What We Can Learn From Struggles Past: Hong Kong

Researcher, scholar and activist JN joins us to discuss the tactics, strategies, and difficulties of the Hong Kong protests and what we can learn from common struggles

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Episode Transcript

Speaker 1 (00:03):
Welcome to the Worst Happenings Here Ever, Bastards pod shit.
I'm Robert evans Um. This is it could Happen here,
a daily podcast about the fact that everything seems to
be falling apart, and wouldn't it be nice if we
tried to do something better than the stuff that's falling apart?

(00:24):
That seems like a good idea. Huh do you agree
with me my my panel for today's episode? Yes, I
agree with that general concept. That's Garrison Davis. And who
else is agreeing with me today? That Christopher Wong is?
Is that Christopher Wong mildly agreeing, mildly agreeing, mildly agreeing. Wow, well,

(00:45):
that's extra disturbing because you you you you're in charge
of today's episode. So in brief, when we did our
first so you know, if you're new to the show,
come back check out the first five episodes of the show.
They're scripted Evergreen kind of layout our philosophy on the
crumbling of society and what to do next. But one
of the questions we had is, Okay, it kind of
seems like one of the only ways potentially forward without

(01:07):
just accepting that everything's going to keep falling apart is
some sort of big general strike that forces action on
you know, things like climate that are are we can't
really wait on anymore. And of course one of the
big questions is, well, all right, you get a bunch
of people to agree to strike, how do you agree
what to do with the strike? How do you agree?
What like the terms are? You know, how do you
how do you put together a list of demands? How

(01:27):
do you get millions of people to agree to a
list of demands and then fight the government in order
to institute those demands? Um? And I don't know the
answer to that question. Um, but there are some people
in the world right now who did a version of
that in Hong Kong. And today we're going to talk
with someone who can talk to us about that process
and hopefully kind of give us some insight both and

(01:48):
how it worked and what didn't work over there, and
that might inform us on what we might do here
someday in the future. Uh, if you know that, that'd
be nice. Maybe did I get it right? Chris? Yeah, yeah,
this is yeah, that's good enough for that ringing endorsement. Yeah,

(02:10):
you know. Okay, So so to to to work more
of this out. Um, I've brought in j n who
is a writer, researcher and organizer with a Laosan collective.
Um he's currently be I said of Los Angeles and Jane, Okay,
do you do you want to talk a little bit
about what Lauson is and then also talk a bit
about how, you know, for people who've sort of forgotten,

(02:33):
weren't paying attention at the time, how the Hong Kong
protest started. Yeah. Sure, thanks thanks for having me excited
to be here and to talk about this kind of
stuff because I've been wanting to kind of you know,
talk about this and discuss the way things have gone
with the protests for a while. Um It's been hard
to find the time, I guess with our cascading crises

(02:56):
and whatnot. Um, but yeah, so I guess Lao Son.
I'll speak briefly about law Song, since you know, I'm
not speaking on behalf of the collective in this interview,
but just kind of like, um, talking about how we
started and then everything else after that is is kind
of just my view of things. UM. So Lawson has
members with kind of like different leftist orientations, um, from

(03:19):
you know, anarchists to more social democratic um, and you know,
it's been a kind of a lot to work through,
as you can imagine. But I think it also that
also kind of reflects the necessity of our political condition, um,
which is that they're really you know, in my view,
there hasn't really been any internationalist groups that focus on
Hong Kong from those different perspectives um, at least for

(03:42):
me when I was growing up. Um, most of the
kind of like radical Hong Kong folks that I knew
would tend to just be uh, you know, we would
join different we would join other movements and stuff like that.
Like there was never anything that was Hong Kong centered, um.
And I guess stuff in the daspora, uh it's pretty conservative.
You know, the diasporad folks that I grew up with,

(04:04):
we're we're pretty conservative. So there wasn't that that kind
of avenue for organizing, unlike other kind of Asian dasper
groups like uh, Philipinos folks have like this kind of
very long history of radical das board organizing and I
don't really think Hong Kong has had that ever. So
I think that's why law Son is this kind of
very broad tent, big umbrella type of organ where we

(04:27):
try where we do kind of collect a lot of
folks who are you know, progressive, left leaning to to
to otherwise. Um And but I I guess our general
orientation is the kind of neither Washington nor Beijing line
with with varying degrees of general anti statis um in
the mix. Um And I think, you know, I'm hopeful

(04:49):
that this is helping to build the foundation for more
of that in the Hong Kong diaspora and then hopefully
in the broader Asian dasper as I see it, since
I think the general divide tends to be kind of
like you know, radical Asian folks will be anti U
s imperiless, which is great, but then specifically do that
by expressing support for states elsewhere and um, you know
that can that can take good forms and bad forms

(05:11):
and whatnot. So um And I guess just really quick,
we we do both kind of organizing and writing and translation.
Those are kind of the three pillars of the group,
I guess, and the bedrock of our work is really
kind of aiming to create international solidarity with Left US
around the world to kind of amplify left his voices
in Hong Kong, but then also kind of create nonstate

(05:32):
centered connections across Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Yeah,
and how do you I mean, I think one of
the big questions that that keeps coming to me over
and over again is how do you overcome the how
do you overcome the resistance to internationals? And that's caused
by kind of I don't know, conspiracism may not be

(05:53):
exactly the right way to frame it, but this belief
that you know, your your struggle for liberation is really
just a c I, A OP or whatever like this
this this, this case of brain worms that keeps that
I see as a major barrier towards you know, kind
of functional internationalism in a lot of cases, particularly within
the United States. Um, what are some ways in which

(06:15):
you you've actually seen some luck in combating that? Yeah,
I mean, that's that's really the million dollar question, I think,
which is, like, you know, I think if we had
figured it out, it wouldn't be an issue. Unfortunately, it's
growing problem growing. So in many ways, from one view
could say that it's we haven't been very successful in
combating that. But I think in some you know, some

(06:37):
of the leading groups in that camp you know, the
campus I think are very well funded and they have
very powerful connections. When you say campus, could you explain
that term briefly, because I don't think it's something and
certainly that's when we've talked about on the show, and
I think a lot of our listeners probably wouldn't be
familiar with that. Yeah. Sure, I mean, I'm sure Chris
could speak much more about this. I feel like you

