December 12, 2025 • 26 mins
Katie and Matt discuss the Warner Bros. bidding war, negotiating against yourself, having your dad buy companies for you, Bleenberg, breakup fees, trillion-dollar IPOs, getting in on the third floor, orbiting data centers, tech capex, rocket explosion securities fraud lawsuits, alternative consumer lending and private credit regulation.
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Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:02):
Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News. Hello. Hi, welcome to
The Money Stuff Podcast, your weekly podcast where we talk
about stuff related to money. I'm Matt Levian and I
write The Money dot Com for Bloomberg Opinion.
Speaker 2 (00:20):
And I'm Katie Greifeld, a reporter for Bloomberg News and
an anchor for Bloomberg Television.
Speaker 1 (00:35):
I like Apostle merger fight, but like, yeah, I don't
like a media deal because everyone pays attention to the
media deals, and the Warner Brothers merger fight has been
wall to wall coverage everywhere, including the Money Stuff newsletter,
and it's like, I don't know, I can't keep up
with it.
Speaker 2 (00:54):
Yeah, it was going to say, when we were talking
about topics and I suggested Warner Brothers, it seems like
you were not psyched, and it's like, I don't know
your column that you write would suggest differently. I agree
with you, though I don't really get jazz talking about media,
and obviously we're covering it on Bloomberg Television as well.
This one. The fact that it's become this bidding war
(01:16):
does make it kind of fun and interesting.
Speaker 1 (01:18):
Oh yeah, right, Like I merge your bidding war is
interesting although it's like a strange bidding war. Yeah, recruiting
is on like Thursday afternoon, who knows. But basically the
deal is that on Friday, Warner announced they signed a
merger agreement with Netflix fair price, let's call it like
twenty nine or thirty dollars in a mix of cash
and two different flavors of stock, mostly cash, but a
(01:39):
fair amount of the value comes from two flavors of stock.
And then on Monday, Paramot Skydance jumped in with a
thirty dollars cash tender offer. And one thing that's worried
about the bidding war is that, like those bids are
pretty close, and a Warner's board did determine that the
Netflix bid was higher because they valued some of the
stock higher. So I think that the bid is our
thirty one on our thirty two dollars to share. But
(02:01):
also like they did an auction, they head advisors, they
took bids, Netflix bid whatever the number, and Paramount bid
thirty dollars in cash, and Warner looked at that and
we're like, we're gonna take the Netflix bid because we
think it's higher. And Paramount went to shareolders with the
same bid that got rejected. It's like kind of an
(02:22):
unusual move, Like you normally you raise your bid to
like to be like, look at how great this bid is.
And here they're like going with the same bid and
arguing the value of the stub stock on the Netflix pid. It's,
I guess, strange way to connect a bidding. More. They've
also gone on TV. I mean like this is not
our best and final offer, which is a crazy way
to connect a shipping more Like, ordinarily you don't negotiate
(02:45):
against yourself, and if you do negotiate against yourself, you
do it. You know, You're like like I haven't got
to raise the bid, but instead they're like, we're not
going to raise the bid, but this is not our
best and final offer. Like how could you tender to that?
How could you be like, okay, you can have it
for not your best and final offer.
Speaker 2 (02:59):
Well you too that. It's also an interesting strategy since
they need this to be a friendly situation with Warner
Brothers as well.
Speaker 1 (03:07):
And they don't like strictly need it, but like they
kind of need it, like they've conditioned their offer on
it becoming a friendly Yeah, it's not that weird, Like
people don't usually do hostile deals all the way through
in twenty twenty five, you know, like you do a
hostile deal, the pressure of the board into coming to
the table with a friendly deal like this is you know,
this is kind of how Twitter worked out, right, It's
(03:27):
like a normal playbook. Yeah, but they're not doing a
pure hostile deal. They're not tendering to share elders and saying,
you know, give us your shares and we're clothing and
never mind what the board says. They need the board
on side, and so it is a negotiation where they
are like waging a public pressure campaign on the Warner board,
but they're not just like doing a pure hostile offer.
Speaker 2 (03:46):
So what happens here? I mean, does Netflix now raise
their bid?
Speaker 1 (03:52):
I don't know who has to move first. Yeah, right now,
Warner has said they're sticking with the Netflix deal. Paramount
can close it thunder and it's all just sort of
like a limbo and you could imagine Netflix just waiting
it out. But I think given that Paramount has said
things like this is not our best and planal offer,
(04:12):
probably the next move is for Paramount to raise. But
I don't know. I think they're sort of seeing what
the shaholders said, if all of the shareholders are tendering
into their offer and like calling up warners bored and
saying the Paramount deal is so much better, then maybe
Paramount can get away with it. But it's just hard
to imagine them paying thirty dollars a share when they
said they'd pay more. Yeah, so I think they have
to raise. But then Netflix has there ra is you know,
(04:34):
it's like and forth.
Speaker 2 (04:35):
There's also the detail that Paramount is for the entirety
of Warner Brothers Discovery, including the cable networks, whereas the
Netflix offer is not. It excludes the cable networks including CNN,
So I mean it also depends on how you value
the cable networks.
Speaker 1 (04:52):
Yeah, this is why the Netflix deal is of uncertain
value because like in that deal, the cable networks stay
with Warner shareolders, which Yeah says is worth about a
dollar per share, and you know the board thinks it's
worth three four.
Speaker 2 (05:05):
Yeah, it seems like consensus would say that one dollar
shares low on the lower end.
Speaker 1 (05:12):
Yeah, Like I think if you add it up, the
Netflix bit is worth right around thirty dollars, is like
kind of market consensus and then like the board is
a little high and Paramoun's a little low, but like
it's not like vastly more, right, It's like around thirty.
Speaker 2 (05:24):
There's also the Ellison of it all because Paramount is
a pretty small company.
Speaker 1 (05:30):
It's like it's an LBO. Right, It's like it's like
there happens to be a Paramount attached to it. But
like basically it's like we're going to borrow a lot
of money against the Warner assets. Paramount does not on
its own have the capacity to raise like, you know,
fifty billion dollars of debt, right, Yeah, it would raise
fifty billion dollars a debt against Warner, and then it
would have a big equity check from you know, they
(05:53):
have like commitments lined up from Jared Kushner and like
some Middle Eastern investors. But it seems that owner's board
expressed uncertainty about the quality of those commitments, and so
they also have a backstop from Larry Ellison's personal trust
or like he'll pay the equity check with his PA
if he has to.
