June 7, 2025 • 26 mins
Newt talks with Anatol Lieven, Director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, about the escalating conflict between Ukraine and Russia, highlighting recent drone attacks by Ukraine on Russian aircraft and Russia's subsequent retaliatory strikes. Lieven provides insights into the historical and current dynamics of Russian Ukrainian relations. They discuss the stability of Putin's regime, the impact of military technology on warfare, and the strategic implications for the United States and Europe. They also touch on the potential consequences for neighboring countries and the geopolitical complexities involving China.
See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:04):
On this episode of its World. Last week, Ukraine attacked
Russia with drones, launching them from semi trucks and destroyed
or damage at least a dozen Russian aircraft, including many
of Moscow's nuclear capable strategic bombers. On Friday, Russia responded
by launching four hundred and seven drones in decoys, nearly
forty crews missiles, and six ballistic missiles from land, air,
(00:27):
and sea at towns and cities across the breadth of
the nation. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, it appeared
to be the second largest drone assault of the war,
after Russia launched nearly five hundred drones last weekend. As
the war in Ukraine escalates, how will the United States respond?
I'm really pleased to welcome my guests, Anatole Levin. He
is the director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy
(00:50):
Institute for Responsible State CREP. Anatole, welcome and thank you
for joining me.
Speaker 2 (01:05):
On news World. Nice to be here. How long have
you been.
Speaker 1 (01:08):
Looking at Ukraine and Ukraine Russian relations?
Speaker 2 (01:12):
Since nineteen ninety when I was a British journalist for
London Times. It was sent out to the then Soviet
Union and spent seven years there. I visited Ukraine a lot,
I can't remember how many times in those years. And
then I wrote a book about the Ukrainian Russian relationship
called A Fraternal Rivalry, which came out in nineteen ninety nine.
Speaker 1 (01:34):
And so you were actually there during the whole transition
from the Soviet Union to Russia and from a Russia
trying to grapple with openness to the rise of Putin.
I was, yes, were you surprised by the rise of Putin?
Speaker 2 (01:50):
No? I mean, in fact, given what happened to Russia
in the nineteen nineties, I was afraid at the time
that it could be even worse, that you could have,
I mean out right fascism and persecution of national minorities
and civil war. Of course, what we've got has been bad,
but in Russia things can always be worse, because you
(02:12):
had a combination of things that very few countries have
faced before, which was a combination of the loss of empire,
because that's really what the Soviet Union was. Now. Of
course other countries went through that, Britain went through it,
France went through it, but that was combined with catastrophic
(02:33):
economic collapse whereas one of the things that made the
loss of Empire easier for the British and French in
the fifties and sixties was that these were years of
great economic prosperity and expansion. And then on top of
that you had the end of communist ideology, which left
people morally and intellectually and ideologically completely at sea. And
(02:57):
so I was expecting backlash against the backlash is what
we got. I mean also, I have to say, and
this alerted me in advance to some of the things
that we've seen, well we're already seeing. We've seen much
more since then. It was the absolute contempt and indifference
(03:18):
of the Moscow and Petersburg liberal intelligentsia to the mass
of the Russian population. They absolutely despise them. Well, there
were reasons they despise them as ignorant Soviet educated backward,
but in the meantime, the liberals fell absolutely headlong for
every Western latest intellectual and moral fashion, while being totally
(03:46):
indifferent to the suffering of ordinary Russians in these years,
and especially older Russians, and Putin's most important base but
also the one he's most afraid of, are in fact,
the pensioners it's rather funny Putin crushes other opponents with
police force and battles and tear gas. You can't do
(04:08):
that to grandmothers. And whenever the grandmothers start to protest,
Putin backs down because for them he paid their pensions
on time. I mean, that was as important as anything else.
Speaker 1 (04:18):
Do you see him, despite everything, as relatively stable in power.
Speaker 2 (04:23):
Wells Jogi Berra said about never making predictions, especially about
the future. So I say this with hesitation, but yes,
I think so. Now. There was of course a very
serious wobble because he and his cronies well launched the
Ukraine War and then hideously mismanaged it, in part because
(04:44):
of the corruption that they had tolerated or even encouraged
within the Russian military. And there was the co attempt
by one of his cronies, Pregosion of Wagner. But he
overcame that, in part, of course, because Pregosian was hoping
that enough of the army would mutiny junior officers and
(05:05):
soldiers on his side because of anger at the way
that the war had been mismanaged. But of course they
all knew that if they did that, that was the
shortest road to defeat. In Ukraine, and first they didn't
want to be defeated. But also, of course they don't
need to learn the history of the Weimar Republic to
know that if you're trying to come to power as
(05:26):
a new regime, you don't want to inherit defeat. So yes,
I think he's relatively stable unless the economy completely collapses.
But it's in trouble, but it showed no sign of
collapse yet.
Speaker 1 (05:40):
Given the Russian capacity for endurance, what we would think
of is the terrible recession. They would think of as normal.
Speaker 2 (05:46):
Yeah, and they went through much worse the older ones
in the nineties. And what the nineties, on top of
the terrible experiences of Russia in the twentieth century left
ordinary Russians is this deep fear of chaos, of anarchy,
of civil strife and violence, and that does make them
(06:09):
naturally conservative. The old British poem always keep tight hold
of nurse for fear of finding something worse. The Russians
have a kind of absolute gut feeling of that.
Speaker 1 (06:21):
If I understand you from their perspective, an authoritarian regime
that blocks the criminals and that blocks the chaos is
preferable to a soft regime that allows the society to decay.
