July 21, 2025 • 27 mins
Over many decades of public service, Robert Gates has served as secretary of defense for two presidents and the director of the CIA.
On today’s Big Take podcast, Gates sits down with host David Gura and shares his perspective on what makes this moment one of “the most perilous” in history.
It’s the first of several interviews David did with some of the biggest names in foreign policy and national security at the Aspen Security Forum. We’ll publish those conversations on The Big Take over the next couple of weeks.
See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
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Speaker 1 (00:02):
Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio news. Tonight, so Russian explosive
drones slamming into.
Speaker 2 (00:12):
Now to Israel issuing new evacuation orders in Gaza. Dozens
of Palestinians were killed by Israeli fire as it waited
for food in northern Gaza. With I am now striking back,
hiking tariffs on US goods arriving in China to one
hundred and twenty five percent, and tonight here American farmers
worry that China will now turn elsewhere.
Speaker 1 (00:31):
I think that it's the most and many respects, the
most perilous time since the late forties, maybe ever.
Speaker 2 (00:41):
Robert Gates has had a storied career in national security.
Speaker 1 (00:45):
Of the eight presidents I worked for, five were Republicans,
three were Democrats. Ironically, my career was bookended by two Democrats,
Lyndon Johnson and Barack Obama.
Speaker 2 (00:56):
Over many decades of public service, Gates served as Secretary
of Defense for two presidents consecutively and as the director
of the CIA. And Since Gates left government in twenty eleven,
he has remained influential as an author and as an advisor.
Then President Electrump sought Gates's Council before he started his
first term and today Gates runs a strategic consulting firm
(01:20):
with President George W. Bush's Secretary of State Condaleza Rice,
alongside other officials from the Bush administration. I wanted to
get Gates's perspective on this perilous moment in history, as
he put it. I wanted to hear about what he's
watching closely, what worries him, and what's at stake for
the world. I'm David Gera, and this is the big
(01:44):
take from Bloomberg News today on the show My conversation
with former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. I sat down
with him away from Washington in Colorado at the Aspen
Security Forum. This is one of several interviews I did
there with some of the biggest names in for we're
in policy and national security. We'll share those with you
over the next few weeks. I wanted to ask you, first,
(02:11):
given your experience and your knowledge of history, how you're
thinking about this moment.
Speaker 1 (02:16):
Well, first of all, I think that it's the most
and respects the most perilous time since the late forties,
maybe ever. We have never confronted aggressive, nuclear armed great
powers in both Asia and Europe. At the same time,
(02:36):
we have a major war going on in Europe, major
war going on in the Middle East, threatened war in Asia.
And this all comes at a time when we as
Americans are divided about our role in the world, about
our politics, about everything else, and lots of things that
(03:00):
need fixing aren't getting fixed, from the deficit and the
debt to figuring out once again how to do military construction,
how to rebuild defense industries. So it's a pretty tough time.
It's also a time of you know, it's been hyped
(03:23):
and headlined and everything, but it really is kind of
an inflection point in terms of taking a hard, cold
look at our government and seeing how we can do
it better. As I like to put it, in any
institution over decades, barnacles, film build up. It's true of
(03:46):
every organization I've led, CIA, boy Scouts, Texas, A and
M and Defense. And the challenge for a leader is
how do you preserve the tradition and the culture that
made the institutions great in the first place, but scrape
off all those barnacles and make the reforms that are
(04:08):
needed to be successful in the future. I think that's
the challenge and I don't think we're facing it very well.
Speaker 2 (04:14):
I'm going to ask you about a few of these
military conflicts that are ongoing in a moment, but first
I want to ask you about the trade war, and
we focus a lot on the economic ramifications of that,
what it's going to mean for trading relationships. How do
you see that in the context of national security? How
does waging this war stand to change the relationships between yes,
(04:35):
trading partners, but nation states as well.
Speaker 1 (04:37):
So interestingly, I think the trade imbalances actually began as
a national security matter, and that was after the war.
The United States gave huge trade advantages to Germany and Japan,
but also the Europeans trying to recover from the war,
and we actually basically said, we'll take make a hit
(05:01):
economically because it's really important for our security for these
countries to get back up on their feet, have a
working economy. That's what's going to keep the communists out.
Work pretty well. But we never turned back to those
advantages that we had given, and over the years, those
disadvantages piled up against the United States, and nobody really
(05:25):
wanted to take them on because obviously, with our allies
that was a very sensitive subject. And then with the
advent of China into the WTO, it sort of put
rocket fuel behind these trade issues, and mainly because China
didn't abide by the rules when China joined WTO, and
(05:50):
we and other developed commentaries failed to hold them accountable.
This should have begun in two thousand and one, two
thousand and two saying you can't do that, you can't
seal that IP, you can't dump over here. There are
a lot of things you can't do. But we let
it go. And so in a way, I would regard
(06:11):
what's going on right now as kind of a reckoning
to readdress the imbalances that have existed with some countries
since after World War Two in the early fifties, and
then have built up since the creation of the WTO
and with China and so on. You know, are there
better ways to do it? Maybe? But in some ways.
(06:32):
Let me use the analogy of the Europeans decisions on
arms control, on arms build up, on defense spending, I,
among many many others berated the Europeans for years, decades
to increase their defense spending, and we had no luck.
