June 17, 2025 • 38 mins
In this episode, Lisa interviews Vice Admiral John W. Miller about escalating Middle East tensions. They discuss Israel’s military successes against Iranian proxies, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and the limitations of Iran’s conventional military power. The conversation covers U.S. foreign policy, the risks of regime change in Iran, and the potential for regional stability. Miller emphasizes Israel’s intelligence capabilities and the evolving geopolitical landscape, while both agree on the need for pragmatic, cautious approaches to avoid further conflict and promote long-term peace in the region. The Truth with Lisa Boothe is part of the Clay Travis & Buck Sexton Podcast Network - new episodes debut every Tuesday & Thursday.
Follow Clay & Buck on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/c/clayandbuck
See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:01):
Welcome to the Truth with Lisa Booth, where we cut
through the noise and.
Speaker 2 (00:04):
Get to the heart of the issues that matter to you.
Speaker 1 (00:07):
Today, we're diving into the escalating tensions in the Middle
East with a guest who brings a lot of experience,
Vice Admiral John W. Miller, who is a former commander
of US Naval Forces Central Command and the US Fifth Fleet.
He spent a lot of his career in the Middle East,
working in and around it, so he knows a lot
about these issues. So we're going to dig into all
(00:30):
of it. Will the U United States be dragged into it?
Does Iran actually have or how close are they to
obtaining nuclear weapons? Particularly after intelligence failures of the past
looking at Iraq when the Iraq Survey Group ended up
finding no active WMDs, no nuclear weapons programs at the
time of the invasion back then, or no significant chemical
(00:51):
and biological weapons stockpiles. So what to make of this
preemptive strike from Israel too Iran? How close is Iran
to actually becoming a nuclear Also? Is I ran a
paper tiger. I don't know about you, but I've been
surprised by how weak Iran really is. So I'll ask
the Vice Admiral if he's surprised by what we are
(01:12):
seeing happen, and then also what happens if there's regime change,
I mean, Israel is taking out a lot of Iran's leaders,
What would be next for Iran? What sort of instability
could we see? And most importantly, what will the United
States involvement, if anything, be in all of this. So
obviously there's a lot to unpack, a lot to dig into,
and who better than someone who has spent his life's
(01:34):
work working in the Middle East and on these issues,
So stay tuned for Vice Admiral John W.
Speaker 2 (01:40):
Miller.
Speaker 1 (01:45):
Well, Vice Admiral John Miller, it's great to have you
on the show. You're my friend's dad, but you also
are very esteemed and have spent so much of your
career in the Middle East. So lucky to have you
as a friend to be able to, you know, get
your expertise in times like these, so I appreciate you
making the time, Sir.
Speaker 3 (02:04):
Great to be with you, Lisa.
Speaker 1 (02:07):
I think we're all pretty surprised by what we've I
guess you know we've seen the lead up obviously with
the October seventh tier attacks.
Speaker 2 (02:16):
Clearly are on.
Speaker 1 (02:17):
You know behind that with Hamas Bang, it's proxy. But
just by what is escalated in such a short period
of time, have you been surprised by the amount of
damage Israel has been able to inflict in.
Speaker 2 (02:32):
Such a short period of time?
Speaker 1 (02:33):
And I guess how would you assess the damage that
has been done so far?
Speaker 3 (02:39):
The Israelis have been very successful.
Speaker 4 (02:41):
I'm not surprised that they've been so successful because you
could see this coming over the.
Speaker 3 (02:46):
Last several months.
Speaker 4 (02:48):
And if you go back to the direct attacks in
exchanges that the Iranians and the Israelis had last year,
So direct attacks from I ran into Israel in April
of twenty four and then again in October of twenty four.
In the interim, the Israelis have been very busy taken
(03:10):
out the proxy states that provided a great deal of
the military power that the Iranians rely on. So the
takedown of Hezbola with very little ramifications or damage done
on the Israeli side, really a masterful piece of work,
including a lot of spycraft that got the bombs into
(03:34):
the pagers and that sort of thing. And then the
eventual will takedown of ISRAELA look at the way that
they took down Syria and separated Iran from Syria. And
then obviously the work that the Israelis have done over
the last several months or years really in Gaza has
(03:57):
taken away the military power of Amas. All that jails
down to Iran being reliant strictly on their own military power,
which has never been all that impressive. They do have
a lot of missiles. They have obviously some longer range
ballistic missiles that are able to get to Israel, but
(04:17):
they don't have an unlimited supply of those.
Speaker 3 (04:19):
They're not terribly accurate.
Speaker 4 (04:21):
We've seen that, and the Israelis at the start of
this particular operation did a lot of work taken out
the command and control and then what was left of
Israeli or Iranian air defense systems. And so I'm not
surprised that it's gone well for the Israelis, and I
think it's going to continue to go well, and every
(04:41):
day that this goes on, it's a little better for
the Israelis and a little worse for the Iranians, and
particularly for their nuclear power, their nuclear weapons program is iren.
Speaker 1 (04:51):
A paper tiger. I think a lot of people seem
surprised by the weakness of the country and sort of
anticipated that it had, you know, stronger capabilities.
Speaker 4 (05:06):
What they have had historically since the revolution is a
lot of asymmetric capability. So these they used proxy's third parties.
They engage in terrorist type activities, the bombing of the
marine barracks, the bombing of Coobar towers, the invention of
the ied that that was used so prolifically throughout Iraq
(05:32):
against American troops. So they always seemed to be a
large military power really since the revolution.
Speaker 3 (05:41):
You know, they fought along war with Iraq, and Iraq.
Speaker 4 (05:44):
Turned out to be more of a paper tiger than
anybody would have inspect expected once we.
Speaker 3 (05:49):
Got engaged with the Iraqis.
Speaker 4 (05:50):
But they the two countries fought for eight consecutive years
and basically fought to a standstill.
Speaker 3 (05:56):
So I would.
Speaker 4 (05:57):
Say Iran as never possessed a great military power. They
had some air defenses that they received in recent years
from the Russians, the S three hundred system. The Israeli
has destroyed all of those after the October Iranian ballistic
missile attack on Israel, so their air defenses were left
(06:19):
to things that they could kind of clues together. They've
never had a significant air force of any sort of capability.
They don't have a navy that is effective in a
way that we would consider navies to be effective, to
be able to operate over the horizon out at sea
in the blue water. But they do have a lot
(06:41):
of asymmetric capability. You know, they have thousands of little
speedboats that they put either RPGs on or they put
fifty caliber weapons on. But the Iranians have also realized
they're not a great military power, and so they've steered
away from direct confrontation until April of last year when
they directly in front of the Israelis.
Speaker 3 (07:01):
That was a mistake.
Speaker 1 (07:04):
I think a lot of people are wondering how close
Iran is to becoming a nuclear power. You know, we
all remember back to the Iraq days when the Iraq
Survey Group found that, you know, there were no active
WMD's in Iraq, there were no nuclear weapons programs at
the time of the invasion, that there's no significant chemical
biological weapons stockpiles, and they found some old degraded munitions
(07:28):
from before the nineteen ninety one Gulf War.
Speaker 2 (07:32):
So, you know, questions about how good is the.
Speaker 1 (07:35):
Intelligence, about how close Iran is to becoming a nuclear power.
You know, we're these premptive strikes necessary. So I guess
what do we know about Iran in terms of being
a nuclear power or how close they are to becoming one,
particularly given you know, some of the intelligence failures of
the past.
Speaker 4 (07:56):
Lisa, given our history with Iraqi WMD, I think it's
right for everybody to be a little bit skeptical about
what's going on in Iran and trying to understand, Okay,
do they really have a capability? Iran and Iraq are
different in a lot of different ways. Iraq really wanted
Saddam Hussein wanted people to think that he had weapons
(08:19):
and mass destructure, that he had the ability was developing,
the ability to build nuclear weapons, that he had chemical
and biological weapons.
Speaker 3 (08:27):
Even his own.
Speaker 4 (08:30):
Senior military personnel thought that the country had chemical and
biological weapons. They all thought that they were in a
different division than the one that they happened to be running.
So Iran is a lot different in that regard. One
of the reasons I think that makes the attack that
the Israelis are in the middle of right now a
(08:52):
good idea is there are many things that we don't know.
