November 17, 2022 • 37 mins
In this episode of The Director’s Chair, Michael Fullilove speaks with Sir Lawrence Freedman, who is in Australia as the Lowy Institute’s 2022 Distinguished Fellow for International Security. Michael and Sir Lawrence discuss Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the lessons it offers for military strategists around the world. They discuss the implications for China and Taiwan, and how the AUKUS security pact has changed Australia’s strategic outlook.
Sir Lawrence Freedman is Emeritus Professor of War Studies, King's College London. Elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 1995 and awarded the CBE in 1996, he was appointed Official Historian of the Falklands Campaign in 1997. In 2003, he was awarded the KCMG. In June 2009, he was appointed to serve as a member of the official inquiry into Britain and the 2003 Iraq War. He has written widely on international history, strategic theory and nuclear weapons issues, as well as commenting on current security issues. Among his books are Strategy: A History (2013) and Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine (2022).
The Distinguished Fellowship for International Security is supported by the Australian Department of Defence through the Strategic Policy Grants program.
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Michael Fullilove (00:00):
Hello, Michael Fullilove here. In this episode, we're talking about
Russia's brutal and somewhat hapless invasion of Ukraine, the lessons
for militaries around the world, as well as developments in
the United Kingdom and Australia.
Sir Lawrence Freedman (00:13):
First, it's very difficult to occupy places where you're not welcome. Secondly,
logistics is incredibly important and you ignore it at your peril.
But in modern warfare, the consumption of ammunition - consumables - is
immensely intense. Unless you can sustain that, you will be
in trouble, however clever you are.
Michael Fullilove (00:32):
Sir Lawrence Freedman is my guest on this episode of
the Director's Chair. I'm Michael Fullilove, the executive director of
the Lowy Institute. On the 24th of February, Russia - a
nuclear weapons power and a permanent member of the UN
Security Council - launched its unprovoked and brutal invasion of Ukraine.
(00:53):
President Putin expected Kyiv to fall within days. Instead, we've
seen the Ukrainian people displaying fierce moral and physical courage
in the defence of their homeland. Russia's assault on Kyiv
was repulsed, and in the past few months, we've seen
Ukraine's armed forces making sweeping gains in the east and
south of their country, culminating in the liberation of the
(01:15):
key city of Kherson last week. Mr Putin intended this
war to show Russia's strength and the West's weakness. Instead,
he has revealed Russia's weakness and the West's strength. But
winter is coming, and the war is still far from over.
To discuss this war and what it means for the world,
I'm very pleased to be joined today on The Director's
Chair by Sir Lawrence Freedman. Lawry is one of the
(01:37):
world's most renowned strategic thinkers. He studied at the University
of Manchester, York and Oxford. He worked at the IISS
and Chatham House before being appointed Professor of War Studies
at King's College London in 1982. He's the author of Command:
The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine, published
(01:57):
by Penguin this year. And most importantly, he's in Australia
as the Distinguished Fellow for International Security at the Lowy Institute. Lawry,
thank you for joining me on The Director's Chair.
Sir Lawrence Freedman (02:07):
My pleasure.
Michael Fullilove (02:08):
All right. Let's begin by talking about the missile that
landed in Poland yesterday, killing two people. It appears that
the missile came from Ukrainian air defence and was not
a strike by Russia. NATO's called this a tragic mistake
and said that ultimately the blame still rests with Russia.
What effect will this incident have, do you think, on
(02:30):
the debate on the war? And are you surprised that
it's taken this long for the war to spill over
beyond Ukraine's borders, even if it was a mistake?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (02:38):
I think the fact that it was a mistake is important.
I think it was also important the speed with which
this was acknowledged to be a mistake. It was quite
interesting when the news first came through. You had inevitably
on social media, lots of speculation about how this was
(02:59):
a deliberate attempt by the Russians to goad NATO or
prove that NATO's ineffectual. Then you have the Russians saying
this was a provocation and the British had been responsible,
because they all seemed to think that we're more capable than
we are. And then the social media started to look
at the evidence and conclude this was the Ukrainian air
defence missiles. This all happened quite quickly. So instead of,
(03:22):
you know, what happens when Russians make a mistake, which
is it's denied and demonstrated to be a provocation and
so on. It was acknowledged very quickly. That's important because
it gives you trust in what's being said. Beyond that,
I don't think it's that important. It's a reminder that
these things can spill over. Chance events can have quite
important consequences. And the more the longer the war goes on,
(03:46):
the more likely it is that there'll be more chance
events that have sad consequences. But I don't think it
changes NATO's attitude to the war, the American attitude to the war. It certainly doesn't
change the Ukrainian or Russian attitude to the war. It's
a reminder of just what a dangerous game the Russians
are playing, what a nasty game the Russians are playing
- in sending missiles to, well, all over Ukraine, to places where
(04:08):
they've got no hope of making any military inroads anymore.
Michael Fullilove (04:12):
Well, let's go back to when that nasty game began
on the 24th of February. Many commentators at the time
believed there was no way Putin would invade Ukraine. How
did they get it so wrong?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (04:24):
Well, I think that I mean, I would include myself
as somebody who was very skeptical. It was impossible to
say no way when when so many troops were gathered
around the borders and so many people who didn't know
a lot about these things well thought it was quite
likely that it would happen. There were reasons for skepticism.
One of which no Russians one spoke to, who wer writing,
(04:45):
seemed to think it would happen. So it seemed like
a potentially, if it was a bluff, very orchestrated. It
was also very stupid thing to do. And I think
that was certainly my view, not because I thought the
Ukrainians would necessarily resist as well as they did, but
because you just can't subjugate a population of that size.
The idea seemed pretty preposterous. So I could imagine something
(05:09):
in the East, in the Donbass to sort that out
for Russia. But the ambitious conquest that they attempted was
a surprise. So, you know, it's a fact of intelligence
assessments that the hardest thing to assess is somebody else's
stupidity, and I think this was stupid. What I think is
as interesting is - and this goes for all of the
people who called the invasion right - is how much it
(05:31):
turned out the Russians were overestimated. They made so many
surprising errors in their initial military moves that what could
have been almost a fait accompli that would have turned
then into some sort of insurgency I believe, the Russians
found they had a big fight on their hands and they
(05:52):
still got a big fight on their hands here. This would not
have been expected in February that we'd still be fighting
in the way we're fighting.
Michael Fullilove (05:58):
One of the amazing moments was when that attributed, quote
appeared from Zelenskyy very early on, when supposedly there was
an offer of safe passage from the Americans. And his
response was, I don't need a ride on an ammo.
Sir Lawrence Freedman (06:12):
Yeah.
Michael Fullilove (06:12):
Looking back, how important was President Zelenskyy's decision to stay
in Kyiv and fight? What would have happened if he
had fled the capital, as Ashraf Ghani did in Afghanistan.
Sir Lawrence Freedman (06:23):
Or as the Emir of Kuwait did in August 1990?
So if he'd been killed or captured by the Russians,
that would have been an important statement. I don't think
actually would have stopped the Ukrainians fighting. I think it's
always likely that Ukrainians would fight. I mean, they've got
a history of resilience and suffering and determination. So there
(06:47):
are other characters in Ukraine who would have stepped forward.
So I don't think it was necessarily important in that way.
But what it did was cement the idea of Zelenskyy
as a national leader, and that's not how he particularly appeared,
didn't appear as a strong figure almost up to the
start of the war. You and remember, most Americans first
(07:07):
heard of Zelenskyy when he was being badgered by Trump
to dish the dirt on Hunter Biden in exchange for weapons.
So Zelenskyy had not appeared as a politically strong president.
