June 23, 2025 • 32 mins
In this episode of One Thing Trump Did, what now after President Trump ordered strikes on Iran's nuclear program, bringing the US into another foreign war? Jeremy is joined by Kenneth Pollack, Vice President for Policy at The Middle East Institute and author of a number of books about Iran. #Iran #nuclear #nukes #Israel #war #bombing #Fordow #Khamenei
See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:15):
Welcome to One Thing Trump did, available exclusively on the
Middle Podcast Feed. I'm Jeremy Hobson. This is a special
addition as we respond to the news of the US
strikes on Iran. The decision to get the US involved
militarily in the conflicts has already been called one of
the most if not the most consequential decisions President Trump
(00:35):
has ever made.
Speaker 2 (00:36):
A short time ago, the US military carried out massive
precision strikes on the three key nuclear facilities in the
Iranian regime for Doau, Natanz, and Sfahan. Everybody heard those
names for years as they built this horribly destructive enterprise.
(01:00):
Our objective was the destruction of a range nuclear irichment
capacity and a stop to the nuclear threat posed by
the world's number one state sponsor of terror. Tonight I
can report to the world that the strikes were a
spectacular military success.
Speaker 1 (01:19):
The strikes were surprised not just in Iran but around
the world, including here in the United States, where many
Americans are asking why the US is getting involved in
this war that was between Israel and Iran. Joining me
now is Ken Pollock, Vice president for Policy at the
Middle East Institute and author of a number of books
on this subject, including Unthinkable, Iran, The Bomb, and American Strategy.
Speaker 3 (01:41):
Ken Pollack, Welcome, Thanks so much for having me on Jeremy.
Speaker 1 (01:45):
So people are still processing what's happened in the last
few days. Were you surprised by these air strikes on
Iran's nuclear facilities by the United States?
Speaker 3 (01:56):
Good question, Yeah, maybe a little bit. Look, you know,
Donald Trump is very unpredictable, and obviously I was following
this very closely. Initially it seemed like he was leaning
towards striking that it seemed like he was leaning against
and then of course he attacked, you know, So no,
it didn't completely surprise me, but maybe a little bit.
(02:19):
But again, I've just learned that with Donald Trump, you
learned to expect the unexpected.
Speaker 1 (02:24):
But as you've been studying this for so many years
and even decades, this has been something that many presidents
could have done when it comes to the nuclear program
in Iran, but they didn't do it. So what are
the immediate consequences of the US actually doing something like this.
Speaker 3 (02:42):
Well, look, first, you're right, this is something a lot
of presidents have looked at and more or less all said,
you know, don't want to do it. Way too risky.
We should also note this is a situation where a
lot of Israeli Prime ministers, including Benjamin Netanyahu, have looked
at in the past and also said don't want to
do it right in terms of the consequences. Either are
two broad sets of issues out there that we need
(03:05):
to be thinking about. One I think we are thinking
about already. People are very focused on that. That is
the question of Iranian retaliation. Are they going to come
after our forces in the region, Do they go after
our Gulf allies, do they attack oil exports from the region.
This is an important set of considerations. Absolutely talk about that,
(03:26):
and I think it's good that we're focused on I'll
say I'm less concerned about that though than I am
with the other set, where I don't really think we're
focused enough, and that is the long term consequences, and
in particular whether these strikes, the Israeli and now American
strikes lead to this Iranian regime never getting a nuclear weapon,
(03:49):
or whether they assure us that this regime is going
to get nuclear weapons. Right. The big issue out there
is they have now been attacked. They've been attacked by Israel,
They've been attacked by America. There are a lot of Iranians,
a lot of Iranian leaders who've always wanted a nuclear weapon,
and they're going to now be in a position to say,
this is why we need nuclear weapons, because the Americans
(04:12):
and Israelis would never dare to attack us if we
have them. And this is what we've seen with other
instances like that in places like Iraq and Iran itself,
we're attacking the nuclear program can become an incentive for
them to go and get nuclear weapons.
Speaker 1 (04:28):
So you think that the attack happened because the US
and I guess Israel are sure that they don't already
have a nuclear weapon at this point, but that they
were getting so close that these countries decided we've got
to do this now so that they don't get one.
Speaker 3 (04:45):
Exactly Everyone is quite confident that Iran does not have
nuclear weapons. I think that is exactly right. The Israelis
have been worried about Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon for
at least thirty years. I think it's clear that Prime
Minister Natagna, who felt like he had a window of opportunity,
there was just a harmonic convergence of a lot of
(05:08):
different things that made in Israeli strike easier, better, less
risky than would any other time. I think that's why
he went ahead and did it. And I think that
once the Israeli started it, then President Trump began thinking
about whether he wanted to join in. And that's effectively
what I think has happened.
Speaker 1 (05:27):
But it did look, as you said, like he was
not going to do that. He said there's going to
be a two week pause. You know, there are a
lot of voices that came out and said, we don't
want to get involved in this war. This is Israel's fight,
this is either Even Tucker Carlson on the right had
that very famous interview with Ted Cruz where he went
after him for suggesting that the US get involved in
(05:48):
something like this. So why do you think the president
just ignored those calls and decided to go for it.
Speaker 3 (05:57):
So at first point I'll make Jeremy is I'm an
old intelligence analyst. I began my career at CIA, and
you know, we're taught to look for indicators and warnings
that things are going to happen. And for me, one
indicator that President Trump was planning to do this was
certainly thinking very hard about doing it was when he
went after Tucker Carlson, Right. The fact that he was
(06:18):
so dismissive of Tucker's complaints suggested to me that he
really was interested in doing this. As to why he
ultimately did it, and it's very hard to say, because
you got to get into the head of another person.
And you know, Donald Trump is he well, he's not
quite Sue generous, but he thinks about things very differently
(06:38):
from myself. You know. I think that there was certainly
an element of, you know, he saw the Israelis waging
this incredible military campaign, right. The Israelis are tactically brilliant
when it comes to military operations. They were doing all
of this stuff. They were getting tremendous credit for their skill,
(06:58):
their creativity, the power that they were demonstrating, right, And
this is something that all these things are things that
I think Donald Trump really admires. He too wants to
be seen as powerful, He too wants to be seen
as skillful and creative. And I think that he wanted
a piece of that. I think that, you know, there's
also the elements of he wanted to deal with the Iranians.
(07:20):
He wanted that before the Israelis attacked, and I suspect
that he also believed that by joining in this war,
he either would be able to get rid of Iran's
nuclear programs as a problem for the United States and
the Middle East, or perhaps open things up to getting
the deal that he's always wanted. And I think that that,
I will say, I think that that prospect is still
(07:42):
out there. But this is definitely complicated that diplomatic situation.
Speaker 1 (07:49):
Iran sent its foreign minister to Moscow to ask Vladimir
Putin for more help after the US strikes. Howard countries
including Russia and China involved in what's happening right now.
