June 26, 2025 • 56 mins
Richard Haass analyzes the situation in Iran and breaks down the future of the Middle East. Then, the former diplomat and President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations discusses what an America First foreign policy really means for the rest of the world.
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Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:09):
This is Gavin Newsom, and this is Richard Haas. Richard,
thank you so much for taking the time to come on,
particularly at a remarkable time in world history, particularly in
history unfolding in the Middle East. Today. President Trump seemed
to have a day that he's been looking forward to
(00:31):
for years and years and years, pushing NATO to move
from two percent to five percent. What was your takeaway
from this NATO summit, at least the first day, and
just Trump deserve I think a lot of praise and
for an accomplishment here.
Speaker 2 (00:49):
I would argue President Trump, well, first of all, got
being good to be with you. Thank you, Like I
would argue President Trump deserves credit for spurring the Europeans
to do they ought to have done years before, they
ought to be putting forward a larger share of the
effort for what's a common defense.
Speaker 3 (01:08):
I was just as an aside.
Speaker 2 (01:10):
I would say, much more important to me than whether
the Europeans spend three percent or two and a half
or four and a half is how they spend it.
And I'd actually say something you'd probably agree with. In
public policy, how you spend money is almost always more
important than how much you spend, and the problem with
European defense is not just that they spend too little,
but each country pretty much determines how it spends its
(01:32):
defense euros, so the whole ends up being less than
the sum of its parts. So I would be pushing
if I were advising the president, I would say, yeah,
push them to do more, but secondly, also push them
in a sense to become more European, rather than country
by country by country, which is the way they often
go about it.
Speaker 3 (01:52):
But I think that part is good.
Speaker 2 (01:53):
Less good is I think he's introduced some doubts into
the reliability of the United States and when I call
the automatic quality of Article five, America's willingness to go
to bat for Europe. And obviously there's also some fairly
significant differences about how to handle the most immediate threat,
which is Russia and the war in Ukraine. So I
(02:17):
think it's a mixed bag. But yes, it's good to
see the Europeans essentially getting pushed to do more.
Speaker 1 (02:23):
And it's interesting just as you unpack and I appreciate
how you spend and where you spend. It was interesting
just looking at some of the details that their direct
spend in support of Ukraine would be considered as part
of that contribution as it relates to that breakdown of
five percent. It was also, though interesting to see the
breakdown within the countries. Obviously Germany looking to move quicker
(02:45):
by twenty twenty nine with close to seventy percent increase
in their domestic defense spending, and then Spain, who was
called out by the President today, looking not necessarily to
reach that numerica. Does that mean much to you or
is that just that's just noise?
Speaker 2 (03:05):
The most interesting part of that is Germany less what
Germany is prepared to do in defense, though doing more
is welcome, but Germany has changed its laws and essentially
now is able to raise serious debt, which was something
that modern Germany had an allergy to because of the
whole Weimar experience, and the fact that Germany now can
(03:26):
really go into the markets and raise that gives them
far more capacity to potentially grow their economies as well
as to contribute to national security.
Speaker 3 (03:36):
And then even go so.
Speaker 2 (03:37):
Far as to say the most interesting figure in Europe
right now is the new Chancellor of Germany. And even
though he had a rough start and getting confirmed and
so forth by his parliament, I actually think the Chancellor
Mertz is in a position to in some ways have
Germany stake out the leadership position in Europe, something that
historically since World War Two Germany has been reticent to
(03:59):
do so. Would I would watch that space, particularly since
the French, the British and others are so gridlocked domestically.
I think Germany now occupies the critical position.
Speaker 1 (04:10):
When you referenced the Article five sort of you know,
I think the president when he was flying over there
was some ambiguity once again sort of creating some doubt
and anxiety. He seemed to shift tone a little bit
when he landed, But that is just that on again,
off again relationship to the Article five. Is that what
you're referring to as sort of a lack of certainty
(04:31):
and confidence in the president?
Speaker 3 (04:32):
Yeah.
Speaker 2 (04:33):
For those who haven't read the NATO treaty recently, Article
five is the core of the agreement. We're essentially an
attack on one who is considered to be an attack
on all. Curiously, it's only been invoked once in NATO's
entire history, and that was on behalf of the United
States after nine to eleven. But alliances depend upon predictability
(04:54):
and reliability and dependability, and I would argue that President
Trump has introduced a significant degree of uncertainty into that,
which I think is counterproductive. He would argue, perhaps it
was necessary to get the Europeans to do more. I
would have said, well, probably there's better ways to do that,
but that's where we are, and to the extent Russia sensus,
(05:16):
there's uncertainty there putin who as we've seen in Ukraine,
can be risk frunt it might be more likely to
take risks. So I always believe that the best way
to deter is through certainty. So your friends know you'll
be there for them, and just as important, your enemies
know you'll be there for your friends. So I would
like for President Trump, as the days and weeks and
(05:36):
months unfold, to look for opportunities to make clear that
whatever our differences are with Europe over their level of
defense effort, we see it as in our interest to
be there with them.
Speaker 1 (05:47):
You're here. What in terms of the actual bombing itself,
and I think my most objective standards, it was a success.
Whether or not these sites were quote unquote obliterated, that's
a separate conversation, is that your assessment that this was
a success, that in the spirit of what you just
said around some certainty that the President wasn't bluffing in
(06:11):
terms of wanting to get diplomatic deal done. They appeared
not to want to move in that direction, so then
he asserted himself militarily.
Speaker 3 (06:19):
I think it was the right thing to do.
Speaker 2 (06:21):
For years, we've been playing this game with the Iranians
where they were enriching uranium far far, far beyond levels
anybody would need to generate electricity, so we all knew
what this was about to put into place. The were
prerequisites for a nuclear weapons program. I also understood we
couldn't allow Iron to get on the threshold, much less
(06:42):
have nuclear weapons. We made that mistake. I would argue
with North Korea, we don't want to have it now
in this part of the world, because if Aron ever
got nuclear weapons, not only would they act more aggressively
imposed potentially an existential threat to Israel. But you know,
and I know, the Saudis, the Egyptians, the Turks and
others would follow suits. And the only thing worse than
the Middle East we've known is the Middle East I've
(07:03):
just described. So I think what Israel and then the
United States did was warrant it we'll see what the
results are. Whatever the Iran, whatever happened, the Iranian program
was not obliterated. Elements of their program I expect will
have survived the attacks on the three sides. More important,
I don't know. You don't know, probably the president doesn't
(07:24):
know what amount of uranium or number of centrifuges and
so forth are under some roof of some warehouse and
some other part of Iran. I actually think going forward, Devin,
we have got to assume just the opposite, that the
Iranian program was not obliterating, but elements of that program exist.
Speaker 3 (07:43):
And what's worrisome to me, I'll be honest with you.
Speaker 2 (07:46):
I would think that a lot of Iranian leaders have said, Hey,
this never would have happened. Had we had nuclear weapons,
we could have deterred the Israelis in the Americas. So
I worry that going forward, I think their determination to
develop nuclear weapons might, if anything, be even greater.
Speaker 1 (08:02):
Well, you know, I want to just pick up on
that point because that's interesting observation in an important one.
And we'll get to North Korea as well in a second.
Because your reference goes back to the opportunity the United
States had under the Clinton administration to take out their
program before it proliferated. But I want to talk a
little bit about the Non Proliferation Treaty. People have brought
(08:23):
that up since the nineteen seventies. I think two hundred
countries were signatories to that, including Iran. There were a
number of countries that have developed nuclear programs that were
not original signers to that. Obviously Korea and Israel and
the extent they have a nuclear program quote unquote, but
(08:43):
certainly India and Pakistan. But those countries as a consequence,
would make the claim you just made that they've been
they've had that deterrent. Now Iran assumed that they would
not be bombed, I presume under the terms of the
Non Proliferation Treaty. Does that put at risk the entire
notion of the non Proliferation Treaty?
Speaker 3 (09:04):
What's just occurred, So let me give you a slightly
convoluted answer.
Speaker 2 (09:08):
The Non Proliferation Treaty is only a small piece of
the effort against non proliferation. I don't think it's a
wildly successful piece in many ways because it really is
a gentleman's agreement. We declare what facilities we're doing, certain
types of research or engineering in and then the inspectors
come look at them. The inspectors can't look at places that.
Speaker 3 (09:29):
Are not known.
Speaker 2 (09:30):
So the entire treaty in that sense is based upon
a degree of faith that I tend.
Speaker 3 (09:36):
Not to have.
Speaker 2 (09:36):
North Korea withdrew from the treaty and there was no
particular penalty or anything for them having done so. Turns
out the most important non proliferation tool out there is
not the Treaty. It's called America's alliances. By giving countries
the confidence that we are there for them, they then
don't need to become self sufficient, and the biggest way
to accelerate proliferation will be, for example, of the South
(09:59):
Koreans or other has come to have doubts about their
relationships with US. So don't get me wrong, I'm not
saying the Non Proliferation Treaty doesn't have some utility, and
I think in particular the inspection provisions can be useful,
but we shouldn't exaggerate it's impact that Iran I would
think was going to do and is going to do
(10:19):
and what it wants regardless of its obligations under.
Speaker 1 (10:23):
This treat So back to what you were saying, I mean,
so just let's speculate what goes happens going forward. Obviously,
this notion of resim change, people sort of pull back
a little bit, or least it appears the President's pulled back.
I don't know if BB is pulled back on the
notion of regime change. But what won't change is their pursuit,
(10:43):
presumably of a nuclear weapon. As you note, we don't
know that the program was quote unquote obliterated. Even if
the physical sites may have been, we don't know where
this enriched uranium is and centrifugius you imagine. Now your
concern is now what that they accelerate that program with
the darkness, meaning without any international inspectors.
Speaker 3 (11:05):
That's my concern.
Speaker 2 (11:06):
It might not be their immedia priority, which I think
is to shore up the regime. But at some point
I do think reconstituting a program will become a priority,
which means, by the way, the day may come where
Israeli United States needs to once again use military force
if we discover some activity going on in the Iranians
won't voluntarily give it up. It's not normal that problems
(11:30):
get solved. When I was the head of the Council,
on Foreign Relations. I used to discourage the Fellows from
using the words solved or solution, because that's just the
way history works. So I don't believe whatever it is
we accomplished the other day, however much we accomplished, it
didn't solve the problem. It may have reduced it. It
may have set back the Iranian program, but that'll pop
(11:51):
up again. It's by the way you mentioned regime change.
It's one of the reasons that people, I think are
attracted to the idea. If you can't solve the Iranian
problem through military force or through diplomacy, then people say,
what's left, Well, let's get a benign government. And I
think that's why there's so much interest in regime change.
The problem is it's easier to talk about it than
(12:13):
bring it about. I don't see the prerequisites in place
for it, and in any case, you can't base.
Speaker 3 (12:20):
Your policy on it.
Speaker 2 (12:21):
People don't like it when I say this, but it's
a wish more than a strategy. If it were to happen.
I think it brings problems but obvious benefits with it.
But we just can't count on it, and no president
can give the order to say Secretary of Defense or
state and say, get me regime change in Iran.
Speaker 3 (12:40):
They wouldn't have then the tools to necessarily.
Speaker 1 (12:43):
Carry it out when it comes to just issues of trust.
And you know, I think one of the questions that
I get and I ask myself all the time, I
feel like, for most of my adult life, I've been
hearing baby Net and Yaho say they're just months away,
a year away from having weapons grade nuclear weapons, and
(13:04):
you know, a certain point you just stopped believing it.
But your assessment, you know, your own objective assessment this
time did appear to be different, that they were getting
closer and actually appeared to be within a matter of
months in a position where potentially we had a weapons
grade weapon coming out of Iran? Is that accurate?
Speaker 2 (13:25):
Pretty much? Look, this was a gathering threat. It wasn't
an imminent threat. It was a gathering threat. And the
question is how close Now we know they had done
most of the enrichment work they need to do to
get it uranium enriched a plus or minus sixty percent,
that's not just sixty percent of the effort, that's actually
closer to ninety percent of the effort. For reasons of physics,
that I couldn't explain because I don't understand them well enough.
Speaker 3 (13:48):
But I think I'm right there. Now. What you don't
know is how close they were on some of the
other things.