Speaker 2 (06:12):
Yeah, there's been a lot of good succession flavored memes
on social media about this situation.
Speaker 1 (06:17):
It is very weird to have your dad by several
companies for you, whatever it's it.
Speaker 2 (06:23):
Is, I think it's cool.
Speaker 1 (06:24):
An expression like, of course my dad would.
Speaker 2 (06:26):
Buy that was an editorial comment by.
Speaker 1 (06:30):
Matt You didn't see the expression. Yeah it's weird. Yeah,
it's weird to be the CEO of a public copany
and feel like my company is going to buy this
prized asset with my dad's tech book. I don't know.
Speaker 2 (06:44):
There's also I mean, so Larry Elson's check book is
a factor here, but also Larry Ellison's relationship with the
White House.
Speaker 1 (06:52):
I don't know. I try to write about this too much,
but it is like the very depressing backdrop to this
is that like Donald Trump does not like CNM, he
would like his friends to buy CNN and change it
to be friendlier to him. And the way merger regulation
in the United States in twenty twenty five works is
that to get a merger done, you have to commit
(07:14):
to making television news friendlier to Donald Trump.
Speaker 2 (07:18):
Yeah, it's really bad.
Speaker 1 (07:20):
Yeah, it's not like, that's not how it used to be.
Speaker 2 (07:23):
I'm trying to find exactly what Trump said on Wednesday
as it relates to CNN.
Speaker 1 (07:28):
I mean, Trump is he doesn't like CNN.
Speaker 2 (07:30):
Yeah, well he said, like when it comes to a
potential deal here, I believe he said that CNN needs
to be included.
Speaker 1 (07:37):
I don't think he really like has been paying attention
to the mechanics of this merger.
Speaker 2 (07:41):
Yeah, you don't think he's like following along reading money
stuff and like watching me on Bleep.
Speaker 1 (07:48):
He's watching you on gleen Berger. He's reading money's too.
I mean he wants changes at CNN, right, and so
if the Paramount deal, then Paramount will own CNN and
we'll make it, you know, twenty four hour praise Donald
Trump network, because like that's a small price to pay
(08:09):
to get the deal done, right. I mean they're valuing
They're valuing not CNN. They're valuing the entire cable package,
including CNN, at like one dollar per share. It's like, yeah, yeah,
turn CNN into the propaganda channel. Who cares, it's not
a major part of the business investment. If the Netflix
still gets done, then CNN will be part of Discovery Global,
which will be a much smaller, more leveried public company
(08:30):
run by you know, existing Warner Discovery Management. But is
that going to be an acquisition target? Jared Kushner by
that it's not obvious that CNN remains independent and with
the same editorial posture that it has now even in
the Netflix deal. Yeah, it just doesn't go to Netflix.
And by the way, like you know, a lot of
(08:50):
the reporting on this is that, like Larry Ellison is
friendlier with Trump, and therefore we'll win, right, And by
will win, I mean like Trump will tell the Justice
Department you have to find an anti trust pretext to
prevent the Netflix deal from closing, and therefore the only
way to get the deal done is to sell the
paramam because the Netflix deal can't close. But there's also
(09:12):
been reporting that Netflix's management have done a good job
of closing after Trump, Like, is one possible outcome here
that like Netflix says, fine, fine, we'll buy a CNN
two and make it into the Trump propaganda channel. Maybe
change the deal. I should say, Also, like I said,
it feels like, because like this is so much about
(09:34):
Trump's feelings about CNN that he could tell the Justice
Department to find a pretext, to find an antro trust
reason to start the deal. Separately, everyone thinks they're like
real assyss problems, Like yeah, it's not like you don't
need a pretext, like it's a real concern when like
the biggest streamer buys HPOE And it's also a real
you know, people in the media industry have real concerns,
you know, about both, but especially about the idea of
(09:57):
Netflix taking over like all these iconic films.
Speaker 2 (10:00):
Yeah. No, it's fascinating, I mean relative to most media
news because we've been discussing the media angle on Bloomberg
TV heading up into the Netflix deal getting announced. And
for Netflix, i mean, Netflix is so dominant in streaming,
you know, talking to analysts about this, they were like,
this is really a nice to have for Netflix, you know,
(10:21):
versus paramount. This is more of a need to have.
So it's an interesting move by Netflix to even pursue this.
But you think about the anti trust concerns. It's also
built into the deal that they announced, like they accounted
for a lot of time to work through all the.
Speaker 1 (10:36):
Different time right, I'm sure you.
Speaker 2 (10:38):
Know whether or not at all. And then well that's
part of the record breakup fee, rights fee.
Speaker 1 (10:49):
It's like two miks of share you want a deal,
they get done.
Speaker 2 (10:51):
Yeah, it's a nice consolation prize though, Okay.
Speaker 1 (10:56):
No, Warner Schralder is going to be like, let's take
the Netflix deal because at least we'll get two bucks
to share in eighteen months when the deal falls apart.
Like they want certainty, right, like Netflix, part of their
job here is to get on sherolders that their deal
will close and like that's not. Yeah, it's like some
amount of like you know, economic analysis and some amount
of like photo ops with Trump.
Speaker 2 (11:17):
Yeah, I do wonder, like just to bring it back
to the employees, like in a situation where your company
is in this deal limbo for eighteen months, I have
to imagine that the company is kind of in suspended animation.
Like things will get done obviously, but that's a lot
of uncertainty to hang over there.
Speaker 1 (11:33):
I don't know about suspended animation, but yeah, it's.
Speaker 2 (11:35):
Depressing, slightly dramatic.
Speaker 1 (11:38):
I think if you work in media, you're work in media.
Like the time between now and eighteen months from now
is it's a perilous time, whether or not you're at
Warner Brothers.
Speaker 2 (11:47):
The only sure thing is podcasts. It's true, shall we
talk about SpaceX?
Speaker 1 (12:05):
Yeah, another eighteen month. Remember it's not eighteen months. It's
like they wouldn't an ip it's.
Speaker 2 (12:11):
Twenty If it's in twenty twenty six, it will be
six months fewer than eighteen months. I just remember, you know,
we spent so much time talking about how private markets
are the new public markets. But now all these mega
companies that were the poster child of staying private forever
potentially coming public.
Speaker 1 (12:29):
Yeah. First of all, it hasn't happened.
Speaker 2 (12:30):
Right, Yeah, it hasn't happened.