Speaker 2 (06:36):
Well, that's right. And if you talk to small businessmen
or business women in Russia, they dislike the corruption of
the top elites in Moscow. But the ones who are
around in the nineteen nineties or whose parents were still
say that now is much better because you know, in
(06:57):
the nineties the mafia was everywhere. There were competing mafias
all extorting from small businesses and ruining them. And now
you know, it's got much more regular. It's you know,
if you like it's you make your payments to the police,
Widows and Orphans Fund, and they do protect you against
the mafia. And so it's sort of become a regular, predictable,
(07:21):
limited form of corruption that businessmen can live with.
Speaker 1 (07:25):
You know, those I think parents that we just don't
appreciate in the West, that fit the historic experience. And
I think also if you remember that two weeks before
the Russian attack on Ukraine, the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Milly, testified in front of a
Senate committee he thought the Russians would be in Ukraine
in three days. So it's not abnormal that the Russians
(07:47):
thought they'd be in Kievan three days and then it
just all fell apart.
Speaker 2 (07:51):
That's right, But you know, all the same, I actually
expect them to try and go for the whole country,
because I didn't think that they had the troops to
do that. I thought they were going to seize the
Russian speaking areas of the east and south, which they
could have done if they ignored Kiev and gone for that.
Then they were going to try to negotiate on that
basis and do a deal, which of course they did
(08:14):
in March of twenty twenty two. But by then they
had already suffered so many defeats that their bargaining position
had gone way down, and the Ukrainians were able, i mean,
possibly foolishly, but still to refuse to do that deal.
And of course the Russians were also still asking some
(08:35):
absolutely unacceptable things, as they are today.
Speaker 1 (08:38):
Seems to me that it's pretty clear that Putin's interest
is a totally neutralized Ukraine, incapable of defending itself.
Speaker 2 (08:49):
Yep, that's what the Russians are asking for or demanding,
But of course the Ukrainians will never agree to that.
I think it's possible that you might get a deal,
which is the terms of the Austrian State Treaty in
nineteen fifty four that the Ukrainians give up certain categories
of weapons like long range missiles that are capable of
(09:10):
striking deep in Russia. But that's as far as they
can go in my view. And look, maybe if the
Russians go on and on, the Ukrainian army will collapse.
But as everyone says over the past year, I mean,
the Russians have been making progress, but very very slowly
(09:31):
and with heavy casualties. So you know, in the end,
I'm afraid this will be decided on the battlefield, and
we just don't know, We cannot be sure what's going
to happen on the battlefield.
Speaker 1 (09:56):
Were you surprised by the Ukrainian ability to drive trucks
thirty four hundred miles from Kiev and then have them
launch automated drones that were reasonably effective in taking out
very expensive aircraft.
Speaker 2 (10:12):
Well I was, yes, I mean it was clearly a
brilliantly planned operation, I mean, a masterpiece of its kind.
But then of course, you know, look at what is
the miss terrorists have been able to do inside Russia
over the years, these ghastly massacres, I mean, of course
this has happened in Europe as well, but then you know,
(10:34):
putin state is a kind of police state. You expect
police states to be able to stop this kind of thing. Clearly,
the Russian system is also very incompetent and leaky.
Speaker 1 (10:45):
I mean, the whole idea that you could drive these
trucks and not a single one of them got picked
up struck me as amazing.
Speaker 2 (10:53):
Yeah, well, you know, could have been bribes to the
police along the way if you claimed that these trucks
were actually full of some kind of smuggled goods and
then paid the police a few thousand dollars to let
them throw and not to check. And of course the
thing is, just as there are so many Russians in Ukraine,
(11:13):
there are millions and millions and millions of Ukrainians in Russia,
and so it's not that you could spot Ukrainian agents automatically,
and they clearly have a network within Russia. From that
point of view, it's almost a little bit like the
IRA in Britain in the past.
Speaker 1 (11:33):
Does that just make it interesting or does it make
it a serious sign that the Ukrainians may be able
to balance off Russian mass by being more agile and
more inventive.
Speaker 2 (11:46):
Well, I think the real thing that's holding the Russians
back on the battlefield is the change of military technology.
Many people have made the analogy with the First World War,
and I think that's right in many ways, because I
was in Ukraine and talked to Ukrainian veterans and what
they said was, you know, we hear all these reports
(12:07):
of supposed Russian human waive attacks and meat attacks. They said,
that's absolute nonsense. They said, you cannot do that because
the battlefields are absolutely choked with mines, and of course
you can clear minefields, but it takes a long time,
and somebody trying to clear a minefield in the open
(12:28):
with a drone hovering overhead as a dead man. The
Russians can't bring tanks up to the front line. So
this whole old Russian approach, or what we thought of
in the Cold War of a huge tank army sweeping
forwards and you know, advancing over hundreds of miles just
not possible. And they're bringing up their reinforcements to the
(12:48):
front line, apparently in groups the smallest three, because anything
bigger will be spotted by drones and destroyed.
Speaker 1 (12:55):
Given how inexpensive some of the drones are. Now, how
much should we be re thinking the American defense system
in the light of these capabilities.
Speaker 2 (13:05):
Well, I think we should be rethinking it very seriously,
as should the Europeans, because I think it does mean,
for example, that the Europeans could stop a Russian attack
on Europe but relatively low cost, which would give them
time to build up their own defenses. As far as
America is concerned, well, one thing, you know, well, several
(13:27):
European countries have already withdrawn from the Anti land Mine Treaty.
