Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:00):
My views on the Iranian conflict. The Israeli Iranian conflict
are starting to get more crystallized, and I'm beginning to
think more and more that boy, I really don't want
us to get more involved, and I think I am
(00:21):
leaning in the direction of the don't interveners as this continues,
and I'm seeing the fault lines begin to show. One
thing that did happen that I thought was valuable, and
I kind of Tucker Carlson seems like he kind of
(00:43):
goes off the rails on a lot of different things.
But one of the things he did was he had
an interview with Ted Cruz where he asked Ted Cruz,
Ted Cruz is very pro Israel, pro wanting to get involved,
pro floating even ideas about regime change. Tucker Carlson asks
(01:04):
Ted Cruz what's the population of Iran? And Ted Cruz
doesn't have an answer, He's not sure. And I thought
that was really revealing. Here's the thing. I don't necessarily
(01:30):
know that I want regime change in Iran. I think
the only thing I agree with is with what the
President has said, we can't let Iran have a nuke.
That I'm I'm fine with you can't have You can't
let Iran have a nuke. They're the world's leading state
(01:52):
sponsor of terrorism. It's clear that they want a nuke.
They clearly are trying to enrich way more uranium than
is necessary. That you don't really need uranium enrichment at
the levels they're doing it for domestic energy production. You know,
(02:15):
you want nuclear power plants, that's fine, you don't need
to be enriching uranium for it. It's obvious that they're
doing something sneaky and not good. Okay, if we want
to just sort of tell them, you're a rogue state.
You've attacked the United States a million times, You've killed
hundreds of American servicemen in Iraq, you attack Israel all
(02:39):
the time, you fund terrorist operations throughout the globe through
your proxies like Hamas and the Houthis and whatnot Hezbollah.
Then basically i'm that, And then all right, we want
(03:00):
to we want to blow up your nuclear projects and
stop you from being able to get a nuke. Okay,
that's good. Regime change is a different thing. You can't
just kind of take out the leadership and then not
get involved. There's no way that that's gonna work. A
(03:22):
regime change project is way more work, way more involvement,
and I'm starting to see the fault lines between people
who don't want to intervene and get involved and those
who do so. Here was this exchange between Tucker Carlson
(03:46):
and Ted Cruz on Tuesday. The Hill has a right
up on it. The conservative media personality. Carlson on Tuesday
released a clip from the interview, set to be released
in full on Wednesday, in which he grills Cruise on
details about Iran and its demographic makeup. When Cruz does
not know the answers Carlson is seeking, the host blasts
a senator for failing to know the details of quote
(04:06):
the country you seek to topple. How many people live
in Iran by the way, Carlson asked, I don't know
the population? Cruz responded at all. No, I don't know
the population. Cruz said, you don't know the population in
the country you seek to topple, Carlson retorted. When Cruz
asked Carlson the same question back, the journalist replied quickly
(04:27):
ninety two million, adding how could you not know that?
I don't sit around memorizing population tables Cruz responded. The
conversation grew increasingly heated from there, as Carlson argued, the
numbers are kind of relevant because you're calling for the
overthrow of the government. Why is it relevant if it's
ninety million or eighty million or a hundred million. Why
is that relevant? Cruz responded, before pushing back against Carlson's
(04:50):
suggestion that he doesn't know anything about the country. Carlson
then offered another trivia question, what's the ethnic mix of Iran?
But that's not a trivia question. Well, see, this is
all really relevant. So let me say this. I think
Tucker Carlson goes off the rails a lot. I don't
(05:12):
really listen to him all that much on Russia Ukraine stuff.
As much as I am not really I sort of
join him, at least in being skeptical about American involvement
in Ukraine, the extent to which Carlson over sells it
to be like, oh, the Putin's actually maybe Putin's really
the good guy. No, Putin's not the good guy. This
(05:32):
was an unjustified aggressive war. The question is whether it's
a smart idea for America to heavily invest in it,
which I'm not sure that it is, and I continue
to not think it is, and I think, actually we'll
talk about that later in the show. Her recent events
have sort of demonstrated how unwise it was to really
commit to this. But the point Tucker's making with Cruise
(05:58):
right now is a really good point and a really
relevant point. Here's Ted Cruz saying, yes, we should seek
to overthrow the existing ruling government of Iran. If you
take that position, you got to kind of and you're
(06:20):
a US senator, you should maybe know some basic facts
about Iran. You should know the ballpark of their population.
