Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:00):
Can't I Am six forty. You're listening to the John
Cobelt podcast on the iHeartRadio app. John Cobelt Show, Can't
Fight Am six forty Alive everywhere on the iHeartRadio app.
We are on every day from one until four o'clock.
After four o'clock, it's John Cobelt Show on demand. It's
the podcast on the iHeart app. Now, Mark Arragos is
(00:22):
getting into the Pacific Palisades case. He has a homeowner
who's filing a lawsuit against City of La County of
La LA's DWP and Mayor Karen Bass over all the
failures before, during, and after the fire. Let's get Mark
Garragos on. How are you? Mark?
Speaker 2 (00:40):
I'm wonderful. How about you? How are you today?
Speaker 1 (00:43):
I'm doing well? What going on?
Speaker 2 (00:45):
What kid?
Speaker 1 (00:47):
Well, you're a client. What was his situation in the fire?
What happened to him?
Speaker 3 (00:53):
Well, it's one of these situations where at least at
first you thought, well, at least the structure was spared,
but then you see what's happened since then surrounding the area,
and what a disaster it's been. And then all of
the subsequent kind of looking at this thing, and it
(01:17):
just looked like it was a lights were on and
nobody was home. In terms of minding the story here,
I don't even understand the gives credit to the FEDS
for doing a report, give credit to the fire department,
and we're based in a fire station in downtown Lam.
(01:37):
I've always playing attention to them, and they were early
money on all of the problems with the city and
what the city wasn't doing. And it's just a I
would say it was a comedy of airs, but it's
been a complete tragedy for everybody involved, at the last
of which is the mayor. And you've got them kind
of dealing with it. I said, you've documented better than anybody.
Speaker 1 (02:01):
Yeah. I am still stunned, even after talking about this
for a year, that those those weather warnings were so
strong for you, five six days ahead, extreme fire warnings,
extreme wind warnings. They used all the apocalyptic language you
(02:21):
could find in the dictionary, the National Weather Service did
in order to describe what potentially could happen. And I'm
not aware of any any preparation meeting that anybody in
the LA government had to address what was called.
Speaker 3 (02:36):
I don't even understand it. I mean, I really don't
you rely on the government. There's some basic functions and
the idea is that they're supposed to protect you, and
it's almost as if they did everything possible to not
protect and that's just very disconcerting. And I'm looking forward
to the discovery in this case. I think the discovery
(02:58):
getting people on their own and requiring, you know, the
after reports and so what was done in real time
and the kinds of clearion palls that we're done were ignored.
Speaker 1 (03:09):
You know, had I got a lot of friends in
the Palisades. It's next door to me, and we were
affected to the extent that we lost our power and
we couldn't use the water, and then the thieves descended
on our neighborhood because there were no police. I mean,
there's no power, there's no water, there was no police.
But we didn't our neighborhood didn't burn. We were a
(03:30):
couple of miles away. But I remember thinking in the
middle of it, it's like, Wow, this is a complete
collapse of the government. You're really on your own. And
we had to hire a guy who is somebody's electrician
in the neighborhood, and he had a pistol and we
were paying him along with a couple of neighbors one
thousand dollars a day to stand outside and shoot any
(03:52):
of the looters that might come on our property. That's
what That's well, that was our reality.
Speaker 3 (03:58):
I like you, was out to data adjacent and we
were evacuated. My kind of anecdotal theory or off the
wall theory is the only reason that the fire didn't
jump and hit us is because JPL was right there
and they weren't going to let that burn. But they
be looting the home invasions immediately after, and we did
(04:19):
the same thing. All the neighbors banded together and kind
of air and arrow in private police force in order
to police the neighborhood. And you start to realize that
the social contract is very, very fragile. And this exposed
exactly all of the problems with the government in not
being prepared. It's the one thing that they literally were doing.
Speaker 1 (04:45):
Why do you think that is they don't care?
