The Buck Sexton Show: Bridge Colby - Wargaming U.S. Response to China-Taiwan Invasion

Bridge Colby is a principal at the Marathon Initiative who served as a lead official on the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which shifted U.S. military preparedness toward China. He’s the author of “Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, which the WSJ named as one of the top ten books of 2021.

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Episode Transcript

Speaker 1 (00:00):
Hey, everybody, Welcome to another episode of the Buck Sexton Show,

(00:02):
The Deep Dives, the long form. Preciate all the comments
you have about this format and how you're enjoying it.
And it's great for me too, because now I get
to sit and really enjoy the brilliance and the insights
of so many guests without a commercial break, jumping in
from radio and limited to eight to ten minutes at
a time. We got plenty of time with our folks,

(00:24):
and we're gonna need it this week for sure. Today
we've got our friend Bridge Colby with us. He has
a principle at the Marathon Initiative. He served as the
lead official in the development of the twenty eighteen Natural
Defense Strategy, which shifted the Pentagon's focus to China, and
is the author of a fantastic book, Strategy of Denial
American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict. Walste

(00:46):
Journal said one of the top ten books of twenty
twenty one. Mister Bridge Colby, who I have also known.
Fun fact, because we didn't get talk with us in radio.
Bridge and I used to do shots of Quervaux at
the same bars in DC back when I was a
cub CIA analyst, and Bridge was, where were you in
Yale law school at the time. You're doing something something

(01:07):
like that. I don't know, so something, uh, you know,
one job or another. But gosh, you've you've you've you've
sold us out here back so I know now people
know Bridge and I go go way back. We're talking
like we're like twenty years and now we're kind of old.
We're kind o looking good. I feel like we're looking
at our end could be worse, right. Yeah, look, let's
be honest. We kind of look like racquetball buddies or something.

(01:29):
So you know, it makes sense that we go way
back here. You know we were we were doubles partners
on the grass sports. So um, Bridge, we're going to
turn out. We'll go back to some fun stuff towards
the end here, but I gotta start with this. Um. Look,
I never want to make uh, I don't. I'm not
trying to make analysts fight with other analysts about these issues.
Did you hear the I think Peter Zihon on the

(01:53):
Rogan By any chance, you know this guy who went
on Rogan, I can give you a summary of what
he says because he would sense. But yeah, yeah, Okay,
So it's basically China's gonna collapse idea, China's gonna collapse.
China is super weak. China imports all like not all,
but you know, basically all of its food inputs. Politically
so sclerotic that she can't get anything done. The population

(02:15):
bomb is going to be there, undoing, and it's all
gonna fall apart within the next ten years in China.
That's the basic thesis. I just want to give that
to you to give your sense of because this guy's
gotten a lot of obviously Rogan podcasts is huge lot
of attention for this. What do you think. I mean, Look,
he could be right, but I think the job of
our strategy, I mean, calling yourself a strategist a little ridiculous,

(02:38):
but I mean, if you'll bear with me for a second,
the job the strategist is to figure out what's in
the best interests of the country. And Peter Zihon could
be right. Personally am skeptical, but again I could be wrong,
but I think we need to cover and prepare for
the downside risk. And you know, if he's right and
we've prepared as if the Chinese are not going to
fall apart, well, then we'll have probably spent too much

(03:00):
money and maybe been a little more regressive than we
might have needed to have been. But if he's wrong
and we took his advice and we assumed that that
was going to happen, then we're in a world of hurt.
So I just I don't honestly that's that argument is
not because okay, so, like it's like if there was
another China out there, Let's say there was a ussr

(03:21):
you know, nineteen fifty, so like, at least allegedly we
thought at the time of peer economy, let's say there
were two of them, and so there was like a
real choice about whether or not you could focus on them.
But Russia's one tenth the economic size of China. So
it's like, all right, well we'll just cover down on
that risk. And if he's right, great, you know, if
the chemo works or whatever, great, you know, it's that's

(03:42):
not the best analogy, but that's you know, I mean,
so that's the basic way. Now if we're going to
be a little bit lean, a little bit farther forward,
and again I don't think we need to on this point.
I mean I'll tell you, I mean, look, a lot
of the numbers people who have to make money for
a living still putting money into China. Right. I'm not
saying that's patriotic, but I'm saying, you know, they're probably

(04:04):
not stupid. And not just Americans. You know a lot
of people in Japan and Europe and so forward. So
I think, by the way, where people put their money
is always such an important indicator. I think it's one
of the one of the best arguments when people talk
about climate change. You know, I'm down here in Miami
and I keep saying, if I went up somebody said, look,
you know, you're on a thirty year mortgage right now.

(04:24):
You just bought this house on the beach, but I'm
going to take it off your hands at half price
because climate change. You know, listen to Al Gore the
Barack Obama's house in Martha's Viney. Yeah, Mount Martha's Vede.
I don't think they're gave me a big break on
that one either. They'll laugh in my face, so we
all know what the reality is with that one. I
think the money going into China is still an important
indicator though to that end, but there does seem to
be this It's interesting to me. I remember back in

(04:46):
the nineties early nineties, really it was Japan is going
to take over the world, and specifically Japan was going
to buy America as in, own our corporations, own our
real estate, our land, our food supply, and then realize,
oh wait a second, Japan actually has huge demographic issues
and is going to go into a long period of
economic stagnation and real and decline. Um. I wonder how

(05:11):
we look at this then, and how we contextualize where
we are visa v. China, Because I just brought up
Peter Zihad, and look, I'm gonna give the guy credit
for it is very interesting, covers a lot of ground.
You know, speaks eloquently, so I don't I'm not criticizing him.
I just think it's interesting to hear. I want more
really smart people and people like you, people who focus
on these issues, to be sharing the different perspectives and

(05:32):
ideas on this, and sometimes that means disagreeing publicly so
we can get closer to what the most likely reality is,
the most likely truth that we face. UM. Gordon Chang
another good friend of mine. I'm sure you know Gordon,
and I've known Gordon for over a decade now. I
mean he kind of smiles about it. But he wrote
a book I think in the early two thousands, the
Coming Collapse, The Coming Collapse of China, and we've been

(05:57):
I mean, and Gordon is super knowledgeable on Chinese talking
about it. I mean he just you know, you want
you want to talk about Den Chauping, and you want
to talk about you know, uh Maoist Industrial Revolution and
all these things. And he's an encyclopedia. But China hasn't
collapsed and it's been like twenty years since he wrote
the book something like that. So what is it with?
Why Why is there this China's about a collapse? China

(06:18):
is about to collapse when China, for thirty years now
overall has just gotten a whole lot wealthier and more influential,
you know what I mean? It seems like there's a dissonance. Yeah,
I mean, I think let me answer the japan thing first.
If they if they conk out where Japan has has
sort of flattened, plateaued, and their debates about where the
Japanese actually are, I think they'd be like two or
three times the size of the American economy, So that

