July 16, 2025 • 35 mins
It's Lincoln's party and he'll cry if he wants to. We trace the evolution of America's major political parties to understand how they've changed since Honest Abe was the Republican standard-bearer. And if he were running for election in 2028, which party would he belong to?
GUEST: Julian Zelizer, New York Times best-selling author and Professor of History and Public Affairs at Princeton University. He publishes a Substack newsletter called The Long View. Check out his book: In Defense of Partisanship.
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Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:03):
You've reached American History Hotline. You asked the question, we
get the answers, leave a methode. Hey, there are American
History Hotliners. Your host, Bob Crawford here, happy to be
joining you again for another episode of American History Hotline.
You're the ones with the questions. I'm a guy trying
to get you some answers. The best way to get
(00:25):
us a question is to record a video or a
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Hotline at gmail dot com. That's Americanhistoryhotline at gmail dot com.
And remember we are the American History Hotline. If you're
thinking about the Roman Empire, you're on the wrong continent
(00:45):
and in the wrong era. Okay, now to today's question,
and it's one we've gotten from a few people.
Speaker 2 (00:52):
Hi there, my name is Adam from Maryland. I teach
eighth grade American history. This is a Lane from Washington, DC.
I get this question from a students a lot. Which
party would Lincoln most identify with today? How does Lincoln's
radical Republican Party of the eighteen sixties become the conservative
Republican party that we see today?
Speaker 1 (01:13):
Thanks Elaine and Adam. I love this question. Here to
help me answer it is Julian Zelzer. He's a professor
of history and public affairs at Princeton University and a
New York Times best selling author. His newest book is
titled In Defense of Partisanship, and please check out his
sub stack, The Longview. Julian, thanks for joining me today.
Speaker 3 (01:37):
Thanks for having me.
Speaker 1 (01:39):
Okay, so first off, let's do a little primer on
party politics. I know this is a tricky question to
answer right now in particular, but pretend I've just derived
from outer space and I'm trying to understand our two
main political parties. What are the major ideological differences?
Speaker 3 (02:00):
Think the Republican Party in our era is a party
that's anti government. It's a party that has become quite
resistant to many social justice initiatives, and it's a party
that increasingly is skeptical of international alliances and commitments. Whereas
Democrats remain a party of government. They believe government is
(02:23):
fundamental to solving many problems. The Democratic Party still is
more committed to traditional postwar TiO international alliances. And finally,
the Democratic Party, for all the divisions and hesitations, is
still on board with the social revolution of the nineteen sixties,
the civil rights Revolution, the feminist revolution, the immigration revolution,
(02:48):
and even again with some more skepticism that has emerged,
represents those values in party politics.
Speaker 1 (02:57):
When I first saw this question, the first thing that
popped into my head was not Abraham Lincoln. It was
Richard Nixon. And I'm thinking, Okay, when did the parties
kind of change clothes, if you want to put it
that way in our recent era, And that was Nixon's
Southern Strategy. From what you just said to me, they've
(03:20):
changed clothes again in some ways. So first explain what
that was and why that's important to this conversation today,
and then talk about the new wardrobe that today's Republican Party,
which you just outlined in some ways, has put on.
Speaker 3 (03:39):
Yeah, I mean, I think the big change does come
in the late sixties and early seventies. The Southern Strategy
was basically the idea that more Republicans and conservatives start
having they It starts actually in the early fifties, but
the idea is that Republicans can form an alliance with
Southern Democrats who were conservative, particularly on race relations, also
(04:04):
on unions. They opposed unions, and Republicans started to see
that that was a fruitful alliance, either a bipartisan alliance
or ultimately a way to take over the electorate of
the South by winning over Southern Democrats who no longer
liked their party. So this is the Southern strategy. As
Democrats become more favorable to civil rights, as Democrats become
(04:29):
more aligned with unions, the Southern Republicans would emerge and
become something which they had never been a serious force
in Southern politics. And Richard Nixon, more than any other
president and candidate in nineteen sixty eight, seize the potential
of this because he is running and then governing after
(04:50):
the Civil Rights Act of sixty four, the Voting Rights
Act of sixty five had caused many Southern Democrats to
be quite upset with the direction of their party. So
he makes a play for the South. He talks about
issues like states' rights, he talks about the limits of government.
He doesn't talk explicitly about race, but that is underlying
(05:12):
some of the appeal. And that's when the Southern strategy
really accelerates in a way that we hadn't seen in
presidential politics. The last thing I'd say is in Congress,
this Southern strategy had been around really since the late thirties,
when there was a coalition of Southern Democratic committee chairs
and Republicans who had worked through the committee system since
(05:33):
nineteen thirty eight to block liberalism at every turn. But
the Southern strategy really refers to this presidential campaign idea,
and ultimately the goal is for Republicans to make the
South a red area in our modern parlance of color schemes.
Speaker 1 (05:50):
So that is social policy, cultural policy. But when I
think of the Republican Party today, I think of America first.
I think of a foreign policy that is looking inward right.
And and also Nixon wasn't he a new deal Maybe
(06:11):
some say he's the last new deal president? Right, osha Epa,
all these all these bureaucratic institutions, you know, he supported
those and he instituted many of those. So how does
the party get from even Nixon to So that's a
whole nother shift.
Speaker 3 (06:32):
Right, Yeah, I mean there's two issues. On the latter point,
he was conservative, and you have to remember he had
a Democratic Congress, a strong Democratic Congress, that's all Congress
had been since the fifties, and so he doesn't have
a lot of leeway, a lot of these ideas like
the EPA are really coming from Democrats on the hill
and liberal Republicans who are still a thing at the time,
(06:55):
and he often doesn't have a choice. So he was conservative,
but it's all relative conservative for mainstream Republicans. In the
late sixties and early seventies, men still accepting that government
was going to have a big role in American life
and working with Democrats to often start and implement new programs,
(07:16):
and that's much different than where we are today. So
I think part of it isn't that he wasn't a conservative,
but the conservatism domestically becomes much more radical, much more
right ward over the next few decades. On foreign policy,
that's a huge shift that's more recent in the nineteen
seventies when you talked about the new conservative movement, people
(07:37):
like Ronald Reagan who are coming onto the scene as
national figures. One of their central arguments was we had
to be very muscular overseas, that the United States had
to work with allies and on its own to assert
itself against the Soviet Union and China, and their idea
of withdrawing was what they criticized Demorcrats for doing after
(08:01):
Vietnam that was the argument. Reagan was even critical of
Nixon and gerald Ford because they practiced something called the
policy of detent, which was easing relations with the Soviets
through negotiations over arms agreement, and Reagan even thought that
was bad. So the Meerica First Wing was always in
(08:22):
the Republican coalition, but it's really only in the last
you know, since nine to eleven, since the war in Iraq,
where it's become the dominant mode of Republican thinking.