(07:00):
of your expertise is is kind of explaining these very
kind of deep left traditions and whatnot. But I guess
my understanding is is just very generally the campus will UM.
You know, it's like the anti imperialism that UM sees
the US as the kind of number one enemy and

(07:20):
everything kind of is is you know, they're the primary
contradiction I guess to use some malice terminology UM, and
that everything must be subordinated to that, to that cause
of like being against the U. S empire UM, And
usually that requires supporting what they see as uh, you know,
abbreviate as a as actually existing socialism UH states that

(07:43):
kind of use that that are nominally socialists, nominally communist
UM and use all the kind of like imagery and
trappings of that um to kind of like whole maintain
that political identity despite the kind of material reality of
their politics and economy and all that. So um, Yeah,

(08:04):
I can tell more about that later maybe, But I
think one thing that I've been chatting with a lot
of my kind of like uh, radical Asian friends, who
are you know, I I am very kind of obviously
against these campus because they are so veriantly against Hong Kong.
But you know, other folks that I've talked to have
have said, you know, they really kind of understand that

(08:26):
viewpoint in the sunset. It's a very emotional attachment, right.
It's like folks for you know, folks let's let's say
Vietnamese folks who uh their families were refugees and had
to come to the US because of the Vietnam War,
for example. Then you know when when you're the child
of refugees and you're like, why the hell am I

(08:46):
here in America, and then you start to kind of
like learn about the history and background of what happened,
then it makes sense that you would have this kind
of very emotional attachment to a s these actually existing
social states UM and those histories and those those radical
anti imperial histories and whatnot, despite the fact that you know,

(09:07):
clearly history has shown that they have either betrayed their
own movements or gone down in defeat and whatnot, which,
you know, I think there's two ways to react to that.
One is to kind of continue to cling to the fantasy,
and then one is to try and figure out what's next. Right,
It's like, how can we either revive that or continue

(09:28):
that in in the ways that makes sense in this world? Right?
And so I think, you know, I guess to answer
the initial question, I think it is a little bit
easier to for especially if we're like young, newly radicalized
Asian folks, it's a little bit easier to maintain that fantasy.
And then, you know, I think the way that media,

(09:50):
you know, social media and online media has gone nowadays,
it's like it's becoming distilled into even like the most
simple and understand bowl like nuggets of that, so like
infographics and stuff like that. So I feel like that
entire ecosystem uh tries to make it so that people
do stay within that fantasy rather than trying to do

(10:12):
the harder work of like how do we extrapolate this
or how do we adapt this to our conditions? Now? Yeah,
and I think, you know, I can talk about this
for a little like a brief amount because I don't
want to spend Jewish time. Yeah, I'm talking about these people,
but you know, like I think, like like one way
to look at them is so camp is um is

(10:33):
a thing from from the Cold War. Right. It's basically like, okay,
you pick you pick one of your like two maybe
three camps. If you come an online movement, it's like, okay,
you're really with the Soviets or with you with the Americans? Right,
And you know, part part of this happening here is
it's like that that's a very easy way to look
at the world. And this is this is why it's
so easy to sort of like condense it in infographics. Right,
It's like there's two sides. One of them is good,
one of them bad. But you know, this is like

(10:55):
the thing that's that's sort of the problem here is
that the Cold War is over, like it's done. It's
it's it's gone, right, the communist countries are gone. None
of the stuff, none of the stuff exists anymore. And
so you know, and it's it's very easy particular, particularly
for for the diaspor to sort of get stuck, suck
like back into the politics where well, okay, well well
no, no no, no, hold on, there's a new Cold War.

(11:16):
The Cold War is happening again. It's all the same stuff,
and you can just sort of like tack all the
same symbols back on. But you know, it leads you
to down these pasts where you know, and this is
like like something Janna I think is dealt with a lot,
which is like, you know, when when when the protests
started happening in Hong Kong, all these people are like, oh,
this is all the CIA, and it's like not at all,

(11:36):
it's you know, it's sort of yees. So it's they
they they come to see this world in a way
that's sort of purely conspiratorial and purely sort of based
in this old Cold War stuff that just doesn't exist anymore. Yeah,
I think part of the problem is that there's been
this consistent failure and this isn't even really a left

(11:57):
or right issue. This is like a a a culture
issue and kind of how to refer to places that
are outside of the US or sort of you know,
in the old days, the USSR is influence block. Like
you have terms like third world and now Global South,
and all of them are really um bad, bad terms
for kind And I'm We're going to try to have

(12:19):
Joey I U bon soon. But I've come to like
the term the periphery to refer to those states that
are kind of outside of or at least kind of
mingling influences from those you know, the major power blocks.
UM and I but it's it is um it I
think has led to this that kind of binary thinking
kind of the failure too. I think the complexity of

(12:42):
the actual global geopolitical situation leads to a failure, leads
to kind of a rejection of that complexity, in which
everything boils down to either pro or anti um socialism
or whatever on a lot of people's heads. And I
don't think that is a particularly good framework for making
good decisions. Yeah, absolutely, And yeah that that piece by

(13:04):
Joey is really amazing, And yeah, I think, you know,
I think the reason you know, a lot of times
folks are just kind of like, well, you know, these
these campus these tankis or whatever, it's just like they
have no real world impacts, so like just don't bother uh,
you know, don't don't spend too much time arguing with
them or whatever. But I guess the part that really
bothers me about all that is, I think what you're

(13:25):
kind of just saying, Robert, is like it's reducing the
complexity of places outside the US so much that it's dehumanizing. Right.
It's just like people in Hong Kong aren't full humans
to these people because they see it's like the c
I you can just kind of parachute one or two
people in and lead like a two million person march, right,
as if Hong Kong people have no political agency of

(13:46):
their own or you know, understandings of how complex their
own situation is, right, just this kind of interimperial entanglement
that they're stuck in. So you know, there's this book
called Nothing Ever Dies by Vieton Win that I would
really recommend folks read, and I wish a lot of
these folks would read it too, because you know, his
he's talking about memory in the Vietnam War. But I

