April 1, 2025 • 32 mins
Last month, Donald Trump fired the Federal Trade Commission's two Democratic commissioners. They have since filed suit, arguing that the law that created the FTC — as well as a 90-year-old Supreme Court precedent — prevent the president from firing them without cause. And now, what might seem like a niche legal dispute could end up having much bigger consequences for other independent government agencies, including the Federal Reserve. That would be a huge shock for Wall Street, which tends to value central bank independence. In this episode, we speak with Lev Menand, professor at Columbia Law School and author of The Fed Unbound, to talk about the huge stakes involved in this case.
Read More:
Trump and the Fed Are on a Collision Course
Who Will Protect the Fed’s Independence? The Markets
Only Bloomberg.com subscribers can get the Odd Lots newsletter in their inbox — now delivered every weekday — plus unlimited access to the site and app. Subscribe at bloomberg.com/subscriptions/oddlots
See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:02):
Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News.
Speaker 2 (00:18):
Hello and welcome to another episode of the All Thoughts podcast.
I'm Tracy Alloway.
Speaker 3 (00:22):
And I'm Jill Wysenthal.
Speaker 2 (00:23):
Joe, it's been a big week for us. We were
cited in an SEC filing for the interview he did
with Brad Jacobs. I think it's the first time I've
ever seen a full podcast transcript.
Speaker 4 (00:34):
It's nice because we used to write transcripts and I
was getting to be so much work. And then it
turned out so we recently were interviewed Brad Jacobs. His
team did a full transcript and submitted it to the SEC.
Speaker 3 (00:45):
Yeah, it was very nice of.
Speaker 2 (00:45):
This doing our work for us. And then the other
thing that happened is we were also cited in a lawsuit.
All in one week.
Speaker 4 (00:52):
All in one week, that's right. You know, we've done
some episodes. We were down in DC recently and we
had the opportunity to interview the new chair of the
FTC under President Trump, and a section of that interview
actually got included in a news lawsuit. Actually, you could
take a listen to it.
Speaker 5 (01:09):
There's also I think some benefits in certain circumstances to
having multi member agencies with people from both parties. I mean, look,
if you have an agency that is exceeding the law,
abusing the companies that are proporced to regulate, it's helpful
for markets, for courts, for litigants, for government transparency to
(01:29):
have people in the other party pointing this out and
saying it in dessense, like you know, I wrote four hundred
plus pages of descents during my time as a minority commissioner.
I think that that adds value.
Speaker 2 (01:39):
Right, So we spoke to Andrew Ferguson. He was talking
about how much he loves having minority commissioners, and then
the very next day there was news that Trump had
fired the two Democratic commissioners, Alvarro Bedoya and Rebecca Kelly Slaughter.
And so they have since filed this lawsuit in which
we're cited, are arguing that they were illegally fired. Commissioners
(02:02):
are supposed to be fired based on an actual reason.
You have to have cause, and I don't think there
was any really sighted in this. And the interesting thing
here is, I know it seems like a very niche topic.
Why are we discussing this FTC lawsuit other than the
fact that we're mentioned in it, but it could have
really broad implications.
Speaker 4 (02:23):
Yeah, no, this is the key thing, right, and so
it's not just FTC. There have been some other instances
already in this administration of President Trump removing people who
are sort of part of various entities that exist within
the federal government, which at least formally in recent administrations,
have had some notion of independence. And there's this popular
(02:45):
sort of conservative legal theory that all of these are
kind of illegitimate, that there are three branches of government judicial, legislative,
and executive. There's not really room for these other things
that are literally outside the executive. And so what we've
seen is this sort of assertion through these removals, firings
of the FTC commissioners, plus others of this idea like, no,
(03:07):
these entities are all under the president. Some of the
implications could be pretty big.
Speaker 2 (03:11):
Right, Well, there is the Federal Reserve as an independent agency,
and we know there is this populist feeling, let's put
it that way against the Federal Reserve. You know, people
think about it as this sort of ivory tower filled
with unelected technocrats. Speaking of unelected technocrats, did you see
Elon Musk's speech in Wisconsin over the weekend.
Speaker 3 (03:34):
I missed that he was.
Speaker 2 (03:35):
Talking about the FED. Someone asked him, do you plan
to do something with the Fed? And he basically said, yeah,
and the Fed and then said in a competition between
a magic eight ball and the central Bank for interest rates,
I don't know exactly what that means, but he said
the magic eight ball would win.
Speaker 4 (03:51):
Well, look, I would just say this that premise of
central bank independence is probably one of the most revered
ideas and sort of modern or the ox economics, the
premise that we have an independent and there are some
critics of it, and there are some like sympathetic critics
to it, but I think, for like Wall Street and
how we do econ policy in this country, the premise
(04:12):
that the FED exists independently of immediate direct political controls
such that it can pursue its two goals full employment
or maximum employment and price stability in a way that's
outside the elections, outside of political control, is this sort
of core thing that we many people take for granted,
and there's this building question of whether that will remain so.
Speaker 2 (04:34):
All right, so a lot to talk about, and we do,
in fact have the perfect guest. We're going to be
speaking to a favorite of the show. It's levmnand Columbia
Law School professor. He's also the author of The Fed Unbound,
which is a fantastic and quite a short book all
about the Central Bank. So if you know, like Elon Musk,
can't figure out what the FED does and feel that
(04:56):
it's absolutely impossible to find out, then you should check
out this book and also many, many, many other books. Okay, Lev,
it's so nice to have you back, so great to
be here. Why are we talking to you. Let's just
lay the scene other than you're one of our favorite guests.
Speaker 3 (05:13):
I think something big is happening in the federal government
right now, where the president is asserting unprecedented powers over
parts of the government that for in some cases over
a century, have operated with a certain amount of separation
from presidential day to day direction, and that threatens to
(05:37):
upend government policy across a range of dimensions. But in
one area in particular, the consequences could be felt immediately,
and that is with respect to the Federal Reserve.
Speaker 4 (05:48):
So I think you know, certainly, the firing of the
two minority commissioners at the FTC almost immediately after we
recorded that episode we're news. I don't think people on
Wall Street like really you know, yeah, okay, something about
mergers that's not really like most people aren't taking, you know,
that's not high on their radar. What is the connection
(06:09):
between the FTC or the action and something that could
happen with the Federal Reserve.