Then all of a sudden he's a true world leader
and all his skills in from the entertainment business, as
well as a pretty shrewd business sense as well understanding
(07:29):
of social media. All of these came to the fore
and that became critical in what was essential to Ukraine,
not only in rallying the people to fight, but in
getting external support. They would have done something without Zelenskyy.
He could have done it from Poland or from the
devil or wherever he might have gone to. But I
think he managed to create a symbolism around himself that
(07:51):
was very powerful.
Michael Fullilove (07:52):
As you know, we hosted President Zelenskyy in a Zoom
event about a month ago, and we and we experienced
this phenomenon that has been commented upon about how clever
and professional the Ukrainians are at targeting their messages to
the audience, to audiences to which Zelenskyy is speaking. In
his remarks, I suddenly discovered that he was quoting to
(08:14):
me a speech that Chancellor Angela merkel had given to
the Lowy Institute in 2014, quite a specific reference that
was artfully worked into his remarks. And afterwards I asked
my colleagues and I asked the Ukrainian ambassador, did did
we provide that material to Kiev? And the answer was no.
And so somebody sitting in Kiev with missiles fall raining
(08:35):
down on their ears has spent a couple of hours
on the Lowy Institute website digging up the perfect content
to add to this speech. And that's a level of
sort of deft statecraft that frankly, you don't get, you know,
usually from presidents of the United States and prime minister
of Great Britain. So we saw that just the deadly
effectiveness of the Ukrainians in the information war.
Sir Lawrence Freedman (08:57):
They're very effective. And it's partly an age thing. They're young.
They understand how the media works, partly the contrast with
Putin sitting at his long desk and avoiding human contact
and almost looking like a pantomime villain. Partly I think
it's the message is absolutely clear. I think when people
(09:18):
talk about information operations, they talk about causing disorientation and confusion,
raising doubts, raising questions, not a bit of it with Ukraine.
It's been a very simple message from day one. Give
us the ammunition. Give us the give us the kit.
We need more of it. We're fighting your battles. This
is what we need provided urgently from day one. That's
(09:40):
been Lansky's message. Then, as you say, if you look
at a series of parliamentary speeches he did to two
different parliaments, every one was tailored every way and they
weren't all soft. I mean, the in the House of
Commons was full of Churchill. The one to the Bundestag
was quite tough and it was critical. And each time
(10:03):
they're clearly working out what the message should be. They
don't always work, you know, and always get the one
to the question. Israel, I think, played too much on
the the Holocaust angle and that that always makes the
Israelis a bit wary. But by and large, I think
they've been extremely successful. The proof of that is in
(10:24):
the amount of support that Zelensky Zelensky's been able to get.
Michael Fullilove (10:27):
Have you been surprised by how unimpressive the Russian military
performance has been and what effect does that have on
Russia's prestige around the world?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (10:38):
Sort of surprised. I mean, if you look back, as
I've done in the book I've just written, check and
now mention if you look back, say, Chechnya, the Russian
military performance was not impressive. So there's been an assumption
that the benefits of two decades of high oil prices
(11:00):
and lots of money coming in to to the Russian
state being spent on military modernization was having an effect.
And people assumed that Syria in particular demonstrated this. But
that was a very limited operation, basically air power against
an enemy without air defenses. And I think people got
(11:24):
over impressed by that without noting that the Russians had
never tried anything big for some time. Certainly what they
did in 2014 with Ukraine, the Ukrainians didn't resist very effectively.
But given the upheavals in Ukraine, that was not necessarily surprising.
So I think part of what it is in terms
(11:45):
of both the Russian underestimation of the Ukrainians, but also
our underestimation of the Ukrainians meant that we were surprised
that the Russians struggled as much as they had a
better grasp of what they were facing. I think their
military campaign might have been better judgment thing about the
big military operations as if they go wrong on the
(12:06):
first day. Even if you're Russia, it's quite hard to
recover your sort of on the back foot thereafter, which
is what happened with the Russians.
Michael Fullilove (12:15):
What about the role of the US so far?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (12:18):
I think Biden's played it pretty well. I mean, personally,
I would have preferred that if he'd been a bit
quicker and more ambitious with some of the kit. But
he's held the alliance together. He's given it purpose. Is
acknowledge what inevitably going to be concerned about nuclear escalation
(12:40):
as being a priority and made that position very clear.
It hasn't been done by subterfuge, he said. These are
the things that we're going to avoid because of that.
And in the end, an enormous amount of resource has
been handed over to Ukraine. And I think because of
the American system where lots of people speak and you
(13:02):
never quite sure with what authority. By and large, they've
understood that the Ukrainians can't be strong armed into a
negotiation and a deal that they can't sell to themselves.
That leaves a chunk of the country under you and
Russian control. And I think that gave us an important
(13:24):
part of the messaging by Ukraine. But I think once
people saw the criminal activity, genocidal activity and strict use
of the term that Russia was engaged, it was very
hard to to say that all that, you know, that
that's a terrible thing that's going on. But, you know,
we've got to be realistic and so on. I think
(13:45):
there's limits to realism here. And the Americans have accepted that.
And I think as indeed of the Germans and the
French and so on as well, since says the scale
of what the Russians were trying to do became apparent
and it became apparent another part of the messaging that
if you gave Ukraine decent weapons, they could use them.
(14:07):
They were very professional. They showed a lot of strategic acumen,
more so than the Russians.
Michael Fullilove (14:12):
You mentioned the nuclear issue a couple of weeks ago
that was running very hot and you were getting we
were getting various messages from Moscow about the prospect of
using nuclear weapons. They seem to have put that in
the box more recently. How concerned are you about the
prospect of use of a tactical nuclear weapon?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (14:31):
My view from the start was I couldn't see any
military value or the political value in the use of
a tactical nuclear weapon. You have the caution you have
to bring in with anything to do with Putin was
that he's done one stupid thing and do another. But
I think people are missing the role that nuclear weapons
played from day one in this, which is relevant to
(14:53):
Biden's attitude as well, which is that you're saying that
Putin said absolutely explicitly from day one, if NATO intervenes
directly on behalf of the Ukrainians, put forces on the
ground to put aircraft in the air, then this could
escalate to something terrible, whether it would or not. You know,
(15:13):
we're not going to find out, I don't think. But
it worked. It worked within the Biden So he wouldn't
have a no fly zone. Work with some of the
limitations on the range of systems being handed over to Ukraine.
And that would be jeopardized if if nuclear weapons were
actually used. Probably to not a lot of benefit. So
(15:34):
I think the Russia it suited the Russians at one point,
I think to stir the pot to get people. Worried.
There's a sort of nonsensical thing about a dirty bomb, which,
of course is not a nuclear weapon. It's an irradiating weapon,
but nothing like a nuclear weapon. You know, the Chinese
way it helps, I think, was is there clearly was
not stopping anybody supporting Ukraine and just alarming people who
(15:58):
might otherwise have been friendly to Russia. So I think
they come back down. I don't think the issue will
ever quite go away until somebody pronounces this war over.
Michael Fullilove (16:07):
Winter's about to set in, so operations will become more
difficult and the conditions much harsher. How will General Winter
affect the course of the war in the coming months,
do you think?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (16:17):
It won't stop the fighting. I don't think that's the case.