Speaker 1 (12:32):
But it's an I don't like, the private markets are
the new public markets like thesis. I mean, look, I
have said in my column on this podcast, Yeah you
can stay private forever, right, and like why not? Why not?
But if it is the case that SpaceX, Open Air, Anthropic,
(12:56):
other names go public in twenty twenty six, then that
might suggest that you count they private forever. But it
will be like really different from previous I p honly
ye going public at a one point five trillion dollar valuation,
which is like the number that SpaceX is banding around.
Speaker 2 (13:17):
Depending on what second you're checking, it's bigger than Tesla.
Speaker 1 (13:20):
Yeah, but like that's not how was used to work
back when public markets were the public markets. Go public,
when you were like you know, there was there was
growth still to come, but like going public at a
one point tried trillion dollar valuation is like, okay, it's
wild in two ways. One is that ordinarily you go
(13:43):
from zero in a garage to one hundred million or
a billion or a ten billion dollar valuation, and then
you go a public and then the next leg up
to like becoming a trillion dollar company, public investors capture, right,
So public investors can invest not early, but like you know,
in like the growth trajectory of a company that will
(14:05):
eventually become large, right, Like that's part of the promise
of an IPI was like, this is a fairly immature
company and you can get in not on the ground floor,
but on like the third floor. You can public get
a one point five trillion dollar valuation, so much of
the upside has been captured already, I mean by private
market investors.
Speaker 2 (14:22):
Maybe you're just thinking small you know, no, I know,
I hear.
Speaker 1 (14:25):
You, right, Like then this is like every elon musk
com package, right, Like, well, it's really one hundred trillion
dollar company, so like going probably at one point.
Speaker 2 (14:32):
Five tracking the final frontier.
Speaker 1 (14:35):
But the other thing, and this is related in the
SpaceX case, is like if SpaceX goes public next year
at a one point five trillion dollar valuation. In one sense,
the private markets have captured most of the upside. In
another sense, it is not a mature company. Blomberg reported
that they're expecting twenty two to twenty four billion dollars
in revenue in twenty twenty six, which is a lot
(14:57):
of money. It's a big company to go public or whatever.
But like they can public it at what seventy times revenue? Yeah,
like that's really big. That is what has happened here
is not they've grown into an enormous company and then
gone public at their enormous valuation. What happens is they've
not grown into an enormous company and they've they're going
(15:17):
public at a huge valuation that reflects the next ten
years of growth, which is a crazy thing to do.
Speaker 2 (15:24):
Yeah, well, let's talk about why they potentially need to
do it, Like why now do they need to do it?
I mean, you think about some of the things that
they're going to.
Speaker 1 (15:33):
Build data centers in space, So they need thirty billion
dollars to build.
Speaker 2 (15:36):
Data centers on the moon, not actually on the moon, just.
Speaker 1 (15:38):
Sustainable data centers.
Speaker 2 (15:40):
Yeah, that's great. It's such a sign of the times.
Speaker 1 (15:43):
Like one theme of the financial markets this year is
that everyone is building data centers and they have tapped
every possible source of financing for data centers, and at
some point, selling thirty billion dollars of SpaceX stock is
one way away to fill the whole of need for
building data centers. And so like space I can raise
(16:04):
a lot of money staying private. And by the way,
it's like cash flow positive and doesn't need to raise
a lot of money to shoot rockets into space. But
the capital expenses are required to build data centers on
every inch of the Earth, and also in space is
so enormous that even space like has to go public. Yeah,
and even open eyes.
Speaker 2 (16:22):
But maybe, well that's the thing, like I feel like,
you know, when we really do think big and you
don't really put our thinking caps on in terms of
how ridiculous things could get, there is a limit to
how long you can stay private.
Speaker 1 (16:35):
Yeah, right, right, Like one possibility is that, like I've
been writing about you know, private markets or the new
public markets for you know, a decade or whatever. And
that was in the context of the biggest, hottest like
most sort of household name tech companies were kind of
at bottom, like capital light consumer tech right, Like, it's
(16:57):
a lot of Like you wouldn't have said Face had
a lot of CAPAX needs because it was a website.
Right now, Facebook has a lot of CAPEX, but like
for a long time it didn't. You know, Uber is like, yeah,
we're going to match drivers and writers. We don't have
to have anything, you know. Yeah, it was a real
like capital light model. And now in that context it
was fairly you know, you have capital light and very scalable.
(17:18):
It's very easy to stay private. You need to spend
a trillion dollars a year putting data centers on the moon.
You have to, like, the private markets are really big,
but they're not big enough for that.
Speaker 2 (17:30):
And even before we get there, like before we get
to the moon, SpaceX has a lot of rockets to build.
That's right.
Speaker 1 (17:35):
They're not capital light, and yet they've but they've managed
the private markets to be large and build a lot
of rockets. You know.
Speaker 2 (17:41):
The point that has been made is the fact that
you know, they have been able to raise large amounts
of money in the private markets. We cover rocket launches
on Bloomberg TV all the time. A lot of the
rockets blow up, a lot of the tests fail. If
SpaceX is a public company, it's going to be really
interesting to have, you know, a split screen of the
(18:03):
rocket of a test launch potentially failing and also the stock.
Speaker 1 (18:07):
That's so true, right, Like you know, I write all
the time that every bad thing that happens to a
public company of security is for it. But like every
time a rocket blows up and they it, it's really
awesome to think about.
Speaker 2 (18:17):
We didn't talk about the wrinkle of Elon Musk potentially
being the CEO of two public companies too.
Speaker 1 (18:22):
Yeah, but you can do that. I mean whatever the
er companies, they're big, now, I know. I'm just like,
I'm I'm I'm curious, like what the dynamic is of
pricing at one point five trillion dollar IPO because on
the one hand, it's like so big, right, and it's like,
you know, like the talk is like they'd raise thirty
billion dollars. That's the trades, like thirty billion dollars or
(18:43):
stock good day, right, Like at some level, like you
just suspend disbelief and you're like, this is not an IPR.
This is just like an Elon Msk public company that
happened to not be public and now it's public and
then like you know, they work it out in a
couple of days, Like it's not I don't know. There's
something like when you get to this level of bigness
and constantly doing tender offers and price transparency, it's like
(19:08):
no one needs a deck to be introduced to SpaceX.
Speaker 2 (19:10):
Like yeah, it's just like yeah, yeah, the roadshow.
Speaker 1 (19:15):
Owns it in like weird vehicles anyway, it's like it's SpaceX, man.
Speaker 2 (19:18):
Yeah, I hope it does go public because yeah, it's cool.