America was never part of it because of South Korea.
But mines, in my view, are well they're not good,
of course, they're hideous things, but they are critical to
the battlefield now.
Speaker 1 (13:40):
Which means that we're moving towards the defense having a
great advantages over the offense.
Speaker 2 (13:46):
Well, that's right. And for Taiwan this has two very
interesting things. I think One is if the Taiwanese are
actually prepared to spend a lot of money and build
up their defenses, they can really deter and badly damage
Chinese attempt at invasion. I think the Chinese would suffer
(14:08):
very heavily. But on the other hand, of course, this
is very worrying for the US Navy if the Chinese
instead impose a naval blockade on Taiwan, because look at
what happened to the Black Sea Fleet. I mean something
that I got completely wrong, but I have to say
so did every other analyst I know. Is that we
(14:29):
thought that the Black Sea Fleet would simply dominate the
Russian Black Sea Fleet would dominate the Black Sea. The
Ukrainians had no navy at all. Instead, they have defeated
and very badly damaged the Russian Black Sea Fleet, forced
it out of its base in Crimea, simply with land
based missiles, drones, seaborn drones as well as airborn drones.
Speaker 1 (14:50):
You have an eleven billion dollar aircraft carrier, and you
have seventeen hundred Chinese merchant ships that visited the US
last year. Now, it would be pretty easy to put
ten or twenty or thirty drones on every merchant ship.
We wouldn't have another ammunition to stop all.
Speaker 2 (15:11):
Look what the Ukrainians did, you know, containers full of
drones operated from a distance. But on the other hand,
you know, if you look at the First and Second
World Wars, it hasn't perhaps been sufficiently noticed because it
wasn't very dramatic, unlike the Great Naval battles. But of course,
if China can blockade Taiwan, the US Navy can still
blockade the whole of China's maritime trade. China still doesn't
(15:35):
have a blue water navy that could unblock the Straits
of Malacca or challenge America in the Indian Ocean. Now,
of course that's a key reason why the Chinese are
building Belton Road and their overland energy supplies. But I
think that is a good deterrent against the Chinese. Look,
you may think you can force Taiwan into surrender, but
we can blockade you the way that the British did
(15:57):
to the Germans, which, of course, in the First War
War at least crippled the German economy and eventually won
the war.
Speaker 1 (16:02):
There's a bill which I have frankly have encouraged in
the Senate that has eighty co sponsors on basically draconian
sanctions against Russia, which Trump doesn't seem to be very
happy with. But at the same time, I have a
hunch that as things above, the Senators may pass it anyway,
and at eighty you really have a pretty big statement.
(16:23):
How do you see this dance continuing over the next
six months?
Speaker 2 (16:28):
What would you expect? Well, I mean, on this bill.
The real problem is countries like India, and above all India,
which are of course very important US partners, but are
very heavily dependent on imports of Russian oil and LNG.
(16:50):
And the Indians they have this tremendous sense of themselves
as a great independent power and as a partner of
the US, but not a satellite or dependency. Is America
really going to slap five hundred percent tariffs on Indian
imports and other countries South Korea that are important US allies.
(17:11):
I mean, so I think somewhat the Europeans are doing
it may be more effective, but I think we've already
learned there isn't an economic knockout blow against Russia. There's pressure,
there isn't a ko as to what will happen in
the next six months, you know, as President Trump has said,
he's going to walk away from the peace process. The
big question though, is does the US continue military and
(17:35):
above all intelligence aid to Ukraine. I think intelligence is
more important than weapons, even because without US satellite intelligence
and the Ukrainians don't know when the Russians are building up
their forces. Without terrain mapping, they can't actually fire the
European cruise missiles they've been given because they can't hit
(17:55):
their targets, and without starlink they can't talk to each other.
So if that is cut, the Ukrainians will be in
very serious trouble. I mean, if it's not, then we will,
I think, see a continuation on the battlefield of this
war of attrition. Plus the Russians, as they've been doing
(18:20):
in the past couple of days, trying to wear down
the Ukrainian economy by attacking above all Ukrainian's energy infrastructure,
we will have to see by the First World War analogy.
On the one hand, you can have a stalemate lasting
for years. On the other hand, as you well know,
eventually one side or the other did crack. And it
(18:41):
doesn't seem to me that if either side cracks, it's
going to be the Russians. And so there is this
risk that eventually the Ukrainians well above all, will run
out of men because we can provide well. Our stocks
are now very low, but still we can corn providing
weapons to the Ukrainians and intelligence unless we send our
own armies, which every administration has vowed not to do.
(19:04):
We can't provide men for the Ukrainians, and that's their
gracious weakness. I think.
Speaker 1 (19:24):
In the middle of all this, as you know, President
Trump spoke with Putin and then posted on truth Social
sort of his version of what they talked about. And
it was a little chilling in that he said. The
call lasted approximately an hour and fifteen minutes. We discussed
the attack on Russia's dock airplanes by Ukraine, and also
various other attacks have been taking place by both sides.
(19:46):
It was a good conversation, but not a conversation that
will lead to immediate peace. President Putin did say and
very strongly, that he will have to respond to the
recent attack on the airfields. He promptly turns it and says,
we also discussed Iran. It's as though I like to
have Russia as an ally, but he knows he really
ought to try to get peace in Ukraine and he's
sort of torn between the two strategic goals.
