Interview with Geoff Mann, Co-Author of Climate Leviathan

We sit down to talk with Geoff Mann, a Professor of Geography and Political Economy who also co-authored the book Climate Leviathan: A Political Theory For Our Planetary Future.

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Episode Transcript

Speaker 1 (00:01):
Hmm. Greetings and salutations. This is it could happen here.
I'm Garrison Davis. I'm part of the research and writing team,
and today we have a special treat for everybody. Here.
We are going to be running an interview with Jeff Man.

(00:23):
Jeff Man is a co author of the fantastic book
Climate Leviathan, A Political Theory of Our Planetary Future. UM.
Jeff Man is a as a as a professor, he
teaches political economy and economic geography. UM. He's done lots
of writing on capitalism and climate change. He is a

(00:45):
He's a fantastic resource and I highly recommend his book.
Um it can get a little academic, um making has
a lot of has a lot of big fancy words
that I probably I would have a hard time saying
out loud, but um, it's a very it's a very
good read. So I would would recommend picking up the
book if you want to read about economics and climate

(01:06):
change and all that kind of stuff. But thankfully we
interviewed him here in the pod, so if you're more
so inclined, you can listen to this interview that's going
to play right after I'm done talking. So without further
ado Here is our interview with Jeff Man talking about
politics and climate change. Let's let's go. So we're the

(01:28):
show we're looking to do. The first season of this,
which we dropped like years ago twenty nineteen, was like
kind of uh my, my, My basic experiences journalists isn't
conflict reporting, so like Rack Siria Ukraine, And it was like,
what would happen if there were to be a civil
conflict in the United States? How would that actually look?
How do these things look in the modern world? And

(01:48):
all that jazz. This season we're doing what is the
world going to be? Just based on what we know
of of how climate change is going to affect things,
and um, that's all too bleak to get into without
trying to provide some positive possibilities for how things could be,
how adaptations that could be made and whatnot. And I
think what's so interesting about your book is it provides

(02:12):
all of the difference. With the exception of the best
case scenario, all the scenarios you present seem very plausible
to me. And I guess I'm wondering, of of the
ones that you've put forward in your book, is there
one that seems more plausible to you right now, are
you kind of at at a point where you're expecting
there to be kind of a regional breakdown as to like,
you know, this chunk of the world goes to this

(02:33):
kind of climate mouthing climate Leviathan, is this sort of
chunk of the world, Like, I'm wondering what you're seeing
right now, just as we're watching ships start to really
hit home for people. Yeah, yeah, I I'm always reluctant
in these instances to say that I know more than
anyone else you know about what's going to happen, So

(02:54):
I hope it doesn't come across as in any way
like me agnosticating um, which actually, to be honest with you,
Jewel is much more comfortable doing the guy I wrote
the book with, who you should also chat with if
you ever get the chance, brilliant guy. Um. But I
think you're right. I do think there's a sort of
fragmentation right now, Um, whether or not like geo politically

(03:19):
in the sense like you said, regional you know, breakdowns,
or the way that like kind of different trajectories could
be happening simultaneously in different parts of the planet. How
long that can last, or whether or not it just
stays that way. I think it's a super interesting question,
Like it does seem to me that, you know, the

(03:40):
Chinese state for a variety of reasons, some of which
I probably can have a handle on, and others I
just don't know enough to know. The Chinese state, you know,
approaches these problems in a really different way than we
do in North America or Western Europe for example. UM
and and how they handle like what is clearly fucking
coming down their pipe, you know, not just with these floods,

(04:01):
but you know, the overall like the soil loss um,
sort of massive ternment in the West um an urbanization
at a scale that you know is like completely unsustainable
because the countryside is you know, can't support its people anymore.
You know, they have these permit systems and everything. How
they approach that whole problem from like ecological breakdown perspective

(04:25):
could very much, I think, take a kind of Leviathan
like form, but a much more authoritarian version. It will not,
I don't think in the short term, look like now
in terms of a sort of revolutionary uh process UM.
But here in North America, I think that this idea
that you know, Joe and I tried to float about
capital taking over and trying to basically maintain itself at

(04:47):
the top of the hierarchy. UM. And you know, basically
allow the planet to break down, but to have the
social uh, to maintain the social order in its own interests.
I actually still think that's unfolding right front of us, UM.
And I think Western Europe is the same that just
managing it in that, you know, in a very different
kind of technocratic way. UM. But I think you're right

(05:08):
to identify not a global kind of coalescence, but rather
a whole variety of conflicting trajectories. That would be my
take on it right now. How do you when you're
trying to have these conversations about like what's what's coming
down the pipe with people who are less buried in
this than you are, how do you introduce the concept

(05:29):
of climate Leviathan to them? Well, so, I mean I
run into this. I mean this might be a terrible
uh what's the right word of comparison, um to make?
But I run into this a lot, like you know,
just in the like classroom, like with students and stuff

(05:50):
like that. And basically the way I usually begin it
is I asked the question you know because people often
I think quite rightly make certain kinds of uh agnostications
about uh, you know, climate change kind of running out
of control and destroying life as we know it in

(06:11):
a rather immediate way. And and I usually just say, like,
like that that runs so counter to the interests of
global capital that it's impossible to imagine I'm not responding
and and and in and in anywhere from a kind

(06:31):
of minor tweakye to men like full on emergency panic
mode response, depending upon the situation and conditions. And so
I basically say the idea of climate Leviathan is precisely
that it's capital responding. Now, of course, we all, I
think rightly know that that response will never be adequate
to the problem, not even at a purely sort of
survivalist level. But I still think that in the medium term,

(06:55):
that's what we're going to see. And that's how I
usually introduced it. It's like, imagine capital response wanting to
climate change because they'll have to. It'll look like Levia Yeah.
And I think one of the yeah no, that that
makes sense. And one of the reasons I like that,
and I like the way you Enjoel frame things is

(07:16):
that I'm I've grown very tired of especially in the
you know, I have some prepping kind of interests and
stuff like I I think that stuff is neat. But
I've always felt like the the obsession with collapse is
not just silly, it's um counter factual um because barring
some sort of like the the ever present possibility of
a nuclear conflict or something, I don't I don't see

(07:36):
collapse as a as a realistic consequence of climate change.
Actually collapses. I see places collapsing, I see survivability and
chunks of the world collapse. And but I think you're
absolutely right. There's no way capital is going to allow
everything to fall apart, because then they can't go them all,
you know. Yeah, yeah, and we can't either, and that's