Speaker 1 (08:33):
All right, as promised, let's get to Abraham Lincoln and
his Republican Party. What were the major ideological stances and
where were most of the Republican voters in eighteen fifty
six eighteen sixty.
Speaker 3 (08:47):
I mean, it's complicated in that we don't want to
say Abraham Lincoln was perfect. He was hesitant and too slow,
many argue on the issue of slavery. He gets there,
but it a little while. But clearly what he represented
by the end of his presidency, by his death and
in that era was a party a committed to union,
(09:10):
be ultimately committed to the abolition of slavery. C. And
this is post Lincoln, but it's still the Party of Lincoln.
Committed to reconstruction at some level, meaning a new union
that not only did not have slavery, but had some
kind of policies to help the freed black population and
(09:32):
to create a more just society. That was the Party
of Lincoln. That's why I went. Many black Americans for
decades would remain loyal to the GOP and never consider
voting for Democrats, who represented the Party of the South.
And that's the final part. The Party of Lincoln was
a northern party. It represented the non South. Because of
(09:55):
how it was formed and because of its role in
the Civil War.
Speaker 1 (10:00):
Eighteen fifty six election, a lot of people were afraid
to vote for the Republican Party because upending the status
quo by having a sectional party, it just seemed like
civil war would have come sooner. Many thoughts what about
the Democratic Party? You mentioned the Democratic Party of Lincoln's
time to talk about them and the complexities of that
(10:24):
Democratic Party.
Speaker 3 (10:25):
It was a parties back then had many different coalitions,
so it wasn't one thing. And you had Northern Democrats
who really, ultimately really later in the nineteenth century would
appeal to immigrants, and in a city like New York,
Democrat didn't mean Dixiecrat a Democrat meant machine a Democrat
(10:47):
and focusing on these new arrivals and power within the cities.
But for I think a lot of the country, what
Democrats meant in the wake of the Civil War was
a party that was not committed to union, a party
that was tied to the slave economy, and ultimately a
party that would help pick apart reconstruction after Lincoln's death
(11:09):
and pressure Republicans in a number of instances, culminating in
eighteen seventy seven with dismantling. This vast program meant to
not only compensate but reconstruct American society after slavery in
the Civil War. So Democrats were very much for a
(11:30):
while a Southern party. Again. That would evolve and it
would change by the nineteen thirties, but that reputation was
strong and with good reason.
Speaker 1 (11:39):
This is American History Hotline. I'm your host Bob Crawford. Today,
my guest is Julian Zelzer. He's a New York Times
best selling author. His newest book is In Defense of Partisanship.
We're talking about the Democratic and Republican party realignment of
the mid twentieth century. What you just said parties evolve
(12:01):
and change, so it's not like I mean, well, it's
kind of it seems abrupt recently, I think of tariffs.
I think of Trump and tariffs, and that seems like
an abrupt switch for a major political party to make.
I mean, like a light switch switch.
Speaker 3 (12:20):
Yeah, I mean, I think that's a good point. And
there's different kinds of changes. I mean, I've been working
on I'm working on a sub stack I have now
called the long view, and it's constantly wrestling with that duality.
Meaning there are certain things that happen in American politics
which rightly are seen as dramatic and quick and an
(12:40):
issue like the tariff, where the Republicans have moved from
staunchly being a free trade party really through certainly George W. Bush,
where it was very marginal anyone who would think not
of one tariff but of an entire tariff regime to
where we are today. And part of that is Trump.
(13:01):
This is someone who has been obsessed with this and
now has the power after decades to put it into place.
But other parts, I think have been slow, kind of
a slow burn, and they've been taking place slowly. So
you can also look at Trump's departure from these international
alliances like NATO, and that's been building up over the decades.
(13:24):
I mean, even in the Reagan era, you see more
skepticism toward members of NATO, complaints they don't pay enough.
George W. Bush, who's the president during nine to eleven,
is willing to go his own way, even though he
does still want support from his allies. And you have
more voices within the GOP organizations and conservative groups who
are more critical of that. And so that's more it's
(13:47):
finally finding the president who will represent how the party
had been changing, rather than being nostalgic and trying to
do something. But with the tariffs, it I think it's
rightfully a pretty big shift, and it's not surprising. That's
one area you've seen more Republican private grumbling, but even
(14:07):
some public grumbling. Not only the economic effects, but this
is not what a lot of the party stands for.
Speaker 2 (14:14):
Well.
Speaker 1 (14:14):
I mean, many of these congressmen in the numbering in
the hundreds ran ads, free trade ads, you know, within
the past several cycles, and now they have to go
back to their constituents and say everything I believed pre
twenty twenty four is now has now changed.
Speaker 3 (14:33):
And it's like a NAFTA when that passed, which has
been the heart of the complaint for many people who
are supportive of the tariffs. That happens first under George H. W.
Bush or Republican He gets it underway and gets the
agreement in place. Then President Clinton is the president when
that gets ratified, but he works with Republicans in Congress.
(14:56):
Democrats are against it, but people like Mute Gingridge at
the time, they are the radicals in the group. They
are the ones who work with him, to the consternation
of many Democrats to get this agreement through because they
believe that free trade is a good thing without many restrictions.
So it is unbelievable to see the party and watch
(15:17):
the party as they wrestle with really a contradiction of
their own history.
Speaker 1 (15:22):
So what I'm getting from everything that you've said is
parties wrestle with these two forces. You have tradition and
then you have the changing times, right the moments. I
just I think of this country since nine to eleven,
or really since the two thousand election, and how dramatically
(15:43):
this first twenty five years of this century have been
so talk about that talk about the tradition of parties.
Because your book in Defensive Partisanship, you really that is
a for anybody who's listening today who wants to learn
more about the evolution and change of parties in Congress.
(16:05):
That is a roadmap for everything we're talking about.
Speaker 3 (16:09):
Yeah, I try to do that. And look, we are
in an age where people think what a party is
today is always what it's been. But these are our institutions, organizations,
they have a history of they own And while people
love to talk about third parties all the time, will
there be a new third party? I'm asked that constantly.
