June 30, 2025 • 31 mins
For awhile there was just MicroStrategy (which has since been renamed as Strategy.) It started buying Bitcoin, and then raised money to buy more Bitcoin, and the stock has done phenomenally well, despite the company not doing much else beside holding Bitcoin. But now it has spawned numerous copycats all doing the same thing. But the question is why? Why are people willing to buy shares of a company that owns Bitcoin, rather than just buying Bitcoin outright (which anyone can easily do now that there's an ETF)? On this episode of the podcast, recorded live in New York City, we speak with famed short-seller Jim Chanos about this phenomenon. We also talk about NYC real estate in the age of Zohran Mamdani, the latest at Tesla, private equity, and whether AI can replace people who understand accounting.
Read more:
Michael Saylor Shifts to Using Preferred Shares to Buy Bitcoin as Criticism Rises
Musk Confidant Afshar Leaves Tesla in Latest High-Level Exit
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Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:02):
Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News.
Speaker 2 (00:18):
Hello, there are all thoughts listeners. You are about to
listen to a very special episode. This is a conversation
recorded live at our recent event in New York.
Speaker 3 (00:28):
That's right, we had a live Odd Lots event on
June twenty sixth. We had tons of conversations. We're going
to be rolling them out in the days ahead, but
the first one we wanted to bring you was our
headliner for the night, Jim Chanos.
Speaker 2 (00:41):
That's right, the famed short seller. He was there giving
us all his thoughts on the market right now, So
take a listen.
Speaker 4 (00:49):
All right.
Speaker 3 (00:50):
First question, our bitcoin treasury company is the stupidest thing
you've ever seen in your entire life.
Speaker 4 (01:00):
You know, it's rarely, rarely that I have to increase
my personal security after a podcast, which I had to
do after your our last podcast together, when I send
some intemperate things about bitcoin treasury companies. Look, I mean, look,
here's the thing. I get people very agitated about this,
(01:22):
and they point out on just what a genius idea
this is, and I keep trying to point out to
them I'm doing the same thing that guys like Michael
Sailor are doing. I'm on the same side of the trade,
and I keep pointing out to my critics, you're on
the opposite side of that trade, and you don't want
(01:43):
to be on the opposite side of the trade. And
the bitcoin treasury paradox being that you are the one
buying the pieces of paper that have infinite supply so
that Michael Sailor and I can buy the digital asset
with the limiteds And it makes kind of no sense.
(02:03):
So what will inevitably happen is happening in that is
there's nothing proprietary here. This is just simply raising capital
to buy a financial asset, and other companies will do this.
And in fact, even since the podcast we last did,
I think the number of companies that have announced this
strategy is you know, scores more. I think there's over
(02:25):
one hundred in the US and over two hundred globally.
Speaker 2 (02:28):
Now, so who's actually buying micro strategy because you know, I.
Speaker 4 (02:32):
Thought everybody on my timeline.
Speaker 2 (02:34):
Okay, but I thought once the spot ETFs, the spot
bitcoin ETFs came out, like this business model will go away,
and it hasn't.
Speaker 4 (02:42):
No, because there's a wonderful sales job that's being done
about the fact that this is an economic engine in
and of itself, and so therefore terms like bitcoin yield
are used, and they've called them financial gibberish because they
are and in fact this will get armed away ultimately
(03:04):
by companies that will do this to try to capture
that spread. In the case of micro Strategy is substantial.
It's still fifty billion dollars something like that of the
difference between the value of the enterprise value of the
company and the value of their bitcoin holdings. But the
thing that really kind of shot me into orbit on
all this was when a sailor and others then said, well, no,
(03:28):
you can't really value us on an NAV basis and
so called m NAB multiple of NAV. You actually have
to also give us additional value for the amount of
profit that we make every quarter from the appreciation in
the asset. And I just pointed out, I said, well,
that's like saying, you know, my whole net worth is
(03:51):
in a house that's worth four hundred thousand dollars that
is now worth five hundred thousand dollars a year or
two later, And my net worth is not five hundred
thousand dollars now, it's two and a half million, because
it's the value of the house plus a multiple on
the increase in the profitability the asset. When you put
it that way, it sounds a little absurd. It is absurd.
(04:12):
There's like two hundred of them now right, it's over
two hundred globally. Yeah, that's wait.
Speaker 2 (04:18):
I have one more question. Why did microst I have
to remember to call them strategy, but I can't bring
myself to do it. Why did they switch from issuing
the convertible debt to preferred shares?
Speaker 4 (04:31):
Because he realized that as he began to issue more
and more common it was putting pressure on the premium.
So now the latest iteration is what we're going to
do this quasi equity security, quasi debt, preferred stock, and
then we can torque up, we can lever up the
balance sheet. Now this is a company who's selling point
(04:51):
a year ago was we're not going to lever because
we have this wonderful equity that we can issue at
a premium. And now they're saying, well, you know, if
maybe if it's trades above two x, will issue equity,
but if it's between one and two x, we'll do
preferred And then if it's below one times, we'll buy
back common and then what is Chaino's going to do,
(05:11):
to which I said, well, I'll be out of the
trade by then. You know, if it's at one time's
anav it's not a trade. So that's kind of the
latest game plan. But stay tuned. It'll change. I think
the narrative keeps changing. The other one is, of course
that micro strategy will be put in the S and
P five hundred and so that will be untold riches
(05:33):
for everyone that doesn't know that's going to happen.
Speaker 3 (05:35):
We got to move off this topic because I just
find it so depressing, you know, like I read the
news and the like, oh, like, you know, some big
breakthrough with batteries and China is happening or whatever. And
then the big entrepreneurial innervation in the United States is
the two hundredth company that's borrowing money right, Like, it's
too bleak when you really think about it's too bleak
exact to contemplate. So on Tuesday or Wednesday morning, shares
(05:59):
in real estate companies fell after Amdani's victory. What's your
take on New York City real estate these days?
Speaker 4 (06:06):
Well, I guess I'm glad I sold my apartment last year.
But look, I think a lot of people are surprised.
Clearly New York City real estate and commercial real estate
will be challenged if a lot of things happen that
the current front runner wants to happen. I think there's
a lot of restrictions that will be put in front
(06:29):
of making some of that stuff happen. But my friends
in New York City commercial real estate have said, really,
the regulatory framework, in the legislative framework in New York
and New York City has done nothing but get worse
over the last fifteen years. And I'm kind of stunned
that some of the publicly traded companies like Bornado and
sl Green still have the cap rates as low as
(06:52):
they do. I mean SLG we looked at yesterday and
it's cap rate is still five point two percent short.
