July 19, 2025 • 27 mins
There’s a long history of US presidents putting pressure on the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates, but the techniques have often been subtle or quiet in some way. Under President Trump, attacks on the Fed have risen to a whole new level. And it’s not just Trump that’s called on Chair Jerome Powell to cut rates. Other members of his administration (along with allies in Congress) have been hammering him both on policy and also topics unrelated to monetary policy, such as the cost of renovating the Federal Reserve building in Washington. Investors are taking seriously the prospect that Trump will find a way or a reason to remove Powell before the end of his term next year. And regardless of when Powell is replaced, there’s a widespread anticipation that the next Fed chair will be someone more closely resembling a Trump loyalist. So do we still have an independent Fed at this point? On this episode, we speak with University of Texas-Austin economics professor Carola Binder about why central bank independence is so cherished by economists, why mere criticism of the Fed could be inflationary, and whether Fed independence has been permanently damaged.
Read More:
Odd Lots Newsletter: Central Bank Independence Is a Spectrum
What Happened the Last Time a Fed Chief Was Bounced
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Speaker 1 (00:02):
Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News.
Speaker 2 (00:18):
Hello and welcome to another episode of the All Thoughts podcast.
I'm Tracy Alloway.
Speaker 3 (00:22):
And I'm Joe wysn't Thal.
Speaker 2 (00:23):
Joe, you wrote a good newsletter this week.
Speaker 4 (00:25):
Thank you.
Speaker 3 (00:26):
Thank you for saying that just that one. I wrote
a good newsletter this week. No but interesting week because
obviously there's for months, you know, talk about FED independence,
Would President Trump try to fire Jerome Powell? All of
these different questions, It's heating up. This is a very
difficult topic to talk about podcast wise, because there's always
(00:48):
that chance that, you know, we record something on FED
independence and by the time the episode is produced and edited,
something new has happened. So very dicey, but you know,
we're hoping that in the next short period of time
this holds, because well, this is a really important story.
Speaker 2 (01:03):
We're recording this on July eighteenth, and I think the
ambition is to get it out on July nineteenth, so
hopefully nothing changes that quickly, but of course you never know.
And just this week we have had these back and
forth headlines. We had a report that Trump was considering
firing Pal sort of imminently, and then he came out
at a press conference and said no, he wasn't.
Speaker 3 (01:24):
Yeah, and he said there was a report that there
was a literal letter that was saying other people affiliated
Indian administration and hammering Powell. Some unrelated to monetary policies,
some relating to the cost of renovations of the Federal
Reserve offices. The criticism is of course getting intense. Anyway,
I've been trying to learn more about this question of
FED independence. I came across a lot of the research
(01:46):
that was done by economist Carola Binder which had that
was interesting, which talks about how FED independence is this
cherished idea in economics. But it's not just about the
idea of whether the FED is legally independent. Sure on
the FED itself, even if the FED doesn't necessarily react,
just the rhetoric against the FED and central banks around
(02:07):
the world, not the FED specifically, but central banks around
the world. Just the rhetoric and the pressure of the
perception that the central bank is losing independence can have
macroeconomic effects.
Speaker 2 (02:17):
Yeah, and despite some people cherishing that independence, we know
from a lot of recent events, the rise of populism
around the world, that it seems a lot of people
don't like unelected bureaucrats.
Speaker 3 (02:28):
Yeah, let's just.
Speaker 4 (02:29):
Put it that way.
Speaker 2 (02:30):
Okay, So we actually have Kerala here. She is, of course,
the Associate professor of economics in the School of Civil
Leadership at UT Austin, Caroala, thank you so much for
coming on odd lots.
Speaker 4 (02:44):
Yeah, thanks so much for having me fitty to be here.
Speaker 2 (02:47):
Do you just want to give us maybe a summary
of your previous work and why you got interested in
the subject of central bank independence in the first place.
Speaker 4 (02:56):
Sure, yeah, I mean the taper that was mentioned in
the New Letters one called political pressure on central banks,
and in that work, I really wanted to understand this
distinction between legal central bank independence, which we know has
been rising around the world for the past couple of decades,
versus actual or de facto central bank independence, because it
(03:19):
seems like even when the central bank does have legal
protections that kind of insulate the bank from politics, there's
still always going to be reason for politicians to try
to convince the central bank to do what they want.
I mean, that's the whole reason why we have legal
protections on central bank independence. So it's kind of hard
(03:40):
to measure that. What I ended up doing, with the
help of a couple of research assistants, was reading through
these reports by Economist Intelligence Unit that come out every
quarter for basically every country and just seeing whenever there
was a mention of some kind of political pressure on
the central bank, and we tried to record whether it
was pressure for easier or looser monetary policy, and also
(04:04):
whether the central bank resisted the pressure or succumbed to it.
And then once we had this new data set about
all of these instances, at least all the known instances
of pressure on central banks, then I was able to
use that to say, well, what happens afterwards, especially to inflation.