(06:40):
that shouldn't give us too much comfort. I mean, bear
in mind that Japan was you know, I guess about
half today, maybe a third of our population. So I
mean it's just a different order man, too. China's one
point four billion people. Yeah, it's declining, but there's still
a lot of people, right, I mean a lot more
than we have. So I think that's we shouldn't take
too much, too much a comfort from the Japan example

(07:01):
in that respect. I mean, why do people do it?
I mean it's like the people who predicted the ten
of the last whatever, three recessions or something like that, right.
I mean it doesn't mean they're wrong, right, But I
mean the market analogy is not a bad one actually here,
because timing is really important. You know, for instance, if
we go drill down onto the Taiwan issue, if we're
ready for a Taiwan fight in twenty thirty five and

(07:22):
the Chinese are ready in twenty thirty doesn't matter, you
know what I mean. So I think it's I mean,
I worry that it's a little bit of wish fulfillment,
that wish is too strong. I mean, I don't want
to say that about these guys, but I mean it's
a little bit, you know, and there's also I will say,
how you look at it, look at if you're trying
to make an important analytical point and maybe get you know,

(07:44):
hit that bull's eye in terms of like, let's say
a really you know, counter market bet. That's one thing.
But if you're if you're dealing with the American you know,
the fate of the American Republic, I think you should
prepare more for you know, kind of less risky is
sort of bet. So the question that I'm gonna post
to Bridge here in a second is what does a

(08:04):
Chinese invasion of Taiwan look like and what happens? Which
is really important. People are gonna want to hear about that.
But I want to step back from it for a
second because I mentioned Bridge and I go way back
to the Georgetown drinking days of our early twenties. I
don't have any photos unfortunately, of it. But if I did,
you know what I would do with I would put
them on legacy box. I would send them in on
legacy box because then I could I could digitize them

(08:26):
and text in the Bridge and say, my god, look
at your haircut, look at mine. It's been twenty years,
but see that's the fun thing about Legacy Box. They
can take old photos, video, super eight film, VHS tapes
and they can transfer it into digital format, so then
it's safe forever. Because by the way, photos old videotape,
so how do you even play that? And it degrades
over time. So now is the time to transfer all

(08:49):
your old media into new media digital media, so it's safe,
you can keep it and you can share it for
many many years to come. So I've done this before
and it is such an e process. They send you
a box in the mail, you fill it with your stuff,
your VHS tape, super eight film, whatever you got, and
then they hand transfer all of it into digital media,
so things like a link in the cloud or even

(09:11):
a thumb drive. They send it right back to you
with all of your original media too, so you keep
all that as well. It's great. You gotta get started
in this, it's a great project. At the beginning of
the year. Go to legacy box dot com slash buck
to take advantage of this great discount offer because we're
getting you fantastic pricing right now. Legacybox dot com slash buck.

(09:31):
That's legacy box dot com slash buck and you're gonna
love your legacy box stuff now that you've got this
all squared away bridge, What happens if I just at
the broadest level, top down and drill down on however
you want, We wake up, we get we get word
that China has invaded Taiwan. What does that look like?

(09:53):
And what happens? I think, just to be really straight,
I think it is a massive attack on Taiwan and
probably at this point an attack on US and probably
Japanese and maybe Australian forces at least in the region.
And here's why. And I think you can see an
illustration of why that makes sense relatively speaking, based on

(10:13):
the Ukraine experience, which is the real lesson of Ukraine
for Hijinping is not don't try. But if you're going
to try, don't mess around, you know, and you could
use you could use a more barnyard epithet if you wanted.
I mean, that's really what what it is is, leave
nothing to chance. If you were thinking of sending two missiles,
send six. If you were thinking somebody was going to defect,
kill him. And that's especially the case when you're dealing

(10:35):
with something like an amphibious invasion. If you're crossing a
land border in a flat territory, you can creep across,
maybe come back, you know, go back, go back. That's
that's not the case with an amphibious invasion. If you're
going to do it, you gotta go in. You got
to go in big. And I think the Chinese are
if they haven't already understood that, I think they're going
to understand. And this is why I'm less worried about
things like a blockade or a seizure of the offshore islands.

(10:57):
I think what they're going to do, and they think
the Americans are going to come in at this point.
So that means get your blow in early and effectively.
And that's something like in effect a Japanese attack in
December and January forty one, forty two, But that could
be more effective and more lasting than the Japanese attack.
Was How do we stack up versus Chinese Chinese military

(11:21):
capabilities in that feed or in this circumstance, as in,
you know, do what are our trump cards or what
are our advantages and what are theirs? Where are the
areas where we've never had to handle their capabilities in
a certain realm or certainly never come up against anything
quite like it, and therefore we could face the unexpected. Well,
I think, I mean, in a sense, this is the

(11:42):
trillion dollar question, and I think the bottom line would
be that it is very competitive, and it's trending in
a bad direction, at least in this decade. I mean,
that's part of the reasons why I'm so concerned about,
say twenty twenty seven, or a little after, or maybe
a little before, is because there's reason to think that
that might be their optimal time to move. So if
you look at back why wars have happened, They've often

(12:02):
happened because an aggressor said I may not be perfectly ready,
but I'm never going to be ready or relative to
the enemy, then I will be right now. So, for instance,
in the nineteen thirty nine the German High command was
reluctant to go to war, but Hitler said, look, we're
readier than the Allies and they're rearming, so this is
our best chance. So what are the fundamental advantages. I mean,
there's a lot of technology going on. I'd say what

(12:23):
you'd say on that is it's become a lot more competitive.
The Chinese appeared to have potentially moved ahead in some areas,
like maybe hypersonics. There's concern about some elements of artificial intelligence.
I think when you really boil it down, our advantages.
They have to attack across eighty to one hundred miles
of water, which is difficult, very difficult again, and subordinate

(12:44):
country effectively that doesn't want to be subordinate, and their
advantages they're one hundred miles and were five thousand miles.
You know, we got a lot of force in Japan,
but the Western Pacific is a maritime theater, so it
cuts both ways. Our wheelhouse, traditionally as a military power
of the last hundred years has been air, space, naval technology.
I mean, if you look back Britain, I mean democracies,

(13:05):
commercial republics like ours. We don't like to throw people
into the meek grinder. What we're better at is high
capital intensive things like that. Chinese continental power willing to
throw a lot of people into the meek grinder necessary,
and I'm pretty confident that Chijinping would as well, and
that's their advantage. But they're also catching up in a
lot of technology areas, and they have the advantage of position,

(13:26):
and as the aggressor, they may have the advantage with surprise.
That's a big factor is whether we'll be able to detect. Now,
we'll probably be able to see a lot of things
that Chinese are doing, but we won't necessarily be able
to discern that that's clearly an indicator of an attack.
How do we go up against them right now to
the degree that we can discern this air to er

(13:46):
Because one thing that everybody that I know who's been
in theater, or even whether it was a civilian analyst
like me in a rock and Afghanistan, I could see this.
But talking to friends of mine who are who are frontline,
who are soldiers, door kick special operations and all arrest,
a total air superiority in theater is something that I

(14:06):
think we have come to take for granted. The Ukrainians
have found out, unfortunately the hard way, that when you
don't have that, you've got some very big problems. How
do we stack up against the Chinese in an air
to air fight, That's a great question. I certainly don't
think we're gonna be able to have air dominance as
we've become accustomed to, and that's one of the things
actually in the strategy back when I was in the Pentagon.