Probably you should know a bit about the ethnic mix,
the ethnic background, something about the culture. Because I was
(06:43):
talking about this on the show yesterday yesterday the day before.
One of the things we really learned in Iraq and
Afghanistan was well, certainly Afghanistan, was that that was not
a place quote ripe for regime change. We went in there,
(07:04):
we kicked out the Taliban, We faced twenty years of
constant civil war, and guess what we went landed up
at the Taliban being in charge again. Because a lot
of these cultures are not ready for eager for wanting
Western style liberal democracies, when you give populations in the
(07:28):
Middle East the right to vote, sometimes the form of
government that they democratically choose is an autocratic theocratic Sharia
law mess case in point, the Gaza strip. Israel pulls
(07:51):
out of it, Hamas comes in and becomes the terrorist organization.
Hamas becomes the dominant political party. They win the elections,
They forcibly militarily shove out Fatah, the other political party,
with like a mini little civil war in Gaza to
(08:12):
shove them out militarily, and they were democratically elected by
the people of Gaza back in the two thousands, I
think it was like two thousand and eight or something
like that. Some places don't think don will not greet
you as a liberator if you come in and topple
their government. I've been hearing two different things about the
(08:35):
Iranian threat my whole I don't know these past twenty years.
One is that Iran was days away, weeks away, mere
months away from getting a nuke. There was a story
from two thousand and six about how Iran was sixteen
days away from getting a nuke that someone posted. People
(08:57):
have been saying Iran is about to get a nuke
for a long long, long, long time, and they just
haven't done it. Now. There have been interventions, Israeli strikes,
all kinds of things to sort of stop Iran from
getting a nuke. But there's a little part of me
that's like, well, this is a kind of a boy
who Cried Wolfe situation. How sure are we that Iran
is actually that close to getting a nuke. I don't
(09:20):
doubt that they're working towards that goal, that they want
a nuke, I just don't know how imminent a threat
it is. The second thing I've heard for a long
time is people saying that the Iranian people are suffering
under the yoke of the horrible Iyatolas, that they resent
(09:42):
the Iyatolas, that they hate the suppressive government, that eighty
percent of the Iranian people actually don't support Aatola komeni
and the theocratic rule by the Iatolas in Iran, that
they yearn for freedom. And then people will always bring up, oh,
remember in the seventies when when the Shaw was in charge,
(10:05):
how awesome that was. And I guess the Shaw's current
I don't know the Shaw who got expelled in the seventies.
I guess it's either his son or his grandson. All
of a sudden, now that he's popping up on videos
on Twitter saying oh, we are ready, we are ready
to come back and free the Iranian people. I'm like,
all right, let's okay. So just a couple of things.
(10:26):
First of all, I keep hearing this about also the
majority of the Iranian people reject the Iyatolas. Well, they've
been awful quiet about their rejection of the Iatolas for
the last you know, twenty plus years, fifty plus years.
They seem awful quiet about it because the Iatola is
still there. He's still in charge, Ayatola Komane, he's eighty
(10:49):
six years old. Nobody's thought to internally topple him. You know,
I don't know, maybe that'll happen in a week. I
guess could happen, But it's only happening. If it happens,
it's only happening as a result of the precipitating event
of Israel blowing up all of their major military leadership.
(11:12):
So clearly, whatever public support there is for getting rid
of the Ayatola has not been able to materialize into
actual effective internal reform within Iran. No one's doing that. Secondly,
this people always bring this up about well, back in
the seventies when the Shaw was in charge in Iran
was such an open country. Okay, well that was seventy
(11:36):
you know, that was fifty plus years ago. And let's
remember it was the Iranian people who overthrew the shot.
They kicked his rear end out and replaced him with
a theocratic, crazy regime ruled by religious leaders, by the Iatolas.
(11:59):
So it was the Iranian people who got rid of
the Sha. Let's let's let's recall that. Okay. I prefer
the Shah over the Iatolas too. I prefer, you know,
pre revolution Iran to current Iran. I think it's nice
that women were able to walk around without hit jobs
(12:20):
and not get shot. But let's remember that it was
the Iranians who overthrew the shot, who didn't like the shot.
