October 24, 2024 • 31 mins
In The Tipping Point, Malcolm helped popularize a controversial approach to policing called “Broken Windows Theory” that is often credited for keeping crime rates down. Now, 25 years later, he goes back and audits his chapter on crime. Did he get it right?
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Speaker 1 (00:15):
Pushkin. What did it mean to go out on a
Saturday or Friday night in nineteen ninety three in New York.
Speaker 2 (00:29):
It was kind of like a given. You know, Yeah,
you wear a fanny pack and was here on the streets.
You turn it around so it's in front of you
so you can see it.
Speaker 1 (00:37):
Did you really do that?
Speaker 2 (00:39):
Absolutely? Well?
Speaker 3 (00:40):
I actually I'm interrupt, but I remember I just had
a flash of remember keys. We all had keys, and
I used to around with keys so that each one
What would I have actually done if someone had attacked me?
I would put my keys between my fingers.
Speaker 1 (00:56):
Yeah, so that someone exactly I was ready. Not long ago.
I called up two friends so I used to hang
out with when I first moved to New York City
in my twenties, Peggy and Erica. Back in the nineties,
we were all young and footloose and on edge. I
seem to remember that at the end of every evening
(01:19):
there was a discussion about everyone had to We all
had to talk about everyone's plan for getting home. Do
you remember this? And if you didn't, who did and
didn't have money for a cab? Did anyone under what
circumstances would you take the subway on a Friday night after.
Speaker 3 (01:37):
Dinner if you were in a large group.
Speaker 1 (01:40):
Only if you're a large group, a large group.
Speaker 3 (01:41):
And it was like a little adventure. So six people
would all get on the subway late at night, and
you felt like you were being adventurous.
Speaker 2 (01:49):
Yeah, thinking back on it, it felt very collegial. We
did things as a group. Yeah, you were never left alone.
Speaker 1 (01:57):
The New York City of that era was one of
the most dangerous big cities in America. The subway was filthy,
there was graffiti everywhere. There were two thousand, two hundred
and sixty two murders in New York andnineteen ninety more
than six a day. Were we personally at risk? I
don't know, but it felt like crime was all around us.
Speaker 2 (02:18):
You know. Someone would always say, Hey, don't worry, I'm
walking you home. We were never allowed to walk along.
Speaker 3 (02:23):
Yeah, even on a right people would walk me home
just because you didn't want to be by yourself.
Speaker 1 (02:29):
As a wonder the pro when you went on on
a date, even if it was a disaster, you had
to walk. You had to walk the woman home, right,
which is like so insanely awkward. You're like.
Speaker 2 (02:41):
You we were you know independent women, but once the
sun went down, you never walked alone.
Speaker 1 (02:50):
Let's tell about how it gets better. I just remember
that all of a sudden, all of the precautions seemed
to go out the window right and it shoot. Statistically,
we know by ninety seven or ninety eight the murder
rate has dropped. I remember this. I had a bedroom
when I was living on that in that walk up
on Bank Street. My bedroom window overlooked the fire escape,
(03:15):
and I had previously been too scared to open my
window at night, and then I started to open my
window at night, so that technically someone could have walked
up down up to fire estrapem and walked in. But
I was like, it's fine, now I can sleep. My
(03:37):
name is Malcolm Gladwell. You're listening to Revisionist History, my
podcast about things overlooked and misunderstood. This is part of
a series introducing my new book, Revenge of the Tipping Point,
now available everywhere. And in this episode, I'm looking back
that the question that got me started on tipping points
(03:57):
twenty five years ago. How in the nineties did New
York become one of the safest cities in America? In
nineteen ninety six, I wrote an article for The New
York and Mega trying to explain this puzzle. It was
called The Tipping Point. That article led to my first book,
called The Tipping Point, where I offered a more complete explanation.
(04:19):
The success of The Tipping Point led to another book
and another. I wouldn't be here today talking to you
were it not from my obsession way back when about
what happened to crime in New York in the nineteen nineties.
And now I've written a sequel to that first book.
Did I mention that it's at in bookstores everywhere. It's
called Revenge of the Tipping Point. And in that spirit,
(04:42):
I've decided to go back and conduct an audit of
my conclusions from twenty five years ago, to look at
my thirty something self in the eye and ask was
I right Back in the nineties. I used to go
to New York University's library all the time to look
(05:03):
for ideas popes a big squat redstone building on Washington
Square in Greenwich Village. This was before Google, so I
was my own search engine. I'd wander the stacks for hours,
and one day I was on the fifth floor in
the HM one dot a sixth Aisle, and I started
leaping to the bank issues of the American Journal of
(05:26):
Sociology from nineteen ninety one, and I found a paper
written by a professor named Jonathan Crane entitled the Epidemic
Theory of Ghettos and Neighborhood Effects on Dropping Out and
teenage Childbearing. A choice of words no one would use today.
This is how it started. The word epidemic is commonly
(05:50):
used to describe the high incidence of social problems in ghettos.
The news is filled with feature stories on crack epidemics,
epidemics of gang violence, and epidemics of teenaged childbearing. The
term is used loosely in popular parlance, but turns out
to be remarkably apt. The word epidemic to Crane wasn't
(06:13):
a metaphor, It was a literal description. His point was
that if you look closely at how those problems spread,
how and why they go up and down, it looks
exactly like the way viruses spread, same rules, same patterns.
And when I read that first paragraph, I thought, oh
my god, this is exactly what happened in New York City.
(06:35):
We had a real, live epidemic of crime. And what
is the hallmark of an epidemic, a tipping point, the
moment when everything changes all at once. That moment when
I left my window open because I suddenly felt safe
was our tipping point, and so front and center in
my first book was a description of what I saw
(06:57):
as the reason why New York's epidemic suddenly tipped the
police department's commitment to broken windows. Policing broken windows was
a theory that small crimes or invitations for large crimes,
that if you let people get away with little things,
then you were signaling that it was okay to cross
the line into bigger things, like serious acts of violence.
(07:21):
And so what do you do? You don't let people
get away with the little things. He was taking the
concept of an epidemic and applying it to crime. Lawlessness
wasn't random. It was something you could catch from those
around you, the same way you can catch a cold
from a warm, stuffy room full of four year olds.
Speaker 4 (07:40):
If somebody urinates in public, the person is telling you
I got a big problem. This is what broken windows
theory is all about.
Speaker 1 (07:50):
The biggest champion of this idea was Rudy Giulioni, the
mayor of New York city at the time. Here he
is at a press conference in the mid nineties, a
few years into the Broken Windows experiment, where in a
span of just a minute and a half he references
public urination eight times.
