August 16, 2025 • 42 mins
Saagar and Ryan sit down with Professor John Mearsheimer to discuss the Trump Putin summit and where the Ukraine war goes from here.
John Mearsheimer: https://www.mearsheimer.com/
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Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:00):
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We need your help to build the future of independent
news media and we hope to see you at Breakingpoints
dot com. All right, hello everybody, Happy Saturday. It is
Ryan and I here to break down the everything that's
gone on in the news. And you may have noticed
that we actually have a very special guest who we're
very honored to be joined by, Professor John Meerscheimer the
University of Chicago, an intellectual hero of mine and a
(00:48):
great friend of the show. Sir, thank you so much
for joining us.
Speaker 3 (00:51):
We really appreciate it. Thank you for having me.
Speaker 4 (00:53):
It's my pleasure to be here with you and Ryan.
Speaker 1 (00:56):
Absolutely, sir, So we are going to go through with
you everything that happen yesterday at the Trump Putin summit,
as well as some of the information that is now
coming out as a result. So just for everybody purposes,
we're recording this around nine am Eastern time. Things could
obviously change with the diplomatic situation, but this is generally
where things stand as of right now. So Griffin, could
(01:18):
we go ahead and start to kind of the show
of the summit where Trump made a big grand gesture
at the in Alaska. At that summit, greeting Putin with
the red carpet lined with US fighter jets, he flew
a B two bomber escort over Putin's head as a
(01:40):
show of a tremendous military might. That seemed to kind
of be the tone that Trump wanted to set a
reminder to Putin quote whose boss? But things very quickly
changed from their professor. What we started to see was
a nearly three hour three on three meeting between Donald Trump,
Secretary Rubio, Steve Wikoff, two of Putin's advisors, and their translators.
(02:05):
There was a scheduled lunch which they eventually missed, and
they announced in a flurry of changes of press conference
at that press conference. It really isn't even fair to
call it a press conference, is more of a press announcement.
Lasted about twelve minutes. Putin actually spoke first, So Griffin,
let's go ahead and take a listen to putin what
(02:26):
he had to say, specifically his framing of an agreement
that they had had the Trump later rejects, but the
contours of what the setting piece is for what follows
after the summit. Griffin, let's go ahead and take a listen.
Speaker 3 (02:40):
Please.
Speaker 5 (02:41):
I expect that today's agreements will be the starting point
not only for the solution of the Ukrainian issue, but
also will help us bring back business like and pragmatic
relations between Russia and the US. And in the end,
I would like to add one more thing. I'd like
to remind you of twenty twenty two. During the last
contact with the previous administration, I tried to convince my
(03:04):
previous American colleague, we should not the situation should not
be brought to the point of no return when it
would come to hostilities.
Speaker 1 (03:17):
So Professor, he initially framed things as an agreement, but
the real top line was that there was no ceasefire
that was announced, and it appears that he rejected the European,
Ukrainian and US position for an immediate ceasefire, just broadly.
Having watched Putin's full eight minute statement and everything, as
well as some of the positions that the United States
(03:40):
tried to force onto Putin in the head of this summit,
what's your reaction so far just to putin the way
that he handled himself there with Donald Trump, and what
does it tell us about the broader situation.
Speaker 4 (03:51):
Well, I think that Putin obviously did a brilliant job
of handling himself in yes day's meeting.
Speaker 3 (04:01):
There's just no question about that.
Speaker 4 (04:03):
And that's really all he had to do was come
and look diplomatic, look smart, look respectful of President Trump,
and it would do a great deal to put an
end to his isolation in the West and give him
real legitimacy. And he came in and is I think
(04:25):
almost everybody expected. He did the job, and he was
very effective in that way. And then there's the whole
question of the ceasefire, which you raise just for the
audience's purposes or for clarification for the audience. It's important
to understand that there's a difference between a peace agreement
(04:48):
and a ceasefire. And really, what the Russians want is
not a cease fire, because they're winning on the battlefield.
What they want is a peace agreement. And what the
West wants and the Ukrainians want.
Speaker 3 (05:02):
Is a ceasefire.
Speaker 4 (05:04):
And Trump tried to convince Putin that what we need
here is a ceasefire. And what resulted is that Putin
said there will be no ceasefire. We have to have
a peace agreement. And in fact, Trump has now backed
off from demanding a ceasefire. And he said to someone
(05:29):
after the meeting that the best solution to this problem
is to go directly to a peace agreement, in other words,
putting the ceasefire that the Ukrainians and the Europeans and
many people in the United States want aside. He's saying
that's a non starter after having talked to Putin. So
(05:50):
I think, in terms of the clip that you just showed,
that's the most important subjective point.
Speaker 6 (05:56):
And can you impact for people why Ukraine would be
reluctant to reach a peace agreement versus an immediate ceasefire, Like,
what is the advantage of one over the other to Ukraine.
Speaker 4 (06:08):
Well, the advantages of a ceasefire are mainly that Ukraine
is losing on the battlefield and the West cannot do
much to help it at this point in time. So
if you can create a ceasefire, put an end to
(06:31):
the fighting on the battlefield, that gives the Ukrainians a
respite Number one and number two, it allows them to
get more arms from the West to build up their
forces and then put up a better fight against the
Russians moving forward once the fighting restarts, in other words,
(06:51):
once the ceasefire ends. But the Russians are not dumkoffs,
and they understand if they're winning it would be nuts,
to put it bluntly, them to stop the war when
they're winning, allow the Ukrainians to recover and then fight
more effectively at some point down the road. So the
Russians have no interest in a ceasefire. Ukraine and the
(07:13):
West really like the idea. What the Russians want is
they want a peace agreement. They want to settle this one,
but they want to settle it on their terms. It's
very important to understand this. The Russians view Ukraine joining
NATO as an existential threat. This war for them is existential,
(07:36):
and they have a set of demands that they will
not compromise on near three principal demands. One is that
Ukraine and the West recognize that Russia has a next
those four oh blosts that they now partially occupy four
oh bloss in Ukraine plus Crimea. That's demand number one.
(08:00):
Number two is that Ukraine be a neutral state. That
means it can't be a NATO and there can't be
Western security guarantees, especially a security guarantee from the United States. Ukraine,
from the Russian perspective, has to be neutral. Third demand
is that Ukraine has to disarm, not completely, but disarmed
(08:23):
to the point where it has no offensive military capability,
i e. It can't threaten Russia. Now, these are three
harsh demands from the Ukrainian point of view and from
the West point of view, these are unacceptable demands to
the Ukrainians and to most people in the West, and
(08:45):
this is why you can't get a peace agreement. So
what we have here is the Russians want a peace agreement,
the Ukrainians in the West have no interest in a
peace agreement. The West and the Ukrainians want to cease fire,
and the ru Ussians have no interest in a ceasefire,
and the end result is you have a very short
meeting and you have no agreement.
Speaker 6 (09:09):
Very well, said sir.
Speaker 1 (09:10):
Let's go ahead and take a listen to Donald Trump,
because with that context, everything that he says begins to
make no sense. There's no deal until there's a deal.
I need to get on the phone with NATO and
with Ukraine, which has now happened, and we're going to
give everybody the results. But it's still actually really the
framework that I want people to go into with the
Trump press conference again, press announcement is, I have never
(09:31):
known this man not to take an extraordinary amount of questions.
Even in the Helsinki summit of twenty eighteen, it's three
minutes roughly that he speaks. It's clear that he is
incredibly muted, both emotionally, you know, after his meeting with Putin,
and I think what he's realizing in real time is
the mistake you know that he made in agreeing to
these European and Ukrainian quote red lines, going into the
(09:54):
summit itself and starting to understand the exact puzzle that
you just laid out. So with that guy, let's go
ahead and take a listen to Donald Trump and what
he had to say.
Speaker 7 (10:04):
We've made some headway. So there's no deal. Until there's
a deal. I will call up NATO in a little while,
I will call up the various people that I think
are appropriate, and all of course call up Presidents Olynsky
and tell him about today's meeting.
Speaker 3 (10:21):
It's ultimately up with them. They're going to have to
agree with what Marco.
Speaker 7 (10:27):
And Steve and some of the great people from the
Trump administration who've come here, Scott and John right, thank
you very much. We have some of our really great leaders.
They've been doing a phenomenal job. We also have some
tremendous Russian business representatives here and I think you know,
(10:48):
everybody wants to deal with us. We've become the hottest
country anywhere in the world at a very short period
of time, and we look forward to that. We look
forward to dealing. We try and get this over with.