(14:09):
think the thing that really stuck out to me and
that in that framework that he develops is like, you know,
everyone is capable of doing right and wrong, and uh,
it's it's the way that we remember things like the
Vietnam War, for example, there are always good and bad
sides that people UM each side will deploy those different

(14:32):
types of memory in order to like villainize others and
uh lionize themselves, right. And then so I guess you know,
he sees the true task as being able to recognize UM,
the agency of all of us to do good and
bad UM, and that that earned him a lot of
hate within the Vietnamese community, I think, right, because you're
encouraged to you know, in southern California, you're encouraged to

(14:54):
be very anti communist in Orange County, that that community,
because that's the southern Vietnamese to Aspera. And then uh,
you know, people in Vietnam saw him as as still
kind of like this this compromised person who lives in
the US. The Vietnamese to Aspera. So it's it's kind
of like, you know, no way to win there, and

(15:15):
I think there's a lot of residents with that in
the Hong Kong ASPMA as well. I kind of want
to move us along if I can to actually talking
about UM the five demands and sort of the process

(15:37):
by which first off like, how you know, and this
is a thing that like a lot of people who
marched in the streets during the Black Lives Matter protests
last year, the uprisings whatever you want to call them, um,
we kind of kept running into this wall of well
what do we what do we want? And a lot
of folks were like, well, we want no police. But
also a lot of folks were like, well we just
want to defund or right, and we just want to

(15:59):
reform the police. And even some of those folks were like,
we want to reform the police by giving them more
money and they'll hopefully kill less people. Like it was,
it was, um, you know, I'm trying to speak abroad here, right.
There were different local kind of movements and organizations that
were more specific, but you had this tremendous amount of
energy and precedent amount of energy out in the streets. Um,

(16:20):
but you did not have concerted demands. I think the
anchor was pretty concerned. I think everybody was more or
less pissed about the right things. But there was not
there was at no point did did we come together
I think in a meaningful way on a big enough
scale to to force to force into the mainstream of
very specific set of demands. Um. And that's not even

(16:43):
really a criticism, it's just an acknowledgement of the reality, right. Um.
Whereas in Hong Kong, I think one of the things
that was really successful was the messaging, the way that
kind of the messaging of the movement united around these
initially five demands, which I think was very successful. And
I'm kind of curious, first off, how did that come about.

(17:06):
It really did kind of take center stage very quickly,
I think, and I think some people maybe we're a
little bit surprised by that, but um, it did. I
think it. You know, it really kind of crystallized around
because you know, the big protests happened kind of like
June nine, um, and it was just like millions of
people on the street, and you know, the protests were

(17:30):
so singular in many ways, like it was the biggest
political mobilization in Hong Kong history. Um. And that had
been kind of just like been boiling for the past
like decade before that, And I think it was just
the atmosphere was was kind of like crystallized in the
sense that everyone like just everyone was scared of what

(17:51):
the CCP was going to do next. And I think
that created this kind of common understanding for people to
come together very quickly and easily around these uh, these
five demands. And you know, on June June twelfth was
when there was like the first really big escalation of
police brutality um, and people were kind of like, you know,

(18:14):
police kettled people inside buildings and then tear gas them,
which was just like the most outrageous thing. And you know,
a lot of Hong Kong's either were formerly not they
didn't really care much about politics, or they didn't really
care much about police violence because you know, that's been
going on for a very long time against marginalized people
in Hong Kong. But I think just the fact that

(18:34):
I happened to the certain set of protesters, um, non
violent protesters at that time, UM, that was one of
the really big kind of like breaking points. And then
on June fift there was there was a protester called
Marco Lung and he had set up on a scaffolding
at the top of like a really tall shopping mall
in this yellow rain code, and he had a banner

(18:56):
that had some of these demands on the banner. UM.
And then you know, eventually he fell off the scaffold
and died, and that was really kind of like, you know,
wake up call to a lot of people about how
dire people were feeling about this. So there was a
lot of emotion behind it that allowed people to come together,
um around these five demands, you know, so like full

(19:18):
withdrawal the bill, retraction of the characterization that the protests
were riots, anesty for for arrested protesters, establishment of you know,
some commission into police abuse, and then uh, Carrie Lamb resigning,
and universal suffrage. So it was it's a really interesting
set of five demands, and I think, I guess to

(19:39):
get to your question, I think it runs the gamut
between like very doable too not so doable, I guess, right, Like, uh,
the universal suffrage, when I think is like, you know,
that's there because that's been the demand from Hong Konger's
for like a very long time, at least a decade
before that. So but then you know, I think that

(20:00):
it's not. I don't think anyone I've really thought that
was going to happen. The government was never going to
concede to that. But uh, you know, the very first amount,
full with drawal, of the bill was very doable, and
it did end up happening very soon after the death
of Marko Lung Right, So, um, I don't know, I
don't know if that helps answer the question a little bit.
Is just like the five demands, Uh, we're we're very

(20:22):
pragmatic in some ways but then also aspirational in other ways,
and that that gave a lot of different people different
avenues to like come into it. And there was I
as I understand, there was like an app right, like,
can we talk a little bit more about like the
kind of methods by which I mean it was that
more forum actually voting on actions or was that one

(20:42):
of the ways in which demands were kind of arrived
at as well? Yeah, so there's it wasn't I mean,
it was telegram. A lot of people use telegrams, but um,
you know l I h k G, which is like
a really popular Internet forum. I guess kind of the
equivalent is something like reddit um. And you know, I

(21:04):
wouldn't say that they were kind of like the centralized
site for where like decisions were like made an issued
from there, but it was the kind of most active
site where people would go to discuss strategy tactics and
debate things. Um. And you know, this might get to
some later questions about like the role of the right
wing and all this, but I would say that the

(21:26):
overall character of the forum was slightly more you know,
right leaning, or at least they were sympathetic to that
to that position, right. So I think in that way, UM,
that might be how things eventually, like you know, a
year and a half later, started moving more towards the