(16:29):
What's I think more interesting and more realistic is how
do parties change internally? And they can change in terms
of the coalition. So Democrats until the nineteen seventies and
eighties were really a party where the weight of the
leadership was in the South, and even as northern Liberals
became more influential, it was the southern Democrat who was
(16:50):
the face of the party. Fast forward to today, it's
hard to find many Southern Democrats. And when Democrats win
in a state like Georgia, it's a surprise as opposed
to a predicted outcome. Their ideologies change over time. I
think that's what we're talking about. Republicans, certainly since Reagan
were really a free trade party. They were for open commerce,
(17:12):
they weren't for government interfering in business, and that has
changed over time in terms of a policy position to
where we are today, where it's not only tariffs, it's
a heavy hand of government making decisions about what will
or will not happen with the economy. And then finally
it's just broader coalitions change. You know, labor was a
(17:36):
huge part of the Democratic coalition from the thirties to
the seventies. It no longer is that coalition now rests
on groups and organizations that represents suburban voters and coastal issues,
including the environment. It's on a coastal issue, but that's
where support is so on all fronts. Parties constantly evolved
(17:57):
that they will again these are not statf creatures, and
I think that's where the fights really take place against
There's lots of third party conversation, but the real interesting
issue is what's going on within the parties and where
is their space for big changes. I'll conclude there by saying,
you know, you're seeing the Republicans since the seventies since
(18:20):
Nixon talked about a silent majority, have been trying to
win over more and more disaffected Democratic voters. For Nixon
and Reagan, it was white ethnic voters and cities who
were still pretty liberal on social issues, on economic issues,
often union members, but didn't like the Civil rights Revolution.
(18:42):
They were uncomfortable with feminism and environmentalism for different reasons.
And now I think Trump has really finished that shift
and brought many white working class voters, particularly rural male voters,
into the coalition. So that's a long term change that
(19:03):
he has perfected and finished. And I think those are
the questions we really need to look at in party politics.
Speaker 1 (19:10):
Who's driving that change? Right? Trump is a I mean,
once in a lifetime charismatic figure, right, love him or
hate him, He is consequential. So is party change typically
driven by the voters or by the elected officials both.
Speaker 3 (19:29):
I mean, it's a historian's answer, but it's both. I
don't think it's one individual though. I never think that's
the answer. But if you think of the Republican Party
and how they moved in that direction, you could think
first of just an electoral response to civil rights since
the sixties, which over time did erode some support from
(19:53):
white voters whose economic interests were still with the Democrats,
but that issue really was important and added to that
or other social issues right through this day with the
trans ad in twenty twenty four. And so that isn't
an individual, it's an electorate gradually parts of an electorate
responding to changes in public policy, to changes in national politics.
(20:17):
But then there are leaders. Presidents are the most well known,
but legislators are important who capitalize on this and figure
out how do you get that vote. Reagan was very
good at it, partly through his charisma and his vision,
partly through his appeal to these issues much more subtly
than President Trump, talking about welfare queens as a way
(20:40):
to kind of tap into some of that anger opposition
to busting all of that. And that has been a
series of leaders. The Tea Party in Congress you could
think of, has been very effective at continuing to work
that room, so to speak, in politics, and culminating with
Trump's you know, you can't have it from one direction only.
(21:02):
I think that's when the big changes happen. The leaders
match up and sync up with changing electoral preferences and
sometimes stimulate and energize those elements, but they're not just
making it out of fresh air. Usually.
Speaker 1 (21:16):
It's just hard to believe Julian that welfare Queen's is
now considered subtle.
Speaker 3 (21:21):
Yes, I mean, we've seen a radicalization in Republican politics.
The things that are said today, certainly by President Trump,
would have not been either acceptable in nineteen eighties Republicans politics,
or at a minimum politically tolerable. There's a famous interview
with Lee Atwater, who is a big political operative who
(21:41):
ran parts of Reagan's campaign, ran famously George H. W.
Bush's nineteen eighty eight campaign. He does a very candid
interview at one point where he becomes more apologetic by
the end of his life, where he talks really explicitly
how Republicans figured out ways to talk about race in
code words States rights. He says, was a way to
(22:04):
talk about it without talking about it, and so it
wasn't not deliberate in how they did this and thought
about it. But what we've seen is some of those guardrails,
whether they're moral, ethical, or whether just political, have fallen away.
And I don't think Republicans in twenty twenty five feel
the need to be very subtle about some of these issues.
(22:26):
On immigration, even the rhetoric that President Trump uses, let
alone the policies are so extreme that it's hard to
fathom that Ronald Reagan, who passes with Democrats a bill,
who supports a bill that comes out in eighty six
that provides amnesty to I think over a million persons
(22:47):
who are living here, that he would ever talk that way.
And I think that change has been really, really significant,
and it's very defining right now, and I don't think
Republicans can escape anymore. They are This is the Party.
Speaker 1 (23:07):
This is American History Hotline. I'm your host, Bob Crawford. Today,
my guest is Julian Zelzer. He's a New York Times
best selling author. His newest book is in Defensive Partisanship,
and his sub stack is The Longview. We're talking about
political parties and how they've changed over time. Julian, We've
talked a lot about the Republican Party of today. What
(23:30):
about the Democratic Party of today?
Speaker 3 (23:33):
Democrats have changed too. I mean, I think in terms
of the electorate, it's not untrue that over the last
few decades, the suburban, college educated voter has become much
more important in terms of dictating the party's preferences, and
coastal Democrats have become more important than they had been
(23:57):
back even in the nineteen fifties and sixties. Lyndon Johnson
in the sixties, he's really thinking of union voters in
a state like Michigan or Wisconsin and really focused on them,
in addition to Southern Democrats who, despite civil rights he
still thought on government issues outside of that, were still supportive.
Whereas today that red blue map and those blue areas
(24:21):
that are concentrated on the coasts really are important parts
of the electorate. I think a second area of Democrats
on economic issues. It's a fair argument that the leadership
has moved to the center since Bill Clinton, I think,
really really Jimmy Carter, I should say, since they started
to push away from some of the philosophy of the
(24:42):
New Deal and embrace some of Reaganism. Some people call
it neoliberalism, as a kind of not quite right wing conservative,
but an acceptance that markets are quite important in public
policy and on international policy. It's been messy, it's not
that different that where the party was. I actually think
they're more internationalist Democrats today than they were in the
(25:05):
seventies after Vietnam, they've been recommitted to these institutions and
to the idea that the US should have a presence overseas.
But at the most basic level, I think Democrats still
just remain the party of FDR in that it's still
a commitment to federal government intervention, both on economic issues,
(25:27):
on social issues, and at some level overseas. And that's
the constant part of where the party is, and it
really I think shapes a lot of the party's character
because ultimately they are committed to the ability to govern
and they can't get away from that, and that leads
them to compromise more, to be a little more pragmatic
(25:48):
and not so extreme in their politics. That's how the
party's both changed. In a core area, they've remained the same.
Speaker 1 (25:56):
Do they need to change? It seems like since the
election twenty twenty four, or since election night, the media
landscape seems to be putting a lot of blame on
the Democratic Party or putting a lot of weight on
the party's failure to connect with voters recently. Is that overblown?