The Iranians have gone to great trouble to hide their program,
and in some ways they've tried to hide it in
plain sight where they have acquiesced through the j CPOA,
which was never a good agreement to international inspections. To
(09:12):
a certain extent, they share data. To a certain extent,
we know Massad has been able to penetrate all levels
of the Iranian government, and so they can fill in
a lot of the blanks. Masad has been able to
fill in a lot of the blanks in terms of
what the Iranians really have UH. And then there are
(09:33):
also parts of the program that that we know about
because the Iranians are making the declarations. And so when
you look at nuclear enrichment, the Iranians are a signer
of the non Proliferation Treaty, and and if you're a
signer of the non proliferation treaty, you agree not to
(09:53):
enrich to the point where you can make nuclear weapons.
They're in violation of that. They've said they're in violation
of that. They've said they're going to pull out of
the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, but they haven't done so yet.
Speaker 3 (10:08):
But they're enriching.
Speaker 4 (10:09):
If you need enrichment to about five percent we'll say,
of uranium to be able to use a nuclear power
plant or to be able to use nuclear medicine. But
if once you go about five percent, now you're getting
towards the ninety percent that you need to make nuclear weapons.
The Uranians have admitted that they have a great deal
(10:30):
of material that's an excess of sixty percent enriched. And
so we know enough about the program to know that
it's a danger not just to the Israelis but to
the entire free world. And we know enough about the
program to know that there are probably some unknowns that
would be dangerous to assume a way as insignificant.
Speaker 1 (10:52):
And Israel takeout Iran's nuclear capabilities unilaterally, you know, I know,
I've read and heard a lot about how you know,
Iran has hardened facilities like nuclear sites a pordoh buried
deep under ground that you sort of need advanced bunk
or busting munitions that Israel just does not have. They
don't possess them. So can Israel unilaterally take out irans
(11:17):
nuclear capabilities or do they need the United States and
other powers.
Speaker 4 (11:21):
There's a presumption I think that we can make that
the Israelis wouldn't have started the job if they weren't
confident that by themselves they can finish the job. And
one of the things that's really not well known about
Israeli defense force is they're not interested in having allies
(11:42):
fight with them and for them. So they don't seek
out American troops or air power to.
Speaker 3 (11:52):
Do their work.
Speaker 4 (11:53):
They do seek out capability, you know, they seek out
the ability to buy the weapons and to buy the
the airplanes, to get foreign EIGHTD. We give them a
great deal of foreign eight is, I think everyone knows.
But they're not interested in having somebody else fight for them.
They're interested in Israelis defending Israel, and so I don't
(12:14):
think that they would have undertaken this endeavor had they
not been confident that they could finish the job without
intervention from someone else. In other words, there's a lot
of talk about these bunker busters and the US has them,
and do we loan them, be two armors with bunker busters,
or do we rent them, or do we go in
(12:35):
and do it for them. I don't think that's the
Israeli plan, but I'm not sure exactly what their plan is,
and I think we'll find out over the next couple
of days, because I think most of the effort that
regards neutralizing the entire nuclear weapons program in Iran is.
Speaker 3 (12:54):
Yet to come.
Speaker 4 (12:55):
There are other ways to be successful in a place
like Florida, which, as you mentioned, and it's deep, it's hardened,
it's a very difficult target for the Israelis to get
at with bombs. It can be done without bunker busting bombs.
You just need a lot of them. But there are
other ways. In The Israelis have shown since the attack
of October seventh, an enormous level of ingenuity in terms
(13:21):
of how they employ their forces. And I go back
to the pager incident with Hasbola, where virtually the entire
leadership structure of Isbola is taken out in a matter
of minutes because all of their pagers and their cell
phones start blowing up. And so it may be that
(13:45):
the Israeli plan is not to take out a place
like Fodo outside to inside, but maybe inside to outside.
I wouldn't be surprised to see that, And so I
think the Israelis have the capability to finish the job.
Speaker 3 (14:00):
It's very important that they do.
Speaker 2 (14:02):
So we've got more of the Admiral.
Speaker 1 (14:04):
But first, folks, we're seeing something truly disturbing. Anti Semitism
is on the rise around the world, and sadly, right
here in America, Jewish schools being targeted, synagogue's threatened, family
is living in fear. It's something we hoped we'd never
have to see again in our lifetime. And let me
say this, silence is just not an option. This is
(14:24):
the moment to take a stand. That's why I want
to tell you about the International Fellowship of Christians and
Jews or IFCJ. They're on the front lines providing real
help where it's needed most. They're giving food and shelter
to Jewish families under threat, building bomb shelters for children,
and helping survivors of hate rebuild their lives. And they
don't just respond to crisis, they work every day to
(14:44):
prevent it. Your gift of only forty five dollars will
helps support their life saving work by helping provide food, shelter,
and much more. The Bible says I will bless those
who bless you. Supporting IFCJ is a spiritual stand. It's
showing up for God's people when it counts. So please
call eight eight eight four A eight IDJ. That's eight
eight eight four A eight four three two five. Or
(15:06):
you can go to IFCJ dot org every dollar hopes
don't wait be the difference is it IFCJ dot org
or call eight eight eight for a eight IJ.
Speaker 2 (15:16):
Now, how do you compare Masad to.
Speaker 1 (15:22):
Like the CIA or some I mean, it seems like
some of the stuff that they've been doing is like
you know, double O seven, like movie stuff where you know,
you see it and you're like, oh, yeah, that's not real,
and then you're like, oh, well, maybe it is.
Speaker 4 (15:37):
Well, the great thing about Clendestine organizations is you don't
really know what they're capable of doing. So I think
it's difficult to do a comparison between an organization like
the CIA, which has enormous capability obviously, in an organization
like Masade, which has an enormous capability and they were
I mean, think about this in terms of an intelligence coup.
Speaker 3 (16:00):
They built a drone factory in Iran.
Speaker 4 (16:03):
And they used that location to launch drones that took
out air defense systems. They took out leadership, they took
out certain parts of the communications infrastructure in Iran, all
from Iran, and this was all built in Iran by
Israelis without the Iranians having any knowledge whatsoever. So rather
(16:25):
than try to compare which one is better, because neither
one is good to have mad at you, I think
sufficient to say Massada is an extraordinarily capable intelligence organization
and they've proven that over the last two years in
ways that are like what you would see in a
(16:46):
movie or are like what you might see on TV
and say, wow, that's not real.
Speaker 3 (16:50):
That can't be done, and they've done it.
Speaker 1 (16:52):
I wonder too, because Israel probably benefits more from kind
of like bragging about those things or getting it out
in the open, right because you know, considering the fact
that Israel is the size of New Jersey and face
by enemies that seek its destruction, it's to its benefit
to you sort of boast or you know what I mean,
to kind of have that bravado versus the United States,
(17:14):
it's probably to benefit to like for the CIA likely
to sort of keep undercover some of the things that's doing.
Speaker 2 (17:19):
I would imagine.
Speaker 3 (17:21):
Do you think that's fair, Yeah, I think that's fair.
I think it's a great point.
Speaker 4 (17:25):
They do use Masad unlike the way we use CIA
as a deterrent, and so they do a lot of
cliant DestinE things where they wouldn't necessarily have to take
the credit and attribute the actions that occurred to the masade,
but they are oftentimes eager to do so because it
(17:49):
is a deterrent.
Speaker 3 (17:49):
To other nations around them.
Speaker 4 (17:51):
And when you look at the geography of Israel, they
are a country that is the only non unfriendly nation
that they have a border with is the ocean, it's
the Mediterranean Sea. The rest of the country is surrounded
by nations that are not friendly for the most part,
(18:14):
with the exception of Jordan to the Israelis, and so
I think they see it as an advantage to them
to say we're miss out and here are the things
that we can do, and if we're willing to talk
about those things, imagine what we can do that we're
not willing to talk about. And that is a very
different mindset than than the CIA and a lot of
(18:35):
other intelligence agency use. But I think it's a very
powerful tool that the Israelis have used to very good effect.
Speaker 1 (18:46):
You know, President Trump tweeted or I guess posted on
X to leave Iran. Why do you think he did that?