It it holds it up the ground bogey. So it's
harder for the Ukrainians to advance quickly. But the conditions
will become harsher. And this is an endurance test, which, again,
(16:37):
what in terms of what one knows, the support being
given by allies to Ukraine in cold weather, keep their better,
be better prepared for it. There's all sorts of question
marks about whether the Russians have got enough kit, whether
they care enough about the people they've mobilized to to
fit them out properly. And you can you know, you're
not going to survive in those conditions. You know, you'll
(17:00):
give up or go home. So I think there will
be operations. And I would have thought after Kherson, you know,
we know that the Russians are going to a desperate
to try to establish lines that they can hold in
the hope that by the end of the winter, the
Russians used their mobilized people more effectively to have some
(17:23):
sort of new offensive capability or better even a better
defensive capability, which is why I don't think the Ukrainians
will want to stop. I think they'll they'll they'll want
to push as hard as they can and hard as
conditions allow.
Michael Fullilove (17:35):
So if you squint your eyes, how will this end?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (17:37):
It's very difficult to know how it end because I
don't think Russia has a plan for ending the war.
And we know how Ukraine wants it to as far
as they're concerned. They want to just get the Russians
out of their country and they'll keep on pushing until
they've got at some point there, they'll expect to negotiation
and they've got cards to play in that negotiation. The
(18:00):
whole question of the future of sanctions against reparations, issues
of war crimes, there's lots of things that will need discussing.
It's not a quick way to end the war, a
negotiation like that, because it won't end quickly, won't be
implemented quickly. So that's one problem. There's no easy negotiated solution,
even if the Russians wanted war. But I think the
(18:21):
real problem is that I don't think Putin knows how
to end it now. He puts in a negotiated solution
for Putin would mean him acknowledging that provinces, which he
has just declared to be Russian are not Russian. He's already,
you know, bizarrely claimed person for a forever part of
(18:46):
Russia and therefore become the first Russian leader to have
to abandon a Russian city. It was this strange behaviour
and he's caught himself. Whether this is deliberate or not,
whether he wanted to bind to his successors as much
as himself. I don't know. But. But now to end
(19:08):
the war in negotiation, he will have to repudiate his
big claim, his most recent claim about the war's objectives.
I don't think he can do that. And also, as
soon as the war ends, there's a reckoning. What was
this for? What are the costs? What's happening to our economy?
Is it worth it? And there's no good answers to
(19:28):
those questions. This is a terrible blunder. It's a catastrophe
for Ukraine. But in the end, one for it for
Russia as well. So my suspicion is the most likely
way this ends is not through a full negotiation between
the governments, but a military military agreement on a ceasefire, disengagement,
(19:51):
which will come as, again, this is a possibility. It's
not a prediction which will come when the Russian military
appreciate their position is untenable.
Michael Fullilove (20:01):
And could Putin survive that? Could could Ukraine spell the
end for Vladimir Putin?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (20:06):
It certainly could. He could survive. He could go. I
think Kremlin watchers are are unsure. I don't know any
of them who declare themselves confident on what the future holds.
I mean, in our countries, somebody who was responsible for
such a mess would go. That is one of the
advantages of our democracies, however embarrassing it can be at times.
(20:30):
There's no obvious way there is an election in 2024
in Russia, but there's no obvious way. Of taking him
out of power. The we can see, but doesn't mean
to say that people in Moscow aren't thinking about it.
There's all sorts of power plays clearly going on amongst
the ultra nationalists, the vacuum group Chechens. There's lots of
(20:52):
different factions involved in all of this. So yeah, it
could mean I mean, the ADU certainly means he's a
much diminished international figure.
Michael Fullilove (20:59):
As you say. The Ukraine war is a reminder of
how difficult it is to invade and occupy another country,
a lesson that great powers seem to constantly forget. What
are the other big lessons out of this war for militaries,
do you think?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (21:14):
Well, you know, the first wars are run as pedagogic exercises.
Every war is a bit different. And what people think
is timeless lessons often are timeless. What this war shows
is what a lot of wars have showed. First, it's
very difficult to occupy places where you're not welcome. Secondly,
(21:36):
logistics is incredibly important and you ignore it at your peril.
But in modern warfare, the consumption of ammunition consumables is
immense and intense. And unless you can sustain that, you'll
be in trouble. However clever you are at fighting. It
(21:57):
warns that not to get overexcited by things like cyber.
Now we know it was tried. It's important, but it
is not decisive. It shows that what we thought was
going to be decisive, which is airpower. Turns out not
to have been so decisive because the Russians weren't prepared
for Ukrainian air defense effort. It's a reminder that there
(22:20):
is one way of fighting a war which ignores the
Geneva Conventions and seeks to coerce, brutalize an enemy into capitulation,
which after the Second World War, we, we said, doesn't
work because of the experience of the Blitz or the
allied bombings of Germany might have know. Undoubtedly, the atomic
(22:44):
bombs did make a point. But Japan was beaten in
all respects by that anyway. And it doesn't seem to
work this time. The contrast between the two ways of
fighting has been very sharp. The Ukrainians didn't have very
much else of a choice. I mean, fighting a pretty
traditional regular war in lines that would have been recognized
(23:07):
by any Second World War general and kept that like
drones and so on, that wasn't a member most respected.
It's perfectly comprehensible in in very classical military terms. The
Russians have been fighting that sort of war not particularly well,
while also fighting a much broader coercive war against the Ukrainians,
(23:29):
also against the West with energy prices and so on. And,
you know, they've demonstrated that they can cause pain, but
not that they can gain political effect as a result
of this.
Michael Fullilove (23:40):
A lot of speculation about what the war in Ukraine
might or might not mean for Taiwan. Do you have
any thoughts about whether what has happened this year makes
a Chinese operation against Taiwan more or less likely? And
how much more difficult would it be to mount that
kind of amphibious invasion?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (23:59):
Well, I don't think it would make a Chinese operation
more likely because it showed pitfalls have shown how true
it is, a reminder that the best laid plans and
so on go wrong. And how hard it is to
to occupy a country that doesn't want to be occupied.
And I think for China, you know, given that that
I mean, the Russians, too, have been talking about, in
(24:19):
a way reunifying a country. But for China to use
the similar sort of messages as the Russians have been using, would,
I think really be very difficult in this context and
certainly would undermine that. Their basic message as to what
the whole thing was about. It's a much more difficult operation,
which obviously a bigger China is much bigger and Taiwan
(24:40):
is much smaller, but it's amphibious and we know how
difficult those are. The Americans have said they would defend Taiwan.
Whether all future presidents will say that, who knows? So
there's many big uncertainties for them. I think they wish
to emphasize the force was it was on the table
(25:01):
and the ambition is still there just because he really
doesn't want the Taiwanese to try and change their legal status,
because that would be a trigger and it would be
very hard. I think given all that has been said,
for the Taiwanese to do that and not get a
big Chinese response, whether that would be all out war
or a blockade, which is a war like out, I
(25:25):
don't know, a blockade as problems, but it would certainly
keep up the pressure and would raise issues for the U.S.
and its allies about including Australia, about how they should respond.
So I'm optimistic, too. Too strong a word. But you
won't get the sense in recent days, including from the G20,
(25:46):
that the Chinese have seen what's happened to Putin and
don't want to fall into the same the stakes of
getting themselves so isolated, of underestimating the West, so much
of taking big military risks that they just get themselves
into a dire situation. So it'd be interesting to see
(26:10):
how this year, the coming year unfolds as whether with,
you know, Biden having successful navigated the midterms inevitably president
for life after the party Congress. Whether the two leaders
are confident enough to carry on the work of of
just calming relations down. Am I. I think Biden's concept
(26:34):
of the floor is quite a good one. You know,
you're not going to have announcement of peace in our
time and a beloved, but something that would recognize that
these two countries really just have to work together. You
can't they can't ignore each other or just go into
an endless competition. And if that happens, then maybe things
will calm down. But it will require the, you know,
(26:57):
the Chinese to rethink some of their foreign policy and
how they relate to the rest of the world and
the wolf warrior diplomacy and all of that, which, you know,
Australia knows a lot about. Indeed, Australia, you know, is
going to be a key test, I think, of of
whether China can manage a different sort of of relationship
(27:17):
with with countries with which you may not have a
natural affinity.