Speaker 3 (26:18):
I tend to think so. I mean, look after an
election where the loss is this serious and it is
a serious loss, even though it's not a landslide. Any
party would be foolhardy not to think of how they
can improve and do better and not to look at
the mistakes they made. Otherwise they can easily recreate the
same loss in four years. But that's different than saying
(26:40):
it's a crisis. You have to overhaul everything. This is
a party that still has a pretty big electoral reach.
It's a party that won in twenty twenty. In twenty
twenty four, they lost, but they were not decimated. It
was still the same map where you don't have a
landslide for President Trump in the electoral college, he had
a plurality, not a majority in the vote. And so
(27:03):
and on top of it, we had this. If you
read all these new books that are coming out about
the election, you remember the situation was truly unusual. But
candidate withdrew after essentially collapsing on a televised debate, and
the next candidate was not only as vice president, which
is very difficult to run in the best of conditions,
(27:25):
but she had weeks to get this thing undergoing. And
it's a she and her social identity makes it hard
in this country. So in some ways she did pretty
well and the Democrats didn't do so poorly. So I
don't know. I think thinking of an overhaul at this
point misses some of the underlying strength. Look, if they
(27:45):
can appeal more to working American white voters, who again
still should be sympathetic to Democratic economic policies, they should
think of how to do that. They should think of
how to become more appealing to young voters who still
are pretty sympathetic to I think most of what the
Democratic Party is about, and you're seeing it in the
(28:07):
first wave of Trump polls. We're indicating a lot of
the support from these groups is already weakening after his
first hundred days, and so there might be room for
Democrats to do that. And obviously finding candidates who don't
necessarily represent a totally new vision for the party, but
(28:27):
are exciting, energetic, appealing, I think that's what they should
be focused on, as opposed to re envisioning everything. That's
my take on the election. It just comes back to
the fact this was still a post nineteen eighty four,
meaning post the final landslide election that we've had kind
(28:48):
of election. It's won on the margins. That doesn't mean
a party has imploded. It means a party can do better.
Speaker 1 (28:54):
So let's go back about two hundred and thirty years
George Washington. I'm thinking of his farewell address. What did
he tell the American people, warn the American people of
when it comes to political parties? Because Julian political parties,
they're the centerpiece of American government, right, And what did
(29:16):
the man above all party say about parties?
Speaker 3 (29:19):
Look, the founders of the country, most of them and
Washington as the first president, were fearful of parties, and
he warns against what these kinds of divisions will do
to the country. And there was a fear of what
they called faction and how we had to essentially remain
focused on being a nation and republic as opposed to
(29:40):
a divided party. The problem was it didn't really work
out that way. We had parties from day one. We
have divisions in this country, and parties have represented them.
And I think there's a very good argument, and obviously
I've helped make this too, that parties have served a function.
They have represented those differences, and when they work well,
they're a healthy institution. And that's why they've been here forever.
(30:04):
And they're the best thing we have at this point
in dealing with these divisions. But the warning still matters.
I mean, I think, look, it's aspirational and that's still relevant,
and you want presidents to push against the divisions, even
if those divisions will exist. I think that's a good thing,
and that's part of the function of the president. Is
even as we're tearing ourselves apart, and we are on
(30:26):
many issues where we don't agree reproductive rights as an example, taxes, war,
it's good to have leaders to say, all right, everyone,
come back into the room now, and let's just take
a deep breath before we go out for round two.
But that was part of the warning. It was a
warning against faction. But Washington also makes another warning which
(30:47):
today I think deserves more attention, And simply by stepping down,
he was warning against the potential for centralized, unchecked power
in our system. That concern very much. He did not
want a monarch in this country. That was important of
the founders. That was important in Washington's addresses, and it
(31:08):
was important what he did by giving up power. He
gave up power at the very start when he was
a very popular, beloved figure in American politics. And that's
the warning for me more than the party division, which
I think again was just aspirational. It's very real and
touched on something that we have seen and we're seen
(31:29):
is very dangerous when we centralize too much power and
put it in the hands of a person in this
case who won't give it up or won't give it
up easily.
Speaker 1 (31:41):
Real quick, what is the likelihood that President Trump could
mount a third a campaign.
Speaker 3 (31:48):
For a third term. My rule of thumb is if
he says he's going to do something, I believe he's
going to do it, and maybe he won't, but it's
a very serious possibility. It totally contradicts the intention of
the two twenty second Amendment. I think there's very good clarity.
Maybe he's going to wordsmith how he does it, or
do one of these you know, I'll run for vice
(32:09):
president that personal step down and there I am again.
But I think it should be taken seriously. I mean,
we see at the start of Trump two point zero
very dramatic and bold actions that threaten and challenge the
legitimacy of the court and the Constitution. Frankly, I mean
he jett us into due process right off the bat
(32:31):
with his deportations and doesn't seem to really care, so
why wouldn't he if he wants and he might not
want to. In a few years, we'll see how this
all goes. But I think we should expect it could
be a reality, and I think politicians have a constitutional
argument against it, so they should be working or thinking
about what to do in the meantime to prepare for that.
(32:54):
But it's a very real possibility.
Speaker 1 (32:59):
From one ridiculus question to a final ridiculous question. Forgive
my premise, but just to button this up, yeah, yeah,
we're going to rerun the eighteen sixty election in today
and Abraham Lincoln is going to run. Does he run
as a Republican or does he run as a Democrat?
Speaker 3 (33:18):
I mean, if he was, it's always hard to imagine
what he would even be thinking. But there's so many
changes in American society since, and even the size of
the government he didn't imagine I couldn't have imagined. But
I would say if he was running today in these
political parties, he would fit much more comfortably in where
(33:39):
the Democratic Party is than the Republican Party, and certainly
their Republican Party of Trump. The Party of Trump is
what it is right now. It's hard to envision, given
what he did, and given the battle he fought for
the Union and ultimately to end this terrible institution, that
he would you feel like the is his party anymore.
(34:01):
That's obviously speculation, counterfactual history. But that is how I
would react, and I think many other people would react
to that question.
Speaker 1 (34:11):
I've been talking to Julian Zelzer. He's a professor of
history and public affairs at Princeton University. He's also a
New York Times best selling author of many many books.
His latest is titled in Defensive Partisanship, and his substack
is The Long View. Please check it out. Julian, thanks
for joining us today on American History Hotline.
Speaker 3 (34:33):
Thanks for having me. It's been great.
Speaker 1 (34:37):
You've been listening to American History Hotline, a production of
iHeart Podcasts and Scratch Track Productions. The show's executive producer
is James Morrison. Our executive producers from iHeart are Jordan
Runtall and Jason English. Original music composed by me Bob Crawford.
Please keep in touch. Our email is American History Hotline
(35:00):
at gmail dot com. If you like the show, please
tell your friends and leave us a review in Apple podcasts.