Speaker 4 (08:07):
I mean, if some guy is urinate in public, we
got a problem. Now you can do one of two things.
You can ignore the problem and say, gee, I'm such
a big, fuzzy headed liberal that I'm going to walk
away from it, and you're going to make believe they
have no problem. That's New York City in the nineteen eighties.
That's New York City with two thousand murders. That's New
(08:28):
York City with five hundred thousand crimes. You have to
pay attention to people urinating on the streets, and you
have to get people to stop urinating on the streets.
That's moving towards civilization, that's moving toward decency. That's what
I mean by a decent society that people want to
invest in, people want their children to live in. You've
(08:50):
got to pay attention to somebody urinating on the street.
It may be a minor thing, it may be a
serious thing, but you cannot ignore it. You have to
deal with it. It is against the law to urinate
in public.
Speaker 1 (09:05):
Giuliani was elected in nineteen ninety three and re elected
in ninety seven by a huge margin. Under his watch,
the city was revitalized. People who had fled for the
suburbs came back. Huge parts of Brooklyn were gentrified. Central
Park was cleaned up. I cannot tell you how gratifying
it was to be a New Yorker in those years
(09:25):
and finally get a mayor who said enough, you can't
jump subway turnstiles and smoke dope on the corner and
harassed pedestrians. But Juliani wasn't just making an argument for civility,
that it was more pleasant to live in a city
where the streets were clean and the police were alert
to every sign of disorder. He was making a more
(09:45):
extravagant claim that arresting the guy urinating on the street
was the reason why the murder rate dropped, and I
believed him. Malcolm Gladwell is about to publish a book.
Speaker 5 (10:02):
Whenever it happens, huge things occur.
Speaker 1 (10:05):
About ten years ago, the journalist John Ronson did a
retrospect dive on the tipping point for a British program
called The Culture Show, and he talked to a public
defender in The Bronx named Kate Rubin.
Speaker 6 (10:16):
I would go around and I would talk to people
in New York City, and the liberal people progressive people
would say, oh, well, you know, we've had this miracle
in New York and some people would say, oh, yeah,
Malcolm Gladwell's idea broken windows.
Speaker 1 (10:28):
I didn't watch any of this at the time, even
though Ronson interviewed me for the segment too. But I
found it while working on this episode, and it made
me realize the claims I made in The Tipping Point
had far more reach than I'd ever imagined.
Speaker 6 (10:41):
Some people knew that it wasn't his idea, but that
he had popularized it. They'd read about it in The
New Yorker and his book, The Tipping Point. I would
never try to speak to what his intent was, but
I think the impact that he had was to serve
as basically a marketing force for this idea. He truly
(11:02):
popularized it.
Speaker 1 (11:06):
So once again, right on the afternoon of February twenty seventh,
two thousand and eight, a young man named David Floyd
left his apartment on Beach Avenue in the Bronx. As
he walked down the pathway next to his building. He
(11:29):
ran into the tenant to lived downstairs, who said he'd
locked himself out of his apartment.
Speaker 7 (11:35):
I was leaving my apartment to actually go to school.
Heading to school, I had my book bag on, you know,
everything that normal students do as they're going to school.
Speaker 1 (11:45):
Missus Floyd, speaking in an interview with the Civil Rights Group,
raced forward. The landlord was Floyd's godmother, so Floyd went
back inside to her apartment to get a ring of keys,
and as he and the tenant tried to figure out
which key worked in the door, three Plaine clothes police
officers suddenly emerged. There have been reports of burglars in
the neighborhood, and here were two young men trying to
(12:08):
get into a locked up apartment, and we were stopped.
Speaker 7 (12:11):
We were first. We were of course told to put
our hands up to stay where we were.
Speaker 1 (12:17):
This was how the police put broken windows into practice.
Don't let the little things pass you by. Be aggressive.
Check for weapons, drugs. Maybe you find them, maybe you don't.
But if you do that enough times, then young men
leave their guns and drugs at home. Floyd had actually
been stopped the previous April while walking down the street,
followed by three officers in a van who jumped out
(12:39):
and confronted him.
Speaker 7 (12:40):
And again, it's just the whole experience. It's humiliating, it's embarrassing,
and really, you know, it doesn't matter what kind of
person you are, how tough you are, whatever, it's a
scary thing because you don't know what is going to
happen with your life. You don't know what's going to
happen with your freedom.
Speaker 1 (13:04):
Floyd becomes the face of a massive class action lawsuit
the City of New York, challenging the NYPDS policy of
stop and frisk, and in twenty thirteen, Floyd wins. In
a shocking ruling, a federal judge said the NYPD's use
of stopping frisk was unconstitutional, effectively ending the broken windows
(13:26):
era in New York City policing. Yes, it still happens today,
but not in the way that they did ten years ago,
not even remotely close. It's no exaggeration to say that
this was one of the most consequential court cases in
the city's history.
Speaker 8 (13:42):
A lot of people at the time, and I think,
you know, not without reason, said wow, this is going
to compromise public safety.
Speaker 1 (13:49):
This is Aaron Chalfin, who's part of a group of
criminologists who have devoted themselves to understanding what exactly happened
in New York.
Speaker 8 (13:56):
The police are no longer going to be able to
make a lot of stops and really show people that
they were being proactive, so that might embolden more gun carrying,
more violence, more homicide.
Speaker 1 (14:06):
When Cholfin says that at the time, a lot of
people thought ending stop and frisk was going to lead
to crime going back up, he means everyone, city government,
the police force, pundits of every variety. That's what I
thought too. What everyone was saying in effect was this, Yes,
doing hundreds of thousands of police stops a year of
young men like David Floyd, who maybe doing nothing more
(14:29):
than helping out a friend is unfortunate, but being killed
is a lot worse. And since this is what's keeping
the crime rate down, we don't have a choice. That
was the calculus. Even the judge in the Floyd case
begins her ruling by making the same point I emphasize
at the outset, as I have throughout the litigation, that
(14:51):
this case is not about the effectiveness of stopping frisk
in deterring or combating crime. This Court's mandate is solely
to judge the constitutionality of police behavior, not its effectiveness
as a law enforcement tool. She goes on, many police
practices may be useful for fighting crime, preventive detention or
(15:12):
coerced confessions, for example, but because they are unconstitutional, they
cannot be used no matter how effective. She's basically saying,
there's a good chance that crime is going to go
back up because of my ruling. But the Constitution is
the constitution. Even the people who hated broken windows thought
(15:33):
that it worked, but then the very thing that absolutely
no one expected to happen happens. Crime falls.
