Katie’s One-on-One with Fmr Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

Robert Gates has worked at the highest levels of government, across eight presidential administrations, earning a reputation for pragmatism and integrity that feels increasingly rare in today’s political climate. In this thoughtful conversation with Katie, the former Defense Secretary reflects on the global crises now testing U.S. leadership—from the war in Ukraine to rising threats in the Middle East—and explains why diplomacy, consistency, and bipartisan cooperation are more essential than ever. As America grapples with a fractured political identity, Gates makes a compelling case for restoring experience and long-term thinking to our foreign policy playbook.

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Episode Transcript

Speaker 1 (00:04):
Life being away from Washington, DC is fantastic.

Speaker 2 (00:10):
I figured you would say that good. Well, I think
you picked a very good time to retire. What can
I say, Secretary, I think the.

Speaker 1 (00:18):
Hardest thing in life is knowing when to dance off
the stage, and I think I picked.

Speaker 2 (00:22):
It perfectly you and Johnny Carson. Hi, everyone, and welcome
to this episode of Next Question. Well, if you've ever
wondered what keeps America's top military minds up at night,
this episode is for you because my guest is former

(00:45):
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. By the way, Bob Gates
is a very nice guy. I did a profile of
him for sixty minutes back in the day and followed
him around to several countries, and afterwards I asked him
if he would autograph a photo that the Pentagon had
taken during one of our interviews. I believe it was

(01:08):
in Baghdad. And in the photo, I'm kind of leaning
forward in my chair and he's kind of leaning back
in his chair, and he signed the photo this way, Katie, Clearly,
I am not buying what you're selling. Robert Gates. So
he also has a great sense of humor. He has

(01:28):
served in various capacities under eight presidents from both parties.
He's held top roles both at the CIA and the Pentagon.
If there was ever a time to learn and talk
to someone with deep bipartisan experience in foreign policy, well
this is it. He has deep concerns about the current

(01:50):
direction of US foreign policy, but he sees some bright
spots too, like the shifts in NATO funding and like
it or not, what Donald Trump has been able to
achieve in that arena. We talked about the war in Ukraine,
in Gaza, rising tensions with China and Iran, and whether

(02:11):
the US still remembers how to wield diplomacy and so
called soft power, not just force. It's a frank and
sometimes sobering discussion. Here's my conversation with former Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates. Secretary Gates, thank you so much for
spending some time with me to talk about the state

(02:32):
of the world. I've often thought of you over the
last several months and wondered what you must be thinking.
So before we get more granular, I'm just curious about
your overall impressions of what's going on globally. Does it
feel as turbulent to you as it does to many

(02:56):
of us watching, Katie.

Speaker 1 (02:58):
I think this is as perilous a time, and not
just right now, but in the foreseeable future, as this
country has faced since the late nineteen forties and maybe ever,
because we face two for the first time, major aggressive

(03:19):
nuclear powers, both in Asia and in Europe, that have
aspirations territorial aspirations that they are willing to use force
to acquire. They're both modernizing and expanding their their nuclear
military forces. They have support in a couple of other countries,

(03:41):
certainly North Korea, also nuclear armed and expanding its Arsenal.
Iran used to be a major problem. I think much
less so now, but still very hostile. And I think
we just on our part, seem paralyzed when it comes

(04:01):
to rebuilding and strengthening our military and particularly are non
military instruments of power, and we seem so divided here
at home in the face of these threats from abroad.
But I think it's a very concerning time.

Speaker 2 (04:19):
Well, there's a lot to dig into given your first answer,
So let's talk about these global hotspots, if you will,
and some of the areas of concern that you and
many others have. Let's begin with the Russia Ukraine War,
which has been underway for more than three years now,

(04:41):
resulting in an estimated two hundred and fifty thousand Russian
military deaths and sixty to one hundred thousand Ukrainian deaths.
President Trump campaigned, as you know, on the promise that
he could end the war in Ukraine in twenty four hours.
Now more than six month into his term, not only

(05:03):
is the war intensifying, but more recently he's publicly vented
that Putin is quote full of bullshit. Are you surprised
that President Trump wasn't able to keep his campaign promise?
And what does it tell you about his grasp of
reality when it comes to dealing with someone like Vladimir Putin.

Speaker 1 (05:24):
You know, it's been my experience that most of the
US presidents that I worked for, and many before that,
beginning with Franklin Roosevelt, always had enormous confidence in their
ability to win over leaders on the other side, that
the force of their personalities and their persuasiveness would enable

(05:46):
them to make headway with the leaders of authoritarian country.
So FDR was this way with Stalin, Old Uncle Joe
as he called him. You saw the same thing when
President Kennedy went to v and that with Khrushchov, thought
he could win him over. And this was true with
most US presidents, and I think President Trump fell into

(06:09):
that category. I had less international experience than most of them,
but I think he felt that by virtue of personality
that he could persuade Putin that making peace made sense.
And I think it starts with fundamentally, and I think
this is true of more than a few people in
this country, a belief that you could negotiate with Putin

(06:32):
and they don't understand that Putin has aspirations that go
far beyond any personal relationships. He considers his destiny to
be recreating the Russian Empire, and there can be no
Russian Empire without Ukraine, as my old mentor's Big Brashinsky
used to say. And so he's not going to quit

(06:54):
in Ukraine until he either feels he can't win or
in some way exhausted, or does achieve his objectives. So
the notion that he would agree to terms less than
achieving dominance over Ukraine, I think was always unrealistic, whether

(07:15):
it was being pursued by a democratic president or a
Republican president.

Speaker 2 (07:19):
So you do not believe this is unique in any way,
shape or form to Donald Trump having said that Secretary Gates,
do you feel the level of presumptuousness and potentially arrogance
is unprecedented for Donald Trump.

Speaker 1 (07:41):
I have never worked for Donald Trump, but I have
worked for a few presidents that I thought were pretty arrogant.
But from a distance, I think it was just this
supreme self confidence that he could win this guy over.