So this idea that, oh, yeah, the Iran's like they're ready,
they're ready to just get rid of the Iatolas and
just go right back to you know, being you know,
(12:43):
the cool, groovy Iran of the nineteen seventies. Boy, I
really doubt that. I do not feel like that makes
a lot of sense. So in short, I don't want
us to be involved. I don't want us to be involved.
(13:06):
I don't want us to be involved. If we want
to be involved at the level of let's stop them
from having a nuke, and if Congress authorizes that or
something like that at some point ever happening, okay, fine
by me. But what I don't want is the president
(13:33):
just doing any kind of military strikes he kind of
wants to whenever he feels like it, involving us in
the actual work of regime change. And I get I
understand the temptation on the part of the people who
want regime change. The Iranian government is terrible. They are horrible.
(13:53):
They are horrible, international sponsors of state of international terrorism.
They funded Hamas who committed the October seventh attack, they
fund the Huthis who've been constantly harassing our shipping. It's bad, bad, bad, bad, bad,
always around, no question, really bad. They're a horrible country.
(14:15):
And I can see how tantalizing it is that with
a couple of air strikes Israel socked them much harder
than I think even the Israelis might have expected. That
they killed basically most of their major military leadership, most
of their nuclear development leadership, and it seems like that
(14:41):
Iotolo Komane's sort of isolated. He's eighty six years old.
Maybe we're at the point where if we do one
harder push, maybe we can take that old man out
and allow something new to come in in Iran. If
that's something new is going to be stable, then the
(15:02):
temptation's gonna be well. America needs to come in, help
us out and help stabilize things, help train our military,
and blah blah blah. Like I don't know, man, Like,
I understand how tantalizing it is if you could get
rid of the Ayatolas. But presumably whoever Comani's successor is
is already ready to go. It's not just a thing
(15:23):
of killing an eighty six year old man. They have
a whole kind of system in place over there, so
I'm and backed by support of the military. So now
a lot of their senior military leadership is all dead.
(15:45):
I'm just saying, if you want to do regime change,
Ted Cruz, you probably should have a sense of what Israel,
of what the Iranian population is. You should have a
sense of their ethnic background. You should have a sense
of their cultural feelings about the shaw versus the current government.
Without just resorting to platitudes about all the noble Iranian
(16:06):
people chafe under the yoke of the audiotols do they do?
They chase under the yoke? I feel like a lot
of them, what like the yoke? I think a lot
of them are like, you know what, this yoke I'm yoking.
We're yoking it up under the iatolas just an ox
feeling very comfortable with my yoke of Sharia Islamist lunacy.
(16:32):
A lot of people in the Middle East like that crap.
They do. They vote for it when they get the
chance to, they overthrow the shot to get it. This
country overthrew the show to get it. Do you think
they're less inclined that way after fifty years of indoctrination.
I don't know. I don't think so. It's not like
(16:54):
the I mean, it's not like the education system was
teaching kids the last fifty years. You know what, back
in the good old days of the Shah people, you know,
people were able to buy cool Western clothes. Nobody was
raised that way for fifty years. You've got like three
generations of people brought up for this form of government.
(17:17):
So I just don't believe this is like a country
ready for regime change. Now when we return, why I
feel like I kind of trust President Trump on this
of all people. That's next on the John Girardi Show.
I think I really trust President Trump on all this
with one caveat one caveat now jd Vance. Jd Vance,
(17:44):
being a millennial, is still willing to go on Twitter
and debate with people and sort of defend the President's
position on a lot of this stuff, including on the
Run stuff, and he wrote that basically, Hey, President Trump's
been really consistent out one not wanting to get America
involved into destructive wars in the Middle East. He's still
(18:07):
that guy. He's still consistent in that. But he's also
been very consistent that Iran kan't avenuke and if the
United States gets involved or doesn't get involved, I think
that President Trump deserves a level of grace and a
level of trust on this point, especially from conservatives. Okay,
(18:30):
I find that to be a fairly compelling argument. And
oddly enough, as much as you know, I've been frustrated
with Trump on certain things with social conservative issues and
sometimes on you know, his postured during the campaign on
abortion was I think frustrating. He's governed pretty pro life,
but there's still some very significant things that I'm hoping
(18:52):
he acts on, particularly with the abortion pill and things
like that. Honestly, though, with foreign policy, I trust Trump
way more than I trust almost anybody else. I feel
like the foreign policy blob of experts have been wrong
about everything all the time, always. I feel like Trump
(19:18):
was the only the first Trump administration was like the
most successful foreign policy four years that we've had for
a very long time. Started, no new wars, helped crush isis,
fostering good relations between Israel and various of its Arab neighbors,
(19:42):
thonging of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, Israel signs treaty,
you know, treaties with various other Middle Eastern countries, to
exchange embassies and have international flights and trade agreements, the
whole Abraham Accurts thing. Trump is wildly more successful, full
then all of these other people who have been in charge.