(08:00):
they're desperate for us to keep doing that, right, So yeah,
I agree, total. Yeah, I'm wondering this climate Leviathan, Like,
when you describe it, it doesn't sound great. It also
sounds at least familiar. It sounds like the same way
I've see. It's like, that's part of why it's very believable,
is it sounds like the way the system currently deals
with every problem. Right, these these technocratic half competent UH

(08:24):
focus group solutions that are generally too late and you know,
only occasionally effective. Um. What scares me is UM and
I forget the exaction, but like essentially the authoritary, the
more authoritarian version of this, you know, like and and
the more authoritarian kind of coming from a We're not
going to fix the problem. We're just going to protect

(08:47):
whatever kind of identitarian chunk we we we we consider
our base from it. Um, do you see that gaining
strength right now? Like where do you where do you
looking at kind of the the lay of the land
at the moment? Where are you seeing that? Yeah, that's
a really good, you know comment from my perspective. I

(09:07):
agree with you. I think that stuff is serious, and
I think, if I'm honest with you, it's a little
bit of a missing bit in the book's argument in
the sense that I don't think we took seriously enough
a version of behemoth that doesn't deny climate change but
only gives a shit about its own internal territories or

(09:30):
you know what I mean, its own interests, so that
it becomes a behemoth like fuck you to the rest
of the world, but but at the same time takes
climate very seriously. Uh. You know, I think some people
call it like eco fascism. I'm not so sure. You know,
I don't I that term. I don't think that covers

(09:51):
exactly what I'm trying to say. But maybe I'm just
don't understand it well enough. But I do think that
that the book Joel and I don't take that prospect
seriously enough. And I think that is actually like that
kind of Mike Davis sort of like you know, if
you guys read that piece who Will Build the Arc?
Mm hmm, yeah, it's it's fucking awesome. It's an amazing

(10:12):
piece of work. Um. It's from about two and ten,
I think, in the New Left Review, and he writes
basically about, you know, an elite kind of attempt to
just sort of create islands of survivability or not more
than survivability, islands of elite leisure in sense um, in
a world that's falling apart around it. And I actually
think that that's totally believable. Like I think that's more

(10:37):
believable than we thought it was when we wrote the book. Yeah,
and I guess you know, the question of whether or
not to call it climate fascism, I think that climate
fascism is a separate thing from the possibility of climate authoritarianism,
because I think you have this possibility of like, all right,
we have a state or a group of states that
are going to produce very authoritarian measures in order to

(10:58):
protect their people, and they're so called way of life
as and I think you also have a chance of
this possibility of kind of a more identarian sort of thing,
like whether it's white nationalist or whatever. Um uh, I
kind of see and I see maybe them feeding into
each other. I don't know, like it's it all gets
very muddled, and I think like one of the problems

(11:19):
you have trying to prognosticate about the future is that
there's always so many variables and you can anything, you
any kind of permutation of any of these things that
you can dream up. You can see the seeds of
them if you go out and find them. You can
find the Christian dominionist chunk of this, like the eco
fascist thing, and you can find a more socialist version,

(11:39):
and you can find a more white nationalist version. And
it's just kind of anyone's guess as to what's going
to pick up steam. Yeah, yeah, yeah, I think yeah,
I mean there's something those I think important about the
kind of thing that Joel and I are trying to
do in the book. And there's also something that is uh,

(12:01):
perhaps inevitably arrogant about that effort, and that that arrogance
like well, I think both Joe and I would always
say that the book what for us at least was
worth writing no matter what, It would be wrong too

(12:22):
to not to not acknowledge the arrogance of that analysis.
That then allows you as as soon as you acknowledge arrogance,
then you acknowledge a lot of the stuff you're talking about, right,
like the the fact that, yeah, I mean, there's a
million things that ways that this could go, and some
of them won't look like what we said they look
and we can't you know, we have to think hard. Well,
that's what I find really intelligent about the way you

(12:44):
set it up, because you're not saying, Okay, this political
party is going to evolve in these ways. You're trying
to say that these are kind of the we can
see from responses to other problems and from responses even
to climate change. These are kind of the patterns things
are going to break down in um And I guess
before I I'll hand it over to Garrison in a
little bit. But um, kind of the last thing I

(13:06):
wanted to really get into was the climate X, the
term you all use for kind of the the most
optimistic scenario that I don't think any of us believes
in as much as we'd like to at the moment. Yeah,
that's exactly it. Yeah, Um, I'm one of the things
that we're trying to do here is envision how that
might look. And the best thing that I can come
up with is a mix of um, really durable, widespread

(13:30):
mutual aid networks to support some sort of mass general
strike in order to institute sweeping changes both to the
nature of capitalism and to like the social system we
have in order to reduce environmental harm and anyway that
sort of thing like that's that's the only thing I
can imagine that I don't think you know, you're talking
about an effort more ambitious than landing a man on

(13:53):
the moon. Um, but at least it's a set of
things that could achieve a goal as opposed to like,
I don't think it's totally pious, guy, it's a possibility.
I'm wondering what when you think about best case scenario,
how if like everything breaks right, things could be resolved positively,
Like what are you envisioning? I'm wondering kind of like
what's your optimistic side say when you let it peek through? Yeah,

(14:19):
I mean I think I think it looks a lot
like what you're describing. I think that you know that
they'll have to be and I do think there will be.
The question is, of course whether it's too late, and
whether it's effective and all other stuff. But there will
have to be a kind of mass based to it,
for sure. But what I don't believe, and I think
you're hinting at this too, telp me if I'm misunderstanding.

(14:42):
What I don't believe is that it will be a
mass based thing from what we might think of as
a single or monolithic movement. It's gonna it's because the
ways that people manage what's coming our way are going
to have to be, for one thing, very locally specific.
As we know, like like you said, like there's collapses,
there's you know, people are dealing with different challenges in

(15:04):
their own places, um, and not just environmentally, but of
course their own political histories and all our stuff. Um,
I think it has to be like an articulation in
these mass moments like you're describing, like a general strike
or whatever, of a whole variety of movements that are
actually organized primarily around meeting the needs of the people

(15:25):
where they live, mutual aid societies, other kinds of distributional
you know, fixes, and this kind of chaotic breakdown like
you describe when things can much more important than coffee
are unavailable widely, those kinds of things. Um, let's not,
let's not. Let's not downplay at the importance of coffee. No, no, no,
I would never down for coffee, but for the moment. Yeah,

