July 24, 2025 • 38 mins
On this episode of Our American Stories, on June 6, 1944, Allied forces launched the Normandy landings in the boldest military campaign of the war. Behind that historic moment was a massive effort built over months of planning, coordination, and sacrifice. Historian Stephen Ambrose walks us through how D-Day came together, from the first strategies to the final push, and explains what the invasion meant for the course of World War II.
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Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:10):
This is Lee Habib, and this is Our American Stories,
the show where America is the star and the American people.
Stephen Ambrose is one of America's leading biographers and historians.
Ambrose passed in two thousand and two, but his epic
storytelling accounts can now be heard here in Our American Stories,
(00:31):
thanks to those who run his estate. Here's Ambrose telling
the World War II story and the lead up to
Operation Overlord, the largest land invasion in history, at Normandy, France,
June sixth, nineteen forty four. Let's take a listen.
Speaker 2 (00:51):
By December of nineteen forty three, the United States and
Great Britain that agreed that the major operation for nineteen
forty four would be the invasion of France, the opening
of the Second Front. In December, Churchill and Roosevelt went
to Tehran in Iran to meet with Stalin to discuss
(01:12):
operations for nineteen forty four. Stalin had only one question,
is there going to be a second Front? Roosevelt assured
him that there would be. Well, who's going to command it?
Stalin asked, well, we haven't decided that yet. Roosevelt answered, well,
Stalin said, and I don't believe you're serious about this,
not until you've appointed a commander in chief for the operation.
(01:33):
Roosevelt and Churchill returned to Cairo, Egypt after the meeting,
and there Roosevelt made his decision on who was going
to have this most coveted command in the.
Speaker 3 (01:43):
History of warfare. His personal choice was General Marshall.
Speaker 2 (01:47):
He felt that Marshall deserved the opportunity to lead an
army in the field. Marshall had built this army. This
was Marshall's strategy that was being implemented. Roosevelt told Eisenhower
he feared that Marshall didn't have a field command, he'd
be forgotten in later years, just as Lincoln's chief of
staff had been forgotten. Everybody knows grant me, but nobody
(02:09):
knows who Lincolns chief of staff is, said the President.
For that reason, he wanted Marshall to have the appointment.
But there are a lot of objections to having Marshall
take the job. He wanted kief of staff the United
States Army. He had worldwide responsibilities. To put him in
command of overlord would be in a way to diminish
his role in the war. Further, to move Marshall from
(02:33):
Washington to London to take over the Overlord command would
mean that someone would have to take Marshall's place of Washington.
That someone was presumably going to be Eisenhower. That would
have put Eisenhower in the position of being General MacArthur's superior.
Since I could serve as a light colonel and MacArthur
for seven years, that was not something that made a
(02:55):
lot of sense. In the end, Roosevelt turned the Marshall
himself and asked.
Speaker 3 (03:02):
Him what he wanted.
Speaker 2 (03:05):
Marshall, who was a very great man as well as
a very great soldier, a real spartan, said and quite properly,
that's not my decision to make, mister President. You're the
commander in chief. It is up to you to decide
where I can serve you best. Roosevelt then made his
decision In Cairo. Roosevelt had Marshall sit down with him
(03:25):
and then dictated a message to Stalin saying that the
immediate appointment of General Eisenhower the command of Operation Overlord
has been decided on. Marshall wrote it down as Roosevelt dictated,
and then handed it to Roosevelt.
Speaker 3 (03:40):
Roosevelt signed it.
Speaker 2 (03:41):
Marshall took that note down to the radio room and
had it sent by Cipher to Stalin in Moscow, and
then wrote Marshall typically of the man saved the note
and sent it to Eisenhower with a little covering note saying, Eisenhower,
I thought you might like to have this as a momental,
had it framed, and from then on wherever his office was. Finally,
(04:03):
of course in the White House, that's what hung behind
his desk, that little handwritten MIMO that catapult at Eisenhower
into the presidency. Of course, first of all, he had
to win the battle, He had to be a successes
over commander before he was going to become President of
the United States. It almost sounds like his selection was
(04:27):
by default, But actually Eisenhower brought many positive qualities to
the job. And we can see now that Marshall didn't
have the temperament to deal with Montgomery and other British officers.
Speaker 3 (04:43):
He didn't suffer fools. Gladly I could put up.
Speaker 2 (04:46):
With more than Marshall, ever was willing to endure. I
think Eisenower probably was the better field commander than Marshall
would have been. Also, in any event, in my view,
roosevelt selection of Eisenower to command Overlord was.
Speaker 3 (04:58):
The best decision at Roosevelt ever.
Speaker 2 (05:01):
Eisenower arrived in London in January of nineteen forty four
to take up his duties as the Supreme Commander Allied
Expeditionary Force in command of Operation Overlord. The first problem
that he had to face was where is this attack
going to take place? His orders from the combined piece
of staff were to cross the Channel, get into France,
(05:24):
and destroy the German army.
Speaker 3 (05:26):
Everything else was left up to him.
Speaker 2 (05:27):
Where and when will this offensive begin was Eisenhower's to decide.
Speaker 3 (05:33):
The things that they kept in mind.
Speaker 2 (05:35):
As they settled on a place were many, but one
stood out above all others.
Speaker 3 (05:42):
There has to be surprise.
Speaker 2 (05:44):
Without surprise, this operation has no chance of his success.
At most, Eisenhower had enough lift to bring five divisions
ashore on the first day. Rommel, his opposite number, who
had taken up his post in France with the headquarters
outside Paris also in January of nineteen forty four, had
(06:06):
fifty five divisions available in France, so he out numbered
Eisenhower Wood for the first few days of the attack
by eleven to one, and of those fifty five divisions,
nine were armored divisions and very good armored divisions.
Speaker 3 (06:19):
At that and Ronald had.
Speaker 2 (06:24):
An absolute superiority here because I wasn't going to have
no armored divisions.
Speaker 3 (06:28):
On the first week of the battle.
Speaker 2 (06:30):
So the Germans had to be surprised that there was
no cancer this operation working.
Speaker 1 (06:35):
And you've been listening to Steven Ambrose recount the decision
making leading up to appointing the commander in charge of
Operation Overlord, and how interesting.
Speaker 3 (06:46):
I mean, there was almost no choice.
Speaker 1 (06:48):
It just simply couldn't be Marshall. That's what we learned
because a lot of people have asked themselves over time
who study the war on one why wasn't it Marshall?
And I'd never known the answer until I heard Steve
and Ambrose give that explanation. And it was prompted by
Stalin's very incisive question, if you don't have a commander,
you're not ready to invade. Well, Roosevelt responded quickly with
(07:10):
that when we come back more of this remarkable story,
the story of Operation Overlord, the largest land invasion in
world history, and we're talking about D Day here on
our American stories. Pleehabib here, and I'd like to encourage
(07:31):
you to subscribe to Our American Stories on Apple Podcasts,
the iHeartRadio app, Spotify, or wherever you get our podcasts.
Any story you missed or want to hear again can
be found there daily Again, please subscribe to the Our
American Stories podcast on Apple Podcasts, the iHeartRadio app, or
(07:52):
anywhere you get your podcasts. It helps us keep these
great American stories coming. And we continue with our American
Stories and with Stephen Ambrose's telling of the lead up
(08:15):
to Operation Overlord, the largest land invasion in history, at Normandy, France,
on June sixth, nineteen forty four. Let's pick up where
we last left off.
Speaker 2 (08:27):
Although the possible invasion front was very broad, there were
many parts of it that were just unsuitable to an attack.
The Dutch coastline, for example, too easily flooded. And when
you get down here toward the Bay of Biscay and Breast,
you're getting too far away from your objective. Remember, the
(08:47):
final objective of this attack is Berlin, and more so
than Berlin, even the Rhine rh region that is Germany's
industrial heartland, without which Germany could not possibly wage modern war.
So here's the objective here, and going down into the
Bay of Biscay, although that was the least defended part
of the French coast, made no sense at all because
it put you so far away from your objective. The
(09:10):
obvious line of attack was to come from Dover across
to Dunkirk or into the Belgian coast in the area
around the French province of the Potto Calais.