(14:27):
They really tried to shift away from as a kind
of cultural shift from you know, when you served in
the Middle East, and I briefly as well for the
State Department that you know, there was total military dominance.
There was no quiet the Tally Bond or the Iraqi insurgents. Right,
they weren't going to shoot down our sea when thirty
with an F eighteen or something. That wasn't happening. They
didn't have artillery basically, you know, maybe here and there,
but you know, I mean effectively, right, totally different situation.

(14:49):
The Chinese are going to be probably attacking in space.
They have air to air interceptors, they're building stealth fighters,
they're building nuclear powered submarines. The list goes on. They
got missiles. I think it's going to be narrower. So
what the smartest kind of military analysts and senior officers
talk about is creating sort of openings of opportunity. And
this is where really focusing on what we need to

(15:10):
do is so important. A lot of this is going
to be about killing their invasion fleet and their air
or model that's delivering and sustaining forces on island. We're
never gonna it's never gonna be in nineteen forty five,
we're going to march into Berlin or Tokyo sail in
Tokyo Bay. It's going to be a defeat of the
invasion short of total victory, but that's going to be enough.
But I think the people that I talk to are

(15:31):
the people who talk to the people who are really
out there at the tip of the spear. They don't
take our superiority for granted, and that's really important. I
think that's one thing I really makes me uncomfortable is
when some of our senior political or military figures, hey,
we never nobody can can compete with us, And it's like,
wait a minute, that's not that doesn't that's not the
kind of attitude we need. We need people who take

(15:51):
nothing for granted, because that's you know. And even if
even if man for man, woman whatever, woman for woman,
that we may be better, they got position numbers, they're
probably willing to lose more people. So we really can't
take anything for granted. How did the Taiwanese Defense forces
stack up in this situation? And is there a whole
lot more we could be or should be doing for

(16:12):
them to make Taiwan you know, the porcupine so to speak,
that China is not going to want to handle. That
is another critical question in fact, that Taiwanese forces resolve
and capability might be the biggest X factor we face
because look, it's a lot of this is going to
be in the sea and air and space, but at
the end of the day, the Chinese is going to
be trying to land a lot of forces on the

(16:34):
island and defeat the Taiwanese ground for the taime when
he's military, but particularly ground forces, and how tough they are,
how willing they are to fight that is, and how
skilled they are is a critical question. We've been pushing
them for a while to shift towards what you could
call asymmetric defense, basically designed to defeat an invasion, and
their former Chief of Defense, Admiral Lei Shiman, has written
a very good book I think thus far only in Chinese,

(16:56):
arguing for this. There's a lot of resistance throughout the
Taiwanese system these moves. Actually, I think the political leadership
is pretty supportive, but that's a big questions when I'm
trying to get a better sense of But if they're
not willing to fight hard and skillfully. This whole thing
may just be untenable. Yeah, what about the US response,

(17:18):
as in, will there definitely be one? Do you think
that there's a real chance that, let's say this, Let's
say it's go time for the Chinese Communist Party and
the People's Liberation Army right in five years, and they
go for it. Whoever the administration is at that point,
Let's just assume it's an American president. We don't know
who it is. Is there a chance that they just

(17:38):
go You know what, Taiwan, we wish you the best.
There is a chance, and that worries me not begain
I think we've talked about this. I mean, stepping back,
you know, I was against the Iraq War, against the
intervention in Syria, I was against the long nation building
mission in Afghanistan. I'm worried about escalation in the context
of Ukraine, so I'm not I'm not looking for an

(18:00):
excuse to intervene. So I totally get that. In fact,
in a sense, that's kind of where my gut sympathy is.
But here's the reality. I mean, China is a superpower,
and if it's looking to dominate Asia and from there
become globally pre eminent and impose itself on our way
of life. And I think Americans really understand that Taiwan
matters a lot for that because if we especially if
we just back down, what are you know, it's human nature.

(18:22):
What are people going to say, Well, I'm not going
to stick my neck out because the Americans are gonna
let me go. They're going to come up with another
excuse to say, why, you know, I'm the Philippines or
I'm Vietnam. Why they got to cut me off? And
then after that, you know, they're going to isolate South
Korea and Japan and you know, it sounds like the
Domino theory, and they got us into Vietnam. And I'm
always conscious of that. But the Domino theory has a
kernel of truth, which is like, you need to know
whether you can trust somebody if you're going to stick

(18:44):
your neck out, And that's really critical. And what I
fear is that somebody would make that decision, and in
the situation, we get so much worse because a lot
of our allies or partners would cut a deal with China,
but we'd still be stuck because we can't let them
run the world, right, We can't let them run our
own you get run the Asia economy and then dominate us,
but then we'd be in a far worse position. So
my view is laser focus on this like and don't

(19:07):
leave anything to chance. I mean, one of the things
that I really don't like about what I think the
administration is doing is they're kind of cutting it close.
It's too cute. Yeah, we're focusing on Taiwan, but you
know we're also going to walk and choogum at the
same time and do Ukraine and not raised defense spending
and all that. And it's like, no, no, no no, don't
screw around. Don't get close to fifty percent, because then
the Chinese are more likely to do it, and we're
more likely to lose. Better to be at seventy five

(19:28):
percent because we can't get to one hundred percent certainty
seventy five eight and then the Chinese won't do it,
and then we won't have to make this decision. But
I think the real and just one last point. The
other thing is if we screw around and equivocate, hey,
you know, let's wait a week or two weeks, it'll
be disastrous. So we've got to be like all in

(19:49):
from the beginning, and he makes a huge military difference.
So that's like, I just think we've got to be
clear in our own mind. And if we're clear and
if we're capable, I think the Chinese will decide not
to do it because Maza don't want to take over
Taie one. But we never did it. He was like
the evilest guy who ever lived, one of them, and
he decided not to do it because he knew he
would fail. So is there a risk of immediate escalation