We literally failed. So incomes President Trump with his two
(06:56):
by four and he's got their attention, and guess what,
they've decided that they will spend more on defense. Now
he had I think a lot of help from Putin,
from Vladimir Putin, who may not scare the American people,
but he sure scares the Europeans. So I think we're
kind of reckoning with both in terms of trade but
(07:20):
also defense spending on the part of the Europeans of
readdressing or addressing problems that have been long extant, but
we really haven't had the political fortitude or the willingness
to potentially offend people to take them on.
Speaker 2 (07:38):
The war in Gaza has gone on now for more
than six hundred and fifty days, and I wonder how
you see the path forward to resolution. Is it evident
to you how long is this going to last?
Speaker 1 (07:49):
You think, well, I hear people betting on different times.
You know, will it end this year? Whenever? Well, the
fastest way for it would end would be for Hamas
to own up to the fact that they destroyed Gaza.
Their attack on October seventh began all of this, and
they created an environment in which Israel said enough is enough,
(08:11):
and we're not going to put up with these attacks.
Every few years. We're going to solve this problem one
way or another. Now, ideally you would have some kind
of political entity for the Palestinians that would have some
credibility internationally, if not with Israel. And that can't be
the Palestinian authority in the West Bank, which everybody knows
(08:35):
is corrupt and incompetent to boot. So where are the
Palestinians finally leaders to say enough is enough, we need
to start rebuilding Gaza. And I personally think this thing will,
this horrible thing will come to an end when Hamas
(08:57):
finally concludes they can't win, They're not winning support abroad,
and their people are being destroyed.
Speaker 2 (09:05):
Benjamin Natnewe, who is somebody you know and have dealt
with over these many years. What have you noticed or
observed about his behavior in this conflict and how much
is that path the resolution going to be shaped by
his political fortunes.
Speaker 1 (09:18):
Well, I've known Bibe a long time and we've had
our disagreements along the way. I think it's fair to say,
but I will give Natanian who credit for this. Since
October seventh, he has trained the strategic environment in the
Middle East in a very significant way. Iran counted on
its surrogates, his Belah Hamas, the whose the tribesmen in
(09:42):
northern Iraq and others to intimidate others in the region
and to attack Israel and taking advantage of that attack
or in response to that attack, Natanie Who and I
think the Israelis in general said enough, and so they
went after his Belah. They went after Hamas. They certainly
played a role in the overthrow of Asad. His Bilah
(10:04):
can't be rearmed now because that path was through Syria
from Iran and dramatically weaken Iran, first through the initial
attack and then through the more recent one that involved
the United States. So I think Iran is very much
on its back foot at this point. Whether we've long
term solved any problems, I think remains to be seen.
(10:26):
But in Atia, Who's made it pretty clear that if
the Iranians resumed that nuclear program, he'll go back in
and as he puts it, mow the grass you were not.
But the bottom line is the strategic environment in the
whole region has been changed subsequent to October seventh, And
the truth is, if some kind of a solution can
(10:47):
be found for the Palestinians, then I think the opportunities
in terms of Israel, Saudi Arabia, the other Arab states
beyond the UAE and Cutter and so on, are really
pretty extraordinary. These guys are all interested in business. They
want to expand, they want investment, they want to diversify
their economy. They see Israel as a technological giant in
(11:10):
the region, so there's a lot of potential there, but
they've got to get past the Palestinian problem.
Speaker 2 (11:17):
You were not somebody who was agitating for strikes on
nuclear facilities in Iran, And as the dust settles on
those strikes, how do you gauge their efficacy and where
does that lead? Do you think?
Speaker 1 (11:28):
Well, this verse came up when I was Secretary of
Defense under President Bush so back in two thousand and seven,
two thousand and eight, I said, you know, there's no
doubt we can do a lot of damage to those facilities.
And they hadn't started going really deep at that point,
but I said, and my position from then until today
has been, you can significantly damage and set back Iran's
(11:53):
nuclear program, but you cannot eliminate it militarily. They can't
unlearn what they've already learned. The Israelis are now saying
that they probably scattered the enriched uranium at three sites Esfahan,
Fordoh and the Tons, so they probably have some of
that and they have some suit centrifuges. My view for
(12:15):
what I was telling President Bush fifteen years ago was
you can damage it, but you can't destroy it. You're
just buying time, and the question is whether the time
that has been bought can be translated into some kind
of an agreement.
Speaker 2 (12:32):
My conversation with former Defense Secretary Robert Gates continues after
the break. After former Defense Secretary Robert Gates and I
discussed the trade war and the war in Gaza, we
(12:52):
turned to another major conflict playing out today in Ukraine.
How do you see President Putin's calculus in that convent?
We see the economic vice the country is in, the
incredible loss of life. Where do you see all of
that headed?
Speaker 1 (13:06):
I think Putin is not all that difficult to understand.
Vladimir Putin believes it is his personal destiny to recreate
the Russian Empire, and as my old mentorist Big Brzhenski
used to say, there can be no Russian Empire without Ukraine.
And so Putin sees it as his personal destiny to
(13:28):
bring Ukraine back into the fold of the Russian Empire,
if not as an integral part of Russia, then as
a client state basically does what Russia wants it to.