Speaker 3 (09:23):
That's the straight line of the objective.
Speaker 2 (09:25):
London Dover, Potto Calais, through Belgium, through Brussels and on
into the German heartland around the Rhine Ruh region, and
these beaches were quite suitable for amphibious operations. For that reason,
the Germans had built up by fire their heaviest defenses here,
the so called Atlantic Wall, and in this area it
(09:50):
probably was what Hitler said, The whole of the Atlantic
Wall was impregnable. The amount of steel reinforced concrete that
had been pulled, the numbers of guns that had prepositioned
their targets, ranging from two hundred and five millimeter down
to the mortars and even to the rifle pits, were
(10:11):
just too much. No force in the world could have
broken through in those areas, and you obviously couldn't achieve
surprise of those areas, and in addition to the fixed
defenses that Ronald had there and the infantry that were
in these prepared positions, that is where about seventy percent
(10:32):
of the German tank strength was located.
Speaker 3 (10:36):
Because above all else.
Speaker 2 (10:37):
The Germans had to prevent a landing here in northern France,
with its easy access to their factory system and Dusseldorf
and Bonn and Cologne and the other great cities of
the Rhine Ruh region. So here was Germany's vulnerability right here,
very close to London, very close to Dover. And so
this is where the German defenses were the strongest. When
(10:59):
you get to the south and the west of the
Sane River running from Paris, here the defenses weren't so
strong and the Panzer divisions were not in place. Here
was where it was possible to effect a lodgment. The Germans,
every time they studied the map, it was, of course,
(11:21):
the same map the Allies were using, came to the
conclusion they won't it's kissed not possible that they would
come here into Normandy because it's in the wrong direction.
It's going south instead of east, and further to go
into Normandy was to put the Sane River and the
Solme River between the Allies.
Speaker 3 (11:41):
And their objective.
Speaker 2 (11:44):
So, because the Germans felt that it was just out
of the question that the Allies would come into Normandy,
the eyes an artistic sided. Normandy's where we're going to go.
Speaker 3 (11:52):
There.
Speaker 2 (11:52):
I know we can get ashore and then we can
be bringing in from London. This vast build up of
men and supplies has been taking place since.
Speaker 3 (12:01):
Nineteen forty three in England.
Speaker 2 (12:03):
The outpouring of America's factories, and these marvelously trained young
Americans and the divisions that have been formed in.
Speaker 3 (12:10):
Forty two and forty three could come into the battle.
So Normandy was the place that Eisenhower picked. The time.
He wanted to go as early in the spring as possible,
as soon.
Speaker 2 (12:22):
As good campaigning weather began, that is, early May, but
he eventually postponed the target day to June first, so
that he could have another month's production of landing craft.
The big shortage guysen Our had was in landing craft.
He had a lot of air. He had plenty of air,
He had plenty of naval warships. He had more divisions
(12:45):
than he could put into the battle until we had
advanced well into France. But what he was short on
was landing craft. Landing Craft had now become a top
priority production item in the United States, and by postponing
from May one to June one, Eisenhower was able to
get that many more O LST's, LCVPs, LCMS, LCTs and
the others into the battle. So where and when where
(13:07):
will be Normandy? When will be the first of June?
And that meant that's the target date, the first date
after the first of June on which the tide and
moon conditions are right. This was because Rommel had begun
in January nineteen forty four to build up the beach defenses.
The obstacles of a myriad of types barbed wire.
Speaker 3 (13:32):
Land mines, sea mines.
Speaker 2 (13:34):
Tetrahydra which were came in a variety of forms, but
basically were steel rails, railroad rails welded together into a
tripod and then a teller mine put on top of
them and set out there so that at high tide
they were just above just below the water, meaning that
any landing craft trying to come in at high tide
(13:55):
was going to run into a mine sitting on one
of these obstacles.
Speaker 3 (13:58):
High tide is the best time to.
Speaker 2 (14:00):
Attack in the sense that it shortens the distance and
the beak, the distance from where the ramp goes down
and them and charge out of their landing craft and
they get to.
Speaker 3 (14:09):
The first cover.
Speaker 2 (14:12):
Low tide is the worst time to attack, because you've
got that long stretch of open beak, all of it
covered by German fire through which the attacking forces have
to work their way. Ronald's beach defenses were designed to
force the Allies to land at low tide, and they did.
Another requirement I should add was moon the night before,
(14:35):
at least a half a moon to provide enough illumination for.
Speaker 3 (14:38):
A night drop.
Speaker 2 (14:40):
This is a very daring part of the Allied plan.
One of the greatest assets that Eisenower had was three
magnificently trained divisions of light infantry, the US eighty second,
hundred and first Airborne and the British sixth Airborne divisions.
He wanted to use those airborne divisions to protect the
flanks of the invasion, letting the Americans land on the
(15:04):
right and the contentin peninsula and the British six they're
born coming in on the left. He wanted to start
putting them at midnight so that they could secure positions,
establish roadblocks, take key villages, knock down German communications, especially
their telephone lines. All before the first attacks began, these
night drops a very dangerous thing, not to be recommended.
(15:28):
The risk had to be run to make it an
acceptable risk. It was necessary to have some moonlight the
night before, so the conditions were not simply a low
tide at dawn, but also moonlight the night before.
Speaker 3 (15:42):
And June fifth fit that date that had.
Speaker 2 (15:45):
Those conditions set al also, so June fifth was picked
as the date.
Speaker 3 (15:50):
Hitler had five division stations in Norway.
Speaker 2 (15:53):
Now these were immobile infantry divisions of not very good
quality troops. Nevertheless, at about twelve men per division, it
was they had an awful lot of firepower. Ramo was screaming
to get those troops out of Norway, where they're not
doing as any good at all, and let's get them
down into France and put them in the trenches along
the Atlantic Wall. To immobilize those Germans in Norway, the
(16:17):
Allies launched Operation Fortitude North to get the Germans fearful
about what was going to come in Norway. Fortitude North
was a shoestring operation. About two dozen over aged British
officers with radio operators were sent to the north of Scotland,
(16:39):
some of.
Speaker 3 (16:39):
The most god awful country in the world.
Speaker 2 (16:41):
They went up there in February and they began exchanging
radio messages with each other.
Speaker 3 (16:47):
Where is this? Where is that?
Speaker 2 (16:49):
All of this taken in the thousands of messages built
this picture in the German mind of a forest gathering
in the north of Scotland to attack Norway.
Speaker 1 (16:59):
And you've been listening to the late Stephen Ambrose tell
the story of Operation Overlord, the largest land invasion in history,
in Normandy, France, on June sixth, nineteen forty four, otherwise
known as D Day. The element of surprise was crucial. Indeed,
we learned that's why Normandy was picked. Nobody thought it
(17:19):
was the best place to go. And then, of course
there's deception, always trying to lure your enemy into thinking
you're doing something else. When we come back more of
this remarkable story, The story of D Day as told
by one of the best storytellers ever on World War
Two author A Band of Brothers. If you haven't seen
(17:41):
the HBO series, watch it. It plays all day on
Memorial Day. Any family should see it, Every family should
sit down and watch it. More of Stephen Ambrose here
on our American story, and we continue with our American
(18:09):
stories and the story of D Day and the planning
that led up to it. Let's pick up with Stephen
Ambrose where we last left off.
Speaker 2 (18:19):
They had wooden bombers set up on the airfield so
that German reconnaissance planes coming out of Norway would take
pictures of them. They had paper machet tanks, they had
rubber tanks. This is where the Allies put to good
use the skills of the technicians in the Hollywood movie
industry and the British movie industry. By early May, Raml
(18:43):
had just about convinced Hitler that nothing was going to
happen in Norway, and had Hitler on the verge of
giving the orders to move these troops from Norway down
into France and Belgium. Lit A whole new flurry of
messages were broken by the ab there the German intelligence service,
and these officers informed Hitler.
Speaker 3 (19:03):
That the threat to Norway is very real.