What do you think is coming. I guess what does
that signal to you?
Speaker 4 (18:57):
I think it's just another way to increase the fog
of war. And you can expect the Iranians with the
loss of infrastructure that they have, and particularly the loss
of their leadership, especially those that are involved in air defense.
There's a lot of confusion in Iran. It's difficult to
(19:19):
communicate from one place to another. I think President Trump
is keenly interested in the Israelis being successful, as he
should be. I think we all should be, and I
think he saw this as an opportunity to add to
the chaos. It's important to note that people were already
leaving Tehran before the President posted this on truth social
(19:43):
I think his particular posting has accelerated people's desire to
leave Tehran. And having Tehran under threat really goes back
to the Iraq Iran War, where people often refer to
it as the best of two cities. And this is
where they were launching missiles from Iran into Baghdad and
(20:07):
for the most part, launching some missiles, but flying airplanes
from Baghdad into Tehran. So there's a history that's not
all that distant. It's within the lifespan of a lot
of people that live in Tehran of remembering capital under siege.
And I think this just adds to that chaos and
confusion and gives the Israeli as a better opportunity to
(20:29):
complete this operation quickly and while being successful minimizing the
overall loss of life.
Speaker 2 (20:36):
Who are Iran's friends?
Speaker 1 (20:38):
You know, are any countries coming to Iran's rescue?
Speaker 4 (20:44):
Well, I don't think there's anybody coming to Iran's rescue
that really is useful.
Speaker 3 (20:49):
To the Iranians or to anyone else. So in terms
of who they rely on.
Speaker 4 (20:57):
And you know a lot of times people will refer
to as as our rans second strike capability.
Speaker 3 (21:02):
That's no longer true. And and and Hisbola.
Speaker 4 (21:06):
Has been largely neutralized for now as a as a
military force.
Speaker 3 (21:10):
And you can see that they're not involved.
Speaker 2 (21:12):
Uh.
Speaker 4 (21:12):
The only organization, not a nation, that appears to continue
to support Iran are the Houthis.
Speaker 3 (21:19):
And that's not surprised because the Iranians give.
Speaker 4 (21:22):
The Houthis the capabilities that they're using to make themselves,
you know, infamous in the world of of maritime transportation
and the ability to keep the ceilanes open. Other than
that their proxies are gone. Syria has gone aside, his
Bola has gone, and Lebanon Hamas is gone in Gaza.
(21:43):
And so if you look at nation states that might
support them, uh, they're not nation states that are particularly
useful to them. The Russians are very busy, uh trying
not to get you know, uh defeated completely militarily in
the Ukraine, so they're not going to be terribly useful.
Speaker 3 (22:02):
The Chinese are not going.
Speaker 4 (22:03):
To get involved in any way, and are likely only
to be involved in some sort of a diplomatic way
because they see the activities that are going on right
now as a threat to the oil that they get.
Speaker 3 (22:15):
Out of Iran at a great discount.
Speaker 4 (22:19):
There's no use in having a country like North Korea
or Venezuela's friends other than they can foment some sort
of mischief in various different parts of the world that
people find unhelpful. But when Anatola wakes up in the morning,
his list of friends is very short. It doesn't go
far beyond any international boundaries, and it's getting shorter every day,
(22:43):
you know how pivotal.
Speaker 1 (22:44):
President Trump obviously worked in the abraham A course during
his first administration and then recently had what has been
deemed as a successful visit to the Middle East, most
recently with some of these Gulf states making economic and
roads as well. You know, he had that great line
in the future of the Middle East is commerce not chaos?
Speaker 2 (23:04):
How?
Speaker 1 (23:05):
You know, how does that trip sort of lay the
groundwork for what is happening now? And also the Abraham
Accords previously. You know, do you think the future of
the Middle East could be commerce not chaos or do
they want commerce or do they want chaos or you know,
sort of what's your assessment.
Speaker 2 (23:21):
Of all that.
Speaker 1 (23:22):
As someone who's you know, worked and spent a lot
of time on the Middle East, I.
Speaker 4 (23:28):
Think that the Arab states, and especially the Arab states
that the President visited, are are keenly interested in stability.
They're keenly interested in commerce over chaos. They do a
very good job of really taking care of their populations.
(23:49):
So these are monarchs. They're not elected, they're not democracies,
they're not likely to be so anytime soon, but they
take care of These monarchs are monarchs that take care
of their people in terms of bitch cation, infrastructure, you know,
the ability to work and to and to grow and
too and to thrive are all priorities for these these
(24:13):
monarchies because they want that stability and they want to
be able to be part of the global economy, to
make money and make their countries and their people more prosperous.
I don't think that's true with Iran. They really do
thrive under chass the regime does. I think most of
(24:34):
the Iranian people would much rather see a different regime
and have have a peaceful Iran that's part of the
Community of Nations.
Speaker 2 (24:43):
Got to take a quick commercial break.
Speaker 1 (24:45):
More with Admiral Miller on the other side, My opinion
is that President Trump sort of the perfect president for
this moment because he's a guy who, you know, obviously
wants the United States to be like the superior power
in the world.
Speaker 2 (25:02):
He doesn't mess around.
Speaker 1 (25:03):
He's willing to engage if needed, but he doesn't want
some sort of drawn out nation building. He realizes the
Middle East is different, like they're never going to subscribe
to democracy like we do here in the United States.
You know, they're never going to be a constitutional republic.
So he's not really trying to impose or worldview on
the Middle East. He's sort of just accepting the Middle
East as they are. And you know, he obviously doesn't
(25:28):
want Iran to have a nuclear weapon, So I think
he's sort of the perfect person to be in charge
right now, Like given the context of all those different things,
sort of what do you make of that assessment? And uh,
you know, I guess my opinion that he's very clear
eyed versus in seeing the world versus kind of seeing
(25:50):
it through you know, rose colored glasses that don't really exist.
Speaker 4 (25:55):
Well, it certainly brings us a different approach to international
relations than than what we've seen in the past, and
it is a business approach. And he's been very clear
with the Iranians when you lay out the timeline he
gets into office, he gives the Iranians sixty days to
make a deal in terms of their nuclear weapons program,
(26:18):
with the bottom line very simple that they cannot become
a nuclear power, they can't have a nuclear weapon and
it's unacceptable. And on day sixty one, the Israelis are
bombing the Iranian nuclear weapons facilities that they're using to
be able to.
Speaker 3 (26:35):
Make a bomb.
Speaker 4 (26:36):
So it's very clear on that and nobody should be
surprised and nobody should really really object to what's happening,
only because it was all laid out very clearly and
you know, if this, then that, and so from that standpoint,
he has been very clear. I do think that that
(26:57):
business approach has a lot of sway in the world now.
I find it particularly interesting how it plays off the Chinese,
who do take a more hole of government approach to
foreign affairs than the Western countries typically have done. And so,
you know, he sees things in the Middle East as
(27:17):
more of a you know, kind of a straight up
business deal, but he also sees things that way with
his engagements in the rest of the world. And you
get into the whole debate about tariffs and and and
those sort of economic moves as the way that President
Trump has chosen to put forward to the world not
(27:39):
only our foreign policy, but our foreign and economic policy
wrapped up into one, but more skewed towards the towards
the economic side. I certainly think that pays a certain
dividend in the Middle East where there's interest. And if
you look at the Middle East today, you go to
the capitals of the Emirates or Qatar or Saudi Arabia,
(28:05):
they are different places than they were ten fifteen twenty
years ago, and far different places than they were a
half a century ago. These are modern capitals with great
infrastructure airports and roads and schools and hospitals and all
of those things that make for.
Speaker 3 (28:25):
Good societies.
Speaker 4 (28:26):
And I think they share a vision of the world
that is similar to the vision that President Trump has.
And you see that play out today in what's happening
by the fact that the air countries by and large
have chosen to stay on the sideline while this fight
between Israel and Iran goes on. The end goal of that,
(28:50):
I think in President Trump's mind, and I think he's
onto something here, is that this is how you get
long term peace and stability. You solve these problems one
way or the other, and then we can all move
together peacefully and concentrate on making everyone's lives better. And
(29:10):
so I think at the end of this you're looking
at a situation not to say that we don't have
to deal with the Palestinian issue.