Speaker 3 (06:13):
Yeah, let me tell you why that FTC firing was
a particularly big deal. There's a Supreme Court case on
the question of whether the president can fire commissioners on
the FTC without cause the way Trump asserted the power
to do the other day, and that is the bedrock
precedent that the case is a federal reserve. It's called
(06:34):
Humphreys Executor. It was decided by the Court in nineteen
thirty five, and it rained in and largely reversed our
cabinet to its facts. A famous decision from nineteen twenty
six called Myers versus the United States that Roosevelt President
Roosevelt FDR had relied on to try to fire a
(06:55):
member of the FTC, and the Supreme Court in nineteen
thirty five said, Nope, you can't do that. That case
isn't going to stand for that anymore. And we've built
up a whole system of government around this understanding. And
here Trump is inviting the Supreme Court to overrule this bedrock. President.
Speaker 2 (07:12):
So, since we already went back in time to nineteen
thirty five and nineteen twenty six, can we go even
further and talk about why we have independent agencies at all?
And you know, I guess the clue is in the
name independent agencies. But they have some oversight clearly, So
who is actually watching over these independent agencies and why
(07:32):
do they exist?
Speaker 3 (07:33):
All the constitutional actors oversee the independent agencies. Independent agency
is a technical term of art in law to refer
to an agency whose heads cannot be removed by the
president at pleasure. And so they include any officer of
the government who is not a legislative officer, a member
(07:54):
of Congress elected, or a judicial officer, an appointed Article
three judge. All of those officers, some of them can
be put into a category of they're part of an
executive agency the head of that agency can be removed
by the president president at pleasure, or an independent agency.
The head of the agency cannot be removed by the
president at pleasure. Now, in that second category independent agencies,
(08:17):
they're accountable to the president to the courts to the
Congress in all sorts of different ways. And so the
President appoints the heads of independent agencies with the advice
and consent of the Senate. The President can remove the
heads of independent agencies, but generally only for cause. Sometimes
those causes are specified like neglective duty or malfeasance in office.
(08:38):
We could talk about that in the Federal Reserve Act.
The statute just says cause, and a four cause removal
involves notice and a hearing, and so it's not the
same thing as an at pleasure removal, and it precludes
the president from removing somebody for a policy disagreement. The
independent agencies are accountable to Congress in that there are
(08:59):
hearing that are held. Their officers have to go down
just like J. Powell goes down and testify. They're subject
to Congress's subpoena power for records. They're imprecated in all
the workings of the government, and their actions, like the
FTC's actions, are subject judicial review by Article three judges.
So they're not independent in this sort of sense that
sometimes asserted that they're like a fourth branch of government
(09:23):
or they're outside of the government. No, they're just a
type of government body that has a different relationship to
the president from the Secretary of Defense or a White
House Chief of Staff, which are positions where the President
can fire or direct the actions of that officer. Now,
these sorts of positions have been around going all the
(09:43):
way back to the founding, and with respect to monetary policy,
it was a question for the first Congress and the
first Secretary of the Treasury how much direction monetary policy
should be subject to day to day oversight or direction
by the president. And so this sort of issue isn't
(10:04):
a new issue for the United States. It's there right
at the beginning.
Speaker 4 (10:24):
Is there any difference legally between the FTC and the
Are they different? Let's say the court says, you know what,
reversing Humphrey's executor, you can fire them. Is there any
reason to think that that exact logic wouldn't apply to
the makeup of the Fomacy Board.
Speaker 3 (10:40):
There's a great question. I think we should take it
into cards. First. We should just start by understanding the similarities. OK. So,
the Federal Reserve Board is a board of control for
the banking sector, and it was established in nineteen thirteen
on the model of something called the Interstate Commerce Commission,
which was established by Congress in eighteen eighty seven and
(11:03):
primarily oversaw the railroad sector. The Interstate Commerce Commission is
a multi member body within the executive branch of the government,
broadly construed, but its heads were not removable by the
President at pleasure. They had to be removed only for cause.
They were appointed by the President but could be removed
(11:25):
only for cause. Congress created something similar in nineteen thirteen
for money in banking. The next year, in nineteen fourteen,
they created a Federal Trade Commission for antitrust enforcement, and
multiple additional agencies that you guys might be familiar with followed,
like the Securities in Exchange Commission in nineteen thirty three.
Most notably so, the Fed has the same basic legal
(11:47):
architecture as these other multi member commissions. It has seven governors,
so it's a board of seven members, and those members
are all tenured for a term of years. They have
office security. The Secretary of the Treasury has no term
of office. They are appointed for no particular term and
can be removed at any time. The board members all
(12:08):
have particular terms and can be removed only for costs.
So these are the things that are in common. There
is an effort underway, in particular and conservative legal circles
and in part in the judicial branch, by those who
are interested in overturning Humphrey's Executor to divine, discover, construct
(12:31):
some type of FED exception, some way to distinguish the
FED constitutionally from these other multi member commissions, such that
were the Court to say Humphrey's Executor is overruled, it
would not necessarily mean the President could fire j. Palell
at pleasure. These efforts are pretty incohete, they're pretty intellectually unsatisfying,
(12:54):
but it's worth sort of trying to tease them out
because there is a real desire for the Court to
to protect the FED independence. And in trying to understand
what's going to happen next, we have to sort of
evaluate how plausible it is that the Court would be
able to embrace some type of rationale for why the
FED is, do you know, the one independent agency that
(13:17):
the president doesn't have the constitutional power to control?
Speaker 2 (13:21):
Okay, so what are those arguments? Because I remember, for instance,
the CFPP, I think, when there was like wrangling over
its independence and someone mentioned that the CFPP is led
by a single leader instead of a commission like the FTC.
Would something like that come into play when you're arguing
that the FED should be a special case.
Speaker 3 (13:43):
Yeah, so great question. This is a slight detour, but
I think it's important. The demise of Humphrey's executor has
been prognosticated for fifteen years now. It dates back to
a Roberts Court decision in twenty ten with respect to
an organization called the PCAOB, which oversees accountants and is
(14:06):
part of the sec and that was struck down and
the Court said the Humphrey's Executor exception to the President's
power to oversee the executive branch, we will not extend
it to this sort of novel organization that is two
layers removed from the president because the PCAOB is under
(14:27):
the Securities in Exchange Commission. And there's a lot of
language in that opinion that made people think, WHOA, these
justices don't really agree with Humphrey's Executor. They have a
different view of the president. What's going to be next?
And in twenty twenty you have the CFPB case that
you're referencing sala law, in which the Court says Yep,
(14:48):
the CFPB, which is a five year term, tenured, single
headed agency. We're not going to extend Humphrey's executor to
that either. And Justice Roberts wrote the opinion, and he said,
this part has way too much power. The Humphreys executor
sort of exception to presidential oversight, as he characterized, it
doesn't cover the CFPV. This thing is new. Congress just
(15:10):
created it and it's not rooted in history. And people thought, okay,
so certain single headed agencies might not be allowed anymore.