And his objectives have not changed from day one. He
wants the four provinces in the East, he wants Ukraine disarmed,
he wants a pro Russian government in Kiev. He wants
(13:50):
a ban on Ukrainian membership in NATO and the EU.
That's all. And he hasn't waivered one whit from the
very beginning, and he is willing to pay whatever price
is involved. And it is beginning to bite. There was
a sugar rush from a lot of the defense industries
investments and a lot of the things coming from China
(14:11):
and so on. But I think they've run through that.
The inflation is really beginning to ramp up twenty one
percent interest rates, that's just a formal interest rate, who
knows what the real one is. Things are getting life's
getting a little harder in Russia. So I don't see
any breakthroughs. That's one of those predictions that may turn
(14:32):
out to be very embarrassing. But the Ukrainians have been
able to hold their ground pretty well in the East,
as it's kind of a drone versus drone war out there.
But Putin is clearly putting the pressure on the domestic
side in Ukraine with these attacks by hundreds of drones
every single night.
Speaker 2 (14:52):
What did you make of what seemed like a change
in tack from President Trump a few days ago. Seems
to be growing frustrated with President Putin. There was a
lot of talk about them meeting and having a summit,
negotiating this themselves. His patient seems to being tested here.
Speaker 1 (15:06):
Most of the presidents that I worked with felt that,
I mean, they got themselves elected president of the United States.
They basically feel like they can win anybody over. I've
seen it Withn't Benny, and you know it started with
Franklin Roosevelt and Uncle Joe Stalin. You know, I can
win this guy over. And a lot of presidents feel
that way, that they can develop a personal chemistry with
(15:29):
the other guy that will make great things possible, and
most of them end up disappointed. And I think that's
what's happened here. I don't think President Trump was unique
in thinking he could bring Puton around, nor is he
unique in being disappointed.
Speaker 2 (15:47):
The president has Steve Witkoff his friend, a businessman, not
somebody who was in the foreign service or a diplomat
before leading the negotiations that he's been having with Russia
with President Putin. Do you see wisdom in that using
somebody who doesn't have that font of experience from government
and diplomacy, or does it raise questions for you about
how approaching well.
Speaker 1 (16:06):
Lots of different presidents use lots of different techniques. When
we were first starting to reach out to the Soviet
Union and to the Chinese and so on, US businessmen
would be used as intermediaries to carry the message, if
you will. I think that other presidents have used special envoys.
(16:29):
President Obama liked special envoys and he had a bunch
of them. I personally have found there are a few
instances where those of work. So on the Northern Ireland
problem George Mitchell, that worked out pretty well. But on
Afghanistan Pakistan Richard Holbrook, that didn't work. So I'm inclined
(16:49):
to give presidents a lot of leeway in the tools
that they want to use. And you know, it's always
also the fact that when appointing ambassadors, I always thought
it was most important to the host government, not that
they had somebody super experienced as the US ambassador, but
somebody who could pick up the telephone and call the
President of the United States.
Speaker 2 (17:09):
It strikes me that the balance that we've had between
hard power and soft power in economic power, isn't that
the equilibriument was that before? Do you agree with that?
How much of a problem is it that we have
an administration that six months in has leaned very heavily
on airstrikes and using hard power to solve some of
these problems, while it's been cutting State Department, USCID, other
(17:31):
foreign aid.
Speaker 1 (17:33):
I've been a long believer and that while the Cold
War was fought against the biggest the backdrop of the
biggest arms race in the history of the world, because
we were able to avoid a direct military conflict, that
conflict was resolved by non military instruments of power economics, technology,
(17:54):
strategic communications, development assistance, ideology, intelligence, and so the most
powerful of those are economics and technology, and we are
very good at using those. I wish we could use
them more in harness with one another of tariffs, trade sanctions,
(18:20):
and so on, because in some cases one might work
better than the other. But we kind of use them independently,
and I think we diminish their effectiveness that way. But economic,
with our economic power, that is a big deal, and
we're seeing that in relationship, particularly with China and Russia
right now. I think on strategic communications and foreign assistance.
(18:43):
You know, the Chinese under who Jentaal invested like seven
billion dollars in strategic communication. There isn't a country in
the world where you can't get Chinese television, Chinese radio,
Chinese social media, Chinese print media, television, you name it,
and they've spread all over the world. We're cutting everything back.
(19:05):
Our voice will not be heard around the world. We
can't tell the Keerge's why it's important not to let
the Chinese have too much power in their country, or
the Kazakhs, or people in the Middle East, or people
in South America. I don't think we've used trade effectively.
China is now the biggest trading partner with one hundred
(19:27):
and twenty countries in the world, all the countries in
South America except Columbia. So my problem is that we
have all these tools that are really powerful for the
United States, but we've decided to keep them in our backpack,
and if we're to avoid a conflict with China, all
these tools will matter in this long term contest. You know,
(19:49):
the line is for the hearts and minds, but the
fact is those hearts and minds also have security arrangements,
their economic markets, their potential sources of instability and terrorism.
So I think pulling back on all of those is
really a mistake. Now that said, all of them are
in serious need of reform. I mean, Congress is self
(20:11):
dismantled USIA in nineteen ninety eight. They tried to dismantle
USAID then, but Bill Clinton wouldn't let him, but he
reduced the size and brought it inside the State Department.