(21:49):
right um through that forum. Yeah, but there was never like,
you know, there was never like, oh, okay, we're gonna
run a poll and then whatever the decision of this is,
that's going to side what we do tomorrow. Like, it
was never that formalized, um. And you know, it was
decentralized in the sense that people would discuss what would
be the best tactic and then you could just like

(22:12):
split off into like affinity groups and then you could
choose to follow that if you want the next day
or or or not right and a lot of times
it was like people would be making these decisions on
the fly the day of, at the front lines on
those telegram groups and stuff. And how was it that, Um,
I guess the question I'm trying to answer for myself

(22:32):
is like it seems like, you know, for a movement
that was in it, you know, it internally had a
lot of ideological diversity and a lot of disagreement. It
seems like there was more of a concerted agreement about
goals in Hong Kong UM than I've seen in anything,
you know, uh, state side in my life. And I'm
kind of wondering how that process of consensus or if

(22:56):
I or if I'm even kind of approaching it from
the wrong perspective by thinking that there was that white
a consensus. Maybe that's something that just reached out internationally.
I guess. I mean, I can talk a little bit
about kind of like what decentralization meant in Hong Kong
and the wider context of like the political culture there,
because like I was saying, like the protests in twenty

(23:17):
nineteen were really singular in the sunset like um, it
was like a really big cultural shift from previous political
events in Hong Kong. So like occupied, the Occupied Central
Movement inteen that morphed into the Umbrella movement UM was
this kind of like Sunday nine day occupation of like
different parts of the city. But like most notably the
central banking areas. And it was it was like very

(23:40):
much led by student protests groups, you know, like Joshua
Wong and all the all the other people that you
would have heard of, um. And then also these kind
of like old guard political parties, and they were the
ones kind of literally on a stage kind of like issuing, Okay,
this is what we should all do. But we've we've
come to our analysis and these are the best decisions.

(24:00):
And you know, the the Umbrella Movement was, you know,
from one perspective, from from just kind of the pragmatic
perspective of like achieving its goals. Like it just a
complete failure, right. It was just seventy nine days occupation
and they were just like swept away by the police.
And but you know, I think that the consciousness of
what happened, which was just like we're gonna sit here

(24:21):
and then we're gonna have leaders tell us what to do.
I think that really kind of affected people when the
Umbrella Movement collapsed. And you know, in in that five
years afterwards, as the CCP was kind of like ramping
up its repression. UM, that's what was kind of like
the light switch for people was like, we can't replicate

(24:42):
this kind of like follow the leaders style thing anymore. Um.
And you know the movements before that too was like
the occupied There was an occupied Central in twelve as well,
you know, obviously to coincide with Global occupy. That was
also this kind of like we're all just going to
camp out here at the plaza beneath hsp SEE headquarters,
and um, there was there was kind of like the

(25:04):
Occupy Wall Street type of like trying to build consensus
and decision making there. Um. But I think it was
so it was like so hemmed in based on the
act of occupation. Um. That that's why you know, people
also learned from that that just you know, camping out

(25:24):
is not really going to do anything in the Hong
Kong context. Um. And then that's where all this kind
of like decentralization be water and the fluidity and all
that stuff. That's where that sprang out of. So so
I guess if I'm understanding this right, the demands kind
of had been like floating around and then you have

(25:46):
the sort of political conscious as you have all of
this stuff anger crystallizing. And then is it accurate to
say that when Marcael young fell from the building, like
holding the signs like that. That's how it's sort of
like became officialized, like the sort of the rage around
that like crystallize it into a thing. They were issued.
I mean, the demands like existed before that, but I

(26:07):
think the when Marco died, that's when like that gave
a lot of people who were either kind of like um,
either apathetic or they like didn't really agree or you know,
they saw no way to like kind of participate in
what became just kind of like it was just like
every you know, eventually everyone had an avenue into this,

(26:29):
into the movement. UM. I think that's what crystallized that, right,
and it made the demands accessible to everyone. So I
guess I guess the question is just like where did
they come from? Like who actually like rope them? Yeah? Yeah,
I mean that would have taken place on the on
l I h KG right, And as far as I know,

(26:50):
no one, there's no like authorship or ownership over them. UM.
People are anonymous on that forum, right, So in that way,
it's like somewhat like four Chad like UM. And yeah,
I mean there was definitely voting on all h KG
UM and I would assume at some point that happened

(27:13):
to bring the five demands together. So there's another thing
I think that that watching it from the outside was
really interesting about the protest that like very much did
that does not happen in the US. Which was the

(27:33):
way that the sort of more militant factions who are
willing to fight the police for like main developed and
maintained like a working relationship with the not the very
nonviolent factions. And it might understanding it was to sort
of solidifies after the storm of the Legislative Council. Um,
could you talk about that a bit more and like

(27:55):
is that actually like is that what happened? And how
how did that actually happen? Because that seems like a
very important moment. It just hasn't happened in the US. Yeah,
I think it's I mean, the way that that happened,
I think was just so um like there were so
many factors, um, that enabled that to happen. Because yeah,

(28:17):
for the longest time, like in those previous movements, especially
the Umbrella um, the Umbrella movement, and then in SI
there was something called the Fishball riots, which was like, um,
you know, police were police and government officials were trying
to like clear out street vendors because of like licensing
issues or whatever. And then you know, just a whole
bunch of kind of like radical folks. They're kind of

(28:38):
like independence leaning uh folks, politicians and stuff. Um, you know,
kind of flat back on that, and it became violent.
And you know, that was that was when the one
of the protest luminaries, Edward Luang was was he came
up with that that that kind of slogan, the free
Hong Kong Revolution of our time slogan. That's when he

(28:59):
was in prison and after that the fish Ball riots.
But um, so there had been this kind of like
push and pull or like tension between the moderates and
the um violent militant factions for quite some time. And
so I think a lot of people saw the Umbrella
movement and it's it's kind of non success as being
attributed to the moderates, right, and so there was I

(29:22):
think there was a general mood that things had to change. Um.
But then I think the fact that I would say
again the overarching thing that enabled people to come together
was this kind of everything has to be against like
we we had to put everything we have against the CCP. Right, So, um,
there was a lot of kind of like power struggle