(15:46):
I get it, you know, like water, you know what
I mean, or something. Um uh, Then I think you're right.
I think it's gonna be. It has to be climate
X has to be multiple in the sense that it
has to take many, many forms specific to the needs
of the folks that are there. But what I am
convinced of which I wasn't always actually, is that the

(16:07):
effectiveness of movements like that will have that they will
depend upon the extent to which they're democratic, not in
terms of actual long term effectiveness. Cannot be like local authoritarianisms.
We can't imagine. This is sort of like a series
of climate change warlords. I don't think that is a

(16:30):
a realistic solution, even from a purely like kind of
managing the climate change perspective. Yeah. No, I've known a
couple of warlords, and none of them are good at
long term planning. Yes, I've never known a warlord, but
I can imagine you are, right, Garrison, you want to

(16:56):
take it over for a bit. Yeah. So yeah, I
mean I started doing just in general kind of climate
research like about half a year ago, like getting like
relatively deep into it, and one of your books was
one of the things that kept coming up as recommended
reading on the topic. UM, and yeah, I found it
super super interesting. There's a lot of a lot of

(17:16):
stuff focuses on, like a lot of stuff on the
topic focuses on like potential physical effects happening to like, um,
geography and to like environments, but not there's not as
much on like the political side of things and how
that's going to break down like societally in terms of
you know, freedom and liberty and sovereignty over specific you

(17:39):
know states or you know free states. Um. So that yeah,
that's what really drew me into your book specifically was
the kind of special focus on that side of things, UM,
and the the other the other part that got me
pretty early on is the mitigation versus adaption side of things,

(17:59):
and how to my understanding, we're kind of like crossing
into the place where mitigation is becoming more and more
difficult and adaptation is both necessary but also unlike unfortunately necessary,
because there's a lot of ways that that can be
used by authoritarian states to make things harder to have

(18:22):
change happened in the future. UM, would you like speak
on what types of mitigation, what type of some mitigation
efforts might we still have, and how and how adaption
is both going to be necessary and how there's going
to be like a dark side to some of those adaptions.
Mm hmm. I would agree with your read there, Like

(18:44):
I think we're at the point now where it's fair
to say that if you ask the climate scientist, I
could be wrong, but I know a few climate scientists
and I do quiz them on stuff like this sometimes, UM,
that we're at the point where mitigation efforts right now
are actually purely adaptive. Like we we are past many
thresholds where somehow we could imagine it's like escaping this problem,

(19:07):
you know what I mean, like evading it, getting out
the side door or something like that. So even our
mitigation efforts right now are actually adaptive in that sense,
an adaptation and I think has become in many ways,
the the holy grail of modern political economy. Like, you
know what I mean, how do we have our luxurious

(19:29):
Western lifestyles and consumption patterns and all this in the
middle of out collapsing ecosystems? Like how do we how
do we manage that? You know what I mean? It's
almost like I think at some point in the book
we say, and Joel and I have certainly said it
a lot since you know, adaptation has become the progress
of our time. Like if in the twentieth century we
talked about all progress progress, that's where capitalism and liberalism deliver.

(19:53):
Now we're like, all the best they can deliver is
adaptation to a fucking crazy set of you know, conditions. Um,
And so I guess I would say that from a
mitigation perspective, for sure, we still have the capacity to
to you know, considerably cut emissions if we you know,

(20:13):
I mean, we have the sort of pie in the sky,
but but hopeful things like you know that the elimination
of the fossil fuel industry, that would do a lot,
but we would still be in kind of short term,
I mean, in medium terms sort of fucked like um,
and that's a big deal. Um So I do think
that the mitigation efforts. I would never want to say, oh,
it don't bother like some sort of accelerationist horseshit, because

(20:36):
of course that will matter. But I do think that, um,
that adaptation has become in some sense like the mode
through which we evaluate anything from like political proposals to
two you know, technical fixes, Like it's at least amongst
people who are willing to admit there's a problem. I

(20:58):
guess there's a you know, a whole world of people
who somehow still don't. Yeah that that that people is
always larger than what I you know, after like spending
like months reading you know, so many climate books, I'm
like still struck at like how basically the majority of

(21:18):
people in America don't think it's a big problem. And
that's like, yeah, that's ire we're real script that from yeah,
it's not it's not. I mean, you know, uh, I
think about like fascism the last time it came around

(21:38):
and how what a common attitude that was towards fascism
sweeping Europe And we eventually got on the same page
about that, and only like a hundred million people died.
So yeah, I know, but I guess I'm gonna say
there there is like there. I think they're really strong.

(21:59):
I magical, if that's the right word. Reasons for the
persistence not of like not of denial is m you know,
in this kind of like stupid stereotypical way, like you know,
it's a Chinese hoax and all that stuff. I don't
mean that. I mean more like this kind of you know,
sometimes people call it the new denialism, where you acknowledge
it as a problem, but then you don't do anything
about it. Like this is what we have in Canada.

(22:21):
We have a national government that that talks all the
time and then subsidizes every oil industry that you can
get its hands on, you know, a sort of like yeah, yeah,
it's a problem, and we're doing everything we can. Here's
our new l en Gen pipeline or whatever, um that
kind of thing. I think that the dominant way of
talking about the problem still contains a lot of like

(22:42):
weird uncertainty. You know that people say things like, um,
you know there's a chance that we're heading towards water scarcity.
It's like no, no, no scientist thinks there's a chance.
Everybody knows it's the case, but we frame it as
if it's still this big tig uncertainty in the future.
And I think that allows people to feel, like what

(23:04):
Garrison saying, a kind of like it gives a room
for not doubt, but like distance or something. I don't
know what to describe it as. Um, yeah, I think distance,
because that's all that's that's that's so deep, particularly in
the American and I guess the Canadian psyche, right, like

(23:25):
even just going back to like the wars of the
last century, this idea that like, well, we're we're separated
from it, We're far enough away from it. And I
think there was even an idea among people who accepted
the reality of climate change in Canada specifically that like, well,
it's just gonna make this place a better growing climate
or whatever, Like it's not gonna it's not going to
lead to tornado, Like it's not going to lead to

(23:47):
like massive storm fronts of lightning built by giant fire
waves destroying entire cities, Like that's not gonna happen, and
I yeah, yeah, the other Yeah. One interesting thing, This
is just something I've been writing about lately, like not
just for myself. I haven't published it or anything, but

(24:07):
but one of the one of the things I've been
trying to study a lot is the climate economic modeling,
you know, like the stuff that the governments supposedly leans
on to like make its plans or determine its tax
rates for carbon and this kind of stuff, you know.
And one of the crazy things about those models, as
I've dug into them, both at the technical level, like