We've been We've been short SOLG on and off for
a number of years, and we are again. And I
just I don't get the risk reward on a five
point two percent cap rate in New York City commercial
(07:12):
real estate right now. I think it should be seven
or eight, is right.
Speaker 3 (07:15):
You can get four and a half percent by buying
your treasure, right, exactly.
Speaker 4 (07:18):
Yeah, and so if you're buying it at five to
two year, and that's redaccounting. Reaccounting is also pretty pretty
squarely by the way, for a lot of reasons. You know,
they don't include overhead in the cap rate, and of
course there is real depreciation in some of this stuff.
There's maintenance capex in New York City, it's pretty high,
and that doesn't include any capex. So I don't get it.
(07:41):
I don't see rents going up here. I guess it
would be the easiest way, and that'd be the only
reason you'd be buying office buildings at a five cap
What about residential Yeah, I mean, you know it's weird.
I mean, your audience knows better than I do. I mean,
it's problematic in so many ways. There's not enough supply,
all kinds of weird regulations. Things are expensive, and you
(08:03):
can kind of see my mom Dommi's message resonated with
a lot of people. A lot of it has to
do with the cost of living here.
Speaker 3 (08:11):
Have you been on the receiving end, I guess dialing
and you have the calls to gather capital for a challenger.
Speaker 4 (08:20):
Well, I'm not in New Yorker anymore. But the answer
is yeah, but which receiving or calling? Receiving? I'm not calling,
but yeah, sure, and.
Speaker 3 (08:31):
Who are they saying who?
Speaker 4 (08:33):
I'm not gonna I'm not gonna get into that. Those
are private conversations. I think I think they're all pretty
pretty silly at this point. Yeah, it was a good try, Jock.
Speaker 2 (08:41):
Yeah, Okay, Well, since we mentioned the word bleak a
couple times in these conversations, now, is it bleak being
a short seller in the current market.
Speaker 4 (08:52):
It's not a lot of fun, but it's never really
been fun. I mean, I started my original fun back
in eighty five that that was a thirteen hundred, so
it's pretty much. And you know, we started hedging back
in ninety six, so you know, it's always a slog.
It's never easiest. Why a lot of people don't do it.
(09:13):
On the other hand, the idiosyncratic opportunities most things fail,
as you know, and the idiosyncratic opportunities have probably never
been greater given the market we have now and with
things like bitcoin, treasury companies and all kinds of other things.
It's just are sort of head scratchers, and our function
of general animal spirits so there's a lot to do,
(09:36):
and I think that's the fun part of what I
do is there's a lot to do, and seemingly more
every year. But some of the stuff going on right
now is a bit of a head scratcher, and we
don't try to predict where the market's going. But the
animal spirits are definitely back.
Speaker 3 (09:50):
You know, it's like several years ago, we're twenty twenty one.
People could have blamed ZERP. It's like, oh, it's because
the rates are at zero and that's why everyone's going crazy.
And I do think it's really interesting how much speculative
activity has persisted and the ZERP excuse does not hold
water anymore. So we got to find we got to
find something new. Speaking of idiosyncratic opportunities, one thing you've
(10:12):
been talking about a lot and multiple times on the
show is the data center Reach and Equinix. I think
just had two terrible days in a row. What's going
on with that? So these are the companies that have clouds,
but they're not like the hyperscalers, like what's there?
Speaker 4 (10:28):
So I think the legacy data centers and there's only
a couple companies in the United States that really have
legacy data centers, there's equin X, there's Digital Realty, and
then there's a sort of the old colony capitals now
called Digital Bridge and they own these things sort of
in fund format. And when we took a look at
(10:48):
this with our partner back in twenty two, the idea
was pretty simple and we did not see the AI
explosion in mid twenty two, but the idea it was
a pretty crummy business then working on the cloud and
SaaS demand. But it became a really bad business with
(11:08):
the advent of AI because it just moved the hyperscalers
to invest more in state of the art data centers.
And these are older data centers that were short and
the idea being that the new GPU centric data centers
need liquid cooling, They basically need all the infrastructure ripped
out and replaced. And the business was not a high
(11:30):
return on capital business before this. It's getting even worse now.
And what equinec said yesterday at their analyst day was
that revenues were not going to quite be what people
thought they would be, but more ominously, capex was going
to keep increasing. And that's what we've been saying that
these are not like warehouses where you're just going to
(11:51):
collect a check. These are actually operating businesses where you
have to service the servers, you have to make sure
there's redundancy. It's just it's a business, a tech business,
and they're traded as reats, and that was kind of
the opportunity. That was the sort of dichotomy in valuation.
So people added back to the depreciation as they do
(12:13):
with reats, and they value them amount a so called
FFO or AFFO, which is a cash flow metric. But
in fact, unlike warehouses, shopping centers to lesser extent office buildings,
the capex was real depreciation was a real expense. So
to give you an example with Equinex, yesterday they said
(12:33):
our capex is now going to bump up to between
four and five billion a year. Well, the problem is
that Ebit Davis year is expected to be four point
five billion, so all of that's going to go to capex,
meaning they're going to have to basically borrow or issue
equity to pay their interest and dividends. And that's just
the definition of a bad business. And it's a business
that's not growing very fast. So unlike other really true
(12:56):
AI companies which are growing twenty five thirty forty percent
a year. These guys are growing three percent, five percent,
six percent, sort of a GDP, So there's no growing
your way out of this, and so they're just really
bad businesses trading just nosebleed valuations.
Speaker 2 (13:30):
On the topic of idiosyncratic opportunities, I got to ask
about Carvana because when my husband and I moved back
to the States in twenty twenty two, we bought a
used car through Carvana and that was a mistake because
it took us about six months to actually get the car,
and they lost all our paperwork and it was just
(13:51):
an absolute nightmare. And I thought at the time, this
is a company whose entire business model was basically built
on regulation, right, Like, that's what they're doing. And I thought,
they're not going to have a future if they are
this bad at it. And yet the stock is up.
Speaker 4 (14:08):
It's yeah, well it's done a double round trip, right.