(29:45):
and like um divisiveness uh during the Umbrella movement of
people trying to like um, have their view you know,
their political analysis or their strategies and tactics take precedence,
and a lot of people saw that as just kind
of like pointless squabbling or like divisiveness that the government
was able to use to like um, you know, defeat

(30:08):
the movement. Right. So I think all those things informed
what was having there. And then there were two kind
of like overriding philosophies in the movement. So one was
like the idea of like having no big stage, that's
what it was called, and so that was like not
taking any uh, not having protest leaders, not having people
make the decisions up top. And the second thing was

(30:30):
this idiom like called brothers climbing the mountain um, which
basically means like we're all climbing the same mountain of
trying to defeat the CCP. It doesn't matter how we're
doing it. So there was this really kind of like, uh,
the question of method uh and means was really kind
of put into the backseat. It was all just kind

(30:51):
of about the end goal UM. And you know, there
was that kind of related idiom of like not cutting Matt,
which means like even if you have different and those
with folks in terms of like how you choose to
go about contributing to the movement, uh, you never severed
ties with people over this, and so those are the
two kind of overwriting philosophies in the movement. And I

(31:12):
think it was definitely very helpful in in keeping this
kind of like movement unity, but it definitely had its
drawbacks eventually in terms of like decentralization. I can talk
more about that later or I can talk about it now.
I don't know. Yeah, no, sorry, I was yeah, I'm
I'm I would like that. So, you know, in terms

(31:33):
of decentralization, I think it was it was just kind
of like in the right place at the right time
for for Hong Kongers. I think, you know, they were
very fed up with with all the ways that things
had gone before, and so a lot of people were
more open to trying this out. And I think the
fact that you know, there was a lot of fear
around surveillance UM and and whatnot at the time in

(31:56):
Hong Kong, and obviously it's gotten much worse, but you know,
so everyone there was never really the kind of that
overriding fear in the umbrella movement or the occupy movements
of like having to stay anonymous or whatever, Whereas here,
I guess the fact that it just went hand in
hand with UM taking more militant actions that a lot
of people kind of. I think the really interesting part

(32:18):
is is so much of the what happened in decentralized
decentralizing UM, you know, the political culture in Hong Kong
was that it adopted a lot of leftist tactics UM
you know, obviously like black block and stuff without you know,
I think the word leftism or leftist in Hong Kong
is like it's like you don't touch it, right because

(32:40):
it's there's no way to dissociate it from from the
CCP and Hong Kong's minds, which is it's very topsy turvy, right,
because there's nothing leftist about the CCP as it stands
right now. But it's it's very hard to convince folks
there of that. And so it's very interesting the way
that people were able to adopt like the tactic and

(33:00):
strategies without any of the ideological underpinnings to it. UM.
And so you know, the no big stage and the
brothers Climbing Mountain um. That eventually became a way to
shut down dissent, right because any time people wanted to
have like principal debate, principled debate or two talk strategy

(33:23):
or to question the way things were going, then that
you know, that philosophy would be kind of trotted out
and you would be you could be accused of like
undermining movement unity and whatnot. And you know, I think
people were so fearful of either being accused of that
or of or or of causing that, right, Like, I

(33:45):
don't think anyone wanted the movement to fragment, right, but um,
people were so averse to doing that, that those two
philosophies really became a way to silence UM any other
thing other than what is dominant in the movement. And
that eventually became you know, the exclusionary, xenophobic like pro

(34:06):
Trump thing, you know, in the tail end of after
COVID and a lot of stuff. So that's how I
see it going down. Yeah, yeah, and it is this, UM,
I think there's this problem. You saw versions of it
in Ukraine too, where As the as a movement kind
of predicated on confronting the government goes on and as

(34:30):
the clashes get more violent, kind of the right wing
UM picks up influence because those kind of folks tend
to be more prepared for the for the fighting. Yeah, exactly.
And I mean there's never been any kind of like,
I don't know, there there's no kind of conclusiveness about
the ideology of the front liners, like the more militant

(34:54):
folks UM, but I think there's there's kind of a
general sense that a lot of the front liners were
UM a little bit more if not right wing, then
they were more sympathetic to the to that right because
if they were fired up enough to like, you know,

(35:14):
do that kind of street fighting, then likely their their
view of China is like, you know, along the more
kind of xenophobic and uh nativist wavelength. One of the
struggles I think is that um, you know, for the
kind of for the goals as they were kind of
hallucidated of the Hong Kong movement, that could have worked,

(35:36):
but it also like you know that that would have
eventually provided a problem when it came to the whole
figuring out what to do next? Thing? Right, Like, there's
only there's there's kind of a limited extent to which
those tendencies can potentially coexist. Um, And it is one
of those things you have to think about, like if
you happen to get a broad movement, you know what.

(35:58):
Like again looking at Ukraine, Um, there there's been this
kind of very awkward compromise with the far right, which
is a minority party, but like that compromise has led
to some very ugly things happening over there, including like
the arming of a kind of a militant neo Nazi movement,
which is like yeah, and I don't know, like when

(36:18):
you're there in the moment and you're just trying to
deal with the state, Um, I don't know how you
entirely avoid that, right because you need frontliners and if
some of those folks believe fucked up ship but they're
going up against the cops, like, what are you going
to do? Exactly? And I mean, I guess it's I
don't think it's any small coincidence that you know, those
those kind of like fascist Ukrainian people showed up at

(36:42):
the Hong Kong protests, right, Um, And you know, I
think a lot of the front liners who like took
photos with them and stuff, had no idea who the
hell they were, right, They're just like hey, Like I
think that the overriding sentiment was like anyone who's who's
going to like show us support? Is that's good for
us because we want this a global visibility to put
pressure on China. That was just how basic it was

(37:05):
and very understandable. And you know, so obviously those images
were trotted out all over uh you know, Twitter and
stuff to show Okay, well Hong kongers or fascist and
and whatnot. But yeah, I think it's it's much more complex,
Like you were saying, it's just like when when you're there,
what do you do. It's like, you're not gonna stop
front liners while they're fighting the cops to like have
principal debate, right, And at some point it's just like,