Michael Fullilove (27:21):
I'll come back to Australia at the end, but before
I leave Ukraine, let me ask you about your own
country's role in that war. You alluded earlier, I think,
to how your politics has been a little embarrassing recently. Yeah.
Is Ukraine a rare bright spot for for British foreign policy?
(27:41):
I mean, Boris promised a global Britain and a completely
different kind of foreign policy. One British official said to
me recently that on Ukraine, Brexit, Britain has been the
moral conscience of Europe. Do you agree with that?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (27:53):
Yeah, I mean, I think oddly, through all our travails,
which are largely about economics and the cost of Brexit
and the impact of COVID and the impact of the war,
I mean, so we share a lot of problems with
other European countries that we've managed to give our own
twist to. The foreign policy actually hasn't been a moderately
bright spot anyway. The integrated review was quite well received.
(28:18):
And I think on Ukraine, you know, the government took
a position early on and this was not just, you know,
when when they were sure that what the intelligence was
saying even before that the defence secretary, who's been one
of the key figures in in the policy, was challenging
(28:38):
what Putin was saying on Ukraine when others were after.
It's not I mean, it's not a competition to show
who's most moral. But the fact is that the British
position vis a vis Northern Europe, as well as the
Ukrainians is strengthened as a result because that's been consistent,
has put resources where the policy was. While the French
(29:01):
and the Germans appeared to equivocate, I mean, I think
the French and the Germans equivocate far less now, but
for a while they did. And, you know, I don't
think we should underestimate the consequences if the British and
the Americans. But the British I mean, the British were
not first in the sense that lots of them, the
Canadians and Americans and others were coming in after 2014.
(29:23):
But on this crisis, the British did push harder than most.
So as one who's been pretty critical of our governments,
I think, obviously got it right.
Michael Fullilove (29:32):
You have a new prime minister. Yeah, I guess he's
fortunate in his predecessor. In a way.
Sir Lawrence Freedman (29:37):
He doesn't have big shoes to follow, you know.
Michael Fullilove (29:40):
How do you assess Rishi Sunak? Do you have any
kind of early hints about his international inclinations?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (29:47):
You know, he was chancellor who's coming in in a
major economic crisis. The budget day today is going to
mean raising taxes. Bad news for lots of families. He's
an accountant, essentially. He's a spreadsheet man and.
Michael Fullilove (30:05):
Been a bit a bit raised some questions about the
defense budget when he was chancellor.
Sir Lawrence Freedman (30:09):
He did, but I thought chancellor's raised questions about the
defence budget. But he kept the Defense Secretary in position
and he kept the former secretary who's actually been a
Trump supporter in position. My sense is, unlike many prime ministers,
he's not leaping into the international arena. He's been to
the G20 instances. He can't ignore it. And like most
(30:32):
prime ministers, you'll get drawn in much more, even if
he wants to concentrate on domestic. It matters. But my
sense is he doesn't particularly want a major reappraisal of
foreign policy. He's got enough to do on the home
front and therefore will continue with the policies he's inherited.
I think the major thing people are looking for is
(30:55):
sort of building on on what's happened as a result
of Ukraine and the fact that, you know, there's not
a lot of bandwidth left in British politics. Whether or
not he needs to ease relations with the EU on
a number of issues. And then again, there are some
early signs of that is not is not is not
picking fights to to impress his backbenches, which has been
(31:17):
a problem with the last couple of prime ministers.
Michael Fullilove (31:20):
Finishing on Australia. Lawry, you've been a regular visitor to
this country for a long time. You've as part of
your fellowship here at the Institute, you've spent time in
Canberra speaking to officials. What has struck you this time
about the Australian strategic debate?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (31:35):
It's much more focused, I would say. You know, when
I first started coming to Australia, which was not long
after the end of the Cold War, you know, it was,
you know, whether or not there was any distinctive Australian
contribution to me seemed to be up in the air.
Then you have, you know, China is the great opportunity
(31:57):
that not such a great opportunity and may be a
problem now, definitely a problem much closer alliance, therefore, with
the U.S. and with the UK potentially with orcas. So
it seems to be a much more focused debate. But
big issues are big issues about whether it's wise to
(32:19):
tie yourself so closely to the to American policy. Is
there a defence policy, security policy that that is that
is more parochial and doesn't play such a big role
in the wider Indo-Pacific region? Can you get the feeling
(32:40):
that the balance of opinion is swung to? We have
a role to play and we and it can be played.
It's a much more, much more. No, I would say
there's an evident and sure consensus, but it's more focused.
The questions are the same questions that that keep up.
And it's always a very interesting debate and I think
(33:03):
Brit Brits coming to Australia or you're quite comfortable with
the US and we recognise elements of it because the
questions that we ask ourselves. You know, we're an island nation.
We're not absolutely mandated to get involved in other people's problems.
Geography is actually being quite kind to us. We have
(33:23):
the close relationship with the Americans, which permeates all our defence.
Is this wise? What would happen if you have another
Trumpist type president? I mean, all these issues we face
you face, except, you know, China looms large for you.
Whereas Russia looms larger for us.
Michael Fullilove (33:43):
And just finally, you mentioned AUKUS, the technology sharing arrangement
that was announced by the three governments last September. At
its heart of it is a commitment on the part
of the United States and the United Kingdom to help
Australia build a fleet of nuclear propelled submarines. What's your
assessment of the wisdom for a country like Australia with
(34:05):
our geography of having nuclear propelled submarines? It's obviously a
very difficult task for a country without an indigenous nuclear
industry or nuclear weapons to attempt this. What are your
thoughts on the achievability and the wisdom of the nuclear subs?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (34:21):
I think - I think the wisdom needs debating. I mean,
I'm not saying it's wrong, but it has implications of
because - this is a UK issue as well - you're always
going to be tied to the Americans and to a degree,
to the Brits, but mainly to the Americans as a
result of becoming, having a nuclear fleet. Nuclear submarines are
(34:44):
very good. They're very effective. They give you a lot
of distance. They're hard to detect and they worry opponents.
So there's nothing particularly wrong with the ambition. If you
can get them, they'll be very effective. Whether you'll get
them remains to be seen. It's a mega procurement project.
(35:04):
Everybody I've asked in the Australian Government has been very positive,
the trilateral relations are working well and that there's a
sort of, having made this commitment, especially the way it
was made in September 2021, which wasn't the most elegant
diplomatic move, shall we say, having made the commitment, you're
(35:26):
really under some obligation to try to make it work.
You don't have a lot of latitude, I think, in this.
And the Americans and Brits have got d reason to have
another nuclear partner. It helps. So I think on balance,
I'd be positive. But I think you have to be cautious.
I think the other technology sharing stuff is in the
(35:48):
short term is very important potentially. And I think there'll
be a lot of tests of the relationship that will be,
will come before you're really onto the big tests of
how far you can take whatever plan comes out next March,
how well you can take that forward. We'll be seeing whether
you're actually able to make things work in the other
(36:09):
areas of technology sharing.
Michael Fullilove (36:12):
Sir Lawrence Freedman, it's lovely having you with us at
the Lowy Institute and it's been a pleasure speaking with
you today. Thank you for joining me on The Director's Chair.
Sir Lawrence Freedman (36:20):
My pleasure.