(24:27):
right down to the mathematical you know, choice is made,
but also how they conceive of them is that all
those models are built h and therefore, you know, most
of the policy expertise that's based on them is also
built on this idea that everything political will stay the same,

(24:48):
everything political economic will stay the same, things will just
get hotter. So like they are a model of stable
capitalism in a warmer world. Do you know, does that
make any sense? No, Yeah, it's this idea that well,
it's it's this acceptance that like it's going to get hotter. Um,
But this ignorant, ignorant the fact that like, and that's

(25:08):
going to increase the number of refugees, and that's going
to provide fuel for the radical right, and that's going
to lead to more exterminationists to talk in like mainstream
politics and like, yeah, it's yes, I get what you're saying.
And what worries me is that that is absolutely like
you can walk really far out on that limb and

(25:31):
then it just cracks and and then you know, the
whole fun and show is no longer temple. And that's
I think, you know, those moments like you're describing, there'll
be placed specific I suppose, yes, but it's that's the
ship that scares me. Yeah, yeah, yeah, it didn't make
sense to the normal person in the street a couple

(25:52):
of weeks ago. It starts to make sense. Yeah, yeah,
that's that. Yeah, I think, and I think a lot
of a lot of people there is definitely like the
everything will stay mostly the same syndrome along among a
lot of the population, whether you know they fall the

(26:13):
conservative or liberal side. I think there's there's a lot
there's a lot of acts that that's a whole lot
easier and in terms of like even for like you know,
people who are more radical, um even you know who
are like on like more on like the left. Um.
You know, there is like this you know perception that
capital is just going is it's gonna stay very similar

(26:36):
to how we see it now. And I think a
lot of people underestimate the adaptive capabilities. And I think
one of the useful things about the plagues last year
is that we've seen capital like transform it like transform
itself in very large ways in terms of like retail
industry supply lines very quickly. Um. So we've both seen
that kind of you know, you know, large scale transformation

(26:59):
on on like on a global scale. And we've also
seen the other thing you talked about creating like islands
of luxury right of like people who are um, you know,
higher class, but also some people who are like middle
class being able to basically create isolated pockets where they
can live in a life that's pretty similar to what

(27:21):
they already had. Where everyone else has to live and
ship like they get they they get everyone else has
so much worse, whereas a middle class class get to
stay kind of like in this in this small bubble um.
And I think that is definitely I think it's really
useful to look at how that happened in the play,
you know, early on with people like you know, where
people like flying to New Zealand to live in there

(27:42):
like cabins um and being like yeah, that's gonna happen. Um.
And now with you know, Amazon Man going to space,
it's like the same thing, right, there's gonna be there's
gonna see more and more extreme versions of this. Um hm. Yeah.
I don't know any thoughts on that that type of
thing in terms of you know, how we can look

(28:04):
at like past past, smaller you know, collapses or crumblings
of you know, of societal norms get really showing how
capital is going to adapt and how quickly it can
adapt in some cases. M I don't know if I
have any specific thoughts, but I you know, I am
with you on all of that analysis. I feel like, well,
for one thing, I think you're very very right to

(28:25):
emphasize the kind of robustness the capital keeps demonstrating, like
like we can knock it all at once. It's a yeah, exactly,
that's exactly I'm just about to say exactly, And it's
tougher than virtually every other political economic arrangement you know
that came before it, at least in the recent centuries,
like it, it does adapt in this remarkable way or

(28:47):
you know, I don't know, shapeshift. Um. But I also think,
like you know, just in terms of the kinds of
dynamics you're describing. Yeah, the the inequality that persists today,
not only like in its purely economic form, in the
sense that you know, there's a few very rich, very

(29:08):
powerful people, um, and then the vast majority of the
planet you know, um, isn't quite far behind, to put
it lightly, um, But that but that we're also like
it's almost like a total disaster that ideologically this problem
emerges precisely at the moment, it seems to me when
inequality is is so widely understood to be just normal

(29:34):
or natural, so that the reaction to almost any crisis
is that, you know, the rich will be fine and
and whether like people like me might say that sucks
and that's shitty, but for the most part, it's wide
they accepted as just the way the world works, right now,
you know what I mean, Like, like, there's never been
a better argument for a wealth tax than there is

(29:56):
right now. I can't think of one maybe the robber
barons in the States or whatever, you know, in the
late nineteenth early twentieth century. But it's it's like, at
least to me, it seems to be just here in
Canada at least it's a total joke, Like we talked
about it, but it's nowhere near happening. There's a sort
of strange like you know, I think Naomi Client has

(30:17):
written about this, like the kind of like poor timing
of the fact that the climate crisis happened precisely when
you know that democracy and social democratic forces are at
their weakest, or at least not weakest, but you know,
not in a good spot. Yeah, I mean, and uh,
I don't know. It was always tempting earlier to talk

(30:37):
about Syria and kind of have climate change contributed to
that and how that contributed to rising authoritarians And there's
actually been some new analysis on that that kind of
has made me less confident in climate change as a
driver of that conflict. Um I am, I guess, But

(30:58):
but what what what I do and why I do
still talk about that when I talk about like how
all this is going to work? Is kind of one
of the things that's most important to understand is that,
like the problem is not just climate change, right, like
you said, it's not just that it's getting warmer, and
it's not even just that climate change is causing these problems.
Is that we have these pre existing problems. We have
all these these issues we didn't deal with for years

(31:19):
and years. Um. It's like an old house and you
didn't do the repair work necessary, and then you know
there's there's extreme weather and the weather does It's not
just the weather that causes the problems, it's you've got
all these all these issues that cascade. UM. One of
the terms I think we're using a lot because we're
trying to get people away from the from the discussion

(31:42):
of collapse, which I don't think is productive. UM. A
friend of both Garrisonizes, is an e R nurse who
has been kind of working through COVID and was talking
about the fact that like, um, you know, prior to COVID,
we had a shortage of healthcare workers. It was exacerbated
by COVID, more people quit, it was exacerbated by all
of these different sort of like issues structurally within Portland itself,

(32:05):
in the way the city is set up, and now
you've got um, all these different medical systems kind of
like falling apart at the point when they're most necessary.
And the term that he uses is the crumbles um,
which I like a lot. Just this this thing, it's
not ever going to just fall apart, but pieces of
it are breaking off at all times, and it's it's

(32:26):
this um. I think that I I think it's an
easier way to get people because like there's you know,
we're having an in Portland right now. We had this
fucking heatwave hit. At the same time, we got a
notice that because of supply line issues, um Oregon was
out of chlor I think it was chlorine in order