(37:28):
when is that going to happen? And I think the
l I h KG as a as an internet forum,
I think, um, in some ways it could make that
very possible, but in other ways, I think it makes
it much more difficult, right, because you're you're having these
discussions with anonymous people who don't you know, Obviously, if
you're anonymous on a forum, it it kind of like

(37:48):
gets rid of so many uh boundaries of like accountability
and um, how you would treat each other with respect
in a debate about your shared goals and of right. So,
you know, I think decentralization was very important to Hong
Kong in that moment. But I think the right wing folks,

(38:11):
you know, who are a very small minority, I think
they were able to instrumentalize those two philosophies very well
and manipulated very well to like position themselves as like
the true inheritors of the movement by you know, forcing
through this idea that they were the ones that were
protecting these kind of like secret principles of like unity

(38:33):
movement unity and no splitting and and all that stuff, right.
And you know, I think what I've heard from from
leftist folks over there is that, you know, obviously the
left is very marginalized in Hong Kong, but what I've
heard from leftist folks is that just like no one
had the means, either the means or the heart to

(38:53):
fight back against that, because I think the conditions just
weren't right. You know, the people were living in such
like everyone felt like they were steeped in this daily
kind of like extremity, that everything was just like crisis mode. UM,
and to ask people to slow down or to like
take non extreme measures became extremely difficult. UM. And I

(39:17):
can totally understand that. Yeah, I mean that's something UM.
I mean, that's something we've seen in Portland to just
this UM. Not with the right wing so much, because
there's obviously has never been really any collaboration between right
and left in the but but with this kind of UM.
If what you're suggesting isn't more extreme than what's been
done before, UM, then why would we listen to it?

(39:39):
You know, this UM, which is I think a product
of trauma as much as anything else. And I don't
know like that I think is one of the things
you have to solve if you're actually going to like win, UM,
which obviously you know, winning is a separate matter altogether,
like we've got. I think there's a lot of lessons
in what happened in Hong Kong, UM. And one of

(40:02):
those lessons is that it's pretty easy for the state
to win. Yeah. And I forgot to mention this before
we were talking about the five demands. But I guess,
just just to jump back really quickly, I mean, there
was that there was a sixth demand, right, and um,
you know that that cropped up around October two one,
like a cop shot a teenager with the live round

(40:23):
and you know, the cropped up for obvious reasons because
of that um in in protest chance all over the place.
But that never crystallized into like a quote unquote official thing,
right because I think there was still that kind of
barrier to the idea of police abolish and uh for
a lot of folks, I guess, and because it's the

(40:44):
it's the first time, you know, this is the only
or I guess this is the time in Hong Kong
where the most people have had the most anti police
sentiment in its history. Right Yeah, Um, like people kind
of like disapprove of, you know, how the police conducted
themselves or whatever during the protests. So, um, it's I

(41:05):
think it's a start. I think it's a good place
for to like plant the seeds of abolition. But I
think that that kind of shows the dynamics of like
what became official and then what became what couldn't become
official in terms of those demands. Um, and I you know,
because I'm I'm assuming on l I h KG. It's

(41:26):
like a closed forum, so you can't you can't join
and discuss if you don't have like a university address
or whatever. So that's why I wasn't on there Hong
Kong University address. Um. There was tons of debate there
about you know, this idea of police abolition, but I
think it eventually. Also, this is kind of a similar
thing between the abolished the police or defund the police

(41:47):
debate here, which is like a lot of people saw
the sixth demand as reform, like we should just like
fire every single cop and then rehire like the entire force, right,
and they thought we just need to clean house. That's
like the bad Apples thing, right, And then other people
saw that as more like we need to actually confront

(42:09):
the practice of policing, practice and concept of policing. So, um,
I guess because there was that divisiveness over what abolition means,
abolition or reform, then yeah, that's why it never took
root as something official. I guess. There is one thing,

(42:37):
which is that you know, we saw some of this
like spread to the US. But the way that I
guess could you talk a bit about how this sort
of like the how the like street fighting tactics spread
because I know, I mean but both both how they
developed inside the movement then, you know, because after that,

(42:59):
I mean, I remember there are these protests Indonesia in
twenty nineteen, and like those people were also you know,
they were doing the like water stuff and that formulas
or to spread really quickly. But I'm exciting and I
know also that like there there I saw some of
these like they had these like really detailed infographics on
like like you know, this is this is how you

(43:21):
form people on a line. This is everyone's roles, is
what equipment you need? So how did that stuff like
appear And was it just spreading a telegram or yeah?
I think, um, And I think that's one of the
ways I guess this kind of connects actually to the
very first question was, which is like how do we
confront or like try and deal with this the campus,

(43:43):
which is like one of the ways we tried to
approach it through lou Song was just kind of like
this exchange of tactics actually is something that we can
share transnationally. Um, because obviously states are collaborating in terms
of exchanging strategies and weapons and ammunitions and a lot
of stuff. So we should be kind of collaborating in
the same way. And I think that's something that Hong

(44:03):
Kong had to offer the world, um, in terms of
how that actually happened. Um, it's kind of interesting, right
because I was saying earlier how I feel like a
lot of the protesters adopted black block without adopting any
of the ideology. Um. And then maybe it was I
think that's seeing that similarity for a lot of folks online,
Like I think it was, it was all like viral videos, right, Um,

(44:23):
that people would just encounter on their timelines without any
real context of like what the hell was happening in
Hong Kong. Uh. You know, seeing seeing like clearly young
young kids like putting out tear gas canisters with pylons
and water and stuff is just like that's something immediately
that you learned within thirty seconds that you don't have

(44:44):
to like I don't agree with their aims or I
don't agree with any of that. And um, you know,
using the umbrellas to block out security cameras and and
all that, and and tear gas and stuff is just
like these things are so portable visually, and like we
were saying before in terms of infographics, where there's drawbacks
to that, I think it's like the thirty second clip
on like TikTok or or Twitter or whatever happens to be.