We really made some great progress today. I've always had
a fantastic relationship with President Putin. With Vladimir we had
(11:11):
many many tough meetings, good meetings. We were interfered with
by the Russia. Russia Russia host.
Speaker 1 (11:19):
All right, Griffin, you can go ahead and come out
of this, because that's effectively everything that we do need
to know, which is he said there's no deal in
heres the deal I need to get on the phone
with the Ukrainians and the Europeans. And now, Professor, we
actually do have the result of that. Can we go
ahead and put Donald Trump's truth please up on the screen,
because this lays out exactly what you said, and I
(11:40):
can go ahead and read from it. It says a
great and very successful day in Alaska. The meeting with
President Putin went very well, as did a late night
phone call. But he says, quote, it was determined by
all that the best way to end the horrific war
between Russia and Ukraine is to go directly to a
peace agreement which would end the war and not a
mere ceasefire agreement often does not hold up. President Zelenski
(12:02):
will be coming to DC the Oval Office on Monday afternoon.
If it all works out, we will then schedule a
meeting with President Putin immediately. Sir, we also got Zelenski's
reaction and kind of the laying out of where I
think things are going to trip up, So let's go
ahead and put that up there as well, because it's
very similar to the ceasefire demand that was made initially.
(12:24):
He says killings must stop as soon as possible. The
fire must cease both on the battlefield and in the sky,
as well as our poor infrastructure. All Ukrainian POWs and
civilians must be released. Pressure must be maintained with the
aggression and occupation. In my conversation with President Trump, I
said that sanctions could be strengthened if there's no trilateral
meeting with Russia. Sanctions are an effective tool, and then
(12:46):
security must be guaranteed reliably and in the long term
with the involvement of both the europe and the US.
All important to Ukraine must be discussed with Ukraine's participation.
So it appears, you know, given the context serve everything
that you've laid out here, that we see that Trump
is now dropping the initial ceasefire demand, which effectively, as
(13:06):
you said, wouldn't make a lot of battlefield sense for Russia.
But on the peace agreement terms, he's accepting this. European
or at the very least, the European and the Ukrainians
are effectively demanding the same ceasefire that Putin just rejected,
as well as a laundry, list of other things that
are unacceptable to the Russian So how do you expect
then the Monday meeting to go with President Zelenski in
(13:28):
the Oval office.
Speaker 4 (13:32):
Well, I think there's one very important dimension to what
Trump said that we don't want to lose sight of,
and that is I think he's passing the torch to Zelensky.
Speaker 3 (13:46):
Yes, I think in.
Speaker 4 (13:47):
A very important way, Trump has come to understand that
he can't settle this one right. There's no way he
can agree Trump to a peace agreement and convince the Ukranians,
the Europeans, and the Western foreign policy establishment that that's
the smart thing to do, right, And he can't convince
(14:08):
Putin to agree to a ceasefire.
Speaker 3 (14:11):
So what can Trump do?
Speaker 4 (14:13):
And of course what Zelensky says he should do is
put secondary sanctions on Russia. And we could talk about that,
because this meeting was in good part about secondary sanctions
and Trump's interest in secondary sanctions in the past. But
Trump understands, he was asked afterwards, what this means for
(14:34):
secondary sanctions. There's going to be no secondary sanctions at
least at this point, says Trump. So the sanctions are
off the table. The cease fire is off the table,
and Trump is basically agreed with Putin that you got
to go directly. He said this, you got to go
directly for a peace agreement. So Zelensky comes to the
(14:55):
White House. What does this mean. He's basically saying, I
that Zelenski and the Europeans can now sit down with
Putin and they can work this out. If they need me,
I'll be there, but it's up to them. I'm not
going to cut a deal and then try and force
(15:15):
it down the throats of the Ukrainians and the Europeans
because they don't want to go along with me. So
if you listen to the press conference, this is what
you were playing. He's said, it's ultimately up to them.
He said he's going to call NATO, He's going to
call the Ukrainians. But what happens is and these were
(15:36):
his words and the clip that you played it is
ultimately up to them. Very important words. Yes, And I
think Trump just understands he can't solve this one, and
he's correct, he can't.
Speaker 3 (15:50):
Solve this one.
Speaker 4 (15:52):
He might have been able to solve it if he
had been strategically smart from the get go, but since
he talked, took office on January twentieth. Up to now,
he has behaved in a remarkably foolish and uninformed way
in terms of dealing with the Russians. What he finally
(16:14):
figured out yesterday after talking to Putin he should have
figured out before he moved into the White House on
January twentieth. The Russians have had one position on this
issue since at least last June fourteenth. Last June fourteenth,
(16:36):
this is June fourteenth, twenty twenty four. Right, Putin said
very clearly what the Russian demands were. They were consistent
with what he had said before June fourteenth.
Speaker 3 (16:47):
Twenty twenty four.
Speaker 4 (16:48):
And he has not changed those demands at all since
June fourteenth, twenty twenty four. So why didn't Trump and
company understand exactly what those demands were and work around
them starting on January twentieth. I don't know what the
answer is, but they didn't. So and the end result
is he finally figured it out yesterday.
Speaker 6 (17:08):
And so from your perspective, it was the like the
Vladimir stop, we need to stop this on day one,
like that was all that was all a mistake, and
he needed to understand that he had to approach this
through the context of a broader peace agreement. Is that
is that what you would say was the mistake that I.
Speaker 4 (17:28):
Think the fundamental mistake Ryan, is that the vast majority
of people in the foreign policy establishment refused to accept
the argument that the Russians see Ukraine in NATO.
Speaker 3 (17:40):
As an existential threat.
Speaker 4 (17:42):
It's an existential threat for Putin and the people around him,
and given it as an existential threat, they are willing
to fight a war, a major league war, to prevent
Ukraine from joining NATO or having security guarantee from the West.
We can't get it through earth thick skulls here in
(18:06):
the West that Russia views Ukraine and NATO as an
existential threat, and we continue to play this game where
we have continued to play this game up until yesterday,
where we thought that Ukraine could have security guarantees from
the West, or maybe it could even join NATO, that
(18:29):
Ukraine could get that territory back that it's lost.
Speaker 3 (18:33):
And so forth and so on.
Speaker 4 (18:34):
We've been delusional up to now. And I believe that
the Ukrainians and the Europeans, and huge chunks of the
national security establishment here in the United States will remain
delusional until the situation on the battlefield makes it impossible
to continue along that foolish path.
Speaker 3 (18:56):
Right.
Speaker 1 (18:56):
It's very tragic the result that you're laying out, but
it obviously, it is obviously the most likely. One of
the things Sarah I want to talk about is the
last grasp of the maximal pressurists is these secondary sanctions,
because Russia is already the most sanctioned country in the
world by the United States, and as Putin pointed out
(19:17):
actually in his press conference, he's like, yeah, our GDP
is up by twenty percent, you know, like we're actually
doing fine. Trump has tried his hands roughly at some
sort of these secondary sanctions with India. But you know,
it's very interesting that the Indian government has not changed
his position a single iota. And in fact, it was
a talking point of the Western security establishment that the
(19:39):
secondary sanctions on India were the reason that Putin agreed
to this summit in the first place. There does not
seem to be hard evidence of that, given you know,
now necessarily how the result of the peace talks happened,
and especially because they didn't change their position. But does
that factor into how you say that the West has
handled itself foolishly in believing that there's one more secret
(20:00):
trick they might be able to pull to change the
strategic calculus of the Russians.
Speaker 4 (20:06):
Yes, I mean secondary sanctions are of enormous importance, and
I believe this meeting was all about secondary sanctions. Now
you're saying to yourself, what exactly does John mean? You
want to remember that Trump in the weeks before this
meeting was threatened name secondary sanctions on Russia, and what
that means is that you're effectively not going to sanction Russia, because,
(20:30):
as you pointed out, the Russians are so sanctioned at
this point that there are no more direct sanctions you
can put on the Russians that are meaningful. Secondary sanctions
mean that you're going to put sanctions on India and
China and a few other countries, but mainly India and
China if they continue to trade with Russia. In other words,
(20:52):
if they continue to import Russian oil, well, they're not
going to work. We cannot put secondary sanctions on the Chinese.
They have too much leverage over us because of rare
earths and magnets, and as you pointed out, the Indians
have made it clear that secondary sanctions are not going
to work with them, and if anything, it's going to
(21:15):
drive the Indians closer to the Russians. Just completely counterproductive.