I'm your host, Bob Crawford. Feel free to hit me
up on social media to ask a history question or
to let me know what you think of the show.
You can find me at Bob Crawford Base. Thanks so
(35:21):
much for listening, See you next week.
You've reached American History Hotline. You asked the question, we
get the answers, leave a methode. Hey, there are American
History Hotliners. Your host, Bob Crawford here, happy to be
joining you again for another episode of American History Hotline.
You're the ones with the questions. I'm a guy trying
to get you some answers. The best way to get
(00:25):
us a question is to record a video or a
voice memo on your phone and email it to Americanhistory
Hotline at gmail dot com. That's Americanhistoryhotline at gmail dot com.
And remember we are the American History Hotline. If you're
thinking about the Roman Empire, you're on the wrong continent
(00:45):
and in the wrong era. Okay, now to today's question,
and it's one we've gotten from a few people.
Speaker 2 (00:52):
Hi there, my name is Adam from Maryland. I teach
eighth grade American history. This is a Lane from Washington, DC.
I get this question from a students a lot. Which
party would Lincoln most identify with today? How does Lincoln's
radical Republican Party of the eighteen sixties become the conservative
Republican party that we see today?
Speaker 1 (01:13):
Thanks Elaine and Adam. I love this question. Here to
help me answer it is Julian Zelzer. He's a professor
of history and public affairs at Princeton University and a
New York Times best selling author. His newest book is
titled In Defense of Partisanship, and please check out his
sub stack, The Longview. Julian, thanks for joining me today.
Speaker 3 (01:37):
Thanks for having me.
Speaker 1 (01:39):
Okay, so first off, let's do a little primer on
party politics. I know this is a tricky question to
answer right now in particular, but pretend I've just derived
from outer space and I'm trying to understand our two
main political parties. What are the major ideological differences?
Speaker 3 (02:00):
Think the Republican Party in our era is a party
that's anti government. It's a party that has become quite
resistant to many social justice initiatives, and it's a party
that increasingly is skeptical of international alliances and commitments. Whereas
Democrats remain a party of government. They believe government is
(02:23):
fundamental to solving many problems. The Democratic Party still is
more committed to traditional postwar TiO international alliances. And finally,
the Democratic Party, for all the divisions and hesitations, is
still on board with the social revolution of the nineteen sixties,
the civil rights Revolution, the feminist revolution, the immigration revolution,
(02:48):
and even again with some more skepticism that has emerged,
represents those values in party politics.
Speaker 1 (02:57):
When I first saw this question, the first thing that
popped into my head was not Abraham Lincoln. It was
Richard Nixon. And I'm thinking, Okay, when did the parties
kind of change clothes, if you want to put it
that way in our recent era, And that was Nixon's
Southern Strategy. From what you just said to me, they've
(03:20):
changed clothes again in some ways. So first explain what
that was and why that's important to this conversation today,
and then talk about the new wardrobe that today's Republican Party,
which you just outlined in some ways, has put on.
Speaker 3 (03:39):
Yeah, I mean, I think the big change does come
in the late sixties and early seventies. The Southern Strategy
was basically the idea that more Republicans and conservatives start
having they It starts actually in the early fifties, but
the idea is that Republicans can form an alliance with
Southern Democrats who were conservative, particularly on race relations, also
(04:04):
on unions. They opposed unions, and Republicans started to see
that that was a fruitful alliance, either a bipartisan alliance
or ultimately a way to take over the electorate of
the South by winning over Southern Democrats who no longer
liked their party. So this is the Southern strategy. As
Democrats become more favorable to civil rights, as Democrats become
(04:29):
more aligned with unions, the Southern Republicans would emerge and
become something which they had never been a serious force
in Southern politics. And Richard Nixon, more than any other
president and candidate in nineteen sixty eight, seize the potential
of this because he is running and then governing after
(04:50):
the Civil Rights Act of sixty four, the Voting Rights
Act of sixty five had caused many Southern Democrats to
be quite upset with the direction of their party. So
he makes a play for the South. He talks about
issues like states' rights, he talks about the limits of government.
He doesn't talk explicitly about race, but that is underlying
(05:12):
some of the appeal. And that's when the Southern strategy
really accelerates in a way that we hadn't seen in
presidential politics. The last thing I'd say is in Congress,
this Southern strategy had been around really since the late thirties,
when there was a coalition of Southern Democratic committee chairs
and Republicans who had worked through the committee system since
(05:33):
nineteen thirty eight to block liberalism at every turn. But
the Southern strategy really refers to this presidential campaign idea,
and ultimately the goal is for Republicans to make the
South a red area in our modern parlance of color schemes.
Speaker 1 (05:50):
So that is social policy, cultural policy. But when I
think of the Republican Party today, I think of America first.
I think of a foreign policy that is looking inward right.
And and also Nixon wasn't he a new deal Maybe
(06:11):
some say he's the last new deal president? Right, osha Epa,
all these all these bureaucratic institutions, you know, he supported
those and he instituted many of those. So how does
the party get from even Nixon to So that's a
whole nother shift.
Speaker 3 (06:32):
Right, Yeah, I mean there's two issues. On the latter point,
he was conservative, and you have to remember he had
a Democratic Congress, a strong Democratic Congress, that's all Congress
had been since the fifties, and so he doesn't have
a lot of leeway, a lot of these ideas like
the EPA are really coming from Democrats on the hill
and liberal Republicans who are still a thing at the time,
(06:55):
and he often doesn't have a choice. So he was conservative,
but it's all relative conservative for mainstream Republicans. In the
late sixties and early seventies, men still accepting that government
was going to have a big role in American life
and working with Democrats to often start and implement new programs,
(07:16):
and that's much different than where we are today. So
I think part of it isn't that he wasn't a conservative,
but the conservatism domestically becomes much more radical, much more
right ward over the next few decades. On foreign policy,
that's a huge shift that's more recent in the nineteen
seventies when you talked about the new conservative movement, people
(07:37):
like Ronald Reagan who are coming onto the scene as
national figures. One of their central arguments was we had
to be very muscular overseas, that the United States had
to work with allies and on its own to assert
itself against the Soviet Union and China, and their idea
of withdrawing was what they criticized Demorcrats for doing after
(08:01):
Vietnam that was the argument. Reagan was even critical of
Nixon and gerald Ford because they practiced something called the
policy of detent, which was easing relations with the Soviets
through negotiations over arms agreement, and Reagan even thought that
was bad. So the Meerica First Wing was always in
(08:22):
the Republican coalition, but it's really only in the last
you know, since nine to eleven, since the war in Iraq,
where it's become the dominant mode of Republican thinking.
Speaker 1 (08:33):
All right, as promised, let's get to Abraham Lincoln and
his Republican Party. What were the major ideological stances and
where were most of the Republican voters in eighteen fifty
six eighteen sixty.
