Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:10):
This is Lee Habib and this is our American Stories,
the show where America is the star and the American
people coming to you from the city where the West begins,
Fort Worth, Texas. PAL codes or codes for permissive action links,
or complex multi digit combinations that vary for each nuclear
(00:30):
weapons system, which prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.
But this wasn't always so. Here to tell the story
of Simon Whistler from the today I found out YouTube channel.
Let's take a listen.
Speaker 2 (00:47):
During the height of the Cold War, the US military
puts such an emphasis on rapid response to an attack
on American soil that to minimize any foreseeable delay in
launching a nuclear missile for nearly two decades, they mentionally
set the launch codes of every silo in the United
States to a string of eight zeros. We guess the
(01:08):
first thing that we need to address is how this
came to be in the first place. Well, in nineteen
sixty two, JFK signs the National Action Security Memorandum one
sixty which was supposed to ensure that every nuclear weapon
in the US was fitted with a Permissive Action Link PAL,
basically a small device that ensured that the missile could
be launched with only the right code and with the
(01:30):
right authority. There was particularly a concern that the nuclear
missiles the United States had stationed in other countries, some
of which had somewhat unstable leaderships, could potentially be seized
by those governments and launched with the Power system, this
became much less of a problem. Beyond foreign seizure, there
was also the problem that many US commanders had the
(01:52):
ability to launch nukes under their control at any time.
Just one commanding officer who wasn't qui in the head
and World War III begins. As US General Horace M.
Wade stated about General Thomas Power, I used to worry
about General Power. I used to worry that General Power
was not stable. I used to worry about the fact
(02:14):
that he had control over so many weapons and weapons
systems and could, under certain conditions, launched the force back
in the days before we had real positive control by
e Powerlock's sac had the power to do a lot
of things, and it was in his hands and he
knew it. To give you an idea of how secure
(02:34):
the power system was at this time, bypassing one was
described once as being about as complex as performing at
tom selectomy while entering the patient from the wrong end.
This system was supposed to be essentially hot wire proof,
making sure only people with the correct codes could activate
the nuclear weapons and launch the missiles. However, though the
(02:56):
devices were supposed to be fitted on every nuclear missile
after JFK issued as memorandum, the military continually dragged its
heels on the matter. In fact, it was noted that
a full twenty years after JFK had ordered pals to
be fitted to every nuclear device, half of the missiles
in Europe were still protected by simple mechanical locks. Most
(03:19):
that did have the new system in place weren't even
activated until nineteen seventy seven. Those in the US that
had been fitted with the devices, such as the one
in the minute Man silos, were installed under the close
scrutiny of Robert McNamara, JFK's Secretary of Defense.
Speaker 3 (03:35):
And the conventional wisdom is, don't make the same mistake twice.
Learn from your mistakes, and we all do. Maybe we
make a same mistake three times, but hopefully not four
or five. There will be no learning period. The nuclear weapons,
you make one mistake, you're going to destroy nations.
Speaker 2 (03:50):
However, these strategic air commands greatly resented MacNamara's presence, and
almost as soon as he left, the code to launch
the missiles or fifty of them was set to eight zeros.
Oh and in case you actually did forget the code,
it was handily written down on a checklist handed out
to soldiers, as doctor Bruce G. Blab, who was once
(04:17):
a Minuteman launch officer, stated, our launch checklist in fact
instructed us the firing crew to double check the locking
panel in our underground's launch bunker to ensure that no
digits other than zero had been inadvertently dialed into the panel.
This ensured that there was no need to wait for
presidential confirmation that would have just wasted valuable Russian muking time.
(04:41):
To be fair, there was also the possibility that command
centers or communication lines could be wiped out. So having
a bunch of nuclear missiles sitting around, unlaunchable because nobody
had the code was seen as a greater risk by
the military brass than a few soldiers simply deciding to
launch the missiles without proper author race station. Doctor Blair,
(05:02):
whose resume to date is far too long to write
out here, is the one who broke this eight zero's
news to the world in its two thousand and four
article Keeping Presidents in the Nuclear Dark. He also outlines
the significant disconnect between the nation's elected leaders and the
military when it came to nuclear weapons during the Cold War.
Doctor Blair had previously made waves in nineteen seventy seven
(05:25):
when he wrote another article entitled the Terrorist Threat to
World's Nuclear Programs. He had first attempted to communicate the
serious security problems at the nuclear silos to congressmen starting
around nineteen seventy three. When that information fell on mostly
deaf ears, he decided to outline it for the public
in this nineteen seventy seven article, where he described how
(05:46):
just four people acting in tandem could easily activate a
nuclear launch in the silos he had worked in. Further,
amongst other things, the panel system Magnamara had touted was
barely an operation, and thus launches could be authored, rised
by anyone without presidential authority. He also noted how virtually
anyone who asked for permission to tour the launch facility
or was granted it with little to know background checks performed.
(06:10):
It is perhaps not coincidence that the Powell systems were
all activated and the codes changed the same year this
article was published, so to recap for around twenty years,
the strategic air commands went out of their way to
make launching a nuclear missile as easy and quick as possible.
To be fair, they had their reasons, such as the
fact that the soldiers in the silos in the case
(06:32):
of a real nuclear war, may have needed to be
able to launch the missiles without being able to contact
anyone on the outside. That said, their actions were in
direct violation of the orders of the command are in chief. Further,
not activating this safeguard and lack of security ensured that
someone with very little planning, someone with three friends who
(06:52):
had a mind to could have started World War III.
We don't even think that could pass for a bad
conspiracy theory film plot, but history is so often stranger
than fiction.
Speaker 1 (07:04):
And a terrific job on the production, editing and storytelling
by our own Greg Hengler, and a special thanks to
frequent contributor Simon Whistler from the Today I Found Out
YouTube channel and its sister, the Brain Food Show podcast.
I recommend both of them heartily. The story of the
remedy for the nuclear launch code here on Our American
(07:26):
Stories Lie Habib here, and I'd like to encourage you
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(07:47):
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