And as Joe said, if the central bank succumbs to
the pressure, it's almost always pressure for looser monetary policy,
(04:28):
So that's certainly followed by higher inflation. But even if
they try to resist, inflation still rises, just not as much,
but it still rises. So my interpretation there is that
it probably has something to do with expectations. So people
start at least worrying that there's a chance that the
(04:49):
central bank is going to give in to those pressures.
They know that if they do, that'll be inflationary, So
inflation expectations rise right now, and that makes inflation itself
start to rise.
Speaker 3 (04:59):
All to back up for a second, I described in
the intro central bank independence one of these sort of
very cherished ideas and perceived is extremely important. What are
you describing? Why is this actually because as Tracy mentioned,
there's a lot of people who find it distasteful that
there are entities within any government that aren't directly democratically accountable.
(05:24):
What is it about central bank independence that is perceived
by economists to be such a goal, so to speak.
Speaker 4 (05:30):
So the way I see it as two main parts.
One is that there is a natural inflationary bias in
monetary policy, So meaning if you had monetary policy controlled
by elected politicians, they would always have this concern about
the next election. They always went to make the public
happy in the short term, so they're going to tend
(05:52):
towards re juicing the economy, even if in the longer
run that's going to cause inflation. So in equilibrium, you're
always running monetary policy to loose and getting too much inflation.
That happens if you don't have an independent central bank.
So if elected officials are controlling monetary policy. The other
side of it is. Think about the distinction between fiscal
(06:15):
policy and monetary policy. So having independent central banks is
very common, having independent fiscal authorities is not. And the
usual justification there is that fiscal policy has very obvious
distributional consequences. I mean, that's basically the point of fiscal
policy in some sense, like you want maybe you want
(06:37):
progressive taxes, you want to spend on certain groups of people,
you want to tax certain activities, and so that's inherently
about distribution, which is something that you really want to
be a political decision. You want, like the voters to
decide about what kind of distribution they want. Monetary policy,
on the other hand, is thought of as being a
(06:59):
lot more even, right, it affects the macroeconomy more than
it affects distribution. So in that way, it's like kind
of more acceptable in a democracy to delegate it to
some technocrats. That's kind of the traditional case, But of
course that's been very much challenged, especially when the FED
(07:20):
during the financial crisis started doing more unconventional monetary policies.
Those did have distributional consequences. They're kind of hard to measure,
but they're there, And even conventional monetary policy, like inflation
is going to hurt some people more than others, having
a weak labor market is going to hurt some people
more than others. So I think people do partly get
(07:43):
dissatisfied with central bank independence when they realize that whatever
the FED is doing, I think maybe hurts them more
than it hurts others, or that they didn't have any
say and in that kind of decision, which it is
political and inflation is political and monetary policy is too.
Speaker 2 (08:01):
You just reminded me on the topic of a natural
bias towards loosening of monetary policy and therefore inflation. Do
you ever get governments trying to pressure for higher interest rates?
I feel like I can't come up with a single examples.
Speaker 4 (08:15):
Well, it might not be obviously for higher interest rates,
but one of the few examples in that paper that
I found of pressure for tighter monetary policy was in
the US after the financial crisis, when the FED was
doing so much QE and a lot of Republicans in
Congress especially, we're worried that that was going to be
very inflationary, so they were pressuring the FED to cut
(08:39):
back on the QE or not do so much monetary easing.
Speaker 2 (08:43):
Those were wild times when we when a lot of people,
myself included, probably thought q was going to be inflationary.
Speaker 3 (08:49):
Yeah, or people thought it was gonna be hyper inflationary.
The more cynical interpretation, by the way, is not that
Republicans thought that, And this is just the cynical interpretation.
I'm not even saying, I'm going to say this, but
not that they were worried about inflation, but that they
didn't want the economy to recover particularly rapidly under a
democratic president. Again, different perceptions of what their motivations are.
Speaker 2 (09:12):
Okay.
Speaker 3 (09:13):
One of the things people say, and you talk to
like veteran people on Wall Street, and like they've always
done this. This is nothing new in this country. Every
president has in some way tried to pressure their central banker,
typically for easing in some way. And I think there's
all there's certainly examples of that, without question, how novel
and different. When we talk about their attacking him over
(09:34):
the cost of renovations, they're directly saying cut three hundred
basis points in a tweet, et cetera. Does this feel
like a meaningful step up in the level of pressure
that we've historically seen in the US.
Speaker 4 (09:48):
Yeah, I think the meaningful difference is that it's so
public now and so obvious, where it used to be
like there was this protocol right that the president might
want lower interest rates, they might want easier monetary policy,
but they're not going to say so out loud. There
was a lot of just careful procedure around it. So
(10:09):
the fact that it's really really like a public spectacle
now is a difference. It does, i think, further politicize
the FED because now the general public sees the President
tweeting about the FED, and depending on whether they support
the President or not, they might be more angry at
the FED or more defensive of the FED. So it
really makes it public in a way that is pretty new.