Speaker 2 (07:54):
You mentioned Vladimir Putin's ultimate goal, and in fact The
New York Times is reporting that quote Putin is now
convinced that his military could overpower Ukraines in the months
to come. So how do you see this next phase
playing out?

Speaker 1 (08:11):
What's interesting to me is the price that Putin is
prepared to pay. You mentioned a quarter of a million
dead Russians. There's another three quarters of a million at
least that have been wounded. So you've got a million
Russian casualties. By comparison, in ten years in Afghanistan, the
Russians suffered fifteen thousand dead. And he has completely militarized

(08:33):
the Russian economy at this point, and you've had a
million young Russians leave the country, particularly young men, entrepreneurs,
and others. So basically Putin has mortgaged the future of
Russia on this campaign in Ukraine. And I think at
this point the key, as far as I'm concerned, is

(08:53):
the will of the Ukrainian people. These attacks in the
last few weeks, particularly on cities in western Ukraine, is
a real test of the morale and of the resilience
of the Ukrainian people. And the Russians are cranking an
enormous number of drones out of their factories now, and
I think they can sustain these kinds of attacks all

(09:17):
night long on cities in western Ukraine. The ground war
is proceeding very slowly. In the east, they still haven't.
The Russians, after all this time, still haven't fully occupied
all four of those provinces in the Dnbas that they
claim and have declared their sovereignty over. The Russians have
made very slow headway. They have been making some headway,

(09:40):
but an enormous cost. I've read one thousand to fifteen
hundred casualties a day in the ground war. And if
the Ukrainians can continue to build their own their domestic
defense industries as they are doing, particularly with drones, they've
got Germans and Danish companies building factories in Ukraine to

(10:03):
produce weapons. I think President Trump's decision to sell weapons
to our NATO allies that they then can provide to
the Ukrainians is really important because the air defenses in
particular is where they need help. But I also read
that this will include offensive missiles as well. So the

(10:23):
only way to stop Putin is to drive the cost
of this war for him through the roof. And I
think that the legislation that Lindsey Graham and others have
put together on the Hill in terms of more sanctions
on Russia is a good thing. My guess is if
it ever passes, it'll include a waiver that allows Trump

(10:46):
to sort of meter it out as he sees fit,
as he thinks elements of sanctions will work, so he'll
have a lot of flexibility in how he applies that law.
But I think all those things need to be done.

Speaker 2 (10:58):
Well, do you think that the Trump administration has been
a reliable enough partner to Ukraine. It seems that they
vacillate and the messaging doesn't seem to be that consistent
coming out of the White House.

Speaker 1 (11:16):
Well, I think there has been an evolution of views
I think that there was you know, everybody's aware of
the Oval Office meeting between Violenski and President Trump.

Speaker 2 (11:28):
Yeah, what did you think of that when you watch that.

Speaker 1 (11:31):
I've never quite seen anything like that, to tell you
the truth. But from that point, as and going back
to our earlier conversation, as Trump has seen Putin refuse
to negotiate and ramp up military attacks on Ukraine, the
views of the administration have evolved toward more help for Ukraine,

(11:55):
in a much friendlier attitude toward Ukraine. And I think
where you've read to this point where President Trump is
now ready to resume providing weapons to Ukraine, albeit through
the cutouts in.

Speaker 2 (12:09):
Europe, you are talking about whether the Ukrainians can withstand
this level of attack and about the ground war. But
let's theorize that the Ukrainians cannot and that Russia does
in fact overtake Ukraine. What then?

Speaker 1 (12:32):
I think that would be a geopolitical and strategic disaster,
and I think it would have a huge impact in Europe.
I also think it would have a real impact in
Asia as well. I think Shi Jenping is watching the
evolution of this battle in Ukraine very closely and has
been from the very beginning. I think he had to

(12:55):
be surprised by the speed with which the Western countries
developed tries, came together to impose sanctions on Russia, and
pretty draconian sanctions. The speed with which Western companies left Russia.
I think there's a big lesson in that for China,
if they should take some military action against Taiwan. I

(13:16):
think he had to be a little amazed at the
poor performance of the Russian military. You know, they carried
five days provisions and their ceremonial uniforms and here we
are in the fourth year, and so the poor performance
of the Russian military, Russian military equipment, Russian generals, and
so I think there's some real lessons there. But should

(13:38):
Putin be successful in Ukraine, then I think that will
probably embolden President she In the meantime, I think you
see the Europeans, particularly the East Europeans and the Swedes
and the Finns are very concerned in terms of their
own security with respect to should Putin be successful in Ukraine.

(14:01):
The Baltic states, I think, are particularly Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia,
very concerned about what would happen. But I also think
it would be a very significant strategic defeat for the
United States.

Speaker 2 (14:14):
And what will happen? Do you think the power graph
would continue if Putin is victorious.

Speaker 1 (14:21):
I think there'll probably be a period of recovery and consolidation.
But I think that Moldova, Transnistria, and even the Baltic
States would all be at risk.

Speaker 2 (14:31):
The war in Ukraine, as you well know, has sparked
a debate about America's role as the lynchpen of the
Western Alliance, as this administration has questioned the value of
NATO and clash with key allies. What would a new
world order look like if the US is no longer
at the center of it.