(32:47):
to like uh pure for the for the water filtration systems.
And they were like, it'll be fine this time, We're
gonna we have like enough stored up to to deal
with like the shortage of equipment. But it's like, okay,
but what about next time? And the same thing. Because
of COVID jet fuel, like to save money, companies fired
all of their drivers, so there's not enough jet fuel

(33:07):
or was not enough jet fuel, which was fine during COVID,
but then these fires hit and they're having to ground
firefighting planes because there's just no jet fuel, and what
there is is being requisitioned to keep flames planes going
to and fro, and so you can't adequately fight the fire.
It's these wow, yeah, all these these seemingly little things

(33:29):
that become big things when you this. Uh it's like
climate changes like steroids to all these little problems too. Yeah, yeah, yeah, no,
it makes a lot of sense. Yeah. Then and they
sort of tend a cascade way that we didn't we
didn't predict. Yeah. Yeah, it's chaos theory stuff, right, It's
like we're we're all we're we're tipping over the edge
of chaos right now, past the point where it makes

(33:50):
things more adaptable, and towards the point where it all
just kind of spirals out of control. Yeah, it's hard
to imagine talking about something like equilibrium right now. It's
just Yeah, but since virtually all of our science is
built on the model of equilibrium that causes trouble, should
you speak to that a little bit more? Because I'm
I am not a scientist, and I'm fairly certain Garrison

(34:11):
doesn't either, so that I hadn't really thought of things
in those terms. Yeah, I mean, I only think of
it in those terms because you know, I'm training in economics,
and that's the framing. But in general, like most of
the complex models not so that's not so true of
the climate science models necessarily behind any means, but most
of the ways that we model, like the behavior of

(34:31):
an ecosystem or the behavior of an economy, assumes that
there's a sort of tendency toward normally normalizing, you know
what I mean, Like that over time, a series of
processes kind of build up a tendency toward a particular direction.
So like that, you know, in in economics that the
economy is understood to be kind of self correcting, not

(34:53):
even kind of self correcting. So like if something they
call it a shock, If something happens in the in
the in the in the economic system that's unexpected, then
of course the whole system kind of shakes a bit.
But then the assumption is that the overall momentum and
dynamics of the system will bring things back to normal.
Does that make sense, Yeah, And that's exactly how we

(35:13):
model ecosystem behavior. Like cut a hole in the middle
of a forest, the assumption is that for a second,
for a second on forest time, this force is like,
holy fun, there's all this sunlight and there's weird animals
in a here that weren't here before, but over time,
the forests sort of pattern of operation will bring it
back to normal. This is why like clear cutting is

(35:35):
supposed to be okay, because eventually the ecosystem will recover um.
And most of our sciences are built on this kind
of equilibrium oriented model, kind of normalizing of the larger
processes of the system that just had their own momentum.
And there's only a few, like ecological sciences that break

(35:55):
that pattern. And there are things like people who study
deserts which are like, oh, they don't really have a middle,
Like it doesn't It doesn't help to talk about a
desert's average temperature because the desert never is that temperature,
you know what I mean, It's just in the middle
of extremes um and uh. And I think that at
least from a sort of like scientific tech perspective, technological

(36:20):
fixed perspective for climate change, one of the biggest problems
is the fact that most of our kind of science
and knowledge can't deal with dissequilibrium systems, like ones that
actually we don't know where they're going and we don't
know where they'll end and we don't have the tools,
like literally the mathematical tools to manage them, so we
can't model them, and then we don't know what then

(36:41):
to do. One of the things I've been reading in
preparation with this that's been useful from a uh an
intellectual framework is this. It was written in two thou
and twelve. It's called the Gonzo Futurist Manifesto, and it's

(37:03):
a guy kind of laying out as someone looking into
this and told them be like, well, it looks like
everything's in this process of like either free fall or
massive change, and we're like, I don't think a lot
of people caught up to. And the frame that the
framework day uses post normal um is like the acceptance
that you're in a post normal era, which I think
is what you're getting at. There's the equilibrium isn't going

(37:24):
to come back right, like we're we and we're you're
you're starting from a flawed position when you're even thinking
of considering that as a possibility, um, the shift has
been too fundamental. It's the same thing politically with assuming
like anything could work the same way after Trump, Like no,
we're in post normal times where it's never going back. Yeah. Yeah,
and that's why I think sometimes it's you know, it

(37:46):
can be quite problematic to talk to progressives of a
different generation, like say my parents, who weren't by any
means lefties, but they were like old school Canadian social democrats,
you know, big welfares ate that kind of stuff. Is
that the assumption is that that's what we need right now,
Like that's we just need to get that back and
everything will be cool. Like that's that's my dad's analysis

(38:10):
of the problem. Yeah, and I can see the temptation, sure,
but it's totally not true. Yeah, I mean, the temptation
is profound because like, yeah, I mean it if things
were if you have this feeling that things were good,

(38:32):
whether or not it's right or wrong, you're naturally gonna
want to return to that, which, you know, is what
what's going to be the fuel for the authoritarian version
of this, but it's also going to be the fuel
for climate Leviathan, you know, like in any case, like
it's easier. The scary thing about trying to bring climate
X into being right is that it's by far the
best possible kind of solution you have, but it requires

(38:56):
saying fundamentally we're the way we all live is going
to have to change our attitudes towards democracy, are going
to have to change our attitudes towards what a society is.
You're going to have to shift in the fundamental level. Well,
everyone else is saying, here's how we bring back what
you used to have here, so we get the coffee
back in the stores, you know, Like, yeah, yeah, that's

(39:16):
kind of been the problem with a lot of left
leaning projects is that it is a newer thing, and
that's why none of them have really lasted very long
or they've you know, gone horribly wrong very quickly. Yeah,
especially if we're gonna try to do any Climate X
is more like a stateless world, or at least a
stateless area. That introduces a whole, a whole new problem

(39:36):
that we haven't really seen on a mass scale, you know,
outside of like Rojava or something. Um, it's gonna be
a whole new, a whole new problem to deal with,
and a whole lot of people are going to be
scared of that. Agreed, And I mean I think it's
you know, like, no, I'm stating you obvious, So I

(39:57):
apologize for this, But part of me thinks, you know,
I kind of need to say it to remind myself.
But you know, for for good or ill. I mean,
I guess it's for ill. A lot of people, like
even though they know that how they live now is untenable,
you know, in the larger frame, it's also how they
live now. Like like like a lot of us, myself included,

