Cuban
government does that. In fact, it's the Coast Guard that
is the US agency that has the best relationships with Cuba.
It's oftentimes diplomacy kind of starts with the Coast Guard's
ties with Cuba. But anyway, that aside, it doesn't make
(20:59):
sense from a counter narcotics standpoint, because look, if you
actually wanted to break up a cartel, what do you do.
I mean, if you are a prosecutor investigator, right, you
capture the smugglers, you seize the cargo, the contraband, which
is evidence. Then you try to flip them up for
immunity for whoever your real targets are. Maybe your target
(21:22):
is Maduro or someone else in the regime. But you
can't do that when you kill everyone on the boat.
Speaker 3 (21:26):
Ye, right. And I think the fact that in I
think the.
Speaker 4 (21:30):
Latest boat strike, they didn't manage to kill everyone, and
a couple of them got away, and then the US,
rather than charge them with a crime, they just turned
them back around. And you would think that if the
US is so certain that the people on those boats
are drug trafficking terrorists that they want to kill them,
then you'd think they would have enough evidence to charge
(21:52):
them to prosecute them of them. Apparently not. So this
is all to say the idea that this is a
counternarcotics operation doesn't hold up.
Speaker 3 (22:00):
Clearly.
Speaker 4 (22:00):
It is meant to be more of a regime change operation.
But again I don't see how the one leads to
the other. I believe that Trump thinks that if he
just saber rattles a little bit and possibly tries some
decapitation strikes the way that the US did on Soleimani
and Iran, that's somehow the regime is going to collapse,
and that does not make any sense. Maduro has surrounded
(22:23):
himself with security, a lot of it, including Recuban advisors.
He keeps his whereabouts very secret. Even if somehow they
were to drone strike him, it's not as if the
regime as a whole would fall because it is an
extremely militarized regime that is upheld by the armed forces
(22:45):
who are not going to break with him because they
have a hand in every lucrative business both legal and illegal,
in Venezuela. They're not going to be paid off or
not be swayed by a bounty that is currently what
something like fifty million dollars. I mean, there are people
around Madula that have made upwards of a billion dollars
in oil rents. So it's not like you could pay
(23:07):
off people.
Speaker 3 (23:08):
To be head either.
Speaker 2 (23:09):
Yeah, and it's not Nor is it like a cult
of personality situation, like certainly not. Now Java's had something
of a sort of charismatic leadership role, but Madula is
not that. So let's talk about the opposition in Venezuela
in so much as, like I guess, if we go
back to the election, last year. Right, that's start with
the election and explain to people what happened there and
(23:32):
the subsequent sort of avenues that are now open for
the avenues that opposition is now exploring, if that's okay.
Speaker 4 (23:40):
There was an election quote unquote that took place last year.
It was broken largely by the US. The US under
the my administration was pushing for some kind of negotiations
between the opposition of Venezuelan government. They convinced enough people
in the opposition to stand for elections under what was
called the Barbados Agreement in twenty twenty three. And this
(24:03):
was meant to be in exchange of partial lifting the
sectoral sanctions that have been in place on Venezuela for
a long time, in which the Trump administration, the first
Trump administration, really tightened in exchange for the Vaduro government
agreeing to stand for elections. And those elections happened last year.
It was pretty clear from pre electoral surveys and from
(24:28):
exit polls and from the vote returns that were coming
in at the time, that the opposite you, Canada, was
going to win by an enormous march about a thirty
five point margin. The candidate was officially at Mundo Gonzales,
but he was candidates mostly because Murray Cornea Matado, the
now Nobel Prize laureate, was barred from running, so she
(24:51):
for blessing to Gonzales to be basically her proxy, and
people were more or less voting for both of them,
so to speak, but both he and her are much
more popular. Maduro, who by all accounts as an extremely
unpopular leader, especially in contrast to as you said, Ugu Chavas, who,
for all his faults, was a genuinely charismatic yeah leader,
and you know, he did stand for elections and win them,
(25:13):
you know, pretty convincingly. Incidentally, oil the price of oil
was about one hundred dollars a barrel when he was president,
and he was able to spend a lot on social programs.
But that aside, Yeah, Helpsudo is pretty unpopular. With this point,
he is pretty widely seen as both a tyrant and
also quite incompetent at managing basic state services. So he
(25:36):
was going to lose unless he stole the election, which
he did. The CNE the Best One Election board announced
that he had won with just fifty one percent of
the vote, which is I have to say, I give
him credit for being subtle. I expected them to announce that.
Speaker 2 (25:47):
He won with like ninety nine percent of the vote, yeah,
and a sad margin.
Speaker 3 (25:51):
Yeah.
Speaker 4 (25:51):
Yeah, No one believed it. And I have to say
one of my critiques of the Bido administration is that
I think the whole thing was rather naive. I think
they character that that somehow Maduro would let himself be
voted out of office.
Speaker 3 (26:04):
Maduro, is he.
Speaker 4 (26:05):
Talked about under a bounty, has a bounty on his head.
Many people in the US politics, in the US Republican
in particular, have promised that they're going to send him
to jail. So why would someone in that position, you know,
give up power. I think, you know, he saw what
happened to Kadafi and he's, you know, he doesn't want
to be jailed or killed. And at the same time,
the stick part of the Karen and Stick mechanism was
(26:26):
that they would simply go back to the sanctions that
existed before, which was called a snapback. And these are
sanctions that the Venezuelan government has weathered for for many,
many years, so it's not really that much of a disincentive.
So anyway, everyone basically admits at this point that he
stole the election, but what are you going to do
about it? The opposition, for its part, has taken different
(26:47):
approaches to how to confront him and is famously very divided.
The Venezuelan opposition has never really been on the same page.
They've never really had an uncontested leader. Mariequrna much is
about the closest they have had. But she herself really
represents more one wing of the opposition, the more you
might say, hard line wing. For a long time there
(27:09):
was a hard line wing personified by Lopez, and there
was a more I don't know if you call it
a soft line or liberal or just more willing to
talk to the regime wing led by Capriles who ran
against at the in the first election. And it's even
within those factions there are there competing personality. It's a
lot of it really is more personal than ideological. But
(27:31):
Maricorne Machallo, she is on the right politically. She you know,
styles herself after Margaret Thatcher. She is also, i will
give a credit for this, a very good organizer. She
is famously kind of gone into communities that have historically
voted with the Chavista left, and convinced many people to
leave that coalition. And also to her credit, you know,
(27:54):
I would say she is a very brave person. She
has remained into the country at a time that many
most opposition leaders, including Amodo Gonzalez, have plied the country,
and she's been hiding. She knows that the regime would arrest,
if not kill her at its soonest opportunity. Yet she
still shows up unannounced at at events, at rallies and
(28:15):
and makes speeches. So she has achieved this kind of
mythic figure and this is something that obviously is only
going to grow with the Nobel prize. So then the
question is what will this Nobel do. I think that
one calculation is that it will simply keep her alive.