Michael Fullilove (36:20):
We've talked today about what General Winter might have in
store for the war in Ukraine. Wherever it goes from here,
we're all hoping for Ukrainian Spring. The Director's Chair is
a podcast from the Lowy Institute, produced on Gadigal Land.
The producers for this episode were Shane McLeod and Darcy Milne,
with research by David Vallance. If you've enjoyed this episode,
(36:42):
please leave a review in your podcast app. You can
find all our past episodes at our website. lowyinstitute.org/directorschair. I'm
Michael Fullilove. Thank you for listening.
Hello, Michael Fullilove here. In this episode, we're talking about
Russia's brutal and somewhat hapless invasion of Ukraine, the lessons
for militaries around the world, as well as developments in
the United Kingdom and Australia.
Sir Lawrence Freedman (00:13):
First, it's very difficult to occupy places where you're not welcome. Secondly,
logistics is incredibly important and you ignore it at your peril.
But in modern warfare, the consumption of ammunition - consumables - is
immensely intense. Unless you can sustain that, you will be
in trouble, however clever you are.
Michael Fullilove (00:32):
Sir Lawrence Freedman is my guest on this episode of
the Director's Chair. I'm Michael Fullilove, the executive director of
the Lowy Institute. On the 24th of February, Russia - a
nuclear weapons power and a permanent member of the UN
Security Council - launched its unprovoked and brutal invasion of Ukraine.
(00:53):
President Putin expected Kyiv to fall within days. Instead, we've
seen the Ukrainian people displaying fierce moral and physical courage
in the defence of their homeland. Russia's assault on Kyiv
was repulsed, and in the past few months, we've seen
Ukraine's armed forces making sweeping gains in the east and
south of their country, culminating in the liberation of the
(01:15):
key city of Kherson last week. Mr Putin intended this
war to show Russia's strength and the West's weakness. Instead,
he has revealed Russia's weakness and the West's strength. But
winter is coming, and the war is still far from over.
To discuss this war and what it means for the world,
I'm very pleased to be joined today on The Director's
Chair by Sir Lawrence Freedman. Lawry is one of the
(01:37):
world's most renowned strategic thinkers. He studied at the University
of Manchester, York and Oxford. He worked at the IISS
and Chatham House before being appointed Professor of War Studies
at King's College London in 1982. He's the author of Command:
The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine, published
(01:57):
by Penguin this year. And most importantly, he's in Australia
as the Distinguished Fellow for International Security at the Lowy Institute. Lawry,
thank you for joining me on The Director's Chair.
Sir Lawrence Freedman (02:07):
My pleasure.
Michael Fullilove (02:08):
All right. Let's begin by talking about the missile that
landed in Poland yesterday, killing two people. It appears that
the missile came from Ukrainian air defence and was not
a strike by Russia. NATO's called this a tragic mistake
and said that ultimately the blame still rests with Russia.
What effect will this incident have, do you think, on
(02:30):
the debate on the war? And are you surprised that
it's taken this long for the war to spill over
beyond Ukraine's borders, even if it was a mistake?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (02:38):
I think the fact that it was a mistake is important.
I think it was also important the speed with which
this was acknowledged to be a mistake. It was quite
interesting when the news first came through. You had inevitably
on social media, lots of speculation about how this was
(02:59):
a deliberate attempt by the Russians to goad NATO or
prove that NATO's ineffectual. Then you have the Russians saying
this was a provocation and the British had been responsible,
because they all seemed to think that we're more capable than
we are. And then the social media started to look
at the evidence and conclude this was the Ukrainian air
defence missiles. This all happened quite quickly. So instead of,
(03:22):
you know, what happens when Russians make a mistake, which
is it's denied and demonstrated to be a provocation and
so on. It was acknowledged very quickly. That's important because
it gives you trust in what's being said. Beyond that,
I don't think it's that important. It's a reminder that
these things can spill over. Chance events can have quite
important consequences. And the more the longer the war goes on,
(03:46):
the more likely it is that there'll be more chance
events that have sad consequences. But I don't think it
changes NATO's attitude to the war, the American attitude to the war. It certainly doesn't
change the Ukrainian or Russian attitude to the war. It's
a reminder of just what a dangerous game the Russians
are playing, what a nasty game the Russians are playing
- in sending missiles to, well, all over Ukraine, to places where
(04:08):
they've got no hope of making any military inroads anymore.
Michael Fullilove (04:12):
Well, let's go back to when that nasty game began
on the 24th of February. Many commentators at the time
believed there was no way Putin would invade Ukraine. How
did they get it so wrong?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (04:24):
Well, I think that I mean, I would include myself
as somebody who was very skeptical. It was impossible to
say no way when when so many troops were gathered
around the borders and so many people who didn't know
a lot about these things well thought it was quite
likely that it would happen. There were reasons for skepticism.
One of which no Russians one spoke to, who wer writing,
(04:45):
seemed to think it would happen. So it seemed like
a potentially, if it was a bluff, very orchestrated. It
was also very stupid thing to do. And I think
that was certainly my view, not because I thought the
Ukrainians would necessarily resist as well as they did, but
because you just can't subjugate a population of that size.
The idea seemed pretty preposterous. So I could imagine something
(05:09):
in the East, in the Donbass to sort that out
for Russia. But the ambitious conquest that they attempted was
a surprise. So, you know, it's a fact of intelligence
assessments that the hardest thing to assess is somebody else's
stupidity, and I think this was stupid. What I think is
as interesting is - and this goes for all of the
people who called the invasion right - is how much it
(05:31):
turned out the Russians were overestimated. They made so many
surprising errors in their initial military moves that what could
have been almost a fait accompli that would have turned
then into some sort of insurgency I believe, the Russians
found they had a big fight on their hands and they
(05:52):
still got a big fight on their hands here. This would not
have been expected in February that we'd still be fighting
in the way we're fighting.
Michael Fullilove (05:58):
One of the amazing moments was when that attributed, quote
appeared from Zelenskyy very early on, when supposedly there was
an offer of safe passage from the Americans. And his
response was, I don't need a ride on an ammo.
Sir Lawrence Freedman (06:12):
Yeah.
Michael Fullilove (06:12):
Looking back, how important was President Zelenskyy's decision to stay
in Kyiv and fight? What would have happened if he
had fled the capital, as Ashraf Ghani did in Afghanistan.
Sir Lawrence Freedman (06:23):
Or as the Emir of Kuwait did in August 1990?
So if he'd been killed or captured by the Russians,
that would have been an important statement. I don't think
actually would have stopped the Ukrainians fighting. I think it's
always likely that Ukrainians would fight. I mean, they've got
a history of resilience and suffering and determination. So there
(06:47):
are other characters in Ukraine who would have stepped forward.
So I don't think it was necessarily important in that way.
But what it did was cement the idea of Zelenskyy
as a national leader, and that's not how he particularly appeared,
didn't appear as a strong figure almost up to the
start of the war. You and remember, most Americans first
(07:07):
heard of Zelenskyy when he was being badgered by Trump
to dish the dirt on Hunter Biden in exchange for weapons.
So Zelenskyy had not appeared as a politically strong president.
Then all of a sudden he's a true world leader
and all his skills in from the entertainment business, as
well as a pretty shrewd business sense as well understanding
(07:29):
of social media. All of these came to the fore
and that became critical in what was essential to Ukraine,
not only in rallying the people to fight, but in
getting external support. They would have done something without Zelenskyy.
He could have done it from Poland or from the
devil or wherever he might have gone to. But I
think he managed to create a symbolism around himself that
(07:51):
was very powerful.