Speaker 3 (29:18):
It does have to be dealt with, but that sort
of sets the table for events like.
Speaker 4 (29:23):
The Abraham Accord to grow and to become treaties or
agreements that other countries are more likely to join. In
on as a way ahead for the future.
Speaker 1 (29:36):
What happens to the Iranian regime if it collapses? What
does the future of Iran look like after that happens,
Like who would take charge?
Speaker 2 (29:45):
Is there concern that it would be even more.
Speaker 1 (29:48):
Volatile than it is now, if it's even possible, or
you know what I mean? Like, what does what does
regime change if that is a byproduct of the regime
getting taken out.
Speaker 4 (30:00):
Well, that's a great question and sort of a caveat
to start with, is we want to be a little
bit careful about what we wish for. So these really
have made it clear that they're not after regime change,
they're after the nuclear weapons program. Having said that, there
are a number of things that the Israelis have done
that might lead one to believe that they're not telling
(30:23):
the truth, the whole truth and nothing.
Speaker 5 (30:25):
But yeah, like taking out the leader, well, taking out
everybody but the leader, right, so he has no friends,
you know, he holds a meeting and nobody else shows
up because they're all dead.
Speaker 3 (30:36):
You know, they get a new army chief is down.
Speaker 2 (30:38):
Not a lot of job stability, huh.
Speaker 4 (30:41):
Yeah, opportunity, but not stability. So that's that's all true.
On the other hand, go back to nineteen seventy nine,
the Shah really was. It was a terrible dictator. He
was more along the lines of Saddam Hussein. And then
(31:01):
probably Western history likes to record. And and so the Iranians,
we were sick of the regime and they wanted they
wanted a new one, and lo and behold they got
one that's worse than the one that they had. And
so because of the way the regime is structured today,
should the Iyatola get killed in the course of this conflict,
(31:25):
it's not clear who takes over and and.
Speaker 3 (31:28):
And who is in charge of Iran.
Speaker 4 (31:31):
And what we must remember is that it's a big
country eighty million people, you know, a couple of times
the size of Texas. It has enormous petroleum reserves that
are important to the world. And so an unstable, chaotic,
ungoverned Iran is not in anybody's interest. And all of
(31:54):
these ORGC, the Revolutionary Guard boats that they have have
the ability to launch drones to be terrorists not only
in the region but all around the world. Because there
are Iranians everywhere, or GC everywhere. That's not a picture
that necessarily benefits the Israeli's the nuclear power program or
(32:19):
the rest of the world.
Speaker 3 (32:21):
And so I think a good solution, if.
Speaker 4 (32:24):
You're looking at this from is the Israel standpoint or
from the US standpoint, is that the Israelis capitulate or
the Iranians capitulate on their nuclear weapons program, the regime
stays in power long enough for stability, and then over
the longer term, in the next five to ten years,
(32:45):
we see some regime change and a better regime. But
I don't think a collapse of the regime in the
near term is in anybody's interest.
Speaker 1 (32:54):
Before we go, I think a lot of people are
wondering kind of like what the United States you had
mentioned earlier, that Israel wouldn't have done this without believing
it can kind of like accomplish its goals, you know, laterally,
and that's kind of how it typically does things.
Speaker 2 (33:09):
I guess is.
Speaker 1 (33:10):
There you know, could the United States get drawn into this?
Speaker 4 (33:15):
You know?
Speaker 1 (33:15):
I think a lot of people are concerned about, you know,
being involved in another sort of Middle Eastern war given
past history, Like what's the likelihood of that. I imagine
I ran right now probably doesn't really want to get
the United States involved, but sort of what's the likelihood
of that and kind of like what are you looking
for in sort of the coming days and weeks as
(33:37):
you kind of watch how this all goes down.
Speaker 4 (33:39):
I don't think there's any appetite within the United States
or within the in the in the region, from the
from the Arab States, or or the Israelis for the
US to be involved.
Speaker 3 (33:51):
So I don't know.
Speaker 4 (33:52):
I don't think there's a lot of appetite for the
US to be directly involved, And I don't expect that
to happen because I don't think the Israelis are going
to need for it to happen in order to finish
the job here. I think what the Iranians are looking
for is the US intervention in terms of a ceasefire,
(34:12):
in terms of the ability to go back to the
negotiating table. But we've been negotiating the nuclear weapons program
with Iran basically for the entire century without any success,
and so I don't think this is the time nor
the opportunity to just go back to the table for
the US to say, Okay, let's have a ceasefire and
(34:35):
let's talk about this in.
Speaker 3 (34:39):
A productive way.
Speaker 4 (34:40):
Because the Iranians aren't going to have that epiphany until
it's too late, So I expect that the Israelis will
continue to do their work. I expect that at the
end of the day, they're going to be successful and
the US won't have to get involved until the nuclear
weapons program has had the kind of setback least a
decade that the Israelis and the rest of the world need,
(35:04):
and then there's an opportunity to negotiate a better future,
not only for the region but also for the Iranians
so that they don't live under this regime that is
replete with all sorts of sanctions that make everyday life
in Iran a very difficult proposition.
Speaker 1 (35:24):
Do you think the Iranian people will rise up right
now or you know what's sort of the possibility of
an uprising?
Speaker 3 (35:34):
Well, I think there will be some uprisings.
Speaker 4 (35:38):
I think there'll be some There's always this level of
discontent that's sort of just below the surface. Whether or
not it's coordinate enough to end up with an overthrow
of the regime like we saw in nineteen seventy nine,
I don't know, and I don't think so, but there
will be disturbances in Iran I expect that they're already
(36:01):
happening to a certain extent, and the Iranians are trying
to keep a lid on that, both in terms of
what's happening and what we know about it.
Speaker 3 (36:11):
But it is something that that.
Speaker 4 (36:14):
The Iranians are going to have to deal with and
we're going to have to be aware of. But I
don't think they rise up and overthrow the government. That said,
the longer this goes on. We saw some footage the
other day of a oil storage facility, facility on the
outskirts of Tehran that was on fire. So when when
(36:35):
there isn't enough fuel to be able to have people
get to and from work, when they when they can't
you know, they can't cook in their homes because there
isn't any fuel available.
Speaker 3 (36:49):
You know, the more difficult life becomes.
Speaker 4 (36:51):
As the war drags on, the more unhappy the people
are going to be, not with the Israelis so much
as with the regime. And so from that standpoint, it
isn't in the best interest of the regime to stand
up and say, hey, we will open the doors. You could,
you know, Iaa can come in, the US can come in,
(37:13):
and they can look at our program, we won't enrich
here's all the stuff we have enriched. You know, they've
got to give it up, but they've got to give
it up completely in a way that everybody believes it
because in the long term, the survival of the regime
is at stake, and I think that the IOTOTA is
probably already feeling that pressure fair enough.
Speaker 1 (37:36):
And then where'd Fozzy come from?
Speaker 4 (37:38):
Well, so I'm up and somebody said that's what I
look like when I was twenty two or twenty three,
and I didn't know what that meant.
Speaker 3 (37:45):
So I said no.
Speaker 4 (37:46):
And you know, once you say no to a call star,
and that's it, because there you go.
Speaker 1 (37:52):
Vice Admiral John W. Fozzy Miller. And I've always called
you Fozzy, so I never knew where that came from.
Speaker 2 (37:57):
So all right, well that's good.
Speaker 3 (37:59):
Yeah, there you go.
Speaker 1 (38:01):
Thank you so much for your expertise and your time
on this. I really appreciate you breaking it down for
all of us.
Speaker 3 (38:07):
You bet, Lisa, pleasure speaking with you as always.
Speaker 1 (38:09):
That was Vice Admiral John W. Fozzie Miller. Appreciate him
for making the time to come on the show. Appreciate
you guys at home for listening every Tuesday and Thursday,
but you can listen throughout the week until next time.
Welcome to the Truth with Lisa Booth, where we cut
through the noise and.
Speaker 2 (00:04):
Get to the heart of the issues that matter to you.
Speaker 1 (00:07):
Today, we're diving into the escalating tensions in the Middle
East with a guest who brings a lot of experience,
Vice Admiral John W. Miller, who is a former commander
of US Naval Forces Central Command and the US Fifth Fleet.