Speaker 2 (19:06):
That you might wonder what did Hitler care about Norway
and why did he need five divisions in Norway. You
got to remember Norway was terribly important Hitler because that's
where his U boats were based, and that was the
last offensive weapon he had. He was an offensive minded person.
He hated being on the defensive. The submarines gave him
(19:26):
a chance to hit the Allies where it hurt. He
was convinced that this attack was coming. At the last minute,
he canceled the movement order that concerned, in this first instance,
some fifty five thousand men who were to come from
Norway down into France. Hitler canceled the order almost as
they were boarding the trains, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, considering
(19:47):
that it was twenty four overaged British officers who pulled
this off. Never in the history of warfare have so
many been immobilized by so few. Well, it didn't matter
how badly you fooled the enemy, it's still going to
be a fight. Germany didn't have an army in nineteen
forty four the equal to the army of nineteen forty
(20:07):
one in some ways, in other ways it was more powerful,
and it was fighting on the defensive behind fixed positions.
When I say that the defenses were relatively less in Normandy.
Understand that this doesn't mean Normandy was undefended. Every beach
that was suitable for landing craft was covered by artillery fire,
heavily reinforced casements, an extensive underground communications system, thousands of
(20:33):
miles of barbed wire, tens of thousands of land mines
of all types, and infantry troops in prepared trenches running
along the bluff back from the beak. So no matter
how successful to repeat the op the deception plan was,
(20:53):
it still was going to come down to a bunch
of eighteen to twenty four year old kids who were
going to have to fight their way out of those
landing craft and get up to the high ground. To
get them to do that, the training in England in
the spring of nineteen forty four was intense and continuous.
The aim of the training was to make the men
(21:14):
feel combat can't.
Speaker 3 (21:15):
Be worse than this.
Speaker 2 (21:18):
A lot of night drops for the airborne divisions and
then three and four and five day problems in the field.
Living in the ground, had a lot of casualties, used
a lot of live ammunition, had a lot of practice exercises.
The most famous took place in the south of England,
had slapped in Sands in April of nineteen forty four.
There were some terrible screw ups. Lessons were learned from
(21:41):
Slapped in Sands by both sides. Hitler learned from it.
Hiller was an amazing guy. He went to France only
once in his life after World War One, when he
had fought in France. He had never been to England,
never traveled to Russia, had never traveled. And he was
the man who set out to conquer the world, who
never hardly ever travel outside of Germany.
Speaker 3 (22:04):
But he could read a map better than anybody that
I've ever heard of.
Speaker 2 (22:10):
He heard about Exercise Tiger, that is his e boats
came back and said there were an awful lot of
LST's out there and they were performing some kind of
an operation at this point on the English coast. And
Hitler took one look at him. He said, that's just
like the coast at Normandy. That's the same gradient, that's
the same kind of sand conditions, that's the same kind
(22:30):
of bluff conditions.
Speaker 3 (22:31):
We better look a little closer.
Speaker 2 (22:32):
At Normandy is a possible invasion site, because if they're
practicing there, maybe they're getting ready for Normandy.
Speaker 3 (22:40):
And so the defensive.
Speaker 2 (22:42):
Construction of the Atlantic Wall in Normandy was speeded up
in the month of May, a little bit too late,
thank god. Eisenhower proposed to isolate Normandy to make it difficult,
maybe even impossible, for Ronald to get reinforcements into Normandy,
by knocking out the bridge system over the Seine River,
(23:03):
knocking out the French railway system, hitting their marshaling yards,
hitting their rolling stock, hitting their repair facilities. The big
bomber Boys, led by Arthur Harris, a bomber command and
two spots of the US Army Air Force, objected strenuously
to this. They said, we weren't built for this kind
(23:24):
of an operation. Our job is to go inside Germany
and conduct strategic warfare. Our job is to defeat Germany
from the air. One of them said to Ikes Chief
of Staff Beatle Smith. At one point did Beatle, we
wish you all luck in the world with Overlord, but meanwhile,
let us get on with the real war. Eisenower never
for a minute believed that the air forces could achieve
(23:47):
victory on their own. He thought the Germans could take
a pounding from the air from now until doomsday, and
they wouldn't quit the only way you were going to
force those Germans to quit was to put GI's and
Tommy's on the ground inside Germany with a gun in
their hand. And to get him there you had to
first of all get a shore in France. And to
get ashore in France, the biggest contribution the bombers could
make would be to carry out this transportation plan, as
(24:09):
it came to be called, the plan to knock out
the French railway system and the bridges over the same river.
Eisenhower had command of all the forces in the British
Isle except the Big Bombers. The Combined Chiefs of Staff
had withheld them from his direct control. They were operating
their own war. Eisenhower in March forty four went to
(24:29):
the Combined Chiefs and beyond them to Churchill and Roosevelt,
and said, I want to carry out this transportation plan,
and if you're not gonna give me command of the
Big Bombers, my best asset to make sure Overlord is
a success, then I'll just have to resign my commission
and go home, because I'm not going to fight this
(24:51):
battle without being able to utilize every asset that I've
got over here in the British isle.
Speaker 3 (24:59):
That was quite a threat.
Speaker 2 (25:02):
He was talking about giving up command of Overlord. It
hit everyone hard that he felt so strongly about it,
and eventually they gave in and gave him command of
the bombers for the period.
Speaker 3 (25:12):
Before Operation Overlord.
Speaker 2 (25:14):
He put the bombers to work on the transportation plan
and it was a smashing success. Every bridge over the
Seine River was knocked down, marshaling yards were torn up,
repair facilities destroyed. The German The index of rail activity
in France went from one hundred and February down to thirty.
Speaker 3 (25:34):
On June five, nineteen forty four.
Speaker 2 (25:37):
There were French casualties, which was something that everyone regretted,
although they checked with de Gaulle, who said, we've got
to take casualties to win this war, and if it's necessary,
it's necessary. The French people are slaves now, they'll do
anything to be free. The final plan for Overlord called
for a landing five divisions strong, with the British going
(25:59):
in on the left and the Americans going in on
the right. The Beacher's code names were Gold Juno Sword
for the British, and Utah on the Cotentin Peninsula and
Omaha on the Calvados coast.
Speaker 3 (26:12):
For the American forces.
Speaker 1 (26:14):
And you're listening to the late Steven Ambrose tell the
story of Operation Overlord, and my goodness, what a story,
what a story about Hitler. Though he never traveled anywhere,
it turns out he understood maps, truly understood him. And
what is war but the study of geography and topography
and knowing, knowing every inch of the terrain. And he
(26:37):
understood that the Americans were practicing where they were practicing.
It meant trying to fortify Normandy. Luckily, as Ambrosey indicated,
he didn't get to that until May of nineteen forty four,
a bit too late. And then Eisenhower's threat. I mean,
imagine the impudence of threatening to his highness commission if
you didn't get control of those bombers. But without the
(27:00):
bomber's boy, our boys would have been slaughtered. When we
come back, more of this remarkable story is only Stephen
Ambrose can tell it. The story of D Day, the
preparation leading up to it, all the work, all the strategy,
and so much more. Here on our American stories, and
(27:37):
we continue with our American stories, and with the late
great Stephen Ambrose one of the great writers in this
country on all things related to World War Two. By
the way, on our American Stories website you'll see Ambrose
on Eisenhower on the b twenty four's So Many Stories
about the War. Let's pick up now where we last
(27:57):
left off on the story of Operation Overlord.
Speaker 2 (28:02):
The final plan for Overlord called for a landing five
divisions strong, with the British going in on the left
and the Americans going in on the right. The beaches
code names were Gold Juno Sword for the British, and
Utah on the Cotentin Peninsula and Omaha on the Calvados
Coast for the American forces. The divisions chosen to lead
(28:26):
the way were, for the most part, in experienced divisions.
One reason for this was that's the only kind of
divisions that the Western Allies had.
Speaker 3 (28:34):
The British had.