Michael Fullilove (07:52):
As you know, we hosted President Zelenskyy in a Zoom
event about a month ago, and we and we experienced
this phenomenon that has been commented upon about how clever
and professional the Ukrainians are at targeting their messages to
the audience, to audiences to which Zelenskyy is speaking. In
his remarks, I suddenly discovered that he was quoting to
(08:14):
me a speech that Chancellor Angela merkel had given to
the Lowy Institute in 2014, quite a specific reference that
was artfully worked into his remarks. And afterwards I asked
my colleagues and I asked the Ukrainian ambassador, did did
we provide that material to Kiev? And the answer was no.
And so somebody sitting in Kiev with missiles fall raining
(08:35):
down on their ears has spent a couple of hours
on the Lowy Institute website digging up the perfect content
to add to this speech. And that's a level of
sort of deft statecraft that frankly, you don't get, you know,
usually from presidents of the United States and prime minister
of Great Britain. So we saw that just the deadly
effectiveness of the Ukrainians in the information war.
Sir Lawrence Freedman (08:57):
They're very effective. And it's partly an age thing. They're young.
They understand how the media works, partly the contrast with
Putin sitting at his long desk and avoiding human contact
and almost looking like a pantomime villain. Partly I think
it's the message is absolutely clear. I think when people
(09:18):
talk about information operations, they talk about causing disorientation and confusion,
raising doubts, raising questions, not a bit of it with Ukraine.
It's been a very simple message from day one. Give
us the ammunition. Give us the give us the kit.
We need more of it. We're fighting your battles. This
is what we need provided urgently from day one. That's
(09:40):
been Lansky's message. Then, as you say, if you look
at a series of parliamentary speeches he did to two
different parliaments, every one was tailored every way and they
weren't all soft. I mean, the in the House of
Commons was full of Churchill. The one to the Bundestag
was quite tough and it was critical. And each time
(10:03):
they're clearly working out what the message should be. They
don't always work, you know, and always get the one
to the question. Israel, I think, played too much on
the the Holocaust angle and that that always makes the
Israelis a bit wary. But by and large, I think
they've been extremely successful. The proof of that is in
(10:24):
the amount of support that Zelensky Zelensky's been able to get.
Michael Fullilove (10:27):
Have you been surprised by how unimpressive the Russian military
performance has been and what effect does that have on
Russia's prestige around the world?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (10:38):
Sort of surprised. I mean, if you look back, as
I've done in the book I've just written, check and
now mention if you look back, say, Chechnya, the Russian
military performance was not impressive. So there's been an assumption
that the benefits of two decades of high oil prices
(11:00):
and lots of money coming in to to the Russian
state being spent on military modernization was having an effect.
And people assumed that Syria in particular demonstrated this. But
that was a very limited operation, basically air power against
an enemy without air defenses. And I think people got
(11:24):
over impressed by that without noting that the Russians had
never tried anything big for some time. Certainly what they
did in 2014 with Ukraine, the Ukrainians didn't resist very effectively.
But given the upheavals in Ukraine, that was not necessarily surprising.
So I think part of what it is in terms
(11:45):
of both the Russian underestimation of the Ukrainians, but also
our underestimation of the Ukrainians meant that we were surprised
that the Russians struggled as much as they had a
better grasp of what they were facing. I think their
military campaign might have been better judgment thing about the
big military operations as if they go wrong on the
(12:06):
first day. Even if you're Russia, it's quite hard to
recover your sort of on the back foot thereafter, which
is what happened with the Russians.
Michael Fullilove (12:15):
What about the role of the US so far?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (12:18):
I think Biden's played it pretty well. I mean, personally,
I would have preferred that if he'd been a bit
quicker and more ambitious with some of the kit. But
he's held the alliance together. He's given it purpose. Is
acknowledge what inevitably going to be concerned about nuclear escalation
(12:40):
as being a priority and made that position very clear.
It hasn't been done by subterfuge, he said. These are
the things that we're going to avoid because of that.
And in the end, an enormous amount of resource has
been handed over to Ukraine. And I think because of
the American system where lots of people speak and you
(13:02):
never quite sure with what authority. By and large, they've
understood that the Ukrainians can't be strong armed into a
negotiation and a deal that they can't sell to themselves.
That leaves a chunk of the country under you and
Russian control. And I think that gave us an important
(13:24):
part of the messaging by Ukraine. But I think once
people saw the criminal activity, genocidal activity and strict use
of the term that Russia was engaged, it was very
hard to to say that all that, you know, that
that's a terrible thing that's going on. But, you know,
we've got to be realistic and so on. I think
(13:45):
there's limits to realism here. And the Americans have accepted that.
And I think as indeed of the Germans and the
French and so on as well, since says the scale
of what the Russians were trying to do became apparent
and it became apparent another part of the messaging that
if you gave Ukraine decent weapons, they could use them.
(14:07):
They were very professional. They showed a lot of strategic acumen,
more so than the Russians.
Michael Fullilove (14:12):
You mentioned the nuclear issue a couple of weeks ago
that was running very hot and you were getting we
were getting various messages from Moscow about the prospect of
using nuclear weapons. They seem to have put that in
the box more recently. How concerned are you about the
prospect of use of a tactical nuclear weapon?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (14:31):
My view from the start was I couldn't see any
military value or the political value in the use of
a tactical nuclear weapon. You have the caution you have
to bring in with anything to do with Putin was
that he's done one stupid thing and do another. But
I think people are missing the role that nuclear weapons
played from day one in this, which is relevant to
(14:53):
Biden's attitude as well, which is that you're saying that
Putin said absolutely explicitly from day one, if NATO intervenes
directly on behalf of the Ukrainians, put forces on the
ground to put aircraft in the air, then this could
escalate to something terrible, whether it would or not. You know,
(15:13):
we're not going to find out, I don't think. But
it worked. It worked within the Biden So he wouldn't
have a no fly zone. Work with some of the
limitations on the range of systems being handed over to Ukraine.
And that would be jeopardized if if nuclear weapons were
actually used. Probably to not a lot of benefit. So
(15:34):
I think the Russia it suited the Russians at one point,
I think to stir the pot to get people. Worried.
There's a sort of nonsensical thing about a dirty bomb, which,
of course is not a nuclear weapon. It's an irradiating weapon,
but nothing like a nuclear weapon. You know, the Chinese
way it helps, I think, was is there clearly was
not stopping anybody supporting Ukraine and just alarming people who
(15:58):
might otherwise have been friendly to Russia. So I think
they come back down. I don't think the issue will
ever quite go away until somebody pronounces this war over.
Michael Fullilove (16:07):
Winter's about to set in, so operations will become more
difficult and the conditions much harsher. How will General Winter
affect the course of the war in the coming months,
do you think?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (16:17):
It won't stop the fighting. I don't think that's the case.
It it holds it up the ground bogey. So it's
harder for the Ukrainians to advance quickly. But the conditions
will become harsher. And this is an endurance test, which, again,
(16:37):
what in terms of what one knows, the support being
given by allies to Ukraine in cold weather, keep their better,
be better prepared for it. There's all sorts of question
marks about whether the Russians have got enough kit, whether
they care enough about the people they've mobilized to to
fit them out properly. And you can you know, you're
not going to survive in those conditions. You know, you'll
(17:00):
give up or go home. So I think there will
be operations. And I would have thought after Kherson, you know,
we know that the Russians are going to a desperate
to try to establish lines that they can hold in
the hope that by the end of the winter, the
Russians used their mobilized people more effectively to have some
(17:23):
sort of new offensive capability or better even a better
defensive capability, which is why I don't think the Ukrainians
will want to stop. I think they'll they'll they'll want
to push as hard as they can and hard as
conditions allow.