You know, it'll be much harder for the Majoria government
(28:35):
to kill her, if you know, if they would be
killing a Nobel laureate, So that may buy her a
little bit more time.
Speaker 2 (28:42):
Try to best them on the first one to kill
a Nobel laureate.
Speaker 4 (28:44):
I guess, right, right, yeah, But you know, will it
bring peace?
Speaker 3 (28:49):
I'm not so sure.
Speaker 4 (28:49):
Because Marie Corny Machaalo has also been very closely allied
and supportive of the Trunk administration and her side of
the opposition has been encouraging the military sikes backing sanctions,
even though the sanctions both have done nothing to dislodge
Maduro and also contribute to a great deal of suffering
for the Venezuelan people.
Speaker 3 (29:08):
And I have to.
Speaker 4 (29:09):
Say, look, I'm not Venezuela. I have no right to
give it the Venezuelan opposition advice. I would say that
if they have tried multiple elections, you know, at least
two of which have been stolen. If they have tried,
you know, I say more democratic means, and nothing has happened.
I can understand why many people would think that a
more radical approach is the only option left on the table. However,
(29:31):
that approach hasn't done anything either. You know, sanctions have
not to dislodge Maduro. Blowing up boats of possible drug traffickers,
maybe just fishermen has not done anything. I think that
nothing appears likely to lead to regime change. But I
can understand the desperation of people living under what is
(29:53):
broadly acknowledged to be an extremely repressive regime.
Speaker 2 (29:56):
Yeah, and just a grinding poverty of everyday life in Venezuela.
There is so like, I've heard so many stories from
so many people of such a difficult existence there can
I can understand people's desperation, Andrew, you know, I've spoken
(30:21):
about like the gulf between the government of Trnidad and
Tobago and the people of Trinidad and Tobago right now,
and obviously the same is true in Venezuela, right Like,
It's not the opposition figures living in Spain who suffer
when we have these sanctions, right it's not opposition candidates
who get blown up when they go fishing. It it's
regular working class and it's whalen people. So do you
(30:44):
want to talk about like, I'm not even sure what
we can do by way of solidarity with these are
of these nations, but maybe you have some thoughts on that.
Speaker 5 (30:53):
I'm honestly at something of a loss to myself, speaking
from a small island, I think the US's superpower status
is almost like into an eltriche horror. It feels like
it's unfathomable how you could even go about approaching that.
Other times, you don't try to remind myself that people
(31:14):
have fought and won, you know, people have resisted and won.
You know, currently there isn't that much going on. There
are murmurs. They are momurs of fair of disdain or disagreement,
of distrust. In terms of grassroots effort, there's a lot
still to be done. The leader of the move On
(31:35):
for Social Justice, which is a small progressive political party
in Tranto Bago, it's a guy named David Abdullah, and
he has been part of this assembly of Caribbean people
who have been signing and issuing a declaration reasserting our
desire for peace, and that has been signed by various
(31:57):
progressive organizations, social movements and figures across the Caribbean. And
there was also an effort last week Thursday, that's October sixteenth,
to organize a region wide day of action in defense
of the Caribbean, and so different actions were taking place
all over in fifteen countries. We had press conferences, we
(32:19):
had state months, and we had pickets that sit in
US embassy's and complicate demonstrations. It was kind of in
the middle of the day on a Thursday, so there
wasn't that big of it out from Barraso when I
had gone, but it shows that there is and from
the at least anecdotal experience. There is a desire to
keep the US out of this situation, you know, despite
(32:42):
the issues of the Venezuelan government, despite the issues of
our own governments. We don't want intervention, you know, And
right now, all we can really levy is our voices,
you know, our words, and all we can really do.
I think, besides protest, what is going on is prepare
for the worst, to ensure that we have, you know,
(33:04):
sit and support systems in place in case, you know,
push comes to show.
Speaker 2 (33:10):
Yeah, that's pretty bleak.
Speaker 3 (33:11):
Michael.
Speaker 2 (33:12):
Do you have anything to add on how people can
can be in solidarity with the people of Venezuela currently.
Speaker 4 (33:18):
Well, I've been calling for people broadly throughout the world
to have solidarity more with people than with states, and
certainly with Venezuelan people as opposed to the Venezuelan state.
I wrote something for the Center or International Policy about this,
and listen, you know, it's not my place to police
the left, so to speak. But you know, as someone
(33:40):
speaking personally who comes from the labor movement, you know,
comes from the Bernie allied left so to speak, you know,
I do think it's been a little bit uncomfortable to
observe how certain elements of the global left have have
stood up for the Madu regime or the very least
been The criticism of it has been taboo, and I
(34:01):
think a lot of that is a legacy of Tapas
Chapas having this strong personal charisma, but also that he
was willing to confront the United States the Bush administration
at a time of the Iraq War, you know, especially
low point in the US's global reputation. Also Venezuela's oil
rants at the time, which we're financing a lot of
(34:22):
not just social programs Venezuela, but a lot of financial
largesse to Allied states and movements around around the region.
So a lot of left parties reflexively defended Maduro even
as his repression and mismanagement just ramped up. I will
say that's fading. You know, we were seeing this within
(34:43):
Latin America. First of all, there's kind of a generational divide,
and some of the older generational Latin American Left, like
Lula or like Petro, have not been overwhelmingly anti Maduru,
but have expressed skepticism about the electoral results. But then
there's a younger generation such as Borg and Chile at
Chile and Adebolo and Guatemala who have been openly very
(35:03):
critical Abouduro and want to just not let him or
his camp, so to speak, define what it means to
be on the left. And really the only countries that
have unquestionably backed him at this point are Bolivia and Cuba,
but also outside of the region, Russia, Iran, China.
Speaker 3 (35:21):
So I think that.
Speaker 4 (35:23):
We should ask ourselves, like, who do we think is
a more credible arbiter of progressive values? Is it or
its in Chile or is it putin you know, even
not even the commonist part of Venezuela and no longer.
Speaker 2 (35:35):
Yes, yeah, that's one of my favorite facts, you know, like.
Speaker 4 (35:38):
He has he has had their their militants killed, you know,
allegedly as well. So it's just it's not helpful to
view the world for in this campus lens.
Speaker 3 (35:47):
You know.
Speaker 4 (35:47):
I think that if people, whether they identify as on
the left or or whatever, want to show solidarity, I
think it should be with the Venezuelan people, which means
listening to voices within civil society in Venezuela. There are
a lot of there are a lot of labor unions,
there are a lot of human rights advocates that are
not opposition parties, that are not running for office. They're
(36:08):
not necessarily calling for regime change, made them very critical
of sanctions, but they have tried to push for better changes,
you know, quality of life, you know, reforms that might
lead to less repression, open up more space for civil society,
and you know, those things are necessary when people are
really living day by day, you know. And I think
(36:30):
that if people on the left want to play the
long game and understand care about the prospects of the future,
they need to understand that the Maduro regime is the
worst model.
Speaker 3 (36:39):
For them to be associated with, you know.