It crashed ninety nine percent and now it's up one
hundred x. So it's pretty interesting again. And the reason
it's interesting is that if you go through the numbers,
they are making more than one hundred percent of their
(14:28):
pre tax profit from gain on sale of loans, subprime
loans and gain on sale of equity stakes in other companies,
and you x those two out, they're losing money, and
they're losing money now, right after the rebound, after the
restructuring from twenty twenty two to twenty twenty three. And
this is a company that is being valued again as
(14:49):
a secular growth stock that saw its used car revenues
drop thirty percent between twenty twenty two and twenty twenty three,
So it's not necessarily a secular growth company. The accounting
is abysmal. And then what people are really missing is
that what's happening in subprime auto securitizations right now, and
(15:09):
you can track it on your Bloomberg Terminal delinquencies are
starting to skyrocket. Yeah.
Speaker 2 (15:14):
We actually did an episode on those recently with Jim Egan.
Speaker 4 (15:17):
Yeah. And so again, a huge amount of their profits
comes from selling generating paper from customers and then selling
it in the open market or to affiliates. And this
is a company that was spun out of a company
called Drivetime Finance, which is their affiliated finance company, which
was originally called Ugly Duckling in the late nineties, which
(15:41):
was run by the Currencyeo's father, and that company collapsed
in the first subprime blow up, which was not the GFC,
was actually in the late nineties in subprime auto credit
and consumer loans, and it didn't go bankrupt, but it
came close and he had to retract ructure. He bought it,
bought it in private, and then restructured it and renamed
(16:04):
it Drivetime Finance. But that's the genesis of Carvana. That's
it's DNA. It's basically a subprime finance you know, lead company,
if you will, And those companies should not trade at
forty and fifty times expected earnings, and they don't by
and large, the consumer finance companies, So it's an odd bird.
(16:26):
It's still heavily leveraged, and the stock is up a ton.
But what really got us interested again recently was the
vast amount of insider selling that has just started in
May and June in the company. If you go look
at the insider selling in the company, it is just
now a torrent of everybody selling like pretty much every day,
(16:46):
and we just don't think that's a good sign. Given
what's happening in the subprime securitization market.
Speaker 3 (16:52):
One area of the financial ecosystem that you've been cynical
about in it goes cynical out for a long time
is the private equity and a lot of the private assets.
And something that I've been talking to some people about
and you hear people talk about, is not so much
necessarily that the values have gone down, though probably in
(17:13):
many cases that they have, but that it's been a
long time since LPs, etc. Have gotten distributions, et cetera.
Whether it's venture at the venture level, the pe level.
How long can that go on where it's like people
are not getting.
Speaker 4 (17:28):
Cash out, Yes, so before it becomes a real problem.
So I really kind of got much more interested in
this area serving on a couple of big investment committees
in Manhattan, and one of which had a really really
huge slug of our assets of this of this nonprofit
in privates, in private equity for the most part, a
little bit of venture, a little bit of real estate.
(17:50):
And what always struck me was that we spent a
lot of time talking about the market, talking about our managers,
talking about why hedge funds were terrible, and then we
get to the part about private and they say, well,
the returns are lagged by a quarter so you know,
here they are, and let's move on. And I started
looking at the numbers, and this is a fund that
(18:11):
had all the premier firms, the ones you all know,
and gee, stock market's doing awfully well, and we're kind
of doing ten percent eleven percent in terms of real
life perturns and then estimated IR which is problematic for
(18:32):
reasons a lot of your audience knows. And is it
just me or are we not understanding we're leveraged long
equity in these entities and yet we're underperforming the indices.
That was five six years ago, and I think that
that's only gotten worse since. And so I'm really beginning
(18:55):
to wonder. Private equity was considered a panacea for or
nonprofits and foundations endowments because basically, as my friend Cliff
Astd has said, it was volatility, you know, laundering if
you will, because no one ever showed you a big
down quarter. But now we're getting to a point where
(19:16):
a lot of these funds are really mature and the
actual returns themselves are not going to be mid teens
with low volatility. They're going to be high single digits,
low double digits. And we can look at the SMP
and say, Okay, you know I'm doing better in that,
and I'm liquid and I'm not paying fees, and so
(19:36):
I suspect that private equity and ultimately private credit are
going to be where hedge funds found themselves ten to
fifteen years ago, having to justify their existence after having
a pretty good run from the late nineties to the GFC.
I suspect that's where we are in private equity. It'll
still be a very lucrative business. But I just think
(19:57):
it's golden days are over where it was just a
free lunch of mid teen returns with no volatility.
Speaker 2 (20:04):
Does anyone ever ask you what you're bullish on? Should
I ask?
Speaker 4 (20:09):
Look, we're long equities, right, we're long stuff. A lot
of people in the audience are long Give us some example. Well,
I mean we're long indity, so we're long general corporate America.
I just, you know, I just hate the stuff. I'm short.
Speaker 3 (20:24):
I think you're supposed to get emotional every once.
Speaker 4 (20:27):
In a while. So's There's one other things though, I
do want to mention, and that is I was talking
to someone earlier today, and I think one of the
things underappreciated by investors, right, now in One of the
things that's been the most interesting to me is how
corporate profit margins have held up, which used to be
very mean reverting as you know. And the more work
(20:51):
we've done on this, the more we're kind of convinced
that the capital spending boom we're seeing due to tech
and specifically AI is is looking very much akin to
the global internet build out networking build out in the
late nineties. And the problem there, of course, is is
that if you buy my chips from Nvidio or you
(21:14):
were buying my networking equipment at Cisco and Lucent, that's
revenue for me and profit, but for you, it's a
capitalized expense, right, it's written off over time, and that
has a big, big boost until people pull their orders.
And that's what we saw up in two thousand and one,
two thousand and two that GDP dropped about one to
(21:38):
two percent in the recession of one to oh two.
Does anybody know what corporate profits did that? And that
was an investment driven recession. Consumers didn't feel it at all.