So secondary sanctions don't work. So what happened here was
Trump got himself into a real pickle. He had promised
that he was going to put secondary sanctions on the
Russians by August eighth, So what does he do? A
(21:35):
few days before August eighth? He sends Steve whitcoff Off
to Moscow to talk with Putin about having a meeting
the beating that took place yesterday. So if you have
that meeting, then you don't have to put sanctions on
the Russians secondary sanctions, which are again effectively sanctions on
(21:58):
India and China. On August. What happens is Witkof goes
talks to Putin. Of course agrees to a meeting, because
a meeting is mona from heaven for Putin, for reasons
we talked about at the start of the show, right,
he agrees, and Witkoff comes back tells Trump. Trump announces
(22:18):
that they're going to have this meeting and he doesn't
have to put secondary sanctions on the Russians on August eighth,
he gets out of the pickle, and it's this meeting
yesterday that does the trick. So one could argue that
the meeting yesterday wasn't a way of victory for Trump
because he got away from that promise. And furthermore, as
(22:43):
we talked about before, it's very important to.
Speaker 3 (22:45):
Understand that he was asked after the.
Speaker 4 (22:48):
Meeting whether or not secondary sanctions would be put on
the Russians, and he basically said that ship has sailed.
So he has taken at least up to now. You
can never know for sure with Trump, but he has
at least for now solved that big problem that he had. Yeah, well,
just to say, guys, the fact is that we have
(23:11):
no cards to play.
Speaker 3 (23:12):
Here, right.
Speaker 6 (23:14):
He solved the problem, but as you pointed out, it
was a problem of his own making.
Speaker 3 (23:18):
Solutely.
Speaker 6 (23:21):
Since with Ukraine coming next week, I want to ask
you from Ukraine's perspective, and I'll put up I think
this is roughly a fairly recent sense of where where
the front lines are. You know, Ukraine, you know, still
has access to the to the Black Sea along these
if these lines were frozen from what I hear from Ukrainians,
they say, okay, what it's actually just going to give
(23:44):
Russia a chance to regroup and then they're going to
attack again and completely cut us off from the Black Sea,
and we will just be instead of a eighty percent
rump of a country, will be a forty percent rump
of a country, landlocked and just a dual client of
both Russia and the EU. So, if you're the Ukrainians,
(24:06):
what's your what are you fighting for here and what's
your best case scenario?
Speaker 4 (24:12):
Well, I have been arguing for a long time. I think,
as you know, Ryan, that the best case from Ukraine's
point of view is to settle this war immediately, because,
as you point out, they're going to lose twenty percent
if they agree to give up those four ro Oho
blosts plus Crimea, about twenty two percent of pre two
(24:33):
thy fourteen Ukraine will be lost. Is this a tragedy
for Ukraine? Absolutely, there's no question about it. I fully
understand why no Ukrainian would want to agree to give
up twenty two percent of the territory of the country. However,
the question you always have to ask yourself as a
good strategist is what is the alternative and the alternative
(24:56):
is to continue fighting, and as you pointed out, if
you continue fighting, you're likely to lose probably about half
the country.
Speaker 3 (25:05):
You're likely to.
Speaker 4 (25:06):
Lose Odessa and that would be catastrophic. You're likely to
lose Harkiev, You're likely to use a lose a handful
more o bloss as well, So you will end up
in that scenario as a dysfunctional rump state. It seems
to me the least bad alternative, and I'm choosing words
(25:27):
carefully here, it's not a good alternative. It's the least
bad alternative is to cut a deal now and minimize.
Speaker 3 (25:35):
How much territory you lose and.
Speaker 4 (25:37):
Also minimize the number of Ukrainians who are going to
die if you continue to fight on. The other thing
is if you continue to fight on and you continue
to insist it you're going to be in NATO, and
you continue to insist you need security guarantees from the West,
and the West flirts with you about security guarantees. You
(25:59):
just give the Russians greater incentives to take more territory
and to make you a truly dysfunctional rub state. What
the Ukrainians should want to do, and I understand this
is hard to swallow. Is to survive as a rump state,
but not as a dysfunctional rum state, and try to
(26:22):
come up with some sort of modus vivendi with the
Russians so that the Russians don't feel threatened, so that
they're not bent on wrecking your country. This is the
best alternative for the Ukrainians at this point of time.
But getting that point through to Zelenskian company and to
(26:43):
the Europeans especially, but also to huge chunks of the
American national security establishment is almost impossible to do. It
really is, sir.
Speaker 1 (26:55):
It's mystifying because it's like they live in an alternative
reality where this status quo is somehow good for Ukraine.
I mean, let's go ahead and put the battlefield reality
tear sheet please up there on the screen. Literally days before,
they made huge gains on the Ukrainian front line, one
of the biggest breakthroughs by the Russians so far. They
(27:16):
have a manpower advantage, obviously, you know the average age
of the Ukrainian military. We still, you know, it remains unclear.
And this is my main question is about inside of Ukraine.
Because Zelenski is wedded to this maximalist position, which again
we all emotionally understand. But the Ukrainian people, we recently
(27:37):
had a poll on our show that we showed had
some you know, a major support actually for some sort
of negotiation, but there's no elections, and in fact, you know,
he's been cracking down on domestic dissension from the beginning
of the war, on top of recently signing this you know,
anti corruption law, which drew massive protests to the streets.
(27:57):
So in that time, in this initial timeframe, it appears
that the most likely scenario is Zelenski will reject outright
some sort of meeting. Trump remains in his pickle about
secondary sanctions, doesn't know what to do. The war will
continue fighting on, at the very least with European support.
Trump seems happy to send you know, weapons to the
(28:18):
Ukrainians as long as the Europeans buy them, and it'll
be like some sort of semi frozen conflict where the
frontline moves daily. Now, how long does Ukraine, the polity,
like the people left inside of Ukraine tolerate that situation,
as you said, as long as these thousands and thousands
of their you know, they're men, increasingly elder men begin
(28:39):
to keep dying on the battlefield.
Speaker 4 (28:42):
It's very hard to answer that question. I mean, the
only sort of analogous case that I know is Germany
and World War One, and what happened is that the
Americans entered the war in April of nineteen seventeen. And
what happened was that by the spring of nineteen eighteen,
(29:04):
the Americans were beginning to come in in huge numbers,
and this meant that the balance of power on the
battlefield in terms of man power, was shifting against the Germans.
This is over the course of nineteen eighteen. At the
same time, what was happening in Germany is.
Speaker 3 (29:24):
That support for the war on the home front.
Speaker 4 (29:26):
Was collapsing, and it was because of the blockade that
the West had put on Germany and on Austria Hungary.
Those countries were starving. It was a total disaster. So
support for the war on the home front evaporated. At
the same time, the coming of the Americans on the
(29:47):
battlefield shifted the balance of power in ways that made
it apparent that Germany was going to lose. And the
end result is that by October nineteen eighteen, Germany was through.
It was all over with and you got a peace agreement.
And you want to remember that the Allies never set
(30:09):
foot during the combat on German territory. Germany collapsed on
the home front. So just to go to Ukraine today,
if you look at what's happening on the battlefield, it's
very clear, and you were hinting at this that Ukraine
does not have enough manpower. They do not have enough infantry,
(30:32):
and infantry is of enormous importance for pairying those Russian offensives.
The Russians have a huge manpower advantage. Looks a lot
like World War One in nineteen eighteen. Is the Americans
come in, the balance of power on the ground is shifting.
And then if you look at what's happening on the
home front, is you just describe support for the war
(30:56):
is evaporating. Huge numbers of people have left or leave
the country. Public opinion has turned against the war. So
it does look like the situation is going to end
in disaster for Ukraine. It's hard to imagine this going
on for another year, given the balance of power and
(31:18):
given public opinion at home. So all of this is
to say the Ukrainians are doomed. And by the way,
I think Trump and his advisors understand this, and they
are telling the Ukrainians and the Europeans, Okay, you want
to continue the fight, We'll give you the weaponry. As
you pointed out, We're going to continue to give the
(31:38):
Ukrainians the weapons, not directly, they're going to go through
the Europeans. The Europeans are going to pay for them.
But American weaponry will go to the Ukrainians. It won't
be enough. But the real problem here is manpower. And
so my view is that Ukraine is doomed, and Zelinski
(31:59):
will soon figure that out, and they'll have to reach
some sort of accommodation with the Russians, and you'll get
a frozen piece.