Michael Fullilove (17:35):
So if you squint your eyes, how will this end?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (17:37):
It's very difficult to know how it end because I
don't think Russia has a plan for ending the war.
And we know how Ukraine wants it to as far
as they're concerned. They want to just get the Russians
out of their country and they'll keep on pushing until
they've got at some point there, they'll expect to negotiation
and they've got cards to play in that negotiation. The
(18:00):
whole question of the future of sanctions against reparations, issues
of war crimes, there's lots of things that will need discussing.
It's not a quick way to end the war, a
negotiation like that, because it won't end quickly, won't be
implemented quickly. So that's one problem. There's no easy negotiated solution,
even if the Russians wanted war. But I think the
(18:21):
real problem is that I don't think Putin knows how
to end it now. He puts in a negotiated solution
for Putin would mean him acknowledging that provinces, which he
has just declared to be Russian are not Russian. He's already,
you know, bizarrely claimed person for a forever part of
(18:46):
Russia and therefore become the first Russian leader to have
to abandon a Russian city. It was this strange behaviour
and he's caught himself. Whether this is deliberate or not,
whether he wanted to bind to his successors as much
as himself. I don't know. But. But now to end
(19:08):
the war in negotiation, he will have to repudiate his
big claim, his most recent claim about the war's objectives.
I don't think he can do that. And also, as
soon as the war ends, there's a reckoning. What was
this for? What are the costs? What's happening to our economy?
Is it worth it? And there's no good answers to
(19:28):
those questions. This is a terrible blunder. It's a catastrophe
for Ukraine. But in the end, one for it for
Russia as well. So my suspicion is the most likely
way this ends is not through a full negotiation between
the governments, but a military military agreement on a ceasefire, disengagement,
(19:51):
which will come as, again, this is a possibility. It's
not a prediction which will come when the Russian military
appreciate their position is untenable.
Michael Fullilove (20:01):
And could Putin survive that? Could could Ukraine spell the
end for Vladimir Putin?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (20:06):
It certainly could. He could survive. He could go. I
think Kremlin watchers are are unsure. I don't know any
of them who declare themselves confident on what the future holds.
I mean, in our countries, somebody who was responsible for
such a mess would go. That is one of the
advantages of our democracies, however embarrassing it can be at times.
(20:30):
There's no obvious way there is an election in 2024
in Russia, but there's no obvious way. Of taking him
out of power. The we can see, but doesn't mean
to say that people in Moscow aren't thinking about it.
There's all sorts of power plays clearly going on amongst
the ultra nationalists, the vacuum group Chechens. There's lots of
(20:52):
different factions involved in all of this. So yeah, it
could mean I mean, the ADU certainly means he's a
much diminished international figure.
Michael Fullilove (20:59):
As you say. The Ukraine war is a reminder of
how difficult it is to invade and occupy another country,
a lesson that great powers seem to constantly forget. What
are the other big lessons out of this war for militaries,
do you think?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (21:14):
Well, you know, the first wars are run as pedagogic exercises.
Every war is a bit different. And what people think
is timeless lessons often are timeless. What this war shows
is what a lot of wars have showed. First, it's
very difficult to occupy places where you're not welcome. Secondly,
(21:36):
logistics is incredibly important and you ignore it at your peril.
But in modern warfare, the consumption of ammunition consumables is
immense and intense. And unless you can sustain that, you'll
be in trouble. However clever you are at fighting. It
(21:57):
warns that not to get overexcited by things like cyber.
Now we know it was tried. It's important, but it
is not decisive. It shows that what we thought was
going to be decisive, which is airpower. Turns out not
to have been so decisive because the Russians weren't prepared
for Ukrainian air defense effort. It's a reminder that there
(22:20):
is one way of fighting a war which ignores the
Geneva Conventions and seeks to coerce, brutalize an enemy into capitulation,
which after the Second World War, we, we said, doesn't
work because of the experience of the Blitz or the
allied bombings of Germany might have know. Undoubtedly, the atomic
(22:44):
bombs did make a point. But Japan was beaten in
all respects by that anyway. And it doesn't seem to
work this time. The contrast between the two ways of
fighting has been very sharp. The Ukrainians didn't have very
much else of a choice. I mean, fighting a pretty
traditional regular war in lines that would have been recognized
(23:07):
by any Second World War general and kept that like
drones and so on, that wasn't a member most respected.
It's perfectly comprehensible in in very classical military terms. The
Russians have been fighting that sort of war not particularly well,
while also fighting a much broader coercive war against the Ukrainians,
(23:29):
also against the West with energy prices and so on. And,
you know, they've demonstrated that they can cause pain, but
not that they can gain political effect as a result
of this.
Michael Fullilove (23:40):
A lot of speculation about what the war in Ukraine
might or might not mean for Taiwan. Do you have
any thoughts about whether what has happened this year makes
a Chinese operation against Taiwan more or less likely? And
how much more difficult would it be to mount that
kind of amphibious invasion?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (23:59):
Well, I don't think it would make a Chinese operation
more likely because it showed pitfalls have shown how true
it is, a reminder that the best laid plans and
so on go wrong. And how hard it is to
to occupy a country that doesn't want to be occupied.
And I think for China, you know, given that that
I mean, the Russians, too, have been talking about, in
(24:19):
a way reunifying a country. But for China to use
the similar sort of messages as the Russians have been using, would,
I think really be very difficult in this context and
certainly would undermine that. Their basic message as to what
the whole thing was about. It's a much more difficult operation,
which obviously a bigger China is much bigger and Taiwan
(24:40):
is much smaller, but it's amphibious and we know how
difficult those are. The Americans have said they would defend Taiwan.
Whether all future presidents will say that, who knows? So
there's many big uncertainties for them. I think they wish
to emphasize the force was it was on the table
(25:01):
and the ambition is still there just because he really
doesn't want the Taiwanese to try and change their legal status,
because that would be a trigger and it would be
very hard. I think given all that has been said,
for the Taiwanese to do that and not get a
big Chinese response, whether that would be all out war
or a blockade, which is a war like out, I
(25:25):
don't know, a blockade as problems, but it would certainly
keep up the pressure and would raise issues for the U.S.
and its allies about including Australia, about how they should respond.
So I'm optimistic, too. Too strong a word. But you
won't get the sense in recent days, including from the G20,
(25:46):
that the Chinese have seen what's happened to Putin and
don't want to fall into the same the stakes of
getting themselves so isolated, of underestimating the West, so much
of taking big military risks that they just get themselves
into a dire situation. So it'd be interesting to see
(26:10):
how this year, the coming year unfolds as whether with,
you know, Biden having successful navigated the midterms inevitably president
for life after the party Congress. Whether the two leaders
are confident enough to carry on the work of of
just calming relations down. Am I. I think Biden's concept
(26:34):
of the floor is quite a good one. You know,
you're not going to have announcement of peace in our
time and a beloved, but something that would recognize that
these two countries really just have to work together. You
can't they can't ignore each other or just go into
an endless competition. And if that happens, then maybe things
will calm down. But it will require the, you know,
(26:57):
the Chinese to rethink some of their foreign policy and
how they relate to the rest of the world and
the wolf warrior diplomacy and all of that, which, you know,
Australia knows a lot about. Indeed, Australia, you know, is
going to be a key test, I think, of of
whether China can manage a different sort of of relationship
(27:17):
with with countries with which you may not have a
natural affinity.
Michael Fullilove (27:21):
I'll come back to Australia at the end, but before
I leave Ukraine, let me ask you about your own
country's role in that war. You alluded earlier, I think,
to how your politics has been a little embarrassing recently. Yeah.