Speaker 3 (08:02):
So what's been most noteworthy so far, Jeremy, is the
fact that they really haven't been The Chinese and the
Russians are both complaining, but they're not doing anything. And
the truth is they, certainly the Chinese others don't really
have much ability to do anything. The Chinese trade a
lot with the Middle East, they buy a lot of
its oil. They don't have much ability to affect these circumstances.
(08:25):
They certainly don't have the military capability to intervene there.
They don't have much ability to stop the United States
or Israel for that matter, Russia is a more interesting question, right,
And for Russia, they both have a very close relationship
to Iran, but so does China. But what's most interesting
and important about Russia is Vladimir Putin's relationship with Donald Trump.
(08:49):
This is a relationship that I don't think any of
us really understands or can really explain. I've heard any
number of people offer different explanations for exactly what is
going on there. All we can really say is that
Donald Trump seems to be quite close to Vladimir Putin,
seems to respect the man, to admire him, to feel
(09:10):
a certain kinship with him. And again, we don't know
what it is, but there is a degree of influence
there between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. But Vladimir Putin
seems to have a lot of influence on Donald Trump,
and I think that's really what the Iranians are looking for.
Would they like some military assistance, sure, Would they like
the Russians to threaten the United States, Sure, But I
(09:32):
don't think that they are expecting any of that. Russia
is tied up with its own war in Ukraine that
is taxing its military as it is, Russia has no
real ability to threaten in the United States at this
point in time. The one thing that Russia has is
Vladimir Putin's ability to convince Donald Trump to do things
that he probably otherwise wouldn't. I think that's what the
(09:53):
Iranians are trying to do, is get Putin to use
whatever voodoo he's got to get Trump to back off.
Speaker 1 (10:00):
But on that note, I would assume that Russia was
not happy to hear about the strikes against Iran by
the United States.
Speaker 3 (10:07):
No, absolutely not. Russia never likes it when the United
States uses its military power, just as we don't like
it when Russia uses its own. And of course Russia
condemned it, called it illegal, which of course is a
bit rich from a country that has been attacking Ukraine
for the last three years.
Speaker 1 (10:26):
You mentioned some of the other things that you may
be worried about in the more short term in terms
of Iran's retaliation. One of the things that's been talked
about is closing the Strait of Hormuz, which is a
big oil shipping route. Who would lose the most if
Iran did that? And do you think Iran would do that,
because it's not just the United States that would be
(10:48):
hurt by something like that.
Speaker 3 (10:50):
Sure, so who loses the most? We all do, Okay.
The Straight of Hormuz is absolutely critical to the global economy,
and every country in the world is linked to the
local economy, starting with the United States of America. If
there is a shutdown of the Strait of Horror moves
for a long period of time, oil prices will soar,
(11:13):
and it will cripple all of our economies. As you're
pointing out though, Jeremy, it also cripples Iran's economy. Right.
Our economy is dependent on oil because of transportation, because
everything ultimately depended on that, petrochemicals, plastics, a whole variety
of other things. Iran is dependent on its oil exports
(11:33):
for sixty to seventy percent of its government revenue, right,
in addition to communications, transportation, everything else. So the Irion's
losing a big way. Even more important than that, the
Iranians seem to understand that if they shut down the
Strait of Horror Muz, pretty much the entire world is
going to turn against their regime overnight because of the
impact it will have on everyone's economy. I think there
(11:57):
is a high expectation in Tehran which is the place
for this matters that the United States would immediately begin
a massive military operation to reopen the strait, and wars
are unpredictable. We can never be certain about this, but
especially given the incredibly incompetence of Iranian military forces that
(12:18):
we've seen in their fight against Israel over the last
several weeks. So you can pitch it back to April
of last year and say over months, right, it seems
highly likely that the United States will be able to obliterate,
if I can use that word. Iran's military forces in
and around the Strait of Horror moves in a matter
of weeks, and so the Strait gets reopened and Iran
(12:41):
loses that military power as well.
Speaker 1 (12:44):
Speaking of obliterating, do you think that we know whether
the strikes were actually effective in obliterating Iran's nuclear capabilities.
Speaker 3 (12:53):
Yeah, I'm really glad you asked that, Jeremy, because I'm
quite concerned about this. Yes. President Trump used the word
obliterated when talking about the three Iranian nuclear facilities that
the United States bombed on Saturday evening. You've had the
Pentagon come in with a more restraint but nonetheless very
(13:15):
positive assessment of the amount of damage that was done.
And look the two of the facilities in Naton and
s Fahn. I'm quite convinced that we did do a
tremendous amount of damage there. There weren't terribly well protected,
certainly not protected the way that the third site, Ferdo
was protected. And there I again, I'm an old intel analyst,
(13:37):
I also served at the White House. I want to
know why the US government is being so optimistic in
its battle damage assessment. I looked at the satellite imagery,
you know, I see a couple of holes, and I
see some shifted surface earth. I don't see anything that
tells me for sure that this deep underground facility that
(13:59):
is also insulated with enormous amounts of concrete and steel,
that this thing has been obliterated or even severely damaged.
I want to know how we know that. Is this
based on modeling, is this based on other intelligences? Is
based on Israeli human sources? Until the government explains why
(14:20):
it is so confident, I'm skeptical. You know, President Trump
likes to call everything he does a wild success and
then insists that his administration back him up on that.
On this one, I'm from Missouri. You got to show me.
Speaker 1 (14:37):
Do you think that Israel and the United States are
on the same page at this point, because after the
strikes by the US, Trump said Iran better not retaliate,
it was time for peace. But then since then there
have been more Israeli strikes on Iran.
Speaker 3 (14:49):
Yeah, this is a great question, Jeremy, because I think
you're right that there's actually a lot more daylight between
the United States and Israel than either government wants to
let on. First of all, the Israelis want to make
sure that they have completely obliterated the Iranian nuclear program.
They also want to take out as much of Iran's
(15:11):
ballistic missile capability as they possibly can, and they are
looking to kill as many of Iran's military leaders and
weapons scientists as they possibly can to really set back
this program as much as it is possible for them
to do so, in part because I think that they
are concerned that they won't necessarily get another shot like
(15:33):
this in the future. I think it's very clear the
Trump administration wants this thing to end pretty quickly. They're
really focused on the nuclear issue. They're not particularly concerned
about anything else beyond it, and what the President is
really focused on is ending the program, being able to
say he ended it, whether it's by his strikes or
(15:54):
by a deal. That's what he's focused on. And even then,
let's also remember the Israelis are very, very concerned about
Iran's actions in the region. You know, the Iranians have
been waging a war against them across the region. The US.
I think the trumpdministration is somewhat concerned about that, but
it's not a priority for that. In fact, I could
(16:16):
make an argument, I think that there is some evidence
already we'll find out more after the fact that part
of the reason that Israel decided to do the strike,
and to do it before the Trump administration's diplomacy had
fully played out, is because they were nervous that the
Trump administration was about to sign a deal with Iran
which would satisfy America's concerns but not necessarily Israel.
Speaker 1 (16:40):
Well, stay with us, because when we come back, we're
going to talk about how this conflict could further escalate,
what it would mean for US involvement. One thing Trump
did with Middle East Institute Vice president of policy Ken
Pollock will be right back. Welcome back to one thing
(17:19):
Trump did exclusively on the Middle Podcast Feed. I'm Jeremy Hobson.