(20:12):
against not just the US force that would be responding
to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Do you think they
could go after us elsewhere? I mean any things. Obviously,
we have bases in the Pacific Theater, Hawaii's out there.
It's a major concentration of US military force, but it's
a small island chain in the middle of the the Pacific.
I mean, do you think that that escalation is something

(20:34):
to be concerned about or would China limit itself to Well,
if you come into the you know, if you come
into the Taiwan Straits, it's fair game. But other than that,
we're gonna we're gonna leave it there. Absolutely risk. I mean,
I think at this point. Given it, they expect that
Americans probably come in. Then they probably attack throughout the
Western Pacific, including against Japan, probably Guam other places. And
I think there's a real possibility, in fact probability, that

(20:55):
they would do some attacks on the homeland of some kind.
Now I think those are likely to be probably matching
to what we would do in attacks on the Chinese mainland,
which would be necessary to be successful in my assessment,
So attacks on military targets, I mean military forces from
the United States would be operating from probably Hawaii or
would be supported from critical parts. And of course the
Chinese have nuclear weapons. But the reality, unfortunately, is that

(21:18):
a homeland is not a sanctuary. And I don't think
the Chinese are crazy, so we have ways of deterring
them from doing things that would be really bloody minded.
But again, nobody knows how a warlike that would go,
so I'm not confident about it. You know, I'm not sanguine,
but I think there are ways of fighting. And that's
actually a big part of what I tried to argue
in the books. I think, as you know, is how
do we manage escalation as context so we don't get

(21:40):
in a place where were our strategy is insane. We
would be stupid to follow through on it because that's
not credible, and if we got to that point, we
shouldn't do it if it's crazy. How much could we
count on the literal states Japan, the Philippines, South Korea,
you know, go go down the list right to be

(22:01):
a meaningful of meaningful assistance and perhaps even direct combatants
in this Chinese invasion of Taiwan war gaming we're talking about.
I think it depends. I think Australia we could count
on a lot, probably although they're far away so limited impact.
But Japan increasingly, I think the Japanese have been very

(22:21):
vocal over the last couple of years that they regard
Taiwan as a directly connected to their own security and independence,
and I think they're right. I mean, it's if you know,
in a way, Taiwan is part of the Japanese archipelago.
I mean the Senkakus, which they're neuralgic about, are within
I believe, within visual range of Taiwan. So if Taiwan falls,
the Japanese are in huge trouble. Now, the South Koreans,

(22:43):
I think, are moving in the right direction under the
Union government. They've got their handsful with North Korea. So
I think militarily probably be more about access and political
support Philippines would be very important. I think the new
government under President Marcos is an improvement. A lot of
that's about the ability to use Philippine territory access itself again.
I mean, look, and I think the Ukraine War again

(23:03):
as an example here, people love a winner. If we're
doing well, people are probably going to be more likely
to kind of take some risk and if they can,
if they can be confidents, if we're getting our tails kicked,
people might cut a deal, you know. And you know,
Thailand has been an ally of the United States for decades,
but in World War Two Thailand signed over to the
Japanese really quickly and let them through to attack the

(23:23):
British permans Malaya. So I mean, people are gonna go
where the wind blows a little bit. So that's that's
why it's important that we'd be prepared. Now back to
the internal dynamics in China for a moment here and
the coming collapse of China that's been coming for a
very long time to depending on which endels you talk to,
is there uh so So here's what I wanted to

(23:46):
pose to you. Really there there was I think it's
fair to say a buy part is in consensus. What's
starting back, and maybe you could roughly put it at
the eighties, maybe some a little sooner sooner, a little
after that. If we do a lot of trade with China,
we helped to get a whole lot wealthier. We get
China in the wto that the political system there will
liberalize and improve over time, and that they'll be, you know,

(24:08):
more like a Western European power and less like a
despotic totalitarian communist state that's very aggressive. I think that
has not been true. That's kind of obvious at this point, right,
I think we could all agree on that. So that
was a misperception that persisted for a very long time.
We've allowed our near we've basically paid our near pier

(24:28):
competitor to become what it is, right or I should say,
you know, the Indians make when we criticize them as hey,
you guys built up the Chinese, don't don't criticize us. Yeah,
and now we're looking to the Indians and saying, hey,
can you guys kind of help keep China? And it's
box and they're you know, they got their own problems, right.
I mean, it's still doing at the Pakistan issue. So
what is what can be done to internally? Is there

(24:51):
anything can be done to internally make things better so
that instead of could we win a short term conflict
with China to defend Taiwan? Did we even get into
that conflict that area? Would you've already gone into It's
China doesn't want to do that anymore, you know? Is
that even something we could we could realistically hope and
or push for. I don't think so. Again, it's possible,

(25:14):
but I mean, there was a book by a Sky
New Yorker guy uh on China called The Age of Ambition,
and it got it's something I didn't actually read the
whole book, but yeah, I know, but the point was
that that it describes something more fundamental about human nature,
which is like, the Chinese are super powerful now and

(25:37):
they expect to be. You know, what you hear from
the Asian other Asian countries is they're like, you're a
small country, behave accordingly, you know, listen to number one.
We expect to be treated as a superpower essentially. So
I don't see that going away and it's not really.
I mean, people talk about the Marxist Leninism in and
that is important, but it's not. I don't think it's
actually the primary driver of why China is so dangerous.

(25:57):
I think it's more ambition, aiveness expansive, you know, as
people get stronger, and if they don't face checkman, it's
the core of the American system. If they don't face
checks and balances, then they are more likely to transgress
others interests. What I would One thing I want to
point out is that there you're you're you're pointing to
something that was very real. People like to deny it now,
but it was obviously there, which was, you know, by

(26:21):
trading with them, we will make them democratic, right. But
there was a second part of that, which is which
was even if they don't change, we will still be
able to outcompete them. And I think this is really
important point from a kind of new right perspective. I
think both of you know, both of us have similar
kind of views on this, which is that was the
almost the more important part of the argument was like

(26:42):
even if we let them into the WTO and we
let them take advantage of us, it doesn't matter because
our you know, our perfect free market system is so good.
Out compete them in that and they'll just make our
stuff that's been disproved, right, They'll just make our stuff
for Walmart, and you know they can they can keep
just exactly and in our in our systems more competitive,
so it'll be more efficient. It's like, and I think
this is where the industrial policy stuff, whether one thinks

(27:03):
industrial policy or government involved in the economy is abstractly necessary.
We don't live in the abstract world. We will live
in a world where the largest economy in the world
in PPP terms is doing industrial policy on a massive scale.
So it's like, that's the world that we live in.
And in terms of I mean, you know, the actual

(27:23):
because I don't think it's so interesting if you go
in and dive a little bit into um North Korean ideology.
I think there's some interesting comparison people make with with
with North Korean ideology obviously very heavily borrows from Stalinist
Stalinist Soviet Union, but also borrows very heavily from UH