(45:06):
It's like that is the flip side of how social
media is actually fucking amazing, right, because it's just like
you're getting this instant kind of political education and also
like street fighting education. Um, just like that and without
without actually seeking it out, right, because I think that's
the key part. Um. People who might be predisposed to

(45:27):
being against what Hong Kong is trying to do or
what they stand for, and that type of thing, um,
you know, Falselier or otherwise, UM might just that that
might just like be retweeted onto their timeline. And I
think that's that's the kind of beautiful thing about Twitter
that I really love. UM. And I'm pretty sure that's
how it spread. I don't you know. Laosan tried to

(45:50):
put on these these formal exchanges where we would talk
more about that, UM, but I'm pretty sure that at
all it was mostly all just viral. Yeah. Yeah, even
mainstream media was picking up stuff up and show sharing
those videos because they want the clicks and they want them. Yeah,
I think they're really hitting on something there with the
spread of visual information, because that's that's something we definitely

(46:13):
saw last year in the States is a lot of
people who were newer to protesting picking up on the
visual cues that they saw from Hong Kong coverage and
trying to replicate it um And for a lot of
the time it didn't actually work out that well. Like
like remember like the first few weeks in Portland, we

(46:33):
would see people like carrying around pylons but not knowing
no what, not really knowing what to do with them,
just because they saw people do this before online. And
then after a while we started to see them slowly
figure out how to actually extinguish tear gas canisters loafing
with like leafblowers and stuff. We see it like they
first used the rhetoric, they first used kind of the aesthetics,
and then slowly they learned the actual practical skills um.

(46:57):
Because you can't just learn something by watching, you have
to also kind of do it. I mean it's it's
it's trickier. You sometimes can, but you generally kind of
have to practice skill as well. We saw that a
lot and one thing that people never really learned how
to do well, but they kept the rhetoric of it
is the whole like b water thing. That's something that

(47:18):
no one really figured out, at least here in Portland.
It was like it would get chanted a lot, people
would say it, but like it didn't actually do You
weren't actually doing anything. Um. And I think that it's
kind of like that. It's kind of the flip side
of having something so reliant on like info graphics and
just like viral footage, is that you'll think you're prepared

(47:39):
for something because you've seen it, and then when you're
actually doing the thing, you're like, oh, this is actually
a very different than sitting in my bed scrolling through Twitter.
Of this is like it's a whole it's a whole
different thing. Um. But still it's it's still like incredibly useful.
Right to have to have that base knowledge in the
first place, is it's very useful, but you have to remember,
like you you can't just think that you can watch

(48:00):
it and then go do it immediately. And I was wondering,
like from from your perspective, when you saw stuff happening
in the States last year, and we saw a lot
of you know, like a lot of like aesthetic mirrors
of the Hong Kong protests. Were there anything, Was there
anything that you think people really succeeded in or was
there stuff that you think people kind of tried to

(48:21):
replicate but kind of failed at. I mean, that's a
really good point, and I think that kind of gets
to what Chris was asking as well, in terms of
just like I feel like there had to be also
the strategic exchange to match the visual exchange in terms
of just like actually knowing how to get into formation
because it's just like, um, yeah, like the with the

(48:43):
putting up the tear gas, with the pylons, it's just
like you actually had to have like three or four
dedicated people, like one person to hold a pilot, one
person to have the water, one person to like you know,
all these different things that really do need to be coordinated,
and then also, like you said, practiced before you get
it right, and um, I don't know. I mean there

(49:06):
I think just so many of the tactics, like you know,
stopping tear gas with umbrellas is not super effective, right,
because it's just like First of all, the rounds are
extremely you know, they move very fast and they're very hot.
And then there it's also not going to actually shield
very much from you, right. So, um, I think visually
it was very striking and it it's very helpful in

(49:27):
terms of surveillance. Um. But that was something that happened
in Hong Kong and also happened over here that I
saw that I was just like, um, that's not super useful. Um.
But I think I have been encouraging people to to
bring those out more still, umbrellas and stuff, because I've

(49:47):
heard in Toronto at least that the cops are like
using surveillance drones. Yeah, umbrellas are great against cameras, and
they do have a lot of advantages compared to hard
shields in a lot of situations, but of course when
you're facing like heavy munition fire, then they're they're not
as useful. Yeah. And I saw, you know, like I
saw a lot of inventiveness with the heavier shields in

(50:08):
Hong Kong in terms of like using plastic barricades. But
then you know that was that that's not super portable, right,
So then I saw a lot of people making them
out of like those floating you know, those things that
helps you float and swim because they're super light, but
then they also reflect chair gats very well, the canisters. So, um,
I didn't see so much of that in the US.

(50:31):
I saw people use more like big wooden boards and
like you know, uh street signs and stuff like that,
and um so that was maybe that's just a difference
in terms of like what material is available to you
and stuff. But um, I think the emphasis on mobility
was a lot more in Hong Kong rather than the US,
where it was just like the actual emphasis was on

(50:54):
luring police to a location and then being able to
quickly run away so that they're stretched so thin, right,
Like that was that was a water touch. But yeah,
that the States did not do that at all. You know, well,
I I would say, like, okay, I don't think the
people who like said be water did that at all.
But like I remember, like in the beginning in Chicago,
before anyone was coordinating anything, it was just a bunch

(51:15):
of people running around like that actually did happen, Like
like that was, yeah, the police like in Chicago collapse
and the reason they collapse was that there's like you know,
there's just six hundred people just on every street corner.
There were absolutely fu cities where that did happen, and um,
but generally from my experience of at least on parts

(51:35):
of the West Coast, there was a lot of a lot,
a lot of chanting about the water while you stand
in front of a police station for six hours. And
there were definitely actions where people did that, you know,
and would would go and and and you know, get
away with some mischief because they were willing to move
quickly and not stick around. But yeah, there was a
lot of chanting be water while repeatedly heading back to

(51:58):
the same police station. Um. You know, I wonder about that,
like because because it seems like once this it seemed
like like once you were in because at the very
early stages in the US, like my impression of it was,
it was just like it caught everyone off guard and
it was just a bunch of rent and people and
it's like they seemed so just like do it. Maybe