Speaker 2 (13:54):
The actual fabrication of explosive device is the bomb, and
so forth. And there there was the Israelis, believe the
economists published some very interesting stuff about it, that they
had made some breakthroughs, they had had some secret programs
and so forth. And I think we have to be tolerant,
just like after nine to eleven we were less willing
(14:16):
to run certain risks, say about what Iraq could do.
And this is not a justification for the Iraq war.
I was against it, but just I understand some of
the thinking. I think Israel after October seventh had less
tolerance of running certain risks in their case. So I
just think the combination of a change mentality in Israel,
the evisceration of groups like Hisbella, which couldn't really attack
(14:41):
Israel anymore, and this new intelligence would suggested, however, far
along the Iranians, for they were farther along. And I
think for all those reasons, the Israelis decided to act
and we came in behind.
Speaker 1 (14:55):
Does this keep BB in power for another extended period
of time.
Speaker 2 (14:59):
We roughly what sixteen seventeen months to run before he
has to. I think the elections are scheduled for October
of next year. It certainly helps them. Mean Israel, as
you know, is deeply divided about issues on democracy, Gaza,
what have you, whether the religious can be drafted and
so forth. They are not divided on Iran, left and right,
(15:20):
hawk and dove. There aren't a lot of doves in
Israel when it comes to rod. So it clearly helps BB.
It changes the conversation a little bit, It brings Israel together.
It's seen as an accomplishment, and he has He has
changed in many ways israel strategic reality given the change
in Syria is volah, the weakening of a masque. Whatever
(15:41):
you think, however critical people watching this might be of
what Israel's done and how it's done it in Gaza,
the reality is that BB nets and Yahou in the
last what eighteen months, has dramatically reduced the external threat
to Israel.
Speaker 1 (16:00):
And on that basis, are you confident that we'll have
sort of a you know, Abraham Accord two point zero
with Saudi coming in? Is that the map that you
see changing or is that still opening end in question
with the everything that's going on or not going on
in Gaza, West Bank, et cetera. What's your over under
(16:21):
on that look?
Speaker 2 (16:22):
As you know, for a while it looked like it
was going to happen before October seventh, and then because
of if you were October eighth and Israeli policy, the
Saudis backed off. They got nervous or uneasy about it.
Two things may have changed now, though, which is interesting.
One is beaving that Tan Yahoo. As you were just suggesting,
Gavin politically is stronger than he was, so he might
(16:44):
give him more leverage against those in his government who
oppose any sort of change in policy on Gaza.
Speaker 3 (16:50):
Secondly, there's this guy named Donald Trump.
Speaker 2 (16:52):
It's interesting on how many occasions Trump has distanced himself
from beving that Ta Nyahoo. He did it on the huties,
he did it on the prisoner move with Hamas he
told the Israelis a few weeks ago, don't you dare
attack around. We're trying to see if diplomacy works. Just
the other day, shall we say, I'm rather colorful language.
(17:13):
He was out there. So it's possible that tomorrow he
would tell the israel Is, hey, knock it off in
Gaza or do this on the West Bank. There's an
unsentimental quality to America firstism. And one of the things
you see, we've beganned the conversation talking about Europe. Well,
(17:34):
one of the things, whether we're talking about security or
tariffs or now this being an ally of the United
States ain't when it used to be. When it comes
to Donald Trump, friends and allies no longer get preferred treatment.
So it wouldn't shock me if Donald Trump, in his
hope to get the Saut East to normalize with Israel,
put real pressure on bb Nets and Yao and we
(17:55):
put the Israelis in a real jam. Trump is popular
in Israel. And also it's almost like Nixon going to China.
Nixon Wan said, you know, they didn't have Nixon to
worry about. Well, you can't do an end run around
Donald Trump. So if Donald Trump leans on vving Netshanyahu,
who are the Israelis going to appeal to in American
domestic politics. So I actually, I actually think that's a
(18:15):
curious possibility that something could happen there.
Speaker 1 (18:19):
Do you find him under the influence And I say,
that loosely, I mean because of his own financial relationships
to the UAE and guitar and the Saudi's sort of
the Arab I mean, do you think they will play
an outsize role in influencing Trump in that respect?
Speaker 2 (18:37):
Look, if they had, you probably would have gone ahead
and done the strike. As much as they wanted around
cut down to size. They were very nervous that they
were going to be in the line of fire of retaliation.
So my guess is there an influence but not a
determinant of what he does.
Speaker 3 (18:53):
And I say that in no way how would I
put it.
Speaker 2 (18:56):
I'm not comfortable with, shall we say, this merging of
the personal the government when it comes to wealth creation
or you know, the fact that people don't refuse themselves
from things, or they carry on private sector activity. I'm
as uncomfortable as I expect you are, or a lot
of people watching that, But I don't think they have.
Speaker 3 (19:14):
I haven't seen that they have undoing. I haven't seen it.
Speaker 1 (19:17):
Over is, you've written a lot about doctrines. You talk
about the Monroe doctrine. I think eighteen twenty three you've
sort of walked us through the Truman doctrine and aspects
of of not only Reagan, but even the freedom doctrine
as you refer to it under the Bush administration dealing
with terrorism, no place to hide? What do you have
any sense of what the hell that Trump doctrine is? Or,
(19:40):
I mean, Jade Vance tried to sert one in a
speech yesterday. What America first? What is it? What's your sense?
Speaker 3 (19:48):
It's a good question. I think about it a lot.
Speaker 2 (19:51):
Well, it might be earlier, it's still early, particularly in
the second term, and the second term is a hell
of a lot more than a continuation of the first term.
You may love that, you may hate it, but it
ain't Trump two point zero is more than an extension
of Trump one point Oh. There is something with this
America first ism that our alliances aren't as predictable, our
(20:12):
enemies aren't aren't seen as enemies. There's a kind of
perpetual maneuver in American foreign policies. I'm not quite sure
if that adds to a doctrine. In some ways, doctrines
lead you to predictable outcomes. In a funny sort of way,
Trump America first ism at times leads you to unpredictable outcomes.
It's not isolationist, though I would say it's quite unilateral,
(20:35):
you know, as we saw the the other day. I
also wrote a few weeks ago that there is something
of a doctrine. It's the opposite of the freedom doctrine,
where under people like George W.
Speaker 3 (20:45):
Bush or even Reagan.
Speaker 2 (20:47):
Or Carter, we cared an awful lot about how governments
treated their own people. This is just the opposite. This
is all look the other way foreign policy. What you
do inside your boards is your business. All we care
about is that our business. So there's almost amoral quality
to Trump be in foreign policy. And again, doctrines have
(21:07):
to explain and predict. So I'm not quite sure yet
we have anything that quite rises to that level.
Speaker 1 (21:13):
Interesting. I mean, the only thing that would that would
contradict that modestly was JD Vance's speech in Munich where
he's lecturing the Europeans one hundred percent.
Speaker 2 (21:22):
You're right to point out that contradiction. It's the one
area where it's almost like there's an equation of elite
Ivy League universities with elite Europe. And that's the one
place where the administration is willing to tackle internal situations
or circumstances in foreign countries.
Speaker 3 (21:42):
But I think that's the exception that kind of proves
the rule.
Speaker 1 (21:45):
Interesting. So where where's Putin now? What's he seen? What's what?
What do you think he's made of the last twelve days?
Where is he in relationship? I mean he's got a
free pass in some respects. The eyes are off him.
He's stepping things up in Ukraine. Is it status quo
ante or is he now reconsidering things?
Speaker 2 (22:05):
Probably a mixed bag. Well, as you say, I think
you're a hundred percent right. He has to be happy
with the fact that both at the G seven and
then at Nato Zelenski and Ukraine were not quite center
stage yep. And that very much fits or feeds Putin's idea.
The time is on his side, so I think he
has to feel pretty good, pretty good about that. Anytime
(22:28):
there's instability that increases energy prices, not that we've seen
a real price bike, that's got to make him feel good.
Speaker 3 (22:33):
Given his economy, it's got to.
Speaker 2 (22:35):
Feel a little bit uneasy with this demonstration of American power,
with the discrepancy between what the United States can do
and what say Iran could do.
Speaker 3 (22:44):
That's got to make them a little bit.
Speaker 2 (22:45):
Uneasy, but I would think all things equal to the
last few days probably made them feel okay.
Speaker 3 (22:51):
For one other reason.
Speaker 2 (22:52):
I don't know if you noticed, the won my Hutzpow
Award for the month the statement by the Russia Foreign
Ministry critical of ISRAE for not respecting the territorial integrity
and sovereignty of a UN member.
Speaker 3 (23:06):
And I'm sitting there reading that, going really really so.
Speaker 2 (23:10):
But the Russians have to like the idea that we
are we would unilaterally decide that certain uses of force
were somehow acceptable, and that's got to be something that
Putin might actually, you know, welcome.
Speaker 1 (23:24):
And do you welcome? Sort of I mean, look from
a tactical perspective, turn the page. In terms of trying
to negotiate peace in Ukraine. Obviously stubborn, he wasn't able
to get it done before he took the oath of office.
He wasn't able to get it done within the twenty
four hour time clock, and he set himself up for
but sort of the overtures to Putin, sort of negotiating
(23:44):
Putin's talking points and putting Zelenski on the spot. But
where do you think Trump is right now in relationship to.
You know, he's been a little more critical, at least publicly,
been willing to be slightly more critical Putin, do you
where do you think the administration is move into to
a conclusion or solution here.
Speaker 2 (24:04):
They're caught in the inconsistency of their own policy. They're
right to say that we need peace there. And I
think they had one improvement over the Biden policy, where
the Biden administration would never speak honestly with Zelenski, at
least publicly, and say, look, you know and we know
that you're not going to militarily liberate Crimea or all
(24:25):
the East. Let's go for a deal that we get
a cease fire. It doesn't prejudice your long term goals,
but let's stop this war. That's Trump's idea, and I
think that's smart. I think that's realistic. Where he's inconsistent
is he sabotaged. He's sabotaging the chance for getting it
by not being supportive of Ukraine. That gives Putin again
(24:46):
the confidence that time is on his side. If this
president would announce this summer, when the pipeline begins to
run dry, we're going to re up American aid for Ukraine,
not so they can militarily liberate all their land. That's
going to have to be done diplomatically, but so Russian
efforts will not succeed. I think that would turn the
(25:09):
war out, and I actually think we may with the
more specifical I think that would persuade Putin over time
that more war would not lead to more territory. And
I think that actually would be the way to get
things at the negotiating table, not for peace, but for
cease fires. So the administration has the right goals, it's
just not going it's going about it in one hundred
(25:29):
percent the wrong way.
Speaker 1 (25:31):
Is she looking at you know, a year whatever we're
in with Ukraine? Is that make him more or less
likely to pursue and make advanced pursuits in Taiwan? Or
has he seen something different the asymmetry of warfare now,
(25:52):
the nature and change the transformation of warfare. What's your
sense of where she is at this moment as well
in relate not only to Ukraine, but also perhaps more
broadly as well to what the Trump administration just initiated
in bb in around.
Speaker 2 (26:09):
My glim answer to is going to be both or yes.
I think on one hand, he looks at Ukraine. He
looks at the sanctions that have been introduced. He looks
at how Putin overestimated the capabilities of his own military.
He's seen how the West came to bat indirectly but
decisively for Ukraine.
Speaker 3 (26:30):
That had to have given him pause. I mean, look,
think about it. There's no general in the Chinese military
who has military experience. Yeah, they have.
Speaker 2 (26:38):
The least time they fought to wars against Vietnam, they didn't.
They didn't do so hot. And for the Chinese government
to go to war against Taiwan and not succeed, imagine
the domestic political consequences of that, The questions of legitimacy
they would raise, not just for she as a person,
but for the party. So I actually think they're they're
(27:01):
somewhat cautious here. I also think they have to find
it impossible to read Donald Trump again, given the tariffs,
given what he just did the other day, and I
think that must introduce a role of caution. I think
they've got some internal issues. He's been purging a lot
of military leaders. They've obviously got their economic challenges. So
(27:21):
he hasn't given up. Don't get me wrong, that Taiwan
is his legacy. That's his way to make himself a
major figure in modern Chinese history. But I don't think
the moments arrived. I think he wants to get a
better reading on Donald Trump. We still don't have a
good feel for the Trump administration's relations with Japan, Taiwan, Australia,
(27:44):
but none of it's going particularly well. I think he
probably wants to see some more about the lessons of
the modern battlefield. He still wants to build up, among
other things, as nuclear arms.