(10:33):
But I mean, I do get the point that there
is always this pressure on the FED, always from within
Congress too. You've had criticism of the FED, which coming
from Congress. It's a bit more appropriate than from the
President because the FED is accountable to Congress, So it
kind of makes more sense that you would see a
(10:53):
lot of criticism of the FED coming from Congress because
that's more their role. They have the monetary that they've
delegated to the fed.
Speaker 2 (11:02):
I know you're not in the sort of market coal
mines on a daily basis, but I'm hoping, I'm hoping
you may nevertheless have an opinion on this because one
of the weird things that happened this week when all
the headlines about Trump possibly firing Pal started to fly around,
was the biggest reaction in the market seemed to be
in the dollar, in the US currency, and we actually
(11:23):
didn't see that much movement in yields, at least going up,
like they didn't start surging. So I guess I'm curious.
If your thesis holds that any type of pressure tends
to be inflationary because it boosts perceptions of inflation, why
wouldn't we have seen an upward rise in yields that
(11:45):
reaction this week.
Speaker 4 (11:47):
Well, it's it's not that any type of pressure is inflationary.
It is that, on average, across all of these hundreds
of data points I was looking at, on average, pressure
was inflationary. This particular could be very different, I think
partly because there's so much, so much uncertainty about what
is Trump actually going to do. It's hard to even
(12:09):
follow the news here where he says he's going to
fire Powell or no he didn't, you know, So any
kind of announcement you get, I think the markets don't
know exactly how to take it right away. And some
of the news right like was already kind of baked in,
Like we've known for a couple of months that President
Trump was having this conflict with Chairman Powell. So maybe
(12:33):
these most recent announcements are not really that much new news.
Speaker 3 (12:53):
Has the damage already been done? This is the sort
of question that I'm wondering about, which is that, Okay,
usure has existed to some extent forever, it's become much
more of a public spectacle, it's become much more aggressive,
et cetera. There is this, I would say safe assumption
that Paula doesn't have that much longer in his term,
but that the assumption is that the next FED chair
(13:16):
will be some sort of capital l loyalist, too sure
that there will be alignment. I forget who it was
on TV talking about we need a new FED Treasury accord.
So would you say, like to some extent, that the
glass has been broken here or the glass has been cracked,
and that the damage has been done, even if the
(13:37):
FED legally retained its existing structure, that the FED going
forward will not be the same independent FED. It will
not be as independent as we've had for the last
several decades.
Speaker 4 (13:49):
Yes, I think that the damage to the perception of
the Fed's independence has already been done. There are really
big political divides how people perceive the FED. The kind
of tradition that one president would reappoint the previous president's
FED share, even if they were from a different political party.
(14:11):
I think that that tradition probably is over.
Speaker 3 (14:15):
Kind of like Supreme Court nominations which used to fly
through now are entirely done on political like the votes
on this confirmation votes are completely political now.
Speaker 4 (14:25):
Yeah, but I would say it's not just the fault
of Trump since his election, since his most recent election.
It's not just that. It's also what was happening during
the pandemic and during the high inflation episode and twenty
twenty one and twenty twenty two that did a lot
of damage as well, because there was so much on
(14:48):
both sides of trying to like place the blame and
saying was everything, The Fed's fault was everything. The fault
of the fiscal stimulus was it transitor, was inflation and
transitory or permanent. That really got things more politicized then,
and that's only been exacerbated by the past couple months.
Speaker 2 (15:06):
So one of the other narratives that I've seen this
week is this idea that, Okay, even if Trump fired
pal and put in place someone who would immediately push
for lower interest rates, you wouldn't necessarily get them a
because of the market expectations which you just describe, So
people might start pricing in higher inflation expectations, which would
(15:28):
move the curve up or steep in the curve. But
also because it's not just the FED chair making decisions,
it's a committee, and Trump might not be able to
influence the entire committee. How do you take into account,
I guess the rest of the FMC members. How do
they play into this type of political pressure.
Speaker 4 (15:50):
Yeah, so it is monetary policy by committee and different
under different FED chairs. The kind of committee decision making
has differed a little, just the norms around it. So
whether they like kind of how strong the FED chair
was and making sure that everyone would come to a
consensus versus allowing some more disagreement to be public. But yeah,
(16:14):
I think the fact that I mean the fact that
the members of the Committee have these overlapping terms and
pretty long term lengths. Is part of what gives it
independence because it means we don't have a complete turnover
of the Committee at any given point in time, and
there's going to be a lot of continuity there because
of that institutional structure. Especially if you get a FED
(16:37):
chair that's kind of external, that's viewed as a loyalist,
the rest of the Committee may be quite reluctant to
just go along with whatever the new FED chair says
if they don't feel like it's the right decision. The
FED to emphasize all the time that they're data dependent,
and I think that's the line that a lot of
Committee members would keep using. The unfortunate things we don't
(17:01):
know exactly in what sense they are data dependent, Like
they don't publish a monetary policy rule that they follow,
but they say that they take into account not just
the PCEE inflation rate and the unemployment rate, but all
sorts of other indicators about where the economy is headed,
and they react to all of those. So they would
(17:23):
I'm pretty sure most of the Committee would try to
just stick to the course that they're on, even if
there were a new chair in place.