Speaker 2 (20:08):
Well, I think that's right. I think the problem as
well is that, for reasons I don't fully understand that
Trump administration has not put together a professional team with
the detailed knowledge to be able to negotiate with Russia,
because as far as I can see, the only hope
(20:30):
is that you get Russia to withdraw or reduce its
demands on Ukraine the things that the Ukrainians cannot accept,
withdrawal from more territory disarmament in return giving the Russians
some of what they want. That's also in accordance with
Trump administration policy when it comes to US Russian relations
(20:54):
because clearly, I mean Putin is very anxious not to
completely ruin his relationship with Trump. And there you're talking
about new arms control agreements, talking about maybe limiting US
forces in Europe, which is what Trump wants to do anyway,
You're talking about some kind of institutionalized you recognition of
a Russian, say, in European security, and of course if
(21:19):
you're looking at an end to further NATO expansion, which
I think Trump is totally uninterested in any way. So
there are things we can offer the Russians that could
potentially lead them to reduce their demands on Ukraine. But
of course, under the surface, but not entirely under the surface,
there's a big debate going on within the Russian establishment.
(21:42):
Over this, there are the hardliners who really do want
to press on for complete victory in Ukraine, and the
others who are saying, look, this isn't militarily possible, it's
not worth it anyway. You know, all we get is
a keep of ruins populated by people who hate us.
So let's try and do a deal. I think both
of those elements are present in Putin's mind from what
(22:03):
I gather, so we need to find a way to
strengthen the one and diminish the other.
Speaker 1 (22:09):
How seriously do you take the worry that if he
does win in Ukraine, that it puts Estonia, Lautfia, Lithuania
and Finland under an increased threat.
Speaker 2 (22:20):
I don't, to be honest, partly because look, I mean,
if you see the problems that Russia has faced in
Ukraine and its failures to launch a direct attack on
NATO would be hideously risky, and the question then is
what do you actually get out of this? But also
there's a contradiction here because many people have said, and
(22:40):
in part quite rightly, they're not just Putin, but Russians
have this particular obsession with Ukraine for a whole set
of historical ethnic, cultural, whatever reasons. But the Russians don't
have these feelings about the Baltic States and certainly not
about Finland. The Russians are a bit bewildered about Finland
joining later because they said, look, we haven't done anything
(23:02):
to Finland since nineteen forty four. We've never threatened Finland.
We always had a good relationship with Finland. We like
the Finns. What's going on here. The Russians didn't like
NATO enlargement to Poland and the Baltic States, but you know,
if you remember, they never did anything about it, and
they could have done. The Russians could have really stirred
up the Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia to revolt.
(23:26):
They could have carried out terrorist attacks and then tried
to stimulate ethnic conflict. They could have laid claim to
Russian majority areas on Russia's borders. They didn't do any
of that because it wasn't worth a catastrophic clash with
NATO for the sake of the Baltic States. But if
they didn't do it, then there really isn't a reason
(23:49):
why they would do it now. Also, I think there
is this desire, certainly to get on with Trump and
hopefully his successor Republican success, whoever that is. There's also,
of course still this desire to reach out to the
right in Europe, who of course have if you look
at the pen in France and so forth, they've lined
up by NATO against the Russian invasion. But still they
(24:12):
and their supporters are not at all enthusiastic about unlimited
permanent support for Ukraine. If you ought a direct attack
on NATO and the European Union, because of course all
these countries are also you members, well, all that simply
goes out of the window. Then you have well the
risk of nuclear catastrophe, but you also have of course
(24:33):
a permanently foreseeable time rect relationship with the West, and
of course you put yourself even more deeply in the
pockets of the Chinese. Now. The Russians are being very
disciplined in public about not talking about their fears in
this regard, but believe me, if you talk to them
in private, a lot of them are very unhappy with
the way in which Russia is becoming dependent on China.
Speaker 1 (24:56):
Goes right to the heart of going all the way
back to the Mongol yoke and the fear of being
absorbed by the East and seeing themselves as a unique
civilization between the West and the East. It's an amazing time.
I want to thank you. I think Anatole, this is
such a complex area and it was very helpful to
(25:16):
get your insights and your understanding. I want to let
our listeners know they can follow the work you're doing
at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft at quincyist dot org.
We're going to have that on our show page and
make sure that people can stay in touch and follow
what you're doing. I really appreciate you taking the time
to be with us today.
Speaker 2 (25:36):
It was a great pleasure, sir, Thank you.
Speaker 1 (25:41):
Thank you to my guests, Anatole Evan. You can learn
more about the war in Ukraine on our show page
at newtsworld dot com. Newsworld is produced by Genglish three
sixty and iHeartMedia. Our executive producer is Guarnsey Slum. Our
researcher is Rachel Peterson. The artwork for the show was
created by Steve Penley. Special thanks to kam Special thanks
(26:02):
to the team at Ginglish three sixty. If you've been
enjoying Newtsworld, I hope you'll go to Apple Podcast and
both rate us with five stars and give us a
review so others can learn what it's all about. Right now,
listeners of newts World can sign up for my three
freeweekly columns at gingwishtree sixty dot com slash newsletter. I'm
Newt Gingrich. This is Newtsworld
On this episode of its World. Last week, Ukraine attacked
Russia with drones, launching them from semi trucks and destroyed
or damage at least a dozen Russian aircraft, including many
of Moscow's nuclear capable strategic bombers. On Friday, Russia responded
by launching four hundred and seven drones in decoys, nearly
forty crews missiles, and six ballistic missiles from land, air,
(00:27):
and sea at towns and cities across the breadth of
the nation. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, it appeared
to be the second largest drone assault of the war,
after Russia launched nearly five hundred drones last weekend. As
the war in Ukraine escalates, how will the United States respond?