(27:45):
from Imperial Japan and some of the racial religious uh,
you know, ultra nationalism. I mean, you know, North Korea
it's not. It's not like Marx came up with this
and like, yeah, we're gonna try that, right, There's there's
some different China is even more different in his sense
because you have the trappings of a communist regime. You
have what like hundreds, maybe up to a thousand people

(28:08):
in China other than she who make any decisions of
any real importance within the party right regionally. I mean
it's not. It's a pretty small group of people overall, who,
as I understand it, are making most of the major
calls for within the Communist party. And she, of course
sits atop the whole thing as as the you know,
the dictator. But is it like a mercantilist authoritarian society

(28:30):
and what because it's people are like, oh, communist China, yes, technically,
but obviously also not technically. There are billionaires walking around
Beijing and Shanghai who are like, yeah, call me a
COMMI exactly with entrepreneurial apps and so forth, and fight
sharing apps and stuff. I mean, look, the Marxist Leninism
element is real. I actually think Shi Jinping himself thinks

(28:52):
he's thinks of himself as a dedicated Marxist lenis is
in some way. But remember his central project is the
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. It's not workers of
the World Unite. It's essentially a nationalistic project. And nationalism
is an incredibly powerful force. I mean, to be fair,
I usually think that we just call nationalism patriotism when

(29:13):
we don't like it. So it's like the Chinese are
super super patriotic. I mean not every Chinese obviously, but
it's you know, and that's another thing, is you know
in Asia you know today, I mean still so much
where a lot of our mental models are refracted through
Europe and there's this post whatever rules based international order
blah blah blah. But like in Asia, nationalism is a

(29:34):
good thing because nationalism was what allowed them to eject
the Europeans who exploited them for several hundred years, and
it allows nations to be strong and pursue their interests.
The Indians are nationalists, Japanese were nationalists kind of, but
the Koreans are definitely both Koreans, the South Koreans too,
they're very nationalistic. Vietnamese they kicked us out, the French,
you know, etc. So it's like, I don't to me

(29:55):
that that's sort of it's not inherently a bad thing
Chinese nationalism or patriotism, but we can't let it run
rough shot. Something else. I want to ask you one
thing I know from one of the things I learned
in the CIA that was super effective, especially when you
have to be moving around to whatever the issue is, right,
this is the thing you become inherently kind of a generalist. People.

(30:16):
Look why I did a Rock and then Afghanistan. Yeah,
because skill set for one Obama administration comes in after Bush.
It was all a rock, they moved Afghanistan. And so
you can't know everything. So you got to know the
people who know. Right, if you can discern who actually knows,
like you land on the ground in cobble or whatever,
you figure out pretty quickly who knows what the heck
they're talking about, and you can piece it together. It's

(30:37):
kind of like the allegory of the cave, right, like
you just you don't have to see it, you just
have to know who can see it. On the wall
and on Russia, the people that I know who understand
that country as as subject matter experts have been kind
of banging this rum for years that we're always told that,
especially for the last whatever to six years. Putin's so evil, dictate, dictator.

(31:01):
Everyone hates him. He's hanging you know, well he's not
hanging on by a thread, but you know, if they could,
they get rid of him in a second. And it's like, well, actually,
whether it's fair to think this way or not, the
Russian people in the post Soviet collapse were completely humiliated
through the nineties and the creation of a Russian middle
class of sorts and certainly of a Russian elite that

(31:22):
pads a lot of pockets and pays a lot of bribes,
but even more so, just more general economic product has
all occurred under Vladimir Putin's watch, and in essence, there's
a very much a quid pro quo constituency of everyday
Russians who are like, no, we actually like Putin. Now
that might have changed a bit in the Ukraine era,
but that's a reality that people that I know who

(31:43):
know Russia say never gets talked about. You know, it's just, oh,
he's bad, he's a dictator. He stole the twenty sixteen
election for Trump. Like, there's a very is a caricature
of him. Yeah, he's a bad guy. Yeah, he's done
terrible things, of course, but if you want understand internally,
I bring it up because in the context of China,
I was in Beijing in twenty nineteen. I was in Beijing.
I was doing a you know, economic kind of economic

(32:04):
junket for for a financial firm, and I went to China.
I went to Beijing and Shanghai. And one thing that
came across very clearly from discussions with some to the
degree that they were willing to talk to us openly
and honestly, is they the Chinese economy has been a miracle.
Like we think of China as a totalitarian society that
doesn't allow free speech, which is all true, and the

(32:26):
weakers and the terrible things, but they've also brought hundreds
of millions of people out of agrarian subsistence poverty, you know,
gradian subsistence living and poverty, dire poverty, and so like.
There there's actually more support for the Communist Party as
it is than the West often realizes, just because of
the economic benefits. Like how do you how do you

(32:49):
view that? I know it's different than the Russian context,
but I see some similarity. But I think I did
an analogy, and I mean, I think this, this gets
to something. I mean just I've been kind of feeling
this recently. I mean, like so much of the discourse
on foreign policy is like it's all about a morality
tale and it's like I sometimes wonder, like am I
on crazy pills? Because like my view is I'm looking
at this and trying to figure out what's in the

(33:10):
best long term enlightened interests of the American people. Like
I don't mean to be moralistic or whatever about it.
I'm saying that's just like my frame. So if you're
going to advance the interest to the American people, like
if you're in let's say we were the trustee of
the the defund of the American people, you wouldn't trust
an investor who was like, oh my gosh, you know

(33:30):
we're going to get off like a natural gas in
like the next five years. Like you'd want somebody who
actually could ensure that you sustain the money so that
kids could go to college and whatever and Gramma could
retire and so forth. Right, So the way you're looking
at and the way I look at Russia and China
is like, well, what is there? And you know what
ideally how can you make it the best? But but ultimately,

(33:51):
like you have to accurately assess the environment and you
were intelligence officer like in order to make good policy
decisions and and so like Putin has become a sort
of um like like a stock character like Paradise loss
kind of thing. If we're going on the literary route,
you know, with Plato and stuff, I mean like a
morality play like almost and it's like, well, Putin's an

(34:12):
evil guy, has done evil things like no question. But
your point about the Russians is you know my understanding,
and I don't improve this. I hope Russia becomes a
democracy and all that, but like they regard the nineties
as an epic disaster and whether they like Putin or whatever,
Russian political culture and humiliating by the way, which to
the Russian mindset was it even you know they can

(34:33):
it's worse. I was told this by a Polish friend
of mine, and I think it was so astute. She
said to me when she says, buck and we're talking
about putinans Dugas, Buck, would you have to stand is
that nothing brings the Russians together like suffering. But they're
very but they're very proud. They're very proud. They've sacrificed
a lot. That's right, so that they will sacrifice I