He spent a lot of his career in the Middle East,
working in and around it, so he knows a lot
about these issues. So we're going to dig into all
(00:30):
of it. Will the U United States be dragged into it?
Does Iran actually have or how close are they to
obtaining nuclear weapons? Particularly after intelligence failures of the past
looking at Iraq when the Iraq Survey Group ended up
finding no active WMDs, no nuclear weapons programs at the
time of the invasion back then, or no significant chemical
(00:51):
and biological weapons stockpiles. So what to make of this
preemptive strike from Israel too Iran? How close is Iran
to actually becoming a nuclear Also? Is I ran a
paper tiger. I don't know about you, but I've been
surprised by how weak Iran really is. So I'll ask
the Vice Admiral if he's surprised by what we are
(01:12):
seeing happen, and then also what happens if there's regime change,
I mean, Israel is taking out a lot of Iran's leaders,
What would be next for Iran? What sort of instability
could we see? And most importantly, what will the United
States involvement, if anything, be in all of this. So
obviously there's a lot to unpack, a lot to dig into,
and who better than someone who has spent his life's
(01:34):
work working in the Middle East and on these issues,
So stay tuned for Vice Admiral John W.
Speaker 2 (01:40):
Miller.
Speaker 1 (01:45):
Well, Vice Admiral John Miller, it's great to have you
on the show. You're my friend's dad, but you also
are very esteemed and have spent so much of your
career in the Middle East. So lucky to have you
as a friend to be able to, you know, get
your expertise in times like these, so I appreciate you
making the time, Sir.
Speaker 3 (02:04):
Great to be with you, Lisa.
Speaker 1 (02:07):
I think we're all pretty surprised by what we've I
guess you know we've seen the lead up obviously with
the October seventh tier attacks.
Speaker 2 (02:16):
Clearly are on.
Speaker 1 (02:17):
You know behind that with Hamas Bang, it's proxy. But
just by what is escalated in such a short period
of time, have you been surprised by the amount of
damage Israel has been able to inflict in.
Speaker 2 (02:32):
Such a short period of time?
Speaker 1 (02:33):
And I guess how would you assess the damage that
has been done so far?
Speaker 3 (02:39):
The Israelis have been very successful.
Speaker 4 (02:41):
I'm not surprised that they've been so successful because you
could see this coming over the.
Speaker 3 (02:46):
Last several months.
Speaker 4 (02:48):
And if you go back to the direct attacks in
exchanges that the Iranians and the Israelis had last year,
So direct attacks from I ran into Israel in April
of twenty four and then again in October of twenty four.
In the interim, the Israelis have been very busy taken
(03:10):
out the proxy states that provided a great deal of
the military power that the Iranians rely on. So the
takedown of Hezbola with very little ramifications or damage done
on the Israeli side, really a masterful piece of work,
including a lot of spycraft that got the bombs into
(03:34):
the pagers and that sort of thing. And then the
eventual will takedown of ISRAELA look at the way that
they took down Syria and separated Iran from Syria. And
then obviously the work that the Israelis have done over
the last several months or years really in Gaza has
(03:57):
taken away the military power of Amas. All that jails
down to Iran being reliant strictly on their own military power,
which has never been all that impressive. They do have
a lot of missiles. They have obviously some longer range
ballistic missiles that are able to get to Israel, but
(04:17):
they don't have an unlimited supply of those.
Speaker 3 (04:19):
They're not terribly accurate.
Speaker 4 (04:21):
We've seen that, and the Israelis at the start of
this particular operation did a lot of work taken out
the command and control and then what was left of
Israeli or Iranian air defense systems. And so I'm not
surprised that it's gone well for the Israelis, and I
think it's going to continue to go well, and every
(04:41):
day that this goes on, it's a little better for
the Israelis and a little worse for the Iranians, and
particularly for their nuclear power, their nuclear weapons program is iren.
Speaker 1 (04:51):
A paper tiger. I think a lot of people seem
surprised by the weakness of the country and sort of
anticipated that it had, you know, stronger capabilities.
Speaker 4 (05:06):
What they have had historically since the revolution is a
lot of asymmetric capability. So these they used proxy's third parties.
They engage in terrorist type activities, the bombing of the
marine barracks, the bombing of Coobar towers, the invention of
the ied that that was used so prolifically throughout Iraq
(05:32):
against American troops. So they always seemed to be a
large military power really since the revolution.
Speaker 3 (05:41):
You know, they fought along war with Iraq, and Iraq.
Speaker 4 (05:44):
Turned out to be more of a paper tiger than
anybody would have inspect expected once we.
Speaker 3 (05:49):
Got engaged with the Iraqis.
Speaker 4 (05:50):
But they the two countries fought for eight consecutive years
and basically fought to a standstill.
Speaker 3 (05:56):
So I would.
Speaker 4 (05:57):
Say Iran as never possessed a great military power. They
had some air defenses that they received in recent years
from the Russians, the S three hundred system. The Israeli
has destroyed all of those after the October Iranian ballistic
missile attack on Israel, so their air defenses were left
(06:19):
to things that they could kind of clues together. They've
never had a significant air force of any sort of capability.
They don't have a navy that is effective in a
way that we would consider navies to be effective, to
be able to operate over the horizon out at sea
in the blue water. But they do have a lot
(06:41):
of asymmetric capability. You know, they have thousands of little
speedboats that they put either RPGs on or they put
fifty caliber weapons on. But the Iranians have also realized
they're not a great military power, and so they've steered
away from direct confrontation until April of last year when
they directly in front of the Israelis.
Speaker 3 (07:01):
That was a mistake.
Speaker 1 (07:04):
I think a lot of people are wondering how close
Iran is to becoming a nuclear power. You know, we
all remember back to the Iraq days when the Iraq
Survey Group found that, you know, there were no active
WMD's in Iraq, there were no nuclear weapons programs at
the time of the invasion, that there's no significant chemical
biological weapons stockpiles, and they found some old degraded munitions
(07:28):
from before the nineteen ninety one Gulf War.
Speaker 2 (07:32):
So, you know, questions about how good is the.
Speaker 1 (07:35):
Intelligence, about how close Iran is to becoming a nuclear power.
You know, we're these premptive strikes necessary. So I guess
what do we know about Iran in terms of being
a nuclear power or how close they are to becoming one,
particularly given you know, some of the intelligence failures of
the past.
Speaker 4 (07:56):
Lisa, given our history with Iraqi WMD, I think it's
right for everybody to be a little bit skeptical about
what's going on in Iran and trying to understand, Okay,
do they really have a capability? Iran and Iraq are
different in a lot of different ways. Iraq really wanted
Saddam Hussein wanted people to think that he had weapons
(08:19):
and mass destructure, that he had the ability was developing,
the ability to build nuclear weapons, that he had chemical
and biological weapons.
Speaker 3 (08:27):
Even his own.
Speaker 4 (08:30):
Senior military personnel thought that the country had chemical and
biological weapons. They all thought that they were in a
different division than the one that they happened to be running.
So Iran is a lot different in that regard. One
of the reasons I think that makes the attack that
the Israelis are in the middle of right now a
(08:52):
good idea is there are many things that we don't know.
The Iranians have gone to great trouble to hide their program,
and in some ways they've tried to hide it in
plain sight where they have acquiesced through the j CPOA,
which was never a good agreement to international inspections. To
(09:12):
a certain extent, they share data. To a certain extent,
we know Massad has been able to penetrate all levels
of the Iranian government, and so they can fill in
a lot of the blanks. Masad has been able to
fill in a lot of the blanks in terms of
what the Iranians really have UH. And then there are
(09:33):
also parts of the program that that we know about
because the Iranians are making the declarations. And so when
you look at nuclear enrichment, the Iranians are a signer
of the non Proliferation Treaty, and and if you're a
signer of the non proliferation treaty, you agree not to
(09:53):
enrich to the point where you can make nuclear weapons.
They're in violation of that. They've said they're in violation
of that. They've said they're going to pull out of
the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, but they haven't done so yet.
Speaker 3 (10:08):
But they're enriching.