Speaker 4 (36:41):
And it's already been taking place with campaigns, selectoral campaigns
around Latin America where Cannon's on the right run against
the boogeyman of you know, Chabbismo, of like of a
Maduro model. And it makes sense. And if a lot
of people on the left are very skeptical of Maria
Kurgna Machado like I have skin about for policy platforms
(37:02):
of privatization and and other neoliberal ideas, they also shouldn't
be surprised if there's been a decade of people being
told that this model of corruption, authoritarianism, state terror, criminal insecurity.
That's what socialism is. Then people are gonna believe that,
and then they're going to then they're vote against whatever
(37:23):
that is. And this model has provoked the greatest refugee crisis,
certainly in the region. Eight million people. They're all carrying
with them stories about why they left right. And so
if there ever were to be democratic elections in Venezuela,
it's pretty clear the country would turn to the right.
And I don't think we should be surprised by that,
(37:44):
you know, And I think we should also recognize that
many of the things that Maludor embodies, these strong men politics,
are things that are embodied by other strong men, not
just on the left too.
Speaker 3 (37:56):
You know.
Speaker 4 (37:57):
I would just point out that, least accordances some Trump
has privately expressed a lot of admiration for Madudo. I
read John Bolton's book, and you know, the former National
Security advisor. You know, maybe he has a lot of
reasons to lie, but you know, he did say that
Trump privately expressed a lot of advertatary for Madodor being,
in his words, too smart and too tough to be overthrown.
(38:18):
You know, was really happy to see him surrounded by
what he called all these good looking generals. He disparaged
one Guido, calling him the Beto O'Rourke of Venezuela, means
you know, so, I think that there is there's something
he said about strong men recognizing strong men, and a
lot of these authoritarian lessons are not limited to one
(38:40):
side of the ideological spectrum.
Speaker 2 (38:42):
Yeah, definitely, I find that tendency on the American left
floor and a sort of Internet left to be massively frustrating. Like,
as someone who went there to see the revolution, who
like went there to understand it, and who spent masses
of time with Venezuelan people in the gap at the
border in Venezuela, I'm very fond of Venezuelan people, and
(39:05):
I think, yeah, our sort of directory should be with them,
not with some strong man's state. We saw this in
Syria as well, right, Like, it is heartbreaking, genuinely heartbreaking
to explain to people how someone who identifies as a
leftist is also denying that their children were gased by
chemical weapons in Syria. Right, This campus graze tendency and
(39:29):
the American less specifically is incredibly toxic, and anybody who
seriously considers themselves to be a lestist. It is massively
undermining any credibility they have when they associate themselves with
regimes which willingly murder their own people. I would like
to see people stop doing that. Perhaps both of you
could finish up by suggesting US coverage of this has
(39:53):
not been great, right like, it tends to focus on
the United States very much, and Venezuela kind of appears
as a and lithic entity. Turning down Tobago rarely gets
any coverage in the US media. I did see I
think Reuter's or AP had done a piece about how
fishermen were relucted to go out. I would like to
see more of that kind of reporting. Perhaps both of
you could suggest a couple of sources where people could
(40:17):
read about this.
Speaker 5 (40:18):
Sure, at least on my end, I suggest looking into
all local news. Now, it's not the best source in
terms of actual interrogation of the issues and the ways
in which some of the narratives just kind of get
repeated uncritically, but you do get at least the occasional interview,
(40:40):
occasional quote from a non US state apartment source. I
would also suggest on Instagram there are a couple of
pages that bring a more radical progressive voice from the Caribbean.
There's a page called Vintage Caribbean and there's another page
called Trinbago for Palestine. Both of those have been doing
(41:01):
a lot of coverage on this particular incident lately, so
you can look through those as well if you want
to get us sort of a grassroots steak on the situation.
Speaker 4 (41:11):
Yeah, I don't really have any go to sources on this.
I would say that it's enough of an international incident
that all the major news sources are covering it. So
you can read really any news source in Latin America
if you speak Spanish Portuguese and see how that reporting
is different. Also, incidentally, and by use in Spain, you
know Coono's on the side, they do pretty good reporting. Yeah,
(41:32):
and they've haven't been doing pretty good reporting. And there's
lots of blogs as well, and you know, newsletters that
you can check out. I will say just made this
I'm biased because I focus a lot on crime. The
site Insight Crime is pretty good in terms of looking
into specific criminal groups like Bindeagua and calling a question
if you know, if this really is a you know,
it's something that is controlled by the puppet master from
(41:54):
you afore as you know, like Lido and some of
these some of these narratives that are justifying this, I'd
also just as a recommendation, I would say, you know,
maybe it should be a little bit skeptical too about
the timing and the purposes of these things. I did
point out in a piece that I wrote for the
Center Financial Policy. Then the first boat strike happened on
the same day to the House Judiciary Committee was releasing
(42:17):
a redacted number of files related to the Jeffrey Epstein case.
You know, and I think that there are many reasons
why this administration would like to use this confrontation as
a conmane distraction from from other things that they would
rather not be talking about.
Speaker 2 (42:36):
Yeah, Leak, I think it's probably a reasonable conclusion given
where we're at. Where can people find both of you
on if they want to follow you online on social
media or find more of your writing. We'll start with you,
Andrew Shure.
Speaker 5 (42:50):
Well, you can find me on my YouTube channel YouTube
dot com, slash Andrew's own, or you could just call
my website for all my other links, Andrew Siege dot org.
Speaker 4 (43:00):
You, Michael, I do have a website. You can look
up my name and that should come up. I haven't
updated it recently, I probably should. I'm also on Twitter
x blue Sky as my name M.
Speaker 3 (43:11):
P A A R L B B r G, so
you can look me up there.
Speaker 4 (43:16):
Great.
Speaker 2 (43:17):
Thank you very much, thank you.
Speaker 1 (43:22):
It Could Happen Here is a production of cool Zone Media.
For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website
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in episode descriptions. Thanks for listening.
All Zone Media.
Speaker 2 (00:06):
Hi everyone, and welcome to it could happen here. It's
a very special round table podcast today where we're going
to discuss the United States ongoing campaign of bombing small
boats in the Caribbean. I'm joined by Michael Pahlberg, an
associate professor of political science at Virginior Commonwealth University and
a fellow at the Center for National Policy. Hi Michael,
(00:29):
thanks for joining us.
Speaker 3 (00:30):
Hi, thanks for having me.
Speaker 2 (00:32):
And Andrew is also here. Listeners of the show will
be familiar with Andrew's work. He joins very often, but
in this instance, Andrew is talking as someone who is
from Trinidad and Tobago, which of course is very much
being impacted by this.
Speaker 3 (00:46):
Hey, Andy, what's going on?
Speaker 2 (00:49):
Not much? Well, let's talk about what's going on, because
something quite perfstantial is going on. What's going on is
that the United States is carrying out a campaign of
drone strikes against small vessels in the Caribbean. As far
as we know, there have been seven strikes. At least
thirty two people have been killed, two people have been
(01:12):
detained and then repatriated, and a number of vessels have
been struck. The US it's bringing its war on terrorism
logic to the Western Hemisphere rate, it's claiming that it's
fighting narco terrorism, and it's claiming that these boats are
for the most part carrying Venezuelan nationals coming out of Venezuela.