Speaker 3 (08:47):
I mean, it's complicated in that we don't want to
say Abraham Lincoln was perfect. He was hesitant and too slow,
many argue on the issue of slavery. He gets there,
but it a little while. But clearly what he represented
by the end of his presidency, by his death and
in that era was a party a committed to union,
(09:10):
be ultimately committed to the abolition of slavery. C. And
this is post Lincoln, but it's still the Party of Lincoln.
Committed to reconstruction at some level, meaning a new union
that not only did not have slavery, but had some
kind of policies to help the freed black population and
(09:32):
to create a more just society. That was the Party
of Lincoln. That's why I went. Many black Americans for
decades would remain loyal to the GOP and never consider
voting for Democrats, who represented the Party of the South.
And that's the final part. The Party of Lincoln was
a northern party. It represented the non South. Because of
(09:55):
how it was formed and because of its role in
the Civil War.
Speaker 1 (10:00):
Eighteen fifty six election, a lot of people were afraid
to vote for the Republican Party because upending the status
quo by having a sectional party, it just seemed like
civil war would have come sooner. Many thoughts what about
the Democratic Party? You mentioned the Democratic Party of Lincoln's
time to talk about them and the complexities of that
(10:24):
Democratic Party.
Speaker 3 (10:25):
It was a parties back then had many different coalitions,
so it wasn't one thing. And you had Northern Democrats
who really, ultimately really later in the nineteenth century would
appeal to immigrants, and in a city like New York,
Democrat didn't mean Dixiecrat a Democrat meant machine a Democrat
(10:47):
and focusing on these new arrivals and power within the cities.
But for I think a lot of the country, what
Democrats meant in the wake of the Civil War was
a party that was not committed to union, a party
that was tied to the slave economy, and ultimately a
party that would help pick apart reconstruction after Lincoln's death
(11:09):
and pressure Republicans in a number of instances, culminating in
eighteen seventy seven with dismantling. This vast program meant to
not only compensate but reconstruct American society after slavery in
the Civil War. So Democrats were very much for a
(11:30):
while a Southern party. Again. That would evolve and it
would change by the nineteen thirties, but that reputation was
strong and with good reason.
Speaker 1 (11:39):
This is American History Hotline. I'm your host Bob Crawford. Today,
my guest is Julian Zelzer. He's a New York Times
best selling author. His newest book is In Defense of Partisanship.
We're talking about the Democratic and Republican party realignment of
the mid twentieth century. What you just said parties evolve
(12:01):
and change, so it's not like I mean, well, it's
kind of it seems abrupt recently, I think of tariffs.
I think of Trump and tariffs, and that seems like
an abrupt switch for a major political party to make.
I mean, like a light switch switch.
Speaker 3 (12:20):
Yeah, I mean, I think that's a good point. And
there's different kinds of changes. I mean, I've been working
on I'm working on a sub stack I have now
called the long view, and it's constantly wrestling with that duality.
Meaning there are certain things that happen in American politics
which rightly are seen as dramatic and quick and an
(12:40):
issue like the tariff, where the Republicans have moved from
staunchly being a free trade party really through certainly George W. Bush,
where it was very marginal anyone who would think not
of one tariff but of an entire tariff regime to
where we are today. And part of that is Trump.
(13:01):
This is someone who has been obsessed with this and
now has the power after decades to put it into place.
But other parts, I think have been slow, kind of
a slow burn, and they've been taking place slowly. So
you can also look at Trump's departure from these international
alliances like NATO, and that's been building up over the decades.
(13:24):
I mean, even in the Reagan era, you see more
skepticism toward members of NATO, complaints they don't pay enough.
George W. Bush, who's the president during nine to eleven,
is willing to go his own way, even though he
does still want support from his allies. And you have
more voices within the GOP organizations and conservative groups who
are more critical of that. And so that's more it's
(13:47):
finally finding the president who will represent how the party
had been changing, rather than being nostalgic and trying to
do something. But with the tariffs, it I think it's
rightfully a pretty big shift, and it's not surprising. That's
one area you've seen more Republican private grumbling, but even
(14:07):
some public grumbling. Not only the economic effects, but this
is not what a lot of the party stands for.
Speaker 2 (14:14):
Well.
Speaker 1 (14:14):
I mean, many of these congressmen in the numbering in
the hundreds ran ads, free trade ads, you know, within
the past several cycles, and now they have to go
back to their constituents and say everything I believed pre
twenty twenty four is now has now changed.
Speaker 3 (14:33):
And it's like a NAFTA when that passed, which has
been the heart of the complaint for many people who
are supportive of the tariffs. That happens first under George H. W.
Bush or Republican He gets it underway and gets the
agreement in place. Then President Clinton is the president when
that gets ratified, but he works with Republicans in Congress.
(14:56):
Democrats are against it, but people like Mute Gingridge at
the time, they are the radicals in the group. They
are the ones who work with him, to the consternation
of many Democrats to get this agreement through because they
believe that free trade is a good thing without many restrictions.
So it is unbelievable to see the party and watch
(15:17):
the party as they wrestle with really a contradiction of
their own history.
Speaker 1 (15:22):
So what I'm getting from everything that you've said is
parties wrestle with these two forces. You have tradition and
then you have the changing times, right the moments. I
just I think of this country since nine to eleven,
or really since the two thousand election, and how dramatically
(15:43):
this first twenty five years of this century have been
so talk about that talk about the tradition of parties.
Because your book in Defensive Partisanship, you really that is
a for anybody who's listening today who wants to learn
more about the evolution and change of parties in Congress.
(16:05):
That is a roadmap for everything we're talking about.
Speaker 3 (16:09):
Yeah, I try to do that. And look, we are
in an age where people think what a party is
today is always what it's been. But these are our institutions, organizations,
they have a history of they own And while people
love to talk about third parties all the time, will
there be a new third party? I'm asked that constantly.