Speaker 1 (14:52):
I think that the US is still at the center
and is likely to remain there because of our economic
and military power, and I think other countries acknowledge this.
The nature of our relationships with other countries I think
could change or would change. You know, Trump's pressure on

(15:16):
the NATO allies has produced some resentment over there and
concerns here. But the truth of the matter, Katie, is
that for decades, those of US at senior levels in
the American government have been hectoring the Europeans to do
more for their own defense. That was my last speech

(15:37):
as secretary in Brussels Secretary of Defense, berating the Europeans
and basically saying I was the last of the generation
of the Cold War that remembered when NATO was powerful
and when these countries did their part, and that a
new generation of politicians was coming along in Washington in
the United States that did not have that emotional attachment

(16:00):
and in the absence of the Europeans doing more, would
begin to look at that relationship more in a cost
benefit analysis. That was June of twenty eleven, fourteen years ago,
but none of us were successful. Got to give President
Trump credit. These countries have all changed their views, and

(16:21):
probably in no small part thanks to Vadimir Putin and
the invasion of Ukraine. But now you've got NATO going
from a two percent threshold of GDP for defense spending
to five percent, three and a half directly on military
and a percent and a half on infrastructure. So that's

(16:41):
a big achievement, frankly, and the Europeans have awakened. Now
what has come along with that is it's partly due
to Vladimir Putin's threat, but it's also due to their
concern that in the future, will the United States be
there for them under Article five in the alliance? And
so you see French President Macron and others saying, you know,

(17:03):
we'd better be more self sufficient because the US may
not be here. So that growing lack of confidence in
whether the US will be there is a concern. There's
no doubt about that. I don't think we're there yet.
And frankly, the president's rhetoric about NATO has changed as
the NATO allies have in fact increased their commitment to

(17:28):
defense spending. So you haven't in the last few months,
you haven't heard the kind of talk that we heard
in the first term about not abiding bio Article five,
or maybe will only defend those countries that spend enough
on defense and so on.

Speaker 2 (17:44):
So you think that the relationship with NATO, some of
the tension that came with the demand to cony up
and pay more of their fair share to the overall
defense budget, that that will not irreparably harm our relationship
with NATO allies. Do you think that the rhetoric has

(18:07):
changed and that the Trump administration can have a good,
overall working relationship with our NATO allies despite some of
the rhetoric that came with these demands.

Speaker 1 (18:20):
Well, I think the atmospherics that have surrounded the President's
recent meetings, say with the UK Prime Minister, with the
German Chancellor, with the Polish President, the atmospherics surrounding those
conversations have actually been pretty good, and so I think

(18:40):
the Europeans at this point have mixed feelings. I mean,
there has always been this concern Katie, on the part
of the Europeans, and particularly the French, whether the United
States actually would be willing to go to war for them.
I mean Charles de gaul when he was pulling France
out of the military part of the alliance, basically was saying,

(19:02):
you know, will Washington sacrifice New York for Paris in
terms of a nuclear exchange. And so there's always been
this undercurrent in this Alliance relationship of whether, particularly in
a nuclear context, the United States would actually step up.
I think that continues. I don't think there's any way

(19:23):
to avoid it all together. But I do think the
change of rhetoric in recent weeks particularly has probably been
encouraging to the Europeans. And the truth is, there are
a lot of members of the US Congress that are
very strong proponents of NATO, and you know there's legislation

(19:45):
on the Hill, it's actually been put forward by both
Republicans and Democrats that would limit the president's ability to
pull troops out of Europe or to in any way
change the relationship with NATO, so that the Europeans have
to be encouraged by that as well.

Speaker 2 (20:06):
If you want to get smarter every morning with a
breakdown of the news and fascinating takes on health and
wellness and pop culture, sign up for our daily newsletter,
Wake Up Call by going to Katiecuric dot com. You

(20:27):
talked about earlier how divided this country is, and you
served under both Presidents George W. Bush and President Obama,
so you're really a symbol of what increasingly appears to
be a bygone era of bipartisan US foreign policy. I
wonder if you could talk a little bit more, Secretary

(20:50):
Gates about the consequences of this fracture and the impact
that you fear I imagine it could have on foreign policy.

Speaker 1 (21:00):
The interesting thing to me, Katie, is that there is
a difference between the rhetoric in Washington and the actual
actions and dealings in Washington and it's like both parties
are afraid publicly to say that they agree with each

(21:21):
other on anything, But the reality is there is a
great degree of bipartisanship on the hill in terms of China,
for example, and the Congress, both Republicans and Democrats are
very hawkish on China. I think there's a great deal
of support for Ukraine across the aisle. In the Congress,

(21:41):
there's a very vocal minority who are opposed both Republicans
and Democrats, but a lot of support. There's a lot
of support for NATO. So I think there is sort
of under the covers, if you will, more bipartisanship than
appear in the public rhetoric in politicians of both parties,

(22:04):
and an unwillingness to acknowledge that. The problem with that
is that it communicates a mixed message to our friends
and allies as well as to our adversaries and the opposition.
One of the biggest reasons we were successful in the
Cold War was that we pursued a public bipartisanship through

(22:27):
nine successive presidents, both Republicans and Democrats. We have a very,
very long contest with China in front of US, and
politicians tend to think in two and four year increments,
and we need to have a publicly articulated bipartisanship that
goes beyond the end of this administration and the next

(22:49):
and so on, that communicates the message to the Chinese
above all that we're in this contest for the long haul.
And so the irony is how to get these politicians
who actually agree with each other when they're in private,
to do so publicly.

Speaker 2 (23:07):
If a united front isn't presented, I mean in real
world terms, how does that impact both our allies and adversaries.

Speaker 1 (23:19):
Well, I think it just raises concerns and doubts on
their part. I think it encourages them to find other
allies and other relationships, and it encourages them to try
and have it both ways. And let's just say, for example, economically,
to have strong economic relationships with both the United States

(23:43):
and China. You see this throughout the global South of
countries who absolutely do not want to be put in
a position of having to choose between one or the other.
And I think the more the US is seen as
turning inward or not engaging around the world, the more
these other countries will position themselves not as our adversaries,

(24:08):
but more in the middle of wanting to have it
both ways, of cultivating relationships with both the US and China.

Speaker 2 (24:15):
Speaking of turning inward, I'd love to talk to you
about the America first isolationist sentiment that is so pervasive today.
As someone who served as Secretary of Defense during the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to what extent do you
think the failures and frustrations of those wars contributed to

(24:36):
the public's dissillusionment with US intervention abroad.