(01:33):
We've heard from Colombia that one Colombian national has been killed.
The two people who had detained were Ecuadorian and Colombian
to Trinidadian or Trinidad and Tobago nationals have been killed
as well. And this has sparked something of a and
what it was a war of words, now it seems
to be a war of more than that, tariffs and
(01:56):
sanctions and if Columbia has withdrawn their diplomat from DC
as of today or yesterday, so it sparks significant political
turmoil in the Western hemisphere. I think we have a
really good panel to talk about that. So to begin with,
I guess we should start Michael. Can you explain their
accusation here right is that these people are members of trend,
(02:17):
Deer Ragua or potentially some other cartels that the term
administration likes to talk about. We've talked about the prevalence
of those groups, but can you explain very briefly what
they are, and I suppose the function that they have
in Venezuela or what they're doing there versus what's been
claimed that they're doing.
Speaker 4 (02:35):
So sure, I do research on organized crime in Latin America,
and Rene de Ragua is a real organized criminal group
in Venezuela and now all over Latin America. It is
a street gang that started out as a prison gang.
It does not primarily engage in international drug trafficking, moving
large quantities of drugs across national borders or across oceans.
(03:00):
It is primarily engaged in human trafficking.
Speaker 3 (03:03):
And extortion rackets.
Speaker 4 (03:05):
And it primarily follows the Venezuelan and Niascara people who
have left Venezuela. And at this point it's an incredible
twenty percent of the population over the last ten years
of Maduro's presidency, so nearly eight million people. Wherever they
go and they take advantage of them, They extort them
for money. They will also take money to move them
(03:26):
across borders. But they're not a cartel in the way
that we traditionally think about cartels like the Sinalo cartel
or some of the Columbian cartels that are engaged in
international cocaine trafficking, and so it's highly unlikely that if
the Trump administration is striking boats that they claim to
(03:50):
be vessels transporting cocaine or vensional, which is not made
in Venezuela. It's primarily made in Mexico using precursors from China,
and increasingly it's actually in the United States. Even that
it's a tilt synthetic drug, that's possible, and Venezuela, of
course is not one of the countries where coca is
grown and therefore cocaine comes from. If they are indeed
(04:12):
striking drug boats, then they probably wouldn't be traded Aaga,
and if they're striking boats with Brenda Arragua, they would
be most likely striking migrant smuggling vessels, in which case
the death account would likely be much higher.
Speaker 3 (04:24):
Yeah.
Speaker 2 (04:25):
Yeah, So we should talk about the other Caribbean nations now,
I guess I want to talk about Trindent Tobago, but
we should probably cover Columbia first, right, because we've seen
significant pushback from Petro, president of Columbia, and then we've
recently seen the President of the United States accused Petro,
who is again president of Columbia, of being a drug
(04:47):
trafficker himself, which is a fairly ludicrous claim on the
face of it. But let's talk about Petro because he
has some background in opposition to organize crime and drug smuggling. Actually, right,
like he's in this for a while. Can you explain
a little bit of his career and then his recent stances.
Speaker 4 (05:05):
Yeah, So Petro is a mercurial figure in Columbian politics,
has been for a long time. He is known for
starting his career as a gorilla with a minor anti
government guerrilla movement called the M nineteen movement. Now, this
is the movement which I don't know, maybe Western audiences
(05:25):
are familiar with from the Netflix series Narcos, for having
participated carried out the Palace of Justice siege at the
Columbian Supreme Court, which was a major disaster in which
the Columbian military went in guns blazing to rescue hostages,
Supreme Court justices and other people just employed in the
(05:49):
Palace of Justice, and most everyone died in a fire
as a result. Petro was not involved in that operation
as far as anyone knows. He was not involved in
eight violent confrontations and this organization, unlike the fark and
the ln never really got on the cocaine money train
and therefore didn't last as long as those other organizations did.
(06:10):
They did demobilize, they did turn to peaceful politics, and
Petro began his political career at the local level Bogota
and then eventually reached the presidency. So he is someone
with a long political career and does have a constituency,
does have a base, and he is the first truly
left wing leader of Colombia, country that has been famously
(06:32):
both ruled by the right and also very closely allied
to the US.
Speaker 3 (06:36):
It's really the US.
Speaker 4 (06:37):
It is top ally in Latin America, well in South America,
at least specifically on security, given Plan Colombia and the
long history of US giving as much as ten billion
dollars over time to beef up Colombia's counterinsurgency and counter
narcotics fights on our behalf.
Speaker 2 (06:58):
Get to acuse of president of being a dry kraft
is fairly ludicrous, Like he's been like even in time
as a senator, right he was like I think he
was sharing some like investigations or committees that looked to
drug smuggling if I remember correctly.
Speaker 4 (07:13):
Yeah, and so I would say Petro has been very
critical of the war on drugs approach generally, but he
does still inherit this long standing, deep relationship with the
United States, and he's not exactly a full on peacenick
when it comes to his own internal security. He did
come it off as promising what he called total peace possibibal,
(07:36):
a platform that was meant to put an end to
all armed in certainties in the country by making a
deal with the remaining combatant groups, namely the ELN, the
dissident bar guerrillas, those who did not agree to the
peace deal signed by Santos in twenty sixteen, and what's
(07:57):
in different terms called the Klandel GORGEPO or the AGC
the Guy Thomas to self defense Forces, but one of
the largest national narco paramilitary group that descends from the
old AUC. And he has failed in that and talks
have broken off with.
Speaker 3 (08:15):
Those other armed groups.
Speaker 4 (08:17):
Colombia has gone back to war against them. The ELN
has engaged in some pretty horrific violence, including a suicide
car bombing the police barracks and the distant FARC as
well taking down a helicopter and a drone attack. So
there has been a return to fairly high level, you know,
(08:38):
armed insurgency in Colombia, even if it's nowhere near the
level it was from the late nineties and early two thousands.
Speaker 2 (08:45):
Right, Yeah, And all of this is happening in the Caribbean,
which is not a vast ocean, right, It's not a
massive area of space. And Sandra and I were talking
about before we recorded. This has impacted other Caribbean nations,
nations which are not the target of the Trump administration's aggression,
(09:05):
but nonetheless are being subjected to it. Do you want
to talk Andrew, Trinida and Tobago's in a particularly kind
of interesting the right word. It's not a great situation, right,
because Trinidadian people are being killed, at least two and
the government is apparently completely unconcerned with this.
Speaker 5 (09:27):
Yes, I suppose I should provide some context. So there
have been seven strikes to date, and the fifth strike
resulted in the deaths of two fishermen from the village
of Las Guavas in Trinantobago being claimed among the victims.