Speaker 4 (10:09):
If you need enrichment to about five percent we'll say,
of uranium to be able to use a nuclear power
plant or to be able to use nuclear medicine. But
if once you go about five percent, now you're getting
towards the ninety percent that you need to make nuclear weapons.
The Uranians have admitted that they have a great deal
(10:30):
of material that's an excess of sixty percent enriched. And
so we know enough about the program to know that
it's a danger not just to the Israelis but to
the entire free world. And we know enough about the
program to know that there are probably some unknowns that
would be dangerous to assume a way as insignificant.
Speaker 1 (10:52):
And Israel takeout Iran's nuclear capabilities unilaterally, you know, I know,
I've read and heard a lot about how you know,
Iran has hardened facilities like nuclear sites a pordoh buried
deep under ground that you sort of need advanced bunk
or busting munitions that Israel just does not have. They
don't possess them. So can Israel unilaterally take out irans
(11:17):
nuclear capabilities or do they need the United States and
other powers.
Speaker 4 (11:21):
There's a presumption I think that we can make that
the Israelis wouldn't have started the job if they weren't
confident that by themselves they can finish the job. And
one of the things that's really not well known about
Israeli defense force is they're not interested in having allies
(11:42):
fight with them and for them. So they don't seek
out American troops or air power to.
Speaker 3 (11:52):
Do their work.
Speaker 4 (11:53):
They do seek out capability, you know, they seek out
the ability to buy the weapons and to buy the
the airplanes, to get foreign EIGHTD. We give them a
great deal of foreign eight is, I think everyone knows.
But they're not interested in having somebody else fight for them.
They're interested in Israelis defending Israel, and so I don't
(12:14):
think that they would have undertaken this endeavor had they
not been confident that they could finish the job without
intervention from someone else. In other words, there's a lot
of talk about these bunker busters and the US has them,
and do we loan them, be two armors with bunker busters,
or do we rent them, or do we go in
(12:35):
and do it for them. I don't think that's the
Israeli plan, but I'm not sure exactly what their plan is,
and I think we'll find out over the next couple
of days, because I think most of the effort that
regards neutralizing the entire nuclear weapons program in Iran is.
Speaker 3 (12:54):
Yet to come.
Speaker 4 (12:55):
There are other ways to be successful in a place
like Florida, which, as you mentioned, and it's deep, it's hardened,
it's a very difficult target for the Israelis to get
at with bombs. It can be done without bunker busting bombs.
You just need a lot of them. But there are
other ways. In The Israelis have shown since the attack
of October seventh, an enormous level of ingenuity in terms
(13:21):
of how they employ their forces. And I go back
to the pager incident with Hasbola, where virtually the entire
leadership structure of Isbola is taken out in a matter
of minutes because all of their pagers and their cell
phones start blowing up. And so it may be that
(13:45):
the Israeli plan is not to take out a place
like Fodo outside to inside, but maybe inside to outside.
I wouldn't be surprised to see that, And so I
think the Israelis have the capability to finish the job.
Speaker 3 (14:00):
It's very important that they do.
Speaker 2 (14:02):
So we've got more of the Admiral.
Speaker 1 (14:04):
But first, folks, we're seeing something truly disturbing. Anti Semitism
is on the rise around the world, and sadly, right
here in America, Jewish schools being targeted, synagogue's threatened, family
is living in fear. It's something we hoped we'd never
have to see again in our lifetime. And let me
say this, silence is just not an option. This is
(14:24):
the moment to take a stand. That's why I want
to tell you about the International Fellowship of Christians and
Jews or IFCJ. They're on the front lines providing real
help where it's needed most. They're giving food and shelter
to Jewish families under threat, building bomb shelters for children,
and helping survivors of hate rebuild their lives. And they
don't just respond to crisis, they work every day to
(14:44):
prevent it. Your gift of only forty five dollars will
helps support their life saving work by helping provide food, shelter,
and much more. The Bible says I will bless those
who bless you. Supporting IFCJ is a spiritual stand. It's
showing up for God's people when it counts. So please
call eight eight eight four A eight IDJ. That's eight
eight eight four A eight four three two five. Or
(15:06):
you can go to IFCJ dot org every dollar hopes
don't wait be the difference is it IFCJ dot org
or call eight eight eight for a eight IJ.
Speaker 2 (15:16):
Now, how do you compare Masad to.
Speaker 1 (15:22):
Like the CIA or some I mean, it seems like
some of the stuff that they've been doing is like
you know, double O seven, like movie stuff where you know,
you see it and you're like, oh, yeah, that's not real,
and then you're like, oh, well, maybe it is.
Speaker 4 (15:37):
Well, the great thing about Clendestine organizations is you don't
really know what they're capable of doing. So I think
it's difficult to do a comparison between an organization like
the CIA, which has enormous capability obviously, in an organization
like Masade, which has an enormous capability and they were
I mean, think about this in terms of an intelligence coup.
Speaker 3 (16:00):
They built a drone factory in Iran.
Speaker 4 (16:03):
And they used that location to launch drones that took
out air defense systems. They took out leadership, they took
out certain parts of the communications infrastructure in Iran, all
from Iran, and this was all built in Iran by
Israelis without the Iranians having any knowledge whatsoever. So rather
(16:25):
than try to compare which one is better, because neither
one is good to have mad at you, I think
sufficient to say Massada is an extraordinarily capable intelligence organization
and they've proven that over the last two years in
ways that are like what you would see in a
(16:46):
movie or are like what you might see on TV
and say, wow, that's not real.
Speaker 3 (16:50):
That can't be done, and they've done it.
Speaker 1 (16:52):
I wonder too, because Israel probably benefits more from kind
of like bragging about those things or getting it out
in the open, right because you know, considering the fact
that Israel is the size of New Jersey and face
by enemies that seek its destruction, it's to its benefit
to you sort of boast or you know what I mean,
to kind of have that bravado versus the United States,
(17:14):
it's probably to benefit to like for the CIA likely
to sort of keep undercover some of the things that's doing.
Speaker 2 (17:19):
I would imagine.
Speaker 3 (17:21):
Do you think that's fair, Yeah, I think that's fair.
I think it's a great point.
Speaker 4 (17:25):
They do use Masad unlike the way we use CIA
as a deterrent, and so they do a lot of
cliant DestinE things where they wouldn't necessarily have to take
the credit and attribute the actions that occurred to the masade,
but they are oftentimes eager to do so because it
(17:49):
is a deterrent.
Speaker 3 (17:49):
To other nations around them.
Speaker 4 (17:51):
And when you look at the geography of Israel, they
are a country that is the only non unfriendly nation
that they have a border with is the ocean, it's
the Mediterranean Sea. The rest of the country is surrounded
by nations that are not friendly for the most part,
(18:14):
with the exception of Jordan to the Israelis, and so
I think they see it as an advantage to them
to say we're miss out and here are the things
that we can do, and if we're willing to talk
about those things, imagine what we can do that we're
not willing to talk about. And that is a very
different mindset than than the CIA and a lot of
(18:35):
other intelligence agency use. But I think it's a very
powerful tool that the Israelis have used to very good effect.
Speaker 1 (18:46):
You know, President Trump tweeted or I guess posted on
X to leave Iran. Why do you think he did that?
What do you think is coming. I guess what does
that signal to you?
Speaker 4 (18:57):
I think it's just another way to increase the fog
of war. And you can expect the Iranians with the
loss of infrastructure that they have, and particularly the loss
of their leadership, especially those that are involved in air defense.
There's a lot of confusion in Iran. It's difficult to
(19:19):
communicate from one place to another. I think President Trump
is keenly interested in the Israelis being successful, as he
should be. I think we all should be, and I
think he saw this as an opportunity to add to
the chaos. It's important to note that people were already
leaving Tehran before the President posted this on truth social
(19:43):
I think his particular posting has accelerated people's desire to
leave Tehran. And having Tehran under threat really goes back
to the Iraq Iran War, where people often refer to
it as the best of two cities. And this is
where they were launching missiles from Iran into Baghdad and
(20:07):
for the most part, launching some missiles, but flying airplanes
from Baghdad into Tehran. So there's a history that's not
all that distant. It's within the lifespan of a lot
of people that live in Tehran of remembering capital under siege.