Speaker 3 (04:49):
I will, I think to some degree now I just
can't accept the fact that people don't care. And I
don't think that that is it. I think that I
think when you say lazy, I think of it as
intellectually lazy. I think that it's that you have to
be prepared, you have to understand these things, and you
(05:11):
have to have god of systems in placement. Was obvious
that there were no systems, or whatever systems were in
place were completely ignored the intellectually lazy or the system challenges.
Speaker 1 (05:26):
And everything failed, the preparation, the execution, and the reaction
to the fire afterwards, and on a state level and
county and city. I mean, everything failed, and I didn't
think that was possible.
Speaker 3 (05:42):
Well, and you know the I often invoke Adam Corolla.
He's the longtime friend, one time the best partner of mine.
He was invalable and has been documenting in his laws.
But the predictions that he was making and they've all
basically come true. Look by kind of a profit in
some ways saying when people understand the jump through to
(06:07):
get a permit, what you have to do in order
to get to kind of navigate the governmental needs, it's
astonishing and it's played out exactly that way. Here we
are knocking on the door of a year, and where's
the rebuilt? Where is anything there? Just is? The non
responsiveness is appalling, and it's just I think people have
(06:28):
to be held accountables.
Speaker 1 (06:29):
So who do you want to talk to the most,
What departments or what officials do you want to depose
for your client's loss?
Speaker 3 (06:36):
Really, I really think I want to get in the
fire department and the mayor's office and the emergency response.
I want to find out who actually was responsible, who
didn't want the trigger, so to speak, on getting some
to your point, I mean not only preparation, but right
in the accident, And that is exactly what we want
(06:58):
to find out.
Speaker 2 (06:59):
What I think we've kind of detailed in the lawsuit
as to what we've seen so far, what we've coddled
together from the various.
Speaker 3 (07:11):
Reports, and we'll plan on doing an expansive discovery, deep
dive into this and to make it once we get
through it as we're doing it.
Speaker 1 (07:23):
But why do your client decide to call you for
an individual lawsuit rather than join the thousands that are
working with the other attorneys.
Speaker 2 (07:31):
Now.
Speaker 3 (07:31):
It's interesting because early on I was I did what's
called a nine ten action for them because they suspected
that and others as well, that this was a governmental
failure like you thought, and so we filed what it
called nine ten actions early on, which were denied. Nine
tens are the what the legislature has imposed a duty
(07:56):
that you file and you get denied almost routinely by
the governmental entities to hold them accountable. I think because
I've got a history of like fulling up against the government,
whether it's for civil rights actions or other things, and
this was a coss or governmental failure, and that's one
(08:16):
of the things that attracted me of new litigation.
Speaker 1 (08:20):
All right, Well, well, when you find things out, and
if you want to share anything from your investigations and depositions,
please always come on the air, because we're looking for
as much information as possible to explain why these people
did or didn't do everything. I mean, I can't think
of one thing that any level of government did right
(08:40):
and did competently in the whole mess.
Speaker 3 (08:45):
And still take a look like, yeah, don't totally me.
Do take a look. It's wild when you look at it.
We're almost a year out or a couple of weeks
away from the year anniversary, and the devastation is still a.
Speaker 1 (09:00):
Believable all Right, Mark, thanks for coming.
Speaker 2 (09:02):
On, Thank you, Bye bye.
Speaker 1 (09:05):
All right, Mark Geragos, who's got a client who's suing
everybody LA City County, the mayor, DWP over the damage
his house suffered from the fire. And when we come back,
would you believe this? I UCLA has something called the
(09:28):
Water Resources Group, and the researchers have done their own
study on whether the reservoirs would have made a difference
if the one hundred and seventeen million gallon reservoir Sentienez
Reservoir in the Palace, would it have made a difference.
It was if it was full instead of bone dry empty.
(09:49):
You're not going to believe their answer. I'll tell you
about it we come back.