The government Transbigo has not made a statement about it,
and the families have not really been contacted or provide
(09:50):
any sort of support. Now for those who are listening
who may not know where Trinaans Bigle is. It is
an independent Twin Ireland republic the Caribbean, and it's actually
geographically an extension of South America. There's a gulf that
separates it, but it's about eleven kilometers away from Venezuela
itself and our elections. It took place this year led
(10:14):
to the removal of the incumbent party and the return
of the United National Congress, the political party led by
Camera Posa Prossessor, claiming the government in a sweep landslide. Really,
but despite that landslide, it wasn't really the result of
popular support for the United National Congress. It was more
(10:37):
so the lack of support for the previous party, the
People's National Movement, which lost I believe two hundred thousand
or so of their usual voters just didn't show up
to vote for them this election, so the opposition party
came into power. When the opposition party wasn't the opposition
(10:57):
They in many ways appeared to just oppose for pose
and sake. They were in power previously from twenty ten
to twenty fifteen, but they were voted out due to,
among other things corruption, and since then the party has
further evolved into a sort of personality cult centered around
came proser prosessor, and her politics have also evolved in
(11:20):
that time to align further and further toward the United
States position. She's become something of a Trump Stan you know,
she was kind of touring his line on a lot
of issues. She supported Guido Juan Guido as the president
of Venezuela and actually went so far while she was
a oposition leader to call on the United States to
(11:43):
sanction Trinan Tobago after the Vice President of Venezuela had
made a visit to the country to meet with the
then Prime Minister Keith Rowley. So she has made her
pro Washington stands clear for a very long time. And
as she's come into power, she has divuted our alignment
(12:03):
with our regional bloc, the Caribbean Community cara COM and
their call for the Caribbean to remain a zone of peace,
and emphasized her continued endorsement for the US military's deployment
outside of Venezuela's territorial waters. But still very much belligerent
(12:24):
in her approach to this issue. You know, we have
gone from a state that was respected as a non
aligned entity that was able to approach various diplomatic partners
from the US to China to the eute in Yale
to Venezuela as well. And we've gone from that sort
(12:46):
of diplomatic approach to a very clear pro West stance
that has really alienated US from the rest of the
region and really placed US almost in the position of
being alite state for US policy. You know, she's been
inviting the US military if they want to base the
(13:06):
operations Auto Turinaud. She has opened our doors to that.
She has called for the US to kill them all violently,
extraditionally and stated that she is quivoctly aligned with what
the US is doing in the region despite its flagrant
violations of international law.
Speaker 2 (13:28):
Yeah, as you said earlier, right that them in this
instance includes at least two of her own citizens.
Speaker 5 (13:35):
And I will say that this sort of zone of
peace designation for the Caribbean, it is something that I
would this is my personal opinion, and consider more of
a hopeful ideal rather than the reality. You know, the
trafficking that takes place in the region does visit a
lot of violence upon people. Is you know, by no
(13:56):
means in reality a zone of peace, even before the
US is in the region. However, though we may not
fit that postcard perfect perception of tropical paradise, it is
still necessary, i think, for US to stand in solidarity
(14:16):
as a region, to speak with one voice when it
comes to these issues, especially as a continued existence depends
on the observation of international law. The respect for the
UN Charter as small islands or safety is really in numbers.
And for the Prime Minister to deviate from that solidarity
(14:38):
in such a blatant way, it's it's really quite sad,
but it shouldn't come as a surprise because there have
been efforts by the US to divide cara Con in
the past. During his first term, Trump had pulled some
cara Con countries into the LIMA Group, which was a
US promoted coalition of right being governments that was pushing
(15:02):
for regime change in Venezuela. And he's not doing the
same thing with trying to get some Caracom governments to
facilitate his actions towards Venezuela. They approached Grenado recently to
try and get Grenada's assistance in basing a satellite there
(15:22):
on the island, and it's really ironic that they would
approach Grenada, which is also quite close to Venezuela, because
Grenado is famously one of the countries that the United
States invaded in October of nineteen eighty three.
Speaker 2 (15:37):
Yeah, I think, I know I say this a lot,
but if you've listened to the song Washington Bullets by
the Clash, and then you go to the border, you
can kind of join up all the people from all
the countries mentioned there and the outcome of US policy
and what that does to migration over time. We should
(16:03):
talk about the Venezuelan opposition. I guess, Michael, would you
give I've done a pretty in depth discussion of Venezuela,
a place where I have spent a decent amount of time,
Like I wanted to see that revolution myself when I
was like nineteen and I was studying political science that
I wanted to see what this like pink Tide was about.
(16:26):
And I have reported a lot on Venezuela migrants. People
who are new to the show, I guess the series
I did from the Darien Gap would be where I
would point you for my discussion of Venezuela and Venezuelan people.
I still speak to people of Venezuela almost every day,
but I think people could do micro with like a
like a high level overview of the Venezuelan opposition. I
(16:48):
guess we can talk about that about prize as well, which,
despite what Donald Trump is saying, was not awarded to
him this year.
Speaker 3 (16:54):
Yeah.
Speaker 4 (16:54):
So the big news is that Maria Quida Machado, who
is be leader of the Venezuelan opposition as we as
we know it today, was awarded of the Nobel Prize,
which was a bit of a surprise and from a
very US centric analysis. One idea that has been floated
is that the Nobel Committee didn't want to award Trump
(17:15):
the prize, but thought that maybe awarding it to an
ally of Trump, would we be away to modify Trump
also possibly to encourage him to take a more peaceful
approach at a time that the US is threatening armed
intervention in some way in Venezuela, whether that is a
counter arcotects operation or more likely a regime change operation
(17:37):
of some kind, even though it's very unclear how they
would get to regime change from blowing up votes, even
blowing up people.
Speaker 2 (17:44):
Maybe we should pause and talk about regime change, actually
because I like it's such a problematic idea, right, we
have attempted regime changes. My career for the last several
years has been reporting on the United States failed attempts
to facilitate regime james all over the world, right, Like,
it's not something we're very good at. I don't think
(18:07):
that the United States is going to invade maybe do
you think differently? But I think we probably agree that
the United States is sound likely to do it, like
an Iraq style invasion of Venezuela. Can you explain the couple,
like why I suppose just just for people who you know,
think that that's what's happening in the Caribbean at the
moment with this concentration of forces.
Speaker 4 (18:28):
Well, it's unlikely to happen because well, it's a very
large country and it would take a lot more troops
than what are currently deployed, which is approaching ten thousand now.
But that's actually that includes all sorts of logistical support.
The actual fighting force, the Marine Expeditionary Unit is actually
much smaller. I've lived in Panama as a kid, and
I was not old enough to be there for the
(18:50):
invasion but I live there some years after that. That's
probably the closest analog to this, at least the way
that the Drum administration is promoting this, which is to say,
a regime change operation that is disguised as a counter
narcotics operation. Famously, nor Diega, it was not a war.
It was an arrest of a foreign leader who was
(19:14):
indeed involved in drug trafficking. And we knew that because
he was literally a CIA asset whose drug trafficking was
being protected as long as he was allied with the
US against Cuban backed rebel groups in Central America. But
at some point later he became too much of embarrassment
for the US. Was genuinely a brutal guy, pulled off
(19:37):
the torture, murder of who was spotifort, all.