Speaker 1 (24:42):
Oh, I think they played a big role. You know,
we saw this after Vietnam. And I've always said the
American people are not very warlike. They basically want to
just be left alone. And if we are going to engage,
a president has to persuade them why it's important. And

(25:04):
Americans are okay with military operations that are quick and effective.
So one example is the First Gulf War, which lasted
one hundred hours on the ground. Another would be President
Trump's attack on Iran. But anything that is prolonged, the
American people will have very limited tolerance for it. And

(25:27):
the way I used to put it was, there's a
residual bank of patients in the American people and presidents
draw down on that bank at their peril. And if
you do it in a situation where American vital interests,
our own security isn't at risk, you risk putting yourself
in a position where the American people are reluctant to engage,

(25:50):
even if it is in our vital interest. So that
twenty years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, I think
dug deep into that well of patients. And I think
it's not just the isolationists. I think there's a very
broad range of people in this country at this point
who have no interest in long term engagements, particularly on

(26:12):
the ground where our sons and daughters are in harm's
way and where you have significant casualties. So I think
it's not just isolationists. I think there's a pretty broad
view within that regard.

Speaker 2 (26:26):
But can that go too far? Can this isolationist tendency
keep us from getting involved in conflicts that we should
be involved in, even if they are not long protracted once.

Speaker 1 (26:42):
Yes, I think the opposition to providing any help to
Ukraine is a good example of that. We're not putting
any American troops at risk in Ukraine. The Ukrainians are
doing the fighting. Zelenski's position reminds me of Churchill in
World War Two when he told Roseven, well, give us
the tools and we will do the job. And that's

(27:04):
what Zelenski has been asking for, and so a refusal
to help Ukraine I think, I think is very shortsighted.
There's always been a strain of isolationism, particularly on both extremes,
both the left and the right. The one on the right.
People forget, if Dwight Eisenhower hadn't run for president in
nineteen fifty two, Satir Bob Taft, who really wasn't out

(27:27):
and out isolationists, may well have become president of the
United States, and the whole history of NATO and everything
else could have been very, very different. He was one
of the handful of people who voted against the NATO
establishing the NATO Alliance. So there's been this strained from
the thirties and the twenties and so on about isolationism.
But I think if you look at what President Trump

(27:49):
has actually done in the last six months, it's far
from isolationists. I mean the Abraham Accords from the first term,
getting involved in continuing sport for Ukraine, although, as we've
talked about mixed messages for a while, but wanting to
try and negotiate a settlement in Ukraine, trying to negotiate

(28:10):
a settlement in Gaza, his willingness to take on Iran,
his engagement with the Gulf Arabs, his engagement with Shijenping.
This guy is not an isolationist. He's certainly transactional in
sense of putting America's interests first in all of these negotiations.
But isolationists is one thing that he really isn't.

Speaker 2 (28:33):
Have you been surprised by that?

Speaker 1 (28:36):
Not really. I think he has a great deal of
self confidence, and I think that he sees a big
role for himself, and not only in this country but
in the world.

Speaker 2 (28:46):
Well, he'd very much liked to win the Nobel Peace Prize.
Do you think he's worthy of that?

Speaker 1 (28:53):
Well, you know, I've watched some of the Nobel Peace Prizes.
In all honesty, you know what, President Obama got the
Nobel Peace Prize a few months into his presidency before
he'd done anything. So I'm not sure what criteria these
folks used in making that determination. I think if there

(29:15):
are some actual achievements, if there were to be a
peace settlement in Gaza, if there were to be a
peace settlement in Ukraine, then I think sure. I think
things like that have to happen where there's actually something
tangible that's been achieved to be a serious candidate.

Speaker 2 (29:32):
I have to follow up with a question about that,
Secretary Gates, are you suggesting that Barack Obama was not
worthy or do you just question the timing of the award.

Speaker 1 (29:45):
I think he was surprised to get the Nobel.

Speaker 2 (29:49):
But ultimately do you think he deserved it?

Speaker 1 (29:52):
Not at that point in his presidency.

Speaker 2 (29:54):
What about later in his presidency?

Speaker 1 (29:57):
Maybe? So what specif peace settlements were achieved, what specific
measures toward peace were put into place and proved defective?
You know, did Jimmy Carter deserve the Nobel Peace Prize
for the Camp David Accords? Absolutely? Maybe Ronald Reagan deserved
it for the I n F Treaty. But I think,

(30:20):
you know, without picking on individual presidents, I think the
criterion needs to be what specifically has been achieved that
merits that award.

Speaker 2 (30:30):
So what would you say specifically was achieved by President Obama?

Speaker 1 (30:35):
Or would you Well, I think that's hard for me
to judge.

Speaker 2 (30:39):
Really you just judged the other guys.

Speaker 1 (30:43):
Well, I'm trying to think back to the whole period,
and I'm trying to think of you know, were there
specific peace agreements that were resolved, Were there significant moves
toward peace in the Middle East? Did things change dramatically
with respect to China?

Speaker 2 (30:59):
So why don't you get back to me on that.
Let's turn to a very serious topic, which, of course
is one you just mentioned, the devastation in Gaza and
the ongoing conflict there. According to the Gaza Health Ministry,
which some people look at with some degree of skepticism,

(31:20):
more than fifty five thousand Palestinians have been killed, and
the IPC reports that half a million people are now
starving and the entire territory is at risk of famine.
This conflict is tearing the Mideast apart, obviously, but also
I think in many ways this country is being torn apart.

(31:43):
And I'm curious if you see any viable path to
a truce and are you optimistic it will be achieved.

Speaker 1 (31:53):
Well, I think there is a viable path, and that
is for Hamas to agree. I mean, how hard can
it be for them to say yes? Given the losses
that have been suffered under their leadership. People need to
remember they started this on October seventh and basically brought

(32:15):
it on themselves. And you have this small number of
leaders who have basic control of the weapons in Gaza
and through intimidation, continue to exercise their authority in Gaza.
And as they look around, at what point do they say,
if we care at all about all of these people

(32:38):
that look to us, why would we not make peace?
Why would we not agree to terms that end this war?
And then begin to think about what happens next. I mean,
my attitude is they started it and they can't seem
to finish it. They've lost some of their leaders, lost

(33:00):
lost so many of their citizens. These are the people
for whom they are responsible. At what point do they
begin to accept responsibility for these extraordinary losses when tomorrow
it could all stop if they just said yes to
the proposals that President Trump and others have put forward.