Speaker 4 (09:55):
You're listening to John Cobelt on demand from KFI AM
six forty.
Speaker 1 (10:01):
I AM six forty more stimulating talk radio. If you
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(10:22):
YouTube channel where we're putting longer segments on. And then
it's at John Cobert Radio for everything else. The UCLA
has something called the Water Resources Group. It's researchers led
by Gregory Pierce, and almost within I think I mentioned this.
We had Rick Caruso on the day after the fire,
(10:44):
very shortly thereafter, and he said in passing and I
didn't even catch it, but he was talking. He already
identified all a lot of the stuff that had gone
wrong with the anticipation and execute of fighting the fire.
And he said something about the reservoirs were dry, and
(11:06):
I didn't know what that meant, and we just moved
on to something else, And then it turned out he
was talking about that Santienez reservoir, one hundred and seventeen
million gallons it's supposed to hold, and it was empty.
And that became a huge focal point of the anger
and the outrage because the La Times did a big
story detailing how they drained it because the cover had
(11:30):
torn and it took them a year to replace. The
cover didn't cost very much money. It wasn't a difficult job.
It was just the inertia, the stupid laziness of government
workers at the DWP. I don't know else. We were
just talking to Mark Arragos, like, what is it, what
is it with the government workers? Nobody prepared for this,
(11:52):
nobody executed. This was all doable. This was all preventable.
What's wrong with you people? When you get up in
the morning you decide not to do anything, but periodically
the reservoir would come, you know, be a debate point
and people, you know, whatever plants the best administration had
(12:15):
online in the comments section. Let's say at the LA Times, Well,
the reservoir wouldn't have made a difference all the reservoir.
Of course it would make a difference. And as I
talked to people involved in the fire, and I mentioned
the other day, I talked to a guy who prevented
his home and two other neighbors homes from burning because
he had two and a half inch hose and he
(12:37):
used I think swimming pool water and he kept the
roofs wet and they survived the fire, where other homes
in the neighborhood did not two and a half inch shoes.
He'd had it because a fire had burned down his
family home back in the nineteen seventies when he was
a little kid, and so he always kept the fire
(13:01):
a hose on the property just in case. And he said,
nobody showed up to fight the fire, and firefighters would say, well,
we're out of water, We're out of water. So now
here comes Gregory Piers, director of the UCLA Water Resources Group,
that wanted to decide whether the intense focus on the
(13:23):
water supply meant that the dry hydrants had uniquely hampered
the Palisades firefight or whether this happened all the time.
And they claim that the hydrants often sput her out
because you lose pressure. You have the burning homes hamorrhaging water.
(13:49):
Right the pipes are melting down and busting, and then
there's too many fire truck hoses and everybody else drawing
on a limited supply. And the report says fire hydrant
performance in the Palisades seems to represent the rule rather
than the exception. The only difference is that the hydrant
(14:10):
performance did not make the headlines of news stories of
other fires. Even though there's plenty of water available in
the system, it's not possible to pump enough water to
the fire area all at once to meet the flow
rate demand. Even if the Yes Santienez Reservoir had been full,
(14:31):
the hydrants could not have maintained pressure. I don't and
that last quote was from the state investigation. Now that
just makes no sense to me. If everybody's using the
water at the same time, and that reduces the water pressure.
(14:55):
But if you have one hundred and seventeen million gallons
constantly flowing into the system, it's going to to extend
the life of their fire fighting capabilities. And and if
it is the lack of water pressure, then how could
(15:19):
Los Angeles have for one hundred years and we've had
a number of fires over the years. How could you
have a system that doesn't work when you need it most.
How could that be the standard fire hydrant system that
we've been living with all this time? How does that happen?