This episode, we're talking about Iran following the US strikes
on the country's nuclear program, and I'm joined by Ken Pollack,
vice president of Policy with the Middle East Institute.
Speaker 3 (17:33):
Ken Pollack.
Speaker 1 (17:34):
Trump made some more headlines, as he often does after
the strikes, when he started talking about regime change and
whether that could be a good idea. What did you
think about that?
Speaker 3 (17:45):
So I'm going to put it this way, Jeremy. Again,
I don't know what is in President From's mind, and
again he clearly thinks about these things very very differently
from me, So I need to be careful here. That said,
I'm going to give him credit and say I think
that what he's trying to do is what the US
needs to do at this point in time, and it's
(18:06):
very very hard to do. This is where you need
outstanding diplomats. What the US needs to do right now
is to simultaneously convince the Iranian regime that we're not
pursuing regime change now, but we could shift and pursue
regime change if the Iranians don't do what we want
(18:29):
them to do, which is stop shooting at Israel and
agree to give up their nuclear program completely and allow
inspectors to do everything that they need to do in
perpetuity so that we can be certain that they won't
rebuild their nuclear program. Right, That's what needs to happen now.
The US needs to convince Roan to do those things,
(18:49):
and that's really hard. That's where you'd like someone like
a Jim Baker or a George Schultz or a Dean Atchison,
some outstanding diplomat who could go in to negotiate in
this very very subtle way, using reassurance and threat to
move the Iranians to where we need them to be.
(19:09):
I think that's what President Trump is trying to do.
He's just doing it in his own fashion, which quite
frankly makes me very uncomfortable, because he's a much more
direct speaker, much more prone to bragadocio as opposed to
the subtlety that I think that we need now.
Speaker 1 (19:29):
Well, And wouldn't regime change necessarily mean there would have
to be US boots on the ground.
Speaker 3 (19:36):
So again, this is part of the problem. And I
think you're you know, you're you're getting at part of
the issue, and it's something that a lot of Americans
are very concerned about, myself included. You know, nobody wants
the United States invading Iran. I once used the line
that you know, if you like the Iraq War, you're
going to love the Iran war, because Iran is three
times the population, four times the land mass, and five
(19:57):
times the problems that Iraq had.
Speaker 2 (20:00):
Right.
Speaker 3 (20:01):
But nonetheless, we've got to get the Iranians to realize
and we've got to get them to believe that there
is something worse for them if they try to get
a nuclear weapon at this point in time. And the
one thing that is very clear that the Iranian leadership
cares about even more than their nuclear program are their
own lives and they're hold on power, right, and so
(20:24):
we have to be able to convince them, to threaten
them that that would be at risk if they pursue
nuclear weapons. Even while it's clear that there's really nobody
here in the United States that would be willing to
go that last mile that you're talking about of mounting
an invasion, which is the only way for certain that
you could change the regime in Iran. That said, there's
(20:45):
certainly stuff that we and the Israelis and the Israelis
are clearly signaling this, but they're doing it in a
much more subtle way than the United States is signaling
that they have ways to kill key regime figures, potentially
including Ayatolahamine well.
Speaker 1 (20:59):
And speaking of a hold on power that Iran's regime has,
what do we know about how the people in Iran
feel at this point about what is going on? We
know it's a police state, we know that they're very
repressive regime. But do you sense any possible uprising on
behalf of the people saying, you know what, get rid
(21:20):
of the nuclear program or anything like that.
Speaker 3 (21:24):
Yeah, So, to give you a brief answer to a
fantastic question that really requires a really long answer, Jeremy,
you're right, it is a police state. Therefore, we have
to be very careful about what we say about Iranian
public opinion. We do not have great sources. Second point,
it's been clear for years that there are a lot
of Iranians who do not like their government. You know,
(21:47):
basically every two to four years since nineteen ninety nine,
you've had a huge segment of the Iranian population try
to rise up and overthrow their government. There's obviously another
segment that is happy with the government. It supports the government,
but there are a lot of our audience who are
unhappy with it. But a couple of problems. First, when
people get bombed, they tend to get angry at the
(22:09):
people bombing them, not so much their own leaders. It
takes a long time for people to come to the
conclusion that, you know what, this is really the fault
of our leaders for going down this path and bringing
the bombing on us. You know, world War two, every
country hoped that their bombing campaign would have that impact,
and what we found was it took a long time
(22:31):
and an enormous amount of bombing and damage to really
push people that point. The truth of the matter is
that Germans and Japanese, even to the end of the war,
most of them were angry at the Allies, much more
so than their own government. And this is the problem.
And then the last thing is again, this regime has
demonstrated a tremendous ability to keep control over a population
(22:54):
that clearly wants it gone. So actually achieving regime change,
especially by bombing alone, would be a very tall order.
Speaker 1 (23:03):
What do you make of the I guess relative silence
from other countries that would be US allies in a conflict.
I mean, we remember that, you know, the coalition of
the willing in the Iraq War, and even a much
bigger coalition in the fight in Afghanistan. What do you
think about the fact that we haven't heard much support
from you know, our typical allies in Europe and North
(23:26):
America and other parts of the world.
Speaker 3 (23:28):
Sure, another great question. So I think what you can
take away from that is that they are both conflicted
and frightened. First of all, I mean big difference between
either the Iraqi so the US invasion of Iraq or
the Persian Gulf War of nineteen ninety ninety one. The
United States isn't bringing tens of thousands of troops into
the region, you know, saying this is going to be
(23:49):
a massive effort in which we will protect you. So
they're frightened. They're frightened of how Iran might respond. They're
not entirely certain of how the uniteds how much the
United States will tech them. They also, let's recognize at
one level, they like what Israel has done. They hate
the Iranians. They're afraid of the Iranians. They like seeing
Iranian military power destroyed degraded, but you know, they're always
(24:14):
nervous about the Israelis too, and the ability of the
Israelis to just act freely in this kind of a fashion.
It leaves many of them asking, g at what point
in time might the Israelis decide to do that against us?
Well beyond that, you know, again take that point, Take
both those points. They hate the Iranians, but they're also
kind of nervous about the Israelis, And you know, at
(24:36):
the end of the day, they're also nervous about how
Iran is going to retaliate. They're nervous about what that
will cause the Israelis to do. None of them wants
to become a battle ground in a war between Israel
and Iran and now the United States. Most of them
are hoping that this whole thing is just going to
go away and not involve them.
Speaker 1 (24:56):
I have to think that there are a lot of
Americans who feel that way too, that they just want
to Okay, wait, I didn't vote for this, I didn't
want this to happen, and I just would like it
to be resolved quickly. What do you think about public
support in the United States right now?
Speaker 3 (25:09):
Yeah, so I think you know, I'll be interested to
see the first polls when they come out, but my
guess is that you're right that people are conflicted as well.