(16:29):
What's I think more interesting and more realistic is how
do parties change internally? And they can change in terms
of the coalition. So Democrats until the nineteen seventies and
eighties were really a party where the weight of the
leadership was in the South, and even as northern Liberals
became more influential, it was the southern Democrat who was
(16:50):
the face of the party. Fast forward to today, it's
hard to find many Southern Democrats. And when Democrats win
in a state like Georgia, it's a surprise as opposed
to a predicted outcome. Their ideologies change over time. I
think that's what we're talking about. Republicans, certainly since Reagan
were really a free trade party. They were for open commerce,
(17:12):
they weren't for government interfering in business, and that has
changed over time in terms of a policy position to
where we are today, where it's not only tariffs, it's
a heavy hand of government making decisions about what will
or will not happen with the economy. And then finally
it's just broader coalitions change. You know, labor was a
(17:36):
huge part of the Democratic coalition from the thirties to
the seventies. It no longer is that coalition now rests
on groups and organizations that represents suburban voters and coastal issues,
including the environment. It's on a coastal issue, but that's
where support is so on all fronts. Parties constantly evolved
(17:57):
that they will again these are not statf creatures, and
I think that's where the fights really take place against
There's lots of third party conversation, but the real interesting
issue is what's going on within the parties and where
is their space for big changes. I'll conclude there by saying,
you know, you're seeing the Republicans since the seventies since
(18:20):
Nixon talked about a silent majority, have been trying to
win over more and more disaffected Democratic voters. For Nixon
and Reagan, it was white ethnic voters and cities who
were still pretty liberal on social issues, on economic issues,
often union members, but didn't like the Civil rights Revolution.
(18:42):
They were uncomfortable with feminism and environmentalism for different reasons.
And now I think Trump has really finished that shift
and brought many white working class voters, particularly rural male voters,
into the coalition. So that's a long term change that
(19:03):
he has perfected and finished. And I think those are
the questions we really need to look at in party politics.
Speaker 1 (19:10):
Who's driving that change? Right? Trump is a I mean,
once in a lifetime charismatic figure, right, love him or
hate him, He is consequential. So is party change typically
driven by the voters or by the elected officials both.
Speaker 3 (19:29):
I mean, it's a historian's answer, but it's both. I
don't think it's one individual though. I never think that's
the answer. But if you think of the Republican Party
and how they moved in that direction, you could think
first of just an electoral response to civil rights since
the sixties, which over time did erode some support from
(19:53):
white voters whose economic interests were still with the Democrats,
but that issue really was important and added to that
or other social issues right through this day with the
trans ad in twenty twenty four. And so that isn't
an individual, it's an electorate gradually parts of an electorate
responding to changes in public policy, to changes in national politics.
(20:17):
But then there are leaders. Presidents are the most well known,
but legislators are important who capitalize on this and figure
out how do you get that vote. Reagan was very
good at it, partly through his charisma and his vision,
partly through his appeal to these issues much more subtly
than President Trump, talking about welfare queens as a way
(20:40):
to kind of tap into some of that anger opposition
to busting all of that. And that has been a
series of leaders. The Tea Party in Congress you could
think of, has been very effective at continuing to work
that room, so to speak, in politics, and culminating with
Trump's you know, you can't have it from one direction only.
(21:02):
I think that's when the big changes happen. The leaders
match up and sync up with changing electoral preferences and
sometimes stimulate and energize those elements, but they're not just
making it out of fresh air. Usually.
Speaker 1 (21:16):
It's just hard to believe Julian that welfare Queen's is
now considered subtle.
Speaker 3 (21:21):
Yes, I mean, we've seen a radicalization in Republican politics.
The things that are said today, certainly by President Trump,
would have not been either acceptable in nineteen eighties Republicans politics,
or at a minimum politically tolerable. There's a famous interview
with Lee Atwater, who is a big political operative who
(21:41):
ran parts of Reagan's campaign, ran famously George H. W.
Bush's nineteen eighty eight campaign. He does a very candid
interview at one point where he becomes more apologetic by
the end of his life, where he talks really explicitly
how Republicans figured out ways to talk about race in
code words States rights. He says, was a way to
(22:04):
talk about it without talking about it, and so it
wasn't not deliberate in how they did this and thought
about it. But what we've seen is some of those guardrails,
whether they're moral, ethical, or whether just political, have fallen away.
And I don't think Republicans in twenty twenty five feel
the need to be very subtle about some of these issues.
(22:26):
On immigration, even the rhetoric that President Trump uses, let
alone the policies are so extreme that it's hard to
fathom that Ronald Reagan, who passes with Democrats a bill,
who supports a bill that comes out in eighty six
that provides amnesty to I think over a million persons
(22:47):
who are living here, that he would ever talk that way.
And I think that change has been really, really significant,
and it's very defining right now, and I don't think
Republicans can escape anymore. They are This is the Party.
Speaker 1 (23:07):
This is American History Hotline. I'm your host, Bob Crawford. Today,
my guest is Julian Zelzer. He's a New York Times
best selling author. His newest book is in Defensive Partisanship,
and his sub stack is The Longview. We're talking about
political parties and how they've changed over time. Julian, We've
talked a lot about the Republican Party of today. What
(23:30):
about the Democratic Party of today?
Speaker 3 (23:33):
Democrats have changed too. I mean, I think in terms
of the electorate, it's not untrue that over the last
few decades, the suburban, college educated voter has become much
more important in terms of dictating the party's preferences, and
coastal Democrats have become more important than they had been
(23:57):
back even in the nineteen fifties and sixties. Lyndon Johnson
in the sixties, he's really thinking of union voters in
a state like Michigan or Wisconsin and really focused on them,
in addition to Southern Democrats who, despite civil rights he
still thought on government issues outside of that, were still supportive.
Whereas today that red blue map and those blue areas
(24:21):
that are concentrated on the coasts really are important parts
of the electorate. I think a second area of Democrats
on economic issues. It's a fair argument that the leadership
has moved to the center since Bill Clinton, I think,
really really Jimmy Carter, I should say, since they started
to push away from some of the philosophy of the
(24:42):
New Deal and embrace some of Reaganism. Some people call
it neoliberalism, as a kind of not quite right wing conservative,
but an acceptance that markets are quite important in public
policy and on international policy. It's been messy, it's not
that different that where the party was. I actually think
they're more internationalist Democrats today than they were in the
(25:05):
seventies after Vietnam, they've been recommitted to these institutions and
to the idea that the US should have a presence overseas.
But at the most basic level, I think Democrats still
just remain the party of FDR in that it's still
a commitment to federal government intervention, both on economic issues,
(25:27):
on social issues, and at some level overseas. And that's
the constant part of where the party is, and it
really I think shapes a lot of the party's character
because ultimately they are committed to the ability to govern
and they can't get away from that, and that leads
them to compromise more, to be a little more pragmatic
(25:48):
and not so extreme in their politics. That's how the
party's both changed. In a core area, they've remained the same.
Speaker 1 (25:56):
Do they need to change? It seems like since the
election twenty twenty four, or since election night, the media
landscape seems to be putting a lot of blame on
the Democratic Party or putting a lot of weight on
the party's failure to connect with voters recently. Is that overblown?
Speaker 3 (26:18):
I tend to think so. I mean, look after an
election where the loss is this serious and it is
a serious loss, even though it's not a landslide. Any
party would be foolhardy not to think of how they
can improve and do better and not to look at
the mistakes they made. Otherwise they can easily recreate the
same loss in four years. But that's different than saying
(26:40):
it's a crisis. You have to overhaul everything. This is
a party that still has a pretty big electoral reach.