Speaker 3 (27:54):
One of the.
Speaker 2 (27:55):
Lessons I think Shiesh Jing learn gav was the United
States did not get directly involved in helping Ukraine, and
he I think from Xijianpingk's point of view, that was
because of the mass of Russian nuclear arsenal. So China
right now is the owner of the world's fastest growing
nuclear arsenal. They're adding hundreds and hundreds of nuclear weapons
each year. They want to get they kind of want
(28:16):
to get the bronze medal in the Serious Nuclear Arsenal's Olympics,
and they're moving as quickly as they can in that direction.
But my guess is they don't want to show down
over Taiwan. For several years until they believe they can
offset or deter any American pressure because of our nuclear advantages.
Speaker 1 (28:38):
What do you make of the new president in Taiwan?
He's rolling out I think this week a unity tour,
is giving speeches. He seems to be you know, you know,
it's sort of not poking the bear, but certainly trying
to sort of suggest more muscularity visa the mainland China.
(28:59):
Is that you know, what do you what do you
read into that?
Speaker 2 (29:02):
Yeah, I mean, some of that's politics, some of it
spoken to bear. My view is what I really want
to do is see Taiwan get stronger. In Taiwan's the
level of defense effort is not in the right zip code. Still,
they've got to do a lot more. I look at
I mean, we talked about Israel a lot, and you know,
Israel's and shall we say, difficult strategic situation at least
(29:22):
it has been for most of its existence. And you
look at the level of military effort they've produced, or
even US during the Cold War, we were probably spending
i don't know, on the average of maybe six five,
six seven percent of GDP. Taiwan's nowhere near that. And
look at the disparities between the mainland and Taiwan. So
Taiwan more important than what they say is what they do,
(29:44):
and I would say they've really got to make a
much larger effort. They've got to also look very carefully
at what just happened in the Middle East and what's
happened in Ukraine and ask themselves whether they are incorporating
the right strategic lessons. Too much of the Taiwan military
historically has elements almost of ours, a small number of
expensive aircraft and so forth. I actually think they need
(30:06):
something much larger numbers are smaller, cheaper systems would probably
be helpful. The other country to really watch there is Japan.
I actually think we're at a moment in history where
Japan's our most important ally still the world's third largest economy,
and militarily it's central to any scenario involving Chinese pressure
(30:28):
against Taiwan. And I worry about the deterioration and that
relationship of late. So again, things like that might actually
affect Chinese calculations as well. But all I said, even
though you know, I worry about a lot, and I
worry about this as a strategic, medium, long term challenge.
Speaker 3 (30:47):
I don't get the sense this is a near term challenge.
Speaker 1 (30:50):
Interesting only slight correction. Japan is fourth to California's third.
I just had it comment on that four points. I'm
just saying, I'm waiting for my G seven invitation. That's
all you know, our G G five. I mean, I
don't know whatever G four of three. It's interesting you
(31:16):
say Japan is the most important. I've heard people others
sort of you know, suggest that Australia plays an outsize
role in terms of just you know, looking at the
sort of strategic realignment. Where do you make I mean
that president or the leadership there surprised some punderance and
pulling out a pretty healthy margin and the victory. Obviously
(31:38):
they're overtures back and forth to China. But you made
a point which I don't really reflected on Trump's sort
of ambiguity with those relationships South Korea obviously and Japan
and the trilat that the Bidy administration had. Now we're
seeing that taking shape with she and obviously Australia seems
(31:59):
to be sort of the plus one right now. But
give me your sense of where Australia plays.
Speaker 3 (32:04):
Look, Australia does play an outsize role.
Speaker 2 (32:07):
I think that the relationship isn't as robust as it
ought to be, hasn't gotten a whole lot of attention,
a lot of you know, a lot of our economic
policy has alienated our friends, you know, the tariffs in particular.
Most of the line on defense is do more, do more,
do more, and that gets a little bit old after
(32:28):
a while. So I would like to see if you
will more consultation with them. And again, you can't have
economic policy and military or strategic policy carried out in
separate silos. It's very hard to hammer an ally or
friend over trade issues on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, and
(32:48):
expect on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. The strategic relationship is
going to be just fine. Doesn't work that way, So
I would say this is again I'm critical of a
lot of the economic policy on it its own merits.
Speaker 3 (33:01):
I don't think it makes sense full stop.
Speaker 2 (33:03):
But even putting that aside, it certainly doesn't make sense
because it ends up penalizing more than anyone our friends,
just those with the exception of China. It's our friends
and neighbors who are, as you know, our biggest economic partners.
Speaker 1 (33:16):
Today. Donald Trump in his press conference when I was
confronted on why he hasn't solved the conflict in Ukraine immediately, well,
he pivoted to his success in immediately solving the crisis
in Pakistan and India. Overstated, understated? Is that an early
success that he deserves more credit than perhaps he's been given.
Speaker 2 (33:41):
It sounds slightly ungenerous my part, but I think it's
a bit exaggerated. And it also has rub raw US
Indian relations.
Speaker 1 (33:50):
I was going to ask that next.
Speaker 2 (33:51):
Yeah, and look, it's always been difficult dealing with Pakistan
and dealing with India. But I think the great breakthrough,
and it was a bipartisan one of them the last
several administrations, was that US Indian relations got on a firmer,
more important strategic footing made sense given India's demographics, economics,
(34:12):
relationship with China and so forth. We bean, as you know,
to bring Indian into various Asia Pacific strategic groupings. I've
always seen Pakistan more as a problem than as a partner.
It was a problem in Afghanistan in many ways, and
you know, the questions of democracy and human rights, the
(34:33):
role of the military and politics it's been a very
uneasy country. If you had asked me years ago what
keeps me up most tonight, I might have said Pakistan,
in part because the potential loss of command and control
over nuclear materials. So the even handedness that we've reintroduced.
And then the shorthand for this is that we've we've
(34:54):
once again, we've once again hyphenated the relationship.
Speaker 3 (34:57):
So rather than having a strategic relationship with India and.
Speaker 2 (35:01):
A lesser relationship with Pakistan, we now once again have
India Pakistan policy. And it seems to me that is
not a wise approach given what I would argue is
India's greater inherent importance and potential.
Speaker 3 (35:16):
You know, how close they really were?
Speaker 2 (35:18):
You know, I don't think things were that close to
escalating or getting out of a hand that said, Look,
anytime the United States can dampen down actual or potential hostilities,
you know, great, and I would you know, say well
done to the President or the Secretary of State or
anyone else who had a hand in it. But yeah,
(35:41):
I wouldn't exaggerate it here. And again it may have
come at some cost as well.
Speaker 1 (35:45):
Yeah, well, and then there was also a price. The
largest I think one of their crypto exchanges in Pakistan
now is yeah, well, and we'll get back into the
corruption questions, or at least questions of corruption.
Speaker 2 (36:00):
Look, I've heard that, and yeah, I don't know, but yeah,
it is what it is.
Speaker 1 (36:04):
It is what it is. So you've been writing a
lot about, talking a lot about, and obviously only highlighted
with the last few weeks, But what the hell's wrong
with American foreign policy? We get so damn bogged down
in the Middle East. You've made the point there's a
whole world out there. We talked, we've sort of jumped
around different countries, different regions, but the reality is we
(36:25):
have been for decades and decades and decades bogged down
in the Middle East. You you e've an interesting history
working in Republican administrations, Bush administrations, But you made the
notation earlier, and it's important point to highlight you were
opposed to that last war in Iraq, and so you've
seen some light and some wisdom through all this. But
what the hell has happened to the United States over
(36:45):
the last I mean, my entire lifetime been consumed by
countries none of us could pronounce. No one knows the
difference between Iraq and Iran. I think there was a
song about that, and you know what's going on, Richard help.
Speaker 3 (36:59):
Us a fair question.
Speaker 2 (37:01):
Just for the record, I didn't work for a democratic administration.
I worked in the Carter Pentagon. And one of the
big issues then was the Middle East. Is nineteen seventy
nine you had the revolution in Iran, then you had
the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.
Speaker 3 (37:16):
Look when the Cold War ended, what thirty five years.
Speaker 2 (37:18):
Ago, I don't think anyone would have predicted Devin that
the Middle East would be such a focus of American
fire policy. The first real crisis of the post Cold
War era was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. We President
Bush forty one rallied the country in the world to
Kuwait's defense.
Speaker 3 (37:38):
It was quite extraordinary. I think it was actually to me.
Speaker 2 (37:43):
Like I duly note that I was part of the administration,
I worked on the Middle East. But you know, credit
I think is due to the President, bren Scokropt, Jim
Baker and others. It was quite remarkably done well, and
I think what we did was necessary. The two thousand
and three Iraq War was a war of choice. I
think it was misguided and some other I think with
(38:05):
the other day what we did was I think was warranted.
But in general, if I look at the map of
American farm policity and that you still have forty thousand
troops in the Middle East, it seems to me that
it's a disproportionate focus for US. It's the one it's
one of the parts the world where you don't have
a great power presence, you don't really have much great
power competition, and that it's you have regional powers, not
(38:29):
great powers.
Speaker 3 (38:30):
I would say.
Speaker 2 (38:30):
Ultimately twenty first century history is going to be much
more written about what happens in Europe and above all
the Asia Pacific. Asia Pacific is where the people are,
it's where the wealth is, It's where the militaries are
going to be. US China competition will be defining. So
it seems to me strategically there is still something odd
(38:51):
about the emphasis that the Middle East gets, and I
think we've we've gotten too ambitious there at times. I think,
in particular forty three's effort to transform it to bring
about democracy was.
Speaker 3 (39:05):
I think still advised.
Speaker 2 (39:07):
I'll be diplomatic here and so forth, and some other
things that we've done again were I would say we
should do no more than is necessary in the Middle East,
because there's other parts of the world that I would
argue are strategically more important, and we just.
Speaker 3 (39:23):
Find ourselves more about that.
Speaker 2 (39:26):
I don't have a good answer for you exactly why
at times, but somehow it's captured our imagination. One of
the odd things for secretaries of state, and I worked
with quite a few. How getting heavily involved in Middle
East and diplomacy was almost part of the job after
Henry Kissinger, and I like it or not, people found
themselves doing it, and yeah, less my take on all
(39:46):
that is, no mediator can ever be more successful than
the protagonists want or would allow him to be. And
I think at times we've too often substituted our own
efforts for what was missing on the part of the locals.
So my argument is not to get out of the
Middle East, but I would where possible dial it down.
Speaker 1 (40:07):
So you know, it's interesting. We had Steve Bannon on
this show, and I don't get the merits and demerits
of that conversation, but he's had a lot of more
public conversations about what he perceived, or at least asserted
was the wisdom of Trump focusing on things like Greenland
or countries like Greenland, focusing on the Panama Canal. Looking
(40:28):
at it more from a strategic prism sort of you know,
hemispheric framework and sort of creating a stronger consciousness to
sort of regionalize our American first framework and to put
it in, you know, in at least creating a narrative
around what some of us perceived as just the absurdity
(40:52):
of these threats to take over Greenland, make Canada fifty
first state, and invade or take over the Panama Canal.
Is there any merit to that argument or is it
just folly?
Speaker 2 (41:05):
Folly would be generous the terrible idea. Look, it seems
to be setting up a kind of spheres of influence
approach to the world. So we would have the lead
role in this part of the world, presumably Russia would
have a lead role in the European theater, China and
the Asia Pacific. Russia and China would be very happy
with that arrangement. No one in this hemisphere would be
(41:27):
so in a f any sort of way. We wouldn't
succeed at playing an outsized role because it would be
resisted every inch.
Speaker 3 (41:34):
Of the way.
Speaker 2 (41:35):
Americans, including a lot of the Maga people, wouldn't want
us involved in imperial wars in this part of the world,
whether it's Panama or Mexico, or Greenland or Canada.