Speaker 3 (17:29):
It would be really interesting because dissents are very rare,
and sometimes you get a lot of times you get
no descent, sometimes you get one. Very rarely you get two.
In the last in my career, I can't remember any
decision in the US that I think ever got more
than two descents. It would be interesting if that norm
or broken, where the Fed really does not control or
(17:51):
have basically get to guide the committee on their preferred path.
I want to talk about in the broad research. Globally,
establishing the independent central bank is politically difficult, and some
countries attempt to do it by simply outsourcing their monetary
policy to the Federal Reserve itself, by setting up a
dollar peg or currency board or something like that, because
(18:13):
they don't even have the sort of political capacity to
establish a truly independent central bank. What are the patterns
you see around the world. I'm curious in your research
when pressure builds on a central bank, is it usually
sort of a symptom of a broader domestic political disintegration
that's happening where just all kinds of norms are being violated,
(18:36):
or all kinds of structures are sort of collapsing or
deteriorating in some way.
Speaker 4 (18:40):
Yeah, Well, to the part about how the central bank
independence is set up, Sometimes it's because there's already a
very strong preference in that country for lower inflation, So
then it's kind of easier to set up an independent
central bank because they really want low inflation and they're
committed to it, which is why it's so hard and
the research to say the central bank independence actually lower
(19:03):
inflation because you have like a reverse causality. So sometimes
that's how it gets set up. Sometimes it's imposed by
like the IMF saying, you know, if you want to
keep having our support, there's some things you need to do,
and one of them is set up as independent central bank.
But then the part about like when do politicians start
(19:24):
pressuring the central bank? When does that really build up? Yeah,
I mean there was a lot more of the pressure
on the central banks around around crisis times. So I
think the financial crisis did erode a lot of trust
and institutions and made it more acceptable to pressure central banks. Also,
(19:44):
during the twenty tens, when inflation was really low, that
made it seem more like, Okay, having higher inflation doesn't
necessarily seem like so much of a threat. What we
really want is to boost the labor markets, at least
in certain countries, so then there was more pressure on
the central banks that way. The other thing is also
(20:06):
like the fiscal situation. So if there's big, big debts
to finance, right, and then there's going to be often
pressure for the lower interest rates or to monetize the
debt tracy.
Speaker 3 (20:16):
By the way, just as we're recording this headline from
the AP, all this stuff about criticism of the FED,
it turns out Chris Rugerberg Josh Bolke of the AP
reporting much of these costs were associated in twenty twenty
with Trump officials demanding that there'll be more marble at
the FED instead of glass. So a new wrinkle to
(20:36):
the cost of these office constructions.
Speaker 2 (20:38):
Anyway, you gotta have that marble. Trump loves marble, marble
and gold. He does have a very Louis the fifteenth style,
I guess tastes in interior design. Anyway, maybe we should
do an interior design. Yeah, yeah, I don't like that.
Speaker 4 (20:54):
Okay.
Speaker 2 (20:54):
Anyway, On a serious note, given those concerns around trusting
unelected bureaucrats and the idea that maybe you know, central
banks started to overstep their traditional roles post two thousand
and eight or something like that. What's the best way of,
I guess, ensuring that central banks are in some way
(21:16):
answerable to the electorate or in some way you know,
there's accountability there without sacrificing that independence.
Speaker 4 (21:26):
Yeah. I mean, this is a really important topic to
me and something I focus a lot on in my
book and in some of my other research. But I
think that making sure that the role of the FED
or the Central Bank is limited to something like price
stability and having a lot of transparency about how they're
achieving that is really important. So the FED has a
(21:48):
dual mandate. Having the price stability and the employment side
of the mandate gives them a lot of discretion because
sometimes those two goals can come into conflict and then
they need to just decide, well, what are we going
to prioritize right now. The more discretion that unelected technocrats have,
the more room there is for people to try to
pressure them one way or the other. In my book,
(22:11):
I advocate for a nominal GDP or a nominal income target,
which I think would help them achieve both parts of
that dual mandate, but with a single target that they're
going after, and then it makes it really clear at
any given point of time do they need tighter or
looser monetary policy, and there's not as much like wiggle room.
(22:32):
It makes it easier for them to justify their actions
and for the public to say, well, are they doing
what they say they're going to do or not? Versus
if you have an inflation target and kind of full
employment target, then you can always argue kind of for
either way. And yeah, so just keeping the role more limited.