Nobody ever designed a better system to supply enough water
(15:46):
for a major fire. Nobody ever thought of it, Nobody
drew it up, nobody voted to pay for it. Don't
I don't understand this. Well, then where would one hundred
and seventeen million gallons go, right, It would come out
of the reservoir, it would go through the system. They
(16:11):
had three million gallons available, three separate tanks that were full,
and they used that. And even if much of the
town would have burned anyway, they would alwa said somebody
that one hundred and seventeen million gallons would have saved
somebody a lot of somebody's I'm just the reservoir was there.
(16:40):
It was built in nineteen sixty four specifically for a fire.
So you're telling me that built a reservoir, But it
didn't matter if it was filled or not. And it
didn't matter if we had ten reservoirs or twenty reservoirs.
It didn't matter. All the fire hydrants would have run
dry anyway. Now that makes sense to me. And if
(17:03):
it did make sense, then why didn't you get a
different system. And of course, if they had just set
the fire crew and kept it there from the January
first fire, they would have put out three kindling right away,
and it really wouldn't matter how many, if the hydrants worked,
or if the reservoir was full, it wouldn't matter. They
would have put out the fire right up there immediately.
(17:27):
All right, more coming up.
Speaker 4 (17:31):
You're listening to John Cobelts on demand from KFI AM
six forty.
Speaker 1 (17:37):
John Cobelt Show I Am six forty Live everywhere on
the iHeartRadio app. We're on every day from one until
four o'clock. After four o'clock John Cobelt Show on demand
on the iHeart app, and you could follow us on
social media at John Cobelt Radio on all the social
media platforms. We're going to talk now with Roger Bailey.
Roger Bailey is one of a team of attorneys representing
(18:00):
thousandths of Palisades residents who got burned out in the fire,
and they're starting to do depositions state Park Reps. They
have texts between State Parks personnel which indicates that the
original fire on January first, and then the Palisades fire
(18:22):
on the seventh, both were in what is called well.
The January first fire created a fire perimeter, and in
that fire perimeter was an avoidance area where they did
not want the plant life disrupted. So when the La
Fire Department went in with bulldozers to build some kind
(18:44):
of fire line for the first fire, that's when they
got chased out by the State Park Reps. And so
the second fire started in the middle of the avoidance area.
And this is actually in the text. Let's get Roger
Bailey on, Roger, how are you?
Speaker 5 (19:00):
I'm doing well, John, how are you?
Speaker 1 (19:03):
Every time you come on, I want to say, I
just don't believe this, but tell us you're now doing depositions.
Are these texts part of the the the document drop
for the depositions.
Speaker 5 (19:17):
Yeah, actually, I'm I'm actually on the way back from
a deposition right now. We've got several of them scheduled
over the next several days. And the documents that we're
getting for the depositions include the text messages that you
see and the area avoidance map that I've sent over.
You may remember last time I was on the state
(19:39):
didn't give us those maps. Right, we knew where the
Palisades fire started, and we said, I wonder if the
reason they didn't give us those maps is because the
Palisades fire started in one of these areas that's off
limits to firefighters. And lo and behold when we got
the map showing where the firefighters were not allowed to go,
that's right where the Palisades fire started.
Speaker 1 (20:00):
Ray Lopez, my producer, just handed me a couple of
the text Can I read them to the audience because
I have not read these out loud. I just got
there and this is the night of the first fire,
January first, two, three am. And it says, Hi, Christy,
are you at the fire? And Christi writes back, I
(20:22):
will be. I'm getting ready now. There is Federal Endangered
s Astragalus along timescal fire road would be nice to
avoid cutting it if possible. Do you have avoidance maps?
I have a couple of RIA ds on standby. I'll
wait to deploy them until you get unseen and assess
(20:43):
the situation. Definitely want to send them down if heavy
equipment arrives. And Christie wrights back. Well, yeah, Christi writes back, Okay,
I'll let you know. So I guess she was the
state fire State Parks representative that we know started getting
(21:04):
in the way of the LA Fire Department and she
was being told to look at the avoidance map because
you've got this astrogallus plant that has to be protected.
Speaker 5 (21:16):
That's right. That plant is also known as the milk vetch.