Earnings were down about forty five percent I think from
pete to trough. In the s and P they were
down about the same little bit more in the global
financial crisis, but of course GDP collapsed. So here's a
(22:00):
little interesting thought experiment right now in videos revenues are
about one half of one percent of US GDP about
one hundred and forty billion dollars, and our GDP is
about twenty nine trillion. Okay, anyone tell me what Cisco
and Lucent the two companies that you needed when building
(22:23):
out your internet network in ninety nine two thousand, So,
I mean, know what their combined revenues of percent of
GDP was in two thousand. No, using your phones, it
was a half a percent. It was it was roughly
fifty billion dollars total on GDP of ten trillion. So
(22:44):
those revenues stopped growing at some point shortly thereafter and
actually shrunk a little bit. So the investment boom we're
seeing right now we've seen before. And it's not just chips, right,
it's Caterpillar. It's people building the data centers, it's people
building new utilities. I mean, there is an ecosystem around
(23:06):
the AI boom that is considerable, as there was for
TMT back in ninety nine and two thousand, But it
is a risk year revenue stream because if people pull back,
they can pull back CAPEX very easily. Projects can get
put on hold for six months or nine months, and
(23:27):
that immediately shows up in disappointing revenues and earnings forecast
if it happens. We're not there yet, but that's one
of the risks out there that I think a lot
of people are under estimating.
Speaker 3 (23:39):
So one of the reasons that we like talking to you,
and a consistent thing that I've noticed in the almost
ten years of doing this podcast, it's always you learn
a lot talking to people who are really steeped in accounting,
and that people who are knowledgeable about accounting just I
don't know, they seem to be have more interesting things
to say than a lot of other people. AI be
(24:00):
able to do accounting, some of these sort of understandings
of you know, whatever capitalized expenses, and like, is this
coming for the accounting well profession?
Speaker 4 (24:11):
About coming for the accounting profession. That's a good question.
I think the AI that we've seen and used is
getting better and better at pulling numbers together and making
sense of them. It's not quite there yet. When I've
done it, I find lost and lots of errors. Not
so much in the numbers themselves, but the implications of
the numbers that AI is still not getting that great,
(24:32):
but it's going to, I think ultimately, And the question
will be for sort of tonight's conversation, and keeping in
the theme is where we made a lot of money
on the short side, idiosyncratically after dot Com from sort
of three to nine were in analog businesses that saw
their business digitize. So if you were selling an analog
(24:55):
product that became digital, you were in a lot of trouble.
Think like Kodak, buster of Yellow Pages, those kinds of businesses,
right it suddenly just didn't have to exist, and there's
going to be a raft of them post AI, and
people are already kind of starting to think that through.
But there will be industries that are collecting what I
call agency rents that will suddenly not be able to
(25:18):
collect those agency rents, and we're trying to keep an
eye on that. But I do think that the issue
isn't so much the quantitative numbers that AI will be
able to generate and give you ratios and things like that,
although Bloomberg does a pretty good job of that already, right,
I mean a databases, but interpreting it and We're not
(25:39):
there yet in terms of understanding what an increase in
receivables are three times revenues or increase in cost of
good soul relative to inventory. But it'll get there. It'll
get there within the next couple of years.
Speaker 2 (25:53):
So one of the things I always wanted to ask
you is how you think about, I guess the timeframes
of some of your short bets, because it's it seems
to me like, you know, we can sit here and
talk about how crazy cap rates are for office buildings
in New York and subprime loans and Carvana and how
stupid bitcoin treasury.
Speaker 3 (26:11):
Companies are climbing car sales at Tesla.
Speaker 2 (26:14):
That's right, and yet you know, the key to all
of this, to making the money on it, is actually
calling what the catalyst is going to be and when
the stock eventually falls.
Speaker 4 (26:23):
Yeah, after forty years, I've kind of figured out that
the catalysts are really evident pretty much in hindsight, that
if the catalysts were that obvious, it would be priced
into the stock. And so you can look for signposts
a long the world, but they're just that. Now there's
some that are better than others. You know, a massive
(26:45):
increase in insider selling and executives leaving has always been
a good one. For the most part. It's probabilistic. But
I think that timing is you know, always like say,
you know, only short the stocks that go down. If
they don't go down, don't short them. And it's hard,
and it's why being hedged pretty much systematically to us
(27:07):
made a lot of sense for the last thirty years
and say, okay, we're going to take the market out
of what we're doing and we're going to just try
to isolate the datias andcratic attributes of our shorts. And
even then, I mean, stuff you would think would bring
a lower valuation out of common sense, you know, doesn't
happen in a brilliant bull markets and in fact can
(27:27):
be a negative factor. You know, the worse the company,
the more it goes up. So you have to be
willing to understand that concept as well. But again it's
it's it's funny. You know, Equine's coming out of the blue.
Just to use the example, we've had tonight and stocked
on twenty percent in two days. I mean, everything it's
said an analyst day was known to anybody who was
(27:48):
paying attention. But yet they came out and said it
and everybody went, oh wow. Ouch.
Speaker 3 (27:54):
Speaking of executive departures, I think there was another one
today at Tesla, someone who is like, I think, pretty
close to Elon or somebody been there for a Brillian time.
Speaker 4 (28:02):
Do you have a Nobody cares? Nobody cares? Do you
have a Tesla thought of the name? Nobody cares, that's
my thought. Nobody cares. Yeah, you could. You know, you
could see Elon, you know, robbing a Brinks truck with
a mask or whatever's Elon. You know, I'm sure they're
going to have a new business of robbing Brinks trucks
and you know, we'll put a we'll put a trillion
(28:24):
valuation on it. I've given up trying to figure out
what people think about about executive departures at that company.
I mean, their car sales are plummeting, their cash flows plummeting,
you know, all the metrics that you would look as
security analysts. But it's a unique animal where people say, oh, well,
of course, yes, but you know, Rosie the robot is
(28:46):
going to serve me my breakfast and it's going to
have Tesla trademark on it, so you know it's worth
a trillion dollars, So there's always one stock and every
bull market that has that at least that imprimiture of
right of I call it hopes and dreams. Everyone can
can really project their hopes and dreams onto that company
(29:07):
and then value it any way they want. And Cisco
was that company, by the way in ninety nine. And
it's undoubtedly Tesla because companies are actually executing in some
of these fantastic areas of the future, like Nvidia and
others traded a discount to Tesla and they're actually doing things.
(29:27):
You know, he's just talking about doing things, but it
doesn't matter at least not yet. To get to your timing.
Speaker 3 (29:33):
Question, Jim Chandos, thank you so much. Always a thrill
to Cheveril.
Speaker 4 (29:39):
Thanks guys Khan.
Speaker 2 (29:54):
This has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast.
I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy and.
Speaker 3 (30:00):
I'm Jill Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwart.
Follow our guest Jim Chanos, He's at Real Jim Chanos.
Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen armand dash Ol
Bennett at dashbot In, Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks more
odd Lots content, go to Bloomberg dot com slash odd Lots,
where we have our daily newsletter and all of our episodes,
and you can chat about these topics twenty four to
(30:21):
seven in our discord Discord dot gg slash od Lots.
Speaker 2 (30:26):
And if you enjoy odd Lots, if you like it
when we talk to veteran investors like Jim Chanos, then
please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform.
And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can
listen to all of our episodes absolutely add free. All
you need to do is find me Bloomberg channel on
Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening
(31:06):
in
Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News.
Speaker 2 (00:18):
Hello, there are all thoughts listeners. You are about to
listen to a very special episode. This is a conversation
recorded live at our recent event in New York.
Speaker 3 (00:28):
That's right, we had a live Odd Lots event on
June twenty sixth. We had tons of conversations. We're going
to be rolling them out in the days ahead, but
the first one we wanted to bring you was our
headliner for the night, Jim Chanos.
Speaker 2 (00:41):
That's right, the famed short seller. He was there giving
us all his thoughts on the market right now, So
take a listen.
Speaker 4 (00:49):
All right.
Speaker 3 (00:50):
First question, our bitcoin treasury company is the stupidest thing
you've ever seen in your entire life.
Speaker 4 (01:00):
You know, it's rarely, rarely that I have to increase
my personal security after a podcast, which I had to
do after your our last podcast together, when I send
some intemperate things about bitcoin treasury companies. Look, I mean, look,
here's the thing. I get people very agitated about this,
(01:22):
and they point out on just what a genius idea
this is, and I keep trying to point out to
them I'm doing the same thing that guys like Michael
Sailor are doing. I'm on the same side of the trade,
and I keep pointing out to my critics, you're on
the opposite side of that trade, and you don't want
(01:43):
to be on the opposite side of the trade. And
the bitcoin treasury paradox being that you are the one
buying the pieces of paper that have infinite supply so
that Michael Sailor and I can buy the digital asset
with the limiteds And it makes kind of no sense.
(02:03):
So what will inevitably happen is happening in that is
there's nothing proprietary here. This is just simply raising capital
to buy a financial asset, and other companies will do this.
And in fact, even since the podcast we last did,
I think the number of companies that have announced this
strategy is you know, scores more. I think there's over
(02:25):
one hundred in the US and over two hundred globally.
Speaker 2 (02:28):
Now, so who's actually buying micro strategy because you know, I.
Speaker 4 (02:32):
Thought everybody on my timeline.
Speaker 2 (02:34):
Okay, but I thought once the spot ETFs, the spot
bitcoin ETFs came out, like this business model will go away,
and it hasn't.
Speaker 4 (02:42):
No, because there's a wonderful sales job that's being done
about the fact that this is an economic engine in
and of itself, and so therefore terms like bitcoin yield
are used, and they've called them financial gibberish because they
are and in fact this will get armed away ultimately
(03:04):
by companies that will do this to try to capture
that spread. In the case of micro Strategy is substantial.
It's still fifty billion dollars something like that of the
difference between the value of the enterprise value of the
company and the value of their bitcoin holdings. But the
thing that really kind of shot me into orbit on
all this was when a sailor and others then said, well, no,
(03:28):
you can't really value us on an NAV basis and
so called m NAB multiple of NAV. You actually have
to also give us additional value for the amount of
profit that we make every quarter from the appreciation in
the asset. And I just pointed out, I said, well,
that's like saying, you know, my whole net worth is
(03:51):
in a house that's worth four hundred thousand dollars that
is now worth five hundred thousand dollars a year or
two later, And my net worth is not five hundred
thousand dollars now, it's two and a half million, because
it's the value of the house plus a multiple on
the increase in the profitability the asset. When you put
it that way, it sounds a little absurd. It is absurd.
(04:12):
There's like two hundred of them now right, it's over
two hundred globally. Yeah, that's wait.
Speaker 2 (04:18):
I have one more question. Why did microst I have
to remember to call them strategy, but I can't bring
myself to do it. Why did they switch from issuing
the convertible debt to preferred shares?
Speaker 4 (04:31):
Because he realized that as he began to issue more
and more common it was putting pressure on the premium.
So now the latest iteration is what we're going to
do this quasi equity security, quasi debt, preferred stock, and
then we can torque up, we can lever up the
balance sheet. Now this is a company who's selling point
(04:51):
a year ago was we're not going to lever because
we have this wonderful equity that we can issue at
a premium. And now they're saying, well, you know, if
maybe if it's trades above two x, will issue equity,
but if it's between one and two x, we'll do
preferred And then if it's below one times, we'll buy
back common and then what is Chaino's going to do,
(05:11):
to which I said, well, I'll be out of the
trade by then. You know, if it's at one time's
anav it's not a trade. So that's kind of the
latest game plan. But stay tuned. It'll change. I think
the narrative keeps changing. The other one is, of course
that micro strategy will be put in the S and
P five hundred and so that will be untold riches
(05:33):
for everyone that doesn't know that's going to happen.
Speaker 3 (05:35):
We got to move off this topic because I just
find it so depressing, you know, like I read the
news and the like, oh, like, you know, some big
breakthrough with batteries and China is happening or whatever. And
then the big entrepreneurial innervation in the United States is
the two hundredth company that's borrowing money right, Like, it's
too bleak when you really think about it's too bleak
exact to contemplate. So on Tuesday or Wednesday morning, shares
(05:59):
in real estate companies fell after Amdani's victory. What's your
take on New York City real estate these days?
Speaker 4 (06:06):
Well, I guess I'm glad I sold my apartment last year.
But look, I think a lot of people are surprised.
Clearly New York City real estate and commercial real estate
will be challenged if a lot of things happen that
the current front runner wants to happen. I think there's
a lot of restrictions that will be put in front
(06:29):
of making some of that stuff happen. But my friends
in New York City commercial real estate have said, really,
the regulatory framework, in the legislative framework in New York
and New York City has done nothing but get worse
over the last fifteen years. And I'm kind of stunned
that some of the publicly traded companies like Bornado and
sl Green still have the cap rates as low as
(06:52):
they do. I mean SLG we looked at yesterday and
it's cap rate is still five point two percent short.
We've been We've been short SOLG on and off for
a number of years, and we are again. And I
just I don't get the risk reward on a five
point two percent cap rate in New York City commercial
(07:12):
real estate right now. I think it should be seven
or eight, is right.