I'm really pleased to welcome my guests, Anatole Levin. He
is the director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy
(00:50):
Institute for Responsible State CREP. Anatole, welcome and thank you
for joining me.
Speaker 2 (01:05):
On news World. Nice to be here. How long have
you been.
Speaker 1 (01:08):
Looking at Ukraine and Ukraine Russian relations?
Speaker 2 (01:12):
Since nineteen ninety when I was a British journalist for
London Times. It was sent out to the then Soviet
Union and spent seven years there. I visited Ukraine a lot,
I can't remember how many times in those years. And
then I wrote a book about the Ukrainian Russian relationship
called A Fraternal Rivalry, which came out in nineteen ninety nine.
Speaker 1 (01:34):
And so you were actually there during the whole transition
from the Soviet Union to Russia and from a Russia
trying to grapple with openness to the rise of Putin.
I was, yes, were you surprised by the rise of Putin?
Speaker 2 (01:50):
No? I mean, in fact, given what happened to Russia
in the nineteen nineties, I was afraid at the time
that it could be even worse, that you could have,
I mean out right fascism and persecution of national minorities
and civil war. Of course, what we've got has been bad,
but in Russia things can always be worse, because you
(02:12):
had a combination of things that very few countries have
faced before, which was a combination of the loss of empire,
because that's really what the Soviet Union was. Now. Of
course other countries went through that, Britain went through it,
France went through it, but that was combined with catastrophic
(02:33):
economic collapse whereas one of the things that made the
loss of Empire easier for the British and French in
the fifties and sixties was that these were years of
great economic prosperity and expansion. And then on top of
that you had the end of communist ideology, which left
people morally and intellectually and ideologically completely at sea. And
(02:57):
so I was expecting backlash against the backlash is what
we got. I mean also, I have to say, and
this alerted me in advance to some of the things
that we've seen, well we're already seeing. We've seen much
more since then. It was the absolute contempt and indifference
(03:18):
of the Moscow and Petersburg liberal intelligentsia to the mass
of the Russian population. They absolutely despise them. Well, there
were reasons they despise them as ignorant Soviet educated backward,
but in the meantime, the liberals fell absolutely headlong for
every Western latest intellectual and moral fashion, while being totally
(03:46):
indifferent to the suffering of ordinary Russians in these years,
and especially older Russians, and Putin's most important base but
also the one he's most afraid of, are in fact,
the pensioners it's rather funny Putin crushes other opponents with
police force and battles and tear gas. You can't do
(04:08):
that to grandmothers. And whenever the grandmothers start to protest,
Putin backs down because for them he paid their pensions
on time. I mean, that was as important as anything else.
Speaker 1 (04:18):
Do you see him, despite everything, as relatively stable in power.
Speaker 2 (04:23):
Wells Jogi Berra said about never making predictions, especially about
the future. So I say this with hesitation, but yes,
I think so. Now. There was of course a very
serious wobble because he and his cronies well launched the
Ukraine War and then hideously mismanaged it, in part because
(04:44):
of the corruption that they had tolerated or even encouraged
within the Russian military. And there was the co attempt
by one of his cronies, Pregosion of Wagner. But he
overcame that, in part, of course, because Pregosian was hoping
that enough of the army would mutiny junior officers and
(05:05):
soldiers on his side because of anger at the way
that the war had been mismanaged. But of course they
all knew that if they did that, that was the
shortest road to defeat. In Ukraine, and first they didn't
want to be defeated. But also, of course they don't
need to learn the history of the Weimar Republic to
know that if you're trying to come to power as
(05:26):
a new regime, you don't want to inherit defeat. So yes,
I think he's relatively stable unless the economy completely collapses.
But it's in trouble, but it showed no sign of
collapse yet.
Speaker 1 (05:40):
Given the Russian capacity for endurance, what we would think
of is the terrible recession. They would think of as normal.
Speaker 2 (05:46):
Yeah, and they went through much worse the older ones
in the nineties. And what the nineties, on top of
the terrible experiences of Russia in the twentieth century left
ordinary Russians is this deep fear of chaos, of anarchy,
of civil strife and violence, and that does make them
(06:09):
naturally conservative. The old British poem always keep tight hold
of nurse for fear of finding something worse. The Russians
have a kind of absolute gut feeling of that.
Speaker 1 (06:21):
If I understand you from their perspective, an authoritarian regime
that blocks the criminals and that blocks the chaos is
preferable to a soft regime that allows the society to decay.
Speaker 2 (06:36):
Well, that's right. And if you talk to small businessmen
or business women in Russia, they dislike the corruption of
the top elites in Moscow. But the ones who are
around in the nineteen nineties or whose parents were still
say that now is much better because you know, in
(06:57):
the nineties the mafia was everywhere. There were competing mafias
all extorting from small businesses and ruining them. And now
you know, it's got much more regular. It's you know,
if you like it's you make your payments to the police,
Widows and Orphans Fund, and they do protect you against
the mafia. And so it's sort of become a regular, predictable,
(07:21):
limited form of corruption that businessmen can live with.
Speaker 1 (07:25):
You know, those I think parents that we just don't
appreciate in the West, that fit the historic experience. And
I think also if you remember that two weeks before
the Russian attack on Ukraine, the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Milly, testified in front of a
Senate committee he thought the Russians would be in Ukraine
in three days. So it's not abnormal that the Russians
(07:47):
thought they'd be in Kievan three days and then it
just all fell apart.