Speaker 3 (19:39):
Sorts of nasty things.
Speaker 4 (19:41):
But the big difference is at that time and when
I lived there, the US had multiple military basis in Panama.
Panama was the headquarters of the US Southern Command, the
Western Hemisphere, headquarters of the Pentagon. We had thirteen thousand
troops already there ready to go. I think they doubled
that for the invasion, which was officially termed Operation just
(20:02):
cause usually called Operation Bluespone, but they had to come
with the sex.
Speaker 3 (20:05):
Of your name.
Speaker 4 (20:06):
And of course Panama is a tiny country and Venezuela
is twenty times larger than Panama.
Speaker 2 (20:12):
Yeah, it's fuss, so it's very odd.
Speaker 4 (20:13):
It's obviously they have deployed many more troops and a
much larger fleet than its necessary for a counter narcotics operation. Incidentally,
it's the US Coast Guard that carries out counter narcotics
interdictions and does it very effectively, and incidentally does it
with the cooperation of other countries which coordinate intelligence or
(20:37):
just simply surveillance of suspicious ships or boats or planes
and tip off the US Coast Guard. Even the Cuban
government does that. In fact, it's the Coast Guard that
is the US agency that has the best relationships with Cuba.
It's oftentimes diplomacy kind of starts with the Coast Guard's
ties with Cuba. But anyway, that aside, it doesn't make
(20:59):
sense from a counter narcotics standpoint, because look, if you
actually wanted to break up a cartel, what do you do.
I mean, if you are a prosecutor investigator, right, you
capture the smugglers, you seize the cargo, the contraband, which
is evidence. Then you try to flip them up for
immunity for whoever your real targets are. Maybe your target
(21:22):
is Maduro or someone else in the regime. But you
can't do that when you kill everyone on the boat.
Speaker 3 (21:26):
Ye, right. And I think the fact that in I
think the.
Speaker 4 (21:30):
Latest boat strike, they didn't manage to kill everyone, and
a couple of them got away, and then the US,
rather than charge them with a crime, they just turned
them back around. And you would think that if the
US is so certain that the people on those boats
are drug trafficking terrorists that they want to kill them,
then you'd think they would have enough evidence to charge
(21:52):
them to prosecute them of them. Apparently not. So this
is all to say the idea that this is a
counternarcotics operation doesn't hold up.
Speaker 3 (22:00):
Clearly.
Speaker 4 (22:00):
It is meant to be more of a regime change operation.
But again I don't see how the one leads to
the other. I believe that Trump thinks that if he
just saber rattles a little bit and possibly tries some
decapitation strikes the way that the US did on Soleimani
and Iran, that's somehow the regime is going to collapse,
and that does not make any sense. Maduro has surrounded
(22:23):
himself with security, a lot of it, including Recuban advisors.
He keeps his whereabouts very secret. Even if somehow they
were to drone strike him, it's not as if the
regime as a whole would fall because it is an
extremely militarized regime that is upheld by the armed forces
(22:45):
who are not going to break with him because they
have a hand in every lucrative business both legal and illegal,
in Venezuela. They're not going to be paid off or
not be swayed by a bounty that is currently what
something like fifty million dollars. I mean, there are people
around Madula that have made upwards of a billion dollars
in oil rents. So it's not like you could pay
(23:07):
off people.
Speaker 3 (23:08):
To be head either.
Speaker 2 (23:09):
Yeah, and it's not Nor is it like a cult
of personality situation, like certainly not. Now Java's had something
of a sort of charismatic leadership role, but Madula is
not that. So let's talk about the opposition in Venezuela
in so much as, like I guess, if we go
back to the election, last year. Right, that's start with
the election and explain to people what happened there and
(23:32):
the subsequent sort of avenues that are now open for
the avenues that opposition is now exploring, if that's okay.
Speaker 4 (23:40):
There was an election quote unquote that took place last year.
It was broken largely by the US. The US under
the my administration was pushing for some kind of negotiations
between the opposition of Venezuelan government. They convinced enough people
in the opposition to stand for elections under what was
called the Barbados Agreement in twenty twenty three. And this
(24:03):
was meant to be in exchange of partial lifting the
sectoral sanctions that have been in place on Venezuela for
a long time, in which the Trump administration, the first
Trump administration, really tightened in exchange for the Vaduro government
agreeing to stand for elections. And those elections happened last year.
It was pretty clear from pre electoral surveys and from
(24:28):
exit polls and from the vote returns that were coming
in at the time, that the opposite you, Canada, was
going to win by an enormous march about a thirty
five point margin. The candidate was officially at Mundo Gonzales,
but he was candidates mostly because Murray Cornea Matado, the
now Nobel Prize laureate, was barred from running, so she
(24:51):
for blessing to Gonzales to be basically her proxy, and
people were more or less voting for both of them,
so to speak, but both he and her are much
more popular. Maduro, who by all accounts as an extremely
unpopular leader, especially in contrast to as you said, Ugu Chavas, who,
for all his faults, was a genuinely charismatic yeah leader,
and you know, he did stand for elections and win them,
(25:13):
you know, pretty convincingly. Incidentally, oil the price of oil
was about one hundred dollars a barrel when he was president,
and he was able to spend a lot on social programs.
But that aside, Yeah, Helpsudo is pretty unpopular. With this point,
he is pretty widely seen as both a tyrant and
also quite incompetent at managing basic state services. So he
(25:36):
was going to lose unless he stole the election, which
he did. The CNE the Best One Election board announced
that he had won with just fifty one percent of
the vote, which is I have to say, I give
him credit for being subtle. I expected them to announce that.
Speaker 2 (25:47):
He won with like ninety nine percent of the vote, yeah,
and a sad margin.
Speaker 3 (25:51):
Yeah.
Speaker 4 (25:51):
Yeah, No one believed it. And I have to say
one of my critiques of the Bido administration is that
I think the whole thing was rather naive. I think
they character that that somehow Maduro would let himself be
voted out of office.
Speaker 3 (26:04):
Maduro, is he.
Speaker 4 (26:05):
Talked about under a bounty, has a bounty on his head.
Many people in the US politics, in the US Republican
in particular, have promised that they're going to send him
to jail. So why would someone in that position, you know,
give up power. I think, you know, he saw what
happened to Kadafi and he's, you know, he doesn't want
to be jailed or killed. And at the same time,
the stick part of the Karen and Stick mechanism was
(26:26):
that they would simply go back to the sanctions that
existed before, which was called a snapback. And these are
sanctions that the Venezuelan government has weathered for for many,
many years, so it's not really that much of a disincentive.
So anyway, everyone basically admits at this point that he
stole the election, but what are you going to do
about it? The opposition, for its part, has taken different
(26:47):
approaches to how to confront him and is famously very divided.
The Venezuelan opposition has never really been on the same page.