(22:52):
Not lately, but before COVID, there was a lot more
pressure around central banks to do even more beyond those
kind of two parts of the dual mandate, to take
on climate change and inequality and issues like that. And
I think that those are important things that somebody needs
to do, but it's not really the job of the
FED because they're not elected to do that, and those
(23:15):
kinds of political topics need to be addressed by elected officials.
Speaker 3 (23:20):
One of the funny things I used to think of
the twenty tens is that had the FED only had
a single mandate, it's not it's conceivable to me that
policy would have been looser if they were continuing to
fail on its inflation target from the downside in those
days that you know, they continued to miss that two percent.
Had they had a nominal GDP target, a nominal income
(23:43):
target solely, it's possible actually that they might have achieved
the employment part of the mandate sooner because it would
be so sufficient that they were failing to hit that
target anyway, Caro Lebinder really appreciate you coming on. I'm
finding your research to be very fascinated. I'm happy to
have dived into it, so thank you so much for
coming on online.
Speaker 4 (24:04):
Thank you.
Speaker 1 (24:17):
Jo.
Speaker 2 (24:18):
Obviously a very timely episode to get out. I do
think the question you asked about whether or not attacks
on central bank independence might be part of a broader
deterioration norms and what's deemed acceptable by society and political society,
there is an element of that, Like, it does feel
like that.
Speaker 3 (24:38):
No, Like I think so like. I think if you
were to look around the world and you were to say,
find those examples where there is a lot of pressure
or stress on central banks, I think almost always you
would find it associated with other things happening in politics
that are sort of you know, the wheels are coming
off in some way. Turkey strikes me is a great
(25:00):
example of a country where the sort of like democratic
norms have eroded over time, certainly over the last twenty years,
many would say, And which gets to this whole idea
which Carola talked about. Causality is often hard to establish.
So you can point to on the line that this
pressure on a central bank, central bank independence period associated
(25:20):
with this or that inflation. But whether that's because it
was the pressure or because many bad things are going
on at the time, it's hard to disentangle.
Speaker 2 (25:29):
Absolutely, But I guess her broad conclusion that on average
this type of political pressure does lead to higher inflation expectations,
like it does suggest that if your ambition is lower rates,
then maybe this doesn't help.
Speaker 3 (25:45):
I mean, here's the thing. We are almost certainly going
to get a FED chair sometime in the next year.
Whether it's because Paula has been removed from his term
prematurely or just because at the end the next central
banker is perceived as a President Trump loyalist, there is
probably going to be a meaningful difference in the reaction
(26:05):
function of the FED toward faster impulse to cut. Very naturally,
people can assume, therefore that the future would be all
things equal, more inflationary.
Speaker 2 (26:16):
Very naturally, the natural rate will go up. Okay, shall
we leave it there.
Speaker 3 (26:19):
Let's leave it there.
Speaker 2 (26:20):
This has been another episode of the Odd Loots podcast.
I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Chacy Alloway.
Speaker 3 (26:26):
And I'm Joe Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwart.
Follow our guest Carola Binder, She's at c Consis. Follow
our producers Kerman Rodriguez at Kerman ermann Dash, Ob Bennett
at Dashbod and Kelbrooks at Kelbrooks. For more Odd Lots content,
go to Bloomberg dot com slash odd Lots with the
daily newsletter and all of our episodes, and you can
chat about all of these topics twenty four to seven
(26:47):
in our discord discord dot gg slash offlines.
Speaker 2 (26:51):
And if you enjoy Odd Lots, if you want Joe
to run for the next fed chair, then please leave
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Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News.
Speaker 2 (00:18):
Hello and welcome to another episode of the All Thoughts podcast.
I'm Tracy Alloway.
Speaker 3 (00:22):
And I'm Joe wysn't Thal.
Speaker 2 (00:23):
Joe, you wrote a good newsletter this week.
Speaker 4 (00:25):
Thank you.
Speaker 3 (00:26):
Thank you for saying that just that one. I wrote
a good newsletter this week. No but interesting week because
obviously there's for months, you know, talk about FED independence,
Would President Trump try to fire Jerome Powell? All of
these different questions, It's heating up. This is a very
difficult topic to talk about podcast wise, because there's always
(00:48):
that chance that, you know, we record something on FED
independence and by the time the episode is produced and edited,
something new has happened. So very dicey, but you know,
we're hoping that in the next short period of time
this holds, because well, this is a really important story.
Speaker 2 (01:03):
We're recording this on July eighteenth, and I think the
ambition is to get it out on July nineteenth, so
hopefully nothing changes that quickly, but of course you never know.
And just this week we have had these back and
forth headlines. We had a report that Trump was considering
firing Pal sort of imminently, and then he came out
at a press conference and said no, he wasn't.