That would be fun.
Speaker 1 (19:24):
There was a thing where he tried to take Tesla private,
right and like he complains about the public markets and
it'll be interesting to the Yeah, it'll be interesting to
see what like a public SpaceX looks like. It'd be
interesting when he gets sued for the fourth time at a.
Speaker 2 (19:39):
Rocket plank, I mean, to be fair, it happens.
Speaker 1 (19:41):
Yeah, I'm not saying that it's actually a securities route
to blow up a rocket, or that he should be
sued for blowing up a rocket, and like the investors
in the current private SpaceX understand that that's part of
the deal and they don't sue him when he blows
up a rocket. All that's wrong. Should talking about private
(20:16):
credits and new public credit. Yeah, there's this fascinating Wall
Street Journal story this week about how it is harder
to know how consumers are doing because the way you
traditionally look at how consumers are doing is bank data,
credit card data, like bank reports. Banks say things like
(20:37):
people are charging a lot of money on their credit cards,
or like we have a lot of delinquencies on our
credit cards, and you get a sense of like what
consumer credit looks like and consumer spending, and what is
happening is that some consumer spending it's like marginal bit's
real has moved away from credit cards and into other stuff.
Alternative consumer lending, which I think I shorthand is like
(21:00):
buy now, pay later, So it's like a firm and
things like this where it's like you charge something, but
instead of charging it to a credit card, you charge
it to a buy now pay letter lender. And the
money for that doesn't usually come from banks. It comes
from other people, and there are a variety of lenders,
but like a lot of it is what you'd call
private credit. It's like insurance companies and private credit firms
(21:22):
that are providing their balance sheet to like FinTechs that
are the front end for these loans, that like make
the buyout pay letter credit decisions right. And so the
thing that you're seeing is that instead of banks with
credit cards providing credit for consumer spending, you have private
credit providing credit for consumer spending, which is kind of
a weird development. And also like a thing that I've
(21:43):
been writing about for a long time now is that
banking is getting narrow. Private credit is taking over from
the banks. But like a lot of that has been
in LBO lending, business lending, data center lending, and now
it's also in consumer lending. It's sort of an interesting shift.
Speaker 2 (21:56):
Yeah. Absolutely, And you point out, as the Wall Street
Journal did, this makes data worse, you know, in terms
of tracking.
Speaker 1 (22:05):
But I don't care that much about that.
Speaker 2 (22:06):
I care a little bit, I guess.
Speaker 1 (22:07):
Yeah. It's like I read about stuff, but I don't
ever write about like, oh, consumer credit as well. I
don't care about this data. Other people care about this
data Like that's bad. But like, I mean, the broader
point I would make is that the worsening of data
is because bank regulators collect a lot of data from
banks and make it public in some form, and so
(22:28):
you can see stuff about what banks are doing. Also,
a lot of you know, the big banks are largely
publicly traded, and so we'll talk about you know, consumer
credit weakness on their runnings calls. Yeah, private credit is private,
and so they don't do those earnings calls. I mean,
there's a publicly traded manager, so you get a little bit,
but like it's not the same level of interest in that,
and like they're not reporting to regulators in the same
(22:50):
way that banks to it. And the point I make
is that, like the whole point of financial regulation in
the last twenty years is that the banking funding model
is systemically important and risky, right, Like banks have runs.
When there's runs on banks, credit titans, and like the
economy gets worse. And if you can replace a runnable
(23:11):
banking system with a long term funded, equity funded private
credit system, then that is structurally better. And the tradeoff
for that is that that's less regulated, right, Like that's
what happens. Like banks are highly regulated because their funding
model is risky. If you just like have a pot
of your own money and make loans out of it,
you're less regulated. And people get nervous about that because
(23:34):
it's less regulated. But it's like that's the trade off
that like the regulator is meant to strike mostly is
that always thinking about it, and it's like a sensible
trade off, and it just makes people real nervous.
Speaker 2 (23:46):
Well, I mean, does it become more regulated?
Speaker 1 (23:48):
I have to no, man, the people keep talking about it,
but we're not in an environment that is like gung
ho and making anything more regulated. That's true, And like
my point is that it doesn't makes sense. I mean
whatever makes it. Like there's a reason this stuff is
less regulated, which is that it is less risky, Like
just as a baseline funding model is less risky. And
(24:10):
so when a private credit firm wants to make bad loans,
it's like, all right, that's your mistake, man, it's your money, right.
When a bank wants to make bad loans is like, no, no,
that's the depositors money. That's like taxpayers money, Like we
need to make sure they don't make bad loans. So
you know, the regulatory pressure is less. But we'll see.
But like for now, nothing's getting more regulated. Banks are
getting less regulated.
Speaker 2 (24:30):
This is a turn. But did you see that piece
in the Ft about Apollo and it quoted an Apollo
executive saying we're becoming a bank. It truly sucks. It
was an unnamed person. It sounds like you didn't see
this piece. No, it was kind of funny. I'll send
it to you. Yeah, look, I mean see if you
were still on Twitter, you would have seen it.
Speaker 1 (24:48):
But there's like a long running history of like banks
get regulated, things that are not banks move into the business,
they become big, they move into risky you're in risk
of your funding models, they blow up, they get built
up by the fat and they become banks. Right, Like
that's kind of the story of two thousand and eight,
Like could that be the story of private credit?
Speaker 2 (25:08):
Like yeah, maybe I'm excited to find out. Truly as
a consumer of news, Yeah, I.
Speaker 1 (25:13):
Don't have in my mind a picture of what it
looks like to have like like the crypto crisis in
twenty twin tiers. It's like truly like a replay of
two thousand and eight, Right, I don't have a picture
in my mind of what that looks like in the
private credit version, Like I don't have a picture of
like runs on private credit firms, but like it would
be cool, yeah, well to write about not like for
(25:35):
the world or whatever. But it would be like an
interesting development. But I again I can't quite visualize it yet.
Who will get there? And that was the Money Stuff Podcast.
Speaker 2 (25:48):
I'm Matt Levine and I'm Katie Greifeld.
Speaker 1 (25:50):
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Speaker 1 (26:27):
Thanks for listening to The Money Stuff Podcast. We'll be
back next week with more stuff
Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News. Hello. Hi, welcome to
The Money Stuff Podcast, your weekly podcast where we talk
about stuff related to money. I'm Matt Levian and I
write The Money dot Com for Bloomberg Opinion.