(34:54):
make it worthwhile. That's right. They will sacrifice the right.
But if you humiliate, you know, but but humiliation to
the sense of honor, that is, that is the thing
that they cannot abide, right exactly, and that that's my impression.
I'm not a Russian, but I mean, the interesting thing
is the Poles, for instance, my general impression, who hate
the Russians and are against the invasion. They understanding me.
They're they're they're not. They don't have any delusions about

(35:16):
the Russians. It's not a surprise that the friend who
was telling you that as a Pole, because they don't
they don't have like this idea that the Russians are
suddenly going to turn over a new leaf and become
a bunch of flower children. Now on the Chinese, I
think the point also is just like think of the
mental map, like you know, people like us who grew
up I mean my you know, my parents with the
college whatever, like you know, it was some there was
the Vietnam and Watergate, but like come on, if you're

(35:39):
Chinese and you're in your forties. That means your parents
went through the uh, the Cultural Revolution, which was literally,
I mean really insane, I mean mass starvation and struggle
sessions in public. I think she's paying in their own
she's in paying himself. Praise mother, I mean family, yeah,

(36:02):
and so and your parents impossibly you excuse me, your
grandparents and possibly your parents were there for the Great
Lead Forward, which in which more people died I think
than any other event in human history. It's up there
the civil the Civil War, and Japanese occupation, which any
one of these is way beyond the conception of Americans
as to the amount of suffering. You go back into

(36:22):
the ninth century, go box, the rebellion, the typing, So
it's like this is the scale of disaster and suffering
is totally different. And they also are very proud, right,
I mean, they considered themselves its traditionally called the Middle Kingdom.
I mean this is a little bit of fortune cookie
analysis on my part, but I think it's fundamentally true,
which is that they expect to be respected and they

(36:44):
feel like they put up with a lot. So the
notion that I mean, there are people in China, I'm
sure who want to live in a democracy. But the
question is do they have the power? Do they have
the courage? You know what? I mean to say that
in a moralistic way, like I don't. I mean the people,
for instance, who protested against the COVID stuff, who knows
what happened to them? And to throw your life away
in futility is I mean, that's a lot. But I

(37:06):
think you're right. I mean, this is the way we
need to look at them, and then we need to
try to push them in the direction that's that's that's
most most practical. And in the fact that the fact
that the premier of China, Shijunping, was denounced by his
own mother as part of the culture revolution struggle sessions
we're talking about, and his half sister was essentially persecuted

(37:28):
to death by mobs saying that she was disloyal, and
she lived in a cave for a while to try
to flee, Yeah, try to flee the Maoist revolution. I
mean literally, this guy lived in a cave to avoid
further persecution and murder of his own family by the
communist system that he now leads. I mean, so you

(37:49):
try to get into the psychology a little bit of
the people that are making the decisions here, and that's
just on this I was looking into this, and I
mean this is deeply rooted in the Leninist party system,
and by the way, the Nationalists also had this. I
mean the amount of suffering and sacrifice and brutality that's
just built in. That's like in the warp and woof
of the political culture there. There's an expression. I used
to go to China and people would say, there's an

(38:09):
anaconda wrapped around every chandelier in these nice rooms, that
there's this like looming menace and potential for violence and
death that we just we just discount, thank God for
our for our own fortune. But that's the kind of
thing we're dealing with. I mean, the the Holidamor, which
I think now gets people just have done a lot
more Ukraine thinking and research for obvious reasons, so people

(38:32):
know more about the Holidomore, the forced starvation of millions
of Ukrainians by the Soviets and and what happened there,
but it's still not known, not at that well known,
i think, relative to the level of atrocity in the
twentieth century. But the Chinese Communist Party and the mass
starvation and the Great Famine which occurred to your point,

(38:55):
within memory of grandparents of people right now, right, I
mean you could have been of a generation where your parents, um,
you know, rather our our grandparents, our grandparents, your parents
would have been alive children, right right. So yeah, so
that just shows how recent this was and how tens

(39:17):
of millions of people died. Tens of millions of people died.
I think the I mean the estimate about twenty I
think twenty to forty is usually what they say, right exactly, Yeah,
I mean, but yeah, and that's only one event. I
mean the Civil War, and I mean and the Civil War.
I threw this example on the Twitter. But like the PLA,
the Communist Party army, while they were towards the end

(39:38):
of the Civil War, there's a nationalist I mean, they
really fought hard. But the Communist army besieged an important
city in Manchuria, and they said we will let nationalist
soldiers out surrender basically, but not civilians. Even if civilians
wanted to get out, they're not allowed out because it
put more pressure on the food situation inside the city. So,

(39:59):
you know, hundreds of tens of thousands of maybe over
one hundred thousand civilians died. And that's just one particularly
famous incident. A tragedy to it too deep. Listen to
the whole propaganda campaign. It's made by the way people
go back and look at some of this stuff and
you realize that this is in the middle of the
twentieth century. This is not a long long time ago.
I think. Wasn't there the sparrows campaign where they convinced

(40:21):
people that the grain shortage there was an acute grain
shortage because the sparrows were eating too much grain. And
so they went out and started they started telling villagers
to go kill the sparrows because you know, these little
birds that were all over the place. And then they
actually I believe that at least this is maybe this
is something of a of a you know, urban legend
at this point. But then they they they killed a

(40:43):
lot of these birds, and then there was locusts or
some other invasive species that made it even worse than
a point being, They created all kinds of new ways
to make a miserable situation even more miserable, and there
was never any not only was there no political accountability
for this. They're still in charge. I mean effectively the same.

(41:04):
The system is still in charge, and so we're dealing
with just a much wealthier version of the system that
presided over catastrophe, mass starvation, and repression on a scale
that reaches the worst depths of what we saw through
in the twentieth century. And now we have Chijianping and
they've got nukes and they want to go after Taiwan.
So it feels like a rough situation. What is your

(41:27):
what's the most positive view of how this is going
to play out between US and China, say over the
next five to ten years, Like, what's the we get
it right and handle them in a way that shows
some dexterity on the US and an allied part so
that it may not sound like it, But in a way,

(41:48):
I'm kind of optimistic relative to some people on the
China issue because I think a lot of this just
boils down to the military balance. Because there's a lot
of talk and there's sort of the sophisticated fancy view
like this is as much an economic and ideological and
societal competition in YadA, YadA, YadA. I actually don't think
that's really true. I think what we're seeing is the
United States itself, but many other countries diversifying away from China.