What's going to happen next Next year? Twenty twenty one,
the Supreme Court, with Justice Alito writing for the court,
decided a case called Collins versus Yellen, and struck down
(15:31):
the independence of the Federal Housing Finance Administration FAHFA. And
there the Court just said, oh, all single headed agencies,
no matter what, no matter how much power they have,
are unconstitutional. And this covers things like the Social Security Administration,
which since its inception has been headed by an individual
(15:53):
tenured for a six year term. And the idea is
SSA administration is nonpartisan and every president shouldn't come in
and just put in their own person. But after Collins
versus yelling. President Biden fired the Social Security Administrator, and
you got to a point where people were wondering, what
about the multi member commissions themselves that Humphrey's executor was about.
(16:16):
Will it no longer be sustained for them either? So
what are the possible exceptions that would allow the logic
of Humphrey's executors to maybe applied to the FED even
if it no longer applies to the FTC. The one
that the Trump administration is running with so far is
(16:36):
that monetary policy is somehow not sovereign executive power and
can be distinguished from the other stuff the FED does,
and that stuff is regulation of financial institutions. So Trump
put out an executive order last month, Executive Order fourteen
two fifteen, which asserted executive power over all the independent
(17:02):
agencies and included specific carve out language for the FED
that said, this order doesn't apply to the FED with
respect to its monetary policy, only with respect to its
regulation and supervision of financial institutions. Okay, so this is
sort of the Trump theory. There's some other options we
can get to, but I think let's maybe sit through
Trump theory. Does this make any sense? There? Are some
(17:24):
huge problems with this theory. It just sort of suggests
that they haven't spent a lot of time thinking about
how the FED conducts monetary policy and what the relationship
is between monetary policy and the regulation of banks, because
it's really all one and the same thing. So the
court would be hard pressed to say, for example, just
(17:45):
as an initial matter, you know, j Powell can't be
removed by the President with respect to what he's doing
on monetary policy, but with respect to what he's doing
on bank regulation, the President could fire him for a
policy disagreement. That would just sort of fall apart pretty easily. Right,
what type of independence has really left? The President could
just say I fired him because I don't like what
he was doing on bank regulation, And the real reason
(18:07):
could be that he didn't like what Jay Powell was
doing on interest rates. But how would we know because
he doesn't need to give a reason except to say
that it's bank regulation. So there's like already a problem.
But the deeper problem is Moynetree policy implementation is bank regulation.
Like in January when the FED met, in the aftermath
(18:29):
of that meeting, the Board of Governors amended Regulation D
through a rule making published in the Federal Register lowering
the interests paid on reserve balances to banks with reserve
accounts at the Federal Reserve Banks. It is a straight
(18:51):
exercise of regulatory power, just like when the SEC writes
a rule for what type of disclosure a company has
to do if it's a publicly traded company. And they
just don't seem to realize this. They think that it's
like FOMC just meets and they talk and then they
announce a decision, and that's monetary policy. It's not regulatory,
(19:12):
it's not a judicatory But actually no monetary policy implementation
is all exercise of government power over the banking system.
Speaker 4 (19:37):
You know what I do find interesting, Like I think
of this concept of the importance of an independent FED
that can pursue both its mandates as this sort of
fairly modern idea in economics. But it is interesting that
apparently the Congress is actually like way ahead of like
eCOM theory in this setup. In this way, it's kind
of fascinating that they sort of intuited this. What I
(19:58):
want to go to is if there is this Trump
world or conservative world desire to find a way in
which Humphrey's executor can be overturned, but yet somehow not
implicate the structure of the FED. Why should anytone care
Because in the end, all laws are just enforced by humans.
(20:18):
And if the general thinking is we're going to read
something into this law that, even though we can't logically
defend it on paper, we all want it to have
this outcome where all of these independent agencies are formerly
just part of the executive branch except this one. If
that's the outcome everyone wants, then isn't that the outcome
we'll get.
Speaker 3 (20:37):
That's a great question. The narrow sort of answer, you know,
just a law professor's concern is that creating illogical exceptions
to doctrine is bad for law. Law as a social
coordinating mechanism. It tears at the fabric of law. Every
time someone violates our understanding of what the law is,
(20:59):
it's tearing at the fabric of law. So these removals
that Trump has engaged in because there's precedent on point
saying you can't do them, this is tearing at law.
This is reducing the effectiveness of law as a coordinating mechanism,
which is something we should value because it helps us
organize our lives in an effective way with minimal social conflict.
So there's sort of just like a narrow concern with
(21:19):
contorting Distorting doctrine and law reduces respect for law and
its effectiveness. The more persuasive I think, answer to market participants,
you know, we're not like invested in this in sort
of you know what's going to happen to the stock market?
Speaker 1 (21:36):
Right.
Speaker 3 (21:37):
I think that every time the court seeds more authority
to the President, they call into question their ability and
willingness in the future to draw the line. And so
if they write an opinion in the FTC case over
(22:00):
ruling Humphrey's Executor that says the FED is an exception
and this ruling doesn't apply to the FED, that will,
of course, in this moment, on its face, protect FED independence.
But now that we've moved the line twenty ten, twenty
twenty twenty one, and then again more and more towards
the president, we invite the President to test this new exception.
(22:23):
And there's a number of ways the President might do it.
And in a year from now or two years from now,
the only organization left is the FED and the Fed's
ability to stand on its own may be limited, and
as people become aware of that and see the pressure
that the President will exert on the FED as the
only remain in an exception, the independence will dissipate and
(22:46):
markets will react, and the Fed's ability to make credible
commitments to maintain price stability over time could be impaired.
Speaker 4 (22:53):
Right now, by the way, Tracy, I just want to
give a quick shout out to Matt Stoller, who wrote
a great blog post a couple of weeks ago about
this sort of thing, and he cited a footnote from
Alito in a dissent on the CFPB in which Alito
himself said the FED quote should be regarded as a
special arrangement sanctioned by history. Yes, a unique institution with
(23:13):
a unique historical background, to which Stohler said, this is
the legal logic of a souvenir T shirt that says
I'm the mommy.
Speaker 3 (23:21):
That's why. Yes.
Speaker 4 (23:23):
So I just want to give a shout out to Matt,
because this is what really this piece was actually sort
of what put a bunch of this sort of in
my head.
Speaker 2 (23:29):
Amazing, amazing. So I have a question how well defined
or codified is the at cause portion of this because
I'm thinking like, Okay, we could do all this, we
go through the Supreme Court, but could Trump just come
up with a new reason that counts as at cause
(23:50):
and that might be an easier way to exert.