Speaker 6 (32:07):
Do you have a sense of where this goes from here? Like,
how much of the World War One analogy can you
draw out? I mean, obviously, a post war Ukraine would
not have the kind of industrial capacity of a post war,
post World War One Germany. And so even if it
if it's far right did feel that it was quote
(32:28):
unquote stabbed in the back and forced into this bad agreement,
it wouldn't really have the capacity to create some monster
over the next thirty years. But what kind of knock
on effects could you expect from a piece of the
kind you're talking about.
Speaker 4 (32:44):
Yeah, this is a great question. I mean, you're absolutely right.
Germany was a monster, right. You went from nineteen fourteen
to nineteen eighteen fighting that monster and defeating it, and
involved the Russians, the French, the British, and then the
Americans took four countries to take the Germans down. And
the Germans key ally was Austria Hungary, which one could
(33:07):
argue was an albatross around the Germans neck. So Germany
was very powerful and when the war ended, the question
is what do you do with that monster? And of
course again we had World War II against that monster
starting in nineteen thirty nine, But this is a completely
different situation that regard. The smart thing for the Ukrainians
(33:30):
to do, as I said before, is, except the fact
that they've lost, right, try to settle it now and
then work out a modus vivendi with the Russians. Do
I think that's going to happen.
Speaker 3 (33:43):
No. And the reason is not simply.
Speaker 4 (33:46):
The Ukrainians, right, who will have powerful incentives to want
to get back that territory. It's also because the West,
and this includes the United States will not accept defeat,
and we will go to great lengths. We in the
West will go to great lengths to cause the Russians
trouble in those areas of Ukraine that they incorporate into Russia,
(34:11):
and the Ukrainians will do the same, and the Russians,
of course will retaliate. And furthermore, you have all sorts
of other potential flash points in Eastern Europe where trouble
could start. Belarus, the Baltic, Arctic, Moldova, the Black Sea,
and so forth, and so on. The potential flash points
(34:32):
are numerous, right, And the end result is I think
you're going to have poisonous relations between the Russians on
one side and the Ukrainians and the West on the
other side. For as far as the eye can sing.
You're not going to have that modus vivenda that I
was talking about. And again I have to say, I
do not understand why people cannot come to grips with
(34:57):
the fact that's settling this war and creating decent relations
between Russia and Ukraine is in Ukraine's interest, right, It
just boggles my mind.
Speaker 6 (35:10):
Is is it ultimately? Before is it ultimately because it's
not up up to Ukraine. Victoria Newland said, you know,
as I think Russia was launching its invasion. Okay, if
they succeed in going to Kiy, they can look forward to,
you know, decades of guerrilla war inside Ukraine.
Speaker 3 (35:27):
Uh.
Speaker 6 (35:27):
And it wasn't as if this was a generous offer
to Ukraine. This was a we are going to see
this goerrilla war, whether Ukraine likes it or not. So
maybe it's just as simple as if it was up
to Ukraine, they would make a more strategic choice.
Speaker 3 (35:44):
But it's not.
Speaker 4 (35:45):
Well, you want to remember Ryan that immediately after the
war started, Putin put out peace fielers to the Ukrainians
to come to sort of come to some sort of
peace agreement so that they could end the war.
Speaker 3 (35:59):
Then remember the.
Speaker 4 (36:00):
War starts in February twenty twenty two, and they're negotiating.
This is the Ukrainians and the Russians. They're negotiating to
end the war almost immediately after it starts, the famous
Istanbul negotiations. And they don't reach an agreement, but they're
making major league progress towards reaching an agreement. And what
happens is that the Americans and the British in the
(36:23):
form of Boris Johnson come in and tell the Ukrainians
to walk away from the negotiations and to continue the war.
So this supports your basic point that we have been
more enthusiastic about this war at different points than the
Ukrainians have, and I think a lot of that has
(36:44):
to do with the fact and I think this reflects
Victorian Newlands thinking that we don't have to do the fighting,
we don't do the dying, and we can use the
Ukrainians for that purpose. We can use the Ukrainians to
bleed the Russians white. The Russians are now a great
Russia is now a great power. This is a problem
(37:04):
for us in their mind, and we have to weaken Russia,
and Ukraine is the perfect opportunity to do that.
Speaker 1 (37:12):
My last question for you, sir, concerns grant strategy. I've
been inspired by your work, you know, intellectually and more.
I cannot you know in this moment, I'm just shocked
at especially with a lot of the people in the
Trump administration. I know them personally. I know you do
as well. And we heard for years about the folly
of being obsessed with the Middle East of American security doctrine,
(37:34):
just having this religious devotion you know, to NATO, to Europe,
to the Middle East, and as I watch, you know,
are the consumption of US weaponry, of US attention and
diplomacy on Israel. Uh uh, you know, an obsession really
with Israel. And then also similar session here with Ukraine,
and then even you know, determining our relationship with India
and with China on the basis of Ukraine. It just
(37:56):
seems so counter to any grand strategics of the United
States and of our Asia, which will compromise on fifty
percent GDP, you know, in the next couple of years.
So just at a very you know, fifty thousand foot level,
does this just confirm really that not only will we
have the twenty twenties be a Chinese decade, but of
(38:17):
one where you know, the US really is just choosing
the last bastions of this Cold War and nineteen nineties
you know, mentality, and when we had the opportunity, which
it seems to be right now, we just decided not
to take it.
Speaker 4 (38:31):
Yeah, I think that's an accurate description of what's happened here.
I mean, the Trump administration and the Biden administration both
argued that the principal contingency the United States should concern
itself with is a war against China and East Asia,
and that their principal goal should be to contain China
(38:53):
in East Asia. That was the consensus opinion inside both administrations.
But what's happened is that we can't get out of Ukraine.
We're pinned down from Ukraine. And the situation in the
Middle East is even worse if you look at what
(39:14):
happened in the war that we picked with the Houthis.
Remember Trump said We're going to go out and beat
the Houthis, and after about a month, Trump said, We're
quitting this war. Those Houthis are mighty formidable. But of
course the real reason that we quit the war is
that we were running through our inventories of weapons at
(39:35):
record pace, and our inventories are not very deep.
Speaker 3 (39:39):
And then we get in.
Speaker 4 (39:41):
The wars that Israel, get involved in the wars that
Israel's fighting, especially their war with Iran, and there again
we're using up all sorts for American weaponry, and we're
pinned down in the Middle East. Right, the Biden administration
at least had the good sense not to get sucked
into a war with Iran. The Israelis, of course, we're
(40:03):
trying to suck us into a war with Iran in
twenty twenty four, but the Biden administration, which did a
few smart things strategically at least in this case, avoided
a war in Iran. But Trump foolishly on June twenty
second of this year, decided to go to war against Iran.
So we're stuck in that situation now, and the question
(40:27):
is how do we get out? So I think from
a strategic point of view, what's going on with regard
to Ukraine and what is going on with regard to
the Middle East as disastrous. And then there's the moral dimension.
Speaker 3 (40:40):
We don't want to.
Speaker 4 (40:41):
Lose sight of the fact that the United States is
complicit in a genocide in the Middle East, that what
is happening in Gods is a genocide. And for those
people who don't want to call it a genocide, I
would think you would least have to acknowledge that this
is mass murder on a scale that we haven't seen
in a long time, and certainly it's mass murder on
(41:04):
the scale we would never accept or should never accept
from a close ally. But nevertheless, here we are supporting
Israel hook line and sinker as it executes a genocide.
So from both a strategic point of view and a
moral point of view, when you look at the behavior
(41:25):
of the Biden administration and now the Trump administration, it
leaves me at least with a sick feeling in my stomach.
Speaker 1 (41:34):
I couldn't agree with you more, sir. It's always just
such an honor to talk to you, So thank you
so much for joining us and giving us your time
to break down this summit.
Speaker 4 (41:41):
Thank you very much to the two of you for
having me on, asking excellent questions and letting me give
these lengthy answers.
Speaker 1 (41:48):
Well, that's what you always have a platform here to do,
so so we look forward to seeing you.
Speaker 4 (41:53):
Again next time.
Speaker 1 (41:54):
Likewise, all right, we're going to go to the second
half of our show now, which is available to premium subscribers.
I hope you guys enjoyed that. And if you want
to be able to watch things like that as well
as Ama on our Friday shows Breakingpoints dot com, you
can become one today.