That's it, Yes, the milk vetch. So that maybe the
name you know more than the astrogallas, but it's the
milk vetch.
Speaker 1 (21:29):
That's yeah. That was identified by in the LA time
stories early on, the milk bitch. Right, Yes, that's right,
got it? This is all true.
Speaker 5 (21:39):
Yes, So so these avoidance areas are designated by the
state park to protect, among other things, plant species, and
they make these maps available to the firefighters, and they
also have these RAA ds are called resource advisors, and
(22:00):
they go up there and they interact with the firefighters
to say, well, here, here's the map, here's where you
can't go, can't use have the equipment over here. Their
own operations manual says that, so everything that we had
been hearing is now being confirmed with these documents.
Speaker 1 (22:19):
So the fire department couldn't use the bulldozers to create
a fire break.
Speaker 5 (22:25):
Right there. The state's policy. Now remember, once this was
determined to be the Lockman fire, the January one fire.
Once that was determined to be burning on state land,
the LAFD calls for a state park repticum and that's
where you see, you know, Christy sayings, he's on route.
And when they get there, their their job is to
(22:47):
interact with the firefighters. And then these raa ds come
in and make sure that these protected plants aren't disturbed
as a result of a firefight or the mop up.
And so you know you've got and by the way,
the state park reps also saw smoldering it the smoke
(23:09):
coming from the hills, and said, oh okay, well the
smoke coming from the hills, should we do anything about it?
They didn't do anything about it. It's their land. That's after
the fire is declared contained. Smoke's coming out of the ground,
and nobody closes the park. Nobody's up there to see
how bad it is.
Speaker 1 (23:24):
Oh, it just can't be. And this is in the
middle of the National Weather Service issuing all these extreme
fire warnings and extreme wind warnings.
Speaker 5 (23:36):
That's right. We were told days before the Palisades fire
that these heavy winds were coming. And if you've got
smoke coming out of the ground in a recent burn scar,
that would be your first clue that there may be
a risk of rekindling. So you'd want to be up
there making sure that didn't happen, or having crews on
(23:56):
standby right there in case it happened. Well, we know
it did happened. Atf confirmed the Palisades fire was a
rekindling of embers smoldering in the ground after the Lockman fire,
So we know it happened. And now we know that
the state had areas that it wouldn't allow the firefighters
to go with their heavy equipment to protect this milk
(24:17):
vetch plant. And that's exactly where the Palistaates fire starts.
Speaker 1 (24:23):
What because I've talked with a number of people about
this and they always say, well, why was the milk
vetch plant so important? What do you know why they
were so bent on protecting this no matter how dangerous
the conditions were.
Speaker 5 (24:40):
I didn't know what a milk vetch was until this case,
but I've looked into it and it's a it's an
endangered plant species, but from what I can tell, interestingly,
it proliferates after wildfires. God, so yeah, I don't know.
Speaker 2 (25:00):
Smart.
Speaker 5 (25:00):
Look, I'll say, I'm all for you know, let's protect
the environment, but you've got to balance in the public safety.
You've got houses right next to this burn scar. I mean,
there's neighborhoods, hundreds and thousands of people, and why you
wouldn't consider their safety over the milk fetch plant is
beyond me.
Speaker 1 (25:19):
Is it reasonable for people to think that if the
only fire department was allowed to do its mop up
and treat that hot spot and do the bulldozing and
any other treatment treatment protocol that they have that then
the Palus States would not have burned the way it burned.
Speaker 5 (25:43):
Well, that's one part of it. But here's the second part.
And I know we talked about this last time. The
state's own Operations Manual says, and I quote, where areas
of a park unit have burned, those areas shall remain
closed and hill appropriate State Department staff have inspected the
(26:03):
area and rectified any public safety issues. So even after
the laf they leaves, assuming they had been able to
do everything they wanted to do. The state's owned Policy
and Operations manual says, you need to be up there,
close the park, and when you got smoke coming out
of the hills that your reps can see, you should
be up there and rectifying the public safety issues. So
(26:25):
had followed their own operations manual, palistaates fire wouldn't have happened.