Speaker 3 (23:52):
Inflation was too high? Yeah. Yes, So that's one of
the concerns that I have. If you preserve this exception
just for the FED, you're inviting a challenge. Now, the
FED is the only four cause protected agency, and the
President has almost never removed anyone for cause. The last
time was over one hundred years ago. You and so
(24:14):
there's very little doctrine on that. You invite the President
to assert a cause and challenge the court to say
that it doesn't qualify. And because the jurisprudence is so thin,
it will be hard and people won't know how the
Court will come out on that, and the harm will
already be done right j poweill have been removed. It
(24:36):
will be chaos. We will be litigating over this question
all the way up to the Supreme Court. The beauty
of maintaining the line in Humphreys Executor is we never
have the fight on the terrain of the Federal Reserve.
The fight is somewhere else. Once you move the line
all the way up to the Federal Reserve, the war
will be on the train of the FED, and in
(24:58):
some ways that's a loss already.
Speaker 4 (25:00):
So you say, Okay, there's this conservative jurisprudence that they
want to come up with ways to justify all of
these agencies are somewhat illegitimate with the accepted FED. Do
you actually believe that that is the end goal, that
all of these agencies are subsumed to the President except
the FED, or do you think this is an intermediate.
Speaker 3 (25:20):
Step to then get to the Fed.
Speaker 4 (25:22):
But they this point, they can't argue the full thing
because that would freak people out too much.
Speaker 3 (25:27):
There's a split amongst conservative legal movement, and I think
there are some people who want the full thing and
there are some who want to protect the FED. And
I think there's a good reason to put Justice Alito,
for example, in the camp of the endgame being we
exempt the FED. And Justice Alito in that dissent in
(25:48):
the Community Financial Services case which came out last spring.
In footnote sixteen which you reference, Justice Alito is speaking
to his colleagues. He is telling them we should overturn
Humphrey's executor I've figured out a way to do it
without hurting the FED. We're just going to claim that
it's a unique institution sanctioned by history. Of course, all
(26:10):
of these independent agencies are unique institutions, and Congress crafted
these particular governance arrangements because of the particular dynamics in
each area, and so there's a fundamental illogic to Alito's effort.
At the same time, he's just trying to say, if
we just say it's a special situation and it's unique,
we can get this outcome that we want, which is
(26:33):
no independent agencies, where these agencies are engaged in policy
making that is sort of constraining market activity. And yes,
independent agency for the Federal Reserve where we're particularly worried
about excessive money creation, which is a pro debtor, you know,
(26:53):
credit or unfriendly policy. And so it's just sort of
you're importing your policy preferences into some attempt to reconstruct
the administrative state to sort of protect your interests and
get the policy you want across the board. I think
it's an untenable sort of outcome in some ways, but
it's very much what a lot of people who subscribe
(27:15):
to the unitary executive theory are trying to achieve.
Speaker 2 (27:19):
So this has been a fantastic overview of what's at stake.
What should we be watching going forward? What are you watching?
Speaker 3 (27:28):
So there are a bunch of cases right now making
their way through the federal courts that began with Trump
illegally firing independent agency heads. So right on January twenty seventh,
shortly after taking office, Trump purported to remove the head
(27:49):
of the National Labor Relations Board, and that led to
a lawsuit where will Cox is seeking reinstatement and a
judicial judgment that she can cannot be removed except for cause.
That case is making its way through. And then another
case involving the Merit System's Protection Board is making its
way through, and now the FTC case is making its
(28:11):
way through. And those first two cases. On Friday, so
just a few days ago, an important thing happened, which
is a panel of the d C Circuit Court of Appeals,
which is like the second highest court in the land.
A panel of the d C Circuit Court of Appeals
embraced Trump's legal theory and overruled a district judge who
(28:32):
had ruled on those cases earlier in favor of Willcox.
And Harris. Now, the parties in that case are going
to ask the full DC Circuit to reconsider the panel's decision,
and shortly thereafter, inevitably, no matter what happens with that,
the parties will seek review by the Supreme Court, an
(28:54):
emergency review, And so the Supreme Court is going to
potentially be drawn into this in the coming days. And
whatever the Supreme Court does in the coming days, it
is possible that one or more justices will dissent from
the Supreme Court's decision with the respect of the emergency
application and say something about what they think the future
of Humphrey's executor is going to be. And so we
(29:17):
could get real tea leaves very soon in some of
the cases that are already preceding.
Speaker 2 (29:23):
I'm really glad we talked to you today, Love, Thank
you so much for coming back on a laws.
Speaker 3 (29:31):
Thank you for having me, Joe.
Speaker 2 (29:46):
That was such a good overview, it really was, And
I didn't realize that stuff was going to happen potentially
on this so quickly, So really good timing on our part,
pat ourselves. By the way, Lev left us some homework,
some assigned reading. He says, we should look up Hamilton's
report on a National Bank.
Speaker 4 (30:06):
Yes, apparently that is some good reading for background on
why Congress intuited to have an independent federal reserve, even
before the academic economics profession sort of understood, you know,
central bank independence is a key thing.
Speaker 3 (30:19):
You know. I was listening.
Speaker 4 (30:21):
I don't know if it's like the trial lawyer equivalent
of constitutional law, you know, because it's like most conversations
about constitutional law do not sound like, you know, a
lawyer giving an opening statement. But I feel like Lev
can like really blend the two.
Speaker 2 (30:34):
Oh absolutely. By the way, for people who well everyone
who wasn't in the studio, you kind of missed Lev's
gesticulations to wild gesticulations, but they are very very effective.
Speaker 4 (30:45):
I think you could kind of hear them.
Speaker 2 (30:46):
Yeah, you can hear it in his voice. All right,
shall we leave it there.
Speaker 3 (30:49):
Let's leave it there.
Speaker 2 (30:50):
This has been another episode of the All Thoughts Podcast.
I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway and.
Speaker 4 (30:56):
I'm Joe Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwart. Hello,
Levmanond at Levmanon. Follow Our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Kerman
armand dash Ol Bennett at dashbod and Kilbrooks at Kalebrooks.
For more odd lootscontent, go to Bloomberg dot com slash
odd Lots, where we have all of our episodes in
a daily newsletter and you can chat about all of
these topics twenty four seven in our discord discord dot
(31:19):
gg slash odlines.
Speaker 2 (31:20):
And if you enjoy odd Lots, if you like it
when we talk about Humphreys Executor, then please leave us
a positive review on your favorite podcast platform. And remember,
if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to
all of our episodes absolutely ad free. All you need
to do is find the Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcasts
and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening
Speaker 3 (32:07):
In
Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News.
Speaker 2 (00:18):
Hello and welcome to another episode of the All Thoughts podcast.