Speaker 2 (00:20):
And I'm Katie Greifeld, a reporter for Bloomberg News and
an anchor for Bloomberg Television.
Speaker 1 (00:35):
I like Apostle merger fight, but like, yeah, I don't
like a media deal because everyone pays attention to the
media deals, and the Warner Brothers merger fight has been
wall to wall coverage everywhere, including the Money Stuff newsletter,
and it's like, I don't know, I can't keep up
with it.
Speaker 2 (00:54):
Yeah, it was going to say, when we were talking
about topics and I suggested Warner Brothers, it seems like
you were not psyched, and it's like, I don't know
your column that you write would suggest differently. I agree
with you, though I don't really get jazz talking about media,
and obviously we're covering it on Bloomberg Television as well.
This one. The fact that it's become this bidding war
(01:16):
does make it kind of fun and interesting.
Speaker 1 (01:18):
Oh yeah, right, Like I merge your bidding war is
interesting although it's like a strange bidding war. Yeah, recruiting
is on like Thursday afternoon, who knows. But basically the
deal is that on Friday, Warner announced they signed a
merger agreement with Netflix fair price, let's call it like
twenty nine or thirty dollars in a mix of cash
and two different flavors of stock, mostly cash, but a
(01:39):
fair amount of the value comes from two flavors of stock.
And then on Monday, Paramot Skydance jumped in with a
thirty dollars cash tender offer. And one thing that's worried
about the bidding war is that, like those bids are
pretty close, and a Warner's board did determine that the
Netflix bid was higher because they valued some of the
stock higher. So I think that the bid is our
thirty one on our thirty two dollars to share. But
(02:01):
also like they did an auction, they head advisors, they
took bids, Netflix bid whatever the number, and Paramount bid
thirty dollars in cash, and Warner looked at that and
we're like, we're gonna take the Netflix bid because we
think it's higher. And Paramount went to shareolders with the
same bid that got rejected. It's like kind of an
(02:22):
unusual move, Like you normally you raise your bid to
like to be like, look at how great this bid is.
And here they're like going with the same bid and
arguing the value of the stub stock on the Netflix pid. It's,
I guess, strange way to connect a bidding. More. They've
also gone on TV. I mean like this is not
our best and final offer, which is a crazy way
to connect a shipping more Like, ordinarily you don't negotiate
(02:45):
against yourself, and if you do negotiate against yourself, you
do it. You know, You're like like I haven't got
to raise the bid, but instead they're like, we're not
going to raise the bid, but this is not our
best and final offer. Like how could you tender to that?
How could you be like, okay, you can have it
for not your best and final offer.
Speaker 2 (02:59):
Well you too that. It's also an interesting strategy since
they need this to be a friendly situation with Warner
Brothers as well.
Speaker 1 (03:07):
And they don't like strictly need it, but like they
kind of need it, like they've conditioned their offer on
it becoming a friendly Yeah, it's not that weird, Like
people don't usually do hostile deals all the way through
in twenty twenty five, you know, like you do a
hostile deal, the pressure of the board into coming to
the table with a friendly deal like this is you know,
this is kind of how Twitter worked out, right, It's
(03:27):
like a normal playbook. Yeah, but they're not doing a
pure hostile deal. They're not tendering to share elders and saying,
you know, give us your shares and we're clothing and
never mind what the board says. They need the board
on side, and so it is a negotiation where they
are like waging a public pressure campaign on the Warner board,
but they're not just like doing a pure hostile offer.
Speaker 2 (03:46):
So what happens here? I mean, does Netflix now raise
their bid?
Speaker 1 (03:52):
I don't know who has to move first. Yeah, right now,
Warner has said they're sticking with the Netflix deal. Paramount
can close it thunder and it's all just sort of
like a limbo and you could imagine Netflix just waiting
it out. But I think given that Paramount has said
things like this is not our best and planal offer,
(04:12):
probably the next move is for Paramount to raise. But
I don't know. I think they're sort of seeing what
the shaholders said, if all of the shareholders are tendering
into their offer and like calling up warners bored and
saying the Paramount deal is so much better, then maybe
Paramount can get away with it. But it's just hard
to imagine them paying thirty dollars a share when they
said they'd pay more. Yeah, so I think they have
to raise. But then Netflix has there ra is you know,
(04:34):
it's like and forth.
Speaker 2 (04:35):
There's also the detail that Paramount is for the entirety
of Warner Brothers Discovery, including the cable networks, whereas the
Netflix offer is not. It excludes the cable networks including CNN,
So I mean it also depends on how you value
the cable networks.
Speaker 1 (04:52):
Yeah, this is why the Netflix deal is of uncertain
value because like in that deal, the cable networks stay
with Warner shareolders, which Yeah says is worth about a
dollar per share, and you know the board thinks it's
worth three four.
Speaker 2 (05:05):
Yeah, it seems like consensus would say that one dollar
shares low on the lower end.
Speaker 1 (05:12):
Yeah, Like I think if you add it up, the
Netflix bit is worth right around thirty dollars, is like
kind of market consensus and then like the board is
a little high and Paramoun's a little low, but like
it's not like vastly more, right, It's like around thirty.
Speaker 2 (05:24):
There's also the Ellison of it all because Paramount is
a pretty small company.
Speaker 1 (05:30):
It's like it's an LBO. Right, It's like it's like
there happens to be a Paramount attached to it. But
like basically it's like we're going to borrow a lot
of money against the Warner assets. Paramount does not on
its own have the capacity to raise like, you know,
fifty billion dollars of debt, right, Yeah, it would raise
fifty billion dollars a debt against Warner, and then it
would have a big equity check from you know, they
(05:53):
have like commitments lined up from Jared Kushner and like
some Middle Eastern investors. But it seems that owner's board
expressed uncertainty about the quality of those commitments, and so
they also have a backstop from Larry Ellison's personal trust
or like he'll pay the equity check with his PA
if he has to.
Speaker 2 (06:12):
Yeah, there's been a lot of good succession flavored memes
on social media about this situation.
Speaker 1 (06:17):
It is very weird to have your dad by several
companies for you, whatever it's it.
Speaker 2 (06:23):
Is, I think it's cool.
Speaker 1 (06:24):
An expression like, of course my dad would.
Speaker 2 (06:26):
Buy that was an editorial comment by.
Speaker 1 (06:30):
Matt You didn't see the expression. Yeah it's weird. Yeah,
it's weird to be the CEO of a public copany
and feel like my company is going to buy this
prized asset with my dad's tech book. I don't know.