They've never really had an uncontested leader. Mariequrna much is
about the closest they have had. But she herself really
represents more one wing of the opposition, the more you
might say, hard line wing. For a long time there
(27:09):
was a hard line wing personified by Lopez, and there
was a more I don't know if you call it
a soft line or liberal or just more willing to
talk to the regime wing led by Capriles who ran
against at the in the first election. And it's even
within those factions there are there competing personality. It's a
lot of it really is more personal than ideological. But
(27:31):
Maricorne Machallo, she is on the right politically. She you know,
styles herself after Margaret Thatcher. She is also, i will
give a credit for this, a very good organizer. She
is famously kind of gone into communities that have historically
voted with the Chavista left, and convinced many people to
leave that coalition. And also to her credit, you know,
(27:54):
I would say she is a very brave person. She
has remained into the country at a time that many
most opposition leaders, including Amodo Gonzalez, have plied the country,
and she's been hiding. She knows that the regime would arrest,
if not kill her at its soonest opportunity. Yet she
still shows up unannounced at at events, at rallies and
(28:15):
and makes speeches. So she has achieved this kind of
mythic figure and this is something that obviously is only
going to grow with the Nobel prize. So then the
question is what will this Nobel do. I think that
one calculation is that it will simply keep her alive.
You know, it'll be much harder for the Majoria government
(28:35):
to kill her, if you know, if they would be
killing a Nobel laureate, So that may buy her a
little bit more time.
Speaker 2 (28:42):
Try to best them on the first one to kill
a Nobel laureate.
Speaker 4 (28:44):
I guess, right, right, yeah, But you know, will it
bring peace?
Speaker 3 (28:49):
I'm not so sure.
Speaker 4 (28:49):
Because Marie Corny Machaalo has also been very closely allied
and supportive of the Trunk administration and her side of
the opposition has been encouraging the military sikes backing sanctions,
even though the sanctions both have done nothing to dislodge
Maduro and also contribute to a great deal of suffering
for the Venezuelan people.
Speaker 3 (29:08):
And I have to.
Speaker 4 (29:09):
Say, look, I'm not Venezuela. I have no right to
give it the Venezuelan opposition advice. I would say that
if they have tried multiple elections, you know, at least
two of which have been stolen. If they have tried,
you know, I say more democratic means, and nothing has happened.
I can understand why many people would think that a
more radical approach is the only option left on the table. However,
(29:31):
that approach hasn't done anything either. You know, sanctions have
not to dislodge Maduro. Blowing up boats of possible drug traffickers,
maybe just fishermen has not done anything. I think that
nothing appears likely to lead to regime change. But I
can understand the desperation of people living under what is
(29:53):
broadly acknowledged to be an extremely repressive regime.
Speaker 2 (29:56):
Yeah, and just a grinding poverty of everyday life in Venezuela.
There is so like, I've heard so many stories from
so many people of such a difficult existence there can
I can understand people's desperation, Andrew, you know, I've spoken
(30:21):
about like the gulf between the government of Trnidad and
Tobago and the people of Trinidad and Tobago right now,
and obviously the same is true in Venezuela, right Like,
It's not the opposition figures living in Spain who suffer
when we have these sanctions, right it's not opposition candidates
who get blown up when they go fishing. It it's
regular working class and it's whalen people. So do you
(30:44):
want to talk about like, I'm not even sure what
we can do by way of solidarity with these are
of these nations, but maybe you have some thoughts on that.
Speaker 5 (30:53):
I'm honestly at something of a loss to myself, speaking
from a small island, I think the US's superpower status
is almost like into an eltriche horror. It feels like
it's unfathomable how you could even go about approaching that.
Other times, you don't try to remind myself that people
(31:14):
have fought and won, you know, people have resisted and won.
You know, currently there isn't that much going on. There
are murmurs. They are momurs of fair of disdain or disagreement,
of distrust. In terms of grassroots effort, there's a lot
still to be done. The leader of the move On
(31:35):
for Social Justice, which is a small progressive political party
in Tranto Bago, it's a guy named David Abdullah, and
he has been part of this assembly of Caribbean people
who have been signing and issuing a declaration reasserting our
desire for peace, and that has been signed by various
(31:57):
progressive organizations, social movements and figures across the Caribbean. And
there was also an effort last week Thursday, that's October sixteenth,
to organize a region wide day of action in defense
of the Caribbean, and so different actions were taking place
all over in fifteen countries. We had press conferences, we
(32:19):
had state months, and we had pickets that sit in
US embassy's and complicate demonstrations. It was kind of in
the middle of the day on a Thursday, so there
wasn't that big of it out from Barraso when I
had gone, but it shows that there is and from
the at least anecdotal experience. There is a desire to
keep the US out of this situation, you know, despite
(32:42):
the issues of the Venezuelan government, despite the issues of
our own governments. We don't want intervention, you know, And
right now, all we can really levy is our voices,
you know, our words, and all we can really do.
I think, besides protest, what is going on is prepare
for the worst, to ensure that we have, you know,
(33:04):
sit and support systems in place in case, you know,
push comes to show.
Speaker 2 (33:10):
Yeah, that's pretty bleak.
Speaker 3 (33:11):
Michael.
Speaker 2 (33:12):
Do you have anything to add on how people can
can be in solidarity with the people of Venezuela currently.
Speaker 4 (33:18):
Well, I've been calling for people broadly throughout the world
to have solidarity more with people than with states, and
certainly with Venezuelan people as opposed to the Venezuelan state.
I wrote something for the Center or International Policy about this,
and listen, you know, it's not my place to police
the left, so to speak. But you know, as someone
(33:40):
speaking personally who comes from the labor movement, you know,
comes from the Bernie allied left so to speak, you know,
I do think it's been a little bit uncomfortable to
observe how certain elements of the global left have have
stood up for the Madu regime or the very least
been The criticism of it has been taboo, and I
(34:01):
think a lot of that is a legacy of Tapas
Chapas having this strong personal charisma, but also that he
was willing to confront the United States the Bush administration
at a time of the Iraq War, you know, especially
low point in the US's global reputation. Also Venezuela's oil
rants at the time, which we're financing a lot of
(34:22):
not just social programs Venezuela, but a lot of financial
largesse to Allied states and movements around around the region.
So a lot of left parties reflexively defended Maduro even
as his repression and mismanagement just ramped up. I will
say that's fading. You know, we were seeing this within
(34:43):
Latin America. First of all, there's kind of a generational divide,
and some of the older generational Latin American Left, like
Lula or like Petro, have not been overwhelmingly anti Maduru,
but have expressed skepticism about the electoral results. But then
there's a younger generation such as Borg and Chile at
Chile and Adebolo and Guatemala who have been openly very
(35:03):
critical Abouduro and want to just not let him or
his camp, so to speak, define what it means to
be on the left. And really the only countries that
have unquestionably backed him at this point are Bolivia and Cuba,
but also outside of the region, Russia, Iran, China.
Speaker 3 (35:21):
So I think that.
Speaker 4 (35:23):
We should ask ourselves, like, who do we think is
a more credible arbiter of progressive values? Is it or
its in Chile or is it putin you know, even
not even the commonist part of Venezuela and no longer.