Speaker 8 (15:44):
We ended stop question FRESC in New York. We know
that went down by ninety or ninety five percent, depending
on which numbers you look at, and yet we have
this incredible, incredible fifty percent decline in homicide.
Speaker 1 (15:58):
In social science, a natural experiment is when the real
world provides you with a clean way of measuring the
truth or falsity of a given proposition. The Floyd decision
was the perfect natural experiment for broken windows. All you
have to do is compared before with after.
Speaker 8 (16:16):
The amazing thing about New York is that if you
look at twenty ten, New York City had a banner
year in terms of homicide.
Speaker 9 (16:22):
It had.
Speaker 8 (16:22):
It was one of the lowest homicide rates in forty
years in the city's history in twenty ten, and you
would have said, well, like, great progress, let's just keep
it up. Let's keep up the good work. Incredibly, by
twenty nineteen, the year before the pandemic right, homicides went
down by fifty percent in New York compared to twenty ten.
Between twenty ten and twenty nineteen, New York is unique
(16:43):
in that it had another great homicide decline at a
time when homicides were really flat nationally.
Speaker 1 (16:48):
This is hands down one of the strangest and craziest
urban transformations ever. Just to give you a sense, if
New York City's crime rate in nineteen ninety had just
stayed the same, didn't change for the next thirty five years,
the city would have had an additional sixty two thousand homicides,
most of them in all likelihood young men of color.
(17:11):
Sixty two thousand young men currently walking around New York
would be dead.
Speaker 8 (17:17):
And by twenty nineteen, New York is almost as safe
as Paris. With respect to homicide rates, New York is
closer to Paris than it is to other US cities,
even like Boston, which is another safe city. Right, it's incredible.
Speaker 1 (17:32):
You know how those billionaires left New York City from
Miami during the pandemic, saying they couldn't deal with the
taxes and the crime. Well, the violent crime rate in
New York City after that second wave is half that
of Miami. If you're really worried about crime, you should
be selling your waterfront home in Coral Gables before someone
murders you and move somewhere much safer like the Bronx.
(17:56):
Or here's another. JD. Vance, the junior senator from Ohio,
tweets this in twenty twenty one, serious question. I have
to go to New York soon, and I'm trying to
figure out where to stay. I've heard it's disgusting and
violent there. But is it like Walking Dead Season one
or season four? I know, I know there's a whole
(18:18):
cottage industry of unearthing crazy things. J. D. Vance once said,
But Vance is from just outside Cincinnati. The violent crime
rate in Cincinnati at the exact moment he wrote that
tweet was twice the violent crime rate in New York City.
Serious question, Senator. I have to go to your hometown soon,
and I'm trying to figure out where to stay because
(18:40):
compared to where I come from, it's disgusting and violent there.
But I digress back to Chelfin and the question at hand.
Speaker 8 (18:49):
And so you know, it does give you the sense
that making loss and loss of these stops was not
the key ingredient.
Speaker 1 (18:55):
It does, doesn't it. We conducted a natural experiment and
the results are in. It wasn't broken windows, it wasn't
stop and frisk.
Speaker 9 (19:07):
My administration will issue hundreds of millions of dollars in
federal grants to reward cities and towns and return to
proven crime fighting methods, including stop and frisk and broken
windows policing. We did that with Rudy Giuliani was so successful.
Speaker 1 (19:24):
At three o'clock in the morning. Sometimes I lie awake
and I think, oh God, did he read The Tipping
Point too. I don't reread any of my books once
(19:49):
I've written them, particularly ones from twenty five years ago,
like the Tipping Point. I mean, why would I do?
I want to wear the clothes I wore in the
year two thousand, No, I don't do I even want
to see pictures of myself from two thousand, not particularly so.
I didn't reread The Tipping Point until I made the
decision last year to revisit my first book on its
(20:12):
silver anniversary. There were parts that I love. It felt
like rediscovering some lost friend, Hush Puppies, Six Degrees of
Lois Weisberg, Paul Revere's Ride. There are also parts that
mystified me. Did I really write an entire chapter on
the children's TV show Blues Clues? But the crime chapter
(20:33):
was the only place where I said I would write
that so differently today. Today, if I were rewriting, I'd
begin with the work of a sociologist in Chicago named
Andrew Papachristos.
Speaker 5 (20:46):
People talk about gun violence as an epidemic or disease,
and it is in many fronts, but really I wanted
to take it seriously. It was like, ohkay, if it's
an epidemic, is it a bloodborne pathogen or is it
an airborne pathogen? And actually, thank God, it's not an
airborne pathogen.
Speaker 9 (21:01):
Right.
Speaker 5 (21:01):
You don't catch a bullet like you catch a cold.
It's actually transmitted through behaviors. And I just try to
figure out ways that science might kind of boost or
amplify those insights.
Speaker 1 (21:12):
Papa Cristos took every single arrest over more than six
years in Chicago, so hundreds of thousands of arrests, and
he made something called a network map.
Speaker 5 (21:22):
All right, first you see it happens in groups, and
then like, okay, what about individuals? All right, well does
it concentrate? What about exposure? What about time?
Speaker 1 (21:33):
So if Andy and Malcolm are arrested together for shooting someone,
then Andy and Malcolm are two dots on the map,
connected by a line. And if Malcolm then is arrested
with Joe as a line connecting Malcolm to Joe, Malcolm
and Joe are one degree, or, to use Papa Cristos's
favorite term, one handshake apart, Joe and Andy two handshakes apart.
(21:56):
You do that for years and years of Chicago arrest data,
and you get a truly enormous map.
Speaker 5 (22:02):
You have this very very large network, right, and then
what you do is you sprinkle in the victimizations, which
come from a separate source of data, right. They come
from homicide records, they come from shooting files, police public health.
Speaker 1 (22:17):
He took the names of everyone who had been shot
over the same period and look to see how many
of those names were in his network map. And what
he found was the victims were already there, and they
were clustered together.
Speaker 5 (22:33):
You just matched the data, and every place where there's
a shooting, the victims bright red, for example, And then
what you see is that these bright red dots all
lingered together. I'll clump together, right like your kid took
a handful of Christmas ornaments and like threw to the tree,
and they're all on one spot.
Speaker 1 (22:53):
It looks just like the social maps epidemil just used
to construct for the spread of HIV in the nineteen eighties.
If someone in your social circle got infected with HIV,
then your chances of becoming infected with HIV increased. In
Papa Cristo's maps, the risk of contagion extended three degrees.