You know, typically when the United States employees military force
and essocially, when none of our people get killed, and
when it looks like we're being successful, typically the president
gets a rally around the flag effect. Most Americans are patriotic,
(25:30):
they want to support the president. I think many Americans
also recognize that the Iranian regime is odious, right, and
they have declared us their enemy. And I've been trying
to harm us for forty six years, right. They've killed
at least a thousand Americans that I can think of,
So I don't think there's a whole lot of love
for the Iranian regime. By the same token, I think
(25:50):
you're also right that right now, most Americans aren't looking
for another war in the Middle East. And I think
that's why President Trump is doing things the way that
he's doing them is he's trying to keep a constant
eye on where his own party, where his own base
and perhaps the larger American population is on this so
he doesn't get two out of step with them.
Speaker 1 (26:11):
Well, and it's been very interesting to see some of
the comments from people that are definitely part of his base,
like Marjorie Taylor Green and even Thomas Massey come out
and say that they're not happy about what's happening there.
Speaker 3 (26:23):
Let me ask you.
Speaker 1 (26:23):
Two more questions. One, how would you de escalate the
situation right now?
Speaker 3 (26:31):
Again, I think the key is that. I mean, first,
the Israelis are going to finish their aerial campaign. I
don't think there's going to be anyone who's going to
stop them. I think would take a lot to get
the United States to stop them. And again, I don't
think that the Trump administration wants to pick that fight
with the Israelis anytime soon, but I think that very
(26:52):
soon the US is going to have to go to
the Israelis and say, okay, guys, time to wrap it up,
and they're The big question mark is, first, what of
the wrong is done already? Right? There is this potential
for escalation. We talked about it briefly. I think the
Iranians are going to feel the need to retaliate against us.
They're certainly going to keep shooting at the Israelis. So
a big question mark is what do they do to us?
(27:13):
Are we able to just ignore it, which would probably
be the best thing of all. Can the Israelis too, say, well,
you know what, Iran's retaliation is getting less and less
and less over time. It's really become a nothing burger.
We can basically just declare victory and go home. Those
are the ideal circumstances. If that doesn't happen, then we
get into one of these situations where we're escalating to
(27:34):
de escalate. That's a really terrible path. Let's not even
talk about that right now. But that is a danger
out there. But assuming that the Israelis completed their mission,
the Iranian retaliation both against US and the Israelis is
not terribly damaging. Is more symbolic, and by the way,
I think it's important to understand, I think that's a
(27:55):
very real possibility out there, even probability. What we've seen
from Iran's leader, Ayatola al Khamane, what we've seen from
him over the years, is he is both a strategic
thinker and a prudent decision maker. Right he is capable
of saying, you know what, I can't win this fight,
and so it doesn't make sense for me to keep fighting,
(28:17):
right and that's we all got a hope. But at
that moment in time, as I've said to you several
times now, the real key is the long term. How
do we prevent this regime from doing what would probably
be natural to them, which is to say, well, look,
not having a nuclear weapon clearly didn't work for us.
It invited these attacks by the Israelis and the Americans.
(28:39):
The only way we can defend ourselves in the future
is to go ahead and get a nuclear weapon. That's
what we've got to prevent them from doing. And I
think the best way to do that is to simultaneously
go to them and you know, diplomatically assure them we're
not looking for regime change. Now, provide them with some
positive inducements. The President has been clear willing to lift
(28:59):
this sanctions if Iran agrees to give up its nuclear
program altogether agree to far reaching inspections so we can
be sure that they're never going to cheat on it.
But then there also has to be the subtle threat
that if Iran doesn't agree to do that, that the
(29:20):
US and Israel would escalate to something like regime change.
I think it's going to take and that's going to
be very very hard. As I said, that's going to
take the skill of a Kissinger or a Bismarck. I
hope that the Trump administration proves to have negotiators who
are capable of that.
Speaker 1 (29:37):
Let me finally ask you, Ken Pollock. You had mentioned
that Iran is much bigger than Iraq or Afghanistan. Ninety
million people in Iran. What is just one or two
things that Americans should know about the country of Iran
that you've been studying for so long.
Speaker 3 (29:56):
What should we know about Iran? Sure, just a couple
of quick I mean, Iranians are extremely proud of their
own culture, of their society. They regard themselves as one
of the world's great civilizations. Right. These are the descendants
of the Persian Empire and the Parthian Empire. They ruled
(30:17):
much of Southwest Asia, certainly over the Middle East for
thousands of years, and Iranians, the vast majority of them,
see that as the natural order. They have a very
capable population. They're often very well educated. They're creative. You know,
(30:37):
think about what went into their nuclear program, their ballistic
missile program. You know, this is not necessarily Japan or
Taiwan or the United States, but Nonetheless, it's a talented, creative,
educated population, you know, quite formidable and you know, also
worth understanding. And when we think about the Middle East,
we think of desert Iran. The pulation is overwhelmingly in
(31:01):
the mountains. That makes them very difficult militarily. It also
anthropologists will tell you that people who live in mountains
tend to have very fragmented societies, right, you know, every
mountain valley is its own little thing and very suspicious.
Aver think about mountainous parts of the world, you get
(31:23):
these very Balkanized political systems, whether it's Afghanistan or the
Balkans itself, or you know, heck, Appalachia and Colorado.
Speaker 1 (31:31):
Well, and by the way, I remember hearing about the
island of Crete was one of the most difficult places
for the Nazis in World War Two because in part
because of the mountains and the people that were up
in the mountains exactly.
Speaker 3 (31:43):
And so you get a very fractious, very fragmented political system,
which means it's often kind of tough for them to
build a political coalition to do things right. But it
also means that if you're talking about regime change, you
don't really know what you're getting right. If we went
in there, it would probably be more fragmented, fractious than
(32:03):
what we saw in places like Iraq, be much more
like Afghanistan, which is not a good outcome. It also
means that if this regime falls, it's much harder to
know what would take its place.
Speaker 1 (32:15):
That is Ken Pollack, who's the vice president for policy
at the Middle East Institute. So interesting. Ken, thank you
so much for coming on the show.
Speaker 3 (32:22):
My pleasure, Jeremy, great questions, great being here.
Speaker 1 (32:25):
And thanks to you for listening to one thing Trump did.
It was produced by Harrison Patino. Our next Middle episode
will be in your podcast feed later this week. We'll
be taking your calls about what's happening with Iran. If
you liked the podcast, please rate it write a review.
Our theme music was composed by Noah Haidu. I'm Jeremy Hobson.
Talk to you soon.
Welcome to One Thing Trump did, available exclusively on the
Middle Podcast Feed. I'm Jeremy Hobson. This is a special
addition as we respond to the news of the US
strikes on Iran. The decision to get the US involved
militarily in the conflicts has already been called one of
the most if not the most consequential decisions President Trump
(00:35):
has ever made.
Speaker 2 (00:36):
A short time ago, the US military carried out massive
precision strikes on the three key nuclear facilities in the
Iranian regime for Doau, Natanz, and Sfahan. Everybody heard those
names for years as they built this horribly destructive enterprise.