Speaker 2 (28:36):
Not been fighting since nineteen forty, except down in North Africa,
and those troops were now in Italy. The Bridge didn't
have any experienced divisions. Inside England, they had long serving troops,
They'd never been in battle. The reason that Eisenhower insisted
on sending unproven, untried, untested troops, unbloodied troops into the
(28:58):
first day of battle was he recognized one of the
older axioms of war. A experienced infantry man is a
terrified infantry man. People often talk about how much better
veterans are than men who have never been in combat before.
It's absolutely true on the defensive, and it's often true
in other situations. But for an attack of this sort,
(29:20):
you're way better off with somebody who has never seen
what hot shrapnel does to a human body, who has
never stood beside his buddy, is his buddy's brains, who's
out of a hole in his head, who has never
seen one of his friends trying to stuff his guts
back into his stomach, who has never seen someone carrying
his left arm in his right hand because it's been
blown off. Somebody who has seen these things happen tends
(29:44):
to take fewer chances than someone who hasn't seen it.
Paul Fusel puts this very nicely in his book Wartime
when he says that going into a battle for the
first time, a young man always thinks it can't.
Speaker 3 (30:02):
Happen to me.
Speaker 2 (30:04):
I'm too young, I'm too good looking, i'm too valuable,
I'm too well trained. In May of nineteen forty four,
the movement of troops from all over England to the
south of England began. Some two million men on the road,
with god knows how many vehicles of all types moving
with them to camps down along the south coast of England,
(30:27):
where they were put under camouflage and put under a
very tight guard, not allowed to enter out of their
camps after they had been briefed on where this operation
was going to take place. By June one, everything was ready.
The Mighty Host, in Eisenhower's words, was as tense as
a coiled spring, ready to vault its energy over the
(30:49):
English Channel. These young Tommy's and Gis and Canadians had
been brought to a fever pick in their training, and
we're absolutely ready to go and eager to go. They
nobody likes to go into combat, but they had some
things going for.
Speaker 3 (31:06):
Them here that were very helpful to morale.
Speaker 2 (31:08):
Number One, all these guys knew I am not going
home until we have brought about the unconditional surrender Nazi Jermany,
so let's get on with it. Also, they'd been training
for two years preparing.
Speaker 3 (31:19):
For this moment.
Speaker 2 (31:20):
They wanted to get it now, let's go and they
all knew that this was a historic occasion. They knew
that they were going into a battle that people would
be writing about and thinking about and honoring and studying
for decades for centuries to come. That they were in
on what Eisenhower called a crusade. The attack was supposed
(31:43):
to begin in the morning of the fifth of June,
and the third the ship started sailing, some of them
coming from the fire away as Belfast, the big ships,
the battleships. This is an immense operation, and all of
it done with our computer. An immense operation involving in
the first day alone, one hundred and seventy five thousand
(32:04):
men to go ashore in France, backed up by about
fifty thousand sailors, and a total force of airmen that
numbered into the many tens of thousands. Also, six thousand
ships of all types were involved, seven thousand airplanes. This
is the biggest military operation for the United States of
the war and in our history, bigger than anything Grant
(32:26):
ever commanded, Bigger than the forces of Schwartz Coough commanded
in the g War. To give you some idea of
the scope of this operation, it was as if you
took the cities of Green Bay, Madison, and Race Scene, Wisconsin,
and picked them up and moved him every man, women
and child and every vehicle across Lake Michigan in one
(32:47):
night against intense opposition. And this is going on all
across the south coast of England. As I say, schedules
were very exact on when people would sail to get
into Cow to go over to France. And all this
began in the morning of June second, and began to
pick up steam on June third for a June five
cross channel attack. Went on June third, the weather, which
(33:10):
had been marvelous all through May, gave way to a
great storm coming in from Iceland, and it became a
question of wait to see what the weather.
Speaker 3 (33:22):
Would be on June five. After June five was too late.
Speaker 2 (33:27):
If you postponed on after June six excuse me, if
you postponed on June five, that is, we're not going
to go on June sixth. Then the next suitable date
when the tide would be right and the moon would
be right, was two weeks later. Eisenhower made the decision
on the morning of the fifth of June at two
(33:51):
o'clock in his headquarters at Sutholk House outside of Southampton,
when he heard his weathermen predict that the storm that
was now raging, the rain was going to stop, the
wind was going to fall off.
Speaker 3 (34:09):
It'd still be some pretty heavy seas.
Speaker 2 (34:12):
But he thought the conditions on the morning on the
night of June five to six for the air drop
would be acceptable. Eisnar asked him for a guarantee, and
he gave a little nervous laugh and said generally, no,
I can't give you a guarantee on this. Remember there
were there have satellites in those days.
Speaker 3 (34:27):
The weatherman left.
Speaker 2 (34:29):
His name was Group Captain Stagg, one of the great
heroes of the war twenty eight years old. Can you
imagine stand in front of all those four stars at
twenty eight and telling you what the weather is going
to be tomorrow with the greatest invasion in history at
stake here. But he did it, and he left, and
Eisnwer then asked each of his subordinates what did he
(34:50):
think he had a habit?
Speaker 3 (34:52):
When he was in deep thought.
Speaker 2 (34:53):
Eisnar did a putting his hands behind his back and
pacing with his chin down on his chest. Then he
would stop and shoot out his hand. What do you think,
Monny said, I should say let's go.
Speaker 3 (35:06):
All right.
Speaker 2 (35:07):
Nod had took that in paced some more, turned and said,
tenor what do you think?
Speaker 3 (35:12):
This was his deputy.
Speaker 2 (35:14):
It's pretty cancy, I should say postpone, Bido, what do
you think? And beadle Smith said, it's a hell of
a gamble, but it's the best possible gamble. Let's go, Ramsey,
what do you think I think we ought to postpone.
Speaker 3 (35:31):
Lee Mallory was all for postponing.
Speaker 2 (35:34):
There were a dozen men in that room. Six said
let's go, and six said let's postpone.
Speaker 3 (35:40):
Now, Eisenaarer was not taking a vote here.
Speaker 2 (35:42):
He just wanted to have their opinions from the point
of view of their own specific service.
Speaker 3 (35:47):
He paced some more.
Speaker 2 (35:50):
Years later I interviewed him about this and asked him
what went through his mind. He said he thought about
he had brought these men up to this point. They
were just ready to dying, to go and to stand
down now, God, ou'd be terrible. And then he thought about,
on the other hand, he said, if we land and
Stag is wrong and they're going across, and those little
(36:10):
tiny Higgins boats doing this and doing this and doing this,
they're all going to be throwing up and weaken the
legs and incapable of fighting. Pobby can't even get off
the landing craft, and those landing crafts are going to
get tossed over by the waves. He thought about the exit,
the effect on the Russians of a postponement. Finally he
made his decision, and standing in front of these officers
(36:34):
or you're pacing in front of me, he came to
a stop at the end of the table, shot out
his chair and said, okay, let's go, And with that a.
Speaker 3 (36:40):
Cheer went up in that room.
Speaker 2 (36:42):
Ken Strong, the intelligence officer, told me in an interview later,
you never heard middle aged men cheer like that in
your life. And then they all rushed out to their
various commands, leaving Eisenhower alone, which was wonderfully symbolic because
until he gave that or.
Speaker 3 (37:00):
He was the most powerful man in the world. At
that moment, the.
Speaker 2 (37:03):
Fate of great nations and hundreds of thousands of men
depended on his decision. The minity had given that decision,
He was not powerless. The battle was in other people's hands.
Speaker 1 (37:12):
And a terrific job on the production and editing by
our own Greg Hengler, and a special thanks to Stephen Ambrose,
who passed in two thousand and two, but his voice
is still heard here on our American Stories, thanks to
those who run his estate. And what a voice indeed,
and what a story. Perhaps the most important invasion of
the twentieth century, perhaps in world history, saving the world.
(37:37):
That's what our boys did, That's what our manufacturing operation
did too.
Speaker 3 (37:41):
Here at home.
Speaker 1 (37:42):
We were producing all those planes, producing all those tanks,
producing those Higgins boats, those landing craft. And that picture
of Eisenhower seeking the input from his twelve most senior
aides in the end when he said let's go. Well,
the war was now in the hands of the commander
of the American troops and the Nazis to fight it out.