If Malcolm gets shot, Andy is at risk, and so
(23:15):
is Joe, and so are any people Andy and Joe
were arrested with.
Speaker 5 (23:19):
Like other social networks, the impact of these shootings tends
to go about two or three handshakes and then it
starts to kind of drop off. So these clusters are
fairly dense and they stick around.
Speaker 1 (23:32):
So hold on, this is this is crucial. So I've
got my I've got my social network map, and I'm overlaying.
I'm sticking in all of the shootings into the and
I've noticed that the shootings are clustering. So we have
this triangle of Joe, Andy, Malcolm, and Malcolm gets shot.
(23:59):
And so once we observe that Malcolm gets shot, what
you're saying is that the likelihood of someone in my
someone connected to me also gets shot.
Speaker 5 (24:10):
Increases skyrockets absolutely.
Speaker 1 (24:13):
And you're saying that the connection the risk is skyrocketing
within between one in three.
Speaker 5 (24:21):
Degrees, that's the where risk is the highest. Once you
get past kind of three degrees, it really levels. It
goes down in levels.
Speaker 1 (24:30):
When do you observe this? Did this surprise you?
Speaker 5 (24:32):
How concentrated it was surprised me. You know, when you
look at these numbers, even when you look at the
larger co funding network, you're talking about five to six
percent of a neighborhood's population. But when you start looking
at where the violence concentrates, it's less than it's less
than a percent. You're talking about, you know, on the
West Side of Chicago, one of the neighborhoods we were working,
(24:54):
it's about fifty thousand people. You're talking about four hundred individuals.
Speaker 1 (24:59):
Four hundred individuals on the entire West Side of Chicago.
The crime problem on the West Side of Chicago isn't
being driven by everyone. It's being driven by a tiny
subset of people within a dense social network where someone
close to them has already been a victim of gun violence.
The West Side of Chicago is not a dangerous place.
(25:22):
Highly specific networks of people within the West Side of
Chicago are dangerous places. The same pattern holds true in
New York City. Why wasn't stop and frisk an effective
strategy in the end, because it assumed that violent crime
was something embedded within an entire community, and it's not.
(25:43):
Even the NYPD's own numbers said so. In one eight
year span, New York City police officers frisked two point
three million people and found weapons in one point five
percent of those stops. They were looking for needles in haystacks.
Why would that be an effective crime fighting strategy. Aaron Chaufin,
(26:06):
the criminologist, says that one of the main reasons crime
fell so dramatically in New York after Stop and Frisk ended,
was that the NYPD took those lessons to heart. They
switched from the kind of indiscriminate policing found in Stop
and Frisk to precision policing. They started focusing on hotspots,
deploying police to the specific places where crime was the worst.
Speaker 8 (26:30):
More targeted investigations, more thinking about who are the shooters,
who are the major players in neighborhoods that are driving
the shootings. What can we do to identify those people
incapacitate those people. So when we think about good policing,
and we think in particular about homicide, it's a very
small number of people who drive the problem. It's a
couple thousand people in a city of eight and a
(26:51):
half million, and you know, making lots of low level rests,
maybe you'll find some more guns and things like that,
but it's probably a much better use of resources to focus, focus, focus,
focus on the drivers of violence. And when you do that.
In my paper, we find that when there's a major
gang takedown around a public housing development, in the next
(27:13):
eighteen months, homicides are down by about thirty percent.
Speaker 1 (27:16):
Thirty percent. Fighting an epidemic means focusing on the few
not the many, And by the way, who made this
argument as loudly as anyone I did. In the Tipping Point,
I called it the law of the few, and it
took up a third of the book. When it comes
to epidemics, I wrote a tiny percentage of people to
(27:38):
the majority of the work. I talked about how this
principle plays out in outbreaks of infectious disease, in the
spread of fashion trends in word of mouth. I described
in great detail the kinds of people who make those
special few, on and on. But then when it came
to crime, I suddenly forgot all about the laws the
(27:58):
few and endorsed an idea that that a really good
way to control an epidemic was to stop and frisk
a hundred young men in the hopes of finding a
gun on one of them. I was wrong. I'm sorry.
Speaker 10 (28:19):
So I don't know Fieldford asks any questions.
Speaker 1 (28:21):
There's one more thing I would do if I were
rewriting the crime chapter. I would talk about Philadelphia and
about a day I spent recently driving around the city
with a guy named Keith Green. So where are we headed?
Speaker 10 (28:33):
So we're going to be driving in like the West Philadelphia.
Speaker 1 (28:38):
Area, GreenWorks for the Pennsylvania Horticultural Society, a group that
was founded in eighteen twenty seven and is best known
for putting on the world's largest indoor flower show. And
for two hours we talked about vacant lots thirty thousand.
Speaker 10 (28:52):
Yeah, because over thirty thousand portions in the city of
the world.
Speaker 1 (28:56):
Yeah, there were blocks we drove past that had two
or even three vacant lots. Every block seemed to have
at least one. In the past, they were overgrown with weeds,
covered in trash, home to rats and raccoons and pots.
And what Green's group has done is to systematically work
its way through the city, cleaning up the lots, planting grass,
(29:17):
putting up low fences.
Speaker 10 (29:18):
And we started seeing a dramatic change. Lots were being maintained,
people starting people started using the lots.
Speaker 1 (29:26):
And when you see people started using the how are
they used.
Speaker 10 (29:29):
To well, people with kids were playing football, people were
having barbecues on the sites. Uh horses or raising on
vacant lots horses.
Speaker 1 (29:43):
In the history of the program, they've cleaned up seventeen
thousand lots. Charles Brannis, the pioneer of the work, let
us starty to see if cleaning up vacant lots lowered
the homicide rate. When you fixed up a neighborhood, what
happened to gun violence? It went down twenty nine percent. Now,
what's the best way to describe this kind of anti
(30:05):
crime intervention. It's broken windows only. Not broken windows as
a grand metaphor, as a hysterical leap that sees a
man urinating on a sidewalk and says we have no
choice but to lock him up. No broken windows as
a literal call to action. You see the lot full
of weeds and trash, and you pick up the garbage
(30:27):
and mow the grass and put a fence out front.
Religion's History is produced by Nina Bird Lawrence with ben
at Af Haffrey and Lucy Sullivan. Our editor is Karen Schakerji.
(30:50):
Fact checking by Sam Russick, Original scoring by Luis Kerra,
mastering by Echo Mountain, Engineering by Sarah Buguer and Nina
Bird Lawrence. Production support from Luke LeMond. Our executive producer
is Jacob Smith. Special thanks to Sarah Nix and as always,
hell Hafe Gotta come. I'm Malcolm Glappa.