Speaker 3 (07:15):
You can get four and a half percent by buying
your treasure, right, exactly.
Speaker 4 (07:18):
Yeah, and so if you're buying it at five to
two year, and that's redaccounting. Reaccounting is also pretty pretty
squarely by the way, for a lot of reasons. You know,
they don't include overhead in the cap rate, and of
course there is real depreciation in some of this stuff.
There's maintenance capex in New York City, it's pretty high,
and that doesn't include any capex. So I don't get it.
(07:41):
I don't see rents going up here. I guess it
would be the easiest way, and that'd be the only
reason you'd be buying office buildings at a five cap
What about residential Yeah, I mean, you know it's weird.
I mean, your audience knows better than I do. I mean,
it's problematic in so many ways. There's not enough supply,
all kinds of weird regulations. Things are expensive, and you
(08:03):
can kind of see my mom Dommi's message resonated with
a lot of people. A lot of it has to
do with the cost of living here.
Speaker 3 (08:11):
Have you been on the receiving end, I guess dialing
and you have the calls to gather capital for a challenger.
Speaker 4 (08:20):
Well, I'm not in New Yorker anymore. But the answer
is yeah, but which receiving or calling? Receiving? I'm not calling,
but yeah, sure, and.
Speaker 3 (08:31):
Who are they saying who?
Speaker 4 (08:33):
I'm not gonna I'm not gonna get into that. Those
are private conversations. I think I think they're all pretty
pretty silly at this point. Yeah, it was a good try, Jock.
Speaker 2 (08:41):
Yeah, Okay, Well, since we mentioned the word bleak a
couple times in these conversations, now, is it bleak being
a short seller in the current market.
Speaker 4 (08:52):
It's not a lot of fun, but it's never really
been fun. I mean, I started my original fun back
in eighty five that that was a thirteen hundred, so
it's pretty much. And you know, we started hedging back
in ninety six, so you know, it's always a slog.
It's never easiest. Why a lot of people don't do it.
(09:13):
On the other hand, the idiosyncratic opportunities most things fail,
as you know, and the idiosyncratic opportunities have probably never
been greater given the market we have now and with
things like bitcoin, treasury companies and all kinds of other things.
It's just are sort of head scratchers, and our function
of general animal spirits so there's a lot to do,
(09:36):
and I think that's the fun part of what I
do is there's a lot to do, and seemingly more
every year. But some of the stuff going on right
now is a bit of a head scratcher, and we
don't try to predict where the market's going. But the
animal spirits are definitely back.
Speaker 3 (09:50):
You know, it's like several years ago, we're twenty twenty one.
People could have blamed ZERP. It's like, oh, it's because
the rates are at zero and that's why everyone's going crazy.
And I do think it's really interesting how much speculative
activity has persisted and the ZERP excuse does not hold
water anymore. So we got to find we got to
find something new. Speaking of idiosyncratic opportunities, one thing you've
(10:12):
been talking about a lot and multiple times on the
show is the data center Reach and Equinix. I think
just had two terrible days in a row. What's going
on with that? So these are the companies that have clouds,
but they're not like the hyperscalers, like what's there?
Speaker 4 (10:28):
So I think the legacy data centers and there's only
a couple companies in the United States that really have
legacy data centers, there's equin X, there's Digital Realty, and
then there's a sort of the old colony capitals now
called Digital Bridge and they own these things sort of
in fund format. And when we took a look at
(10:48):
this with our partner back in twenty two, the idea
was pretty simple and we did not see the AI
explosion in mid twenty two, but the idea it was
a pretty crummy business then working on the cloud and
SaaS demand. But it became a really bad business with
(11:08):
the advent of AI because it just moved the hyperscalers
to invest more in state of the art data centers.
And these are older data centers that were short and
the idea being that the new GPU centric data centers
need liquid cooling, They basically need all the infrastructure ripped
out and replaced. And the business was not a high
(11:30):
return on capital business before this. It's getting even worse now.
And what equinec said yesterday at their analyst day was
that revenues were not going to quite be what people
thought they would be, but more ominously, capex was going
to keep increasing. And that's what we've been saying that
these are not like warehouses where you're just going to
(11:51):
collect a check. These are actually operating businesses where you
have to service the servers, you have to make sure
there's redundancy. It's just it's a business, a tech business,
and they're traded as reats, and that was kind of
the opportunity. That was the sort of dichotomy in valuation.
So people added back to the depreciation as they do
(12:13):
with reats, and they value them amount a so called
FFO or AFFO, which is a cash flow metric. But
in fact, unlike warehouses, shopping centers to lesser extent office buildings,
the capex was real depreciation was a real expense. So
to give you an example with Equinex, yesterday they said
(12:33):
our capex is now going to bump up to between
four and five billion a year. Well, the problem is
that Ebit Davis year is expected to be four point
five billion, so all of that's going to go to capex,
meaning they're going to have to basically borrow or issue
equity to pay their interest and dividends. And that's just
the definition of a bad business. And it's a business
that's not growing very fast. So unlike other really true
(12:56):
AI companies which are growing twenty five thirty forty percent
a year. These guys are growing three percent, five percent,
six percent, sort of a GDP, So there's no growing
your way out of this, and so they're just really
bad businesses trading just nosebleed valuations.
Speaker 2 (13:30):
On the topic of idiosyncratic opportunities, I got to ask
about Carvana because when my husband and I moved back
to the States in twenty twenty two, we bought a
used car through Carvana and that was a mistake because
it took us about six months to actually get the car,
and they lost all our paperwork and it was just
(13:51):
an absolute nightmare. And I thought at the time, this
is a company whose entire business model was basically built
on regulation, right, Like, that's what they're doing. And I thought,
they're not going to have a future if they are
this bad at it. And yet the stock is up.
Speaker 4 (14:08):
It's yeah, well it's done a double round trip, right.
It crashed ninety nine percent and now it's up one
hundred x. So it's pretty interesting again. And the reason
it's interesting is that if you go through the numbers,
they are making more than one hundred percent of their
(14:28):
pre tax profit from gain on sale of loans, subprime
loans and gain on sale of equity stakes in other companies,
and you x those two out, they're losing money, and
they're losing money now, right after the rebound, after the
restructuring from twenty twenty two to twenty twenty three. And
this is a company that is being valued again as
(14:49):
a secular growth stock that saw its used car revenues
drop thirty percent between twenty twenty two and twenty twenty three,
So it's not necessarily a secular growth company. The accounting
is abysmal. And then what people are really missing is
that what's happening in subprime auto securitizations right now, and
(15:09):
you can track it on your Bloomberg Terminal delinquencies are
starting to skyrocket. Yeah.