Speaker 3 (01:24):
Yeah, and he said there was a report that there
was a literal letter that was saying other people affiliated
Indian administration and hammering Powell. Some unrelated to monetary policies,
some relating to the cost of renovations of the Federal
Reserve offices. The criticism is of course getting intense. Anyway,
I've been trying to learn more about this question of
FED independence. I came across a lot of the research
(01:46):
that was done by economist Carola Binder which had that
was interesting, which talks about how FED independence is this
cherished idea in economics. But it's not just about the
idea of whether the FED is legally independent. Sure on
the FED itself, even if the FED doesn't necessarily react,
just the rhetoric against the FED and central banks around
(02:07):
the world, not the FED specifically, but central banks around
the world. Just the rhetoric and the pressure of the
perception that the central bank is losing independence can have
macroeconomic effects.
Speaker 2 (02:17):
Yeah, and despite some people cherishing that independence, we know
from a lot of recent events, the rise of populism
around the world, that it seems a lot of people
don't like unelected bureaucrats.
Speaker 3 (02:28):
Yeah, let's just.
Speaker 4 (02:29):
Put it that way.
Speaker 2 (02:30):
Okay, So we actually have Kerala here. She is, of course,
the Associate professor of economics in the School of Civil
Leadership at UT Austin, Caroala, thank you so much for
coming on odd lots.
Speaker 4 (02:44):
Yeah, thanks so much for having me fitty to be here.
Speaker 2 (02:47):
Do you just want to give us maybe a summary
of your previous work and why you got interested in
the subject of central bank independence in the first place.
Speaker 4 (02:56):
Sure, yeah, I mean the taper that was mentioned in
the New Letters one called political pressure on central banks,
and in that work, I really wanted to understand this
distinction between legal central bank independence, which we know has
been rising around the world for the past couple of decades,
versus actual or de facto central bank independence, because it
(03:19):
seems like even when the central bank does have legal
protections that kind of insulate the bank from politics, there's
still always going to be reason for politicians to try
to convince the central bank to do what they want.
I mean, that's the whole reason why we have legal
protections on central bank independence. So it's kind of hard
(03:40):
to measure that. What I ended up doing, with the
help of a couple of research assistants, was reading through
these reports by Economist Intelligence Unit that come out every
quarter for basically every country and just seeing whenever there
was a mention of some kind of political pressure on
the central bank, and we tried to record whether it
was pressure for easier or looser monetary policy, and also
(04:04):
whether the central bank resisted the pressure or succumbed to it.
And then once we had this new data set about
all of these instances, at least all the known instances
of pressure on central banks, then I was able to
use that to say, well, what happens afterwards, especially to inflation.
And as Joe said, if the central bank succumbs to
the pressure, it's almost always pressure for looser monetary policy,
(04:28):
So that's certainly followed by higher inflation. But even if
they try to resist, inflation still rises, just not as much,
but it still rises. So my interpretation there is that
it probably has something to do with expectations. So people
start at least worrying that there's a chance that the
(04:49):
central bank is going to give in to those pressures.
They know that if they do, that'll be inflationary, So
inflation expectations rise right now, and that makes inflation itself
start to rise.
Speaker 3 (04:59):
All to back up for a second, I described in
the intro central bank independence one of these sort of
very cherished ideas and perceived is extremely important. What are
you describing? Why is this actually because as Tracy mentioned,
there's a lot of people who find it distasteful that
there are entities within any government that aren't directly democratically accountable.
(05:24):
What is it about central bank independence that is perceived
by economists to be such a goal, so to speak.
Speaker 4 (05:30):
So the way I see it as two main parts.
One is that there is a natural inflationary bias in
monetary policy, So meaning if you had monetary policy controlled
by elected politicians, they would always have this concern about
the next election. They always went to make the public
happy in the short term, so they're going to tend
(05:52):
towards re juicing the economy, even if in the longer
run that's going to cause inflation. So in equilibrium, you're
always running monetary policy to loose and getting too much inflation.
That happens if you don't have an independent central bank.
So if elected officials are controlling monetary policy. The other
side of it is. Think about the distinction between fiscal
(06:15):
policy and monetary policy. So having independent central banks is
very common, having independent fiscal authorities is not. And the
usual justification there is that fiscal policy has very obvious
distributional consequences. I mean, that's basically the point of fiscal
policy in some sense, like you want maybe you want
(06:37):
progressive taxes, you want to spend on certain groups of people,
you want to tax certain activities, and so that's inherently
about distribution, which is something that you really want to
be a political decision. You want, like the voters to
decide about what kind of distribution they want. Monetary policy,
on the other hand, is thought of as being a
(06:59):
lot more even, right, it affects the macroeconomy more than
it affects distribution. So in that way, it's like kind
of more acceptable in a democracy to delegate it to
some technocrats. That's kind of the traditional case, But of
course that's been very much challenged, especially when the FED
(07:20):
during the financial crisis started doing more unconventional monetary policies.