(38:05):
What a story, one of the great Stephen Ambrose operation
Overlord here on our American Stories.
This is Lee Habib, and this is Our American Stories,
the show where America is the star and the American people.
Stephen Ambrose is one of America's leading biographers and historians.
Ambrose passed in two thousand and two, but his epic
storytelling accounts can now be heard here in Our American Stories,
(00:31):
thanks to those who run his estate. Here's Ambrose telling
the World War II story and the lead up to
Operation Overlord, the largest land invasion in history, at Normandy, France,
June sixth, nineteen forty four. Let's take a listen.
Speaker 2 (00:51):
By December of nineteen forty three, the United States and
Great Britain that agreed that the major operation for nineteen
forty four would be the invasion of France, the opening
of the Second Front. In December, Churchill and Roosevelt went
to Tehran in Iran to meet with Stalin to discuss
(01:12):
operations for nineteen forty four. Stalin had only one question,
is there going to be a second Front? Roosevelt assured
him that there would be. Well, who's going to command it?
Stalin asked, well, we haven't decided that yet. Roosevelt answered, well,
Stalin said, and I don't believe you're serious about this,
not until you've appointed a commander in chief for the operation.
(01:33):
Roosevelt and Churchill returned to Cairo, Egypt after the meeting,
and there Roosevelt made his decision on who was going
to have this most coveted command in the.
Speaker 3 (01:43):
History of warfare. His personal choice was General Marshall.
Speaker 2 (01:47):
He felt that Marshall deserved the opportunity to lead an
army in the field. Marshall had built this army. This
was Marshall's strategy that was being implemented. Roosevelt told Eisenhower
he feared that Marshall didn't have a field command, he'd
be forgotten in later years, just as Lincoln's chief of
staff had been forgotten. Everybody knows grant me, but nobody
(02:09):
knows who Lincolns chief of staff is, said the President.
For that reason, he wanted Marshall to have the appointment.
But there are a lot of objections to having Marshall
take the job. He wanted kief of staff the United
States Army. He had worldwide responsibilities. To put him in
command of overlord would be in a way to diminish
his role in the war. Further, to move Marshall from
(02:33):
Washington to London to take over the Overlord command would
mean that someone would have to take Marshall's place of Washington.
That someone was presumably going to be Eisenhower. That would
have put Eisenhower in the position of being General MacArthur's superior.
Since I could serve as a light colonel and MacArthur
for seven years, that was not something that made a
(02:55):
lot of sense. In the end, Roosevelt turned the Marshall
himself and asked.
Speaker 3 (03:02):
Him what he wanted.
Speaker 2 (03:05):
Marshall, who was a very great man as well as
a very great soldier, a real spartan, said and quite properly,
that's not my decision to make, mister President. You're the
commander in chief. It is up to you to decide
where I can serve you best. Roosevelt then made his
decision In Cairo. Roosevelt had Marshall sit down with him
(03:25):
and then dictated a message to Stalin saying that the
immediate appointment of General Eisenhower the command of Operation Overlord
has been decided on. Marshall wrote it down as Roosevelt dictated,
and then handed it to Roosevelt.
Speaker 3 (03:40):
Roosevelt signed it.
Speaker 2 (03:41):
Marshall took that note down to the radio room and
had it sent by Cipher to Stalin in Moscow, and
then wrote Marshall typically of the man saved the note
and sent it to Eisenhower with a little covering note saying, Eisenhower,
I thought you might like to have this as a momental,
had it framed, and from then on wherever his office was. Finally,
(04:03):
of course in the White House, that's what hung behind
his desk, that little handwritten MIMO that catapult at Eisenhower
into the presidency. Of course, first of all, he had
to win the battle, He had to be a successes
over commander before he was going to become President of
the United States. It almost sounds like his selection was
(04:27):
by default, But actually Eisenhower brought many positive qualities to
the job. And we can see now that Marshall didn't
have the temperament to deal with Montgomery and other British officers.
Speaker 3 (04:43):
He didn't suffer fools. Gladly I could put up.
Speaker 2 (04:46):
With more than Marshall, ever was willing to endure. I
think Eisenower probably was the better field commander than Marshall
would have been. Also, in any event, in my view,
roosevelt selection of Eisenower to command Overlord was.
Speaker 3 (04:58):
The best decision at Roosevelt ever.
Speaker 2 (05:01):
Eisenower arrived in London in January of nineteen forty four
to take up his duties as the Supreme Commander Allied
Expeditionary Force in command of Operation Overlord. The first problem
that he had to face was where is this attack
going to take place? His orders from the combined piece
of staff were to cross the Channel, get into France,
(05:24):
and destroy the German army.
Speaker 3 (05:26):
Everything else was left up to him.
Speaker 2 (05:27):
Where and when will this offensive begin was Eisenhower's to decide.
Speaker 3 (05:33):
The things that they kept in mind.
Speaker 2 (05:35):
As they settled on a place were many, but one
stood out above all others.
Speaker 3 (05:42):
There has to be surprise.
Speaker 2 (05:44):
Without surprise, this operation has no chance of his success.
At most, Eisenhower had enough lift to bring five divisions
ashore on the first day. Rommel, his opposite number, who
had taken up his post in France with the headquarters
outside Paris also in January of nineteen forty four, had
(06:06):
fifty five divisions available in France, so he out numbered
Eisenhower Wood for the first few days of the attack
by eleven to one, and of those fifty five divisions,
nine were armored divisions and very good armored divisions.
Speaker 3 (06:19):
At that and Ronald had.
Speaker 2 (06:24):
An absolute superiority here because I wasn't going to have
no armored divisions.
Speaker 3 (06:28):
On the first week of the battle.
Speaker 2 (06:30):
So the Germans had to be surprised that there was
no cancer this operation working.
Speaker 1 (06:35):
And you've been listening to Steven Ambrose recount the decision
making leading up to appointing the commander in charge of
Operation Overlord, and how interesting.
Speaker 3 (06:46):
I mean, there was almost no choice.
Speaker 1 (06:48):
It just simply couldn't be Marshall. That's what we learned
because a lot of people have asked themselves over time
who study the war on one why wasn't it Marshall?
And I'd never known the answer until I heard Steve
and Ambrose give that explanation. And it was prompted by
Stalin's very incisive question, if you don't have a commander,
you're not ready to invade. Well, Roosevelt responded quickly with
(07:10):
that when we come back more of this remarkable story,
the story of Operation Overlord, the largest land invasion in
world history, and we're talking about D Day here on
our American stories. Pleehabib here, and I'd like to encourage
(07:31):
you to subscribe to Our American Stories on Apple Podcasts,
the iHeartRadio app, Spotify, or wherever you get our podcasts.
Any story you missed or want to hear again can
be found there daily Again, please subscribe to the Our
American Stories podcast on Apple Podcasts, the iHeartRadio app, or
(07:52):
anywhere you get your podcasts. It helps us keep these
great American stories coming. And we continue with our American
Stories and with Stephen Ambrose's telling of the lead up
(08:15):
to Operation Overlord, the largest land invasion in history, at Normandy, France,
on June sixth, nineteen forty four. Let's pick up where
we last left off.
Speaker 2 (08:27):
Although the possible invasion front was very broad, there were
many parts of it that were just unsuitable to an attack.
The Dutch coastline, for example, too easily flooded. And when
you get down here toward the Bay of Biscay and Breast,
you're getting too far away from your objective. Remember, the
(08:47):
final objective of this attack is Berlin, and more so
than Berlin, even the Rhine rh region that is Germany's
industrial heartland, without which Germany could not possibly wage modern war.
So here's the objective here, and going down into the
Bay of Biscay, although that was the least defended part
of the French coast, made no sense at all because
it put you so far away from your objective. The
(09:10):
obvious line of attack was to come from Dover across
to Dunkirk or into the Belgian coast in the area
around the French province of the Potto Calais.
Speaker 3 (09:23):
That's the straight line of the objective.