Speaker 2 (15:14):
We actually did an episode on those recently with Jim Egan.
Speaker 4 (15:17):
Yeah. And so again, a huge amount of their profits
comes from selling generating paper from customers and then selling
it in the open market or to affiliates. And this
is a company that was spun out of a company
called Drivetime Finance, which is their affiliated finance company, which
was originally called Ugly Duckling in the late nineties, which
(15:41):
was run by the Currencyeo's father, and that company collapsed
in the first subprime blow up, which was not the GFC,
was actually in the late nineties in subprime auto credit
and consumer loans, and it didn't go bankrupt, but it
came close and he had to retract ructure. He bought it,
bought it in private, and then restructured it and renamed
(16:04):
it Drivetime Finance. But that's the genesis of Carvana. That's
it's DNA. It's basically a subprime finance you know, lead company,
if you will, And those companies should not trade at
forty and fifty times expected earnings, and they don't by
and large, the consumer finance companies, So it's an odd bird.
(16:26):
It's still heavily leveraged, and the stock is up a ton.
But what really got us interested again recently was the
vast amount of insider selling that has just started in
May and June in the company. If you go look
at the insider selling in the company, it is just
now a torrent of everybody selling like pretty much every day,
(16:46):
and we just don't think that's a good sign. Given
what's happening in the subprime securitization market.
Speaker 3 (16:52):
One area of the financial ecosystem that you've been cynical
about in it goes cynical out for a long time
is the private equity and a lot of the private assets.
And something that I've been talking to some people about
and you hear people talk about, is not so much
necessarily that the values have gone down, though probably in
(17:13):
many cases that they have, but that it's been a
long time since LPs, etc. Have gotten distributions, et cetera.
Whether it's venture at the venture level, the pe level.
How long can that go on where it's like people
are not getting.
Speaker 4 (17:28):
Cash out, Yes, so before it becomes a real problem.
So I really kind of got much more interested in
this area serving on a couple of big investment committees
in Manhattan, and one of which had a really really
huge slug of our assets of this of this nonprofit
in privates, in private equity for the most part, a
little bit of venture, a little bit of real estate.
(17:50):
And what always struck me was that we spent a
lot of time talking about the market, talking about our managers,
talking about why hedge funds were terrible, and then we
get to the part about private and they say, well,
the returns are lagged by a quarter so you know,
here they are, and let's move on. And I started
looking at the numbers, and this is a fund that
(18:11):
had all the premier firms, the ones you all know,
and gee, stock market's doing awfully well, and we're kind
of doing ten percent eleven percent in terms of real
life perturns and then estimated IR which is problematic for
(18:32):
reasons a lot of your audience knows. And is it
just me or are we not understanding we're leveraged long
equity in these entities and yet we're underperforming the indices.
That was five six years ago, and I think that
that's only gotten worse since. And so I'm really beginning
(18:55):
to wonder. Private equity was considered a panacea for or
nonprofits and foundations endowments because basically, as my friend Cliff
Astd has said, it was volatility, you know, laundering if
you will, because no one ever showed you a big
down quarter. But now we're getting to a point where
(19:16):
a lot of these funds are really mature and the
actual returns themselves are not going to be mid teens
with low volatility. They're going to be high single digits,
low double digits. And we can look at the SMP
and say, Okay, you know I'm doing better in that,
and I'm liquid and I'm not paying fees, and so
(19:36):
I suspect that private equity and ultimately private credit are
going to be where hedge funds found themselves ten to
fifteen years ago, having to justify their existence after having
a pretty good run from the late nineties to the GFC.
I suspect that's where we are in private equity. It'll
still be a very lucrative business. But I just think
(19:57):
it's golden days are over where it was just a
free lunch of mid teen returns with no volatility.
Speaker 2 (20:04):
Does anyone ever ask you what you're bullish on? Should
I ask?
Speaker 4 (20:09):
Look, we're long equities, right, we're long stuff. A lot
of people in the audience are long Give us some example. Well,
I mean we're long indity, so we're long general corporate America.
I just, you know, I just hate the stuff. I'm short.
Speaker 3 (20:24):
I think you're supposed to get emotional every once.
Speaker 4 (20:27):
In a while. So's There's one other things though, I
do want to mention, and that is I was talking
to someone earlier today, and I think one of the
things underappreciated by investors, right, now in One of the
things that's been the most interesting to me is how
corporate profit margins have held up, which used to be
very mean reverting as you know. And the more work
(20:51):
we've done on this, the more we're kind of convinced
that the capital spending boom we're seeing due to tech
and specifically AI is is looking very much akin to
the global internet build out networking build out in the
late nineties. And the problem there, of course, is is
that if you buy my chips from Nvidio or you
(21:14):
were buying my networking equipment at Cisco and Lucent, that's
revenue for me and profit, but for you, it's a
capitalized expense, right, it's written off over time, and that
has a big, big boost until people pull their orders.
And that's what we saw up in two thousand and one,
two thousand and two that GDP dropped about one to
(21:38):
two percent in the recession of one to oh two.
Does anybody know what corporate profits did that? And that
was an investment driven recession. Consumers didn't feel it at all.
Earnings were down about forty five percent I think from
pete to trough. In the s and P they were
down about the same little bit more in the global
financial crisis, but of course GDP collapsed. So here's a
(22:00):
little interesting thought experiment right now in videos revenues are
about one half of one percent of US GDP about
one hundred and forty billion dollars, and our GDP is
about twenty nine trillion. Okay, anyone tell me what Cisco
and Lucent the two companies that you needed when building
(22:23):
out your internet network in ninety nine two thousand, So,
I mean, know what their combined revenues of percent of
GDP was in two thousand. No, using your phones, it
was a half a percent. It was it was roughly
fifty billion dollars total on GDP of ten trillion. So
(22:44):
those revenues stopped growing at some point shortly thereafter and
actually shrunk a little bit. So the investment boom we're
seeing right now we've seen before. And it's not just chips, right,
it's Caterpillar. It's people building the data centers, it's people
building new utilities. I mean, there is an ecosystem around
(23:06):
the AI boom that is considerable, as there was for
TMT back in ninety nine and two thousand, But it
is a risk year revenue stream because if people pull back,
they can pull back CAPEX very easily. Projects can get
put on hold for six months or nine months, and
(23:27):
that immediately shows up in disappointing revenues and earnings forecast
if it happens. We're not there yet, but that's one
of the risks out there that I think a lot
of people are under estimating.