I'm Tracy Alloway.
Speaker 3 (00:22):
And I'm Jill Wysenthal.
Speaker 2 (00:23):
Joe, it's been a big week for us. We were
cited in an SEC filing for the interview he did
with Brad Jacobs. I think it's the first time I've
ever seen a full podcast transcript.
Speaker 4 (00:34):
It's nice because we used to write transcripts and I
was getting to be so much work. And then it
turned out so we recently were interviewed Brad Jacobs. His
team did a full transcript and submitted it to the SEC.
Speaker 3 (00:45):
Yeah, it was very nice of.
Speaker 2 (00:45):
This doing our work for us. And then the other
thing that happened is we were also cited in a lawsuit.
All in one week.
Speaker 4 (00:52):
All in one week, that's right. You know, we've done
some episodes. We were down in DC recently and we
had the opportunity to interview the new chair of the
FTC under President Trump, and a section of that interview
actually got included in a news lawsuit. Actually, you could
take a listen to it.
Speaker 5 (01:09):
There's also I think some benefits in certain circumstances to
having multi member agencies with people from both parties. I mean, look,
if you have an agency that is exceeding the law,
abusing the companies that are proporced to regulate, it's helpful
for markets, for courts, for litigants, for government transparency to
(01:29):
have people in the other party pointing this out and
saying it in dessense, like you know, I wrote four hundred
plus pages of descents during my time as a minority commissioner.
I think that that adds value.
Speaker 2 (01:39):
Right, So we spoke to Andrew Ferguson. He was talking
about how much he loves having minority commissioners, and then
the very next day there was news that Trump had
fired the two Democratic commissioners, Alvarro Bedoya and Rebecca Kelly Slaughter.
And so they have since filed this lawsuit in which
we're cited, are arguing that they were illegally fired. Commissioners
(02:02):
are supposed to be fired based on an actual reason.
You have to have cause, and I don't think there
was any really sighted in this. And the interesting thing
here is, I know it seems like a very niche topic.
Why are we discussing this FTC lawsuit other than the
fact that we're mentioned in it, but it could have
really broad implications.
Speaker 4 (02:23):
Yeah, no, this is the key thing, right, and so
it's not just FTC. There have been some other instances
already in this administration of President Trump removing people who
are sort of part of various entities that exist within
the federal government, which at least formally in recent administrations,
have had some notion of independence. And there's this popular
(02:45):
sort of conservative legal theory that all of these are
kind of illegitimate, that there are three branches of government judicial, legislative,
and executive. There's not really room for these other things
that are literally outside the executive. And so what we've
seen is this sort of assertion through these removals, firings
of the FTC commissioners, plus others of this idea like, no,
(03:07):
these entities are all under the president. Some of the
implications could be pretty big.
Speaker 2 (03:11):
Right, Well, there is the Federal Reserve as an independent agency,
and we know there is this populist feeling, let's put
it that way against the Federal Reserve. You know, people
think about it as this sort of ivory tower filled
with unelected technocrats. Speaking of unelected technocrats, did you see
Elon Musk's speech in Wisconsin over the weekend.
Speaker 3 (03:34):
I missed that he was.
Speaker 2 (03:35):
Talking about the FED. Someone asked him, do you plan
to do something with the Fed? And he basically said, yeah,
and the Fed and then said in a competition between
a magic eight ball and the central Bank for interest rates,
I don't know exactly what that means, but he said
the magic eight ball would win.
Speaker 4 (03:51):
Well, look, I would just say this that premise of
central bank independence is probably one of the most revered
ideas and sort of modern or the ox economics, the
premise that we have an independent and there are some
critics of it, and there are some like sympathetic critics
to it, but I think, for like Wall Street and
how we do econ policy in this country, the premise
(04:12):
that the FED exists independently of immediate direct political controls
such that it can pursue its two goals full employment
or maximum employment and price stability in a way that's
outside the elections, outside of political control, is this sort
of core thing that we many people take for granted,
and there's this building question of whether that will remain so.
Speaker 2 (04:34):
All right, so a lot to talk about, and we do,
in fact have the perfect guest. We're going to be
speaking to a favorite of the show. It's levmnand Columbia
Law School professor. He's also the author of The Fed Unbound,
which is a fantastic and quite a short book all
about the Central Bank. So if you know, like Elon Musk,
can't figure out what the FED does and feel that
(04:56):
it's absolutely impossible to find out, then you should check
out this book and also many, many, many other books. Okay, Lev,
it's so nice to have you back, so great to
be here. Why are we talking to you. Let's just
lay the scene other than you're one of our favorite guests.
Speaker 3 (05:13):
I think something big is happening in the federal government
right now, where the president is asserting unprecedented powers over
parts of the government that for in some cases over
a century, have operated with a certain amount of separation
from presidential day to day direction, and that threatens to
(05:37):
upend government policy across a range of dimensions. But in
one area in particular, the consequences could be felt immediately,
and that is with respect to the Federal Reserve.
Speaker 4 (05:48):
So I think you know, certainly, the firing of the
two minority commissioners at the FTC almost immediately after we
recorded that episode we're news. I don't think people on
Wall Street like really you know, yeah, okay, something about
mergers that's not really like most people aren't taking, you know,
that's not high on their radar. What is the connection
(06:09):
between the FTC or the action and something that could
happen with the Federal Reserve.
Speaker 3 (06:13):
Yeah, let me tell you why that FTC firing was
a particularly big deal. There's a Supreme Court case on
the question of whether the president can fire commissioners on
the FTC without cause the way Trump asserted the power
to do the other day, and that is the bedrock
precedent that the case is a federal reserve. It's called
(06:34):
Humphreys Executor. It was decided by the Court in nineteen
thirty five, and it rained in and largely reversed our
cabinet to its facts. A famous decision from nineteen twenty
six called Myers versus the United States that Roosevelt President
Roosevelt FDR had relied on to try to fire a
(06:55):
member of the FTC, and the Supreme Court in nineteen
thirty five said, Nope, you can't do that. That case
isn't going to stand for that anymore. And we've built
up a whole system of government around this understanding. And
here Trump is inviting the Supreme Court to overrule this bedrock. President.
Speaker 2 (07:12):
So, since we already went back in time to nineteen
thirty five and nineteen twenty six, can we go even
further and talk about why we have independent agencies at all?
And you know, I guess the clue is in the
name independent agencies. But they have some oversight clearly, So
who is actually watching over these independent agencies and why
(07:32):
do they exist?