Speaker 2 (35:35):
Yes, yeah, that's one of my favorite facts, you know, like.
Speaker 4 (35:38):
He has he has had their their militants killed, you know,
allegedly as well. So it's just it's not helpful to
view the world for in this campus lens.
Speaker 3 (35:47):
You know.
Speaker 4 (35:47):
I think that if people, whether they identify as on
the left or or whatever, want to show solidarity, I
think it should be with the Venezuelan people, which means
listening to voices within civil society in Venezuela. There are
a lot of there are a lot of labor unions,
there are a lot of human rights advocates that are
not opposition parties, that are not running for office. They're
(36:08):
not necessarily calling for regime change, made them very critical
of sanctions, but they have tried to push for better changes,
you know, quality of life, you know, reforms that might
lead to less repression, open up more space for civil society,
and you know, those things are necessary when people are
really living day by day, you know. And I think
(36:30):
that if people on the left want to play the
long game and understand care about the prospects of the future,
they need to understand that the Maduro regime is the
worst model.
Speaker 3 (36:39):
For them to be associated with, you know.
Speaker 4 (36:41):
And it's already been taking place with campaigns, selectoral campaigns
around Latin America where Cannon's on the right run against
the boogeyman of you know, Chabbismo, of like of a
Maduro model. And it makes sense. And if a lot
of people on the left are very skeptical of Maria
Kurgna Machado like I have skin about for policy platforms
(37:02):
of privatization and and other neoliberal ideas, they also shouldn't
be surprised if there's been a decade of people being
told that this model of corruption, authoritarianism, state terror, criminal insecurity.
That's what socialism is. Then people are gonna believe that,
and then they're going to then they're vote against whatever
(37:23):
that is. And this model has provoked the greatest refugee crisis,
certainly in the region. Eight million people. They're all carrying
with them stories about why they left right. And so
if there ever were to be democratic elections in Venezuela,
it's pretty clear the country would turn to the right.
And I don't think we should be surprised by that,
(37:44):
you know, And I think we should also recognize that
many of the things that Maludor embodies, these strong men politics,
are things that are embodied by other strong men, not
just on the left too.
Speaker 3 (37:56):
You know.
Speaker 4 (37:57):
I would just point out that, least accordances some Trump
has privately expressed a lot of admiration for Madudo. I
read John Bolton's book, and you know, the former National
Security advisor. You know, maybe he has a lot of
reasons to lie, but you know, he did say that
Trump privately expressed a lot of advertatary for Madodor being,
in his words, too smart and too tough to be overthrown.
(38:18):
You know, was really happy to see him surrounded by
what he called all these good looking generals. He disparaged
one Guido, calling him the Beto O'Rourke of Venezuela, means
you know, so, I think that there is there's something
he said about strong men recognizing strong men, and a
lot of these authoritarian lessons are not limited to one
(38:40):
side of the ideological spectrum.
Speaker 2 (38:42):
Yeah, definitely, I find that tendency on the American left
floor and a sort of Internet left to be massively frustrating. Like,
as someone who went there to see the revolution, who
like went there to understand it, and who spent masses
of time with Venezuelan people in the gap at the
border in Venezuela, I'm very fond of Venezuelan people, and
(39:05):
I think, yeah, our sort of directory should be with them,
not with some strong man's state. We saw this in
Syria as well, right, Like, it is heartbreaking, genuinely heartbreaking
to explain to people how someone who identifies as a
leftist is also denying that their children were gased by
chemical weapons in Syria. Right, This campus graze tendency and
(39:29):
the American less specifically is incredibly toxic, and anybody who
seriously considers themselves to be a lestist. It is massively
undermining any credibility they have when they associate themselves with
regimes which willingly murder their own people. I would like
to see people stop doing that. Perhaps both of you
could finish up by suggesting US coverage of this has
(39:53):
not been great, right like, it tends to focus on
the United States very much, and Venezuela kind of appears
as a and lithic entity. Turning down Tobago rarely gets
any coverage in the US media. I did see I
think Reuter's or AP had done a piece about how
fishermen were relucted to go out. I would like to
see more of that kind of reporting. Perhaps both of
you could suggest a couple of sources where people could
(40:17):
read about this.
Speaker 5 (40:18):
Sure, at least on my end, I suggest looking into
all local news. Now, it's not the best source in
terms of actual interrogation of the issues and the ways
in which some of the narratives just kind of get
repeated uncritically, but you do get at least the occasional interview,
(40:40):
occasional quote from a non US state apartment source. I
would also suggest on Instagram there are a couple of
pages that bring a more radical progressive voice from the Caribbean.
There's a page called Vintage Caribbean and there's another page
called Trinbago for Palestine. Both of those have been doing
(41:01):
a lot of coverage on this particular incident lately, so
you can look through those as well if you want
to get us sort of a grassroots steak on the situation.
Speaker 4 (41:11):
Yeah, I don't really have any go to sources on this.
I would say that it's enough of an international incident
that all the major news sources are covering it. So
you can read really any news source in Latin America
if you speak Spanish Portuguese and see how that reporting
is different. Also, incidentally, and by use in Spain, you
know Coono's on the side, they do pretty good reporting. Yeah,
(41:32):
and they've haven't been doing pretty good reporting. And there's
lots of blogs as well, and you know, newsletters that
you can check out. I will say just made this
I'm biased because I focus a lot on crime. The
site Insight Crime is pretty good in terms of looking
into specific criminal groups like Bindeagua and calling a question
if you know, if this really is a you know,
it's something that is controlled by the puppet master from
(41:54):
you afore as you know, like Lido and some of
these some of these narratives that are justifying this, I'd
also just as a recommendation, I would say, you know,
maybe it should be a little bit skeptical too about
the timing and the purposes of these things. I did
point out in a piece that I wrote for the
Center Financial Policy. Then the first boat strike happened on
the same day to the House Judiciary Committee was releasing
(42:17):
a redacted number of files related to the Jeffrey Epstein case.
You know, and I think that there are many reasons
why this administration would like to use this confrontation as
a conmane distraction from from other things that they would
rather not be talking about.
Speaker 2 (42:36):
Yeah, Leak, I think it's probably a reasonable conclusion given
where we're at. Where can people find both of you
on if they want to follow you online on social
media or find more of your writing. We'll start with you,
Andrew Shure.
Speaker 5 (42:50):
Well, you can find me on my YouTube channel YouTube
dot com, slash Andrew's own, or you could just call
my website for all my other links, Andrew Siege dot org.
Speaker 4 (43:00):
You, Michael, I do have a website. You can look
up my name and that should come up. I haven't
updated it recently, I probably should. I'm also on Twitter
x blue Sky as my name M.
Speaker 3 (43:11):
P A A R L B B r G, so
you can look me up there.
Speaker 4 (43:16):
Great.
Speaker 2 (43:17):
Thank you very much, thank you.
Speaker 1 (43:22):
It Could Happen Here is a production of cool Zone Media.
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