(40:21):
are invested in the way things work now, do you
know what I mean, Like like the prospect of that
radical change that that is a hard sell when you know,
like this is what put food on the table, this
is how my kids go to school, Like these are
you know, this is like that big leap that we
will have to demand of ourselves and others at some

(40:44):
point in the near future. Probably is also like justifiably
terrifying to lots of people. Yeah, and it's I mean
the big yeah. And it's always easier, it's always it's
a lot less frightening to tell people. I can make
it like it was yeah, which but it was you know, yeah,

(41:07):
and maybe it was awesome for some of them, you know, um,
for my dada, Yeah, yeah, yeah. I find it interesting
that you bring up deserts in that framework of like
of like equilibrium in terms of like, you know, they're
being a normal and desert is not as one of
the things that isn't it's always fluctuating between different temperates

(41:28):
um and you know, and and I think there was
there was a popular anarchists book I think also written
in two thousand and twelve, um just called Desert about
climate change and how basically it's it's it's it's it's
it's not. It's not about like how the whole world
we're literally turned into a desert. It's about like how
the desert model in terms of like they're never being

(41:48):
a normal again. It's gonna fluctuating between extremes. It's going
to happen in a lot of places, like like everything
is gonna get turned into their own version of deserts. Yeah.
The title is based off the idea of that old
quote that like empires make a desert and call it
peace right, and it's kind of seeing global capital as
the Yeah, it's called desert. Yeah. Online, it's like a

(42:11):
little bit of a manifesto. But yeah, but yeah, like
in terms of like we're never gonna even even as
the crumbles start happening, we're not We're never gonna rereach
a place of stability. It's always going to be in flux.
We're never going to get to that normal again. We

(42:31):
may have coffee for a year, we may have insulin
you know, being produced locally, but it's going to be
it's not that we're not going to have the same
false stability that we have now, right, Like we have
an idea of stability now now it's not true, you know,
because Taco Bell doesn't have ground beef anymore. Um right,
but like, actually real, are you guys saying yeah, yeah, yeah,

(42:52):
there's I mean there's shortages Taco Bells, like not able
to serve a lot of stuff. They're having shortages of things.
You don't really have Taco Bell here in can You're
not missing. I was, Oh, but you guys have tim
Horton's so no one's hands are clean. No, no, no,
it's true. Yeah. I didn't didn't mean. I didn't need

(43:13):
to absolve my strow responsibility. I just ate some Tim
Horton's cereal this morning. My my mother, who lives in
Canada sent me some. Um so that's what I ate
for breakfast. So yeah, did you used to live in Canada?
I did, Yeah, I'm Canadian Oh yeah, he's Canadian as hell. Yeah.

(43:35):
I moved to Portland with my family. Then most most
of my families moved back to Canada, which is probably
the smart move. Um. But I mean, as we see,
you know, both both these countries right now have like
liberals in charge quote quote right now, and it's not no.
You know, both Trudeau and Biden have a lot of
the same problems despite their generational gap, and they have

(43:58):
kind of the same effect in terms of what they
say versus what they do. You know, both of them.
You know, Biden talked about banning fracking in his campaign,
and everyone who is further to the left of Biden
new like, no, you're just lying. I like this, come on,
like come on. And you know Trudeau made a lot
of promises about pipelines and how that's not that's not
working out, um. And I think one of the things

(44:19):
that we haven't talked about yet is the symbiotic relationship
between the state and like tech companies and oil companies, um,
and how that will be alert how that I see
that being a large part of Levivan is basically the
government subsidizing or the government letting tech companies try to
fix the problem therefore increasing our reliance on capital and

(44:41):
those companies to maintain kind of you know, you know
in terms of like gew in terms of like gew
and engineering or carbon capture. Right if if the government
is gonna is gonna help help those companies do those things,
as soon as those companies go away, we get so
much more carbon released immediately. And it's kind of like
this like self preservation that I think capital is going

(45:02):
to try to do. Um. I know you you you
brought up stuff similar to this in terms of like
climate levies. That's like, yeah, do you do you have
like what what? What do you see? Now? That's kind
of frightening in terms of you know, tech getting its
hands on not just like government influence, but like you know,

(45:23):
trying to make itself a necessary part of our world
in terms of in term terms of climates. I mean,
the text is necessary for a lot of ways right now,
but specifically in terms of climate. How do you kind
of see that happening? Yeah? Now, I think that's a
really good point. And I'm not sure I put enough
thought into it to be honest with you, but I
do think you're right there. It's it's it's obvious, it
seems to me right now that that tech or you know,

(45:47):
green whatever they're calling themselves this kind of stuff. The goal,
and I think it's actually like quite explicit, is to
make itself essential to how we deal with the problem,
which which means that of course, like I think you
just said, the first thing that that requires is that
we write off a whole bunch of ways of dealing

(46:07):
with the problem so that we can prioritize this way
of doing things. And then and then once that, once
that becomes the way of managing things like carbon capture
or you know, something like that, that requires, as you say,
you know, once you once you start, it's like an addiction,
like you can't you can't stop it, or you're fucked. Um.
If we've written the other options off the table or

(46:28):
they just become untenable at some point, then then yeah,
I mean, the way that that tech will be crucial
to this um is absolutely their plan. I would say,
you know, like and I would say probably it's it's
already under discussion in big you know, serious ways that
big companies like Google and all the rest of it.

(46:50):
But the other thing I would say, on this same front,
and I think you just mentioned it too, is this
idea of you know, what will happen with geo engineering,
which I think it in terms of what I find
scary that I find a bit scary, and not just
of course, you know, the sort of experimenting with the
planetary system, which you know is pretty terrifying, but but

(47:13):
the political implications of of the power associated with being
able to manipulate the planet purely in the interests of
maintaining capital's power, you know, like we're really like, we're
really talking about we are willing to dicker with the
entire planet rather than change the way that we live.
Like that's that's that astounding. The scariest part of your

(47:39):
book for me was when you started talking about that
and space weaponry um, and that I was thinking about
this a lot yesterday with Bess going up in his
penis rocket um. And I think I even talked about
it on on another show. Is yeah, is the intersection
between the militarization of the atmosphere with the UH then

(48:02):
with like the control of the atmosphere right like basically
like making the atmosphere a thing that we're like, I
think colonizes the wrong word. I think that that's kind
of inappropriate for actual clon colonization. But it's it's kind
of similar, Like it's like it's the it's another frontier
that we wanted to conquer. It's the next one is
gonna be the atmosphere itself in terms of like weapons