Speaker 2 (06:44):
There's also I mean, so Larry Elson's check book is
a factor here, but also Larry Ellison's relationship with the
White House.
Speaker 1 (06:52):
I don't know. I try to write about this too much,
but it is like the very depressing backdrop to this
is that like Donald Trump does not like CNM, he
would like his friends to buy CNN and change it
to be friendlier to him. And the way merger regulation
in the United States in twenty twenty five works is
that to get a merger done, you have to commit
(07:14):
to making television news friendlier to Donald Trump.
Speaker 2 (07:18):
Yeah, it's really bad.
Speaker 1 (07:20):
Yeah, it's not like, that's not how it used to be.
Speaker 2 (07:23):
I'm trying to find exactly what Trump said on Wednesday
as it relates to CNN.
Speaker 1 (07:28):
I mean, Trump is he doesn't like CNN.
Speaker 2 (07:30):
Yeah, well he said, like when it comes to a
potential deal here, I believe he said that CNN needs
to be included.
Speaker 1 (07:37):
I don't think he really like has been paying attention
to the mechanics of this merger.
Speaker 2 (07:41):
Yeah, you don't think he's like following along reading money
stuff and like watching me on Bleep.
Speaker 1 (07:48):
He's watching you on gleen Berger. He's reading money's too.
I mean he wants changes at CNN, right, and so
if the Paramount deal, then Paramount will own CNN and
we'll make it, you know, twenty four hour praise Donald
Trump network, because like that's a small price to pay
(08:09):
to get the deal done, right. I mean they're valuing
They're valuing not CNN. They're valuing the entire cable package,
including CNN, at like one dollar per share. It's like, yeah, yeah,
turn CNN into the propaganda channel. Who cares, it's not
a major part of the business investment. If the Netflix
still gets done, then CNN will be part of Discovery Global,
which will be a much smaller, more leveried public company
(08:30):
run by you know, existing Warner Discovery Management. But is
that going to be an acquisition target? Jared Kushner by
that it's not obvious that CNN remains independent and with
the same editorial posture that it has now even in
the Netflix deal. Yeah, it just doesn't go to Netflix.
And by the way, like you know, a lot of
(08:50):
the reporting on this is that, like Larry Ellison is
friendlier with Trump, and therefore we'll win, right, And by
will win, I mean like Trump will tell the Justice
Department you have to find an anti trust pretext to
prevent the Netflix deal from closing, and therefore the only
way to get the deal done is to sell the
paramam because the Netflix deal can't close. But there's also
(09:12):
been reporting that Netflix's management have done a good job
of closing after Trump, Like, is one possible outcome here
that like Netflix says, fine, fine, we'll buy a CNN
two and make it into the Trump propaganda channel. Maybe
change the deal. I should say, Also, like I said,
it feels like, because like this is so much about
(09:34):
Trump's feelings about CNN that he could tell the Justice
Department to find a pretext, to find an antro trust
reason to start the deal. Separately, everyone thinks they're like
real assyss problems, Like yeah, it's not like you don't
need a pretext, like it's a real concern when like
the biggest streamer buys HPOE And it's also a real
you know, people in the media industry have real concerns,
you know, about both, but especially about the idea of
(09:57):
Netflix taking over like all these iconic films.
Speaker 2 (10:00):
Yeah. No, it's fascinating, I mean relative to most media
news because we've been discussing the media angle on Bloomberg
TV heading up into the Netflix deal getting announced. And
for Netflix, i mean, Netflix is so dominant in streaming,
you know, talking to analysts about this, they were like,
this is really a nice to have for Netflix, you know,
(10:21):
versus paramount. This is more of a need to have.
So it's an interesting move by Netflix to even pursue this.
But you think about the anti trust concerns. It's also
built into the deal that they announced, like they accounted
for a lot of time to work through all the.
Speaker 1 (10:36):
Different time right, I'm sure you.
Speaker 2 (10:38):
Know whether or not at all. And then well that's
part of the record breakup fee, rights fee.
Speaker 1 (10:49):
It's like two miks of share you want a deal,
they get done.
Speaker 2 (10:51):
Yeah, it's a nice consolation prize though, Okay.
Speaker 1 (10:56):
No, Warner Schralder is going to be like, let's take
the Netflix deal because at least we'll get two bucks
to share in eighteen months when the deal falls apart.
Like they want certainty, right, like Netflix, part of their
job here is to get on sherolders that their deal
will close and like that's not. Yeah, it's like some
amount of like you know, economic analysis and some amount
of like photo ops with Trump.
Speaker 2 (11:17):
Yeah, I do wonder, like just to bring it back
to the employees, like in a situation where your company
is in this deal limbo for eighteen months, I have
to imagine that the company is kind of in suspended animation.
Like things will get done obviously, but that's a lot
of uncertainty to hang over there.
Speaker 1 (11:33):
I don't know about suspended animation, but yeah, it's.
Speaker 2 (11:35):
Depressing, slightly dramatic.
Speaker 1 (11:38):
I think if you work in media, you're work in media.
Like the time between now and eighteen months from now
is it's a perilous time, whether or not you're at
Warner Brothers.
Speaker 2 (11:47):
The only sure thing is podcasts. It's true, shall we
talk about SpaceX?
Speaker 1 (12:05):
Yeah, another eighteen month. Remember it's not eighteen months. It's
like they wouldn't an ip it's.
Speaker 2 (12:11):
Twenty If it's in twenty twenty six, it will be
six months fewer than eighteen months. I just remember, you know,
we spent so much time talking about how private markets
are the new public markets. But now all these mega
companies that were the poster child of staying private forever
potentially coming public.
Speaker 1 (12:29):
Yeah. First of all, it hasn't happened.
Speaker 2 (12:30):
Right, Yeah, it hasn't happened.
Speaker 1 (12:32):
But it's an I don't like, the private markets are
the new public markets like thesis. I mean, look, I
have said in my column on this podcast, Yeah you
can stay private forever, right, and like why not? Why not?
But if it is the case that SpaceX, Open Air, Anthropic,
(12:56):
other names go public in twenty twenty six, then that
might suggest that you count they private forever. But it
will be like really different from previous I p honly
ye going public at a one point five trillion dollar valuation,
which is like the number that SpaceX is banding around.
Speaker 2 (13:17):
Depending on what second you're checking, it's bigger than Tesla.