Speaker 2 (33:19):
I'm curious. I've asked this question to many people before,
but not really of someone of your stature, And I
wonder why there has never been a viable alternative to
Hamas and why some kind of more humane government has

(33:41):
not been able to be installed. Maybe that's a dumb
question because I guess they would just kill everyone. But
couldn't there be some way that Hamas could be replaced
with a better government.

Speaker 1 (33:56):
Well, part of the problem is that the West Bank
Palestinian authority is both corrupt and incompetent. President of Boss
is eighty eight years old, something like that. And you know,
if you had a significantly younger leader among the Palestinians emerged,

(34:19):
somebody with a reform agenda, somebody who was actually thinking
about the well being of Palestinians, then maybe you have
an option to get something positive going in Gaza. But
right now there's not much of an alternative on the
West Bank either. And you know, at one point, I've

(34:39):
had my differences with Bib Natanyau over the years, but
bb asked a good question. When you're talking about a
two states solution, which Palestinians am I going to be
negotiating with the Palestinians on the West Bank that have
acknowledged the Israel has a right to exist and with
whom we have cooperated on security and various other majors

(35:03):
or Hamas that has resolved that Israel should cease to exist,
which Palestinians. Am I going to be negotiating with and
until the Palestinians can come together? And this is a
place where it seems to me the Arab States could
play a more constructive role.

Speaker 2 (35:21):
Why don't they?

Speaker 1 (35:22):
It's a good question, and it's a question that I've
asked myself and others for a very very long time.

Speaker 2 (35:29):
You mentioned Benjamin Netanyahu and there was a recent New
York Times report that says he may have intentionally prolonged
the war in Gaza in part to avoid facing prosecution
at the International Criminal Court. What did you think of
that report? Do you think it's a legitimate explanation, and

(35:50):
if so, how should it shape the US governments ongoing
military and diplomatic support of Israel.

Speaker 1 (35:58):
Well, I have never been a particularly effective mind reader,
so figuring out baby nepping y'all who's motives in any
given situation is a puzzled I don't think I'm able
to solve.

Speaker 2 (36:11):
That's it. That's it, Okay, Hi everyone, it's me Katiekuric.
You know, lately, I've been overwhelmed by the whole wellness industry.
So much information out there about flaxed pelvic floor serums

(36:32):
and anti aging, So I launched a newsletter it's called
Body and Soul to share expert approved advice for your
physical and mental health. And guess what, It's free. Just
sign up at Katiecuric dot com slash Body and Soul.
That's k A T I E C O U r
C dot com slash Body and Soul. I promise it

(36:53):
will make you happier and healthier. You've also said it
would be a very heavy political lift your words for
any US president to cut off military supplies to Israel

(37:15):
to force the halt in Gaza. Given that reality, what
kind of meaningful leverage does the US actually have to
bring about a cease fire or limit or reduce civilian casualties.

Speaker 1 (37:28):
Well, I think we have under both President Biden and
President Trump. We have tried to get humanitarian aid flowing
and tried to get the Israelis to be more cautious
in their military operations in terms of innocent casualties. I
think the truth is that the United States, at least

(37:51):
from a political standpoint, neither Republicans nor Democrats have been
prepared to exercise the kind of economic orlilitary leverage on
Israel that would produce a change in Israeli behavior. Should
they I think if they had some viable alternatives, if

(38:11):
they had proposals that had some prospect of bringing an
end to the conflict or a path forward, we should
be prepared at some point to exercise that kind of influence.

Speaker 2 (38:27):
The war in Gaza has contributed to a broader regional escalation,
as you know, leading to Israeli strikes on Iran and
more recently US attacks on three Iranian nuclear sites. Can
you talk about the unprecedented nature of these strikes. I
know you applauded them early because you said there was
a specific goal, it wasn't a long protracted conflict. But

(38:52):
how did this move by the Trump administration upend both
long standing military and diplomatic norms? To me, like you
think it was a positive thing.

Speaker 1 (39:03):
I think that what Israel you know, in terms of
unintended consequences and taking a tactical situation and turning it
into a strategic opportunity is what at high cost the
October seventh attack on Israel produced, and that was a

(39:23):
decision on the part of the Israelis to change the
strategic environment in the Middle East. And so what you
have seen over the last year or so is. The
Israelis at first essentially destroying all but one of the
surrogates Iran had created at great cost and with great

(39:46):
effort over time, so Hamas in Gaza, his Belaw in
southern Lebanon. The Israelis didn't directly create the change of
government in Syria, but the change of go government in
Syria has cut off the supply line from Iran to
his blaw, so his blow can't rearm. So Iran had

(40:08):
counted on these surrogates. And the third is the Huthis
in Yemen, which nobody has been able to actually get
control of. But by so weakening Hamas and his blaw,
and with the replacement of the Syrian government of an
Ala white Hashia government with a Sunni government, the Israelis

(40:31):
considerably weakened Iran's reach in the region. And then their
attack on the Iranian nuclear facilities. The first attack got
rid of their strategic air defenses around the nuclear sites
and several other sites and set back their program. So
if you add then to that the more recent US attack,

(40:55):
what you have seen is a change in the strategic
environment in the Middle East, deduced by Israel and in
effect reinforced by the United States of a very, very
significantly weakened Iran, And I think that the worry of
the Gulf States was that that war would expand and
reach them, and the fact that it has not, I

(41:17):
think they see this change in the strategic environment and
the weakening of Iran as a positive thing. So I
think what we've seen over the last year or so
is a pretty significant change in the environment in the
Middle East, and frankly in the weakening of its most
disruptive player.

Speaker 2 (41:40):
So it changed the strategic environment, or a series of
events have changed the strategic environment. But what about the
mission itself. I know in May, before the US strike
on Iran's nuclear sites, you said, quote the problem that
I've had with the strike on the Iranian nuclear program
from the time I was secretary is that it buys

(42:02):
you a year or two. You cannot get at the
very deeply buried parts of the Iranian nuclear program. Even
our massive ordnance penetrator won't get that far down. And
following the US strike in June, we still don't fully
know the extent of the impact it will have on
Iran's nuclear program. So I guess, yes, it changed and

(42:24):
was part of this effort to change the strategic environment.
But do you think it got the job done in
terms of dismantling or destroying or significantly damaging Iran's nuclear capabilities.