It's a party that won in twenty twenty. In twenty
twenty four, they lost, but they were not decimated. It
was still the same map where you don't have a
landslide for President Trump in the electoral college, he had
a plurality, not a majority in the vote. And so
(27:03):
and on top of it, we had this. If you
read all these new books that are coming out about
the election, you remember the situation was truly unusual. But
candidate withdrew after essentially collapsing on a televised debate, and
the next candidate was not only as vice president, which
is very difficult to run in the best of conditions,
(27:25):
but she had weeks to get this thing undergoing. And
it's a she and her social identity makes it hard
in this country. So in some ways she did pretty
well and the Democrats didn't do so poorly. So I
don't know. I think thinking of an overhaul at this
point misses some of the underlying strength. Look, if they
(27:45):
can appeal more to working American white voters, who again
still should be sympathetic to Democratic economic policies, they should
think of how to do that. They should think of
how to become more appealing to young voters who still
are pretty sympathetic to I think most of what the
Democratic Party is about, and you're seeing it in the
(28:07):
first wave of Trump polls. We're indicating a lot of
the support from these groups is already weakening after his
first hundred days, and so there might be room for
Democrats to do that. And obviously finding candidates who don't
necessarily represent a totally new vision for the party, but
(28:27):
are exciting, energetic, appealing, I think that's what they should
be focused on, as opposed to re envisioning everything. That's
my take on the election. It just comes back to
the fact this was still a post nineteen eighty four,
meaning post the final landslide election that we've had kind
(28:48):
of election. It's won on the margins. That doesn't mean
a party has imploded. It means a party can do better.
Speaker 1 (28:54):
So let's go back about two hundred and thirty years
George Washington. I'm thinking of his farewell address. What did
he tell the American people, warn the American people of
when it comes to political parties? Because Julian political parties,
they're the centerpiece of American government, right, And what did
(29:16):
the man above all party say about parties?
Speaker 3 (29:19):
Look, the founders of the country, most of them and
Washington as the first president, were fearful of parties, and
he warns against what these kinds of divisions will do
to the country. And there was a fear of what
they called faction and how we had to essentially remain
focused on being a nation and republic as opposed to
(29:40):
a divided party. The problem was it didn't really work
out that way. We had parties from day one. We
have divisions in this country, and parties have represented them.
And I think there's a very good argument, and obviously
I've helped make this too, that parties have served a function.
They have represented those differences, and when they work well,
they're a healthy institution. And that's why they've been here forever.
(30:04):
And they're the best thing we have at this point
in dealing with these divisions. But the warning still matters.
I mean, I think, look, it's aspirational and that's still relevant,
and you want presidents to push against the divisions, even
if those divisions will exist. I think that's a good thing,
and that's part of the function of the president. Is
even as we're tearing ourselves apart, and we are on
(30:26):
many issues where we don't agree reproductive rights as an example, taxes, war,
it's good to have leaders to say, all right, everyone,
come back into the room now, and let's just take
a deep breath before we go out for round two.
But that was part of the warning. It was a
warning against faction. But Washington also makes another warning which
(30:47):
today I think deserves more attention, And simply by stepping down,
he was warning against the potential for centralized, unchecked power
in our system. That concern very much. He did not
want a monarch in this country. That was important of
the founders. That was important in Washington's addresses, and it
(31:08):
was important what he did by giving up power. He
gave up power at the very start when he was
a very popular, beloved figure in American politics. And that's
the warning for me more than the party division, which
I think again was just aspirational. It's very real and
touched on something that we have seen and we're seen
(31:29):
is very dangerous when we centralize too much power and
put it in the hands of a person in this
case who won't give it up or won't give it
up easily.
Speaker 1 (31:41):
Real quick, what is the likelihood that President Trump could
mount a third a campaign.
Speaker 3 (31:48):
For a third term. My rule of thumb is if
he says he's going to do something, I believe he's
going to do it, and maybe he won't, but it's
a very serious possibility. It totally contradicts the intention of
the two twenty second Amendment. I think there's very good clarity.
Maybe he's going to wordsmith how he does it, or
do one of these you know, I'll run for vice
(32:09):
president that personal step down and there I am again.
But I think it should be taken seriously. I mean,
we see at the start of Trump two point zero
very dramatic and bold actions that threaten and challenge the
legitimacy of the court and the Constitution. Frankly, I mean
he jett us into due process right off the bat
(32:31):
with his deportations and doesn't seem to really care, so
why wouldn't he if he wants and he might not
want to. In a few years, we'll see how this
all goes. But I think we should expect it could
be a reality, and I think politicians have a constitutional
argument against it, so they should be working or thinking
about what to do in the meantime to prepare for that.
(32:54):
But it's a very real possibility.
Speaker 1 (32:59):
From one ridiculus question to a final ridiculous question. Forgive
my premise, but just to button this up, yeah, yeah,
we're going to rerun the eighteen sixty election in today
and Abraham Lincoln is going to run. Does he run
as a Republican or does he run as a Democrat?
Speaker 3 (33:18):
I mean, if he was, it's always hard to imagine
what he would even be thinking. But there's so many
changes in American society since, and even the size of
the government he didn't imagine I couldn't have imagined. But
I would say if he was running today in these
political parties, he would fit much more comfortably in where
(33:39):
the Democratic Party is than the Republican Party, and certainly
their Republican Party of Trump. The Party of Trump is
what it is right now. It's hard to envision, given
what he did, and given the battle he fought for
the Union and ultimately to end this terrible institution, that
he would you feel like the is his party anymore.
(34:01):
That's obviously speculation, counterfactual history. But that is how I
would react, and I think many other people would react
to that question.
Speaker 1 (34:11):
I've been talking to Julian Zelzer. He's a professor of
history and public affairs at Princeton University. He's also a
New York Times best selling author of many many books.
His latest is titled in Defensive Partisanship, and his substack
is The Long View. Please check it out. Julian, thanks
for joining us today on American History Hotline.
Speaker 3 (34:33):
Thanks for having me. It's been great.
Speaker 1 (34:37):
You've been listening to American History Hotline, a production of
iHeart Podcasts and Scratch Track Productions. The show's executive producer
is James Morrison. Our executive producers from iHeart are Jordan
Runtall and Jason English. Original music composed by me Bob Crawford.
Please keep in touch. Our email is American History Hotline
(35:00):
at gmail dot com. If you like the show, please
tell your friends and leave us a review in Apple podcasts.
I'm your host, Bob Crawford. Feel free to hit me
up on social media to ask a history question or
to let me know what you think of the show.
You can find me at Bob Crawford Base. Thanks so
(35:21):
much for listening, See you next week.
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