(42:11):
I think we're going to continue trading with China, but
people now know, hey, I don't want to have all
my a set amnifin or ibuprofen or penicillan made in China. Right,
So that's that's gonna take place, right, and the Chinese
are going to have difficulty using their economic leverage or
they don't have any soft power. Nobody wants to like
turn into this society, right, so like they don't, they're
gonna find it difficult to say, hey, Taiwan, give up

(42:33):
and fall under our shadow, or else we're gonna cut
off you know, your iPhones, like it doesn't work, and
they've tried it. They're trying in Australia. It's not working.
So that's actually that makes me more sanguine. That's partially
our own experience. I mean, you saw this when you're
in the government. Our sanctions don't work that well. I
mean they're not even working that well against the Russians
right now. The sanctions, I find, is a talking point
for diplomacy, so it doesn't look toothless. Basically, that's generally

(42:56):
what in class, it's what they understand it's it's easy
to use. Congress can pass it. What that means though,
is the military piece. They war and aggression can work
though war can pay. I mean, the reason California and
Texas and the southwestern states are American is because of
a successful aggressive war. Right, so that can work. But
if we get that right, I actually think will be

(43:19):
okay because the Chinese then will have an incentive. As
much as they would love to dominate the world, they're
not going to have a plausible route to do it,
and they'll be forced to deal. And I did like
to keep it simple stupid, you know. Yeah, there has
been a recognition. One of the things I always say
that Trump does not getting nearly enough credit for is
that with very few exceptions, I knew a few super
trade policy nerds who even early in the Trump administration,

(43:42):
you know, outside of the administration, but people just out
there we're saying, no, he's actually right about the China thing,
like we have to do something. We're just in a
one way ste hundred years that's going to be the thing,
you know, China, And you had to call it out
in an adversarial way because otherwise it was just fluff,
and it was a one way trade war already. You know,
you could either recognize what was going on or you

(44:03):
could just keep saying, no, we don't want to rock
the boat. It's like they're rocking the boat all over
the place. So Trump, for his all of his pugnacious inclinations,
was I think spot on on that. And you know
this because the Biden administration has basically continued and with
the Trump policies with regard to China, and he did
that over the Oh, trade wars lead to real wars.

(44:24):
A lot of people on the right were very, oh
my gosh, he's amaniac on this. Yey. He was totally
right on that. But I think it's also forced a
I mean, and I want to ask you, do you
think we've reached the point of enough of an understanding
that domestic industry, especially for things like silicon chips, things
that we need you know, um, that we have to

(44:44):
have it here? Actually that outsourcing production to a more
developing economy to the degree that if they shut off
their supply, we're screwed. That's not a good plan. Well,
I hope. So, I mean again, then that gets back
to that, can we outcompete China if they're doing, as
you say, one way trade war. I think that's exactly right.
So no, I mean, I think we can maintain summer

(45:05):
lines there, but I think we should totally come bring
stuff back home. I think some of it is going
to these supply chains, from what I can tell, are
so complex. We're not going to bring the whole thing back,
but it's more a matter of degree. We're going to
bring more stuff back. And that's good for I think
the kind of objectives that many across the political spectrum.
I mean, people like us, I think on the right,
but you know, the Rocannas of the world that Matt
Stoller's on the left also want people to have good

(45:27):
jobs and be able to support families and all that
war and cast all that kind of thing. So that's good.
The other thing that is really necessary in this front is,
if I'm right, that you really got to get the
military balance right. And by the way, that's another area
where the Bide administration has been continuing the Trump administration,
and I have to admit in some ways they're doing
a better job. I mean, I kind of hate to
admit it, but in terms of actually implementing that they're
carrying it forward. They're not going as fast as I

(45:47):
would want and with the urgency and focus that I
would want. But I can't deny that they actually are
moving forward. But what I would say is we need
a defense industrial base that can produce at scale and quickly.
We don't have it, and that it's got to be
at home or in really trusted places. Yeah, you know,
I mean Australia or Canada or whatever. By the way,
I just wanted to look it up because I was
trying to remember the name because I thought that would

(46:09):
that would trigger more remembrance of us. Yes, it was.
It was Great Lead Forward, so not really Cultural Revolution era.
Great Lead Forward though. There was the four Pests campaign
and there are these unbelievable posters that that existed in
Maoist China of the Menace of the sparrow. It was sparrows, mosquitos, rats,

(46:30):
and flies. And so they actually decided to and this
is because obviously the grain harvests were way down. They
didn't have enough food for everybody, so this is leading
into the Great Famine. Uh, they decided to go on
this mass extermination campaign of the Eurasian tree sparrow which is,
you know, like pigeons and sparrows in America, very very
common in China, and they killed so many of the

(46:51):
sparrows that the locust population boomed and they had locust plates.
This actually happened, So that gives you a sense of
it's kind of yeah, it's it's maoist Chinese version of
you know this book. I mean, I was gonna say
it's academic, but you know, that's that's your wheelhouse of seeing,
like a state by the guy at Yale, where he
just goes through it's very dry, but he goes through

(47:13):
these different occasions where you get historically, these world class
experts to just come up with a plan to like
completely revolutionize, not in the crazy way we saw in
the Soviet Union and in China where it was absolute catastrophe,
because by the way, those weren't experts, you know, these
are these were the thuggish commissars who who couldn't add,
who are like, yeah, let's just like melt all the

(47:33):
plowshares um. But in the case of German, one of
the one of the case studies is German forestry, and
I think the way I know this is super This
is where we get to the sexy stuff on this
podcast wherever it's like, yeah, sign you up. German forestry
in I think it was the mid nineteenth century and
they they decided they had this whole campaign, you know,

(47:54):
across you know, the German States, but this idea caught
hold in Germany of you need to plant one kind
of tree symmetrically in rows in a way that will
increase the yield. And you know, and this is basically
mathematize and systematize the planting of trees. And they had
this whole thing, and what they didn't realize is that
made them if you get one kind of pest for

(48:15):
that tree, you are screwed. If you don't have underbrush,
if you don't have you know, you don't have the
other plan. Anyway, it was a total and utter disaster.
And the smartest people in forest stry management in the
world at that time thought this is gonna be a
great idea. So that's what that book goes into, which
I always thought was so interesting to be Oh, the
maoist some of the Maoist propaganda posers about the sparrows military.

(48:37):
I want to go back to the US military for
a second. What are what do we need to do
differently than what is being done right now, or prepare
for the next one. I mean, the biggest cliche we're
talking about military strategy. You know, whether you're from from
Klausowitz the Mike Tyson, everybody has a plan until they're
punched in the face, right. I mean, the biggest cliche

(48:58):
I think of all is, you know, we always preparing
to fight the last war, so we know we're not
going to be doing low intensity counterinsurgency operations as the
primary US national security focus for the next twenty years.
We just because we're not going to do it right.
That's just not how we might pay somebody else to
do it. We might Yeah, I certainly hope that that's
actually a better that's a better way of putting it.