Speaker 3 (41:48):
So I just think it's unnecessary.
Speaker 2 (41:51):
We can have the access the influence we need without
an imperial coercive role. And again, the real strategic challenges
of the century are not going to be met here.
Speaker 3 (42:03):
They're going to be met.
Speaker 2 (42:04):
In other parts of the world, above all Asia and
the Pacific. So I think it's really a truly misguided approach.
But it makes me uneasy because I can see something
of it, and this kind of people don't yet speak
about spheres of influence, but it's kind of in the
air of the water, and I'm uneasy about it. But
it's not a recipe for order. We would be resisted here,
(42:27):
and history suggest wherever there'd be a lot of opposition.
And by the way, it would become a real recipe
for proliferation. Watch how if something like that were to
begin to gain momentum, Watch countries in e urbeer in
Asia decide they need nuclear weapons of their own. So
I think that kind of an approach to the world
(42:48):
would be quite honestly catastrophic.
Speaker 1 (42:52):
Questions around the globe in terms of concerns we so
often neglect. Continent of Africa was a reference today of
Congo from the President the only time we tend to
focus on Africa as a relationship to China's investment. The
same with the Central America or South America as well.
(43:15):
I mean parts of the globe that seemed to be
under resourced in terms of mind share and investment, strategic investments.
What's your over under in terms of America's posture in
South America, Central America. But first let's start in Africa.
Speaker 2 (43:32):
What makes Africa, siouey generous, What makes it unique going
forward is demographics. Most of the world is getting a
shrinking in number and getting older. South Asia is the
one partial exception. Africa is an enormous exception. Africa is
going to be increasing by what more than a billion
people over the next generation or so, and the question
(43:54):
is whether that's a burden or a bonus, and that.
Speaker 3 (43:57):
Remains to be seen.
Speaker 2 (43:58):
So I think Africa is important, not in the sense
of great power strategic competition. That's a sideshow for the
most part, but really it's a human story. It's with
you know, all these people, and the question is can
economically these people, can they be employed?
Speaker 3 (44:18):
Can governments provide services?
Speaker 2 (44:20):
You can you have good enough governance, So in places
like Nigeria, South Africa and other countries that you don't.
Speaker 3 (44:27):
Have civil wars and so forth.
Speaker 2 (44:29):
So I think that's the big question for Africa, and
by the way, pretty true of Latin America as well,
without the democraptic dimension. But again, the biggest problems in
Latin America are not whether Brazil is going to invade
Argentina or whether Russia or China going to do.
Speaker 3 (44:44):
Some of the biggest issues they are internal their governance.
Can the Mexican.
Speaker 2 (44:47):
Government meet the responsibilities and challenges of sovereignty within Mexico?
Can they deal with cartels and drugs and criminals and
the and the light and where possible. I think our
policy ought to be to help these countries meet their challenges,
because it's good for them, but it's also good for us.
(45:09):
Then there'll be conditions of stability, better chance for democracy,
better chance for trade and investment, better way to deal
with whether it's health challenges or climate challenges or what
have you. So we do it it's both. Again, it's
not either or it's the right thing to do. It's
helpful to them, but I think it also very much
works in our favor. It's one of the reasons, by
(45:30):
the way, I'm so critical of what we've done to
the Agency for International Development. The real folly of that
is not that it provides opportunities for China, which it does,
but again, we weaken the ability of these societies and
these governments to deal with their immediate challenges. That can't
be good because ultimately failed states become places where terrorists
set up shop, where disease breaks out and spread, Pirates
(45:53):
do their things, criminals do their things. So again, even
out of narrow self interest, we ought to be doing
more in these places. So I just think it's quite
short sighted.
Speaker 1 (46:09):
So let me move back, and I see it. You've
got a book behind you that I want to talk
about in a moment, and it brings us back a
little bit more domestically, and it brings back sort of
just to the prism of you know, my lens has
changed dramatically in the last few weeks since I have
just shy have five thousand members of the US military
on the streets of one of America's largest cities, Los Angeles,
(46:34):
without council consent on the support of the state revere
the men and women in uniform that are out there
just not their assignment. But it also sort of assigned
some consideration and consciousness to this administration and what distinguishes
it from the first Trump administration. I know you've got
(46:58):
a blog You've written a little bit about this where
you said Trump is organized a cabinet that are more
of amplifiers than more traditional sort of metrics of people
that would sort of, you know, great sort of a
governing of our framework, regulatory or regulate some of the thinking.
I mean, where's where are you today in terms of
(47:21):
this administration? One hundred and fifty or so days in
however many days, it's been growing concern simmering concerns We
overstate authoritarianism. Is that a word that we should even
be using. Is democracy hanging in the balance or are
we fine? What's your sort of over under what's the
(47:41):
temperature right now?
Speaker 2 (47:43):
The fact that we have to have this conversation tells
you something am uneasy. I'm uncomfortable with words like authoritarianism
all that that's something to be avoided ultimately, but there's
tendencies that worry me. We haven't had. There's two major
lines that the administrations walked right up to and played
(48:06):
footsoe with but hasn't quite crossed in a decisive way.
One was the one you were alluding to, which is
the use of the American military inside our borders, and
that to me has all sorts of implications for American democracy,
but also it's terrible for the American military. It reduces readiness,
(48:26):
It politicizes what has been in some ways the most
successful modern American institution that we.
Speaker 3 (48:33):
Have. So that's one thing that makes me uneasy. We're not.
Speaker 2 (48:38):
We haven't quite crossed that line, but we've tiptoed up
to it, as you know better than I do. The
other is defiance of decisions by the judiciary, and again
some of the quasi defiance, not quite hearing what the
courts were saying on deportations and so far.
Speaker 3 (48:57):
So that leaves me uneasy. But I don't think.
Speaker 2 (48:59):
Either yet has reached the point of shall we say,
broad crisis or crisis of the first order.
Speaker 3 (49:05):
But I think there's grounds for being uneasy.
Speaker 2 (49:09):
Look, it's the irony of this isn't lost here we are.
It's now what late June and approximately what twelve months.
In a week we're going to be marking the two
hundred and fiftieth anniversary of this country. And to me,
the lesson is not to take democracy for granted. You've
(49:31):
done good things, by the way in your state with
Josh Friday, I think in terms of promoting volunteerism and
public service, which I think is great both for the
values enhances, but also it brings Americans together. I've tried
to make a big thing about Civics education. We shouldn't
assume that people don't need it or somehow get it automatically.
(49:51):
The answers they do need it and they don't get
in their schools. For the most part, that ought to
become much bigger priority, and we ought to think a
lot about what we need uh to do to make
sure American democracy works. But I get uneasy with some
of the attacks on civil society, whether it's law firms
or universities or or what have you. So I think
(50:12):
there's a lot of yellow lights flashing, and so my
view is we ought to we ought to be mindful
of them and not again not take anything for granted,
or you know, you know Churchill has always quoted for everything. Uh,
and one of them is that you Americans can always
be counted on to do the right thing after they
(50:33):
do everything else.
Speaker 3 (50:34):
There's a kind of sanguine quality.
Speaker 2 (50:36):
Or yeah, we get in trouble, but we've always come
out in the right place and never sell America short.
Speaker 3 (50:43):
Probably, but let's not take it for granted. That's my
only view.
Speaker 2 (50:46):
I think it's just a we ought to feel a
sense of urgency and the given how enormous the stakes are.
I don't think anybody kind of how to put it,
democracy can't be a spectator sport. And whether you were
in positions of authority like you, whether you're a quote
unquote justice citizen or you're a CEO of some business
(51:08):
or what have you.
Speaker 3 (51:10):
I just think there's ways for people to make a difference,
and again, we just can't. It's too valuable to not.
Speaker 2 (51:21):
How I put it, none of us wants to be
in a position where, if things do heads out, we
wish we had done things that we know that we
simply sat on the sidelines.
Speaker 1 (51:31):
You talk about citizenship, you've written about citizenship, and you've
challenged us to reconsider what you refer to as sort
of a lopsided notion of citizenship, that it's not just
about rights, it's about obligations. You wrote a book, the
Bill of Obligations, and you enumerate a framework about the
(51:52):
critical importance of service and civics, the common good, the
best of you know, the wrong and republic, Greek democracy,
and I think the principles are founding fathers. To talk
to us a little bit about what inspired you to
write the book. You wrote it a few years ago,
I imagine inspiration today would be even more acute. But
(52:15):
it's an important and essential read. And by the way,
it's fantastic for anyone that's listening. Talk to me Richard
a little bit and all of us about what inspired
this book and what you're really trying to communicate.
Speaker 3 (52:29):
Well, first of all, thank you.
Speaker 2 (52:31):
Years before I wrote another book called Foreign Policy Begins
at Home. And you know, I'm a fart as you look,
as we can see from this conversation, for better or worse,
I'm a foreign policy guy. That's my educational training, that's
my professional experience. But probably about a decade ago I
started to see much greater connection between what we were
doing or not doing here at home, and our ability
(52:52):
to be effective abroad. I wrote about everything from indebtedness
ten years ago. A big issue was energy dependence. By
the way, shows we can work through things. Quality or
lack of it, of our public education, strength of our democracy.
Speaker 3 (53:08):
And I was worried very much.
Speaker 2 (53:09):
A decade ago about our inability to generate majorities to
deal with the challenges increasingly, particularly at the federal level,
less so at the state level. We were gridlocked. And
what I noticed in the year since that things weren't
getting better, things were getting worse. And so I just decided,
(53:29):
I can't quite answer your question what inspired me, but
I was just thinking a lot about it. And I
take long walks when I think about a book, and
Central Park becomes my co author. And just then went
back and reread or in some cases read for the
first time, a lot of the great works of American
political history, and I was just struck by how much
(53:53):
explicitly a lot of our modern are not so modern
history was about the expansion of rights what Lincoln called
the unfinished work, and I get it, and it's actually
been one of the great things civil rights and so forth.
We have a lot to be proud of in this
country towards a more perfect union. We're not there, but
we've made some real strides. But it seemed to be
(54:13):
lost in that. Increasingly was the other side of us
that no one was any more talking about obligations. It's
interesting the founding fathers didn't talk about it a lot explicitly.
I think they assumed it. Gavin, I think it was implicit.
They didn't think they needed to remind people about it.
But increasingly it seemed to me we did. You look
at the numbers of the people who are eligible to
(54:33):
vote and don't vote, the amount of people who get
their information quote unquote from TikTok rather than from serious sources,
the polls that show young people don't value democracy, don't
think it's worth saving, the lack of public service opportunities increasingly,
the failure to require quality the civics to be taught
(54:56):
in classrooms, growing threats or realities of pe to go violence,
and on and on, and things like COVID and so forth,
showed me that a lack of what you mentioned before
about the common good, whether to get vaccinated, to wear
a mask. It's not just for me, but it's also
for the other person. So it just all added up
and I just decided that I would I would put
(55:20):
my hand to it. So it's for me as an author.
It was great. But I learned more writing that book
than any other book I've ever written, because I knew
less about it going in.
Speaker 1 (55:30):
And you've written what sixteen book? How many books?
Speaker 2 (55:32):
I've written a dozen and edited a few more. So
it's a it's a large it's up to sixteen. But
I'm not done yet. I got a few more in me.
Speaker 1 (55:45):
There's plenty of chapters of your life left and and
and look, I'm grateful for this opportunity to share a
little bit of your time and your your your action
and passion as it were. And when we get you back,
I need you back for the original conversation we haven't had,
which is what the hell is going on with my party,
(56:06):
the Democratic Party?
Speaker 3 (56:08):
Uh?
Speaker 1 (56:08):
And how we're going to take back the House, what
we need to do? Uh? And uh, how we get
back on the right side of these presidential elections.
Speaker 3 (56:17):
You give me thirty more seconds.
Speaker 2 (56:18):
I was going to raise that which is out everyone's
talking about bda battle damage assessment in terms of Iran.
I was going to raise Bda in terms of the
New York mayoral primary.