Speaker 2 (07:51):
That's right, But you know, all the same, I actually
expect them to try and go for the whole country,
because I didn't think that they had the troops to
do that. I thought they were going to seize the
Russian speaking areas of the east and south, which they
could have done if they ignored Kiev and gone for that.
Then they were going to try to negotiate on that
basis and do a deal, which of course they did
(08:14):
in March of twenty twenty two. But by then they
had already suffered so many defeats that their bargaining position
had gone way down, and the Ukrainians were able, i mean,
possibly foolishly, but still to refuse to do that deal.
And of course the Russians were also still asking some
(08:35):
absolutely unacceptable things, as they are today.
Speaker 1 (08:38):
Seems to me that it's pretty clear that Putin's interest
is a totally neutralized Ukraine, incapable of defending itself.
Speaker 2 (08:49):
Yep, that's what the Russians are asking for or demanding,
But of course the Ukrainians will never agree to that.
I think it's possible that you might get a deal,
which is the terms of the Austrian State Treaty in
nineteen fifty four that the Ukrainians give up certain categories
of weapons like long range missiles that are capable of
(09:10):
striking deep in Russia. But that's as far as they
can go in my view. And look, maybe if the
Russians go on and on, the Ukrainian army will collapse.
But as everyone says over the past year, I mean,
the Russians have been making progress, but very very slowly
(09:31):
and with heavy casualties. So you know, in the end,
I'm afraid this will be decided on the battlefield, and
we just don't know, We cannot be sure what's going
to happen on the battlefield.
Speaker 1 (09:56):
Were you surprised by the Ukrainian ability to drive trucks
thirty four hundred miles from Kiev and then have them
launch automated drones that were reasonably effective in taking out
very expensive aircraft.
Speaker 2 (10:12):
Well I was, yes, I mean it was clearly a
brilliantly planned operation, I mean, a masterpiece of its kind.
But then of course, you know, look at what is
the miss terrorists have been able to do inside Russia
over the years, these ghastly massacres, I mean, of course
this has happened in Europe as well, but then you know,
(10:34):
putin state is a kind of police state. You expect
police states to be able to stop this kind of thing. Clearly,
the Russian system is also very incompetent and leaky.
Speaker 1 (10:45):
I mean, the whole idea that you could drive these
trucks and not a single one of them got picked
up struck me as amazing.
Speaker 2 (10:53):
Yeah, well, you know, could have been bribes to the
police along the way if you claimed that these trucks
were actually full of some kind of smuggled goods and
then paid the police a few thousand dollars to let
them throw and not to check. And of course the
thing is, just as there are so many Russians in Ukraine,
(11:13):
there are millions and millions and millions of Ukrainians in Russia,
and so it's not that you could spot Ukrainian agents automatically,
and they clearly have a network within Russia. From that
point of view, it's almost a little bit like the
IRA in Britain in the past.
Speaker 1 (11:33):
Does that just make it interesting or does it make
it a serious sign that the Ukrainians may be able
to balance off Russian mass by being more agile and
more inventive.
Speaker 2 (11:46):
Well, I think the real thing that's holding the Russians
back on the battlefield is the change of military technology.
Many people have made the analogy with the First World War,
and I think that's right in many ways, because I
was in Ukraine and talked to Ukrainian veterans and what
they said was, you know, we hear all these reports
(12:07):
of supposed Russian human waive attacks and meat attacks. They said,
that's absolute nonsense. They said, you cannot do that because
the battlefields are absolutely choked with mines, and of course
you can clear minefields, but it takes a long time,
and somebody trying to clear a minefield in the open
(12:28):
with a drone hovering overhead as a dead man. The
Russians can't bring tanks up to the front line. So
this whole old Russian approach, or what we thought of
in the Cold War of a huge tank army sweeping
forwards and you know, advancing over hundreds of miles just
not possible. And they're bringing up their reinforcements to the
(12:48):
front line, apparently in groups the smallest three, because anything
bigger will be spotted by drones and destroyed.
Speaker 1 (12:55):
Given how inexpensive some of the drones are. Now, how
much should we be re thinking the American defense system
in the light of these capabilities.
Speaker 2 (13:05):
Well, I think we should be rethinking it very seriously,
as should the Europeans, because I think it does mean,
for example, that the Europeans could stop a Russian attack
on Europe but relatively low cost, which would give them
time to build up their own defenses. As far as
America is concerned, well, one thing, you know, well, several
(13:27):
European countries have already withdrawn from the Anti land Mine Treaty.
America was never part of it because of South Korea.
But mines, in my view, are well they're not good,
of course, they're hideous things, but they are critical to
the battlefield now.
Speaker 1 (13:40):
Which means that we're moving towards the defense having a
great advantages over the offense.
Speaker 2 (13:46):
Well, that's right. And for Taiwan this has two very
interesting things. I think One is if the Taiwanese are
actually prepared to spend a lot of money and build
up their defenses, they can really deter and badly damage
Chinese attempt at invasion. I think the Chinese would suffer
(14:08):
very heavily. But on the other hand, of course, this
is very worrying for the US Navy if the Chinese
instead impose a naval blockade on Taiwan, because look at
what happened to the Black Sea Fleet. I mean something
that I got completely wrong, but I have to say
so did every other analyst I know. Is that we
(14:29):
thought that the Black Sea Fleet would simply dominate the
Russian Black Sea Fleet would dominate the Black Sea. The
Ukrainians had no navy at all. Instead, they have defeated
and very badly damaged the Russian Black Sea Fleet, forced
it out of its base in Crimea, simply with land
based missiles, drones, seaborn drones as well as airborn drones.