Speaker 3 (07:33):
All the constitutional actors oversee the independent agencies. Independent agency
is a technical term of art in law to refer
to an agency whose heads cannot be removed by the
president at pleasure. And so they include any officer of
the government who is not a legislative officer, a member
(07:54):
of Congress elected, or a judicial officer, an appointed Article
three judge. All of those officers, some of them can
be put into a category of they're part of an
executive agency the head of that agency can be removed
by the president president at pleasure, or an independent agency.
The head of the agency cannot be removed by the
president at pleasure. Now, in that second category independent agencies,
(08:17):
they're accountable to the president to the courts to the
Congress in all sorts of different ways. And so the
President appoints the heads of independent agencies with the advice
and consent of the Senate. The President can remove the
heads of independent agencies, but generally only for cause. Sometimes
those causes are specified like neglective duty or malfeasance in office.
(08:38):
We could talk about that in the Federal Reserve Act.
The statute just says cause, and a four cause removal
involves notice and a hearing, and so it's not the
same thing as an at pleasure removal, and it precludes
the president from removing somebody for a policy disagreement. The
independent agencies are accountable to Congress in that there are
(08:59):
hearing that are held. Their officers have to go down
just like J. Powell goes down and testify. They're subject
to Congress's subpoena power for records. They're imprecated in all
the workings of the government, and their actions, like the
FTC's actions, are subject judicial review by Article three judges.
So they're not independent in this sort of sense that
sometimes asserted that they're like a fourth branch of government
(09:23):
or they're outside of the government. No, they're just a
type of government body that has a different relationship to
the president from the Secretary of Defense or a White
House Chief of Staff, which are positions where the President
can fire or direct the actions of that officer. Now,
these sorts of positions have been around going all the
(09:43):
way back to the founding, and with respect to monetary policy,
it was a question for the first Congress and the
first Secretary of the Treasury how much direction monetary policy
should be subject to day to day oversight or direction
by the president. And so this sort of issue isn't
(10:04):
a new issue for the United States. It's there right
at the beginning.
Speaker 4 (10:24):
Is there any difference legally between the FTC and the
Are they different? Let's say the court says, you know what,
reversing Humphrey's executor, you can fire them. Is there any
reason to think that that exact logic wouldn't apply to
the makeup of the Fomacy Board.
Speaker 3 (10:40):
There's a great question. I think we should take it
into cards. First. We should just start by understanding the similarities. OK. So,
the Federal Reserve Board is a board of control for
the banking sector, and it was established in nineteen thirteen
on the model of something called the Interstate Commerce Commission,
which was established by Congress in eighteen eighty seven and
(11:03):
primarily oversaw the railroad sector. The Interstate Commerce Commission is
a multi member body within the executive branch of the government,
broadly construed, but its heads were not removable by the
President at pleasure. They had to be removed only for cause.
They were appointed by the President but could be removed
(11:25):
only for cause. Congress created something similar in nineteen thirteen
for money in banking. The next year, in nineteen fourteen,
they created a Federal Trade Commission for antitrust enforcement, and
multiple additional agencies that you guys might be familiar with followed,
like the Securities in Exchange Commission in nineteen thirty three.
Most notably so, the Fed has the same basic legal
(11:47):
architecture as these other multi member commissions. It has seven governors,
so it's a board of seven members, and those members
are all tenured for a term of years. They have
office security. The Secretary of the Treasury has no term
of office. They are appointed for no particular term and
can be removed at any time. The board members all
(12:08):
have particular terms and can be removed only for costs.
So these are the things that are in common. There
is an effort underway, in particular and conservative legal circles
and in part in the judicial branch, by those who
are interested in overturning Humphrey's Executor to divine, discover, construct
(12:31):
some type of FED exception, some way to distinguish the
FED constitutionally from these other multi member commissions, such that
were the Court to say Humphrey's Executor is overruled, it
would not necessarily mean the President could fire j. Palell
at pleasure. These efforts are pretty incohete, they're pretty intellectually unsatisfying,
(12:54):
but it's worth sort of trying to tease them out
because there is a real desire for the Court to
to protect the FED independence. And in trying to understand
what's going to happen next, we have to sort of
evaluate how plausible it is that the Court would be
able to embrace some type of rationale for why the
FED is, do you know, the one independent agency that
(13:17):
the president doesn't have the constitutional power to control?
Speaker 2 (13:21):
Okay, so what are those arguments? Because I remember, for instance,
the CFPP, I think, when there was like wrangling over
its independence and someone mentioned that the CFPP is led
by a single leader instead of a commission like the FTC.
Would something like that come into play when you're arguing
that the FED should be a special case.
Speaker 3 (13:43):
Yeah, so great question. This is a slight detour, but
I think it's important. The demise of Humphrey's executor has
been prognosticated for fifteen years now. It dates back to
a Roberts Court decision in twenty ten with respect to
an organization called the PCAOB, which oversees accountants and is
(14:06):
part of the sec and that was struck down and
the Court said the Humphrey's Executor exception to the President's
power to oversee the executive branch, we will not extend
it to this sort of novel organization that is two
layers removed from the president because the PCAOB is under
(14:27):
the Securities in Exchange Commission. And there's a lot of
language in that opinion that made people think, WHOA, these
justices don't really agree with Humphrey's Executor. They have a
different view of the president. What's going to be next?
And in twenty twenty you have the CFPB case that
you're referencing sala law, in which the Court says Yep,
(14:48):
the CFPB, which is a five year term, tenured, single
headed agency. We're not going to extend Humphrey's executor to
that either. And Justice Roberts wrote the opinion, and he said,
this part has way too much power. The Humphreys executor
sort of exception to presidential oversight, as he characterized, it
doesn't cover the CFPV. This thing is new. Congress just
(15:10):
created it and it's not rooted in history. And people thought, okay,
so certain single headed agencies might not be allowed anymore.
What's going to happen next Next year? Twenty twenty one,
the Supreme Court, with Justice Alito writing for the court,
decided a case called Collins versus Yellen, and struck down
(15:31):
the independence of the Federal Housing Finance Administration FAHFA. And
there the Court just said, oh, all single headed agencies,
no matter what, no matter how much power they have,
are unconstitutional. And this covers things like the Social Security Administration,
which since its inception has been headed by an individual
(15:53):
tenured for a six year term. And the idea is
SSA administration is nonpartisan and every president shouldn't come in
and just put in their own person. But after Collins
versus yelling. President Biden fired the Social Security Administrator, and
you got to a point where people were wondering, what
about the multi member commissions themselves that Humphrey's executor was about.