Is Ukraine a rare bright spot for for British foreign policy?
(27:41):
I mean, Boris promised a global Britain and a completely
different kind of foreign policy. One British official said to
me recently that on Ukraine, Brexit, Britain has been the
moral conscience of Europe. Do you agree with that?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (27:53):
Yeah, I mean, I think oddly, through all our travails,
which are largely about economics and the cost of Brexit
and the impact of COVID and the impact of the war,
I mean, so we share a lot of problems with
other European countries that we've managed to give our own
twist to. The foreign policy actually hasn't been a moderately
bright spot anyway. The integrated review was quite well received.
(28:18):
And I think on Ukraine, you know, the government took
a position early on and this was not just, you know,
when when they were sure that what the intelligence was
saying even before that the defence secretary, who's been one
of the key figures in in the policy, was challenging
(28:38):
what Putin was saying on Ukraine when others were after.
It's not I mean, it's not a competition to show
who's most moral. But the fact is that the British
position vis a vis Northern Europe, as well as the
Ukrainians is strengthened as a result because that's been consistent,
has put resources where the policy was. While the French
(29:01):
and the Germans appeared to equivocate, I mean, I think
the French and the Germans equivocate far less now, but
for a while they did. And, you know, I don't
think we should underestimate the consequences if the British and
the Americans. But the British I mean, the British were
not first in the sense that lots of them, the
Canadians and Americans and others were coming in after 2014.
(29:23):
But on this crisis, the British did push harder than most.
So as one who's been pretty critical of our governments,
I think, obviously got it right.
Michael Fullilove (29:32):
You have a new prime minister. Yeah, I guess he's
fortunate in his predecessor. In a way.
Sir Lawrence Freedman (29:37):
He doesn't have big shoes to follow, you know.
Michael Fullilove (29:40):
How do you assess Rishi Sunak? Do you have any
kind of early hints about his international inclinations?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (29:47):
You know, he was chancellor who's coming in in a
major economic crisis. The budget day today is going to
mean raising taxes. Bad news for lots of families. He's
an accountant, essentially. He's a spreadsheet man and.
Michael Fullilove (30:05):
Been a bit a bit raised some questions about the
defense budget when he was chancellor.
Sir Lawrence Freedman (30:09):
He did, but I thought chancellor's raised questions about the
defence budget. But he kept the Defense Secretary in position
and he kept the former secretary who's actually been a
Trump supporter in position. My sense is, unlike many prime ministers,
he's not leaping into the international arena. He's been to
the G20 instances. He can't ignore it. And like most
(30:32):
prime ministers, you'll get drawn in much more, even if
he wants to concentrate on domestic. It matters. But my
sense is he doesn't particularly want a major reappraisal of
foreign policy. He's got enough to do on the home
front and therefore will continue with the policies he's inherited.
I think the major thing people are looking for is
(30:55):
sort of building on on what's happened as a result
of Ukraine and the fact that, you know, there's not
a lot of bandwidth left in British politics. Whether or
not he needs to ease relations with the EU on
a number of issues. And then again, there are some
early signs of that is not is not is not
picking fights to to impress his backbenches, which has been
(31:17):
a problem with the last couple of prime ministers.
Michael Fullilove (31:20):
Finishing on Australia. Lawry, you've been a regular visitor to
this country for a long time. You've as part of
your fellowship here at the Institute, you've spent time in
Canberra speaking to officials. What has struck you this time
about the Australian strategic debate?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (31:35):
It's much more focused, I would say. You know, when
I first started coming to Australia, which was not long
after the end of the Cold War, you know, it was,
you know, whether or not there was any distinctive Australian
contribution to me seemed to be up in the air.
Then you have, you know, China is the great opportunity
(31:57):
that not such a great opportunity and may be a
problem now, definitely a problem much closer alliance, therefore, with
the U.S. and with the UK potentially with orcas. So
it seems to be a much more focused debate. But
big issues are big issues about whether it's wise to
(32:19):
tie yourself so closely to the to American policy. Is
there a defence policy, security policy that that is that
is more parochial and doesn't play such a big role
in the wider Indo-Pacific region? Can you get the feeling
(32:40):
that the balance of opinion is swung to? We have
a role to play and we and it can be played.
It's a much more, much more. No, I would say
there's an evident and sure consensus, but it's more focused.
The questions are the same questions that that keep up.
And it's always a very interesting debate and I think
(33:03):
Brit Brits coming to Australia or you're quite comfortable with
the US and we recognise elements of it because the
questions that we ask ourselves. You know, we're an island nation.
We're not absolutely mandated to get involved in other people's problems.
Geography is actually being quite kind to us. We have
(33:23):
the close relationship with the Americans, which permeates all our defence.
Is this wise? What would happen if you have another
Trumpist type president? I mean, all these issues we face
you face, except, you know, China looms large for you.
Whereas Russia looms larger for us.
Michael Fullilove (33:43):
And just finally, you mentioned AUKUS, the technology sharing arrangement
that was announced by the three governments last September. At
its heart of it is a commitment on the part
of the United States and the United Kingdom to help
Australia build a fleet of nuclear propelled submarines. What's your
assessment of the wisdom for a country like Australia with
(34:05):
our geography of having nuclear propelled submarines? It's obviously a
very difficult task for a country without an indigenous nuclear
industry or nuclear weapons to attempt this. What are your
thoughts on the achievability and the wisdom of the nuclear subs?
Sir Lawrence Freedman (34:21):
I think - I think the wisdom needs debating. I mean,
I'm not saying it's wrong, but it has implications of
because - this is a UK issue as well - you're always
going to be tied to the Americans and to a degree,
to the Brits, but mainly to the Americans as a
result of becoming, having a nuclear fleet. Nuclear submarines are
(34:44):
very good. They're very effective. They give you a lot
of distance. They're hard to detect and they worry opponents.
So there's nothing particularly wrong with the ambition. If you
can get them, they'll be very effective. Whether you'll get
them remains to be seen. It's a mega procurement project.
(35:04):
Everybody I've asked in the Australian Government has been very positive,
the trilateral relations are working well and that there's a
sort of, having made this commitment, especially the way it
was made in September 2021, which wasn't the most elegant
diplomatic move, shall we say, having made the commitment, you're
(35:26):
really under some obligation to try to make it work.
You don't have a lot of latitude, I think, in this.
And the Americans and Brits have got d reason to have
another nuclear partner. It helps. So I think on balance,
I'd be positive. But I think you have to be cautious.
I think the other technology sharing stuff is in the
(35:48):
short term is very important potentially. And I think there'll
be a lot of tests of the relationship that will be,
will come before you're really onto the big tests of
how far you can take whatever plan comes out next March,
how well you can take that forward. We'll be seeing whether
you're actually able to make things work in the other
(36:09):
areas of technology sharing.
Michael Fullilove (36:12):
Sir Lawrence Freedman, it's lovely having you with us at
the Lowy Institute and it's been a pleasure speaking with
you today. Thank you for joining me on The Director's Chair.
Sir Lawrence Freedman (36:20):
My pleasure.
Michael Fullilove (36:20):
We've talked today about what General Winter might have in
store for the war in Ukraine. Wherever it goes from here,
we're all hoping for Ukrainian Spring. The Director's Chair is
a podcast from the Lowy Institute, produced on Gadigal Land.
The producers for this episode were Shane McLeod and Darcy Milne,
with research by David Vallance. If you've enjoyed this episode,
(36:42):
please leave a review in your podcast app. You can
find all our past episodes at our website. lowyinstitute.org/directorschair. I'm
Michael Fullilove. Thank you for listening.
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