Speaker 1 (42:40):
The reason that I have argued for a long time
that a conventional strike would damage but not destroy the
Iranian nuclear program. It basically would buy you time. And
the timeline is anywhere from a year to two years
to frankly two to five years. But it basically buys

(43:03):
you time for one thing. You can't unlearn what you've
already learned. So the Iranians are not going to forget
about this. The Israelians themselves are saying that they thought
that the enriched material was spread out among the three
sites as bahand Natans and Fdo, and that was not
all destroyed. They also are saying they're probably centrifugias that

(43:28):
were in clandestine places. So I think that you have
basically set back the Iranian program by some period of time.
My guess would be over a year, who knows how long.
And the question now, it seems to me for the
Iranian government, both with respect to their surrogates in the

(43:52):
region and their nuclear program, there have to be voices
in Iran saying we have spent billions and billions and
billions of dollars on supporting these surrogates and on our
nuclear program, and look where we are. Is this a
path that makes any sense at all going forward? Or

(44:13):
do we actually start to try and rebuild this country.
And I think that's a decision that the Iranians are
facing right now. And I think that there is enough
that has survived. I think there's great damage that's been
done to the Iranian program, but enough has survived and
enough people have survived that they could reconstitute that program

(44:37):
over a period of time, probably more covertly and even
deeper than has been the case. I don't think they
can cheat, though, because one of the amazing things, as
an old intelligence guy, that just impresses the heck out
of me is how thoroughly the Israeli has penetrated the
Iranian government. To know where specific officials are at any

(44:59):
given time and even where they're going to be is
an intelligence achievement of extraordinary proportions. And so if I
were an Iranian, I would not believe that I could
keep anything secret at this point. So the question is,
what do the Iranians decide to.

Speaker 2 (45:16):
Do right and if they'll have second thoughts as a
result of this.

Speaker 1 (45:20):
Yeah, and I think that question remains open.

Speaker 2 (45:23):
I know, as a former sect deaf our men and
women in uniform are near and dear to your heart.
I wanted to ask you a few questions about sort
of our military itself and its reputation. President Trump, as
you know, deployed the National Guard and then the US
Marines to Los Angeles over Governor Gavin Newsom's objections. It's

(45:45):
the first such move without a governor's consent since nineteen
sixty five, I believe. Days later, he held a campaign
style rally at Fort Bragg, where uniform soldiers applauded as
he attacked political rivals. And then on January fourteenth, there
was a massive military parade, officially to mark the Army's
two hundred and fiftieth birthday, but conveniently timed to Donald

(46:09):
Trump's birthday. I wonder how you feel about the blatant
politicization of our armed forces.

Speaker 1 (46:20):
I feel that, first of all that, and I expressed
my concern to the chiefs of staff for both President
Bush and President Obama about events in which they used
troops as a backdrop, and those were pretty innocent events,
but they weren't military events, but they still had troops

(46:43):
in the background, and I've always been very nervous about that.
You know, In terms of the deployment of the National Guard,
first President Bush did it after the Rodney King attack,
so it's been done before. As you pointed out, I
do have concerns about any protracted involvement of the National

(47:05):
Guard on American streets. The National Guard is the part
of our military that's closest to the people. People in
the National Guard are the folks you see out there
after a flash flood or after a hurricane, or after
helping people and being seen as a positive influence and
as somebody from the community helping the community. And I

(47:27):
think preserving that image is a very important one. So
if the President is going to order the deployment of
the National Guard, I think it needs to be for
very limited periods of time until other law enforcement or
other authorities can be put in place, whether it's ICE
or anybody else. I will say this about politicization of

(47:49):
the military, one of my biggest concerns, and I've had
it for a long time, has been really beginning in
nineteen ninety two the growing number of retired military who
become politically active and endorsing and campaigning with presidential campaigns

(48:11):
and others. And the problem that I have with it
is that they appear on television and interviews and so
on and so forth. The problem that I have when
they're politically engaged like that is that, first of all,
if you didn't have general or admiral in front of
their name, nobody would care what they thought. But the

(48:32):
other side of it is people often can't discern whether
they're still active duty or not. Are they speaking for
themselves or are they speaking for their institution and kind
of who do you represent on this? And if you
have a bunch of them, then you're going to begin
to think, well, gee, do all the people in that

(48:54):
institution believe the same thing that he does? And so
if you have these people on the side of one candidate,
then maybe the people on the other side are going
to say, well, maybe I can't trust that institution if
that's what those people believe. So I've believed for a
long time that the active engagement, and I would say

(49:16):
more recently the engagement of former senior intelligence officials creates
the same question. If director weren't in front of their names,
who would care And do they represent the institution that
they led, or do they represent the views of the
people in their institution so that people on the other

(49:37):
side of the aisle say, well, gee, maybe I can't
trust that institution at all. So having these retired national
security officials actively engaged in politics, in my view, undermines
the a political role of the military and the perception

(49:57):
of an a political military and creates an environment that
makes it easier for politicians to try and make use
of the military. So I think this is a very
complicated problem, and it goes back many years, and it's
from both inside these institutions and the leaders who have
left those institutions, but also the politicians themselves. Politicians always

(50:22):
want the military to be present because the military still,
despite everything, is the most respected institution in America, and
when people see somebody in uniform, they have more confidence
in that person as looking out for them in America's
interests than they do pretty much anybody else in the spectrum.

Speaker 2 (50:44):
So are you talking about active duty and retired members
of the military.

Speaker 1 (50:49):
I don't know of any instances where an active duty
person has actually been involved in a care right or
speaking in.

Speaker 2 (50:56):
Or opining about policy. I mean, it's interesting because my
last question to you was going to be but I
have a lot more after this, was to ask you
about something the Atlantics. Tom Nichols recently called on and
that was for senior military officials, and I'm assuming he
needs active duty to quote speak up and be leaders.