(16:16):
Will it no longer be sustained for them either? So
what are the possible exceptions that would allow the logic
of Humphrey's executors to maybe applied to the FED even
if it no longer applies to the FTC. The one
that the Trump administration is running with so far is
(16:36):
that monetary policy is somehow not sovereign executive power and
can be distinguished from the other stuff the FED does,
and that stuff is regulation of financial institutions. So Trump
put out an executive order last month, Executive Order fourteen
two fifteen, which asserted executive power over all the independent
(17:02):
agencies and included specific carve out language for the FED
that said, this order doesn't apply to the FED with
respect to its monetary policy, only with respect to its
regulation and supervision of financial institutions. Okay, so this is
sort of the Trump theory. There's some other options we
can get to, but I think let's maybe sit through
Trump theory. Does this make any sense? There? Are some
(17:24):
huge problems with this theory. It just sort of suggests
that they haven't spent a lot of time thinking about
how the FED conducts monetary policy and what the relationship
is between monetary policy and the regulation of banks, because
it's really all one and the same thing. So the
court would be hard pressed to say, for example, just
(17:45):
as an initial matter, you know, j Powell can't be
removed by the President with respect to what he's doing
on monetary policy, but with respect to what he's doing
on bank regulation, the President could fire him for a
policy disagreement. That would just sort of fall apart pretty easily. Right,
what type of independence has really left? The President could
just say I fired him because I don't like what
he was doing on bank regulation, And the real reason
(18:07):
could be that he didn't like what Jay Powell was
doing on interest rates. But how would we know because
he doesn't need to give a reason except to say
that it's bank regulation. So there's like already a problem.
But the deeper problem is Moynetree policy implementation is bank regulation.
Like in January when the FED met, in the aftermath
(18:29):
of that meeting, the Board of Governors amended Regulation D
through a rule making published in the Federal Register lowering
the interests paid on reserve balances to banks with reserve
accounts at the Federal Reserve Banks. It is a straight
(18:51):
exercise of regulatory power, just like when the SEC writes
a rule for what type of disclosure a company has
to do if it's a publicly traded company. And they
just don't seem to realize this. They think that it's
like FOMC just meets and they talk and then they
announce a decision, and that's monetary policy. It's not regulatory,
(19:12):
it's not a judicatory But actually no monetary policy implementation
is all exercise of government power over the banking system.
Speaker 4 (19:37):
You know what I do find interesting, Like I think
of this concept of the importance of an independent FED
that can pursue both its mandates as this sort of
fairly modern idea in economics. But it is interesting that
apparently the Congress is actually like way ahead of like
eCOM theory in this setup. In this way, it's kind
of fascinating that they sort of intuited this. What I
(19:58):
want to go to is if there is this Trump
world or conservative world desire to find a way in
which Humphrey's executor can be overturned, but yet somehow not
implicate the structure of the FED. Why should anytone care
Because in the end, all laws are just enforced by humans.
(20:18):
And if the general thinking is we're going to read
something into this law that, even though we can't logically
defend it on paper, we all want it to have
this outcome where all of these independent agencies are formerly
just part of the executive branch except this one. If
that's the outcome everyone wants, then isn't that the outcome
we'll get.
Speaker 3 (20:37):
That's a great question. The narrow sort of answer, you know,
just a law professor's concern is that creating illogical exceptions
to doctrine is bad for law. Law as a social
coordinating mechanism. It tears at the fabric of law. Every
time someone violates our understanding of what the law is,
(20:59):
it's tearing at the fabric of law. So these removals
that Trump has engaged in because there's precedent on point
saying you can't do them, this is tearing at law.
This is reducing the effectiveness of law as a coordinating mechanism,
which is something we should value because it helps us
organize our lives in an effective way with minimal social conflict.
So there's sort of just like a narrow concern with
(21:19):
contorting Distorting doctrine and law reduces respect for law and
its effectiveness. The more persuasive I think, answer to market participants,
you know, we're not like invested in this in sort
of you know what's going to happen to the stock market?
Speaker 1 (21:36):
Right.
Speaker 3 (21:37):
I think that every time the court seeds more authority
to the President, they call into question their ability and
willingness in the future to draw the line. And so
if they write an opinion in the FTC case over
(22:00):
ruling Humphrey's Executor that says the FED is an exception
and this ruling doesn't apply to the FED, that will,
of course, in this moment, on its face, protect FED independence.
But now that we've moved the line twenty ten, twenty
twenty twenty one, and then again more and more towards
the president, we invite the President to test this new exception.
(22:23):
And there's a number of ways the President might do it.
And in a year from now or two years from now,
the only organization left is the FED and the Fed's
ability to stand on its own may be limited, and
as people become aware of that and see the pressure
that the President will exert on the FED as the
only remain in an exception, the independence will dissipate and
(22:46):
markets will react, and the Fed's ability to make credible
commitments to maintain price stability over time could be impaired.
Speaker 4 (22:53):
Right now, by the way, Tracy, I just want to
give a quick shout out to Matt Stoller, who wrote
a great blog post a couple of weeks ago about
this sort of thing, and he cited a footnote from
Alito in a dissent on the CFPB in which Alito
himself said the FED quote should be regarded as a
special arrangement sanctioned by history. Yes, a unique institution with
(23:13):
a unique historical background, to which Stohler said, this is
the legal logic of a souvenir T shirt that says
I'm the mommy.
Speaker 3 (23:21):
That's why. Yes.
Speaker 4 (23:23):
So I just want to give a shout out to Matt,
because this is what really this piece was actually sort
of what put a bunch of this sort of in
my head.
Speaker 2 (23:29):
Amazing, amazing. So I have a question how well defined
or codified is the at cause portion of this because
I'm thinking like, Okay, we could do all this, we
go through the Supreme Court, but could Trump just come
up with a new reason that counts as at cause
(23:50):
and that might be an easier way to exert.
Speaker 3 (23:52):
Inflation was too high? Yeah. Yes, So that's one of
the concerns that I have. If you preserve this exception
just for the FED, you're inviting a challenge. Now, the
FED is the only four cause protected agency, and the
President has almost never removed anyone for cause. The last
time was over one hundred years ago. You and so
(24:14):
there's very little doctrine on that. You invite the President
to assert a cause and challenge the court to say
that it doesn't qualify. And because the jurisprudence is so thin,
it will be hard and people won't know how the
Court will come out on that, and the harm will
already be done right j poweill have been removed. It
(24:36):
will be chaos. We will be litigating over this question
all the way up to the Supreme Court. The beauty
of maintaining the line in Humphreys Executor is we never
have the fight on the terrain of the Federal Reserve.
The fight is somewhere else. Once you move the line
all the way up to the Federal Reserve, the war
will be on the train of the FED, and in
(24:58):
some ways that's a loss already.