Speaker 6 (42:06):
Let's get to it.
Hey, guys, Saga and Crystal here.
Speaker 2 (00:01):
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Speaker 1 (00:25):
We need your help to build the future of independent
news media and we hope to see you at Breakingpoints
dot com. All right, hello everybody, Happy Saturday. It is
Ryan and I here to break down the everything that's
gone on in the news. And you may have noticed
that we actually have a very special guest who we're
very honored to be joined by, Professor John Meerscheimer the
University of Chicago, an intellectual hero of mine and a
(00:48):
great friend of the show. Sir, thank you so much
for joining us.
Speaker 3 (00:51):
We really appreciate it. Thank you for having me.
Speaker 4 (00:53):
It's my pleasure to be here with you and Ryan.
Speaker 1 (00:56):
Absolutely, sir, So we are going to go through with
you everything that happen yesterday at the Trump Putin summit,
as well as some of the information that is now
coming out as a result. So just for everybody purposes,
we're recording this around nine am Eastern time. Things could
obviously change with the diplomatic situation, but this is generally
where things stand as of right now. So Griffin, could
(01:18):
we go ahead and start to kind of the show
of the summit where Trump made a big grand gesture
at the in Alaska. At that summit, greeting Putin with
the red carpet lined with US fighter jets, he flew
a B two bomber escort over Putin's head as a
(01:40):
show of a tremendous military might. That seemed to kind
of be the tone that Trump wanted to set a
reminder to Putin quote whose boss? But things very quickly
changed from their professor. What we started to see was
a nearly three hour three on three meeting between Donald Trump,
Secretary Rubio, Steve Wikoff, two of Putin's advisors, and their translators.
(02:05):
There was a scheduled lunch which they eventually missed, and
they announced in a flurry of changes of press conference
at that press conference. It really isn't even fair to
call it a press conference, is more of a press announcement.
Lasted about twelve minutes. Putin actually spoke first, So Griffin,
let's go ahead and take a listen to putin what
(02:26):
he had to say, specifically his framing of an agreement
that they had had the Trump later rejects, but the
contours of what the setting piece is for what follows
after the summit. Griffin, let's go ahead and take a listen.
Speaker 3 (02:40):
Please.
Speaker 5 (02:41):
I expect that today's agreements will be the starting point
not only for the solution of the Ukrainian issue, but
also will help us bring back business like and pragmatic
relations between Russia and the US. And in the end,
I would like to add one more thing. I'd like
to remind you of twenty twenty two. During the last
contact with the previous administration, I tried to convince my
(03:04):
previous American colleague, we should not the situation should not
be brought to the point of no return when it
would come to hostilities.
Speaker 1 (03:17):
So Professor, he initially framed things as an agreement, but
the real top line was that there was no ceasefire
that was announced, and it appears that he rejected the European,
Ukrainian and US position for an immediate ceasefire, just broadly.
Having watched Putin's full eight minute statement and everything, as
well as some of the positions that the United States
(03:40):
tried to force onto Putin in the head of this summit,
what's your reaction so far just to putin the way
that he handled himself there with Donald Trump, and what
does it tell us about the broader situation.
Speaker 4 (03:51):
Well, I think that Putin obviously did a brilliant job
of handling himself in yes day's meeting.
Speaker 3 (04:01):
There's just no question about that.
Speaker 4 (04:03):
And that's really all he had to do was come
and look diplomatic, look smart, look respectful of President Trump,
and it would do a great deal to put an
end to his isolation in the West and give him
real legitimacy. And he came in and is I think
(04:25):
almost everybody expected. He did the job, and he was
very effective in that way. And then there's the whole
question of the ceasefire, which you raise just for the
audience's purposes or for clarification for the audience. It's important
to understand that there's a difference between a peace agreement
(04:48):
and a ceasefire. And really, what the Russians want is
not a cease fire, because they're winning on the battlefield.
What they want is a peace agreement. And what the
West wants and the Ukrainians want.
Speaker 3 (05:02):
Is a ceasefire.
Speaker 4 (05:04):
And Trump tried to convince Putin that what we need
here is a ceasefire. And what resulted is that Putin
said there will be no ceasefire. We have to have
a peace agreement. And in fact, Trump has now backed
off from demanding a ceasefire. And he said to someone
(05:29):
after the meeting that the best solution to this problem
is to go directly to a peace agreement, in other words,
putting the ceasefire that the Ukrainians and the Europeans and
many people in the United States want aside. He's saying
that's a non starter after having talked to Putin. So
(05:50):
I think, in terms of the clip that you just showed,
that's the most important subjective point.
Speaker 6 (05:56):
And can you impact for people why Ukraine would be
reluctant to reach a peace agreement versus an immediate ceasefire, Like,
what is the advantage of one over the other to Ukraine.
Speaker 4 (06:08):
Well, the advantages of a ceasefire are mainly that Ukraine
is losing on the battlefield and the West cannot do
much to help it at this point in time. So
if you can create a ceasefire, put an end to
(06:31):
the fighting on the battlefield, that gives the Ukrainians a
respite Number one and number two, it allows them to
get more arms from the West to build up their
forces and then put up a better fight against the
Russians moving forward once the fighting restarts, in other words,
(06:51):
once the ceasefire ends. But the Russians are not dumkoffs,
and they understand if they're winning it would be nuts,
to put it bluntly, them to stop the war when
they're winning, allow the Ukrainians to recover and then fight
more effectively at some point down the road. So the
Russians have no interest in a ceasefire. Ukraine and the
(07:13):
West really like the idea. What the Russians want is
they want a peace agreement. They want to settle this one,
but they want to settle it on their terms. It's
very important to understand this. The Russians view Ukraine joining
NATO as an existential threat. This war for them is existential,
(07:36):
and they have a set of demands that they will
not compromise on near three principal demands. One is that
Ukraine and the West recognize that Russia has a next
those four oh blosts that they now partially occupy four
oh bloss in Ukraine plus Crimea. That's demand number one.
(08:00):
Number two is that Ukraine be a neutral state. That
means it can't be a NATO and there can't be
Western security guarantees, especially a security guarantee from the United States. Ukraine,
from the Russian perspective, has to be neutral. Third demand
is that Ukraine has to disarm, not completely, but disarmed
(08:23):
to the point where it has no offensive military capability,
i e. It can't threaten Russia. Now, these are three
harsh demands from the Ukrainian point of view and from
the West point of view, these are unacceptable demands to
the Ukrainians and to most people in the West, and
(08:45):
this is why you can't get a peace agreement. So
what we have here is the Russians want a peace agreement,
the Ukrainians in the West have no interest in a
peace agreement. The West and the Ukrainians want to cease fire,
and the ru Ussians have no interest in a ceasefire,
and the end result is you have a very short
meeting and you have no agreement.
Speaker 6 (09:09):
Very well, said sir.
Speaker 1 (09:10):
Let's go ahead and take a listen to Donald Trump,
because with that context, everything that he says begins to
make no sense. There's no deal until there's a deal.
I need to get on the phone with NATO and
with Ukraine, which has now happened, and we're going to
give everybody the results. But it's still actually really the
framework that I want people to go into with the
Trump press conference again, press announcement is, I have never
(09:31):
known this man not to take an extraordinary amount of questions.
Even in the Helsinki summit of twenty eighteen, it's three
minutes roughly that he speaks. It's clear that he is
incredibly muted, both emotionally, you know, after his meeting with Putin,
and I think what he's realizing in real time is
the mistake you know that he made in agreeing to
these European and Ukrainian quote red lines, going into the
(09:54):
summit itself and starting to understand the exact puzzle that
you just laid out. So with that guy, let's go
ahead and take a listen to Donald Trump and what
he had to say.
Speaker 7 (10:04):
We've made some headway. So there's no deal. Until there's
a deal. I will call up NATO in a little while,
I will call up the various people that I think
are appropriate, and all of course call up Presidents Olynsky
and tell him about today's meeting.
Speaker 3 (10:21):
It's ultimately up with them. They're going to have to
agree with what Marco.
Speaker 7 (10:27):
And Steve and some of the great people from the
Trump administration who've come here, Scott and John right, thank
you very much. We have some of our really great leaders.
They've been doing a phenomenal job. We also have some
tremendous Russian business representatives here and I think you know,
(10:48):
everybody wants to deal with us. We've become the hottest
country anywhere in the world at a very short period
of time, and we look forward to that. We look
forward to dealing. We try and get this over with.