Speaker 1 (26:31):
Wow, Oh, that's just so crazy.
Speaker 5 (26:33):
It's stunning, And I mean it's stunning every day. When
you can't you think it can't get more bizarre, it
gets more bizarre.
Speaker 1 (26:41):
And you're only at the beginning of these depositions, right The.
Speaker 5 (26:44):
First one was today, and we've got sixteen more lined up,
you know, up through Christmas.
Speaker 1 (26:51):
Can you hang on for a moment, you bet, all right.
Roger Bailey, he's the one of the attorneys for the
thousands of Palisades owners who got burned out in the fire.
And yeah, you're hearing this right in order to save
the milkvetch plant. The State Parks Department, said representatives. The
night of the first fire, it was still burning to
(27:14):
make sure that the milkvetch plant, which is endangered, wasn't destroyed.
And that's why the LA Fire Department was prevented from
doing the cleanup the next day. The mop up and
buildoze to create a fire break and to try to
tamp down the smoldering and the smoking and the hot
rocks and the hot tree stumps and the whole bit.
And the state was supposed to close that park area
(27:36):
and if they saw any action coming from this fire,
they were supposed to take care of it too with CalFire.
And then this doesn't happen. Oh my god, this is
so bad. This is so bad. Okay, we've got more
coming up on the John Cobelt Show.
Speaker 4 (27:50):
You're listening to John Cobelts on demand from KFI Am sixty.
Speaker 1 (27:56):
John Coblet Show, I Am six forty Live everywhere the
iHeartRadio app were on every day from one until four
o'clock and then after four o'clock John Cobilt's Show on
demand Right now more with Roger Bailey, The attorney along
with others representing thousands of Palisades residents. And the big
bombshell today is they're starting depositions of California State Parks employees.
(28:20):
There are texts they've gotten a hold of, and the
night of the first fly fire on January first, they
were already sending down a State Parks rep to make
sure that the milk vetch plant wasn't destroyed by LA
Fire Department or anybody else. And that's why they didn't
do a fire break. That's why they didn't tamp down
the hot spot with the smouldering and the hot rocks,
(28:41):
and that's where the fire then reignited, rekindled and became
the Palisades fire Roger. What else are you looking for
as you go through these depositions? I think you've got
the milk Vetch story here, or at least you know
enough to lead, because I know as you get more
(29:01):
testimony you're going to go down other roads. What's one
of your targets here? What do you want to know
on behalf of your clients?
Speaker 5 (29:09):
Well, as I said before the break, the State's own
Operations Manual has a section that requires It's not optional.
It requires closure of any area of the state park
that has burned, and it's to remain closed until state
(29:29):
park representatives have been up and inspected the property. Take
the issues, and what we haven't heard yet from any
state park representative is why was the park not closed?
They've confirmed it wasn't closed because you clearly had the
Lockman fire that burned to Panka State Park State park land.
(29:50):
Why was the park not closed? Number one? Number two?
Why did the state not send its own inspectors up
there to check for the hotspots that were reported and
were videotaped by members of the public. You know, members
of the public were walking through this area days after
the Lockman fire videoing smoldering embers and smoke coming out
(30:15):
of the ground, so we know there's something not right.
So why we want to know did the state not
get up there, close the park as its own manual
requires and then dispatch inspectors, their own inspectors that go
up and make sure we didn't have the risk of
a rekindling. We know we had a rick kindling and
(30:37):
it could have been prevented. They followed their own manual
right and.
Speaker 1 (30:40):
Then send in firefighters state firefighters to take care of
the hotspots.