And I think this just adds to that chaos and
confusion and gives the Israeli as a better opportunity to
(20:29):
complete this operation quickly and while being successful minimizing the
overall loss of life.
Speaker 2 (20:36):
Who are Iran's friends?
Speaker 1 (20:38):
You know, are any countries coming to Iran's rescue?
Speaker 4 (20:44):
Well, I don't think there's anybody coming to Iran's rescue
that really is useful.
Speaker 3 (20:49):
To the Iranians or to anyone else. So in terms
of who they rely on.
Speaker 4 (20:57):
And you know a lot of times people will refer
to as as our rans second strike capability.
Speaker 3 (21:02):
That's no longer true. And and and Hisbola.
Speaker 4 (21:06):
Has been largely neutralized for now as a as a
military force.
Speaker 3 (21:10):
And you can see that they're not involved.
Speaker 2 (21:12):
Uh.
Speaker 4 (21:12):
The only organization, not a nation, that appears to continue
to support Iran are the Houthis.
Speaker 3 (21:19):
And that's not surprised because the Iranians give.
Speaker 4 (21:22):
The Houthis the capabilities that they're using to make themselves,
you know, infamous in the world of of maritime transportation
and the ability to keep the ceilanes open. Other than
that their proxies are gone. Syria has gone aside, his
Bola has gone, and Lebanon Hamas is gone in Gaza.
(21:43):
And so if you look at nation states that might
support them, uh, they're not nation states that are particularly
useful to them. The Russians are very busy, uh trying
not to get you know, uh defeated completely militarily in
the Ukraine, so they're not going to be terribly useful.
Speaker 3 (22:02):
The Chinese are not going.
Speaker 4 (22:03):
To get involved in any way, and are likely only
to be involved in some sort of a diplomatic way
because they see the activities that are going on right
now as a threat to the oil that they get.
Speaker 3 (22:15):
Out of Iran at a great discount.
Speaker 4 (22:19):
There's no use in having a country like North Korea
or Venezuela's friends other than they can foment some sort
of mischief in various different parts of the world that
people find unhelpful. But when Anatola wakes up in the morning,
his list of friends is very short. It doesn't go
far beyond any international boundaries, and it's getting shorter every day,
(22:43):
you know how pivotal.
Speaker 1 (22:44):
President Trump obviously worked in the abraham A course during
his first administration and then recently had what has been
deemed as a successful visit to the Middle East, most
recently with some of these Gulf states making economic and
roads as well. You know, he had that great line
in the future of the Middle East is commerce not chaos?
Speaker 2 (23:04):
How?
Speaker 1 (23:05):
You know, how does that trip sort of lay the
groundwork for what is happening now? And also the Abraham
Accords previously. You know, do you think the future of
the Middle East could be commerce not chaos or do
they want commerce or do they want chaos or you know,
sort of what's your assessment.
Speaker 2 (23:21):
Of all that.
Speaker 1 (23:22):
As someone who's you know, worked and spent a lot
of time on the Middle East, I.
Speaker 4 (23:28):
Think that the Arab states, and especially the Arab states
that the President visited, are are keenly interested in stability.
They're keenly interested in commerce over chaos. They do a
very good job of really taking care of their populations.
(23:49):
So these are monarchs. They're not elected, they're not democracies,
they're not likely to be so anytime soon, but they
take care of These monarchs are monarchs that take care
of their people in terms of bitch cation, infrastructure, you know,
the ability to work and to and to grow and
too and to thrive are all priorities for these these
(24:13):
monarchies because they want that stability and they want to
be able to be part of the global economy, to
make money and make their countries and their people more prosperous.
I don't think that's true with Iran. They really do
thrive under chass the regime does. I think most of
(24:34):
the Iranian people would much rather see a different regime
and have have a peaceful Iran that's part of the
Community of Nations.
Speaker 2 (24:43):
Got to take a quick commercial break.
Speaker 1 (24:45):
More with Admiral Miller on the other side, My opinion
is that President Trump sort of the perfect president for
this moment because he's a guy who, you know, obviously
wants the United States to be like the superior power
in the world.
Speaker 2 (25:02):
He doesn't mess around.
Speaker 1 (25:03):
He's willing to engage if needed, but he doesn't want
some sort of drawn out nation building. He realizes the
Middle East is different, like they're never going to subscribe
to democracy like we do here in the United States.
You know, they're never going to be a constitutional republic.
So he's not really trying to impose or worldview on
the Middle East. He's sort of just accepting the Middle
East as they are. And you know, he obviously doesn't
(25:28):
want Iran to have a nuclear weapon, So I think
he's sort of the perfect person to be in charge
right now, Like given the context of all those different things,
sort of what do you make of that assessment? And uh,
you know, I guess my opinion that he's very clear
eyed versus in seeing the world versus kind of seeing
(25:50):
it through you know, rose colored glasses that don't really exist.
Speaker 4 (25:55):
Well, it certainly brings us a different approach to international
relations than than what we've seen in the past, and
it is a business approach. And he's been very clear
with the Iranians when you lay out the timeline he
gets into office, he gives the Iranians sixty days to
make a deal in terms of their nuclear weapons program,
(26:18):
with the bottom line very simple that they cannot become
a nuclear power, they can't have a nuclear weapon and
it's unacceptable. And on day sixty one, the Israelis are
bombing the Iranian nuclear weapons facilities that they're using to
be able to.
Speaker 3 (26:35):
Make a bomb.
Speaker 4 (26:36):
So it's very clear on that and nobody should be
surprised and nobody should really really object to what's happening,
only because it was all laid out very clearly and
you know, if this, then that, and so from that standpoint,
he has been very clear. I do think that that
(26:57):
business approach has a lot of sway in the world now.
I find it particularly interesting how it plays off the Chinese,
who do take a more hole of government approach to
foreign affairs than the Western countries typically have done. And so,
you know, he sees things in the Middle East as
(27:17):
more of a you know, kind of a straight up
business deal, but he also sees things that way with
his engagements in the rest of the world. And you
get into the whole debate about tariffs and and and
those sort of economic moves as the way that President
Trump has chosen to put forward to the world not
(27:39):
only our foreign policy, but our foreign and economic policy
wrapped up into one, but more skewed towards the towards
the economic side. I certainly think that pays a certain
dividend in the Middle East where there's interest. And if
you look at the Middle East today, you go to
the capitals of the Emirates or Qatar or Saudi Arabia,
(28:05):
they are different places than they were ten fifteen twenty
years ago, and far different places than they were a
half a century ago. These are modern capitals with great
infrastructure airports and roads and schools and hospitals and all
of those things that make for.
Speaker 3 (28:25):
Good societies.
Speaker 4 (28:26):
And I think they share a vision of the world
that is similar to the vision that President Trump has.
And you see that play out today in what's happening
by the fact that the air countries by and large
have chosen to stay on the sideline while this fight
between Israel and Iran goes on. The end goal of that,
(28:50):
I think in President Trump's mind, and I think he's
onto something here, is that this is how you get
long term peace and stability. You solve these problems one
way or the other, and then we can all move
together peacefully and concentrate on making everyone's lives better. And
(29:10):
so I think at the end of this you're looking
at a situation not to say that we don't have
to deal with the Palestinian issue.
Speaker 3 (29:18):
It does have to be dealt with, but that sort
of sets the table for events like.
Speaker 4 (29:23):
The Abraham Accord to grow and to become treaties or
agreements that other countries are more likely to join. In
on as a way ahead for the future.
Speaker 1 (29:36):
What happens to the Iranian regime if it collapses? What
does the future of Iran look like after that happens,
Like who would take charge?
Speaker 2 (29:45):
Is there concern that it would be even more.
Speaker 1 (29:48):
Volatile than it is now, if it's even possible, or
you know what I mean? Like, what does what does
regime change if that is a byproduct of the regime
getting taken out.
Speaker 4 (30:00):
Well, that's a great question and sort of a caveat
to start with, is we want to be a little
bit careful about what we wish for. So these really
have made it clear that they're not after regime change,
they're after the nuclear weapons program. Having said that, there
are a number of things that the Israelis have done
that might lead one to believe that they're not telling
(30:23):
the truth, the whole truth and nothing.