Speaker 1 (14:50):
You have an eleven billion dollar aircraft carrier, and you
have seventeen hundred Chinese merchant ships that visited the US
last year. Now, it would be pretty easy to put
ten or twenty or thirty drones on every merchant ship.
We wouldn't have another ammunition to stop all.
Speaker 2 (15:11):
Look what the Ukrainians did, you know, containers full of
drones operated from a distance. But on the other hand,
you know, if you look at the First and Second
World Wars, it hasn't perhaps been sufficiently noticed because it
wasn't very dramatic, unlike the Great Naval battles. But of course,
if China can blockade Taiwan, the US Navy can still
blockade the whole of China's maritime trade. China still doesn't
(15:35):
have a blue water navy that could unblock the Straits
of Malacca or challenge America in the Indian Ocean. Now,
of course that's a key reason why the Chinese are
building Belton Road and their overland energy supplies. But I
think that is a good deterrent against the Chinese. Look,
you may think you can force Taiwan into surrender, but
we can blockade you the way that the British did
(15:57):
to the Germans, which, of course, in the First War
War at least crippled the German economy and eventually won
the war.
Speaker 1 (16:02):
There's a bill which I have frankly have encouraged in
the Senate that has eighty co sponsors on basically draconian
sanctions against Russia, which Trump doesn't seem to be very
happy with. But at the same time, I have a
hunch that as things above, the Senators may pass it anyway,
and at eighty you really have a pretty big statement.
(16:23):
How do you see this dance continuing over the next
six months?
Speaker 2 (16:28):
What would you expect? Well, I mean, on this bill.
The real problem is countries like India, and above all India,
which are of course very important US partners, but are
very heavily dependent on imports of Russian oil and LNG.
(16:50):
And the Indians they have this tremendous sense of themselves
as a great independent power and as a partner of
the US, but not a satellite or dependency. Is America
really going to slap five hundred percent tariffs on Indian
imports and other countries South Korea that are important US allies.
(17:11):
I mean, so I think somewhat the Europeans are doing
it may be more effective, but I think we've already
learned there isn't an economic knockout blow against Russia. There's pressure,
there isn't a ko as to what will happen in
the next six months, you know, as President Trump has said,
he's going to walk away from the peace process. The
big question though, is does the US continue military and
(17:35):
above all intelligence aid to Ukraine. I think intelligence is
more important than weapons, even because without US satellite intelligence
and the Ukrainians don't know when the Russians are building up
their forces. Without terrain mapping, they can't actually fire the
European cruise missiles they've been given because they can't hit
(17:55):
their targets, and without starlink they can't talk to each other.
So if that is cut, the Ukrainians will be in
very serious trouble. I mean, if it's not, then we will,
I think, see a continuation on the battlefield of this
war of attrition. Plus the Russians, as they've been doing
(18:20):
in the past couple of days, trying to wear down
the Ukrainian economy by attacking above all Ukrainian's energy infrastructure,
we will have to see by the First World War analogy.
On the one hand, you can have a stalemate lasting
for years. On the other hand, as you well know,
eventually one side or the other did crack. And it
(18:41):
doesn't seem to me that if either side cracks, it's
going to be the Russians. And so there is this
risk that eventually the Ukrainians well above all, will run
out of men because we can provide well. Our stocks
are now very low, but still we can corn providing
weapons to the Ukrainians and intelligence unless we send our
own armies, which every administration has vowed not to do.
(19:04):
We can't provide men for the Ukrainians, and that's their
gracious weakness. I think.
Speaker 1 (19:24):
In the middle of all this, as you know, President
Trump spoke with Putin and then posted on truth Social
sort of his version of what they talked about. And
it was a little chilling in that he said. The
call lasted approximately an hour and fifteen minutes. We discussed
the attack on Russia's dock airplanes by Ukraine, and also
various other attacks have been taking place by both sides.
(19:46):
It was a good conversation, but not a conversation that
will lead to immediate peace. President Putin did say and
very strongly, that he will have to respond to the
recent attack on the airfields. He promptly turns it and says,
we also discussed Iran. It's as though I like to
have Russia as an ally, but he knows he really
ought to try to get peace in Ukraine and he's
sort of torn between the two strategic goals.
Speaker 2 (20:08):
Well, I think that's right. I think the problem as
well is that, for reasons I don't fully understand that
Trump administration has not put together a professional team with
the detailed knowledge to be able to negotiate with Russia,
because as far as I can see, the only hope
(20:30):
is that you get Russia to withdraw or reduce its
demands on Ukraine the things that the Ukrainians cannot accept,
withdrawal from more territory disarmament in return giving the Russians
some of what they want. That's also in accordance with
Trump administration policy when it comes to US Russian relations
(20:54):
because clearly, I mean Putin is very anxious not to
completely ruin his relationship with Trump. And there you're talking
about new arms control agreements, talking about maybe limiting US
forces in Europe, which is what Trump wants to do anyway,
You're talking about some kind of institutionalized you recognition of
a Russian, say, in European security, and of course if
(21:19):
you're looking at an end to further NATO expansion, which
I think Trump is totally uninterested in any way. So
there are things we can offer the Russians that could
potentially lead them to reduce their demands on Ukraine. But
of course, under the surface, but not entirely under the surface,
there's a big debate going on within the Russian establishment.