Pushkin. What did it mean to go out on a
Saturday or Friday night in nineteen ninety three in New York.
Speaker 2 (00:29):
It was kind of like a given. You know, Yeah,
you wear a fanny pack and was here on the streets.
You turn it around so it's in front of you
so you can see it.
Speaker 1 (00:37):
Did you really do that?
Speaker 2 (00:39):
Absolutely? Well?
Speaker 3 (00:40):
I actually I'm interrupt, but I remember I just had
a flash of remember keys. We all had keys, and
I used to around with keys so that each one
What would I have actually done if someone had attacked me?
I would put my keys between my fingers.
Speaker 1 (00:56):
Yeah, so that someone exactly I was ready. Not long ago.
I called up two friends so I used to hang
out with when I first moved to New York City
in my twenties, Peggy and Erica. Back in the nineties,
we were all young and footloose and on edge. I
seem to remember that at the end of every evening
(01:19):
there was a discussion about everyone had to We all
had to talk about everyone's plan for getting home. Do
you remember this? And if you didn't, who did and
didn't have money for a cab? Did anyone under what
circumstances would you take the subway on a Friday night after.
Speaker 3 (01:37):
Dinner if you were in a large group.
Speaker 1 (01:40):
Only if you're a large group, a large group.
Speaker 3 (01:41):
And it was like a little adventure. So six people
would all get on the subway late at night, and
you felt like you were being adventurous.
Speaker 2 (01:49):
Yeah, thinking back on it, it felt very collegial. We
did things as a group. Yeah, you were never left alone.
Speaker 1 (01:57):
The New York City of that era was one of
the most dangerous big cities in America. The subway was filthy,
there was graffiti everywhere. There were two thousand, two hundred
and sixty two murders in New York andnineteen ninety more
than six a day. Were we personally at risk? I
don't know, but it felt like crime was all around us.
Speaker 2 (02:18):
You know. Someone would always say, Hey, don't worry, I'm
walking you home. We were never allowed to walk along.
Speaker 3 (02:23):
Yeah, even on a right people would walk me home
just because you didn't want to be by yourself.
Speaker 1 (02:29):
As a wonder the pro when you went on on
a date, even if it was a disaster, you had
to walk. You had to walk the woman home, right,
which is like so insanely awkward. You're like.
Speaker 2 (02:41):
You we were you know independent women, but once the
sun went down, you never walked alone.
Speaker 1 (02:50):
Let's tell about how it gets better. I just remember
that all of a sudden, all of the precautions seemed
to go out the window right and it shoot. Statistically,
we know by ninety seven or ninety eight the murder
rate has dropped. I remember this. I had a bedroom
when I was living on that in that walk up
on Bank Street. My bedroom window overlooked the fire escape,
(03:15):
and I had previously been too scared to open my
window at night, and then I started to open my
window at night, so that technically someone could have walked
up down up to fire estrapem and walked in. But
I was like, it's fine, now I can sleep. My
(03:37):
name is Malcolm Gladwell. You're listening to Revisionist History, my
podcast about things overlooked and misunderstood. This is part of
a series introducing my new book, Revenge of the Tipping Point,
now available everywhere. And in this episode, I'm looking back
that the question that got me started on tipping points
(03:57):
twenty five years ago. How in the nineties did New
York become one of the safest cities in America? In
nineteen ninety six, I wrote an article for The New
York and Mega trying to explain this puzzle. It was
called The Tipping Point. That article led to my first book,
called The Tipping Point, where I offered a more complete explanation.
(04:19):
The success of The Tipping Point led to another book
and another. I wouldn't be here today talking to you
were it not from my obsession way back when about
what happened to crime in New York in the nineteen nineties.
And now I've written a sequel to that first book.
Did I mention that it's at in bookstores everywhere. It's
called Revenge of the Tipping Point. And in that spirit,
(04:42):
I've decided to go back and conduct an audit of
my conclusions from twenty five years ago, to look at
my thirty something self in the eye and ask was
I right Back in the nineties. I used to go
to New York University's library all the time to look
(05:03):
for ideas popes a big squat redstone building on Washington
Square in Greenwich Village. This was before Google, so I
was my own search engine. I'd wander the stacks for hours,
and one day I was on the fifth floor in
the HM one dot a sixth Aisle, and I started
leaping to the bank issues of the American Journal of
(05:26):
Sociology from nineteen ninety one, and I found a paper
written by a professor named Jonathan Crane entitled the Epidemic
Theory of Ghettos and Neighborhood Effects on Dropping Out and
teenage Childbearing. A choice of words no one would use today.
This is how it started. The word epidemic is commonly
(05:50):
used to describe the high incidence of social problems in ghettos.
The news is filled with feature stories on crack epidemics,
epidemics of gang violence, and epidemics of teenaged childbearing. The
term is used loosely in popular parlance, but turns out
to be remarkably apt. The word epidemic to Crane wasn't
(06:13):
a metaphor, It was a literal description. His point was
that if you look closely at how those problems spread,
how and why they go up and down, it looks
exactly like the way viruses spread, same rules, same patterns.
And when I read that first paragraph, I thought, oh
my god, this is exactly what happened in New York City.
(06:35):
We had a real, live epidemic of crime. And what
is the hallmark of an epidemic, a tipping point, the
moment when everything changes all at once. That moment when
I left my window open because I suddenly felt safe
was our tipping point, and so front and center in
my first book was a description of what I saw
(06:57):
as the reason why New York's epidemic suddenly tipped the
police department's commitment to broken windows. Policing broken windows was
a theory that small crimes or invitations for large crimes,
that if you let people get away with little things,
then you were signaling that it was okay to cross
the line into bigger things, like serious acts of violence.
(07:21):
And so what do you do? You don't let people
get away with the little things. He was taking the
concept of an epidemic and applying it to crime. Lawlessness
wasn't random. It was something you could catch from those
around you, the same way you can catch a cold
from a warm, stuffy room full of four year olds.
Speaker 4 (07:40):
If somebody urinates in public, the person is telling you
I got a big problem. This is what broken windows
theory is all about.
Speaker 1 (07:50):
The biggest champion of this idea was Rudy Giulioni, the
mayor of New York city at the time. Here he
is at a press conference in the mid nineties, a
few years into the Broken Windows experiment, where in a
span of just a minute and a half he references
public urination eight times.
Speaker 4 (08:07):
I mean, if some guy is urinate in public, we
got a problem. Now you can do one of two things.