Speaker 2 (09:25):
London Dover, Potto Calais, through Belgium, through Brussels and on
into the German heartland around the Rhine Ruh region, and
these beaches were quite suitable for amphibious operations. For that reason,
the Germans had built up by fire their heaviest defenses here,
the so called Atlantic Wall, and in this area it
(09:50):
probably was what Hitler said, The whole of the Atlantic
Wall was impregnable. The amount of steel reinforced concrete that
had been pulled, the numbers of guns that had prepositioned
their targets, ranging from two hundred and five millimeter down
to the mortars and even to the rifle pits, were
(10:11):
just too much. No force in the world could have
broken through in those areas, and you obviously couldn't achieve
surprise of those areas, and in addition to the fixed
defenses that Ronald had there and the infantry that were
in these prepared positions, that is where about seventy percent
(10:32):
of the German tank strength was located.
Speaker 3 (10:36):
Because above all else.
Speaker 2 (10:37):
The Germans had to prevent a landing here in northern France,
with its easy access to their factory system and Dusseldorf
and Bonn and Cologne and the other great cities of
the Rhine Ruh region. So here was Germany's vulnerability right here,
very close to London, very close to Dover. And so
this is where the German defenses were the strongest. When
(10:59):
you get to the south and the west of the
Sane River running from Paris, here the defenses weren't so
strong and the Panzer divisions were not in place. Here
was where it was possible to effect a lodgment. The Germans,
every time they studied the map, it was, of course,
(11:21):
the same map the Allies were using, came to the
conclusion they won't it's kissed not possible that they would
come here into Normandy because it's in the wrong direction.
It's going south instead of east, and further to go
into Normandy was to put the Sane River and the
Solme River between the Allies.
Speaker 3 (11:41):
And their objective.
Speaker 2 (11:44):
So, because the Germans felt that it was just out
of the question that the Allies would come into Normandy,
the eyes an artistic sided. Normandy's where we're going to go.
Speaker 3 (11:52):
There.
Speaker 2 (11:52):
I know we can get ashore and then we can
be bringing in from London. This vast build up of
men and supplies has been taking place since.
Speaker 3 (12:01):
Nineteen forty three in England.
Speaker 2 (12:03):
The outpouring of America's factories, and these marvelously trained young
Americans and the divisions that have been formed in.
Speaker 3 (12:10):
Forty two and forty three could come into the battle.
So Normandy was the place that Eisenhower picked. The time.
He wanted to go as early in the spring as possible,
as soon.
Speaker 2 (12:22):
As good campaigning weather began, that is, early May, but
he eventually postponed the target day to June first, so
that he could have another month's production of landing craft.
The big shortage guysen Our had was in landing craft.
He had a lot of air. He had plenty of air,
He had plenty of naval warships. He had more divisions
(12:45):
than he could put into the battle until we had
advanced well into France. But what he was short on
was landing craft. Landing Craft had now become a top
priority production item in the United States, and by postponing
from May one to June one, Eisenhower was able to
get that many more O LST's, LCVPs, LCMS, LCTs and
the others into the battle. So where and when where
(13:07):
will be Normandy? When will be the first of June?
And that meant that's the target date, the first date
after the first of June on which the tide and
moon conditions are right. This was because Rommel had begun
in January nineteen forty four to build up the beach defenses.
The obstacles of a myriad of types barbed wire.
Speaker 3 (13:32):
Land mines, sea mines.
Speaker 2 (13:34):
Tetrahydra which were came in a variety of forms, but
basically were steel rails, railroad rails welded together into a
tripod and then a teller mine put on top of
them and set out there so that at high tide
they were just above just below the water, meaning that
any landing craft trying to come in at high tide
(13:55):
was going to run into a mine sitting on one
of these obstacles.
Speaker 3 (13:58):
High tide is the best time to.
Speaker 2 (14:00):
Attack in the sense that it shortens the distance and
the beak, the distance from where the ramp goes down
and them and charge out of their landing craft and
they get to.
Speaker 3 (14:09):
The first cover.
Speaker 2 (14:12):
Low tide is the worst time to attack, because you've
got that long stretch of open beak, all of it
covered by German fire through which the attacking forces have
to work their way. Ronald's beach defenses were designed to
force the Allies to land at low tide, and they did.
Another requirement I should add was moon the night before,
(14:35):
at least a half a moon to provide enough illumination for.
Speaker 3 (14:38):
A night drop.
Speaker 2 (14:40):
This is a very daring part of the Allied plan.
One of the greatest assets that Eisenower had was three
magnificently trained divisions of light infantry, the US eighty second,
hundred and first Airborne and the British sixth Airborne divisions.
He wanted to use those airborne divisions to protect the
flanks of the invasion, letting the Americans land on the
(15:04):
right and the contentin peninsula and the British six they're
born coming in on the left. He wanted to start
putting them at midnight so that they could secure positions,
establish roadblocks, take key villages, knock down German communications, especially
their telephone lines. All before the first attacks began, these
night drops a very dangerous thing, not to be recommended.
(15:28):
The risk had to be run to make it an
acceptable risk. It was necessary to have some moonlight the
night before, so the conditions were not simply a low
tide at dawn, but also moonlight the night before.
Speaker 3 (15:42):
And June fifth fit that date that had.
Speaker 2 (15:45):
Those conditions set al also, so June fifth was picked
as the date.
Speaker 3 (15:50):
Hitler had five division stations in Norway.
Speaker 2 (15:53):
Now these were immobile infantry divisions of not very good
quality troops. Nevertheless, at about twelve men per division, it
was they had an awful lot of firepower. Ramo was screaming
to get those troops out of Norway, where they're not
doing as any good at all, and let's get them
down into France and put them in the trenches along
the Atlantic Wall. To immobilize those Germans in Norway, the
(16:17):
Allies launched Operation Fortitude North to get the Germans fearful
about what was going to come in Norway. Fortitude North
was a shoestring operation. About two dozen over aged British
officers with radio operators were sent to the north of Scotland,
(16:39):
some of.
Speaker 3 (16:39):
The most god awful country in the world.
Speaker 2 (16:41):
They went up there in February and they began exchanging
radio messages with each other.
Speaker 3 (16:47):
Where is this? Where is that?
Speaker 2 (16:49):
All of this taken in the thousands of messages built
this picture in the German mind of a forest gathering
in the north of Scotland to attack Norway.
Speaker 1 (16:59):
And you've been listening to the late Stephen Ambrose tell
the story of Operation Overlord, the largest land invasion in history,
in Normandy, France, on June sixth, nineteen forty four, otherwise
known as D Day. The element of surprise was crucial. Indeed,
we learned that's why Normandy was picked. Nobody thought it
(17:19):
was the best place to go. And then, of course
there's deception, always trying to lure your enemy into thinking
you're doing something else. When we come back more of
this remarkable story, The story of D Day as told
by one of the best storytellers ever on World War
Two author A Band of Brothers. If you haven't seen
(17:41):
the HBO series, watch it. It plays all day on
Memorial Day. Any family should see it, Every family should
sit down and watch it. More of Stephen Ambrose here
on our American story, and we continue with our American
(18:09):
stories and the story of D Day and the planning
that led up to it. Let's pick up with Stephen
Ambrose where we last left off.
Speaker 2 (18:19):
They had wooden bombers set up on the airfield so
that German reconnaissance planes coming out of Norway would take
pictures of them. They had paper machet tanks, they had
rubber tanks. This is where the Allies put to good
use the skills of the technicians in the Hollywood movie
industry and the British movie industry. By early May, Raml
(18:43):
had just about convinced Hitler that nothing was going to
happen in Norway, and had Hitler on the verge of
giving the orders to move these troops from Norway down
into France and Belgium. Lit A whole new flurry of
messages were broken by the ab there the German intelligence service,
and these officers informed Hitler.
Speaker 3 (19:03):
That the threat to Norway is very real.
Speaker 2 (19:06):
That you might wonder what did Hitler care about Norway
and why did he need five divisions in Norway. You
got to remember Norway was terribly important Hitler because that's
where his U boats were based, and that was the
last offensive weapon he had. He was an offensive minded person.