(21:42):
Over this, there are the hardliners who really do want
to press on for complete victory in Ukraine, and the
others who are saying, look, this isn't militarily possible, it's
not worth it anyway. You know, all we get is
a keep of ruins populated by people who hate us.
So let's try and do a deal. I think both
of those elements are present in Putin's mind from what
(22:03):
I gather, so we need to find a way to
strengthen the one and diminish the other.
Speaker 1 (22:09):
How seriously do you take the worry that if he
does win in Ukraine, that it puts Estonia, Lautfia, Lithuania
and Finland under an increased threat.
Speaker 2 (22:20):
I don't, to be honest, partly because look, I mean,
if you see the problems that Russia has faced in
Ukraine and its failures to launch a direct attack on
NATO would be hideously risky, and the question then is
what do you actually get out of this? But also
there's a contradiction here because many people have said, and
(22:40):
in part quite rightly, they're not just Putin, but Russians
have this particular obsession with Ukraine for a whole set
of historical ethnic, cultural, whatever reasons. But the Russians don't
have these feelings about the Baltic States and certainly not
about Finland. The Russians are a bit bewildered about Finland
joining later because they said, look, we haven't done anything
(23:02):
to Finland since nineteen forty four. We've never threatened Finland.
We always had a good relationship with Finland. We like
the Finns. What's going on here. The Russians didn't like
NATO enlargement to Poland and the Baltic States, but you know,
if you remember, they never did anything about it, and
they could have done. The Russians could have really stirred
up the Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia to revolt.
(23:26):
They could have carried out terrorist attacks and then tried
to stimulate ethnic conflict. They could have laid claim to
Russian majority areas on Russia's borders. They didn't do any
of that because it wasn't worth a catastrophic clash with
NATO for the sake of the Baltic States. But if
they didn't do it, then there really isn't a reason
(23:49):
why they would do it now. Also, I think there
is this desire, certainly to get on with Trump and
hopefully his successor Republican success, whoever that is. There's also,
of course still this desire to reach out to the
right in Europe, who of course have if you look
at the pen in France and so forth, they've lined
up by NATO against the Russian invasion. But still they
(24:12):
and their supporters are not at all enthusiastic about unlimited
permanent support for Ukraine. If you ought a direct attack
on NATO and the European Union, because of course all
these countries are also you members, well, all that simply
goes out of the window. Then you have well the
risk of nuclear catastrophe, but you also have of course
(24:33):
a permanently foreseeable time rect relationship with the West, and
of course you put yourself even more deeply in the
pockets of the Chinese. Now. The Russians are being very
disciplined in public about not talking about their fears in
this regard, but believe me, if you talk to them
in private, a lot of them are very unhappy with
the way in which Russia is becoming dependent on China.
Speaker 1 (24:56):
Goes right to the heart of going all the way
back to the Mongol yoke and the fear of being
absorbed by the East and seeing themselves as a unique
civilization between the West and the East. It's an amazing time.
I want to thank you. I think Anatole, this is
such a complex area and it was very helpful to
(25:16):
get your insights and your understanding. I want to let
our listeners know they can follow the work you're doing
at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft at quincyist dot org.
We're going to have that on our show page and
make sure that people can stay in touch and follow
what you're doing. I really appreciate you taking the time
to be with us today.
Speaker 2 (25:36):
It was a great pleasure, sir, Thank you.
Speaker 1 (25:41):
Thank you to my guests, Anatole Evan. You can learn
more about the war in Ukraine on our show page
at newtsworld dot com. Newsworld is produced by Genglish three
sixty and iHeartMedia. Our executive producer is Guarnsey Slum. Our
researcher is Rachel Peterson. The artwork for the show was
created by Steve Penley. Special thanks to kam Special thanks
(26:02):
to the team at Ginglish three sixty. If you've been
enjoying Newtsworld, I hope you'll go to Apple Podcast and
both rate us with five stars and give us a
review so others can learn what it's all about. Right now,
listeners of newts World can sign up for my three
freeweekly columns at gingwishtree sixty dot com slash newsletter. I'm
Newt Gingrich. This is Newtsworld
Popular Podcasts
On Purpose with Jay Shetty
I’m Jay Shetty host of On Purpose the worlds #1 Mental Health podcast and I’m so grateful you found us. I started this podcast 5 years ago to invite you into conversations and workshops that are designed to help make you happier, healthier and more healed. I believe that when you (yes you) feel seen, heard and understood you’re able to deal with relationship struggles, work challenges and life’s ups and downs with more ease and grace. I interview experts, celebrities, thought leaders and athletes so that we can grow our mindset, build better habits and uncover a side of them we’ve never seen before. New episodes every Monday and Friday. Your support means the world to me and I don’t take it for granted — click the follow button and leave a review to help us spread the love with On Purpose. I can’t wait for you to listen to your first or 500th episode!
Dateline NBC
Current and classic episodes, featuring compelling true-crime mysteries, powerful documentaries and in-depth investigations. Follow now to get the latest episodes of Dateline NBC completely free, or subscribe to Dateline Premium for ad-free listening and exclusive bonus content: DatelinePremium.com
Stuff You Should Know
If you've ever wanted to know about champagne, satanism, the Stonewall Uprising, chaos theory, LSD, El Nino, true crime and Rosa Parks, then look no further. Josh and Chuck have you covered.