Speaker 4 (25:00):
So you say, Okay, there's this conservative jurisprudence that they
want to come up with ways to justify all of
these agencies are somewhat illegitimate with the accepted FED. Do
you actually believe that that is the end goal, that
all of these agencies are subsumed to the President except
the FED, or do you think this is an intermediate.
Speaker 3 (25:20):
Step to then get to the Fed.
Speaker 4 (25:22):
But they this point, they can't argue the full thing
because that would freak people out too much.
Speaker 3 (25:27):
There's a split amongst conservative legal movement, and I think
there are some people who want the full thing and
there are some who want to protect the FED. And
I think there's a good reason to put Justice Alito,
for example, in the camp of the endgame being we
exempt the FED. And Justice Alito in that dissent in
(25:48):
the Community Financial Services case which came out last spring.
In footnote sixteen which you reference, Justice Alito is speaking
to his colleagues. He is telling them we should overturn
Humphrey's executor I've figured out a way to do it
without hurting the FED. We're just going to claim that
it's a unique institution sanctioned by history. Of course, all
(26:10):
of these independent agencies are unique institutions, and Congress crafted
these particular governance arrangements because of the particular dynamics in
each area, and so there's a fundamental illogic to Alito's effort.
At the same time, he's just trying to say, if
we just say it's a special situation and it's unique,
we can get this outcome that we want, which is
(26:33):
no independent agencies, where these agencies are engaged in policy
making that is sort of constraining market activity. And yes,
independent agency for the Federal Reserve where we're particularly worried
about excessive money creation, which is a pro debtor, you know,
(26:53):
credit or unfriendly policy. And so it's just sort of
you're importing your policy preferences into some attempt to reconstruct
the administrative state to sort of protect your interests and
get the policy you want across the board. I think
it's an untenable sort of outcome in some ways, but
it's very much what a lot of people who subscribe
(27:15):
to the unitary executive theory are trying to achieve.
Speaker 2 (27:19):
So this has been a fantastic overview of what's at stake.
What should we be watching going forward? What are you watching?
Speaker 3 (27:28):
So there are a bunch of cases right now making
their way through the federal courts that began with Trump
illegally firing independent agency heads. So right on January twenty seventh,
shortly after taking office, Trump purported to remove the head
(27:49):
of the National Labor Relations Board, and that led to
a lawsuit where will Cox is seeking reinstatement and a
judicial judgment that she can cannot be removed except for cause.
That case is making its way through. And then another
case involving the Merit System's Protection Board is making its
way through, and now the FTC case is making its
(28:11):
way through. And those first two cases. On Friday, so
just a few days ago, an important thing happened, which
is a panel of the d C Circuit Court of Appeals,
which is like the second highest court in the land.
A panel of the d C Circuit Court of Appeals
embraced Trump's legal theory and overruled a district judge who
(28:32):
had ruled on those cases earlier in favor of Willcox.
And Harris. Now, the parties in that case are going
to ask the full DC Circuit to reconsider the panel's decision,
and shortly thereafter, inevitably, no matter what happens with that,
the parties will seek review by the Supreme Court, an
(28:54):
emergency review, And so the Supreme Court is going to
potentially be drawn into this in the coming days. And
whatever the Supreme Court does in the coming days, it
is possible that one or more justices will dissent from
the Supreme Court's decision with the respect of the emergency
application and say something about what they think the future
of Humphrey's executor is going to be. And so we
(29:17):
could get real tea leaves very soon in some of
the cases that are already preceding.
Speaker 2 (29:23):
I'm really glad we talked to you today, Love, Thank
you so much for coming back on a laws.
Speaker 3 (29:31):
Thank you for having me, Joe.
Speaker 2 (29:46):
That was such a good overview, it really was, And
I didn't realize that stuff was going to happen potentially
on this so quickly, So really good timing on our part,
pat ourselves. By the way, Lev left us some homework,
some assigned reading. He says, we should look up Hamilton's
report on a National Bank.
Speaker 4 (30:06):
Yes, apparently that is some good reading for background on
why Congress intuited to have an independent federal reserve, even
before the academic economics profession sort of understood, you know,
central bank independence is a key thing.
Speaker 3 (30:19):
You know. I was listening.
Speaker 4 (30:21):
I don't know if it's like the trial lawyer equivalent
of constitutional law, you know, because it's like most conversations
about constitutional law do not sound like, you know, a
lawyer giving an opening statement. But I feel like Lev
can like really blend the two.
Speaker 2 (30:34):
Oh absolutely. By the way, for people who well everyone
who wasn't in the studio, you kind of missed Lev's
gesticulations to wild gesticulations, but they are very very effective.
Speaker 4 (30:45):
I think you could kind of hear them.
Speaker 2 (30:46):
Yeah, you can hear it in his voice. All right,
shall we leave it there.
Speaker 3 (30:49):
Let's leave it there.
Speaker 2 (30:50):
This has been another episode of the All Thoughts Podcast.
I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway and.
Speaker 4 (30:56):
I'm Joe Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwart. Hello,
Levmanond at Levmanon. Follow Our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Kerman
armand dash Ol Bennett at dashbod and Kilbrooks at Kalebrooks.
For more odd lootscontent, go to Bloomberg dot com slash
odd Lots, where we have all of our episodes in
a daily newsletter and you can chat about all of
these topics twenty four seven in our discord discord dot
(31:19):
gg slash odlines.
Speaker 2 (31:20):
And if you enjoy odd Lots, if you like it
when we talk about Humphreys Executor, then please leave us
a positive review on your favorite podcast platform. And remember,
if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to
all of our episodes absolutely ad free. All you need
to do is find the Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcasts
and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening
Speaker 3 (32:07):
In
Hosts And Creators
Joe Weisenthal
Tracy Alloway
Popular Podcasts
Crime Junkie
Does hearing about a true crime case always leave you scouring the internet for the truth behind the story? Dive into your next mystery with Crime Junkie. Every Monday, join your host Ashley Flowers as she unravels all the details of infamous and underreported true crime cases with her best friend Brit Prawat. From cold cases to missing persons and heroes in our community who seek justice, Crime Junkie is your destination for theories and stories you won’t hear anywhere else. Whether you're a seasoned true crime enthusiast or new to the genre, you'll find yourself on the edge of your seat awaiting a new episode every Monday. If you can never get enough true crime... Congratulations, you’ve found your people. Follow to join a community of Crime Junkies! Crime Junkie is presented by audiochuck Media Company.
24/7 News: The Latest
The latest news in 4 minutes updated every hour, every day.
Stuff You Should Know
If you've ever wanted to know about champagne, satanism, the Stonewall Uprising, chaos theory, LSD, El Nino, true crime and Rosa Parks, then look no further. Josh and Chuck have you covered.