(01:00):
Our objective was the destruction of a range nuclear irichment
capacity and a stop to the nuclear threat posed by
the world's number one state sponsor of terror. Tonight I
can report to the world that the strikes were a
spectacular military success.
Speaker 1 (01:19):
The strikes were surprised not just in Iran but around
the world, including here in the United States, where many
Americans are asking why the US is getting involved in
this war that was between Israel and Iran. Joining me
now is Ken Pollock, Vice president for Policy at the
Middle East Institute and author of a number of books
on this subject, including Unthinkable, Iran, The Bomb, and American Strategy.
Speaker 3 (01:41):
Ken Pollack, Welcome, Thanks so much for having me on Jeremy.
Speaker 1 (01:45):
So people are still processing what's happened in the last
few days. Were you surprised by these air strikes on
Iran's nuclear facilities by the United States?
Speaker 3 (01:56):
Good question, Yeah, maybe a little bit. Look, you know,
Donald Trump is very unpredictable, and obviously I was following
this very closely. Initially it seemed like he was leaning
towards striking that it seemed like he was leaning against
and then of course he attacked, you know, So no,
it didn't completely surprise me, but maybe a little bit.
(02:19):
But again, I've just learned that with Donald Trump, you
learned to expect the unexpected.
Speaker 1 (02:24):
But as you've been studying this for so many years
and even decades, this has been something that many presidents
could have done when it comes to the nuclear program
in Iran, but they didn't do it. So what are
the immediate consequences of the US actually doing something like this.
Speaker 3 (02:42):
Well, look, first, you're right, this is something a lot
of presidents have looked at and more or less all said,
you know, don't want to do it. Way too risky.
We should also note this is a situation where a
lot of Israeli Prime ministers, including Benjamin Netanyahu, have looked
at in the past and also said don't want to
do it right in terms of the consequences. Either are
two broad sets of issues out there that we need
(03:05):
to be thinking about. One I think we are thinking
about already. People are very focused on that. That is
the question of Iranian retaliation. Are they going to come
after our forces in the region, Do they go after
our Gulf allies, do they attack oil exports from the region.
This is an important set of considerations. Absolutely talk about that,
(03:26):
and I think it's good that we're focused on I'll
say I'm less concerned about that though than I am
with the other set, where I don't really think we're
focused enough, and that is the long term consequences, and
in particular whether these strikes, the Israeli and now American
strikes lead to this Iranian regime never getting a nuclear weapon,
(03:49):
or whether they assure us that this regime is going
to get nuclear weapons. Right. The big issue out there
is they have now been attacked. They've been attacked by Israel,
They've been attacked by America. There are a lot of Iranians,
a lot of Iranian leaders who've always wanted a nuclear weapon,
and they're going to now be in a position to say,
this is why we need nuclear weapons, because the Americans
(04:12):
and Israelis would never dare to attack us if we
have them. And this is what we've seen with other
instances like that in places like Iraq and Iran itself,
we're attacking the nuclear program can become an incentive for
them to go and get nuclear weapons.
Speaker 1 (04:28):
So you think that the attack happened because the US
and I guess Israel are sure that they don't already
have a nuclear weapon at this point, but that they
were getting so close that these countries decided we've got
to do this now so that they don't get one.
Speaker 3 (04:45):
Exactly Everyone is quite confident that Iran does not have
nuclear weapons. I think that is exactly right. The Israelis
have been worried about Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon for
at least thirty years. I think it's clear that Prime
Minister Natagna, who felt like he had a window of opportunity,
there was just a harmonic convergence of a lot of
(05:08):
different things that made in Israeli strike easier, better, less
risky than would any other time. I think that's why
he went ahead and did it. And I think that
once the Israeli started it, then President Trump began thinking
about whether he wanted to join in. And that's effectively
what I think has happened.
Speaker 1 (05:27):
But it did look, as you said, like he was
not going to do that. He said there's going to
be a two week pause. You know, there are a
lot of voices that came out and said, we don't
want to get involved in this war. This is Israel's fight,
this is either Even Tucker Carlson on the right had
that very famous interview with Ted Cruz where he went
after him for suggesting that the US get involved in
(05:48):
something like this. So why do you think the president
just ignored those calls and decided to go for it.
Speaker 3 (05:57):
So at first point I'll make Jeremy is I'm an
old intelligence analyst. I began my career at CIA, and
you know, we're taught to look for indicators and warnings
that things are going to happen. And for me, one
indicator that President Trump was planning to do this was
certainly thinking very hard about doing it was when he
went after Tucker Carlson, Right. The fact that he was
(06:18):
so dismissive of Tucker's complaints suggested to me that he
really was interested in doing this. As to why he
ultimately did it, and it's very hard to say, because
you got to get into the head of another person.
And you know, Donald Trump is he well, he's not
quite Sue generous, but he thinks about things very differently
(06:38):
from myself. You know. I think that there was certainly
an element of, you know, he saw the Israelis waging
this incredible military campaign, right. The Israelis are tactically brilliant
when it comes to military operations. They were doing all
of this stuff. They were getting tremendous credit for their skill,
(06:58):
their creativity, the power that they were demonstrating, right, And
this is something that all these things are things that
I think Donald Trump really admires. He too wants to
be seen as powerful, He too wants to be seen
as skillful and creative. And I think that he wanted
a piece of that. I think that, you know, there's
also the elements of he wanted to deal with the Iranians.
(07:20):
He wanted that before the Israelis attacked, and I suspect
that he also believed that by joining in this war,
he either would be able to get rid of Iran's
nuclear programs as a problem for the United States and
the Middle East, or perhaps open things up to getting
the deal that he's always wanted. And I think that that,
I will say, I think that that prospect is still
(07:42):
out there. But this is definitely complicated that diplomatic situation.
Speaker 1 (07:49):
Iran sent its foreign minister to Moscow to ask Vladimir
Putin for more help after the US strikes. Howard countries
including Russia and China involved in what's happening right now.
Speaker 3 (08:02):
So what's been most noteworthy so far, Jeremy, is the
fact that they really haven't been The Chinese and the
Russians are both complaining, but they're not doing anything. And
the truth is they, certainly the Chinese others don't really
have much ability to do anything. The Chinese trade a
lot with the Middle East, they buy a lot of
its oil. They don't have much ability to affect these circumstances.
(08:25):
They certainly don't have the military capability to intervene there.
They don't have much ability to stop the United States
or Israel for that matter, Russia is a more interesting question, right,
And for Russia, they both have a very close relationship
to Iran, but so does China. But what's most interesting
and important about Russia is Vladimir Putin's relationship with Donald Trump.
(08:49):
This is a relationship that I don't think any of
us really understands or can really explain. I've heard any
number of people offer different explanations for exactly what is
going on there. All we can really say is that
Donald Trump seems to be quite close to Vladimir Putin,
seems to respect the man, to admire him, to feel
(09:10):
a certain kinship with him. And again, we don't know
what it is, but there is a degree of influence
there between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. But Vladimir Putin
seems to have a lot of influence on Donald Trump,
and I think that's really what the Iranians are looking for.