We really made some great progress today. I've always had
a fantastic relationship with President Putin. With Vladimir we had
(11:11):
many many tough meetings, good meetings. We were interfered with
by the Russia. Russia Russia host.
Speaker 1 (11:19):
All right, Griffin, you can go ahead and come out
of this, because that's effectively everything that we do need
to know, which is he said there's no deal in
heres the deal I need to get on the phone
with the Ukrainians and the Europeans. And now, Professor, we
actually do have the result of that. Can we go
ahead and put Donald Trump's truth please up on the screen,
because this lays out exactly what you said, and I
(11:40):
can go ahead and read from it. It says a
great and very successful day in Alaska. The meeting with
President Putin went very well, as did a late night
phone call. But he says, quote, it was determined by
all that the best way to end the horrific war
between Russia and Ukraine is to go directly to a
peace agreement which would end the war and not a
mere ceasefire agreement often does not hold up. President Zelenski
(12:02):
will be coming to DC the Oval Office on Monday afternoon.
If it all works out, we will then schedule a
meeting with President Putin immediately. Sir, we also got Zelenski's
reaction and kind of the laying out of where I
think things are going to trip up, So let's go
ahead and put that up there as well, because it's
very similar to the ceasefire demand that was made initially.
(12:24):
He says killings must stop as soon as possible. The
fire must cease both on the battlefield and in the sky,
as well as our poor infrastructure. All Ukrainian POWs and
civilians must be released. Pressure must be maintained with the
aggression and occupation. In my conversation with President Trump, I
said that sanctions could be strengthened if there's no trilateral
meeting with Russia. Sanctions are an effective tool, and then
(12:46):
security must be guaranteed reliably and in the long term
with the involvement of both the europe and the US.
All important to Ukraine must be discussed with Ukraine's participation.
So it appears, you know, given the context serve everything
that you've laid out here, that we see that Trump
is now dropping the initial ceasefire demand, which effectively, as
(13:06):
you said, wouldn't make a lot of battlefield sense for Russia.
But on the peace agreement terms, he's accepting this. European
or at the very least, the European and the Ukrainians
are effectively demanding the same ceasefire that Putin just rejected,
as well as a laundry, list of other things that
are unacceptable to the Russian So how do you expect
then the Monday meeting to go with President Zelenski in
(13:28):
the Oval office.
Speaker 4 (13:32):
Well, I think there's one very important dimension to what
Trump said that we don't want to lose sight of,
and that is I think he's passing the torch to Zelensky.
Speaker 3 (13:46):
Yes, I think in.
Speaker 4 (13:47):
A very important way, Trump has come to understand that
he can't settle this one right. There's no way he
can agree Trump to a peace agreement and convince the Ukranians,
the Europeans, and the Western foreign policy establishment that that's
the smart thing to do, right, And he can't convince
(14:08):
Putin to agree to a ceasefire.
Speaker 3 (14:11):
So what can Trump do?
Speaker 4 (14:13):
And of course what Zelensky says he should do is
put secondary sanctions on Russia. And we could talk about that,
because this meeting was in good part about secondary sanctions
and Trump's interest in secondary sanctions in the past. But
Trump understands, he was asked afterwards, what this means for
(14:34):
secondary sanctions. There's going to be no secondary sanctions at
least at this point, says Trump. So the sanctions are
off the table. The cease fire is off the table,
and Trump is basically agreed with Putin that you got
to go directly. He said this, you got to go
directly for a peace agreement. So Zelensky comes to the
(14:55):
White House. What does this mean. He's basically saying, I
that Zelenski and the Europeans can now sit down with
Putin and they can work this out. If they need me,
I'll be there, but it's up to them. I'm not
going to cut a deal and then try and force
(15:15):
it down the throats of the Ukrainians and the Europeans
because they don't want to go along with me. So
if you listen to the press conference, this is what
you were playing. He's said, it's ultimately up to them.
He said he's going to call NATO, He's going to
call the Ukrainians. But what happens is and these were
(15:36):
his words and the clip that you played it is
ultimately up to them. Very important words. Yes, And I
think Trump just understands he can't solve this one, and
he's correct, he can't.
Speaker 3 (15:50):
Solve this one.
Speaker 4 (15:52):
He might have been able to solve it if he
had been strategically smart from the get go, but since
he talked, took office on January twentieth. Up to now,
he has behaved in a remarkably foolish and uninformed way
in terms of dealing with the Russians. What he finally
(16:14):
figured out yesterday after talking to Putin he should have
figured out before he moved into the White House on
January twentieth. The Russians have had one position on this
issue since at least last June fourteenth. Last June fourteenth,
(16:36):
this is June fourteenth, twenty twenty four. Right, Putin said
very clearly what the Russian demands were. They were consistent
with what he had said before June fourteenth.
Speaker 3 (16:47):
Twenty twenty four.
Speaker 4 (16:48):
And he has not changed those demands at all since
June fourteenth, twenty twenty four. So why didn't Trump and
company understand exactly what those demands were and work around
them starting on January twentieth. I don't know what the
answer is, but they didn't. So and the end result
is he finally figured it out yesterday.
Speaker 6 (17:08):
And so from your perspective, it was the like the
Vladimir stop, we need to stop this on day one,
like that was all that was all a mistake, and
he needed to understand that he had to approach this
through the context of a broader peace agreement. Is that
is that what you would say was the mistake that I.
Speaker 4 (17:28):
Think the fundamental mistake Ryan, is that the vast majority
of people in the foreign policy establishment refused to accept
the argument that the Russians see Ukraine in NATO.
Speaker 3 (17:40):
As an existential threat.
Speaker 4 (17:42):
It's an existential threat for Putin and the people around him,
and given it as an existential threat, they are willing
to fight a war, a major league war, to prevent
Ukraine from joining NATO or having security guarantee from the West.
We can't get it through earth thick skulls here in
(18:06):
the West that Russia views Ukraine and NATO as an
existential threat, and we continue to play this game where
we have continued to play this game up until yesterday,
where we thought that Ukraine could have security guarantees from
the West, or maybe it could even join NATO, that
(18:29):
Ukraine could get that territory back that it's lost.
Speaker 3 (18:33):
And so forth and so on.
Speaker 4 (18:34):
We've been delusional up to now. And I believe that
the Ukrainians and the Europeans, and huge chunks of the
national security establishment here in the United States will remain
delusional until the situation on the battlefield makes it impossible
to continue along that foolish path.
Speaker 3 (18:56):
Right.
Speaker 1 (18:56):
It's very tragic the result that you're laying out, but
it obviously, it is obviously the most likely. One of
the things Sarah I want to talk about is the
last grasp of the maximal pressurists is these secondary sanctions,
because Russia is already the most sanctioned country in the
world by the United States, and as Putin pointed out
(19:17):
actually in his press conference, he's like, yeah, our GDP
is up by twenty percent, you know, like we're actually
doing fine. Trump has tried his hands roughly at some
sort of these secondary sanctions with India. But you know,
it's very interesting that the Indian government has not changed
his position a single iota. And in fact, it was
a talking point of the Western security establishment that the
(19:39):
secondary sanctions on India were the reason that Putin agreed
to this summit in the first place. There does not
seem to be hard evidence of that, given you know,
now necessarily how the result of the peace talks happened,
and especially because they didn't change their position. But does
that factor into how you say that the West has
handled itself foolishly in believing that there's one more secret
(20:00):
trick they might be able to pull to change the
strategic calculus of the Russians.
Speaker 4 (20:06):
Yes, I mean secondary sanctions are of enormous importance, and
I believe this meeting was all about secondary sanctions. Now
you're saying to yourself, what exactly does John mean? You
want to remember that Trump in the weeks before this
meeting was threatened name secondary sanctions on Russia, and what
that means is that you're effectively not going to sanction Russia, because,
(20:30):
as you pointed out, the Russians are so sanctioned at
this point that there are no more direct sanctions you
can put on the Russians that are meaningful. Secondary sanctions
mean that you're going to put sanctions on India and
China and a few other countries, but mainly India and
China if they continue to trade with Russia. In other words,
(20:52):
if they continue to import Russian oil, well, they're not
going to work. We cannot put secondary sanctions on the Chinese.
They have too much leverage over us because of rare
earths and magnets, and as you pointed out, the Indians
have made it clear that secondary sanctions are not going
to work with them, and if anything, it's going to
(21:15):
drive the Indians closer to the Russians. Just completely counterproductive.