(51:18):
This is what he wrote. The top officers of the
US military where eagles or stars on their shoulders that
give them great privilege as befits, people who assume responsibility
for the defense of the nation and the welfare of
their troops. They command the power of life and death
itself on the field of battle. But those ranks also

(51:39):
carry immense responsibility. If they are truly Washington's heirs, meaning
President Washington, they should speak up now and stand with
the first Commander in Chief, George Washington against the rogue
forty seven.

Speaker 1 (51:57):
I think that's a big mistake. I think active duty
military should play no role in non military political matters.

Speaker 2 (52:16):
Hi. Everyone, it's me Katie Couric. You know, if you've
been following me on social media, you know I love
to cook, or at least try especially alongside some of
my favorite chefs and foodies like Benny Blanco, Jake Cohen,
Lighty Hoyke, Alison Roman, and Ininagarten. So I started a
free newsletter called good Taste to share recipes, tips and

(52:36):
kitchen mustaves. Just sign up at Katiecuric dot com slash
good Taste. That's k A t I E C O
U r I c dot com slash good Taste. I
promise your taste buds will be happy you did. I know.

(53:00):
You currently lead the Gates Global Policy Center, where much
of your work focuses on how the US can strengthen
and modernize its non military tools of power like diplomacy,
economic influence, strategic communication, and development assistance, just as it
did during the Cold War. Why do you think this

(53:21):
non military use of power is so essential?

Speaker 1 (53:25):
It really has to do in my experience the Kadie
in the Cold War. The Cold War took place against
the backdrop of the biggest arms build up in the
history of the world, but because we were able to
avoid a military conflict with the Soviet Union, the outcome
of the Cold War was actually determined by non military

(53:47):
instruments of power. Above all, economics, our economic power and
their weakness, our technological superiority, but also strategic communications, our
world wide networks, the radios, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe,
Radio Free Asia and more, and the USIA libraries we

(54:09):
had all over the world, and so on our development assistance.
President Bush's program that he initiated the second President Bush
for being with HIV AIDS in Africa saved tens of
millions of lives. Everybody agrees with that, and that program
was supported long after he left office on a bipartisan basis,

(54:31):
and that kind of support had a big role, I think,
and you know that's post Cold War, but we had
similar kinds of programs for polio and other diseases. And
so these ideology, religion, all of these were instruments we
used in the contest against the Soviet Union. And so

(54:52):
what we try to do at the Gates Policy Center
is bring together each year on a specific subject economic tools,
development assistance, strategic communications, security assistance, people from both the
administration and from Congress, both Republicans and Democrats, people from

(55:12):
the private sector, people from think tanks and scholars, and
all of these tools are in need of significant reform,
all have significant flaws, and to put together a menu
of recommended changes that we can provide to the Congress
and to the administration and say, you know, this would

(55:34):
have bipartisan support. If you understand and accept the importance
of this as part of your arsenal, then these are
the kinds of changes that you need to make. And
I'll just give you one example of how dysfunctional some
of these events. So strategic communications. You know, USIA played
a huge role in the in the Cold War. It

(55:56):
was dismantled in nineteen ninety eight by the Congress. But
now we have fourteen Cabinet departments and forty eight agencies
that do strategic communications internationally, and nobody coordinates them. There's
no common messaging, there's no leadership, and there's no coordination.
So what can you accomplish? So the whole purpose of

(56:17):
the Center is to put together a menu of reform
measures that can make these more important, because if we
can avoid a military conflict with China, these tools will
be as important in the ongoing struggle with China as
they were in the struggle with the Soviet Union.

Speaker 2 (56:37):
Well, this is a big argument. Obviously, secretory gates for
soft power, right, non military, what's called soft power so
I have to believe that you're not a fan of
dismantling of USAID, particularly given what you said about George W.
Bush and petfar First of.

Speaker 1 (56:57):
All, Congress tried to dismantle us AID in nineteen ninety
eight also, and President Clinton stopped it, but it became
a very different kind of agency after that. So when
I left government in nineteen ninety three, USAID had sixteen
thousand employees, dedicated people operating in inhospitable places all over

(57:20):
the world and doing healthcare, doing education, agronomy, veterinary medicine,
all those things, and they were out there in really
tough places. When I came back to government as Secretary
of Defense in two thousand and six, it was down
to three thousand people, largely managing contractors. I was struck
when USAID was dismantled. Not a single former Secretary of

(57:45):
State complained. There have been a lot of problems with USAID.
So the question is, and this goes to what I
was just talking about, what the Gates Center does, because
a number of the missions of USAID were so important,
whether it's in healthcare or in agriculture or other kinds

(58:06):
of assistance. How can we restructure this within the State
Department to ensure that those missions get accomplished, but in
a much more effective way. So I think that's the
challenge that people face now. But the notion of just
killing programs like PEPFAR and these other programs, I think
that would be a serious mistake.

Speaker 2 (58:28):
So it sounds to me like you believe it could
have been reformed or reimagined, but not necessarily dismantled altogether.

Speaker 1 (58:37):
Maybe you did need to dismantle it, but there certainly
was a different way to do it that made clear
that there would be continuity in accomplishing these missions, so
that you would say, okay, if USAID, Well, first of all,
PEPFAR wasn't under USAID, it was independent under the State Department.

(58:58):
But some of these other the healthcare programs, who's going
to do that? How are we going to do it
in a different way and do it more cost effectively
and more effectively. But there's a way to change things,
and I changed a lot of things when I was
in the Department of Defense. There's a way to reform
these organizations and make them work better without basically throwing

(59:22):
the baby out with the bath water.

Speaker 2 (59:24):
Do you think there is the political will, though, now
that usaidea is essentially gone, is there the political will
and the understanding of the importance of soft power in
the Trump administration to want to do that.