Those did have distributional consequences. They're kind of hard to measure,
but they're there, And even conventional monetary policy, like inflation
is going to hurt some people more than others, having
a weak labor market is going to hurt some people
more than others. So I think people do partly get
(07:43):
dissatisfied with central bank independence when they realize that whatever
the FED is doing, I think maybe hurts them more
than it hurts others, or that they didn't have any
say and in that kind of decision, which it is
political and inflation is political and monetary policy is too.
Speaker 2 (08:01):
You just reminded me on the topic of a natural
bias towards loosening of monetary policy and therefore inflation. Do
you ever get governments trying to pressure for higher interest rates?
I feel like I can't come up with a single examples.
Speaker 4 (08:15):
Well, it might not be obviously for higher interest rates,
but one of the few examples in that paper that
I found of pressure for tighter monetary policy was in
the US after the financial crisis, when the FED was
doing so much QE and a lot of Republicans in
Congress especially, we're worried that that was going to be
very inflationary, so they were pressuring the FED to cut
(08:39):
back on the QE or not do so much monetary easing.
Speaker 2 (08:43):
Those were wild times when we when a lot of people,
myself included, probably thought q was going to be inflationary.
Speaker 3 (08:49):
Yeah, or people thought it was gonna be hyper inflationary.
The more cynical interpretation, by the way, is not that
Republicans thought that, And this is just the cynical interpretation.
I'm not even saying, I'm going to say this, but
not that they were worried about inflation, but that they
didn't want the economy to recover particularly rapidly under a
democratic president. Again, different perceptions of what their motivations are.
Speaker 2 (09:12):
Okay.
Speaker 3 (09:13):
One of the things people say, and you talk to
like veteran people on Wall Street, and like they've always
done this. This is nothing new in this country. Every
president has in some way tried to pressure their central banker,
typically for easing in some way. And I think there's
all there's certainly examples of that, without question, how novel
and different. When we talk about their attacking him over
(09:34):
the cost of renovations, they're directly saying cut three hundred
basis points in a tweet, et cetera. Does this feel
like a meaningful step up in the level of pressure
that we've historically seen in the US.
Speaker 4 (09:48):
Yeah, I think the meaningful difference is that it's so
public now and so obvious, where it used to be
like there was this protocol right that the president might
want lower interest rates, they might want easier monetary policy,
but they're not going to say so out loud. There
was a lot of just careful procedure around it. So
(10:09):
the fact that it's really really like a public spectacle
now is a difference. It does, i think, further politicize
the FED because now the general public sees the President
tweeting about the FED, and depending on whether they support
the President or not, they might be more angry at
the FED or more defensive of the FED. So it
really makes it public in a way that is pretty new.
(10:33):
But I mean, I do get the point that there
is always this pressure on the FED, always from within
Congress too. You've had criticism of the FED, which coming
from Congress. It's a bit more appropriate than from the
President because the FED is accountable to Congress, So it
kind of makes more sense that you would see a
(10:53):
lot of criticism of the FED coming from Congress because
that's more their role. They have the monetary that they've
delegated to the fed.
Speaker 2 (11:02):
I know you're not in the sort of market coal
mines on a daily basis, but I'm hoping, I'm hoping
you may nevertheless have an opinion on this because one
of the weird things that happened this week when all
the headlines about Trump possibly firing Pal started to fly around,
was the biggest reaction in the market seemed to be
in the dollar, in the US currency, and we actually
(11:23):
didn't see that much movement in yields, at least going up,
like they didn't start surging. So I guess I'm curious.
If your thesis holds that any type of pressure tends
to be inflationary because it boosts perceptions of inflation, why
wouldn't we have seen an upward rise in yields that
(11:45):
reaction this week.
Speaker 4 (11:47):
Well, it's it's not that any type of pressure is inflationary.
It is that, on average, across all of these hundreds
of data points I was looking at, on average, pressure
was inflationary. This particular could be very different, I think
partly because there's so much, so much uncertainty about what
is Trump actually going to do. It's hard to even
(12:09):
follow the news here where he says he's going to
fire Powell or no he didn't, you know, So any
kind of announcement you get, I think the markets don't
know exactly how to take it right away. And some
of the news right like was already kind of baked in,
Like we've known for a couple of months that President
Trump was having this conflict with Chairman Powell. So maybe
(12:33):
these most recent announcements are not really that much new news.
Speaker 3 (12:53):
Has the damage already been done? This is the sort
of question that I'm wondering about, which is that, Okay,
usure has existed to some extent forever, it's become much
more of a public spectacle, it's become much more aggressive,
et cetera. There is this, I would say safe assumption
that Paula doesn't have that much longer in his term,
but that the assumption is that the next FED chair
(13:16):
will be some sort of capital l loyalist, too sure
that there will be alignment. I forget who it was
on TV talking about we need a new FED Treasury accord.
So would you say, like to some extent, that the
glass has been broken here or the glass has been cracked,
and that the damage has been done, even if the
(13:37):
FED legally retained its existing structure, that the FED going
forward will not be the same independent FED. It will
not be as independent as we've had for the last
several decades.