(52:18):
maybe just by the fact that they were very coordinated
and so it was it was just centralized, just sort
of just by the nature of the fact that it
was just a bunch of red and people. But then
when you started getting these sort of like you had.
We had another phase in Chicago that was it was
like it worked really well, but it was there's there's

(52:39):
like a bunch of anti statute protests and it was
like the anti statue people would they were just like
surround like a statue and they would just throw things
at it. And that was very much more similar to Portland.
I guess, so I don't know. Part of me is
wondering whether it was like there's something about the organizational
structure that in the States where that were people that

(53:02):
that like heavily favors getting a bunch of people to
go to one place and sitting there in a way
that didn't happen in Hong Kong. I think it was
that you there was a certain point in the protests
in a number of US cities where you still had
intense interest in people being out in the streets, but
you hadn't had Number One, there wasn't necessarily a concerted,

(53:23):
agreed upon list of demands, but also there wasn't a
clear understanding of how to achieve them, Like you know,
in Portland, there was a point where the hardcore folks,
the folks showing up every night pretty much we're all
in agreement that like, yeah, we don't want any more cops.
But there was also not a white agreement. I'm like, well,
how do we what's the path to that? Is? It?
Is it showing up and trying to make their lives

(53:44):
miserable every night? Like? Is it? There was kind of
a there was a there was a point at which
their motivation to be on the streets was there, but
the understanding of like how to achieve the goals was not,
and so folks were, um. You would see kind of
the same thing being done a few times without without

(54:05):
it necessarily making making progress, and eventually, you know, people
didn't move on. But it was this this thing of like,
I think what you need if you're going to actually
forced through significant changes is um a continually evolving understanding
of your goals and methods UM. And that's it's a

(54:26):
really hard like I'm saying, this is what's necessary, I
have no idea how to do that when you've got
this very decentralized, large group of people out in the streets,
you don't have you know, leaders or a central organization.
In fact, having those things is going to endanger people
in the movement because that stuff always gets infiltrated, you know,
or or winds up to be in some other way problematic.
So it's kind of I'm acknowledging this as a problem,

(54:48):
and I don't want that to be like I'm pointing
at like activists in Portland or activists and wherever and saying,
you dummies didn't figure that. No one's figured it out.
We don't know like nobody knows how to do this
yet because it hasn't been done. Um, but that's clearly
where I think you can see. That's where the problem
is is that you you get these situations where there's motivation,
people are willing to be out in the streets, but

(55:08):
there's also not outside of being angry and in the streets,
there's not necessarily clear understanding of like, well, how okay,
how do we what what are we trying to achieve specifically?
And how were we achieving it? Like how are we
furthering that Golden Night? Yeah? Well I'm not sure if
I mean, because eventually, you know, street fighting I don't

(55:29):
not really like lost its luster, but people were just
kind of like what is this doing in Hong Kong
as well, And um, it's you know, eventually it stopped
because all the all the kids were doing it were
like traumatized or bodily you know, exhaustion or mental exhaustion
and all those different things where they were all arrested. Right,
so you know, there's it just kind of petered out

(55:49):
like that. And I think the problem was that, you know,
it was very anti CCP for for most of it,
but then I think eventually it became just so anti
police that um it. I think a lot of people
kind of eventually lost sight of what yeah, like you're
saying the goal was, or what what's the best way
to achieve what we want? And if it was just

(56:11):
continually attacking the police on the street, then it wasn't
going to accomplish that what I mean, No, no, no, yeah, yeah.
And I don't want any of this to come as
like criticisms. It's more just like a well this, this
didn't do it, you know, like they're still cops, right,
like if that's if that is the goal and for
some people, right for the broader tens of millions of
Americans in the streets, there was never that kind of

(56:33):
a consensus. It was much more muddled, but the dedicated activists,
there was a consensus, but it also didn't it ain't
done yet, So I think there is like there's a
continuing question everybody needs to be asking themselves, just like, well,
how do we get from A to B, you know,
um or A to Z as the case maybe? Is
there is there any uma places that people can go

(56:54):
to learn more about this type of stuff online or
any any like resources that you you would like to share. Yeah,
I mean, of course, uh, you know, plug loss on
in terms of our website, you can go to las
h K and then all of our social media stuff
like that. UM, I don't know. Yeah, if folks are
more interested in We're trying to put together a uh

(57:16):
kind of non status anti militarist coalition soon UM, and
our first event is going to be hopefully in a
month or so UM to try and provide some solutions
to um what we see as kind of like anti
war activism that is, like it's just about kind of
marching from from A to B and then holding PSL

(57:38):
signs and answer coalition signs and stuff like that. So
I guess I'll just pre plug that for now and
keep an eye on that. Great. Yeah, and thank you
so much, for coming on and talking with us. Yes,
thank you, Yeah, thanks for the invite. Happy to be
this has been it could happen here talking about a
place where it did in fact happen and then yeah

(58:02):
it did, it didn't happen enough. Yeah, and it didn't
happen enough here either, And a lot of questions in common,
Like I hope nobody thinks when we say, like we're
going to talk about how to you know, potentially come
to agreements about a list of demands and even general
strike that we're saying like here's the solution to this.
Um I I've said a couple of times. I think

(58:24):
the problem confronting as getting a mass movement to agree
on a list of demands and then take mass concerted
action to force them, like is a is a a
cultural task, probably exceeding in difficulty the moon landing. Um
So no, like we're not we're not coming here trying
to say like here, but like here's what everyone needs

(58:46):
to do. It's more of like, well, this is a
question we all need to be asking ourselves, and I
think our role in that is to be asking that
question of some people who have spent a lot of
time trying to practically ask that question another part of
the world and learning what we can from that example,
because we don't have a tremendous amount of time, so

(59:08):
we should probably be studying. Yeah. You can find us
on Twitter at Happened Here pod and cool Zone Media.
You can listen to other episodes of it Could Happen
Here um five days a week, Monday through Friday on
this feed and other podcasts. You know where to find
them behind the Bastards source you're ever that kind of stuff.

(59:29):
Thank you for listening. We will We will be back
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a production of cool Zone Media. For more podcasts from
cool Zone Media, visit our website cool zone media dot com,

(59:52):
or check us out on the I Heart Radio app,
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