There are a lot of problems with a lot of
the aid programs. You know, when the Millennium Challenge Corporation
was established by Congress under the first President of second
(20:32):
President Bush, there were a lot of conservatives who said,
let's do that because of its rules in terms of accountability,
local buy in, and so on. So one of the
things that I'm trying to do through a Global Policy
center affiliated with William and Mary is bring together people
on both sides of the aisle and experts and say
kind of what new path forward can we have in
(20:54):
these different using these tools that gets away from all
the mistakes of the past, gets away from all the
bureaucracy and the barnacles of the past, and points a
way forward to make us much more effective and cost
effective in these programs.
Speaker 2 (21:11):
My conversation with former Defense Secretary of Robert Gates at
the Aspen Security Forum continues after the break. In the
final part of my interview with former Secretary of Defense
(21:32):
Robert Gates, I circled back to China and the threat
of the relationship between China and the US deteriorating further
as President Trump wages a global trade war. You mentioned
avoiding conflict with China at this moment. How much does
that worry you? Do you think we're headed for it
for conflict? What needs to be done to forestall that
to prevent that from happening?
Speaker 1 (21:53):
Well, I mean, I don't think I'm fairly confident the
leader of neither side want a war. It would be
catastrophic for both sides. So the question is, how do
you maneuver against each other over a period of decades
as we did with the Soviet Union without it leading
to war? And so I think we have to be
(22:16):
very tough on China when it comes to intellectual property theft,
when it comes to trade and some of these issues.
I think we need to be tough in terms of
their military deployments, some of the things they're doing around
the world. But at the same time, I think it's
essential that we maintain the dialogue with them, particularly military
to military, to prevent incidents that could balloon into a
(22:38):
conflict nobody wanted. So I think keeping a dialogue with
them going is very important. I'm encouraged by the fact
that President Trump and President she talk from time to time.
I'm not sure they don't talk past each other, but
that's okay. But I think maintaining those contacts, and I
would say especially on the military to military side, is
(22:59):
really important.
Speaker 2 (23:00):
We've talked a bit about the reform agenda. Maybe I
can tease out your barnacle's metaphor. There was an effort
in the early days of this term to really go
after those barnacles in forests, and I think kind of
blew up the hull of the ship maybe trying to
do that. What's your council for doing it appropriately? Because
we see with this administration in particular, a real sense
of urgency a president who gets impatient, how do you
(23:24):
do the kind of reform that you're describing in a
thoughtful way, a careful way, and not have knock on
effects that can be damaging to these institutions.
Speaker 1 (23:32):
So in two thousand and nine, in over a period
of four months, in probably forty meetings with all the
military leadership, the joint chiefs of staff, the combatant commanders,
all the senior civilians, we examine I saw a budgetary
train wreck coming after the financial crisis in two thousand
(23:54):
and eight, and as I said, we've got to show
some responsibility here and better we look at what can
be cut than people who don't know what they're doing. No,
I won't mention any names or institutions, and so we
compiled a list of programs that were questionable and we
(24:16):
went through it in these forty meetings. Bottom line, we
ended up cutting thirty six legacy programs that, had they
been built to completion, would have cost the taxpayers three
hundred and thirty billion dollars. And we did it essentially
without a ripple. Now, some companies weren't too happy, but
(24:39):
that goes with the territory and then the next year
facing the same challenges, same kind of meetings over a
three month period, same number of meetings roughly, and the
meetings weren't just to vent meetings were kind of is
this a good idea, what do we need this for?
Or to the Air Force, you want a new tanker,
(25:00):
a miss a new ICBM, you want the F thirty five,
and you've got to make a choice or two here,
and the same thing with all the services. And but
on the IF what we called the Efficiency Exercise overhead
exercise in the spring of twenty ten, we identified one
hundred and eighty billion dollars in overhead cuts in the military.
(25:22):
Over a period of about five years. We eliminated an
entire combatant command, Joint Forces man that it was Jim
Madison's first four star job was to go. I sent
him down to dismantle that command. And we didn't have
any leakers. We didn't have people going to the hill
behind our backs. We didn't have we had a lot
of support on the hill. You know, individual congressmen were
(25:42):
very much against things that we were doing that were
in their districts. That's that's life. But we did an
enormous amount of change and reform and really without any
without perturbing the force. As it were the gallery, he
didn't collapse, and nobody on the hill was calling for
(26:03):
my head. So there is a way to reform these
institutions and to do so in a thoughtful way that
involves a lot of people, that gets a lot of input,
gets a lot of suggestions, so that when a decision
is made, even if it goes against you, well I've
been respected. I got my chance to make my case.
(26:27):
My case didn't work, but at least I was in
the room, so I think. And the other final point
I'd make is my experience in leading organizations and leading
change in organizations is that change imposed solely from the
top without any engagement below that are changes that walk
(26:49):
out the door the day that boss leaves. If you
want sustainable change, change that lasts, you need to involve
the people who deliver the mission.
Speaker 2 (27:01):
Mister Secretary, Thank you very much, h my pleasure. This
is the big take from Bloomberg News. I'm David Gura.
That was my conversation with former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,
the first in a series of interviews I did with
some of the biggest names in national security and foreign policy.
We're bringing more of these conversations in the days ahead.