Speaker 1 (56:29):
Uh okay, is that how we're going to end this
as opposed to begin this conversation. Uh? That is for
all of you listening a preview of the next podcast
or your us I guess on well, part one of
this two part pod. Richard, thanks for being
Speaker 3 (56:49):
Here, Thank you sir, enjoying us
This is Gavin Newsom, and this is Richard Haas. Richard,
thank you so much for taking the time to come on,
particularly at a remarkable time in world history, particularly in
history unfolding in the Middle East. Today. President Trump seemed
to have a day that he's been looking forward to
(00:31):
for years and years and years, pushing NATO to move
from two percent to five percent. What was your takeaway
from this NATO summit, at least the first day, and
just Trump deserve I think a lot of praise and
for an accomplishment here.
Speaker 2 (00:49):
I would argue President Trump, well, first of all, got
being good to be with you. Thank you, Like I
would argue President Trump deserves credit for spurring the Europeans
to do they ought to have done years before, they
ought to be putting forward a larger share of the
effort for what's a common defense.
Speaker 3 (01:08):
I was just as an aside.
Speaker 2 (01:10):
I would say, much more important to me than whether
the Europeans spend three percent or two and a half
or four and a half is how they spend it.
And I'd actually say something you'd probably agree with. In
public policy, how you spend money is almost always more
important than how much you spend, and the problem with
European defense is not just that they spend too little,
but each country pretty much determines how it spends its
(01:32):
defense euros, so the whole ends up being less than
the sum of its parts. So I would be pushing
if I were advising the president, I would say, yeah,
push them to do more, but secondly, also push them
in a sense to become more European, rather than country
by country by country, which is the way they often
go about it.
Speaker 3 (01:52):
But I think that part is good.
Speaker 2 (01:53):
Less good is I think he's introduced some doubts into
the reliability of the United States and when I call
the automatic quality of Article five, America's willingness to go
to bat for Europe. And obviously there's also some fairly
significant differences about how to handle the most immediate threat,
which is Russia and the war in Ukraine. So I
(02:17):
think it's a mixed bag. But yes, it's good to
see the Europeans essentially getting pushed to do more.
Speaker 1 (02:23):
And it's interesting just as you unpack and I appreciate
how you spend and where you spend. It was interesting
just looking at some of the details that their direct
spend in support of Ukraine would be considered as part
of that contribution as it relates to that breakdown of
five percent. It was also, though interesting to see the
breakdown within the countries. Obviously Germany looking to move quicker
(02:45):
by twenty twenty nine with close to seventy percent increase
in their domestic defense spending, and then Spain, who was
called out by the President today, looking not necessarily to
reach that numerica. Does that mean much to you or
is that just that's just noise?
Speaker 2 (03:05):
The most interesting part of that is Germany less what
Germany is prepared to do in defense, though doing more
is welcome, but Germany has changed its laws and essentially
now is able to raise serious debt, which was something
that modern Germany had an allergy to because of the
whole Weimar experience, and the fact that Germany now can
(03:26):
really go into the markets and raise that gives them
far more capacity to potentially grow their economies as well
as to contribute to national security.
Speaker 3 (03:36):
And then even go so.
Speaker 2 (03:37):
Far as to say the most interesting figure in Europe
right now is the new Chancellor of Germany. And even
though he had a rough start and getting confirmed and
so forth by his parliament, I actually think the Chancellor
Mertz is in a position to in some ways have
Germany stake out the leadership position in Europe, something that
historically since World War Two Germany has been reticent to
(03:59):
do so. Would I would watch that space, particularly since
the French, the British and others are so gridlocked domestically.
I think Germany now occupies the critical position.
Speaker 1 (04:10):
When you referenced the Article five sort of you know,
I think the president when he was flying over there
was some ambiguity once again sort of creating some doubt
and anxiety. He seemed to shift tone a little bit
when he landed, But that is just that on again,
off again relationship to the Article five. Is that what
you're referring to as sort of a lack of certainty
(04:31):
and confidence in the president?
Speaker 3 (04:32):
Yeah.
Speaker 2 (04:33):
For those who haven't read the NATO treaty recently, Article
five is the core of the agreement. We're essentially an
attack on one who is considered to be an attack
on all. Curiously, it's only been invoked once in NATO's
entire history, and that was on behalf of the United
States after nine to eleven. But alliances depend upon predictability
(04:54):
and reliability and dependability, and I would argue that President
Trump has introduced a significant degree of uncertainty into that,
which I think is counterproductive. He would argue, perhaps it
was necessary to get the Europeans to do more. I
would have said, well, probably there's better ways to do that,
but that's where we are, and to the extent Russia sensus,
(05:16):
there's uncertainty there putin who as we've seen in Ukraine,
can be risk frunt it might be more likely to
take risks. So I always believe that the best way
to deter is through certainty. So your friends know you'll
be there for them, and just as important, your enemies
know you'll be there for your friends. So I would
like for President Trump, as the days and weeks and
(05:36):
months unfold, to look for opportunities to make clear that
whatever our differences are with Europe over their level of
defense effort, we see it as in our interest to
be there with them.
Speaker 1 (05:47):
You're here. What in terms of the actual bombing itself,
and I think my most objective standards, it was a success.
Whether or not these sites were quote unquote obliterated, that's
a separate conversation, is that your assessment that this was
a success, that in the spirit of what you just
said around some certainty that the President wasn't bluffing in
(06:11):
terms of wanting to get diplomatic deal done. They appeared
not to want to move in that direction, so then
he asserted himself militarily.
Speaker 3 (06:19):
I think it was the right thing to do.
Speaker 2 (06:21):
For years, we've been playing this game with the Iranians
where they were enriching uranium far far, far beyond levels
anybody would need to generate electricity, so we all knew
what this was about to put into place. The were
prerequisites for a nuclear weapons program. I also understood we
couldn't allow Iron to get on the threshold, much less
(06:42):
have nuclear weapons. We made that mistake. I would argue
with North Korea, we don't want to have it now
in this part of the world, because if Aron ever
got nuclear weapons, not only would they act more aggressively
imposed potentially an existential threat to Israel. But you know,
and I know, the Saudis, the Egyptians, the Turks and
others would follow suits. And the only thing worse than
the Middle East we've known is the Middle East I've
(07:03):
just described. So I think what Israel and then the
United States did was warrant it we'll see what the
results are. Whatever the Iran, whatever happened, the Iranian program
was not obliterated. Elements of their program I expect will
have survived the attacks on the three sides. More important,
I don't know. You don't know, probably the president doesn't
(07:24):
know what amount of uranium or number of centrifuges and
so forth are under some roof of some warehouse and
some other part of Iran. I actually think going forward, Devin,
we have got to assume just the opposite, that the
Iranian program was not obliterating, but elements of that program exist.
Speaker 3 (07:43):
And what's worrisome to me, I'll be honest with you.
Speaker 2 (07:46):
I would think that a lot of Iranian leaders have said, Hey,
this never would have happened. Had we had nuclear weapons,
we could have deterred the Israelis in the Americas. So
I worry that going forward, I think their determination to
develop nuclear weapons might, if anything, be even greater.
Speaker 1 (08:02):
Well, you know, I want to just pick up on
that point because that's interesting observation in an important one.
And we'll get to North Korea as well in a second.
Because your reference goes back to the opportunity the United
States had under the Clinton administration to take out their
program before it proliferated. But I want to talk a
little bit about the Non Proliferation Treaty. People have brought
(08:23):
that up since the nineteen seventies. I think two hundred
countries were signatories to that, including Iran. There were a
number of countries that have developed nuclear programs that were
not original signers to that. Obviously Korea and Israel and
the extent they have a nuclear program quote unquote, but
(08:43):
certainly India and Pakistan. But those countries as a consequence,
would make the claim you just made that they've been
they've had that deterrent. Now Iran assumed that they would
not be bombed, I presume under the terms of the
Non Proliferation Treaty. Does that put at risk the entire
notion of the non Proliferation Treaty?
Speaker 3 (09:04):
What's just occurred, So let me give you a slightly
convoluted answer.
Speaker 2 (09:08):
The Non Proliferation Treaty is only a small piece of
the effort against non proliferation. I don't think it's a
wildly successful piece in many ways because it really is
a gentleman's agreement. We declare what facilities we're doing, certain
types of research or engineering in and then the inspectors
come look at them. The inspectors can't look at places that.
Speaker 3 (09:29):
Are not known.
Speaker 2 (09:30):
So the entire treaty in that sense is based upon
a degree of faith that I tend.
Speaker 3 (09:36):
Not to have.
Speaker 2 (09:36):
North Korea withdrew from the treaty and there was no
particular penalty or anything for them having done so. Turns
out the most important non proliferation tool out there is
not the Treaty. It's called America's alliances. By giving countries
the confidence that we are there for them, they then
don't need to become self sufficient, and the biggest way
to accelerate proliferation will be, for example, of the South
(09:59):
Koreans or other has come to have doubts about their
relationships with US. So don't get me wrong, I'm not
saying the Non Proliferation Treaty doesn't have some utility, and
I think in particular the inspection provisions can be useful,
but we shouldn't exaggerate it's impact that Iran I would
think was going to do and is going to do
(10:19):
and what it wants regardless of its obligations under.
Speaker 1 (10:23):
This treat So back to what you were saying, I mean,
so just let's speculate what goes happens going forward. Obviously,
this notion of resim change, people sort of pull back
a little bit, or least it appears the President's pulled back.
I don't know if BB is pulled back on the
notion of regime change. But what won't change is their pursuit,
(10:43):
presumably of a nuclear weapon. As you note, we don't
know that the program was quote unquote obliterated. Even if
the physical sites may have been, we don't know where
this enriched uranium is and centrifugius you imagine. Now your
concern is now what that they accelerate that program with
the darkness, meaning without any international inspectors.
Speaker 3 (11:05):
That's my concern.
Speaker 2 (11:06):
It might not be their immedia priority, which I think
is to shore up the regime. But at some point
I do think reconstituting a program will become a priority,
which means, by the way, the day may come where
Israeli United States needs to once again use military force
if we discover some activity going on in the Iranians
won't voluntarily give it up. It's not normal that problems
(11:30):
get solved. When I was the head of the Council,
on Foreign Relations. I used to discourage the Fellows from
using the words solved or solution, because that's just the
way history works. So I don't believe whatever it is
we accomplished the other day, however much we accomplished, it
didn't solve the problem. It may have reduced it. It
may have set back the Iranian program, but that'll pop
(11:51):
up again. It's by the way you mentioned regime change.
It's one of the reasons that people, I think are
attracted to the idea. If you can't solve the Iranian
problem through military force or through diplomacy, then people say,
what's left, Well, let's get a benign government. And I
think that's why there's so much interest in regime change.
The problem is it's easier to talk about it than
(12:13):
bring it about. I don't see the prerequisites in place
for it, and in any case, you can't base.
Speaker 3 (12:20):
Your policy on it.
Speaker 2 (12:21):
People don't like it when I say this, but it's
a wish more than a strategy. If it were to happen.
I think it brings problems but obvious benefits with it.
But we just can't count on it, and no president
can give the order to say Secretary of Defense or
state and say, get me regime change in Iran.
Speaker 3 (12:40):
They wouldn't have then the tools to necessarily.
Speaker 1 (12:43):
Carry it out when it comes to just issues of trust.
And you know, I think one of the questions that
I get and I ask myself all the time, I
feel like, for most of my adult life, I've been
hearing baby Net and Yaho say they're just months away,
a year away from having weapons grade nuclear weapons, and
(13:04):
you know, a certain point you just stopped believing it.
But your assessment, you know, your own objective assessment this
time did appear to be different, that they were getting
closer and actually appeared to be within a matter of
months in a position where potentially we had a weapons
grade weapon coming out of Iran? Is that accurate?
Speaker 2 (13:25):
Pretty much? Look, this was a gathering threat. It wasn't
an imminent threat. It was a gathering threat. And the
question is how close Now we know they had done
most of the enrichment work they need to do to
get it uranium enriched a plus or minus sixty percent,
that's not just sixty percent of the effort, that's actually
closer to ninety percent of the effort. For reasons of physics,
that I couldn't explain because I don't understand them well enough.
Speaker 3 (13:48):
But I think I'm right there. Now. What you don't
know is how close they were on some of the
other things.