Speaker 1 (13:20):
Yeah, but like that's not how was used to work
back when public markets were the public markets. Go public,
when you were like you know, there was there was
growth still to come, but like going public at a
one point tried trillion dollar valuation is like, okay, it's
wild in two ways. One is that ordinarily you go
(13:43):
from zero in a garage to one hundred million or
a billion or a ten billion dollar valuation, and then
you go a public and then the next leg up
to like becoming a trillion dollar company, public investors capture, right,
So public investors can invest not early, but like you know,
in like the growth trajectory of a company that will
(14:05):
eventually become large, right, Like that's part of the promise
of an IPI was like, this is a fairly immature
company and you can get in not on the ground floor,
but on like the third floor. You can public get
a one point five trillion dollar valuation, so much of
the upside has been captured already, I mean by private
market investors.
Speaker 2 (14:22):
Maybe you're just thinking small you know, no, I know,
I hear.
Speaker 1 (14:25):
You, right, Like then this is like every elon musk
com package, right, Like, well, it's really one hundred trillion
dollar company, so like going probably at one point.
Speaker 2 (14:32):
Five tracking the final frontier.
Speaker 1 (14:35):
But the other thing, and this is related in the
SpaceX case, is like if SpaceX goes public next year
at a one point five trillion dollar valuation. In one sense,
the private markets have captured most of the upside. In
another sense, it is not a mature company. Blomberg reported
that they're expecting twenty two to twenty four billion dollars
in revenue in twenty twenty six, which is a lot
(14:57):
of money. It's a big company to go public or whatever.
But like they can public it at what seventy times revenue? Yeah,
like that's really big. That is what has happened here
is not they've grown into an enormous company and then
gone public at their enormous valuation. What happens is they've
not grown into an enormous company and they've they're going
(15:17):
public at a huge valuation that reflects the next ten
years of growth, which is a crazy thing to do.
Speaker 2 (15:24):
Yeah, well, let's talk about why they potentially need to
do it, Like why now do they need to do it?
I mean, you think about some of the things that
they're going to.
Speaker 1 (15:33):
Build data centers in space, So they need thirty billion
dollars to build.
Speaker 2 (15:36):
Data centers on the moon, not actually on the moon, just.
Speaker 1 (15:38):
Sustainable data centers.
Speaker 2 (15:40):
Yeah, that's great. It's such a sign of the times.
Speaker 1 (15:43):
Like one theme of the financial markets this year is
that everyone is building data centers and they have tapped
every possible source of financing for data centers, and at
some point, selling thirty billion dollars of SpaceX stock is
one way away to fill the whole of need for
building data centers. And so like space I can raise
(16:04):
a lot of money staying private. And by the way,
it's like cash flow positive and doesn't need to raise
a lot of money to shoot rockets into space. But
the capital expenses are required to build data centers on
every inch of the Earth, and also in space is
so enormous that even space like has to go public. Yeah,
and even open eyes.
Speaker 2 (16:22):
But maybe, well that's the thing, like I feel like,
you know, when we really do think big and you
don't really put our thinking caps on in terms of
how ridiculous things could get, there is a limit to
how long you can stay private.
Speaker 1 (16:35):
Yeah, right, right, Like one possibility is that, like I've
been writing about you know, private markets or the new
public markets for you know, a decade or whatever. And
that was in the context of the biggest, hottest like
most sort of household name tech companies were kind of
at bottom, like capital light consumer tech right, Like, it's
(16:57):
a lot of Like you wouldn't have said Face had
a lot of CAPAX needs because it was a website.
Right now, Facebook has a lot of CAPEX, but like
for a long time it didn't. You know, Uber is like, yeah,
we're going to match drivers and writers. We don't have
to have anything, you know. Yeah, it was a real
like capital light model. And now in that context it
was fairly you know, you have capital light and very scalable.
(17:18):
It's very easy to stay private. You need to spend
a trillion dollars a year putting data centers on the moon.
You have to, like, the private markets are really big,
but they're not big enough for that.
Speaker 2 (17:30):
And even before we get there, like before we get
to the moon, SpaceX has a lot of rockets to build.
That's right.
Speaker 1 (17:35):
They're not capital light, and yet they've but they've managed
the private markets to be large and build a lot
of rockets. You know.
Speaker 2 (17:41):
The point that has been made is the fact that
you know, they have been able to raise large amounts
of money in the private markets. We cover rocket launches
on Bloomberg TV all the time. A lot of the
rockets blow up, a lot of the tests fail. If
SpaceX is a public company, it's going to be really
interesting to have, you know, a split screen of the
(18:03):
rocket of a test launch potentially failing and also the stock.
Speaker 1 (18:07):
That's so true, right, Like you know, I write all
the time that every bad thing that happens to a
public company of security is for it. But like every
time a rocket blows up and they it, it's really
awesome to think about.
Speaker 2 (18:17):
We didn't talk about the wrinkle of Elon Musk potentially
being the CEO of two public companies too.
Speaker 1 (18:22):
Yeah, but you can do that. I mean whatever the
er companies, they're big, now, I know. I'm just like,
I'm I'm I'm curious, like what the dynamic is of
pricing at one point five trillion dollar IPO because on
the one hand, it's like so big, right, and it's like,
you know, like the talk is like they'd raise thirty
billion dollars. That's the trades, like thirty billion dollars or
(18:43):
stock good day, right, Like at some level, like you
just suspend disbelief and you're like, this is not an IPR.
This is just like an Elon Msk public company that
happened to not be public and now it's public and
then like you know, they work it out in a
couple of days, Like it's not I don't know. There's
something like when you get to this level of bigness
and constantly doing tender offers and price transparency, it's like
(19:08):
no one needs a deck to be introduced to SpaceX.
Speaker 2 (19:10):
Like yeah, it's just like yeah, yeah, the roadshow.
Speaker 1 (19:15):
Owns it in like weird vehicles anyway, it's like it's SpaceX, man.
Speaker 2 (19:18):
Yeah, I hope it does go public because yeah, it's cool.
That would be fun.
Speaker 1 (19:24):
There was a thing where he tried to take Tesla private,
right and like he complains about the public markets and
it'll be interesting to the Yeah, it'll be interesting to
see what like a public SpaceX looks like. It'd be
interesting when he gets sued for the fourth time at a.
Speaker 2 (19:39):
Rocket plank, I mean, to be fair, it happens.