So secondary sanctions don't work. So what happened here was
Trump got himself into a real pickle. He had promised
that he was going to put secondary sanctions on the
Russians by August eighth, So what does he do? A
(21:35):
few days before August eighth? He sends Steve whitcoff Off
to Moscow to talk with Putin about having a meeting
the beating that took place yesterday. So if you have
that meeting, then you don't have to put sanctions on
the Russians secondary sanctions, which are again effectively sanctions on
(21:58):
India and China. On August. What happens is Witkof goes
talks to Putin. Of course agrees to a meeting, because
a meeting is mona from heaven for Putin, for reasons
we talked about at the start of the show, right,
he agrees, and Witkoff comes back tells Trump. Trump announces
(22:18):
that they're going to have this meeting and he doesn't
have to put secondary sanctions on the Russians on August eighth,
he gets out of the pickle, and it's this meeting
yesterday that does the trick. So one could argue that
the meeting yesterday wasn't a way of victory for Trump
because he got away from that promise. And furthermore, as
(22:43):
we talked about before, it's very important to.
Speaker 3 (22:45):
Understand that he was asked after the.
Speaker 4 (22:48):
Meeting whether or not secondary sanctions would be put on
the Russians, and he basically said that ship has sailed.
So he has taken at least up to now. You
can never know for sure with Trump, but he has
at least for now solved that big problem that he had. Yeah, well,
just to say, guys, the fact is that we have
(23:11):
no cards to play.
Speaker 3 (23:12):
Here, right.
Speaker 6 (23:14):
He solved the problem, but as you pointed out, it
was a problem of his own making.
Speaker 3 (23:18):
Solutely.
Speaker 6 (23:21):
Since with Ukraine coming next week, I want to ask
you from Ukraine's perspective, and I'll put up I think
this is roughly a fairly recent sense of where where
the front lines are. You know, Ukraine, you know, still
has access to the to the Black Sea along these
if these lines were frozen from what I hear from Ukrainians,
they say, okay, what it's actually just going to give
(23:44):
Russia a chance to regroup and then they're going to
attack again and completely cut us off from the Black Sea,
and we will just be instead of a eighty percent
rump of a country, will be a forty percent rump
of a country, landlocked and just a dual client of
both Russia and the EU. So, if you're the Ukrainians,
(24:06):
what's your what are you fighting for here and what's
your best case scenario?
Speaker 4 (24:12):
Well, I have been arguing for a long time. I think,
as you know, Ryan, that the best case from Ukraine's
point of view is to settle this war immediately, because,
as you point out, they're going to lose twenty percent
if they agree to give up those four ro Oho
blosts plus Crimea, about twenty two percent of pre two
(24:33):
thy fourteen Ukraine will be lost. Is this a tragedy
for Ukraine? Absolutely, there's no question about it. I fully
understand why no Ukrainian would want to agree to give
up twenty two percent of the territory of the country. However,
the question you always have to ask yourself as a
good strategist is what is the alternative and the alternative
(24:56):
is to continue fighting, and as you pointed out, if
you continue fighting, you're likely to lose probably about half
the country.
Speaker 3 (25:05):
You're likely to.
Speaker 4 (25:06):
Lose Odessa and that would be catastrophic. You're likely to
lose Harkiev, You're likely to use a lose a handful
more o bloss as well, So you will end up
in that scenario as a dysfunctional rump state. It seems
to me the least bad alternative, and I'm choosing words
(25:27):
carefully here, it's not a good alternative. It's the least
bad alternative is to cut a deal now and minimize.
Speaker 3 (25:35):
How much territory you lose and.
Speaker 4 (25:37):
Also minimize the number of Ukrainians who are going to
die if you continue to fight on. The other thing
is if you continue to fight on and you continue
to insist it you're going to be in NATO, and
you continue to insist you need security guarantees from the West,
and the West flirts with you about security guarantees. You
(25:59):
just give the Russians greater incentives to take more territory
and to make you a truly dysfunctional rub state. What
the Ukrainians should want to do, and I understand this
is hard to swallow. Is to survive as a rump state,
but not as a dysfunctional rum state, and try to
(26:22):
come up with some sort of modus vivendi with the
Russians so that the Russians don't feel threatened, so that
they're not bent on wrecking your country. This is the
best alternative for the Ukrainians at this point of time.
But getting that point through to Zelenskian company and to
(26:43):
the Europeans especially, but also to huge chunks of the
American national security establishment is almost impossible to do. It
really is, sir.
Speaker 1 (26:55):
It's mystifying because it's like they live in an alternative
reality where this status quo is somehow good for Ukraine.
I mean, let's go ahead and put the battlefield reality
tear sheet please up there on the screen. Literally days before,
they made huge gains on the Ukrainian front line, one
of the biggest breakthroughs by the Russians so far. They
(27:16):
have a manpower advantage, obviously, you know the average age
of the Ukrainian military. We still, you know, it remains unclear.
And this is my main question is about inside of Ukraine.
Because Zelenski is wedded to this maximalist position, which again
we all emotionally understand. But the Ukrainian people, we recently
(27:37):
had a poll on our show that we showed had
some you know, a major support actually for some sort
of negotiation, but there's no elections, and in fact, you know,
he's been cracking down on domestic dissension from the beginning
of the war, on top of recently signing this you know,
anti corruption law, which drew massive protests to the streets.
(27:57):
So in that time, in this initial timeframe, it appears
that the most likely scenario is Zelenski will reject outright
some sort of meeting. Trump remains in his pickle about
secondary sanctions, doesn't know what to do. The war will
continue fighting on, at the very least with European support.
Trump seems happy to send you know, weapons to the
(28:18):
Ukrainians as long as the Europeans buy them, and it'll
be like some sort of semi frozen conflict where the
frontline moves daily. Now, how long does Ukraine, the polity,
like the people left inside of Ukraine tolerate that situation,
as you said, as long as these thousands and thousands
of their you know, they're men, increasingly elder men begin
(28:39):
to keep dying on the battlefield.
Speaker 4 (28:42):
It's very hard to answer that question. I mean, the
only sort of analogous case that I know is Germany
and World War One, and what happened is that the
Americans entered the war in April of nineteen seventeen. And
what happened was that by the spring of nineteen eighteen,
(29:04):
the Americans were beginning to come in in huge numbers,
and this meant that the balance of power on the
battlefield in terms of man power, was shifting against the Germans.
This is over the course of nineteen eighteen. At the
same time, what was happening in Germany is.
Speaker 3 (29:24):
That support for the war on the home front.
Speaker 4 (29:26):
Was collapsing, and it was because of the blockade that
the West had put on Germany and on Austria Hungary.
Those countries were starving. It was a total disaster. So
support for the war on the home front evaporated. At
the same time, the coming of the Americans on the
(29:47):
battlefield shifted the balance of power in ways that made
it apparent that Germany was going to lose. And the
end result is that by October nineteen eighteen, Germany was through.
It was all over with and you got a peace agreement.
And you want to remember that the Allies never set
(30:09):
foot during the combat on German territory. Germany collapsed on
the home front. So just to go to Ukraine today,
if you look at what's happening on the battlefield, it's
very clear, and you were hinting at this that Ukraine
does not have enough manpower. They do not have enough infantry,
(30:32):
and infantry is of enormous importance for pairying those Russian offensives.
The Russians have a huge manpower advantage. Looks a lot
like World War One in nineteen eighteen. Is the Americans
come in, the balance of power on the ground is shifting.
And then if you look at what's happening on the
home front, is you just describe support for the war
(30:56):
is evaporating. Huge numbers of people have left or leave
the country. Public opinion has turned against the war. So
it does look like the situation is going to end
in disaster for Ukraine. It's hard to imagine this going
on for another year, given the balance of power and
(31:18):
given public opinion at home. So all of this is
to say the Ukrainians are doomed. And by the way,
I think Trump and his advisors understand this, and they
are telling the Ukrainians and the Europeans, Okay, you want
to continue the fight, We'll give you the weaponry. As
you pointed out, We're going to continue to give the
(31:38):
Ukrainians the weapons, not directly, they're going to go through
the Europeans. The Europeans are going to pay for them.
But American weaponry will go to the Ukrainians. It won't
be enough. But the real problem here is manpower. And
so my view is that Ukraine is doomed, and Zelinski
(31:59):
will soon figure that out, and they'll have to reach
some sort of accommodation with the Russians, and you'll get
a frozen piece.