Speaker 2 (13:54):
The actual fabrication of explosive device is the bomb, and
so forth. And there there was the Israelis, believe the
economists published some very interesting stuff about it, that they
had made some breakthroughs, they had had some secret programs
and so forth. And I think we have to be tolerant,
just like after nine to eleven we were less willing
(14:16):
to run certain risks, say about what Iraq could do.
And this is not a justification for the Iraq war.
I was against it, but just I understand some of
the thinking. I think Israel after October seventh had less
tolerance of running certain risks in their case. So I
just think the combination of a change mentality in Israel,
the evisceration of groups like Hisbella, which couldn't really attack
(14:41):
Israel anymore, and this new intelligence would suggested, however, far
along the Iranians, for they were farther along. And I
think for all those reasons, the Israelis decided to act
and we came in behind.
Speaker 1 (14:55):
Does this keep BB in power for another extended period
of time.
Speaker 2 (14:59):
We roughly what sixteen seventeen months to run before he
has to. I think the elections are scheduled for October
of next year. It certainly helps them. Mean Israel, as
you know, is deeply divided about issues on democracy, Gaza,
what have you, whether the religious can be drafted and
so forth. They are not divided on Iran, left and right,
(15:20):
hawk and dove. There aren't a lot of doves in
Israel when it comes to rod. So it clearly helps BB.
It changes the conversation a little bit, It brings Israel together.
It's seen as an accomplishment, and he has He has
changed in many ways israel strategic reality given the change
in Syria is volah, the weakening of a masque. Whatever
(15:41):
you think, however critical people watching this might be of
what Israel's done and how it's done it in Gaza,
the reality is that BB nets and Yahou in the
last what eighteen months, has dramatically reduced the external threat
to Israel.
Speaker 1 (16:00):
And on that basis, are you confident that we'll have
sort of a you know, Abraham Accord two point zero
with Saudi coming in? Is that the map that you
see changing or is that still opening end in question
with the everything that's going on or not going on
in Gaza, West Bank, et cetera. What's your over under
(16:21):
on that look?
Speaker 2 (16:22):
As you know, for a while it looked like it
was going to happen before October seventh, and then because
of if you were October eighth and Israeli policy, the
Saudis backed off. They got nervous or uneasy about it.
Two things may have changed now, though, which is interesting.
One is beaving that Tan Yahoo. As you were just suggesting,
Gavin politically is stronger than he was, so he might
(16:44):
give him more leverage against those in his government who
oppose any sort of change in policy on Gaza.
Speaker 3 (16:50):
Secondly, there's this guy named Donald Trump.
Speaker 2 (16:52):
It's interesting on how many occasions Trump has distanced himself
from beving that Ta Nyahoo. He did it on the huties,
he did it on the prisoner move with Hamas he
told the Israelis a few weeks ago, don't you dare
attack around. We're trying to see if diplomacy works. Just
the other day, shall we say, I'm rather colorful language.
(17:13):
He was out there. So it's possible that tomorrow he
would tell the israel Is, hey, knock it off in
Gaza or do this on the West Bank. There's an
unsentimental quality to America firstism. And one of the things
you see, we've beganned the conversation talking about Europe. Well,
(17:34):
one of the things, whether we're talking about security or
tariffs or now this being an ally of the United
States ain't when it used to be. When it comes
to Donald Trump, friends and allies no longer get preferred treatment.
So it wouldn't shock me if Donald Trump, in his
hope to get the Saut East to normalize with Israel,
put real pressure on bb Nets and Yao and we
(17:55):
put the Israelis in a real jam. Trump is popular
in Israel. And also it's almost like Nixon going to China.
Nixon Wan said, you know, they didn't have Nixon to
worry about. Well, you can't do an end run around
Donald Trump. So if Donald Trump leans on vving Netshanyahu,
who are the Israelis going to appeal to in American
domestic politics. So I actually, I actually think that's a
(18:15):
curious possibility that something could happen there.
Speaker 1 (18:19):
Do you find him under the influence And I say,
that loosely, I mean because of his own financial relationships
to the UAE and guitar and the Saudi's sort of
the Arab I mean, do you think they will play
an outsize role in influencing Trump in that respect?
Speaker 2 (18:37):
Look, if they had, you probably would have gone ahead
and done the strike. As much as they wanted around
cut down to size. They were very nervous that they
were going to be in the line of fire of retaliation.
So my guess is there an influence but not a
determinant of what he does.
Speaker 3 (18:53):
And I say that in no way how would I
put it.
Speaker 2 (18:56):
I'm not comfortable with, shall we say, this merging of
the personal the government when it comes to wealth creation
or you know, the fact that people don't refuse themselves
from things, or they carry on private sector activity. I'm
as uncomfortable as I expect you are, or a lot
of people watching that, But I don't think they have.
Speaker 3 (19:14):
I haven't seen that they have undoing. I haven't seen it.
Speaker 1 (19:17):
Over is, you've written a lot about doctrines. You talk
about the Monroe doctrine. I think eighteen twenty three you've
sort of walked us through the Truman doctrine and aspects
of of not only Reagan, but even the freedom doctrine
as you refer to it under the Bush administration dealing
with terrorism, no place to hide? What do you have
any sense of what the hell that Trump doctrine is? Or,
(19:40):
I mean, Jade Vance tried to sert one in a
speech yesterday. What America first? What is it? What's your sense?
Speaker 3 (19:48):
It's a good question. I think about it a lot.
Speaker 2 (19:51):
Well, it might be earlier, it's still early, particularly in
the second term, and the second term is a hell
of a lot more than a continuation of the first term.
You may love that, you may hate it, but it
ain't Trump two point zero is more than an extension
of Trump one point Oh. There is something with this
America first ism that our alliances aren't as predictable, our
(20:12):
enemies aren't aren't seen as enemies. There's a kind of
perpetual maneuver in American foreign policies. I'm not quite sure
if that adds to a doctrine. In some ways, doctrines
lead you to predictable outcomes. In a funny sort of way,
Trump America first ism at times leads you to unpredictable outcomes.
It's not isolationist, though I would say it's quite unilateral,
(20:35):
you know, as we saw the the other day. I
also wrote a few weeks ago that there is something
of a doctrine. It's the opposite of the freedom doctrine,
where under people like George W.
Speaker 3 (20:45):
Bush or even Reagan.
Speaker 2 (20:47):
Or Carter, we cared an awful lot about how governments
treated their own people. This is just the opposite. This
is all look the other way foreign policy. What you
do inside your boards is your business. All we care
about is that our business. So there's almost amoral quality
to Trump be in foreign policy. And again, doctrines have
(21:07):
to explain and predict. So I'm not quite sure yet
we have anything that quite rises to that level.
Speaker 1 (21:13):
Interesting. I mean, the only thing that would that would
contradict that modestly was JD Vance's speech in Munich where
he's lecturing the Europeans one hundred percent.
Speaker 2 (21:22):
You're right to point out that contradiction. It's the one
area where it's almost like there's an equation of elite
Ivy League universities with elite Europe. And that's the one
place where the administration is willing to tackle internal situations
or circumstances in foreign countries.
Speaker 3 (21:42):
But I think that's the exception that kind of proves
the rule.
Speaker 1 (21:45):
Interesting. So where where's Putin now? What's he seen? What's what?
What do you think he's made of the last twelve days?
Where is he in relationship? I mean he's got a
free pass in some respects. The eyes are off him.
He's stepping things up in Ukraine. Is it status quo
ante or is he now reconsidering things?
Speaker 2 (22:05):
Probably a mixed bag. Well, as you say, I think
you're a hundred percent right. He has to be happy
with the fact that both at the G seven and
then at Nato Zelenski and Ukraine were not quite center
stage yep. And that very much fits or feeds Putin's idea.
The time is on his side, so I think he
has to feel pretty good, pretty good about that. Anytime
(22:28):
there's instability that increases energy prices, not that we've seen
a real price bike, that's got to make him feel good.
Speaker 3 (22:33):
Given his economy, it's got to.
Speaker 2 (22:35):
Feel a little bit uneasy with this demonstration of American power,
with the discrepancy between what the United States can do
and what say Iran could do.
Speaker 3 (22:44):
That's got to make them a little bit.
Speaker 2 (22:45):
Uneasy, but I would think all things equal to the
last few days probably made them feel okay.
Speaker 3 (22:51):
For one other reason.
Speaker 2 (22:52):
I don't know if you noticed, the won my Hutzpow
Award for the month the statement by the Russia Foreign
Ministry critical of ISRAE for not respecting the territorial integrity
and sovereignty of a UN member.
Speaker 3 (23:06):
And I'm sitting there reading that, going really really so.
Speaker 2 (23:10):
But the Russians have to like the idea that we
are we would unilaterally decide that certain uses of force
were somehow acceptable, and that's got to be something that
Putin might actually, you know, welcome.
Speaker 1 (23:24):
And do you welcome? Sort of I mean, look from
a tactical perspective, turn the page. In terms of trying
to negotiate peace in Ukraine. Obviously stubborn, he wasn't able
to get it done before he took the oath of office.
He wasn't able to get it done within the twenty
four hour time clock, and he set himself up for
but sort of the overtures to Putin, sort of negotiating
(23:44):
Putin's talking points and putting Zelenski on the spot. But
where do you think Trump is right now in relationship to.
You know, he's been a little more critical, at least publicly,
been willing to be slightly more critical Putin, do you
where do you think the administration is move into to
a conclusion or solution here.
Speaker 2 (24:04):
They're caught in the inconsistency of their own policy. They're
right to say that we need peace there. And I
think they had one improvement over the Biden policy, where
the Biden administration would never speak honestly with Zelenski, at
least publicly, and say, look, you know and we know
that you're not going to militarily liberate Crimea or all
(24:25):
the East. Let's go for a deal that we get
a cease fire. It doesn't prejudice your long term goals,
but let's stop this war. That's Trump's idea, and I
think that's smart. I think that's realistic. Where he's inconsistent
is he sabotaged. He's sabotaging the chance for getting it
by not being supportive of Ukraine. That gives Putin again
(24:46):
the confidence that time is on his side. If this
president would announce this summer, when the pipeline begins to
run dry, we're going to re up American aid for Ukraine,
not so they can militarily liberate all their land. That's
going to have to be done diplomatically, but so Russian
efforts will not succeed. I think that would turn the
(25:09):
war out, and I actually think we may with the
more specifical I think that would persuade Putin over time
that more war would not lead to more territory. And
I think that actually would be the way to get
things at the negotiating table, not for peace, but for
cease fires. So the administration has the right goals, it's
just not going it's going about it in one hundred
(25:29):
percent the wrong way.
Speaker 1 (25:31):
Is she looking at you know, a year whatever we're
in with Ukraine? Is that make him more or less
likely to pursue and make advanced pursuits in Taiwan? Or
has he seen something different the asymmetry of warfare now,
(25:52):
the nature and change the transformation of warfare. What's your
sense of where she is at this moment as well
in relate not only to Ukraine, but also perhaps more
broadly as well to what the Trump administration just initiated
in bb in around.
Speaker 2 (26:09):
My glim answer to is going to be both or yes.
I think on one hand, he looks at Ukraine. He
looks at the sanctions that have been introduced. He looks
at how Putin overestimated the capabilities of his own military.
He's seen how the West came to bat indirectly but
decisively for Ukraine.
Speaker 3 (26:30):
That had to have given him pause. I mean, look,
think about it. There's no general in the Chinese military
who has military experience. Yeah, they have.
Speaker 2 (26:38):
The least time they fought to wars against Vietnam, they didn't.
They didn't do so hot. And for the Chinese government
to go to war against Taiwan and not succeed, imagine
the domestic political consequences of that, The questions of legitimacy
they would raise, not just for she as a person,
but for the party. So I actually think they're they're
(27:01):
somewhat cautious here. I also think they have to find
it impossible to read Donald Trump again, given the tariffs,
given what he just did the other day, and I
think that must introduce a role of caution. I think
they've got some internal issues. He's been purging a lot
of military leaders. They've obviously got their economic challenges. So
(27:21):
he hasn't given up. Don't get me wrong, that Taiwan
is his legacy. That's his way to make himself a
major figure in modern Chinese history. But I don't think
the moments arrived. I think he wants to get a
better reading on Donald Trump. We still don't have a
good feel for the Trump administration's relations with Japan, Taiwan, Australia,
(27:44):
but none of it's going particularly well. I think he
probably wants to see some more about the lessons of
the modern battlefield. He still wants to build up, among
other things, as nuclear arms.