(20:05):
So I'm very inclined to trust President Trump with all
of this, with only this caveat, With only this caveat.
One of the things Vance was saying was, you know,
it's going to be up to President Trump whether to
engage in military strikes or whatnot. Blah blah blah. Eh.
(20:26):
This is a thing I've hated about military operations in general.
It's not really up to President Trump whether to engage
in strikes. If America is getting attacked, yes, President Trump
can defensively initiate things. But if we're talking about America
(20:53):
offensively engaging in something has to be involved. Congress has
to be involved. The president is not unilaterally. Yes, once
the military is engaged in something, the president has total
control over the conduct of the military. Once Congress declares war,
(21:15):
once Congress authorizes his use of military force, the president
is in charge. The president is in charge of how
the military conducts itself in battle. One hundred percent totally agree,
no argument there. But the decision of going to war,
(21:35):
Congress needs to be involved with that. Particularly the House. Okay,
the House, as the representative of the American people, as
the most directly proportional representative of the American population. The
House has been involved, is involved, is mandated to be
involved in the text of the Constitution because it's the
(21:57):
American people deciding are we going to put our life
on the line, Are we going to put the lives
of our sons on the line to fight for this
or that cause. Why has the US not ever directly
engaged in the Ukraine War because the American people don't
want it. Congress is smart enough to realize that they
(22:17):
can't even put that to a vote. All of the
foreign policy blob who would love for American time, treasure,
and blood to be invested in the Ukraine Russian War,
they don't even dare say it because they know that
the American people think it's nuts. They don't want American
boys to die for the DNBAS. So now, maybe President
(22:41):
Trump can try to argue that he's got coverage for
using military force based on the two thousand and one
Congressional Authorization for military force that President Bush and President
Obama and President Trump and all the present and since
have used for fighting terrorism in the Middle East. Maybe
(23:08):
he still has that. I find that to be a
big stretch personally. I'm just saying, if we're gonna get
to the point of regime change, especially, we need another
authorized use in military force. And the problem is they're
not gonna get it. All these people who want to
(23:30):
top of the Iranian government. I just don't think the
American people want a regime change war, which necessarily will
require investment of more American time and treasure time, treasure blood,
and American troops. I don't think people want that. I
don't think the American people are gonna sign up for that. Now,
(23:52):
limited air strikes, you get authorized used for limited air
strikes just to take out Iranian stuff, or even just
get giving the Israelis some of the bunker buster bombs
that they don't have that we have that they might
need for finishing the job with some of Iran's nuclear facilities. Okay,
the American people might like that, but I do think
(24:13):
Congress needs to be somewhat involved to the extent that
they legally need to be. When we return, we'll talk
about Ukraine. What's happening there next on the John Gerardi Show.
The situation in Ukraine is getting worse and worse and
is deteriorating more and more. And there's now that there's
(24:36):
more and more of a rift developing between the American
foreign policy folks who really want more intervention in Ukraine
and those who don't. And the frustration on the part
of those who want more intervention is why aren't we
continuing to supply the Ukrainian Why aren't we giving them
more aid? Why you know, Ukraine's gonna be suffer this
terrible defeat and America's gonna look terrible. The reputation costs
(25:00):
the United States is going to be terrible, to which
all the people who said maybe we shouldn't get involved
in this are starting to very rightly say, I told yousel.
This piece by Michael Brennan Doherty in National Review has
been one of the leading foreign policy talking heads against
(25:22):
more American involvement in Ukraine. He writes this Three years ago.
Daherty wrote this on how to Lose Big in Ukraine.