Would they like some military assistance, sure, Would they like
the Russians to threaten the United States, Sure, But I
(09:32):
don't think that they are expecting any of that. Russia
is tied up with its own war in Ukraine that
is taxing its military as it is, Russia has no
real ability to threaten in the United States at this
point in time. The one thing that Russia has is
Vladimir Putin's ability to convince Donald Trump to do things
that he probably otherwise wouldn't. I think that's what the
(09:53):
Iranians are trying to do, is get Putin to use
whatever voodoo he's got to get Trump to back off.
Speaker 1 (10:00):
But on that note, I would assume that Russia was
not happy to hear about the strikes against Iran by
the United States.
Speaker 3 (10:07):
No, absolutely not. Russia never likes it when the United
States uses its military power, just as we don't like
it when Russia uses its own. And of course Russia
condemned it, called it illegal, which of course is a
bit rich from a country that has been attacking Ukraine
for the last three years.
Speaker 1 (10:26):
You mentioned some of the other things that you may
be worried about in the more short term in terms
of Iran's retaliation. One of the things that's been talked
about is closing the Strait of Hormuz, which is a
big oil shipping route. Who would lose the most if
Iran did that? And do you think Iran would do that,
because it's not just the United States that would be
(10:48):
hurt by something like that.
Speaker 3 (10:50):
Sure, so who loses the most? We all do, Okay.
The Straight of Hormuz is absolutely critical to the global economy,
and every country in the world is linked to the
local economy, starting with the United States of America. If
there is a shutdown of the Strait of Horror moves
for a long period of time, oil prices will soar,
(11:13):
and it will cripple all of our economies. As you're
pointing out though, Jeremy, it also cripples Iran's economy. Right.
Our economy is dependent on oil because of transportation, because
everything ultimately depended on that, petrochemicals, plastics, a whole variety
of other things. Iran is dependent on its oil exports
(11:33):
for sixty to seventy percent of its government revenue, right,
in addition to communications, transportation, everything else. So the Irion's
losing a big way. Even more important than that, the
Iranians seem to understand that if they shut down the
Strait of Horror Muz, pretty much the entire world is
going to turn against their regime overnight because of the
impact it will have on everyone's economy. I think there
(11:57):
is a high expectation in Tehran which is the place
for this matters that the United States would immediately begin
a massive military operation to reopen the strait, and wars
are unpredictable. We can never be certain about this, but
especially given the incredibly incompetence of Iranian military forces that
(12:18):
we've seen in their fight against Israel over the last
several weeks. So you can pitch it back to April
of last year and say over months, right, it seems
highly likely that the United States will be able to obliterate,
if I can use that word. Iran's military forces in
and around the Strait of Horror moves in a matter
of weeks, and so the Strait gets reopened and Iran
(12:41):
loses that military power as well.
Speaker 1 (12:44):
Speaking of obliterating, do you think that we know whether
the strikes were actually effective in obliterating Iran's nuclear capabilities.
Speaker 3 (12:53):
Yeah, I'm really glad you asked that, Jeremy, because I'm
quite concerned about this. Yes. President Trump used the word
obliterated when talking about the three Iranian nuclear facilities that
the United States bombed on Saturday evening. You've had the
Pentagon come in with a more restraint but nonetheless very
(13:15):
positive assessment of the amount of damage that was done.
And look the two of the facilities in Naton and
s Fahn. I'm quite convinced that we did do a
tremendous amount of damage there. There weren't terribly well protected,
certainly not protected the way that the third site, Ferdo
was protected. And there I again, I'm an old intel analyst,
(13:37):
I also served at the White House. I want to
know why the US government is being so optimistic in
its battle damage assessment. I looked at the satellite imagery,
you know, I see a couple of holes, and I
see some shifted surface earth. I don't see anything that
tells me for sure that this deep underground facility that
(13:59):
is also insulated with enormous amounts of concrete and steel,
that this thing has been obliterated or even severely damaged.
I want to know how we know that. Is this
based on modeling, is this based on other intelligences? Is
based on Israeli human sources? Until the government explains why
(14:20):
it is so confident, I'm skeptical. You know, President Trump
likes to call everything he does a wild success and
then insists that his administration back him up on that.
On this one, I'm from Missouri. You got to show me.
Speaker 1 (14:37):
Do you think that Israel and the United States are
on the same page at this point, because after the
strikes by the US, Trump said Iran better not retaliate,
it was time for peace. But then since then there
have been more Israeli strikes on Iran.
Speaker 3 (14:49):
Yeah, this is a great question, Jeremy, because I think
you're right that there's actually a lot more daylight between
the United States and Israel than either government wants to
let on. First of all, the Israelis want to make
sure that they have completely obliterated the Iranian nuclear program.
They also want to take out as much of Iran's
(15:11):
ballistic missile capability as they possibly can, and they are
looking to kill as many of Iran's military leaders and
weapons scientists as they possibly can to really set back
this program as much as it is possible for them
to do so, in part because I think that they
are concerned that they won't necessarily get another shot like
(15:33):
this in the future. I think it's very clear the
Trump administration wants this thing to end pretty quickly. They're
really focused on the nuclear issue. They're not particularly concerned
about anything else beyond it, and what the President is
really focused on is ending the program, being able to
say he ended it, whether it's by his strikes or
(15:54):
by a deal. That's what he's focused on. And even then,
let's also remember the Israelis are very, very concerned about
Iran's actions in the region. You know, the Iranians have
been waging a war against them across the region. The US.
I think the trumpdministration is somewhat concerned about that, but
it's not a priority for that. In fact, I could
(16:16):
make an argument, I think that there is some evidence
already we'll find out more after the fact that part
of the reason that Israel decided to do the strike,
and to do it before the Trump administration's diplomacy had
fully played out, is because they were nervous that the
Trump administration was about to sign a deal with Iran
which would satisfy America's concerns but not necessarily Israel.
Speaker 1 (16:40):
Well, stay with us, because when we come back, we're
going to talk about how this conflict could further escalate,
what it would mean for US involvement. One thing Trump
did with Middle East Institute Vice president of policy Ken
Pollock will be right back. Welcome back to one thing
(17:19):
Trump did exclusively on the Middle Podcast Feed. I'm Jeremy Hobson.
This episode, we're talking about Iran following the US strikes
on the country's nuclear program, and I'm joined by Ken Pollack,
vice president of Policy with the Middle East Institute.
Speaker 3 (17:33):
Ken Pollack.
Speaker 1 (17:34):
Trump made some more headlines, as he often does after
the strikes, when he started talking about regime change and
whether that could be a good idea. What did you
think about that?
Speaker 3 (17:45):
So I'm going to put it this way, Jeremy. Again,
I don't know what is in President From's mind, and
again he clearly thinks about these things very very differently
from me, So I need to be careful here. That said,
I'm going to give him credit and say I think
that what he's trying to do is what the US
needs to do at this point in time, and it's
(18:06):
very very hard to do. This is where you need
outstanding diplomats. What the US needs to do right now
is to simultaneously convince the Iranian regime that we're not
pursuing regime change now, but we could shift and pursue
regime change if the Iranians don't do what we want
(18:29):
them to do, which is stop shooting at Israel and
agree to give up their nuclear program completely and allow
inspectors to do everything that they need to do in
perpetuity so that we can be certain that they won't
rebuild their nuclear program. Right, That's what needs to happen now.