Speaker 3 (27:54):
One of the.
Speaker 2 (27:55):
Lessons I think Shiesh Jing learn gav was the United
States did not get directly involved in helping Ukraine, and
he I think from Xijianpingk's point of view, that was
because of the mass of Russian nuclear arsenal. So China
right now is the owner of the world's fastest growing
nuclear arsenal. They're adding hundreds and hundreds of nuclear weapons
each year. They want to get they kind of want
(28:16):
to get the bronze medal in the Serious Nuclear Arsenal's Olympics,
and they're moving as quickly as they can in that direction.
But my guess is they don't want to show down
over Taiwan. For several years until they believe they can
offset or deter any American pressure because of our nuclear advantages.
Speaker 1 (28:38):
What do you make of the new president in Taiwan?
He's rolling out I think this week a unity tour,
is giving speeches. He seems to be you know, you know,
it's sort of not poking the bear, but certainly trying
to sort of suggest more muscularity visa the mainland China.
(28:59):
Is that you know, what do you what do you
read into that?
Speaker 2 (29:02):
Yeah, I mean, some of that's politics, some of it
spoken to bear. My view is what I really want
to do is see Taiwan get stronger. In Taiwan's the
level of defense effort is not in the right zip code. Still,
they've got to do a lot more. I look at
I mean, we talked about Israel a lot, and you know,
Israel's and shall we say, difficult strategic situation at least
(29:22):
it has been for most of its existence. And you
look at the level of military effort they've produced, or
even US during the Cold War, we were probably spending
i don't know, on the average of maybe six five,
six seven percent of GDP. Taiwan's nowhere near that. And
look at the disparities between the mainland and Taiwan. So
Taiwan more important than what they say is what they do,
(29:44):
and I would say they've really got to make a
much larger effort. They've got to also look very carefully
at what just happened in the Middle East and what's
happened in Ukraine and ask themselves whether they are incorporating
the right strategic lessons. Too much of the Taiwan military
historically has elements almost of ours, a small number of
expensive aircraft and so forth. I actually think they need
(30:06):
something much larger numbers are smaller, cheaper systems would probably
be helpful. The other country to really watch there is Japan.
I actually think we're at a moment in history where
Japan's our most important ally still the world's third largest economy,
and militarily it's central to any scenario involving Chinese pressure
(30:28):
against Taiwan. And I worry about the deterioration and that
relationship of late. So again, things like that might actually
affect Chinese calculations as well. But all I said, even
though you know, I worry about a lot, and I
worry about this as a strategic, medium, long term challenge.
Speaker 3 (30:47):
I don't get the sense this is a near term challenge.
Speaker 1 (30:50):
Interesting only slight correction. Japan is fourth to California's third.
I just had it comment on that four points. I'm
just saying, I'm waiting for my G seven invitation. That's
all you know, our G G five. I mean, I
don't know whatever G four of three. It's interesting you
(31:16):
say Japan is the most important. I've heard people others
sort of you know, suggest that Australia plays an outsize
role in terms of just you know, looking at the
sort of strategic realignment. Where do you make I mean
that president or the leadership there surprised some punderance and
pulling out a pretty healthy margin and the victory. Obviously
(31:38):
they're overtures back and forth to China. But you made
a point which I don't really reflected on Trump's sort
of ambiguity with those relationships South Korea obviously and Japan
and the trilat that the Bidy administration had. Now we're
seeing that taking shape with she and obviously Australia seems
(31:59):
to be sort of the plus one right now. But
give me your sense of where Australia plays.
Speaker 3 (32:04):
Look, Australia does play an outsize role.
Speaker 2 (32:07):
I think that the relationship isn't as robust as it
ought to be, hasn't gotten a whole lot of attention,
a lot of you know, a lot of our economic
policy has alienated our friends, you know, the tariffs in particular.
Most of the line on defense is do more, do more,
do more, and that gets a little bit old after
(32:28):
a while. So I would like to see if you
will more consultation with them. And again, you can't have
economic policy and military or strategic policy carried out in
separate silos. It's very hard to hammer an ally or
friend over trade issues on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, and
(32:48):
expect on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. The strategic relationship is
going to be just fine. Doesn't work that way, So
I would say this is again I'm critical of a
lot of the economic policy on it its own merits.
Speaker 3 (33:01):
I don't think it makes sense full stop.
Speaker 2 (33:03):
But even putting that aside, it certainly doesn't make sense
because it ends up penalizing more than anyone our friends,
just those with the exception of China. It's our friends
and neighbors who are, as you know, our biggest economic partners.
Speaker 1 (33:16):
Today. Donald Trump in his press conference when I was
confronted on why he hasn't solved the conflict in Ukraine immediately, well,
he pivoted to his success in immediately solving the crisis
in Pakistan and India. Overstated, understated? Is that an early
success that he deserves more credit than perhaps he's been given.
Speaker 2 (33:41):
It sounds slightly ungenerous my part, but I think it's
a bit exaggerated. And it also has rub raw US
Indian relations.
Speaker 1 (33:50):
I was going to ask that next.
Speaker 2 (33:51):
Yeah, and look, it's always been difficult dealing with Pakistan
and dealing with India. But I think the great breakthrough,
and it was a bipartisan one of them the last
several administrations, was that US Indian relations got on a firmer,
more important strategic footing made sense given India's demographics, economics,
(34:12):
relationship with China and so forth. We bean, as you know,
to bring Indian into various Asia Pacific strategic groupings. I've
always seen Pakistan more as a problem than as a partner.
It was a problem in Afghanistan in many ways, and
you know, the questions of democracy and human rights, the
(34:33):
role of the military and politics it's been a very
uneasy country. If you had asked me years ago what
keeps me up most tonight, I might have said Pakistan,
in part because the potential loss of command and control
over nuclear materials. So the even handedness that we've reintroduced.
And then the shorthand for this is that we've we've
(34:54):
once again, we've once again hyphenated the relationship.
Speaker 3 (34:57):
So rather than having a strategic relationship with India and.
Speaker 2 (35:01):
A lesser relationship with Pakistan, we now once again have
India Pakistan policy. And it seems to me that is
not a wise approach given what I would argue is
India's greater inherent importance and potential.
Speaker 3 (35:16):
You know, how close they really were?
Speaker 2 (35:18):
You know, I don't think things were that close to
escalating or getting out of a hand that said, Look,
anytime the United States can dampen down actual or potential hostilities,
you know, great, and I would you know, say well
done to the President or the Secretary of State or
anyone else who had a hand in it. But yeah,
(35:41):
I wouldn't exaggerate it here. And again it may have
come at some cost as well.
Speaker 1 (35:45):
Yeah, well, and then there was also a price. The
largest I think one of their crypto exchanges in Pakistan
now is yeah, well, and we'll get back into the
corruption questions, or at least questions of corruption.
Speaker 2 (36:00):
Look, I've heard that, and yeah, I don't know, but yeah,
it is what it is.
Speaker 1 (36:04):
It is what it is. So you've been writing a
lot about, talking a lot about, and obviously only highlighted
with the last few weeks, But what the hell's wrong
with American foreign policy? We get so damn bogged down
in the Middle East. You've made the point there's a
whole world out there. We talked, we've sort of jumped
around different countries, different regions, but the reality is we
(36:25):
have been for decades and decades and decades bogged down
in the Middle East. You you e've an interesting history
working in Republican administrations, Bush administrations, But you made the
notation earlier, and it's important point to highlight you were
opposed to that last war in Iraq, and so you've
seen some light and some wisdom through all this. But
what the hell has happened to the United States over
(36:45):
the last I mean, my entire lifetime been consumed by
countries none of us could pronounce. No one knows the
difference between Iraq and Iran. I think there was a
song about that, and you know what's going on, Richard help.
Speaker 3 (36:59):
Us a fair question.
Speaker 2 (37:01):
Just for the record, I didn't work for a democratic administration.
I worked in the Carter Pentagon. And one of the
big issues then was the Middle East. Is nineteen seventy
nine you had the revolution in Iran, then you had
the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.
Speaker 3 (37:16):
Look when the Cold War ended, what thirty five years.
Speaker 2 (37:18):
Ago, I don't think anyone would have predicted Devin that
the Middle East would be such a focus of American
fire policy. The first real crisis of the post Cold
War era was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. We President
Bush forty one rallied the country in the world to
Kuwait's defense.
Speaker 3 (37:38):
It was quite extraordinary. I think it was actually to me.
Speaker 2 (37:43):
Like I duly note that I was part of the administration,
I worked on the Middle East. But you know, credit
I think is due to the President, bren Scokropt, Jim
Baker and others. It was quite remarkably done well, and
I think what we did was necessary. The two thousand
and three Iraq War was a war of choice. I
think it was misguided and some other I think with
(38:05):
the other day what we did was I think was warranted.
But in general, if I look at the map of
American farm policity and that you still have forty thousand
troops in the Middle East, it seems to me that
it's a disproportionate focus for US. It's the one it's
one of the parts the world where you don't have
a great power presence, you don't really have much great
power competition, and that it's you have regional powers, not
(38:29):
great powers.
Speaker 3 (38:30):
I would say.
Speaker 2 (38:30):
Ultimately twenty first century history is going to be much
more written about what happens in Europe and above all
the Asia Pacific. Asia Pacific is where the people are,
it's where the wealth is, It's where the militaries are
going to be. US China competition will be defining. So
it seems to me strategically there is still something odd
(38:51):
about the emphasis that the Middle East gets, and I
think we've we've gotten too ambitious there at times. I think,
in particular forty three's effort to transform it to bring
about democracy was.
Speaker 3 (39:05):
I think still advised.
Speaker 2 (39:07):
I'll be diplomatic here and so forth, and some other
things that we've done again were I would say we
should do no more than is necessary in the Middle East,
because there's other parts of the world that I would
argue are strategically more important, and we just.
Speaker 3 (39:23):
Find ourselves more about that.
Speaker 2 (39:26):
I don't have a good answer for you exactly why
at times, but somehow it's captured our imagination. One of
the odd things for secretaries of state, and I worked
with quite a few. How getting heavily involved in Middle
East and diplomacy was almost part of the job after
Henry Kissinger, and I like it or not, people found
themselves doing it, and yeah, less my take on all
(39:46):
that is, no mediator can ever be more successful than
the protagonists want or would allow him to be. And
I think at times we've too often substituted our own
efforts for what was missing on the part of the locals.
So my argument is not to get out of the
Middle East, but I would where possible dial it down.
Speaker 1 (40:07):
So you know, it's interesting. We had Steve Bannon on
this show, and I don't get the merits and demerits
of that conversation, but he's had a lot of more
public conversations about what he perceived, or at least asserted
was the wisdom of Trump focusing on things like Greenland
or countries like Greenland, focusing on the Panama Canal. Looking
(40:28):
at it more from a strategic prism sort of you know,
hemispheric framework and sort of creating a stronger consciousness to
sort of regionalize our American first framework and to put
it in, you know, in at least creating a narrative
around what some of us perceived as just the absurdity
(40:52):
of these threats to take over Greenland, make Canada fifty
first state, and invade or take over the Panama Canal.
Is there any merit to that argument or is it
just folly?
Speaker 2 (41:05):
Folly would be generous the terrible idea. Look, it seems
to be setting up a kind of spheres of influence
approach to the world. So we would have the lead
role in this part of the world, presumably Russia would
have a lead role in the European theater, China and
the Asia Pacific. Russia and China would be very happy
with that arrangement. No one in this hemisphere would be
(41:27):
so in a f any sort of way. We wouldn't
succeed at playing an outsized role because it would be
resisted every inch.
Speaker 3 (41:34):
Of the way.
Speaker 2 (41:35):
Americans, including a lot of the Maga people, wouldn't want
us involved in imperial wars in this part of the world,
whether it's Panama or Mexico, or Greenland or Canada.
Speaker 3 (41:48):
So I just think it's unnecessary.