(49:19):
What do we need to do to prepare for the
actual situations we're seeing, for example, I mean Russia Ukraine.
The possibility of that spiraling is I think low, but
it is it does exist. What do we need to
do differently from military preparedness standpoint? So I actually think
we're not preparing for the last war. We're preparing for
what we think the next war will be. I mean,

(49:39):
and we in the Trump administration, we shifted the focus
to China and more folks on Taiwan, and they've carried
that forward and in a lot of ways intensified it
under this administration. So there is a lot of bureaucracy
in tail in ershia blah blah blah. That's all what
I would say. The bottom line is is I think
it's a matter of scale and urgency. So here's the
analogy that I use. You know, you've gotten a diagnosis

(50:01):
from your doctor that you're acute heart disease and you you
need to lose a lot of weight and otherwise you're
you know, you're you're potentially going to croak, and we
are you know, you basically have said I'm going to
do the diet. I'm doing a diet. I cut out,
you know, my dessert after lunch, but I'm still having
some ice cream after dinner. And I'm meaning the French
friends And it's like this sounds like my diet, by

(50:22):
the way, But well, I mean that's the thing I
actually been thinking about it because it's like I'm trying
to think of the theory of change, because fundamentally, like
getting back to that fifty percent or forty five percent.
Like there was a war game that was done that
got a lot of press recently by the Center First
Frugic International Studies, and I had some problems with it.
I think it was too confident in our ability. Mostly
classified wargaming by their own emission is more is more pessimistic.

(50:44):
M but you know, even they in this optimistics that
it would be an absolute slug fest. We'd lose more
people and things than we've lost since since World War Two.
And so my feeling is like, well, why are we
even getting close to that? Why are we even why
are we even getting close to that point? And people say,
you know, for our defense industrial base is too slow,
or we can't you know, reduce forces in Europe while

(51:04):
the Ukraine War we can't reduce force in the same
common It's like, well, wait, isn't this our priority? You know,
the the Chinese are the one who are the heart attack.
These other things are like you know, stub toe or
I mean worse than that. Maybe they're a broken bone.
But that's the problem that we have to fix. And
if there's something, if there's a problem with fixing it,
if there's a fundamental issue, for instance, the defense industrial

(51:25):
base we need to produce more ammunitions. It's obvious. So
the administration is saying, Okay, we're going to authorize the
defense primes to get multiyear contracts. Oh, that's probably part
of it, but obviously the whole model is insufficient. If
this is where we are now, So why doesn't the
President get on national television and say here's what we need?
And I'm another sign these are the executive words. He's
willing to do it over Ukraine. You know, our congressional leadership,

(51:45):
a lot of them are willing to do over Ukraine.
Why don't we do it over over China? That's so
much more important. So that is the kind of that
I think is the It's not that we're doing the
wrong things. You know the specifics, and I mean, you
can argue, but nobody really knows how a war like
that would. You know, we probably we need more anti
ship missiles, that's an obvious. We need more targeting apparatus,
space and air breeding, etc. Yes we know that, but

(52:08):
but that's not solved in micro movements. We've made the
kind of movements we can. We now need to have
fundamental muscle movements and that requires political will. What worries you,
And maybe this would be or you know, when we're
wrapping up here with you in a couple of minutes,
But what worries you such that if you had the
attention of the Biden apparatus, right, so Joe Biden, but

(52:33):
really also the people around him who are making more
of the national security decisions. However that shakes out not China, Russia,
Ukraine or military preparedness. We've talked about that, but if
if they if there was something else that you're gonna say,
you really need to pay attention to. And this is
about what's best for the country. This isn't some you know,
partisan shot in the ribs when old man Joe's not

(52:54):
paying attention. Is there anything that comes to mind for you?
Is there anything where you're like, I worry about what
can happen or what will happen in this area, on
this issue or in this realm. I mean, obviously the
you know, the biggest ones we've already hit China, Russia, Ukraine,
and I think just general military preparedness. But is there
anything you know or are you worried about something happening

(53:15):
with Iran going nuclear? You worried about the cartels and
what it could mean just for you know, destabilization along
the border. I mean, you tell me, but is there
anything what would you be like, guys, we need we
need to spend some time on this. I look at power,
so there's nothing in the same order magnitude, and I mean,
you know, I don't want another pandemic obviously, things like that.
I mean, look, I think the immigration issue and the

(53:35):
potential for cartels, I don't think it's I don't know
why we would just rule out the potential to use
I don't know why we would just rule out the
potential to use military force under any circumstances. I'm not
saying we should, but I think it's worth considering. I mean,
that's a huge harm to the American people, and that
seems something and I don't think this administration has been
good on it. Within the security realm, I think the

(53:56):
one that's probably I mean, I think it's possible the
Israelis will go after you in program in the near term.
I think there's ways to handle that, particularly by supporting
the Israelis and the and the you know, the Abraham
Accords crowd. I think the North Korea situation is really Um,
it's untenable to keep going like it is because they're
going to develop the ability to get out beyond our
missile defenses, which don't work well enough to keep up

(54:19):
with them. And they're they're pretty crazy, and the South
Koreans are making noises, and I think we need to
have a kind of a rethink of what that is.
I think I think there are I think there are
things that we could do. You know, Um, I mean
I don't like, I'll put I'll put it to you bluntly.
I don't think at the end of the day, we
don't want proliferation to our allies. But that is not

(54:40):
the worst thing. It's not as bad as a North
Korean nuclear attack on the American homeland. It's not as
bad as breaking our alliance with South Korea. So you know,
we need to put we need to have like a
fundamental rethink of our situation North Korea. And at the
end of the day, Look, he's your point about the
North Koreans. The Juche model is basically in super independence nationalism.
Well that applies to China. Actually I didn't know this

(55:02):
until recently, but the North Korean's kicked out the Chinese
in the late fifties from North Korea after the Chinese
had intervened and saved North Korea from the US and
the South Koreans and the UN forces. So I'm not
I'm not optimistic about North Korea, but I don't think
we can continue going along the same trajectory that we've
been going on. And Bridge Colby, Sir, phenomenal as always,

(55:23):
so so appreciative you joining me here on the Buck
Sexton Show. Your book is great where thank you very much.
Tell people the book where can they go get it? Great?
I really delight to be with you, Buck. The book
is The Strategy of Denial, American Defense and Age of
Great Power Conflict that you can find it on Amazon,
the Yale University website, and I'm on Twitter at Elbridge
Colby UM. And uh, you know, look forward to hearing

(55:45):
from any of the listeners who want to follow up. Yeah,
please to tweet tweet questions and thoughts to Bridge and
my friend. It's been twenty years. Here we are. It's
good to talk to you about Thanks for being here,
you too, Thanks man.