You can ignore the problem and say, gee, I'm such
a big, fuzzy headed liberal that I'm going to walk
away from it, and you're going to make believe they
have no problem. That's New York City in the nineteen eighties.
That's New York City with two thousand murders. That's New
(08:28):
York City with five hundred thousand crimes. You have to
pay attention to people urinating on the streets, and you
have to get people to stop urinating on the streets.
That's moving towards civilization, that's moving toward decency. That's what
I mean by a decent society that people want to
invest in, people want their children to live in. You've
(08:50):
got to pay attention to somebody urinating on the street.
It may be a minor thing, it may be a
serious thing, but you cannot ignore it. You have to
deal with it. It is against the law to urinate
in public.
Speaker 1 (09:05):
Giuliani was elected in nineteen ninety three and re elected
in ninety seven by a huge margin. Under his watch,
the city was revitalized. People who had fled for the
suburbs came back. Huge parts of Brooklyn were gentrified. Central
Park was cleaned up. I cannot tell you how gratifying
it was to be a New Yorker in those years
(09:25):
and finally get a mayor who said enough, you can't
jump subway turnstiles and smoke dope on the corner and
harassed pedestrians. But Juliani wasn't just making an argument for civility,
that it was more pleasant to live in a city
where the streets were clean and the police were alert
to every sign of disorder. He was making a more
(09:45):
extravagant claim that arresting the guy urinating on the street
was the reason why the murder rate dropped, and I
believed him. Malcolm Gladwell is about to publish a book.
Speaker 5 (10:02):
Whenever it happens, huge things occur.
Speaker 1 (10:05):
About ten years ago, the journalist John Ronson did a
retrospect dive on the tipping point for a British program
called The Culture Show, and he talked to a public
defender in The Bronx named Kate Rubin.
Speaker 6 (10:16):
I would go around and I would talk to people
in New York City, and the liberal people progressive people
would say, oh, well, you know, we've had this miracle
in New York and some people would say, oh, yeah,
Malcolm Gladwell's idea broken windows.
Speaker 1 (10:28):
I didn't watch any of this at the time, even
though Ronson interviewed me for the segment too. But I
found it while working on this episode, and it made
me realize the claims I made in The Tipping Point
had far more reach than I'd ever imagined.
Speaker 6 (10:41):
Some people knew that it wasn't his idea, but that
he had popularized it. They'd read about it in The
New Yorker and his book, The Tipping Point. I would
never try to speak to what his intent was, but
I think the impact that he had was to serve
as basically a marketing force for this idea. He truly
(11:02):
popularized it.
Speaker 1 (11:06):
So once again, right on the afternoon of February twenty seventh,
two thousand and eight, a young man named David Floyd
left his apartment on Beach Avenue in the Bronx. As
he walked down the pathway next to his building. He
(11:29):
ran into the tenant to lived downstairs, who said he'd
locked himself out of his apartment.
Speaker 7 (11:35):
I was leaving my apartment to actually go to school.
Heading to school, I had my book bag on, you know,
everything that normal students do as they're going to school.
Speaker 1 (11:45):
Missus Floyd, speaking in an interview with the Civil Rights Group,
raced forward. The landlord was Floyd's godmother, so Floyd went
back inside to her apartment to get a ring of keys,
and as he and the tenant tried to figure out
which key worked in the door, three Plaine clothes police
officers suddenly emerged. There have been reports of burglars in
the neighborhood, and here were two young men trying to
(12:08):
get into a locked up apartment, and we were stopped.
Speaker 7 (12:11):
We were first. We were of course told to put
our hands up to stay where we were.
Speaker 1 (12:17):
This was how the police put broken windows into practice.
Don't let the little things pass you by. Be aggressive.
Check for weapons, drugs. Maybe you find them, maybe you don't.
But if you do that enough times, then young men
leave their guns and drugs at home. Floyd had actually
been stopped the previous April while walking down the street,
followed by three officers in a van who jumped out
(12:39):
and confronted him.
Speaker 7 (12:40):
And again, it's just the whole experience. It's humiliating, it's embarrassing,
and really, you know, it doesn't matter what kind of
person you are, how tough you are, whatever, it's a
scary thing because you don't know what is going to
happen with your life. You don't know what's going to
happen with your freedom.
Speaker 1 (13:04):
Floyd becomes the face of a massive class action lawsuit
the City of New York, challenging the NYPDS policy of
stop and frisk, and in twenty thirteen, Floyd wins. In
a shocking ruling, a federal judge said the NYPD's use
of stopping frisk was unconstitutional, effectively ending the broken windows
(13:26):
era in New York City policing. Yes, it still happens today,
but not in the way that they did ten years ago,
not even remotely close. It's no exaggeration to say that
this was one of the most consequential court cases in
the city's history.
Speaker 8 (13:42):
A lot of people at the time, and I think,
you know, not without reason, said wow, this is going
to compromise public safety.
Speaker 1 (13:49):
This is Aaron Chalfin, who's part of a group of
criminologists who have devoted themselves to understanding what exactly happened
in New York.
Speaker 8 (13:56):
The police are no longer going to be able to
make a lot of stops and really show people that
they were being proactive, so that might embolden more gun carrying,
more violence, more homicide.
Speaker 1 (14:06):
When Cholfin says that at the time, a lot of
people thought ending stop and frisk was going to lead
to crime going back up, he means everyone, city government,
the police force, pundits of every variety. That's what I
thought too. What everyone was saying in effect was this, Yes,
doing hundreds of thousands of police stops a year of
young men like David Floyd, who maybe doing nothing more
(14:29):
than helping out a friend is unfortunate, but being killed
is a lot worse. And since this is what's keeping
the crime rate down, we don't have a choice. That
was the calculus. Even the judge in the Floyd case
begins her ruling by making the same point I emphasize
at the outset, as I have throughout the litigation, that
(14:51):
this case is not about the effectiveness of stopping frisk
in deterring or combating crime. This Court's mandate is solely
to judge the constitutionality of police behavior, not its effectiveness
as a law enforcement tool. She goes on, many police
practices may be useful for fighting crime, preventive detention or
(15:12):
coerced confessions, for example, but because they are unconstitutional, they
cannot be used no matter how effective. She's basically saying,
there's a good chance that crime is going to go
back up because of my ruling. But the Constitution is
the constitution. Even the people who hated broken windows thought
(15:33):
that it worked, but then the very thing that absolutely
no one expected to happen happens. Crime falls.