Speaker 2 (41:51):
We can have the access the influence we need without
an imperial coercive role. And again, the real strategic challenges
of the century are not going to be met here.
Speaker 3 (42:03):
They're going to be met.
Speaker 2 (42:04):
In other parts of the world, above all Asia and
the Pacific. So I think it's really a truly misguided approach.
But it makes me uneasy because I can see something
of it, and this kind of people don't yet speak
about spheres of influence, but it's kind of in the
air of the water, and I'm uneasy about it. But
it's not a recipe for order. We would be resisted here,
(42:27):
and history suggest wherever there'd be a lot of opposition.
And by the way, it would become a real recipe
for proliferation. Watch how if something like that were to
begin to gain momentum, Watch countries in e urbeer in
Asia decide they need nuclear weapons of their own. So
I think that kind of an approach to the world
(42:48):
would be quite honestly catastrophic.
Speaker 1 (42:52):
Questions around the globe in terms of concerns we so
often neglect. Continent of Africa was a reference today of
Congo from the President the only time we tend to
focus on Africa as a relationship to China's investment. The
same with the Central America or South America as well.
(43:15):
I mean parts of the globe that seemed to be
under resourced in terms of mind share and investment, strategic investments.
What's your over under in terms of America's posture in
South America, Central America. But first let's start in Africa.
Speaker 2 (43:32):
What makes Africa, siouey generous, What makes it unique going
forward is demographics. Most of the world is getting a
shrinking in number and getting older. South Asia is the
one partial exception. Africa is an enormous exception. Africa is
going to be increasing by what more than a billion
people over the next generation or so, and the question
(43:54):
is whether that's a burden or a bonus, and that.
Speaker 3 (43:57):
Remains to be seen.
Speaker 2 (43:58):
So I think Africa is important, not in the sense
of great power strategic competition. That's a sideshow for the
most part, but really it's a human story. It's with
you know, all these people, and the question is can
economically these people, can they be employed?
Speaker 3 (44:18):
Can governments provide services?
Speaker 2 (44:20):
You can you have good enough governance, So in places
like Nigeria, South Africa and other countries that you don't.
Speaker 3 (44:27):
Have civil wars and so forth.
Speaker 2 (44:29):
So I think that's the big question for Africa, and
by the way, pretty true of Latin America as well,
without the democraptic dimension. But again, the biggest problems in
Latin America are not whether Brazil is going to invade
Argentina or whether Russia or China going to do.
Speaker 3 (44:44):
Some of the biggest issues they are internal their governance.
Can the Mexican.
Speaker 2 (44:47):
Government meet the responsibilities and challenges of sovereignty within Mexico?
Can they deal with cartels and drugs and criminals and
the and the light and where possible. I think our
policy ought to be to help these countries meet their challenges,
because it's good for them, but it's also good for us.
(45:09):
Then there'll be conditions of stability, better chance for democracy,
better chance for trade and investment, better way to deal
with whether it's health challenges or climate challenges or what
have you. So we do it it's both. Again, it's
not either or it's the right thing to do. It's
helpful to them, but I think it also very much
works in our favor. It's one of the reasons, by
(45:30):
the way, I'm so critical of what we've done to
the Agency for International Development. The real folly of that
is not that it provides opportunities for China, which it does,
but again, we weaken the ability of these societies and
these governments to deal with their immediate challenges. That can't
be good because ultimately failed states become places where terrorists
set up shop, where disease breaks out and spread, Pirates
(45:53):
do their things, criminals do their things. So again, even
out of narrow self interest, we ought to be doing
more in these places. So I just think it's quite
short sighted.
Speaker 1 (46:09):
So let me move back, and I see it. You've
got a book behind you that I want to talk
about in a moment, and it brings us back a
little bit more domestically, and it brings back sort of
just to the prism of you know, my lens has
changed dramatically in the last few weeks since I have
just shy have five thousand members of the US military
on the streets of one of America's largest cities, Los Angeles,
(46:34):
without council consent on the support of the state revere
the men and women in uniform that are out there
just not their assignment. But it also sort of assigned
some consideration and consciousness to this administration and what distinguishes
it from the first Trump administration. I know you've got
(46:58):
a blog You've written a little bit about this where
you said Trump is organized a cabinet that are more
of amplifiers than more traditional sort of metrics of people
that would sort of, you know, great sort of a
governing of our framework, regulatory or regulate some of the thinking.
I mean, where's where are you today in terms of
(47:21):
this administration? One hundred and fifty or so days in
however many days, it's been growing concern simmering concerns We
overstate authoritarianism. Is that a word that we should even
be using. Is democracy hanging in the balance or are
we fine? What's your sort of over under what's the
(47:41):
temperature right now?
Speaker 2 (47:43):
The fact that we have to have this conversation tells
you something am uneasy. I'm uncomfortable with words like authoritarianism
all that that's something to be avoided ultimately, but there's
tendencies that worry me. We haven't had. There's two major
lines that the administrations walked right up to and played
(48:06):
footsoe with but hasn't quite crossed in a decisive way.
One was the one you were alluding to, which is
the use of the American military inside our borders, and
that to me has all sorts of implications for American democracy,
but also it's terrible for the American military. It reduces readiness,
(48:26):
It politicizes what has been in some ways the most
successful modern American institution that we.
Speaker 3 (48:33):
Have. So that's one thing that makes me uneasy. We're not.
Speaker 2 (48:38):
We haven't quite crossed that line, but we've tiptoed up
to it, as you know better than I do. The
other is defiance of decisions by the judiciary, and again
some of the quasi defiance, not quite hearing what the
courts were saying on deportations and so far.
Speaker 3 (48:57):
So that leaves me uneasy. But I don't think.
Speaker 2 (48:59):
Either yet has reached the point of shall we say,
broad crisis or crisis of the first order.
Speaker 3 (49:05):
But I think there's grounds for being uneasy.
Speaker 2 (49:09):
Look, it's the irony of this isn't lost here we are.
It's now what late June and approximately what twelve months.
In a week we're going to be marking the two
hundred and fiftieth anniversary of this country. And to me,
the lesson is not to take democracy for granted. You've
(49:31):
done good things, by the way in your state with
Josh Friday, I think in terms of promoting volunteerism and
public service, which I think is great both for the
values enhances, but also it brings Americans together. I've tried
to make a big thing about Civics education. We shouldn't
assume that people don't need it or somehow get it automatically.
(49:51):
The answers they do need it and they don't get
in their schools. For the most part, that ought to
become much bigger priority, and we ought to think a
lot about what we need uh to do to make
sure American democracy works. But I get uneasy with some
of the attacks on civil society, whether it's law firms
or universities or or what have you. So I think
(50:12):
there's a lot of yellow lights flashing, and so my
view is we ought to we ought to be mindful
of them and not again not take anything for granted,
or you know, you know Churchill has always quoted for everything. Uh,
and one of them is that you Americans can always
be counted on to do the right thing after they
(50:33):
do everything else.
Speaker 3 (50:34):
There's a kind of sanguine quality.
Speaker 2 (50:36):
Or yeah, we get in trouble, but we've always come
out in the right place and never sell America short.
Speaker 3 (50:43):
Probably, but let's not take it for granted. That's my
only view.
Speaker 2 (50:46):
I think it's just a we ought to feel a
sense of urgency and the given how enormous the stakes are.
I don't think anybody kind of how to put it,
democracy can't be a spectator sport. And whether you were
in positions of authority like you, whether you're a quote
unquote justice citizen or you're a CEO of some business
(51:08):
or what have you.
Speaker 3 (51:10):
I just think there's ways for people to make a difference,
and again, we just can't. It's too valuable to not.
Speaker 2 (51:21):
How I put it, none of us wants to be
in a position where, if things do heads out, we
wish we had done things that we know that we
simply sat on the sidelines.
Speaker 1 (51:31):
You talk about citizenship, you've written about citizenship, and you've
challenged us to reconsider what you refer to as sort
of a lopsided notion of citizenship, that it's not just
about rights, it's about obligations. You wrote a book, the
Bill of Obligations, and you enumerate a framework about the
(51:52):
critical importance of service and civics, the common good, the
best of you know, the wrong and republic, Greek democracy,
and I think the principles are founding fathers. To talk
to us a little bit about what inspired you to
write the book. You wrote it a few years ago,
I imagine inspiration today would be even more acute. But
(52:15):
it's an important and essential read. And by the way,
it's fantastic for anyone that's listening. Talk to me Richard
a little bit and all of us about what inspired
this book and what you're really trying to communicate.
Speaker 3 (52:29):
Well, first of all, thank you.
Speaker 2 (52:31):
Years before I wrote another book called Foreign Policy Begins
at Home. And you know, I'm a fart as you look,
as we can see from this conversation, for better or worse,
I'm a foreign policy guy. That's my educational training, that's
my professional experience. But probably about a decade ago I
started to see much greater connection between what we were
doing or not doing here at home, and our ability
(52:52):
to be effective abroad. I wrote about everything from indebtedness
ten years ago. A big issue was energy dependence. By
the way, shows we can work through things. Quality or
lack of it, of our public education, strength of our democracy.
Speaker 3 (53:08):
And I was worried very much.
Speaker 2 (53:09):
A decade ago about our inability to generate majorities to
deal with the challenges increasingly, particularly at the federal level,
less so at the state level. We were gridlocked. And
what I noticed in the year since that things weren't
getting better, things were getting worse. And so I just decided,
(53:29):
I can't quite answer your question what inspired me, but
I was just thinking a lot about it. And I
take long walks when I think about a book, and
Central Park becomes my co author. And just then went
back and reread or in some cases read for the
first time, a lot of the great works of American
political history, and I was just struck by how much
(53:53):
explicitly a lot of our modern are not so modern
history was about the expansion of rights what Lincoln called
the unfinished work, and I get it, and it's actually
been one of the great things civil rights and so forth.
We have a lot to be proud of in this
country towards a more perfect union. We're not there, but
we've made some real strides. But it seemed to be
(54:13):
lost in that. Increasingly was the other side of us
that no one was any more talking about obligations. It's
interesting the founding fathers didn't talk about it a lot explicitly.
I think they assumed it. Gavin, I think it was implicit.
They didn't think they needed to remind people about it.
But increasingly it seemed to me we did. You look
at the numbers of the people who are eligible to
(54:33):
vote and don't vote, the amount of people who get
their information quote unquote from TikTok rather than from serious sources,
the polls that show young people don't value democracy, don't
think it's worth saving, the lack of public service opportunities increasingly,
the failure to require quality the civics to be taught
(54:56):
in classrooms, growing threats or realities of pe to go violence,
and on and on, and things like COVID and so forth,
showed me that a lack of what you mentioned before
about the common good, whether to get vaccinated, to wear
a mask. It's not just for me, but it's also
for the other person. So it just all added up
and I just decided that I would I would put
(55:20):
my hand to it. So it's for me as an author.
It was great. But I learned more writing that book
than any other book I've ever written, because I knew
less about it going in.
Speaker 1 (55:30):
And you've written what sixteen book? How many books?
Speaker 2 (55:32):
I've written a dozen and edited a few more. So
it's a it's a large it's up to sixteen. But
I'm not done yet. I got a few more in me.
Speaker 1 (55:45):
There's plenty of chapters of your life left and and
and look, I'm grateful for this opportunity to share a
little bit of your time and your your your action
and passion as it were. And when we get you back,
I need you back for the original conversation we haven't had,
which is what the hell is going on with my party,
(56:06):
the Democratic Party?
Speaker 3 (56:08):
Uh?
Speaker 1 (56:08):
And how we're going to take back the House, what
we need to do? Uh? And uh, how we get
back on the right side of these presidential elections.
Speaker 3 (56:17):
You give me thirty more seconds.
Speaker 2 (56:18):
I was going to raise that which is out everyone's
talking about bda battle damage assessment in terms of Iran.
I was going to raise Bda in terms of the
New York mayoral primary.
Speaker 1 (56:29):
Uh okay, is that how we're going to end this
as opposed to begin this conversation. Uh? That is for
all of you listening a preview of the next podcast
or your us I guess on well, part one of
this two part pod. Richard, thanks for being
Speaker 3 (56:49):
Here, Thank you sir, enjoying us
Host
Gavin Newsom
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