The US needs to convince Roan to do those things,
(18:49):
and that's really hard. That's where you'd like someone like
a Jim Baker or a George Schultz or a Dean Atchison,
some outstanding diplomat who could go in to negotiate in
this very very subtle way, using reassurance and threat to
move the Iranians to where we need them to be.
(19:09):
I think that's what President Trump is trying to do.
He's just doing it in his own fashion, which quite
frankly makes me very uncomfortable, because he's a much more
direct speaker, much more prone to bragadocio as opposed to
the subtlety that I think that we need now.
Speaker 1 (19:29):
Well, And wouldn't regime change necessarily mean there would have
to be US boots on the ground.
Speaker 3 (19:36):
So again, this is part of the problem. And I
think you're you know, you're you're getting at part of
the issue, and it's something that a lot of Americans
are very concerned about, myself included. You know, nobody wants
the United States invading Iran. I once used the line
that you know, if you like the Iraq War, you're
going to love the Iran war, because Iran is three
times the population, four times the land mass, and five
(19:57):
times the problems that Iraq had.
Speaker 2 (20:00):
Right.
Speaker 3 (20:01):
But nonetheless, we've got to get the Iranians to realize
and we've got to get them to believe that there
is something worse for them if they try to get
a nuclear weapon at this point in time. And the
one thing that is very clear that the Iranian leadership
cares about even more than their nuclear program are their
own lives and they're hold on power, right, and so
(20:24):
we have to be able to convince them, to threaten
them that that would be at risk if they pursue
nuclear weapons. Even while it's clear that there's really nobody
here in the United States that would be willing to
go that last mile that you're talking about of mounting
an invasion, which is the only way for certain that
you could change the regime in Iran. That said, there's
(20:45):
certainly stuff that we and the Israelis and the Israelis
are clearly signaling this, but they're doing it in a
much more subtle way than the United States is signaling
that they have ways to kill key regime figures, potentially
including Ayatolahamine well.
Speaker 1 (20:59):
And speaking of a hold on power that Iran's regime has,
what do we know about how the people in Iran
feel at this point about what is going on? We
know it's a police state, we know that they're very
repressive regime. But do you sense any possible uprising on
behalf of the people saying, you know what, get rid
(21:20):
of the nuclear program or anything like that.
Speaker 3 (21:24):
Yeah, So, to give you a brief answer to a
fantastic question that really requires a really long answer, Jeremy,
you're right, it is a police state. Therefore, we have
to be very careful about what we say about Iranian
public opinion. We do not have great sources. Second point,
it's been clear for years that there are a lot
of Iranians who do not like their government. You know,
(21:47):
basically every two to four years since nineteen ninety nine,
you've had a huge segment of the Iranian population try
to rise up and overthrow their government. There's obviously another
segment that is happy with the government. It supports the government,
but there are a lot of our audience who are
unhappy with it. But a couple of problems. First, when
people get bombed, they tend to get angry at the
(22:09):
people bombing them, not so much their own leaders. It
takes a long time for people to come to the
conclusion that, you know what, this is really the fault
of our leaders for going down this path and bringing
the bombing on us. You know, world War two, every
country hoped that their bombing campaign would have that impact,
and what we found was it took a long time
(22:31):
and an enormous amount of bombing and damage to really
push people that point. The truth of the matter is
that Germans and Japanese, even to the end of the war,
most of them were angry at the Allies, much more
so than their own government. And this is the problem.
And then the last thing is again, this regime has
demonstrated a tremendous ability to keep control over a population
(22:54):
that clearly wants it gone. So actually achieving regime change,
especially by bombing alone, would be a very tall order.
Speaker 1 (23:03):
What do you make of the I guess relative silence
from other countries that would be US allies in a conflict.
I mean, we remember that, you know, the coalition of
the willing in the Iraq War, and even a much
bigger coalition in the fight in Afghanistan. What do you
think about the fact that we haven't heard much support
from you know, our typical allies in Europe and North
(23:26):
America and other parts of the world.
Speaker 3 (23:28):
Sure, another great question. So I think what you can
take away from that is that they are both conflicted
and frightened. First of all, I mean big difference between
either the Iraqi so the US invasion of Iraq or
the Persian Gulf War of nineteen ninety ninety one. The
United States isn't bringing tens of thousands of troops into
the region, you know, saying this is going to be
(23:49):
a massive effort in which we will protect you. So
they're frightened. They're frightened of how Iran might respond. They're
not entirely certain of how the uniteds how much the
United States will tech them. They also, let's recognize at
one level, they like what Israel has done. They hate
the Iranians. They're afraid of the Iranians. They like seeing
Iranian military power destroyed degraded, but you know, they're always
(24:14):
nervous about the Israelis too, and the ability of the
Israelis to just act freely in this kind of a fashion.
It leaves many of them asking, g at what point
in time might the Israelis decide to do that against us?
Well beyond that, you know, again take that point, Take
both those points. They hate the Iranians, but they're also
kind of nervous about the Israelis, And you know, at
(24:36):
the end of the day, they're also nervous about how
Iran is going to retaliate. They're nervous about what that
will cause the Israelis to do. None of them wants
to become a battle ground in a war between Israel
and Iran and now the United States. Most of them
are hoping that this whole thing is just going to
go away and not involve them.
Speaker 1 (24:56):
I have to think that there are a lot of
Americans who feel that way too, that they just want
to Okay, wait, I didn't vote for this, I didn't
want this to happen, and I just would like it
to be resolved quickly. What do you think about public
support in the United States right now?
Speaker 3 (25:09):
Yeah, so I think you know, I'll be interested to
see the first polls when they come out, but my
guess is that you're right that people are conflicted as well.
You know, typically when the United States employees military force
and essocially, when none of our people get killed, and
when it looks like we're being successful, typically the president
gets a rally around the flag effect. Most Americans are patriotic,
(25:30):
they want to support the president. I think many Americans
also recognize that the Iranian regime is odious, right, and
they have declared us their enemy. And I've been trying
to harm us for forty six years, right. They've killed
at least a thousand Americans that I can think of,
So I don't think there's a whole lot of love
for the Iranian regime. By the same token, I think
(25:50):
you're also right that right now, most Americans aren't looking
for another war in the Middle East. And I think
that's why President Trump is doing things the way that
he's doing them is he's trying to keep a constant
eye on where his own party, where his own base
and perhaps the larger American population is on this so
he doesn't get two out of step with them.
Speaker 1 (26:11):
Well, and it's been very interesting to see some of
the comments from people that are definitely part of his base,
like Marjorie Taylor Green and even Thomas Massey come out
and say that they're not happy about what's happening there.
Speaker 3 (26:23):
Let me ask you.