(48:23):
as you talked about in the book, and then geo engineering,
and then with you know Bezos talking about moving all
of the polluting stuff into space, you know, it's the
same thing. Um yeah, I'd like so, yeah, I was
watching that happened yesterday, and you know, your your book
was written a few years ago, and it's like it's
the same thing. You're like, that's and before I read
your book, that's not that's not. I never thought about

(48:44):
the space thing specifically, And now with Basis talking about that,
that's like wow, they're just going all for it, Like
they're just yeah, they're just like it's like what what what?
What what made you guys think of that possibility? Like
what was the thing you saw there? Was like, hey,
this is how we kind of see this trend going
that will result in this kind of colonization of the

(49:06):
atmosphere in space, And well, well what did you see
that kind of got you there? Well, like, if I'm
honest with you, ah, that was really Joel's brainchild, like
that that part of the book about SRM solar Radiation
management and the space weaponry and that kind of stuff.
That was something that was a connection that he made

(49:26):
and he pursued, uh, most rigorously, and he actually wrote
that part of the book because as you can imagine,
to split it up, you know what I mean. Um.
And so I wouldn't want I mean, for me what
who made that connection was Joel, So I wouldn't want
to I wouldn't want to speak for him. I think
he he's he's in conversation both professionally and also just

(49:51):
like interest wise with a whole range of of international
relations scholars who inside the university are considered kind of wacky,
like people who take like space weapons seriously, like they're
sort of like peripheral, you know what I mean. And
Joel has been in conversation with him for a very
long time, so that he knew all that literature like
already before we even started. And I've never even heard

(50:13):
of it, um. But I do think the connection is
really compelling, and I know he's pursued it since I
hope you guys get a chance to chat with him.
He's a fucking brilliant I love to you're you're just
the easier person to contact. Yeah, yeah, you know, he's
and he loves to chat chat and he's infinitely more
articulate than me. Like you'll you'll you'll get way more

(50:34):
out of him than you ever have from me. Um,
he's a brilliant guy. Uh, but he's he's a that's
a connection that he made and I wouldn't want to
speak for how he got there. Sure, like you're more interested,
Like correct me if I'm wrong, But it's more you
you have like a lot of more studying in like
the economics side of things. Um, do do you see

(50:58):
because like the other the other kind of out of
this you know, ties in the space separy is just
the U. S Military itself. Um do you see them
interacting with the economy and in collapse like in like
crumble scenarios. How how do you see the military being
used by the state to kind of not solve issues
but like you know, mitigate some of them or adapt

(51:19):
to some of those. Yeah. I mean again, I don't
want to say I know any better than anyone else,
but I do think, I mean, the U. S Military
in particular has a couple of advantages you want to
call it that in terms of the role that they
might play as you know, certain kinds of crumbling become
essential for the state to deal with them. The first

(51:41):
is that it's been taking climate change seriously for decades
like that. Yeah, no mencing words in any of those reports, exactly,
very blunt and very accurate. Yeah. And they even they
know for a long time, they know the international security risks.
They you know, they have they have plans, they're you know,
they're trying to design weapons that don't require fossil fuels

(52:04):
like they are. They take the problem seriously, so they're
ahead in that sense. And also, I do think that
the kind of sort of localized for lack of a
better term, of regionalized crumbling that you guys are just
discussing will make the militarization of certain parts of the economy,
probably especially supply lines um and certain production processes, maybe

(52:28):
even if something as central as agriculture um, well, the
militarization and the securitization of those aspects of the modern
economy are going to become more and more essential, and
as far as I'm concerned, at least in North America,
the principle instrument of that securitization will be the military.
And I think the other interesting things in terms of

(52:49):
like the plague is like that's the one thing we
all saw the military do is be crucial in the
vaccine distribution effort. Um. So I think, you know, really
the past year has been for interesting glimpse into how
we're gonna use our capital and military power when stuff
gets more and more unstable. Um. It seems like in

(53:12):
the States that's how the state, the state knows how
to step in is via the military or via the police.
Do you know what I mean? Because there isn't like
as you know here in Canada. I mean, we've got
lots of things that are problematic, but one of the
things we didn't need for the distribution of the vaccine
was anything more than our public health care system, which

(53:33):
was extant and worked perfectly fine, you know what I mean,
Like we didn't have to build up any new infrastructure,
and like that, we just had to say, oh, you
people who are already doing this do this too. Yeah.
And the lack of the lack of civil infrastructure in
the States makes US more both need to rely on

(53:53):
the military, and it makes Americans imaginations so small that
the only way they can envision that is your military
force or is through policing because the only civil infrastructure
we fund is policing in the military. Well in the
military is also the only thing Americans overwhelmingly trust, Like
there's no other like you look at polling, like there's

(54:14):
no other branch of the government that is widely trusted
by US citizens other than the military. And it's I mean,
it's because of the most successful propaganda campaign of all time, um,
their partnership with Hollywood, but it is it is a reality,
Like huh, yeah, that's a really interesting point. We'll probably

(54:34):
want to rap up with. The one other thing I
want to mention is like the hardest part of looking
at Levithan for me is the is how incapable the
UN is um in terms of like like how bad
they are at doing their job. So what do you
think would need to change um for something like the

(54:57):
UN And maybe maybe not then specifically, but like you know,
if we're going to have like a transnational cooperation of
the state and capital to try to to try to
to try to you know, alleviate some of the worst
spect of climate change. What would need to happen for
to make that more realistic because the u N is
not it, at least not right now. Um yeah, yeah,

(55:21):
I don't know if I have a good answer to
that question, to be honest with you, you know, partly
because it's such a good question. Um. I think the
U N and the u n F Triple C you know,
have have proven like like I mean, I don't think
it's too much to say that, you know that the
international negotiations that have gone on around this, you know, Copenhagen, Paris,

(55:42):
can COOUM whatever, Dada da da have literally got us nowhere,
like seriously nowhere. Um. It's been more of, you know,
a sort of long term dithering. H And it's hard
to imagine to me at least that that framework an
approach to global problem solving is gonna you know, somehow

(56:03):
be redeemed the next meeting a Glasgow and everything will
be fine again. Um. I think that from a purely
like real politic perspective, it's gonna take like the US
and China creating a G two and just making rules
for the world. Those rules will be terrible um and

(56:27):
and it it will be a kind of levi authoritarian
Leviathan form if that happens. I think, but I think
in terms of what we might actually anticipate happening in
the medium term, that's much closer than any sort of
like global hug that's gonna get us through this. I'm
so like, I'm I'm pretty young, I'm eighteen. I'm part