Speaker 1 (59:40):
I'm not sure there is. I'm very concerned about the
shutting down of the Voice of America. Again, big problems
needed to be reformed, but I think there was a
way to do that. But these are the ways we
communicate to the rest of the world who we are,
what we stand for, defend our policies, and so on

(01:00:00):
and so Now I think a lot depends on the
leadership of Secretary Rubio. He's now in charge of these programs.
He needs to figure out a way to identify and
persuade the President and the Congress how to preserve the
most important of these programs, and how to structure the

(01:00:23):
State Department to make them work.

Speaker 2 (01:00:25):
And have you talked to him about it? No, do
you plan to talk to him about it anytime?

Speaker 1 (01:00:31):
I would be prepared to.

Speaker 2 (01:00:33):
The Gates Global Policy Center's most recent report argues that
we've been overly reliant on sanctions, and I'm curious if
you believe sanctions work or that we've just gone back
to that well too many times.

Speaker 1 (01:00:48):
There's something like nineteen thousand sanctions in effect right now.
And one of the things that I observe is that
you now corporations have to have whole batteries of lawyers
to determine whether they're complying with all these sanctions against institutions, countries,
and individuals around the world. I think we've overused them.

(01:01:12):
I think they have a place. There have been occasions
when they've been successful. I think the sanctions were helpful
in getting rid of the Libyan nuclear program. They certainly
were helpful in getting rid of white supremacy and what
was then Rhodesia and South Africa. But I think it's
too easy as a default to impose sanctions because it

(01:01:34):
doesn't have any apparent costs, and it's never very controversial
and so on. It's sort of like it used to
be that if we didn't want to use the military
and we didn't think diplomacy would work, they would just
turn to see Ia say well, let's just do some
covert action. So the same thing as kind of the
default with sanctions now. And I think here's one of
the challenges, how do you effectively integrate the use of

(01:01:58):
sanctions and technology, export bans and tariffs. To have a
consolidated economic policy that maximizes your strengths and minimizes the
consequences are costs to you. And figuring out how to
put all that together I think has been absent for

(01:02:19):
a long time, not just in this administration.

Speaker 2 (01:02:22):
Are you worried about all these tariffs, Secretary Gates?

Speaker 1 (01:02:26):
Well, again, this is one of those situations where we
allowed a situation to develop over decades in which many
countries had unequal trade relationships with the United States in
the sense that they had certain taxes, certain barriers to
trade at tariffs. The EU is a good example that

(01:02:49):
is true in other countries. And my view is that
I think it's a mistake to use tariffs to try
and generate revenue for the United States. The question is,
how do you use tariffs punitively to level the playing
field so that the rules that apply to us apply
to the other side as well. And I mean, I

(01:03:12):
think that's one of the challenges that we've had for
decades with China. There's been a big significant imbalance here.
But instead of one hundred and forty five percent tariffs,
how do you level the playing field in a way
that still generates revenue, maybe not as much as you
want it, but also makes it a fair game for

(01:03:32):
American companies trying to do business overseas, and that's where
we've been disadvantaged. And I think the recent example of
the Canadians imposing this digital tax on US companies to
win countries, or the EU disadvantage American companies like that,
then I think that's a legitimate approach to try and

(01:03:53):
figure out how to make the situation fairer.

Speaker 2 (01:03:57):
I know we're out of time, Can I ask you
one last question?

Speaker 1 (01:04:02):
Sure?

Speaker 2 (01:04:03):
Because I thought this was so interesting. A recent ug
of survey shows a sharp decline in the number of
veterans who would recommend military service, going from eighty percent
to just sixty two percent in five years, and many
cite mistrust of political leadership and discomfort with DEI and

(01:04:26):
other social policies, and nearly all oppose racial quotas in
the officer corps. I'm curious what you think of that
and what it suggests about the ongoing debate about DEI
and the military. And I would love to hear your
view on this war on DEI, if you will. In

(01:04:48):
all aspects of American society.

Speaker 1 (01:04:50):
Really, I think that the way I put it when
I was president of Texas A and M, I put
in rules when it came to admit that said we're
going to have merit based admissions. We're not going to
do affirmative action. We're also not going to do legacy.
If you get in here, you get in here on

(01:05:12):
your own merits. But then I devoted a lot of
effort to going around to high schools around Texas and
particularly predominantly minority high schools, telling him how welcome they
are at Texas A and M. And I would take
a student from that high school with me who was
at A and M to talk about his or her experience.

(01:05:33):
So I've not been a believer in these things or
quotas and so on. But I also believe that institutions
need to look like the people they represent. So I
thought Texas A and M needed to look more like
the state of Texas demographically, but we were going to

(01:05:55):
do it based on merit and I'm One of my
favorite emails that I ever as president of A and
M was from an African American woman student who said, finally,
when people ask me how I got here, I tell
them I got here the same way you did. I
earned it, and I think that holds us true for
the military. For other institutions as well, I think they

(01:06:18):
need to be merit based. I think people need to
be able to perform, but I also think it's a
responsibility of leaders to do what they can to make
sure their institutions look like the people they represent.

Speaker 2 (01:06:32):
Secretary Robert Gates, Bob Gates, I so appreciate your time.
I note this took a while to schedule, but you've
been so generous. Thank you. I always appreciate your perspective
and hopefully we can have a conversation again in the
near future, because one thing is certain, the world is
changing every day and there will always be plenty to

(01:06:56):
talk about.

Speaker 1 (01:06:57):
It's a pleasure to be with you again, Katie.

Speaker 2 (01:07:06):
Thanks for listening. Everyone. If you have a question for me,
a subject you want us to cover, or you want
to share your thoughts about how you navigate this crazy world,
reach out send me a DM on Instagram. I would
love to hear from you. Next Question is a production
of iHeartMedia and Katie Couric Media. The executive producers are Me,

(01:07:27):
Katie Kuric, and Courtney Ltz. Our supervising producer is Ryan Martz,
and our producers are Adriana Fazzio and Meredith Barnes. Julian
Weller composed our theme music. For more information about today's episode,
or to sign up for my newsletter, wake Up Call,
go to the description in the podcast app, or visit

(01:07:48):
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