Speaker 1 (26:23):
Two more questions. One, how would you de escalate the
situation right now?
Speaker 3 (26:31):
Again, I think the key is that. I mean, first,
the Israelis are going to finish their aerial campaign. I
don't think there's going to be anyone who's going to
stop them. I think would take a lot to get
the United States to stop them. And again, I don't
think that the Trump administration wants to pick that fight
with the Israelis anytime soon, but I think that very
(26:52):
soon the US is going to have to go to
the Israelis and say, okay, guys, time to wrap it up,
and they're The big question mark is, first, what of
the wrong is done already? Right? There is this potential
for escalation. We talked about it briefly. I think the
Iranians are going to feel the need to retaliate against us.
They're certainly going to keep shooting at the Israelis. So
a big question mark is what do they do to us?
(27:13):
Are we able to just ignore it, which would probably
be the best thing of all. Can the Israelis too, say, well,
you know what, Iran's retaliation is getting less and less
and less over time. It's really become a nothing burger.
We can basically just declare victory and go home. Those
are the ideal circumstances. If that doesn't happen, then we
get into one of these situations where we're escalating to
(27:34):
de escalate. That's a really terrible path. Let's not even
talk about that right now. But that is a danger
out there. But assuming that the Israelis completed their mission,
the Iranian retaliation both against US and the Israelis is
not terribly damaging. Is more symbolic, and by the way,
I think it's important to understand, I think that's a
(27:55):
very real possibility out there, even probability. What we've seen
from Iran's leader, Ayatola al Khamane, what we've seen from
him over the years, is he is both a strategic
thinker and a prudent decision maker. Right he is capable
of saying, you know what, I can't win this fight,
and so it doesn't make sense for me to keep fighting,
(28:17):
right and that's we all got a hope. But at
that moment in time, as I've said to you several
times now, the real key is the long term. How
do we prevent this regime from doing what would probably
be natural to them, which is to say, well, look,
not having a nuclear weapon clearly didn't work for us.
It invited these attacks by the Israelis and the Americans.
(28:39):
The only way we can defend ourselves in the future
is to go ahead and get a nuclear weapon. That's
what we've got to prevent them from doing. And I
think the best way to do that is to simultaneously
go to them and you know, diplomatically assure them we're
not looking for regime change. Now, provide them with some
positive inducements. The President has been clear willing to lift
(28:59):
this sanctions if Iran agrees to give up its nuclear
program altogether agree to far reaching inspections so we can
be sure that they're never going to cheat on it.
But then there also has to be the subtle threat
that if Iran doesn't agree to do that, that the
(29:20):
US and Israel would escalate to something like regime change.
I think it's going to take and that's going to
be very very hard. As I said, that's going to
take the skill of a Kissinger or a Bismarck. I
hope that the Trump administration proves to have negotiators who
are capable of that.
Speaker 1 (29:37):
Let me finally ask you, Ken Pollock. You had mentioned
that Iran is much bigger than Iraq or Afghanistan. Ninety
million people in Iran. What is just one or two
things that Americans should know about the country of Iran
that you've been studying for so long.
Speaker 3 (29:56):
What should we know about Iran? Sure, just a couple
of quick I mean, Iranians are extremely proud of their
own culture, of their society. They regard themselves as one
of the world's great civilizations. Right. These are the descendants
of the Persian Empire and the Parthian Empire. They ruled
(30:17):
much of Southwest Asia, certainly over the Middle East for
thousands of years, and Iranians, the vast majority of them,
see that as the natural order. They have a very
capable population. They're often very well educated. They're creative. You know,
(30:37):
think about what went into their nuclear program, their ballistic
missile program. You know, this is not necessarily Japan or
Taiwan or the United States, but Nonetheless, it's a talented, creative,
educated population, you know, quite formidable and you know, also
worth understanding. And when we think about the Middle East,
we think of desert Iran. The pulation is overwhelmingly in
(31:01):
the mountains. That makes them very difficult militarily. It also
anthropologists will tell you that people who live in mountains
tend to have very fragmented societies, right, you know, every
mountain valley is its own little thing and very suspicious.
Aver think about mountainous parts of the world, you get
(31:23):
these very Balkanized political systems, whether it's Afghanistan or the
Balkans itself, or you know, heck, Appalachia and Colorado.
Speaker 1 (31:31):
Well, and by the way, I remember hearing about the
island of Crete was one of the most difficult places
for the Nazis in World War Two because in part
because of the mountains and the people that were up
in the mountains exactly.
Speaker 3 (31:43):
And so you get a very fractious, very fragmented political system,
which means it's often kind of tough for them to
build a political coalition to do things right. But it
also means that if you're talking about regime change, you
don't really know what you're getting right. If we went
in there, it would probably be more fragmented, fractious than
(32:03):
what we saw in places like Iraq, be much more
like Afghanistan, which is not a good outcome. It also
means that if this regime falls, it's much harder to
know what would take its place.
Speaker 1 (32:15):
That is Ken Pollack, who's the vice president for policy
at the Middle East Institute. So interesting. Ken, thank you
so much for coming on the show.
Speaker 3 (32:22):
My pleasure, Jeremy, great questions, great being here.
Speaker 1 (32:25):
And thanks to you for listening to one thing Trump did.
It was produced by Harrison Patino. Our next Middle episode
will be in your podcast feed later this week. We'll
be taking your calls about what's happening with Iran. If
you liked the podcast, please rate it write a review.
Our theme music was composed by Noah Haidu. I'm Jeremy Hobson.
Talk to you soon.
Host
Jeremy Hobson
Popular Podcasts
Bookmarked by Reese's Book Club
Welcome to Bookmarked by Reese’s Book Club — the podcast where great stories, bold women, and irresistible conversations collide! Hosted by award-winning journalist Danielle Robay, each week new episodes balance thoughtful literary insight with the fervor of buzzy book trends, pop culture and more. Bookmarked brings together celebrities, tastemakers, influencers and authors from Reese's Book Club and beyond to share stories that transcend the page. Pull up a chair. You’re not just listening — you’re part of the conversation.
On Purpose with Jay Shetty
I’m Jay Shetty host of On Purpose the worlds #1 Mental Health podcast and I’m so grateful you found us. I started this podcast 5 years ago to invite you into conversations and workshops that are designed to help make you happier, healthier and more healed. I believe that when you (yes you) feel seen, heard and understood you’re able to deal with relationship struggles, work challenges and life’s ups and downs with more ease and grace. I interview experts, celebrities, thought leaders and athletes so that we can grow our mindset, build better habits and uncover a side of them we’ve never seen before. New episodes every Monday and Friday. Your support means the world to me and I don’t take it for granted — click the follow button and leave a review to help us spread the love with On Purpose. I can’t wait for you to listen to your first or 500th episode!
Dateline NBC
Current and classic episodes, featuring compelling true-crime mysteries, powerful documentaries and in-depth investigations. Follow now to get the latest episodes of Dateline NBC completely free, or subscribe to Dateline Premium for ad-free listening and exclusive bonus content: DatelinePremium.com