Speaker 8 (15:44):
We ended stop question FRESC in New York. We know
that went down by ninety or ninety five percent, depending
on which numbers you look at, and yet we have
this incredible, incredible fifty percent decline in homicide.
Speaker 1 (15:58):
In social science, a natural experiment is when the real
world provides you with a clean way of measuring the
truth or falsity of a given proposition. The Floyd decision
was the perfect natural experiment for broken windows. All you
have to do is compared before with after.
Speaker 8 (16:16):
The amazing thing about New York is that if you
look at twenty ten, New York City had a banner
year in terms of homicide.
Speaker 9 (16:22):
It had.
Speaker 8 (16:22):
It was one of the lowest homicide rates in forty
years in the city's history in twenty ten, and you
would have said, well, like, great progress, let's just keep
it up. Let's keep up the good work. Incredibly, by
twenty nineteen, the year before the pandemic right, homicides went
down by fifty percent in New York compared to twenty ten.
Between twenty ten and twenty nineteen, New York is unique
(16:43):
in that it had another great homicide decline at a
time when homicides were really flat nationally.
Speaker 1 (16:48):
This is hands down one of the strangest and craziest
urban transformations ever. Just to give you a sense, if
New York City's crime rate in nineteen ninety had just
stayed the same, didn't change for the next thirty five years,
the city would have had an additional sixty two thousand homicides,
most of them in all likelihood young men of color.
(17:11):
Sixty two thousand young men currently walking around New York
would be dead.
Speaker 8 (17:17):
And by twenty nineteen, New York is almost as safe
as Paris. With respect to homicide rates, New York is
closer to Paris than it is to other US cities,
even like Boston, which is another safe city. Right, it's incredible.
Speaker 1 (17:32):
You know how those billionaires left New York City from
Miami during the pandemic, saying they couldn't deal with the
taxes and the crime. Well, the violent crime rate in
New York City after that second wave is half that
of Miami. If you're really worried about crime, you should
be selling your waterfront home in Coral Gables before someone
murders you and move somewhere much safer like the Bronx.
(17:56):
Or here's another. JD. Vance, the junior senator from Ohio,
tweets this in twenty twenty one, serious question. I have
to go to New York soon, and I'm trying to
figure out where to stay. I've heard it's disgusting and
violent there. But is it like Walking Dead Season one
or season four? I know, I know there's a whole
(18:18):
cottage industry of unearthing crazy things. J. D. Vance once said,
But Vance is from just outside Cincinnati. The violent crime
rate in Cincinnati at the exact moment he wrote that
tweet was twice the violent crime rate in New York City.
Serious question, Senator. I have to go to your hometown soon,
and I'm trying to figure out where to stay because
(18:40):
compared to where I come from, it's disgusting and violent there.
But I digress back to Chelfin and the question at hand.
Speaker 8 (18:49):
And so you know, it does give you the sense
that making loss and loss of these stops was not
the key ingredient.
Speaker 1 (18:55):
It does, doesn't it. We conducted a natural experiment and
the results are in. It wasn't broken windows, it wasn't
stop and frisk.
Speaker 9 (19:07):
My administration will issue hundreds of millions of dollars in
federal grants to reward cities and towns and return to
proven crime fighting methods, including stop and frisk and broken
windows policing. We did that with Rudy Giuliani was so successful.
Speaker 1 (19:24):
At three o'clock in the morning. Sometimes I lie awake
and I think, oh God, did he read The Tipping
Point too. I don't reread any of my books once
(19:49):
I've written them, particularly ones from twenty five years ago,
like the Tipping Point. I mean, why would I do?
I want to wear the clothes I wore in the
year two thousand, No, I don't do I even want
to see pictures of myself from two thousand, not particularly so.
I didn't reread The Tipping Point until I made the
decision last year to revisit my first book on its
(20:12):
silver anniversary. There were parts that I love. It felt
like rediscovering some lost friend, Hush Puppies, Six Degrees of
Lois Weisberg, Paul Revere's Ride. There are also parts that
mystified me. Did I really write an entire chapter on
the children's TV show Blues Clues? But the crime chapter
(20:33):
was the only place where I said I would write
that so differently today. Today, if I were rewriting, I'd
begin with the work of a sociologist in Chicago named
Andrew Papachristos.
Speaker 5 (20:46):
People talk about gun violence as an epidemic or disease,
and it is in many fronts, but really I wanted
to take it seriously. It was like, ohkay, if it's
an epidemic, is it a bloodborne pathogen or is it
an airborne pathogen? And actually, thank God, it's not an
airborne pathogen.
Speaker 9 (21:01):
Right.
Speaker 5 (21:01):
You don't catch a bullet like you catch a cold.
It's actually transmitted through behaviors. And I just try to
figure out ways that science might kind of boost or
amplify those insights.
Speaker 1 (21:12):
Papa Cristos took every single arrest over more than six
years in Chicago, so hundreds of thousands of arrests, and
he made something called a network map.
Speaker 5 (21:22):
All right, first you see it happens in groups, and
then like, okay, what about individuals? All right, well does
it concentrate? What about exposure? What about time?
Speaker 1 (21:33):
So if Andy and Malcolm are arrested together for shooting someone,
then Andy and Malcolm are two dots on the map,
connected by a line. And if Malcolm then is arrested
with Joe as a line connecting Malcolm to Joe, Malcolm
and Joe are one degree, or, to use Papa Cristos's
favorite term, one handshake apart, Joe and Andy two handshakes apart.
(21:56):
You do that for years and years of Chicago arrest data,
and you get a truly enormous map.
Speaker 5 (22:02):
You have this very very large network, right, and then
what you do is you sprinkle in the victimizations, which
come from a separate source of data, right. They come
from homicide records, they come from shooting files, police public health.
Speaker 1 (22:17):
He took the names of everyone who had been shot
over the same period and look to see how many
of those names were in his network map. And what
he found was the victims were already there, and they
were clustered together.
Speaker 5 (22:33):
You just matched the data, and every place where there's
a shooting, the victims bright red, for example, And then
what you see is that these bright red dots all
lingered together. I'll clump together, right like your kid took
a handful of Christmas ornaments and like threw to the tree,
and they're all on one spot.
Speaker 1 (22:53):
It looks just like the social maps epidemil just used
to construct for the spread of HIV in the nineteen eighties.
If someone in your social circle got infected with HIV,
then your chances of becoming infected with HIV increased. In
Papa Cristo's maps, the risk of contagion extended three degrees.
If Malcolm gets shot, Andy is at risk, and so
(23:15):
is Joe, and so are any people Andy and Joe
were arrested with.