Speaker 5 (30:25):
But yeah, like taking out the leader, well, taking out
everybody but the leader, right, so he has no friends,
you know, he holds a meeting and nobody else shows
up because they're all dead.
Speaker 3 (30:36):
You know, they get a new army chief is down.
Speaker 2 (30:38):
Not a lot of job stability, huh.
Speaker 4 (30:41):
Yeah, opportunity, but not stability. So that's that's all true.
On the other hand, go back to nineteen seventy nine,
the Shah really was. It was a terrible dictator. He
was more along the lines of Saddam Hussein. And then
(31:01):
probably Western history likes to record. And and so the Iranians,
we were sick of the regime and they wanted they
wanted a new one, and lo and behold they got
one that's worse than the one that they had. And
so because of the way the regime is structured today,
should the Iyatola get killed in the course of this conflict,
(31:25):
it's not clear who takes over and and.
Speaker 3 (31:28):
And who is in charge of Iran.
Speaker 4 (31:31):
And what we must remember is that it's a big
country eighty million people, you know, a couple of times
the size of Texas. It has enormous petroleum reserves that
are important to the world. And so an unstable, chaotic,
ungoverned Iran is not in anybody's interest. And all of
(31:54):
these ORGC, the Revolutionary Guard boats that they have have
the ability to launch drones to be terrorists not only
in the region but all around the world. Because there
are Iranians everywhere, or GC everywhere. That's not a picture
that necessarily benefits the Israeli's the nuclear power program or
(32:19):
the rest of the world.
Speaker 3 (32:21):
And so I think a good solution, if.
Speaker 4 (32:24):
You're looking at this from is the Israel standpoint or
from the US standpoint, is that the Israelis capitulate or
the Iranians capitulate on their nuclear weapons program, the regime
stays in power long enough for stability, and then over
the longer term, in the next five to ten years,
(32:45):
we see some regime change and a better regime. But
I don't think a collapse of the regime in the
near term is in anybody's interest.
Speaker 1 (32:54):
Before we go, I think a lot of people are
wondering kind of like what the United States you had
mentioned earlier, that Israel wouldn't have done this without believing
it can kind of like accomplish its goals, you know, laterally,
and that's kind of how it typically does things.
Speaker 2 (33:09):
I guess is.
Speaker 1 (33:10):
There you know, could the United States get drawn into this?
Speaker 4 (33:15):
You know?
Speaker 1 (33:15):
I think a lot of people are concerned about, you know,
being involved in another sort of Middle Eastern war given
past history, Like what's the likelihood of that. I imagine
I ran right now probably doesn't really want to get
the United States involved, but sort of what's the likelihood
of that and kind of like what are you looking
for in sort of the coming days and weeks as
(33:37):
you kind of watch how this all goes down.
Speaker 4 (33:39):
I don't think there's any appetite within the United States
or within the in the in the region, from the
from the Arab States, or or the Israelis for the
US to be involved.
Speaker 3 (33:51):
So I don't know.
Speaker 4 (33:52):
I don't think there's a lot of appetite for the
US to be directly involved, And I don't expect that
to happen because I don't think the Israelis are going
to need for it to happen in order to finish
the job here. I think what the Iranians are looking
for is the US intervention in terms of a ceasefire,
(34:12):
in terms of the ability to go back to the
negotiating table. But we've been negotiating the nuclear weapons program
with Iran basically for the entire century without any success,
and so I don't think this is the time nor
the opportunity to just go back to the table for
the US to say, Okay, let's have a ceasefire and
(34:35):
let's talk about this in.
Speaker 3 (34:39):
A productive way.
Speaker 4 (34:40):
Because the Iranians aren't going to have that epiphany until
it's too late, So I expect that the Israelis will
continue to do their work. I expect that at the
end of the day, they're going to be successful and
the US won't have to get involved until the nuclear
weapons program has had the kind of setback least a
decade that the Israelis and the rest of the world need,
(35:04):
and then there's an opportunity to negotiate a better future,
not only for the region but also for the Iranians
so that they don't live under this regime that is
replete with all sorts of sanctions that make everyday life
in Iran a very difficult proposition.
Speaker 1 (35:24):
Do you think the Iranian people will rise up right
now or you know what's sort of the possibility of
an uprising?
Speaker 3 (35:34):
Well, I think there will be some uprisings.
Speaker 4 (35:38):
I think there'll be some There's always this level of
discontent that's sort of just below the surface. Whether or
not it's coordinate enough to end up with an overthrow
of the regime like we saw in nineteen seventy nine,
I don't know, and I don't think so, but there
will be disturbances in Iran I expect that they're already
(36:01):
happening to a certain extent, and the Iranians are trying
to keep a lid on that, both in terms of
what's happening and what we know about it.
Speaker 3 (36:11):
But it is something that that.
Speaker 4 (36:14):
The Iranians are going to have to deal with and
we're going to have to be aware of. But I
don't think they rise up and overthrow the government. That said,
the longer this goes on. We saw some footage the
other day of a oil storage facility, facility on the
outskirts of Tehran that was on fire. So when when
(36:35):
there isn't enough fuel to be able to have people
get to and from work, when they when they can't
you know, they can't cook in their homes because there
isn't any fuel available.
Speaker 3 (36:49):
You know, the more difficult life becomes.
Speaker 4 (36:51):
As the war drags on, the more unhappy the people
are going to be, not with the Israelis so much
as with the regime. And so from that standpoint, it
isn't in the best interest of the regime to stand
up and say, hey, we will open the doors. You could,
you know, Iaa can come in, the US can come in,
(37:13):
and they can look at our program, we won't enrich
here's all the stuff we have enriched. You know, they've
got to give it up, but they've got to give
it up completely in a way that everybody believes it
because in the long term, the survival of the regime
is at stake, and I think that the IOTOTA is
probably already feeling that pressure fair enough.
Speaker 1 (37:36):
And then where'd Fozzy come from?
Speaker 4 (37:38):
Well, so I'm up and somebody said that's what I
look like when I was twenty two or twenty three,
and I didn't know what that meant.
Speaker 3 (37:45):
So I said no.
Speaker 4 (37:46):
And you know, once you say no to a call star,
and that's it, because there you go.
Speaker 1 (37:52):
Vice Admiral John W. Fozzy Miller. And I've always called
you Fozzy, so I never knew where that came from.
Speaker 2 (37:57):
So all right, well that's good.
Speaker 3 (37:59):
Yeah, there you go.
Speaker 1 (38:01):
Thank you so much for your expertise and your time
on this. I really appreciate you breaking it down for
all of us.
Speaker 3 (38:07):
You bet, Lisa, pleasure speaking with you as always.
Speaker 1 (38:09):
That was Vice Admiral John W. Fozzie Miller. Appreciate him
for making the time to come on the show. Appreciate
you guys at home for listening every Tuesday and Thursday,
but you can listen throughout the week until next time.
The Clay Travis and Buck Sexton Show News
Hosts And Creators
Clay Travis
Buck Sexton
Show Links
WebsiteNewsletterPopular Podcasts
Stuff You Should Know
If you've ever wanted to know about champagne, satanism, the Stonewall Uprising, chaos theory, LSD, El Nino, true crime and Rosa Parks, then look no further. Josh and Chuck have you covered.
Dateline NBC
Current and classic episodes, featuring compelling true-crime mysteries, powerful documentaries and in-depth investigations. Follow now to get the latest episodes of Dateline NBC completely free, or subscribe to Dateline Premium for ad-free listening and exclusive bonus content: DatelinePremium.com
On Purpose with Jay Shetty
I’m Jay Shetty host of On Purpose the worlds #1 Mental Health podcast and I’m so grateful you found us. I started this podcast 5 years ago to invite you into conversations and workshops that are designed to help make you happier, healthier and more healed. I believe that when you (yes you) feel seen, heard and understood you’re able to deal with relationship struggles, work challenges and life’s ups and downs with more ease and grace. I interview experts, celebrities, thought leaders and athletes so that we can grow our mindset, build better habits and uncover a side of them we’ve never seen before. New episodes every Monday and Friday. Your support means the world to me and I don’t take it for granted — click the follow button and leave a review to help us spread the love with On Purpose. I can’t wait for you to listen to your first or 500th episode!