Speaker 5 (30:48):
Yeah, well right, send anybody in, But first to you,
as the landowner, state, you should go up there and
check your land and make sure that risk isn't there
and if you find it, because it was there, if
you were there, you would have seen it. Send somebody,
send cow fire, send LAFD back, whatever, but get up
there and do something. But there was nobody up there
(31:09):
for days before the Palisades fire reignited.
Speaker 1 (31:11):
Is this incompetence laziness? I mean, I can't imagine a
good reason for not doing what's a mandatory in their manual.
Speaker 5 (31:21):
Yeah, we're asking the same questions, and as yet there's
been no answer. The answer we were given by the
state initially was well, LAFD declared the Lockman fire fully contained. Okay, great.
What about your manual that says after the fire has burned,
you close the park and get up there and inspect it.
(31:42):
No answer to that question, and I'm eager to hear it,
because I think had they followed their own manual and
eliminated this dangerous condition of the smoldering embers, there would
be no Palisades fire. You wouldn't have had twelve people
die and seven thousand structures burned down.
Speaker 1 (31:59):
And who makes that decision to close the park and
then send the inspectors in? Is that come from the
go ahead?
Speaker 5 (32:07):
It comes from somebody within the state, and from what
we know as of today, it's somebody up in the
management above the rangers. But their manual and the rangers
are all familiar with the operations manual and they're aware
that when and they said, yeah, we know that when
you have a fire, you close the park. But why
(32:27):
this particular fire didn't prompt them to close the park
and go up there and inspect is anybody's guests. We
have no idea, but that's one of the you want
Roger there there and checked for dangerous conditions on its land.
Speaker 1 (32:45):
Yeah, And newsome As first denied that the state had
any knowledge that this fire was going on the night
of January first.
Speaker 4 (32:53):
Yeah, that's uh.
Speaker 5 (32:54):
You know, he gave an interview back in the springtime
where he first said that the power let's say it's
fire ignited on federal land. Well, we know that's not
true because the audio recordings we obtained of those nine
to one one calls and then the radio communications between CalFire,
I mean, the State park dispatch in Laft confirming, Hey,
(33:16):
this fire lackman's burning on state park property, so no
federal property involvement. And yes, we now know that the
state was notified twenty seven minutes after midnight on January one,
right after midnight New Year's Eve, the state got a
call there's a fire burning on your land. So they
knew about it. They dispatched several park rangers. At least
(33:40):
one of those rangers and potentially others. When we depose
them in the next few days, we'll say we saw
smoke coming out of the ground. That's what we heard today.
State park ranger was up there and saw smoke coming
out of the ground after the fire department had left.
Speaker 1 (33:53):
Roger, thank you for coming on with us, and as
you have information that you can give us, please come
back on and we'll keep we'll keep adding to the story.
Speaker 5 (34:03):
Absolutely happy to do it all right.
Speaker 1 (34:05):
Roger Bailey, one of the attorneys representing the thousands of
Palisade residents. I cannot imagine the pain and anger and
frustration that these people are feeling. I mean, I've got
the text messages here from one employee. Hi, Christy, are
you at the fire? This is two three am. Wednesday morning,
(34:26):
January first, and Christie writes, I will be I'm getting
ready now and I believe she showed up at about
four am. And this other employee said, there is federally
endangered astrogalls along the Tmescal fire road. That's the milkvetch plant.
Would be nice to avoid cutting it if possible. Do
you have avoidance maps? And there are photos of the
(34:49):
avoidance maps and the original fire and its perimeter, and
the new fire started in the area that these these
forty park reps were told to avoid and to make
sure that Ala Fire Department avoided this area. So no bulldozers,
which means they didn't stamp out the remnants of the fire,
(35:12):
the smoldering and the hot rocks and all that for
the milkvetch plant. For the milkvetch plant. Okay, we've got
more coming up on The John Cobelt Show. Hey, you've
been listening to The John Cobalt Show podcast. You can
always hear the show live on KFI Am six forty
from one to four pm every Monday through Friday, and
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