Speaker 5 (23:19):
Like other social networks, the impact of these shootings tends
to go about two or three handshakes and then it
starts to kind of drop off. So these clusters are
fairly dense and they stick around.
Speaker 1 (23:32):
So hold on, this is this is crucial. So I've
got my I've got my social network map, and I'm overlaying.
I'm sticking in all of the shootings into the and
I've noticed that the shootings are clustering. So we have
this triangle of Joe, Andy, Malcolm, and Malcolm gets shot.
(23:59):
And so once we observe that Malcolm gets shot, what
you're saying is that the likelihood of someone in my
someone connected to me also gets shot.
Speaker 5 (24:10):
Increases skyrockets absolutely.
Speaker 1 (24:13):
And you're saying that the connection the risk is skyrocketing
within between one in three.
Speaker 5 (24:21):
Degrees, that's the where risk is the highest. Once you
get past kind of three degrees, it really levels. It
goes down in levels.
Speaker 1 (24:30):
When do you observe this? Did this surprise you?
Speaker 5 (24:32):
How concentrated it was surprised me. You know, when you
look at these numbers, even when you look at the
larger co funding network, you're talking about five to six
percent of a neighborhood's population. But when you start looking
at where the violence concentrates, it's less than it's less
than a percent. You're talking about, you know, on the
West Side of Chicago, one of the neighborhoods we were working,
(24:54):
it's about fifty thousand people. You're talking about four hundred individuals.
Speaker 1 (24:59):
Four hundred individuals on the entire West Side of Chicago.
The crime problem on the West Side of Chicago isn't
being driven by everyone. It's being driven by a tiny
subset of people within a dense social network where someone
close to them has already been a victim of gun violence.
The West Side of Chicago is not a dangerous place.
(25:22):
Highly specific networks of people within the West Side of
Chicago are dangerous places. The same pattern holds true in
New York City. Why wasn't stop and frisk an effective
strategy in the end, because it assumed that violent crime
was something embedded within an entire community, and it's not.
(25:43):
Even the NYPD's own numbers said so. In one eight
year span, New York City police officers frisked two point
three million people and found weapons in one point five
percent of those stops. They were looking for needles in haystacks.
Why would that be an effective crime fighting strategy. Aaron Chaufin,
(26:06):
the criminologist, says that one of the main reasons crime
fell so dramatically in New York after Stop and Frisk ended,
was that the NYPD took those lessons to heart. They
switched from the kind of indiscriminate policing found in Stop
and Frisk to precision policing. They started focusing on hotspots,
deploying police to the specific places where crime was the worst.
Speaker 8 (26:30):
More targeted investigations, more thinking about who are the shooters,
who are the major players in neighborhoods that are driving
the shootings. What can we do to identify those people
incapacitate those people. So when we think about good policing,
and we think in particular about homicide, it's a very
small number of people who drive the problem. It's a
couple thousand people in a city of eight and a
(26:51):
half million, and you know, making lots of low level rests,
maybe you'll find some more guns and things like that,
but it's probably a much better use of resources to focus, focus, focus,
focus on the drivers of violence. And when you do that.
In my paper, we find that when there's a major
gang takedown around a public housing development, in the next
(27:13):
eighteen months, homicides are down by about thirty percent.
Speaker 1 (27:16):
Thirty percent. Fighting an epidemic means focusing on the few
not the many, And by the way, who made this
argument as loudly as anyone I did. In the Tipping Point,
I called it the law of the few, and it
took up a third of the book. When it comes
to epidemics, I wrote a tiny percentage of people to
(27:38):
the majority of the work. I talked about how this
principle plays out in outbreaks of infectious disease, in the
spread of fashion trends in word of mouth. I described
in great detail the kinds of people who make those
special few, on and on. But then when it came
to crime, I suddenly forgot all about the laws the
(27:58):
few and endorsed an idea that that a really good
way to control an epidemic was to stop and frisk
a hundred young men in the hopes of finding a
gun on one of them. I was wrong. I'm sorry.
Speaker 10 (28:19):
So I don't know Fieldford asks any questions.
Speaker 1 (28:21):
There's one more thing I would do if I were
rewriting the crime chapter. I would talk about Philadelphia and
about a day I spent recently driving around the city
with a guy named Keith Green. So where are we headed?
Speaker 10 (28:33):
So we're going to be driving in like the West Philadelphia.
Speaker 1 (28:38):
Area, GreenWorks for the Pennsylvania Horticultural Society, a group that
was founded in eighteen twenty seven and is best known
for putting on the world's largest indoor flower show. And
for two hours we talked about vacant lots thirty thousand.
Speaker 10 (28:52):
Yeah, because over thirty thousand portions in the city of
the world.
Speaker 1 (28:56):
Yeah, there were blocks we drove past that had two
or even three vacant lots. Every block seemed to have
at least one. In the past, they were overgrown with weeds,
covered in trash, home to rats and raccoons and pots.
And what Green's group has done is to systematically work
its way through the city, cleaning up the lots, planting grass,
(29:17):
putting up low fences.
Speaker 10 (29:18):
And we started seeing a dramatic change. Lots were being maintained,
people starting people started using the lots.
Speaker 1 (29:26):
And when you see people started using the how are
they used.
Speaker 10 (29:29):
To well, people with kids were playing football, people were
having barbecues on the sites. Uh horses or raising on
vacant lots horses.
Speaker 1 (29:43):
In the history of the program, they've cleaned up seventeen
thousand lots. Charles Brannis, the pioneer of the work, let
us starty to see if cleaning up vacant lots lowered
the homicide rate. When you fixed up a neighborhood, what
happened to gun violence? It went down twenty nine percent. Now,
what's the best way to describe this kind of anti
(30:05):
crime intervention. It's broken windows only. Not broken windows as
a grand metaphor, as a hysterical leap that sees a
man urinating on a sidewalk and says we have no
choice but to lock him up. No broken windows as
a literal call to action. You see the lot full
of weeds and trash, and you pick up the garbage
(30:27):
and mow the grass and put a fence out front.
Religion's History is produced by Nina Bird Lawrence with ben
at Af Haffrey and Lucy Sullivan. Our editor is Karen Schakerji.
(30:50):
Fact checking by Sam Russick, Original scoring by Luis Kerra,
mastering by Echo Mountain, Engineering by Sarah Buguer and Nina
Bird Lawrence. Production support from Luke LeMond. Our executive producer
is Jacob Smith. Special thanks to Sarah Nix and as always,
hell Hafe Gotta come. I'm Malcolm Glappa.
Host
Malcolm Gladwell
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