Speaker 1 (19:41):
Yeah, I'm not saying that it's actually a securities route
to blow up a rocket, or that he should be
sued for blowing up a rocket, and like the investors
in the current private SpaceX understand that that's part of
the deal and they don't sue him when he blows
up a rocket. All that's wrong. Should talking about private
(20:16):
credits and new public credit. Yeah, there's this fascinating Wall
Street Journal story this week about how it is harder
to know how consumers are doing because the way you
traditionally look at how consumers are doing is bank data,
credit card data, like bank reports. Banks say things like
(20:37):
people are charging a lot of money on their credit cards,
or like we have a lot of delinquencies on our
credit cards, and you get a sense of like what
consumer credit looks like and consumer spending, and what is
happening is that some consumer spending it's like marginal bit's
real has moved away from credit cards and into other stuff.
Alternative consumer lending, which I think I shorthand is like
(21:00):
buy now, pay later, So it's like a firm and
things like this where it's like you charge something, but
instead of charging it to a credit card, you charge
it to a buy now pay letter lender. And the
money for that doesn't usually come from banks. It comes
from other people, and there are a variety of lenders,
but like a lot of it is what you'd call
private credit. It's like insurance companies and private credit firms
(21:22):
that are providing their balance sheet to like FinTechs that
are the front end for these loans, that like make
the buyout pay letter credit decisions right. And so the
thing that you're seeing is that instead of banks with
credit cards providing credit for consumer spending, you have private
credit providing credit for consumer spending, which is kind of
a weird development. And also like a thing that I've
(21:43):
been writing about for a long time now is that
banking is getting narrow. Private credit is taking over from
the banks. But like a lot of that has been
in LBO lending, business lending, data center lending, and now
it's also in consumer lending. It's sort of an interesting shift.
Speaker 2 (21:56):
Yeah. Absolutely, And you point out, as the Wall Street
Journal did, this makes data worse, you know, in terms
of tracking.
Speaker 1 (22:05):
But I don't care that much about that.
Speaker 2 (22:06):
I care a little bit, I guess.
Speaker 1 (22:07):
Yeah. It's like I read about stuff, but I don't
ever write about like, oh, consumer credit as well. I
don't care about this data. Other people care about this
data Like that's bad. But like, I mean, the broader
point I would make is that the worsening of data
is because bank regulators collect a lot of data from
banks and make it public in some form, and so
(22:28):
you can see stuff about what banks are doing. Also,
a lot of you know, the big banks are largely
publicly traded, and so we'll talk about you know, consumer
credit weakness on their runnings calls. Yeah, private credit is private,
and so they don't do those earnings calls. I mean,
there's a publicly traded manager, so you get a little bit,
but like it's not the same level of interest in that,
and like they're not reporting to regulators in the same
(22:50):
way that banks to it. And the point I make
is that, like the whole point of financial regulation in
the last twenty years is that the banking funding model
is systemically important and risky, right, Like banks have runs.
When there's runs on banks, credit titans, and like the
economy gets worse. And if you can replace a runnable
(23:11):
banking system with a long term funded, equity funded private
credit system, then that is structurally better. And the tradeoff
for that is that that's less regulated, right, Like that's
what happens. Like banks are highly regulated because their funding
model is risky. If you just like have a pot
of your own money and make loans out of it,
you're less regulated. And people get nervous about that because
(23:34):
it's less regulated. But it's like that's the trade off
that like the regulator is meant to strike mostly is
that always thinking about it, and it's like a sensible
trade off, and it just makes people real nervous.
Speaker 2 (23:46):
Well, I mean, does it become more regulated?
Speaker 1 (23:48):
I have to no, man, the people keep talking about it,
but we're not in an environment that is like gung
ho and making anything more regulated. That's true, And like
my point is that it doesn't makes sense. I mean
whatever makes it. Like there's a reason this stuff is
less regulated, which is that it is less risky, Like
just as a baseline funding model is less risky. And
(24:10):
so when a private credit firm wants to make bad loans,
it's like, all right, that's your mistake, man, it's your money, right.
When a bank wants to make bad loans is like, no, no,
that's the depositors money. That's like taxpayers money, Like we
need to make sure they don't make bad loans. So
you know, the regulatory pressure is less. But we'll see.
But like for now, nothing's getting more regulated. Banks are
getting less regulated.
Speaker 2 (24:30):
This is a turn. But did you see that piece
in the Ft about Apollo and it quoted an Apollo
executive saying we're becoming a bank. It truly sucks. It
was an unnamed person. It sounds like you didn't see
this piece. No, it was kind of funny. I'll send
it to you. Yeah, look, I mean see if you
were still on Twitter, you would have seen it.
Speaker 1 (24:48):
But there's like a long running history of like banks
get regulated, things that are not banks move into the business,
they become big, they move into risky you're in risk
of your funding models, they blow up, they get built
up by the fat and they become banks. Right, Like
that's kind of the story of two thousand and eight,
Like could that be the story of private credit?
Speaker 2 (25:08):
Like yeah, maybe I'm excited to find out. Truly as
a consumer of news, Yeah, I.
Speaker 1 (25:13):
Don't have in my mind a picture of what it
looks like to have like like the crypto crisis in
twenty twin tiers. It's like truly like a replay of
two thousand and eight, Right, I don't have a picture
in my mind of what that looks like in the
private credit version, Like I don't have a picture of
like runs on private credit firms, but like it would
be cool, yeah, well to write about not like for
(25:35):
the world or whatever. But it would be like an
interesting development. But I again I can't quite visualize it yet.
Who will get there? And that was the Money Stuff Podcast.
Speaker 2 (25:48):
I'm Matt Levine and I'm Katie Greifeld.
Speaker 1 (25:50):
You can find my work by subscribing to The Money
Stuff newsletter on Bloomberg.
Speaker 2 (25:54):
Dot com, and you can find me on Bloomberg TV
every day on the close between three and five pm.
Speaker 1 (26:01):
We'd love to hear from you. You can send an
email to Moneypod at Bloomberg dot net, ask us a
question and we might answer it on the air.
Speaker 2 (26:08):
You can also subscribe to our show wherever you're listening
right now and leave us a review. It helps more
people find the show.
Speaker 1 (26:15):
The Money Stuff Podcast is produced by Anamazerakis and Moses Onden.
Speaker 2 (26:19):
Our theme music was composed by Blake Maples.
Speaker 1 (26:22):
Amy Keen is our executive.
Speaker 2 (26:24):
Producer, and Sage Falman is Bloomberg's head of Podcasts.
Speaker 1 (26:27):
Thanks for listening to The Money Stuff Podcast. We'll be
back next week with more stuff
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