(27:22):
Make sure you're following the Big Take so you can
hear them all. To get unlimited access to all of
bloomberg dot com, subscribe today at Bloomberg dot com Slash
Podcast offer. Thanks for listening. We'll be back tomorrow.
Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio news. Tonight, so Russian explosive
drones slamming into.
Speaker 2 (00:12):
Now to Israel issuing new evacuation orders in Gaza. Dozens
of Palestinians were killed by Israeli fire as it waited
for food in northern Gaza. With I am now striking back,
hiking tariffs on US goods arriving in China to one
hundred and twenty five percent, and tonight here American farmers
worry that China will now turn elsewhere.
Speaker 1 (00:31):
I think that it's the most and many respects, the
most perilous time since the late forties, maybe ever.
Speaker 2 (00:41):
Robert Gates has had a storied career in national security.
Speaker 1 (00:45):
Of the eight presidents I worked for, five were Republicans,
three were Democrats. Ironically, my career was bookended by two Democrats,
Lyndon Johnson and Barack Obama.
Speaker 2 (00:56):
Over many decades of public service, Gates served as Secretary
of Defense for two presidents consecutively and as the director
of the CIA. And Since Gates left government in twenty eleven,
he has remained influential as an author and as an advisor.
Then President Electrump sought Gates's Council before he started his
first term and today Gates runs a strategic consulting firm
(01:20):
with President George W. Bush's Secretary of State Condaleza Rice,
alongside other officials from the Bush administration. I wanted to
get Gates's perspective on this perilous moment in history, as
he put it. I wanted to hear about what he's
watching closely, what worries him, and what's at stake for
the world. I'm David Gera, and this is the big
(01:44):
take from Bloomberg News today on the show My conversation
with former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. I sat down
with him away from Washington in Colorado at the Aspen
Security Forum. This is one of several interviews I did
there with some of the biggest names in for we're
in policy and national security. We'll share those with you
over the next few weeks. I wanted to ask you, first,
(02:11):
given your experience and your knowledge of history, how you're
thinking about this moment.
Speaker 1 (02:16):
Well, first of all, I think that it's the most
and respects the most perilous time since the late forties,
maybe ever. We have never confronted aggressive, nuclear armed great
powers in both Asia and Europe. At the same time,
(02:36):
we have a major war going on in Europe, major
war going on in the Middle East, threatened war in Asia.
And this all comes at a time when we as
Americans are divided about our role in the world, about
our politics, about everything else, and lots of things that
(03:00):
need fixing aren't getting fixed, from the deficit and the
debt to figuring out once again how to do military construction,
how to rebuild defense industries. So it's a pretty tough time.
It's also a time of you know, it's been hyped
(03:23):
and headlined and everything, but it really is kind of
an inflection point in terms of taking a hard, cold
look at our government and seeing how we can do
it better. As I like to put it, in any
institution over decades, barnacles, film build up. It's true of
(03:46):
every organization I've led, CIA, boy Scouts, Texas, A and
M and Defense. And the challenge for a leader is
how do you preserve the tradition and the culture that
made the institutions great in the first place, but scrape
off all those barnacles and make the reforms that are
(04:08):
needed to be successful in the future. I think that's
the challenge and I don't think we're facing it very well.
Speaker 2 (04:14):
I'm going to ask you about a few of these
military conflicts that are ongoing in a moment, but first
I want to ask you about the trade war, and
we focus a lot on the economic ramifications of that,
what it's going to mean for trading relationships. How do
you see that in the context of national security? How
does waging this war stand to change the relationships between yes,
(04:35):
trading partners, but nation states as well.
Speaker 1 (04:37):
So interestingly, I think the trade imbalances actually began as
a national security matter, and that was after the war.
The United States gave huge trade advantages to Germany and Japan,
but also the Europeans trying to recover from the war,
and we actually basically said, we'll take make a hit
(05:01):
economically because it's really important for our security for these
countries to get back up on their feet, have a
working economy. That's what's going to keep the communists out.
Work pretty well. But we never turned back to those
advantages that we had given, and over the years, those
disadvantages piled up against the United States, and nobody really
(05:25):
wanted to take them on because obviously, with our allies
that was a very sensitive subject. And then with the
advent of China into the WTO, it sort of put
rocket fuel behind these trade issues, and mainly because China
didn't abide by the rules when China joined WTO, and
(05:50):
we and other developed commentaries failed to hold them accountable.
This should have begun in two thousand and one, two
thousand and two saying you can't do that, you can't
seal that IP, you can't dump over here. There are
a lot of things you can't do. But we let
it go. And so in a way, I would regard
(06:11):
what's going on right now as kind of a reckoning
to readdress the imbalances that have existed with some countries
since after World War Two in the early fifties, and
then have built up since the creation of the WTO
and with China and so on. You know, are there
better ways to do it? Maybe? But in some ways.
(06:32):
Let me use the analogy of the Europeans decisions on
arms control, on arms build up, on defense spending, I,
among many many others berated the Europeans for years, decades
to increase their defense spending, and we had no luck.