He hated being on the defensive. The submarines gave him
(19:26):
a chance to hit the Allies where it hurt. He
was convinced that this attack was coming. At the last minute,
he canceled the movement order that concerned, in this first instance,
some fifty five thousand men who were to come from
Norway down into France. Hitler canceled the order almost as
they were boarding the trains, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, considering
(19:47):
that it was twenty four overaged British officers who pulled
this off. Never in the history of warfare have so
many been immobilized by so few. Well, it didn't matter
how badly you fooled the enemy, it's still going to
be a fight. Germany didn't have an army in nineteen
forty four the equal to the army of nineteen forty
(20:07):
one in some ways, in other ways it was more powerful,
and it was fighting on the defensive behind fixed positions.
When I say that the defenses were relatively less in Normandy.
Understand that this doesn't mean Normandy was undefended. Every beach
that was suitable for landing craft was covered by artillery fire,
heavily reinforced casements, an extensive underground communications system, thousands of
(20:33):
miles of barbed wire, tens of thousands of land mines
of all types, and infantry troops in prepared trenches running
along the bluff back from the beak. So no matter
how successful to repeat the op the deception plan was,
(20:53):
it still was going to come down to a bunch
of eighteen to twenty four year old kids who were
going to have to fight their way out of those
landing craft and get up to the high ground. To
get them to do that, the training in England in
the spring of nineteen forty four was intense and continuous.
The aim of the training was to make the men
(21:14):
feel combat can't.
Speaker 3 (21:15):
Be worse than this.
Speaker 2 (21:18):
A lot of night drops for the airborne divisions and
then three and four and five day problems in the field.
Living in the ground, had a lot of casualties, used
a lot of live ammunition, had a lot of practice exercises.
The most famous took place in the south of England,
had slapped in Sands in April of nineteen forty four.
There were some terrible screw ups. Lessons were learned from
(21:41):
Slapped in Sands by both sides. Hitler learned from it.
Hiller was an amazing guy. He went to France only
once in his life after World War One, when he
had fought in France. He had never been to England,
never traveled to Russia, had never traveled. And he was
the man who set out to conquer the world, who
never hardly ever travel outside of Germany.
Speaker 3 (22:04):
But he could read a map better than anybody that
I've ever heard of.
Speaker 2 (22:10):
He heard about Exercise Tiger, that is his e boats
came back and said there were an awful lot of
LST's out there and they were performing some kind of
an operation at this point on the English coast. And
Hitler took one look at him. He said, that's just
like the coast at Normandy. That's the same gradient, that's
the same kind of sand conditions, that's the same kind
(22:30):
of bluff conditions.
Speaker 3 (22:31):
We better look a little closer.
Speaker 2 (22:32):
At Normandy is a possible invasion site, because if they're
practicing there, maybe they're getting ready for Normandy.
Speaker 3 (22:40):
And so the defensive.
Speaker 2 (22:42):
Construction of the Atlantic Wall in Normandy was speeded up
in the month of May, a little bit too late,
thank god. Eisenhower proposed to isolate Normandy to make it difficult,
maybe even impossible, for Ronald to get reinforcements into Normandy,
by knocking out the bridge system over the Seine River,
(23:03):
knocking out the French railway system, hitting their marshaling yards,
hitting their rolling stock, hitting their repair facilities. The big
bomber Boys, led by Arthur Harris, a bomber command and
two spots of the US Army Air Force, objected strenuously
to this. They said, we weren't built for this kind
(23:24):
of an operation. Our job is to go inside Germany
and conduct strategic warfare. Our job is to defeat Germany
from the air. One of them said to Ikes Chief
of Staff Beatle Smith. At one point did Beatle, we
wish you all luck in the world with Overlord, but meanwhile,
let us get on with the real war. Eisenower never
for a minute believed that the air forces could achieve
(23:47):
victory on their own. He thought the Germans could take
a pounding from the air from now until doomsday, and
they wouldn't quit the only way you were going to
force those Germans to quit was to put GI's and
Tommy's on the ground inside Germany with a gun in
their hand. And to get him there you had to
first of all get a shore in France. And to
get ashore in France, the biggest contribution the bombers could
make would be to carry out this transportation plan, as
(24:09):
it came to be called, the plan to knock out
the French railway system and the bridges over the same river.
Eisenhower had command of all the forces in the British
Isle except the Big Bombers. The Combined Chiefs of Staff
had withheld them from his direct control. They were operating
their own war. Eisenhower in March forty four went to
(24:29):
the Combined Chiefs and beyond them to Churchill and Roosevelt,
and said, I want to carry out this transportation plan,
and if you're not gonna give me command of the
Big Bombers, my best asset to make sure Overlord is
a success, then I'll just have to resign my commission
and go home, because I'm not going to fight this
(24:51):
battle without being able to utilize every asset that I've
got over here in the British isle.
Speaker 3 (24:59):
That was quite a threat.
Speaker 2 (25:02):
He was talking about giving up command of Overlord. It
hit everyone hard that he felt so strongly about it,
and eventually they gave in and gave him command of
the bombers for the period.
Speaker 3 (25:12):
Before Operation Overlord.
Speaker 2 (25:14):
He put the bombers to work on the transportation plan
and it was a smashing success. Every bridge over the
Seine River was knocked down, marshaling yards were torn up,
repair facilities destroyed. The German The index of rail activity
in France went from one hundred and February down to thirty.
Speaker 3 (25:34):
On June five, nineteen forty four.
Speaker 2 (25:37):
There were French casualties, which was something that everyone regretted,
although they checked with de Gaulle, who said, we've got
to take casualties to win this war, and if it's necessary,
it's necessary. The French people are slaves now, they'll do
anything to be free. The final plan for Overlord called
for a landing five divisions strong, with the British going
(25:59):
in on the left and the Americans going in on
the right. The Beacher's code names were Gold Juno Sword
for the British, and Utah on the Cotentin Peninsula and
Omaha on the Calvados coast.
Speaker 3 (26:12):
For the American forces.
Speaker 1 (26:14):
And you're listening to the late Steven Ambrose tell the
story of Operation Overlord, and my goodness, what a story,
what a story about Hitler. Though he never traveled anywhere,
it turns out he understood maps, truly understood him. And
what is war but the study of geography and topography
and knowing, knowing every inch of the terrain. And he
(26:37):
understood that the Americans were practicing where they were practicing.
It meant trying to fortify Normandy. Luckily, as Ambrosey indicated,
he didn't get to that until May of nineteen forty four,
a bit too late. And then Eisenhower's threat. I mean,
imagine the impudence of threatening to his highness commission if
you didn't get control of those bombers. But without the
(27:00):
bomber's boy, our boys would have been slaughtered. When we
come back, more of this remarkable story is only Stephen
Ambrose can tell it. The story of D Day, the
preparation leading up to it, all the work, all the strategy,
and so much more. Here on our American stories, and
(27:37):
we continue with our American stories, and with the late
great Stephen Ambrose one of the great writers in this
country on all things related to World War Two. By
the way, on our American Stories website you'll see Ambrose
on Eisenhower on the b twenty four's So Many Stories
about the War. Let's pick up now where we last
(27:57):
left off on the story of Operation Overlord.
Speaker 2 (28:02):
The final plan for Overlord called for a landing five
divisions strong, with the British going in on the left
and the Americans going in on the right. The beaches
code names were Gold Juno Sword for the British, and
Utah on the Cotentin Peninsula and Omaha on the Calvados
Coast for the American forces. The divisions chosen to lead
(28:26):
the way were, for the most part, in experienced divisions.
One reason for this was that's the only kind of
divisions that the Western Allies had.
Speaker 3 (28:34):
The British had.
Speaker 2 (28:36):
Not been fighting since nineteen forty, except down in North Africa,
and those troops were now in Italy. The Bridge didn't
have any experienced divisions. Inside England, they had long serving troops,
They'd never been in battle. The reason that Eisenhower insisted
on sending unproven, untried, untested troops, unbloodied troops into the
(28:58):
first day of battle was he recognized one of the
older axioms of war. A experienced infantry man is a
terrified infantry man. People often talk about how much better
veterans are than men who have never been in combat before.