Speaker 3 (23:39):
So one of the reasons that we like talking to you,
and a consistent thing that I've noticed in the almost
ten years of doing this podcast, it's always you learn
a lot talking to people who are really steeped in accounting,
and that people who are knowledgeable about accounting just I
don't know, they seem to be have more interesting things
to say than a lot of other people. AI be
(24:00):
able to do accounting, some of these sort of understandings
of you know, whatever capitalized expenses, and like, is this
coming for the accounting well profession?
Speaker 4 (24:11):
About coming for the accounting profession. That's a good question.
I think the AI that we've seen and used is
getting better and better at pulling numbers together and making
sense of them. It's not quite there yet. When I've
done it, I find lost and lots of errors. Not
so much in the numbers themselves, but the implications of
the numbers that AI is still not getting that great,
(24:32):
but it's going to, I think ultimately, And the question
will be for sort of tonight's conversation, and keeping in
the theme is where we made a lot of money
on the short side, idiosyncratically after dot Com from sort
of three to nine were in analog businesses that saw
their business digitize. So if you were selling an analog
(24:55):
product that became digital, you were in a lot of trouble.
Think like Kodak, buster of Yellow Pages, those kinds of businesses,
right it suddenly just didn't have to exist, and there's
going to be a raft of them post AI, and
people are already kind of starting to think that through.
But there will be industries that are collecting what I
call agency rents that will suddenly not be able to
(25:18):
collect those agency rents, and we're trying to keep an
eye on that. But I do think that the issue
isn't so much the quantitative numbers that AI will be
able to generate and give you ratios and things like that,
although Bloomberg does a pretty good job of that already, right,
I mean a databases, but interpreting it and We're not
(25:39):
there yet in terms of understanding what an increase in
receivables are three times revenues or increase in cost of
good soul relative to inventory. But it'll get there. It'll
get there within the next couple of years.
Speaker 2 (25:53):
So one of the things I always wanted to ask
you is how you think about, I guess the timeframes
of some of your short bets, because it's it seems
to me like, you know, we can sit here and
talk about how crazy cap rates are for office buildings
in New York and subprime loans and Carvana and how
stupid bitcoin treasury.
Speaker 3 (26:11):
Companies are climbing car sales at Tesla.
Speaker 2 (26:14):
That's right, and yet you know, the key to all
of this, to making the money on it, is actually
calling what the catalyst is going to be and when
the stock eventually falls.
Speaker 4 (26:23):
Yeah, after forty years, I've kind of figured out that
the catalysts are really evident pretty much in hindsight, that
if the catalysts were that obvious, it would be priced
into the stock. And so you can look for signposts
a long the world, but they're just that. Now there's
some that are better than others. You know, a massive
(26:45):
increase in insider selling and executives leaving has always been
a good one. For the most part. It's probabilistic. But
I think that timing is you know, always like say,
you know, only short the stocks that go down. If
they don't go down, don't short them. And it's hard,
and it's why being hedged pretty much systematically to us
(27:07):
made a lot of sense for the last thirty years
and say, okay, we're going to take the market out
of what we're doing and we're going to just try
to isolate the datias andcratic attributes of our shorts. And
even then, I mean, stuff you would think would bring
a lower valuation out of common sense, you know, doesn't
happen in a brilliant bull markets and in fact can
(27:27):
be a negative factor. You know, the worse the company,
the more it goes up. So you have to be
willing to understand that concept as well. But again it's
it's it's funny. You know, Equine's coming out of the blue.
Just to use the example, we've had tonight and stocked
on twenty percent in two days. I mean, everything it's
said an analyst day was known to anybody who was
(27:48):
paying attention. But yet they came out and said it
and everybody went, oh wow. Ouch.
Speaker 3 (27:54):
Speaking of executive departures, I think there was another one
today at Tesla, someone who is like, I think, pretty
close to Elon or somebody been there for a Brillian time.
Speaker 4 (28:02):
Do you have a Nobody cares? Nobody cares? Do you
have a Tesla thought of the name? Nobody cares, that's
my thought. Nobody cares. Yeah, you could. You know, you
could see Elon, you know, robbing a Brinks truck with
a mask or whatever's Elon. You know, I'm sure they're
going to have a new business of robbing Brinks trucks
and you know, we'll put a we'll put a trillion
(28:24):
valuation on it. I've given up trying to figure out
what people think about about executive departures at that company.
I mean, their car sales are plummeting, their cash flows plummeting,
you know, all the metrics that you would look as
security analysts. But it's a unique animal where people say, oh, well,
of course, yes, but you know, Rosie the robot is
(28:46):
going to serve me my breakfast and it's going to
have Tesla trademark on it, so you know it's worth
a trillion dollars, So there's always one stock and every
bull market that has that at least that imprimiture of
right of I call it hopes and dreams. Everyone can
can really project their hopes and dreams onto that company
(29:07):
and then value it any way they want. And Cisco
was that company, by the way in ninety nine. And
it's undoubtedly Tesla because companies are actually executing in some
of these fantastic areas of the future, like Nvidia and
others traded a discount to Tesla and they're actually doing things.
(29:27):
You know, he's just talking about doing things, but it
doesn't matter at least not yet. To get to your timing.
Speaker 3 (29:33):
Question, Jim Chandos, thank you so much. Always a thrill
to Cheveril.
Speaker 4 (29:39):
Thanks guys Khan.
Speaker 2 (29:54):
This has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast.
I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy and.
Speaker 3 (30:00):
I'm Jill Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwart.
Follow our guest Jim Chanos, He's at Real Jim Chanos.
Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen armand dash Ol
Bennett at dashbot In, Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks more
odd Lots content, go to Bloomberg dot com slash odd Lots,
where we have our daily newsletter and all of our episodes,
and you can chat about these topics twenty four to
(30:21):
seven in our discord Discord dot gg slash od Lots.
Speaker 2 (30:26):
And if you enjoy odd Lots, if you like it
when we talk to veteran investors like Jim Chanos, then
please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform.
And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can
listen to all of our episodes absolutely add free. All
you need to do is find me Bloomberg channel on
Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening
(31:06):
in
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