We literally failed. So incomes President Trump with his two
(06:56):
by four and he's got their attention, and guess what,
they've decided that they will spend more on defense. Now
he had I think a lot of help from Putin,
from Vladimir Putin, who may not scare the American people,
but he sure scares the Europeans. So I think we're
kind of reckoning with both in terms of trade but
(07:20):
also defense spending on the part of the Europeans of
readdressing or addressing problems that have been long extant, but
we really haven't had the political fortitude or the willingness
to potentially offend people to take them on.
Speaker 2 (07:38):
The war in Gaza has gone on now for more
than six hundred and fifty days, and I wonder how
you see the path forward to resolution. Is it evident
to you how long is this going to last?
Speaker 1 (07:49):
You think, well, I hear people betting on different times.
You know, will it end this year? Whenever? Well, the
fastest way for it would end would be for Hamas
to own up to the fact that they destroyed Gaza.
Their attack on October seventh began all of this, and
they created an environment in which Israel said enough is enough,
(08:11):
and we're not going to put up with these attacks.
Every few years. We're going to solve this problem one
way or another. Now, ideally you would have some kind
of political entity for the Palestinians that would have some
credibility internationally, if not with Israel. And that can't be
the Palestinian authority in the West Bank, which everybody knows
(08:35):
is corrupt and incompetent to boot. So where are the
Palestinians finally leaders to say enough is enough, we need
to start rebuilding Gaza. And I personally think this thing will,
this horrible thing will come to an end when Hamas
(08:57):
finally concludes they can't win, They're not winning support abroad,
and their people are being destroyed.
Speaker 2 (09:05):
Benjamin Natnewe, who is somebody you know and have dealt
with over these many years. What have you noticed or
observed about his behavior in this conflict and how much
is that path the resolution going to be shaped by
his political fortunes.
Speaker 1 (09:18):
Well, I've known Bibe a long time and we've had
our disagreements along the way. I think it's fair to say,
but I will give Natanian who credit for this. Since
October seventh, he has trained the strategic environment in the
Middle East in a very significant way. Iran counted on
its surrogates, his Belah Hamas, the whose the tribesmen in
(09:42):
northern Iraq and others to intimidate others in the region
and to attack Israel and taking advantage of that attack
or in response to that attack, Natanie Who and I
think the Israelis in general said enough, and so they
went after his Belah. They went after Hamas. They certainly
played a role in the overthrow of Asad. His Bilah
(10:04):
can't be rearmed now because that path was through Syria
from Iran and dramatically weaken Iran, first through the initial
attack and then through the more recent one that involved
the United States. So I think Iran is very much
on its back foot at this point. Whether we've long
term solved any problems, I think remains to be seen.
(10:26):
But in Atia, Who's made it pretty clear that if
the Iranians resumed that nuclear program, he'll go back in
and as he puts it, mow the grass you were not.
But the bottom line is the strategic environment in the
whole region has been changed subsequent to October seventh, And
the truth is, if some kind of a solution can
(10:47):
be found for the Palestinians, then I think the opportunities
in terms of Israel, Saudi Arabia, the other Arab states
beyond the UAE and Cutter and so on, are really
pretty extraordinary. These guys are all interested in business. They
want to expand, they want investment, they want to diversify
their economy. They see Israel as a technological giant in
(11:10):
the region, so there's a lot of potential there, but
they've got to get past the Palestinian problem.
Speaker 2 (11:17):
You were not somebody who was agitating for strikes on
nuclear facilities in Iran, And as the dust settles on
those strikes, how do you gauge their efficacy and where
does that lead? Do you think?
Speaker 1 (11:28):
Well, this verse came up when I was Secretary of
Defense under President Bush so back in two thousand and seven,
two thousand and eight, I said, you know, there's no
doubt we can do a lot of damage to those facilities.
And they hadn't started going really deep at that point,
but I said, and my position from then until today
has been, you can significantly damage and set back Iran's
(11:53):
nuclear program, but you cannot eliminate it militarily. They can't
unlearn what they've already learned. The Israelis are now saying
that they probably scattered the enriched uranium at three sites Esfahan,
Fordoh and the Tons, so they probably have some of
that and they have some suit centrifuges. My view for
(12:15):
what I was telling President Bush fifteen years ago was
you can damage it, but you can't destroy it. You're
just buying time, and the question is whether the time
that has been bought can be translated into some kind
of an agreement.
Speaker 2 (12:32):
My conversation with former Defense Secretary Robert Gates continues after
the break. After former Defense Secretary Robert Gates and I
discussed the trade war and the war in Gaza, we
(12:52):
turned to another major conflict playing out today in Ukraine.
How do you see President Putin's calculus in that convent?
We see the economic vice the country is in, the
incredible loss of life. Where do you see all of
that headed?
Speaker 1 (13:06):
I think Putin is not all that difficult to understand.
Vladimir Putin believes it is his personal destiny to recreate
the Russian Empire, and as my old mentorist Big Brzhenski
used to say, there can be no Russian Empire without Ukraine.
And so Putin sees it as his personal destiny to
(13:28):
bring Ukraine back into the fold of the Russian Empire,
if not as an integral part of Russia, then as
a client state basically does what Russia wants it to.
And his objectives have not changed from day one. He
wants the four provinces in the East, he wants Ukraine disarmed,
he wants a pro Russian government in Kiev. He wants
(13:50):
a ban on Ukrainian membership in NATO and the EU.