The mismatch is quite clear consistent with the theory that
Russia ultimately cares more about this conflict. It is acting
(25:45):
vigorously to achieve an acceptable end. Russia is acting chief
vigorously to achieve an end that's acceptable to itself. Meanwhile,
the United States, unable to rally the deep passions of
the American people to take signs significant risks in this conflict,
must satisfy itself with hoping that more of the same
(26:07):
failed strategy will yield a marginally less humiliating outcome. Our
policymakers in the executive branch and across the blob of
NGOs are cut off from the people whom the constitution
authorizes to declare war through their elective elected representatives. So basically,
here's what Darty saying. In Russia, policy for their military
(26:34):
operations is vested pretty much totally in Vladimir Putin. Putin decides,
he completely controls the politics over there. He decides, and
he desperately wants to get some kind of acceptable outcome
in Ukraine. He wants some level of victory in Ukraine,
whether even if it's not the total takeover of Ukraine,
(26:55):
it's capturing a lot of it. And he seems still
aligned with the Russian people on wanting to achieve that goal.
So that's really important to them. The Ukraine situations the
most important thing for the Russians right now. Well, Ukraine
(27:16):
is just not that important to the decision makers on
war and peace in America, namely the American people. The
American people, through their elected representatives in Congress, who authorize
the President to engage in military conflicts, who through Congress
(27:38):
declare war. They are not willing to take the same
risks that the Russians are. They just don't care about
it at the level that the Russians do, and the
Foreign policy Blob can rant and rape, but it's so
critically important. Okay, you think it's important the American people, don't,
(27:59):
you know how? I know. We're not even close to
thinking about proposing to Congress the idea of America declaring
war on Russia over Ukraine. We're not close. We have
debates in Congress about whether or not we will give
the Ukrainians money, and half of half are a very
(28:23):
sizable minority anyway of Congress, half approaching a majority says no,
we don't want to give them more money, like we've given.
How much are we going to give? What's the end
goal here? We're ambivalent about giving the Ukrainians money as
a country, and frankly, it's just not something the American
(28:46):
people care about. The Foreign policy Blob can rant and
rap about this all they want. The simple fact of
the matter is it does not impact the United States
one wit who controls the DNVAS region. It just doesn't.
It does not impact the lives of a single person
who lives in Oklahoma or Illinois, or Chicago or Los Angeles.
It just doesn't. It does not change the price of fish.
(29:13):
It does not change. The price of beef does not
change the price of it. Just there are so many
more issues that are so much more important to the
American people right now. They just don't care about it
to the level that the Foreign policy Blob wants. Hence,
(29:34):
the American people are not willing to declare war. The
American people are barely willing to fund the Ukrainians. So
the idea that you're going to get mad that why
aren't we wanting to fund it, Well, it's just not
that important to the American people. So getting us involved
in the first place, investing as much money as we do,
as we did now it's like this is going to
(29:57):
be such a humiliating defeat for the United States. Okay, well,
you guys were the ones who wanted us to get
on the hook for it, knowing how anemic the support was.
We can't. There just isn't the will. And that's the
difference between our two countries. Again. In Russia, Vladimir Putin
(30:21):
snaps his fingers and the whole policy of the Russian government.
Putin could end the war tomorrow. Putin could snap his
fingers and say we're done, we're going back. He wouldn't
he doesn't need to take a vote, doesn't need to
take a poll, He just snaps his fingers and it's done.
In the United States, we don't do that. I might
(30:41):
talk about it in the next segment. How similar it
is to kind of the classical model, to Rome and
Greece and the city states of the Mediterranean. That this
feature of our constitution I think is brilliant and right
that the people who are the ones who are going
(31:01):
to go to war and send their children to fight
and die in a war, through their most representative branch,
the House of Representatives, have the critical role in deciding
whether we're going to war or not. So you know
(31:23):
that this is the problem, is that this has always
been much more important for Russia than it has been
for the United States. So for the pro Ukraine types
to get mad and angry, why aren't we investing more?
Why isn't Trump investing more? Well, Trump was elected by
a large number of people who don't want to keep
funding Ukraine. He won the election in twenty twenty four
(31:45):
after years and years of the Congress and the presidency
under the Biden era giving Ukraine more and more money.
Trump won. Sorry like you lost that you lost that
rhetorical argument. You can be upset about this, think about
the reputational costs to America. Well, the whole point of
this was for America not to be directly involved. And
(32:07):
that's why I hate the whole concept of proxy wars,
the idea that oh, we're we're not voting on war,
We're just voting on you know, military funding for the Ukrainians.
But then it's like we're losing a war. Our reputation
is harmed. Look, if there's someone you want to blame,
I don't think it's Trump for coming in towards the
(32:31):
end of this and acknowledging this isn't working. They're not winning.