(56:48):
of the zoomers, um my generation. You know. The friends
that I've had that are my age don't have much
hope for the future. Kind of like the term we
use is like a dum er. That's like kind of
like the kind of thing we use is like we
can't see anything besides doom and despair. And for some
people that drives them to nihilism. For some people, it

(57:08):
just drives them to apathy. Uh, sometimes it drives them
to like anger and resentment and attack. Um do do
you have any hope for what's going to happen in
the next few years? Do you? You know, I'm not
sure if you have kids, but like how what what
do you think? You know, like you're you're at least
your teachers, Like what what do you say to like

(57:30):
younger generations? In terms of like, how can we look
at these very depressing problems and how can we get
a more useful outlook than just being doomers, because like,
the doomer action is natural, it's easy, you know. I
I default to that every day. You know, it takes
it takes takes active fighting to not just want to

(57:51):
lay in my bed and cry. Um, So like what what? Yeah?
Like do you have hope? Where does it? If so,
where does it come from? Where can you see you know,
not non dumor outlooks being useful? Yeah, I think about
this all the time too. Um. I do have kids there,

(58:12):
you're exactly your age, you're seventeen and twenty. Um. So
one just graduated high school. There's part way through university. Um,
that's what he went to do. Um And I don't
think interestingly enough. And I don't mean this in any
kind of like value of way. Neither of them are dumers.

(58:36):
Both of them are. I wouldn't call them hopeful, but
they are. They are not h which and it would
be totally reasonable to be. They are not obsessed with
what the future seems not to hold. Um. And I
say that only because um, I do think that well,

(59:05):
I guess one of the have to sort of responses,
and the first of which is is, I apologize quite cliche,
but I actually think it still matters, and that is
that your generation will soon be in charge and that's
a very good, good thing. Um. But but that's the cliche.
But the second part is that I I because I because,

(59:29):
like Robert was saying earlier, I think I'm assuming you
sort of have a little bit of a similar take
cares because I don't see this as kind of like
a collapse process, but rather us managing a series of
radical changes in the way that systems work, crumblings, you know,
and breakdowns, that kind of thing, but also changes that
that we that my hope lies in our capacity to

(59:52):
use those moments as ways to not fix things or
make things all better, but to like work together generously
with the folks with whom we're alive they'll be dickheads
for sure, um, to to make the most of what
we have at that moment and to work to the future.
And I don't see those moments running out. Those will

(01:00:17):
be there, and insofar as we leap into them generously,
because we don't know any better than anyone else, necessarily
we will always have the capacity for hopeful and actually
joyous solidarity in confronting those problems, and it won't always
be fun around on the tournament romanticize it. But all
I'm trying to say is that I actually think that

(01:00:41):
they're the world will not be without joy unless we
choose to let it go there. And I guess like,
at least for now, I still feel like we can.
We can tell ourselves, we can, we can confront what's
coming our way. I don't know if it's going to
be bad or good, but we will do so. Um.
And there will be a group of us who does

(01:01:02):
it with good in our hearts, and I would just
take that for what it's worth, you know. Yeah, It's like,
in like a weird way, a lot of these crumbles
will almost give an opportunity for radical freedom because like,
you know, we we think of ourselves and looking like
a free society, but you know, we rely on so
many things that are out of our control and that

(01:01:23):
you know makes us unhappy subconsciously and subconsciously um. And
when we're forced to live such be so active in
our life and in our communities and with you know,
people we love and care about. You know, it does
it the one thing that I hope that I do
hope for that it will give us more opportunities to
have like some like radical freedom, um, and you know,

(01:01:46):
be able to live and to be able to have
small communities that can live, you know, much much more
free than what we do now. Um in terms of
you know, authoritarianism from the state and through you know,
companies in capital um. Yeah, as as long as as
long as we don't fall into a full military dictatorship
of capital tech. UM, that's kind of that's kind of

(01:02:09):
the thing that I would like. Um. Yeah, I don't know.
It's really hard to talk about this stuff without sounding cheesy. Yeah. Yeah,
especially when you talk about when you try to sell
people on the only possible optimistic outcomes for this, because
there's you you have to I guess I think we

(01:02:31):
were also trying. This is another thing capitalism does well,
talking about it as a resilient system. Um. When you
talk about alternatives to capitalism, it's hard not to sound like, uh,
it's hard. It's hard not to sound silly to people
because anything that isn't this specific system either sounds you're

(01:02:52):
either going back and saying I want to do a
community Soviet Union again, but we'll get it right this time,
or you're I don't know, it's it's tough because people
are are very bought have very much bought into the
idea that like anything that isn't a slight modification of
what we're doing right now is um is silly, uh

(01:03:15):
star trek bullshit. You know, I agree you guys, you
guys have probably both heard that. I always come back
to it all the time. I think it's great that
famous quote from Frederick Jamison where he says it's easier
to imagine the end of the world than it is
the end of capitalism and u and it gets attributed
to tons of different people, but it was you know,
it was coined by that guy Jamison. He's a English

(01:03:37):
professor actually weirdly enough at Duke. But there's a good
ursula kay La gwinn uh comment on kind of the same.
Oh yeah, I'm sure, but I think you're right, Like
it's it's a it's a quip and it's sort of
you know, superficial, but it's actually also true. Like a
lot of the times today, it does feel like that
it's easy, it's literally easier to imagine us driving the

(01:03:59):
planet into the end of its functioning, and it is
for many people to imagine otherwise. I think I think
you're right, Robert, like when you tell people, oh, no, no,
In fact, a lot of things could be otherwise, and
we could have it quite quickly if we chose. People
look at you like you have two heads. Yeah, And
that was one of the most optimistic thing I've experienced

(01:04:20):
in the last several years was going to northeast Syria,
which is a mess in a very complicated situation, but
like sitting down with like militia in the desert and
having these conversations about like the future that they were
trying to build, and like here's the like here's our
soil reclamation project, and like here's the way we're trying
to like alter and it like, well, if they're able

(01:04:42):
to like try, that's remarkable and they've got some ship
to deal with, you know. Um amazing, Yeah, thank you
so much. Yeah, super nice to meet you both. I
really appreciate. And that is our interview with Jeff Mann,
co author of Climate Leviathan. You can find him on

(01:05:04):
Twitter at Jeff p. Man Um Jeff spelt with a
with a with a G. Not with a not with
a J, and follow us on Twitter, at cool Zone
Media and happen Here pod. You can find me at
Hungry bow Tie. Thank you for listening, and see you tomorrow.