That's all. And he hasn't waivered one whit from the
very beginning, and he is willing to pay whatever price
is involved. And it is beginning to bite. There was
a sugar rush from a lot of the defense industries
investments and a lot of the things coming from China
(14:11):
and so on. But I think they've run through that.
The inflation is really beginning to ramp up twenty one
percent interest rates, that's just a formal interest rate, who
knows what the real one is. Things are getting life's
getting a little harder in Russia. So I don't see
any breakthroughs. That's one of those predictions that may turn
(14:32):
out to be very embarrassing. But the Ukrainians have been
able to hold their ground pretty well in the East,
as it's kind of a drone versus drone war out there.
But Putin is clearly putting the pressure on the domestic
side in Ukraine with these attacks by hundreds of drones
every single night.
Speaker 2 (14:52):
What did you make of what seemed like a change
in tack from President Trump a few days ago. Seems
to be growing frustrated with President Putin. There was a
lot of talk about them meeting and having a summit,
negotiating this themselves. His patient seems to being tested here.
Speaker 1 (15:06):
Most of the presidents that I worked with felt that,
I mean, they got themselves elected president of the United States.
They basically feel like they can win anybody over. I've
seen it Withn't Benny, and you know it started with
Franklin Roosevelt and Uncle Joe Stalin. You know, I can
win this guy over. And a lot of presidents feel
that way, that they can develop a personal chemistry with
(15:29):
the other guy that will make great things possible, and
most of them end up disappointed. And I think that's
what's happened here. I don't think President Trump was unique
in thinking he could bring Puton around, nor is he
unique in being disappointed.
Speaker 2 (15:47):
The president has Steve Witkoff his friend, a businessman, not
somebody who was in the foreign service or a diplomat
before leading the negotiations that he's been having with Russia
with President Putin. Do you see wisdom in that using
somebody who doesn't have that font of experience from government
and diplomacy, or does it raise questions for you about
how approaching well.
Speaker 1 (16:06):
Lots of different presidents use lots of different techniques. When
we were first starting to reach out to the Soviet
Union and to the Chinese and so on, US businessmen
would be used as intermediaries to carry the message, if
you will. I think that other presidents have used special envoys.
(16:29):
President Obama liked special envoys and he had a bunch
of them. I personally have found there are a few
instances where those of work. So on the Northern Ireland
problem George Mitchell, that worked out pretty well. But on
Afghanistan Pakistan Richard Holbrook, that didn't work. So I'm inclined
(16:49):
to give presidents a lot of leeway in the tools
that they want to use. And you know, it's always
also the fact that when appointing ambassadors, I always thought
it was most important to the host government, not that
they had somebody super experienced as the US ambassador, but
somebody who could pick up the telephone and call the
President of the United States.
Speaker 2 (17:09):
It strikes me that the balance that we've had between
hard power and soft power in economic power, isn't that
the equilibriument was that before? Do you agree with that?
How much of a problem is it that we have
an administration that six months in has leaned very heavily
on airstrikes and using hard power to solve some of
these problems, while it's been cutting State Department, USCID, other
(17:31):
foreign aid.
Speaker 1 (17:33):
I've been a long believer and that while the Cold
War was fought against the biggest the backdrop of the
biggest arms race in the history of the world, because
we were able to avoid a direct military conflict, that
conflict was resolved by non military instruments of power economics, technology,
(17:54):
strategic communications, development assistance, ideology, intelligence, and so the most
powerful of those are economics and technology, and we are
very good at using those. I wish we could use
them more in harness with one another of tariffs, trade sanctions,
(18:20):
and so on, because in some cases one might work
better than the other. But we kind of use them independently,
and I think we diminish their effectiveness that way. But economic,
with our economic power, that is a big deal, and
we're seeing that in relationship, particularly with China and Russia
right now. I think on strategic communications and foreign assistance.
(18:43):
You know, the Chinese under who Jentaal invested like seven
billion dollars in strategic communication. There isn't a country in
the world where you can't get Chinese television, Chinese radio,
Chinese social media, Chinese print media, television, you name it,
and they've spread all over the world. We're cutting everything back.
(19:05):
Our voice will not be heard around the world. We
can't tell the Keerge's why it's important not to let
the Chinese have too much power in their country, or
the Kazakhs, or people in the Middle East, or people
in South America. I don't think we've used trade effectively.
China is now the biggest trading partner with one hundred
(19:27):
and twenty countries in the world, all the countries in
South America except Columbia. So my problem is that we
have all these tools that are really powerful for the
United States, but we've decided to keep them in our backpack,
and if we're to avoid a conflict with China, all
these tools will matter in this long term contest. You know,
(19:49):
the line is for the hearts and minds, but the
fact is those hearts and minds also have security arrangements,
their economic markets, their potential sources of instability and terrorism.
So I think pulling back on all of those is
really a mistake. Now that said, all of them are
in serious need of reform. I mean, Congress is self
(20:11):
dismantled USIA in nineteen ninety eight. They tried to dismantle
USAID then, but Bill Clinton wouldn't let him, but he
reduced the size and brought it inside the State Department.