Speaker 6 (32:07):
Do you have a sense of where this goes from here? Like,
how much of the World War One analogy can you
draw out? I mean, obviously, a post war Ukraine would
not have the kind of industrial capacity of a post war,
post World War One Germany. And so even if it
if it's far right did feel that it was quote
(32:28):
unquote stabbed in the back and forced into this bad agreement,
it wouldn't really have the capacity to create some monster
over the next thirty years. But what kind of knock
on effects could you expect from a piece of the
kind you're talking about.
Speaker 4 (32:44):
Yeah, this is a great question. I mean, you're absolutely right.
Germany was a monster, right. You went from nineteen fourteen
to nineteen eighteen fighting that monster and defeating it, and
involved the Russians, the French, the British, and then the
Americans took four countries to take the Germans down. And
the Germans key ally was Austria Hungary, which one could
(33:07):
argue was an albatross around the Germans neck. So Germany
was very powerful and when the war ended, the question
is what do you do with that monster? And of
course again we had World War II against that monster
starting in nineteen thirty nine, But this is a completely
different situation that regard. The smart thing for the Ukrainians
(33:30):
to do, as I said before, is, except the fact
that they've lost, right, try to settle it now and
then work out a modus vivendi with the Russians. Do
I think that's going to happen.
Speaker 3 (33:43):
No. And the reason is not simply.
Speaker 4 (33:46):
The Ukrainians, right, who will have powerful incentives to want
to get back that territory. It's also because the West,
and this includes the United States will not accept defeat,
and we will go to great lengths. We in the
West will go to great lengths to cause the Russians
trouble in those areas of Ukraine that they incorporate into Russia,
(34:11):
and the Ukrainians will do the same, and the Russians,
of course will retaliate. And furthermore, you have all sorts
of other potential flash points in Eastern Europe where trouble
could start. Belarus, the Baltic, Arctic, Moldova, the Black Sea,
and so forth, and so on. The potential flash points
(34:32):
are numerous, right, And the end result is I think
you're going to have poisonous relations between the Russians on
one side and the Ukrainians and the West on the
other side. For as far as the eye can sing.
You're not going to have that modus vivenda that I
was talking about. And again I have to say, I
do not understand why people cannot come to grips with
(34:57):
the fact that's settling this war and creating decent relations
between Russia and Ukraine is in Ukraine's interest, right, It
just boggles my mind.
Speaker 6 (35:10):
Is is it ultimately? Before is it ultimately because it's
not up up to Ukraine. Victoria Newland said, you know,
as I think Russia was launching its invasion. Okay, if
they succeed in going to Kiy, they can look forward to,
you know, decades of guerrilla war inside Ukraine.
Speaker 3 (35:27):
Uh.
Speaker 6 (35:27):
And it wasn't as if this was a generous offer
to Ukraine. This was a we are going to see
this goerrilla war, whether Ukraine likes it or not. So
maybe it's just as simple as if it was up
to Ukraine, they would make a more strategic choice.
Speaker 3 (35:44):
But it's not.
Speaker 4 (35:45):
Well, you want to remember Ryan that immediately after the
war started, Putin put out peace fielers to the Ukrainians
to come to sort of come to some sort of
peace agreement so that they could end the war.
Speaker 3 (35:59):
Then remember the.
Speaker 4 (36:00):
War starts in February twenty twenty two, and they're negotiating.
This is the Ukrainians and the Russians. They're negotiating to
end the war almost immediately after it starts, the famous
Istanbul negotiations. And they don't reach an agreement, but they're
making major league progress towards reaching an agreement. And what
happens is that the Americans and the British in the
(36:23):
form of Boris Johnson come in and tell the Ukrainians
to walk away from the negotiations and to continue the war.
So this supports your basic point that we have been
more enthusiastic about this war at different points than the
Ukrainians have, and I think a lot of that has
(36:44):
to do with the fact and I think this reflects
Victorian Newlands thinking that we don't have to do the fighting,
we don't do the dying, and we can use the
Ukrainians for that purpose. We can use the Ukrainians to
bleed the Russians white. The Russians are now a great
Russia is now a great power. This is a problem
(37:04):
for us in their mind, and we have to weaken Russia,
and Ukraine is the perfect opportunity to do that.
Speaker 1 (37:12):
My last question for you, sir, concerns grant strategy. I've
been inspired by your work, you know, intellectually and more.
I cannot you know in this moment, I'm just shocked
at especially with a lot of the people in the
Trump administration. I know them personally. I know you do
as well. And we heard for years about the folly
of being obsessed with the Middle East of American security doctrine,
(37:34):
just having this religious devotion you know, to NATO, to Europe,
to the Middle East, and as I watch, you know,
are the consumption of US weaponry, of US attention and
diplomacy on Israel. Uh uh, you know, an obsession really
with Israel. And then also similar session here with Ukraine,
and then even you know, determining our relationship with India
and with China on the basis of Ukraine. It just
(37:56):
seems so counter to any grand strategics of the United
States and of our Asia, which will compromise on fifty
percent GDP, you know, in the next couple of years.
So just at a very you know, fifty thousand foot level,
does this just confirm really that not only will we
have the twenty twenties be a Chinese decade, but of
(38:17):
one where you know, the US really is just choosing
the last bastions of this Cold War and nineteen nineties
you know, mentality, and when we had the opportunity, which
it seems to be right now, we just decided not
to take it.
Speaker 4 (38:31):
Yeah, I think that's an accurate description of what's happened here.
I mean, the Trump administration and the Biden administration both
argued that the principal contingency the United States should concern
itself with is a war against China and East Asia,
and that their principal goal should be to contain China
(38:53):
in East Asia. That was the consensus opinion inside both administrations.
But what's happened is that we can't get out of Ukraine.
We're pinned down from Ukraine. And the situation in the
Middle East is even worse if you look at what
(39:14):
happened in the war that we picked with the Houthis.
Remember Trump said We're going to go out and beat
the Houthis, and after about a month, Trump said, We're
quitting this war. Those Houthis are mighty formidable. But of
course the real reason that we quit the war is
that we were running through our inventories of weapons at
(39:35):
record pace, and our inventories are not very deep.
Speaker 3 (39:39):
And then we get in.
Speaker 4 (39:41):
The wars that Israel, get involved in the wars that
Israel's fighting, especially their war with Iran, and there again
we're using up all sorts for American weaponry, and we're
pinned down in the Middle East. Right, the Biden administration
at least had the good sense not to get sucked
into a war with Iran. The Israelis, of course, we're
(40:03):
trying to suck us into a war with Iran in
twenty twenty four, but the Biden administration, which did a
few smart things strategically at least in this case, avoided
a war in Iran. But Trump foolishly on June twenty
second of this year, decided to go to war against Iran.
So we're stuck in that situation now, and the question
(40:27):
is how do we get out? So I think from
a strategic point of view, what's going on with regard
to Ukraine and what is going on with regard to
the Middle East as disastrous. And then there's the moral dimension.
Speaker 3 (40:40):
We don't want to.
Speaker 4 (40:41):
Lose sight of the fact that the United States is
complicit in a genocide in the Middle East, that what
is happening in Gods is a genocide. And for those
people who don't want to call it a genocide, I
would think you would least have to acknowledge that this
is mass murder on a scale that we haven't seen
in a long time, and certainly it's mass murder on
(41:04):
the scale we would never accept or should never accept
from a close ally. But nevertheless, here we are supporting
Israel hook line and sinker as it executes a genocide.
So from both a strategic point of view and a
moral point of view, when you look at the behavior
(41:25):
of the Biden administration and now the Trump administration, it
leaves me at least with a sick feeling in my stomach.
Speaker 1 (41:34):
I couldn't agree with you more, sir. It's always just
such an honor to talk to you, So thank you
so much for joining us and giving us your time
to break down this summit.
Speaker 4 (41:41):
Thank you very much to the two of you for
having me on, asking excellent questions and letting me give
these lengthy answers.
Speaker 1 (41:48):
Well, that's what you always have a platform here to do,
so so we look forward to seeing you.
Speaker 4 (41:53):
Again next time.
Speaker 1 (41:54):
Likewise, all right, we're going to go to the second
half of our show now, which is available to premium subscribers.
I hope you guys enjoyed that. And if you want
to be able to watch things like that as well
as Ama on our Friday shows Breakingpoints dot com, you
can become one today.
Speaker 6 (42:06):
Let's get to it.
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