We got to have some kind of peaceful resolution to it. Now,
I think they're legitimate criticisms of Trump that he has
failed to utilize maximum leverage, and to a certain extent,
he needs to give Ukraine a bit more leverage so
that he can actually affect some kind of peaceful resolution.
(32:52):
Although we forget that Trump's only been on the job
for a very short amount of time. So I don't
know the idea that you know, we should judge Trump.
I think by whatever the end result, what ends up
being rather than where we are right now. I think
there are some fair and legitimate critiques of how Trump
(33:15):
has sort of negotiated this up until now that you know,
he has not really allowed Ukraine to get much negotiating leverage,
and he's not really giving you know, if the United
States keep saying, like, you know, we don't want to
keep funding Ukraine, then it's not going to give much
leverage to the United States to negotiate a peaceful settlement.
If Putin thinks, well, the United States is just going
(33:37):
to stop funding them, I'm going to keep this war going.
He has to give the Ukrainian some kind of leverage,
and I think there's some legitimate critiques that he has
not done that. But in short, this is the problem
with Ukraine is people get mad that the United States
is going to suffer a horrible reputational loss if we
(33:58):
allow Ukraine to lose. Well, you know, you sell this as, oh,
we're just funny, We're just giving them a little bit
of money. We're just giving them, you know, forty billion
dollars to help, you know, massively deteriorate the Russian milita.
It's a small investment. Now, it's our reputations on the line, Well,
we didn't want our reputation to be on the line.
(34:19):
You sold it as let's just give a little money
to deplete the resources of the Russians. I find the
whole thing frustrating. I feel like we kept giving money
to a losing cause, and I feel terribly for the Ukraine.
I don't want Ukraine to be conquered by Russia. I
don't think Vladimir Putin's a good guy. I think is
(34:39):
a horrible guy. But we're in this sort of lose
lose situation when we return this function of the constitution
as putting the people in charge of decisions to go
to war and peace. How it relates to the Greek
and Roman models that's next to close out the John
Girardi Show. One of the interesting thing things about various
(35:01):
different Greek and Roman political constitutions that got embodied into
our American written constitution, the unwritten constitutions of those Greek
and Roman city states, Greek city states and the Roman Republic,
is they basically allowed a lot of the Greek city
(35:24):
states had some kind of democratic assembly, an assembly of
the citizens that would decide certain kinds of questions. Now
it varied from city city state to city state in
Greece and the Roman Republican model also was a little
different from the various Greek models, but one of the
things that seemed consistent was that it was usually in
(35:45):
an assembly of the citizens that questions of war and
peace were decided, and the property qualifications for being a
citizen in many individual Greek city states and in Rome,
a lot of it had to do with did you
have enough money to pay for your own sword, spear armor.
(36:11):
In Rome, actually you were a different kind of class.
If you had a horse that you paid for, you
were an equestrian, and that was like a property status class,
and it changed sort of the level of the weight
that your vote had and the idea of being basically,
we are going to extend to you the right to
(36:33):
make laws, to vote on laws, to decide on governmental
policy to the extent that you're invested in this project,
and we're not. We are as a city state, we're
not going to go to war unless we all sitting
here together decide yep, we're because we're the we're the
ones voting, and we're the ones who're going to go
(36:54):
to war. And that's why citizenship was usually limited to
adult men. It may have had something more to do
with that than, you know, just pure misogyny. I mean,
certainly there was a certain kind of chopanism that existed.
But the guys all voting were the guys who themselves
(37:15):
were gonna go to war and fight and possibly die.
It's probably why Athens had a much broader democracy than
most of the other city states. Athens had a navy.
The qualifications to fight in a navy are less than
to fight in hop light battles because you're just rowing
an ore. You don't necessarily need enough money to pay
for armor or swords, you know, all that hoplight armor.
(37:41):
And this gets incorporated into the American Constitution by if
we're going to declare war, then the House of Representatives,
which is the most representative body that the directly proportional
representation of the people as a whole, the citizenry as
a whole, which is going to have to go to
war itself and fight and die, the House of Representatives
has to okay it. And it's this cool feature of
(38:03):
our constitution that it's if when the people decide to
go to war, the people decide to go to war,
and I think that needs to be first and foremost
in our foreign policy blobs. Eyes that'll do it. John j.
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