There are a lot of problems with a lot of
the aid programs. You know, when the Millennium Challenge Corporation
was established by Congress under the first President of second
(20:32):
President Bush, there were a lot of conservatives who said,
let's do that because of its rules in terms of accountability,
local buy in, and so on. So one of the
things that I'm trying to do through a Global Policy
center affiliated with William and Mary is bring together people
on both sides of the aisle and experts and say
kind of what new path forward can we have in
(20:54):
these different using these tools that gets away from all
the mistakes of the past, gets away from all the
bureaucracy and the barnacles of the past, and points a
way forward to make us much more effective and cost
effective in these programs.
Speaker 2 (21:11):
My conversation with former Defense Secretary of Robert Gates at
the Aspen Security Forum continues after the break. In the
final part of my interview with former Secretary of Defense
(21:32):
Robert Gates, I circled back to China and the threat
of the relationship between China and the US deteriorating further
as President Trump wages a global trade war. You mentioned
avoiding conflict with China at this moment. How much does
that worry you? Do you think we're headed for it
for conflict? What needs to be done to forestall that
to prevent that from happening?
Speaker 1 (21:53):
Well, I mean, I don't think I'm fairly confident the
leader of neither side want a war. It would be
catastrophic for both sides. So the question is, how do
you maneuver against each other over a period of decades
as we did with the Soviet Union without it leading
to war? And so I think we have to be
(22:16):
very tough on China when it comes to intellectual property theft,
when it comes to trade and some of these issues.
I think we need to be tough in terms of
their military deployments, some of the things they're doing around
the world. But at the same time, I think it's
essential that we maintain the dialogue with them, particularly military
to military, to prevent incidents that could balloon into a
(22:38):
conflict nobody wanted. So I think keeping a dialogue with
them going is very important. I'm encouraged by the fact
that President Trump and President she talk from time to time.
I'm not sure they don't talk past each other, but
that's okay. But I think maintaining those contacts, and I
would say especially on the military to military side, is
(22:59):
really important.
Speaker 2 (23:00):
We've talked a bit about the reform agenda. Maybe I
can tease out your barnacle's metaphor. There was an effort
in the early days of this term to really go
after those barnacles in forests, and I think kind of
blew up the hull of the ship maybe trying to
do that. What's your council for doing it appropriately? Because
we see with this administration in particular, a real sense
of urgency a president who gets impatient, how do you
(23:24):
do the kind of reform that you're describing in a
thoughtful way, a careful way, and not have knock on
effects that can be damaging to these institutions.
Speaker 1 (23:32):
So in two thousand and nine, in over a period
of four months, in probably forty meetings with all the
military leadership, the joint chiefs of staff, the combatant commanders,
all the senior civilians, we examine I saw a budgetary
train wreck coming after the financial crisis in two thousand
(23:54):
and eight, and as I said, we've got to show
some responsibility here and better we look at what can
be cut than people who don't know what they're doing. No,
I won't mention any names or institutions, and so we
compiled a list of programs that were questionable and we
(24:16):
went through it in these forty meetings. Bottom line, we
ended up cutting thirty six legacy programs that, had they
been built to completion, would have cost the taxpayers three
hundred and thirty billion dollars. And we did it essentially
without a ripple. Now, some companies weren't too happy, but
(24:39):
that goes with the territory and then the next year
facing the same challenges, same kind of meetings over a
three month period, same number of meetings roughly, and the
meetings weren't just to vent meetings were kind of is
this a good idea, what do we need this for?
Or to the Air Force, you want a new tanker,
(25:00):
a miss a new ICBM, you want the F thirty five,
and you've got to make a choice or two here,
and the same thing with all the services. And but
on the IF what we called the Efficiency Exercise overhead
exercise in the spring of twenty ten, we identified one
hundred and eighty billion dollars in overhead cuts in the military.
(25:22):
Over a period of about five years. We eliminated an
entire combatant command, Joint Forces man that it was Jim
Madison's first four star job was to go. I sent
him down to dismantle that command. And we didn't have
any leakers. We didn't have people going to the hill
behind our backs. We didn't have we had a lot
of support on the hill. You know, individual congressmen were
(25:42):
very much against things that we were doing that were
in their districts. That's that's life. But we did an
enormous amount of change and reform and really without any
without perturbing the force. As it were the gallery, he
didn't collapse, and nobody on the hill was calling for
(26:03):
my head. So there is a way to reform these
institutions and to do so in a thoughtful way that
involves a lot of people, that gets a lot of input,
gets a lot of suggestions, so that when a decision
is made, even if it goes against you, well I've
been respected. I got my chance to make my case.
(26:27):
My case didn't work, but at least I was in
the room, so I think. And the other final point
I'd make is my experience in leading organizations and leading
change in organizations is that change imposed solely from the
top without any engagement below that are changes that walk
(26:49):
out the door the day that boss leaves. If you
want sustainable change, change that lasts, you need to involve
the people who deliver the mission.
Speaker 2 (27:01):
Mister Secretary, Thank you very much, h my pleasure. This
is the big take from Bloomberg News. I'm David Gura.
That was my conversation with former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,
the first in a series of interviews I did with
some of the biggest names in national security and foreign policy.
We're bringing more of these conversations in the days ahead.
(27:22):
Make sure you're following the Big Take so you can
hear them all. To get unlimited access to all of
bloomberg dot com, subscribe today at Bloomberg dot com Slash
Podcast offer. Thanks for listening. We'll be back tomorrow.
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