It's absolutely true on the defensive, and it's often true
in other situations. But for an attack of this sort,
(29:20):
you're way better off with somebody who has never seen
what hot shrapnel does to a human body, who has
never stood beside his buddy, is his buddy's brains, who's
out of a hole in his head, who has never
seen one of his friends trying to stuff his guts
back into his stomach, who has never seen someone carrying
his left arm in his right hand because it's been
blown off. Somebody who has seen these things happen tends
(29:44):
to take fewer chances than someone who hasn't seen it.
Paul Fusel puts this very nicely in his book Wartime
when he says that going into a battle for the
first time, a young man always thinks it can't.
Speaker 3 (30:02):
Happen to me.
Speaker 2 (30:04):
I'm too young, I'm too good looking, i'm too valuable,
I'm too well trained. In May of nineteen forty four,
the movement of troops from all over England to the
south of England began. Some two million men on the road,
with god knows how many vehicles of all types moving
with them to camps down along the south coast of England,
(30:27):
where they were put under camouflage and put under a
very tight guard, not allowed to enter out of their
camps after they had been briefed on where this operation
was going to take place. By June one, everything was ready.
The Mighty Host, in Eisenhower's words, was as tense as
a coiled spring, ready to vault its energy over the
(30:49):
English Channel. These young Tommy's and Gis and Canadians had
been brought to a fever pick in their training, and
we're absolutely ready to go and eager to go. They
nobody likes to go into combat, but they had some
things going for.
Speaker 3 (31:06):
Them here that were very helpful to morale.
Speaker 2 (31:08):
Number One, all these guys knew I am not going
home until we have brought about the unconditional surrender Nazi Jermany,
so let's get on with it. Also, they'd been training
for two years preparing.
Speaker 3 (31:19):
For this moment.
Speaker 2 (31:20):
They wanted to get it now, let's go and they
all knew that this was a historic occasion. They knew
that they were going into a battle that people would
be writing about and thinking about and honoring and studying
for decades for centuries to come. That they were in
on what Eisenhower called a crusade. The attack was supposed
(31:43):
to begin in the morning of the fifth of June,
and the third the ship started sailing, some of them
coming from the fire away as Belfast, the big ships,
the battleships. This is an immense operation, and all of
it done with our computer. An immense operation involving in
the first day alone, one hundred and seventy five thousand
(32:04):
men to go ashore in France, backed up by about
fifty thousand sailors, and a total force of airmen that
numbered into the many tens of thousands. Also, six thousand
ships of all types were involved, seven thousand airplanes. This
is the biggest military operation for the United States of
the war and in our history, bigger than anything Grant
(32:26):
ever commanded, Bigger than the forces of Schwartz Coough commanded
in the g War. To give you some idea of
the scope of this operation, it was as if you
took the cities of Green Bay, Madison, and Race Scene, Wisconsin,
and picked them up and moved him every man, women
and child and every vehicle across Lake Michigan in one
(32:47):
night against intense opposition. And this is going on all
across the south coast of England. As I say, schedules
were very exact on when people would sail to get
into Cow to go over to France. And all this
began in the morning of June second, and began to
pick up steam on June third for a June five
cross channel attack. Went on June third, the weather, which
(33:10):
had been marvelous all through May, gave way to a
great storm coming in from Iceland, and it became a
question of wait to see what the weather.
Speaker 3 (33:22):
Would be on June five. After June five was too late.
Speaker 2 (33:27):
If you postponed on after June six excuse me, if
you postponed on June five, that is, we're not going
to go on June sixth. Then the next suitable date
when the tide would be right and the moon would
be right, was two weeks later. Eisenhower made the decision
on the morning of the fifth of June at two
(33:51):
o'clock in his headquarters at Sutholk House outside of Southampton,
when he heard his weathermen predict that the storm that
was now raging, the rain was going to stop, the
wind was going to fall off.
Speaker 3 (34:09):
It'd still be some pretty heavy seas.
Speaker 2 (34:12):
But he thought the conditions on the morning on the
night of June five to six for the air drop
would be acceptable. Eisnar asked him for a guarantee, and
he gave a little nervous laugh and said generally, no,
I can't give you a guarantee on this. Remember there
were there have satellites in those days.
Speaker 3 (34:27):
The weatherman left.
Speaker 2 (34:29):
His name was Group Captain Stagg, one of the great
heroes of the war twenty eight years old. Can you
imagine stand in front of all those four stars at
twenty eight and telling you what the weather is going
to be tomorrow with the greatest invasion in history at
stake here. But he did it, and he left, and
Eisnwer then asked each of his subordinates what did he
(34:50):
think he had a habit?
Speaker 3 (34:52):
When he was in deep thought.
Speaker 2 (34:53):
Eisnar did a putting his hands behind his back and
pacing with his chin down on his chest. Then he
would stop and shoot out his hand. What do you think,
Monny said, I should say let's go.
Speaker 3 (35:06):
All right.
Speaker 2 (35:07):
Nod had took that in paced some more, turned and said,
tenor what do you think?
Speaker 3 (35:12):
This was his deputy.
Speaker 2 (35:14):
It's pretty cancy, I should say postpone, Bido, what do
you think? And beadle Smith said, it's a hell of
a gamble, but it's the best possible gamble. Let's go, Ramsey,
what do you think I think we ought to postpone.
Speaker 3 (35:31):
Lee Mallory was all for postponing.
Speaker 2 (35:34):
There were a dozen men in that room. Six said
let's go, and six said let's postpone.
Speaker 3 (35:40):
Now, Eisenaarer was not taking a vote here.
Speaker 2 (35:42):
He just wanted to have their opinions from the point
of view of their own specific service.
Speaker 3 (35:47):
He paced some more.
Speaker 2 (35:50):
Years later I interviewed him about this and asked him
what went through his mind. He said he thought about
he had brought these men up to this point. They
were just ready to dying, to go and to stand
down now, God, ou'd be terrible. And then he thought about,
on the other hand, he said, if we land and
Stag is wrong and they're going across, and those little
(36:10):
tiny Higgins boats doing this and doing this and doing this,
they're all going to be throwing up and weaken the
legs and incapable of fighting. Pobby can't even get off
the landing craft, and those landing crafts are going to
get tossed over by the waves. He thought about the exit,
the effect on the Russians of a postponement. Finally he
made his decision, and standing in front of these officers
(36:34):
or you're pacing in front of me, he came to
a stop at the end of the table, shot out
his chair and said, okay, let's go, And with that a.
Speaker 3 (36:40):
Cheer went up in that room.
Speaker 2 (36:42):
Ken Strong, the intelligence officer, told me in an interview later,
you never heard middle aged men cheer like that in
your life. And then they all rushed out to their
various commands, leaving Eisenhower alone, which was wonderfully symbolic because
until he gave that or.
Speaker 3 (37:00):
He was the most powerful man in the world. At
that moment, the.
Speaker 2 (37:03):
Fate of great nations and hundreds of thousands of men
depended on his decision. The minity had given that decision,
He was not powerless. The battle was in other people's hands.
Speaker 1 (37:12):
And a terrific job on the production and editing by
our own Greg Hengler, and a special thanks to Stephen Ambrose,
who passed in two thousand and two, but his voice
is still heard here on our American Stories, thanks to
those who run his estate. And what a voice indeed,
and what a story. Perhaps the most important invasion of
the twentieth century, perhaps in world history, saving the world.
(37:37):
That's what our boys did, That's what our manufacturing operation
did too.
Speaker 3 (37:41):
Here at home.
Speaker 1 (37:42):
We were producing all those planes, producing all those tanks,
producing those Higgins boats, those landing craft. And that picture
of Eisenhower seeking the input from his twelve most senior
aides in the end when he said let's go. Well,
the war was now in the hands of the commander
of the American troops and the Nazis to fight it out.
(38:05):
What a story, one of the great Stephen Ambrose operation
Overlord here on our American Stories.
Host
Lee Habeeb
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