Speaker 4 (13:49):
Yes, I think that the damage to the perception of
the Fed's independence has already been done. There are really
big political divides how people perceive the FED. The kind
of tradition that one president would reappoint the previous president's
FED share, even if they were from a different political party.
(14:11):
I think that that tradition probably is over.
Speaker 3 (14:15):
Kind of like Supreme Court nominations which used to fly
through now are entirely done on political like the votes
on this confirmation votes are completely political now.
Speaker 4 (14:25):
Yeah, but I would say it's not just the fault
of Trump since his election, since his most recent election.
It's not just that. It's also what was happening during
the pandemic and during the high inflation episode and twenty
twenty one and twenty twenty two that did a lot
of damage as well, because there was so much on
(14:48):
both sides of trying to like place the blame and
saying was everything, The Fed's fault was everything. The fault
of the fiscal stimulus was it transitor, was inflation and
transitory or permanent. That really got things more politicized then,
and that's only been exacerbated by the past couple months.
Speaker 2 (15:06):
So one of the other narratives that I've seen this
week is this idea that, Okay, even if Trump fired
pal and put in place someone who would immediately push
for lower interest rates, you wouldn't necessarily get them a
because of the market expectations which you just describe, So
people might start pricing in higher inflation expectations, which would
(15:28):
move the curve up or steep in the curve. But
also because it's not just the FED chair making decisions,
it's a committee, and Trump might not be able to
influence the entire committee. How do you take into account,
I guess the rest of the FMC members. How do
they play into this type of political pressure.
Speaker 4 (15:50):
Yeah, so it is monetary policy by committee and different
under different FED chairs. The kind of committee decision making
has differed a little, just the norms around it. So
whether they like kind of how strong the FED chair
was and making sure that everyone would come to a
consensus versus allowing some more disagreement to be public. But yeah,
(16:14):
I think the fact that I mean the fact that
the members of the Committee have these overlapping terms and
pretty long term lengths. Is part of what gives it
independence because it means we don't have a complete turnover
of the Committee at any given point in time, and
there's going to be a lot of continuity there because
of that institutional structure. Especially if you get a FED
(16:37):
chair that's kind of external, that's viewed as a loyalist,
the rest of the Committee may be quite reluctant to
just go along with whatever the new FED chair says
if they don't feel like it's the right decision. The
FED to emphasize all the time that they're data dependent,
and I think that's the line that a lot of
Committee members would keep using. The unfortunate things we don't
(17:01):
know exactly in what sense they are data dependent, Like
they don't publish a monetary policy rule that they follow,
but they say that they take into account not just
the PCEE inflation rate and the unemployment rate, but all
sorts of other indicators about where the economy is headed,
and they react to all of those. So they would
(17:23):
I'm pretty sure most of the Committee would try to
just stick to the course that they're on, even if
there were a new chair in place.
Speaker 3 (17:29):
It would be really interesting because dissents are very rare,
and sometimes you get a lot of times you get
no descent, sometimes you get one. Very rarely you get two.
In the last in my career, I can't remember any
decision in the US that I think ever got more
than two descents. It would be interesting if that norm
or broken, where the Fed really does not control or
(17:51):
have basically get to guide the committee on their preferred path.
I want to talk about in the broad research. Globally,
establishing the independent central bank is politically difficult, and some
countries attempt to do it by simply outsourcing their monetary
policy to the Federal Reserve itself, by setting up a
dollar peg or currency board or something like that, because
(18:13):
they don't even have the sort of political capacity to
establish a truly independent central bank. What are the patterns
you see around the world. I'm curious in your research
when pressure builds on a central bank, is it usually
sort of a symptom of a broader domestic political disintegration
that's happening where just all kinds of norms are being violated,
(18:36):
or all kinds of structures are sort of collapsing or
deteriorating in some way.
Speaker 4 (18:40):
Yeah, Well, to the part about how the central bank
independence is set up, Sometimes it's because there's already a
very strong preference in that country for lower inflation, So
then it's kind of easier to set up an independent
central bank because they really want low inflation and they're
committed to it, which is why it's so hard and
the research to say the central bank independence actually lower
(19:03):
inflation because you have like a reverse causality. So sometimes
that's how it gets set up. Sometimes it's imposed by
like the IMF saying, you know, if you want to
keep having our support, there's some things you need to do,
and one of them is set up as independent central bank.
But then the part about like when do politicians start
(19:24):
pressuring the central bank? When does that really build up? Yeah,
I mean there was a lot more of the pressure
on the central banks around around crisis times. So I
think the financial crisis did erode a lot of trust
and institutions and made it more acceptable to pressure central banks. Also,
(19:44):
during the twenty tens, when inflation was really low, that
made it seem more like, Okay, having higher inflation doesn't
necessarily seem like so much of a threat. What we
really want is to boost the labor markets, at least
in certain countries, so then there was more pressure on
the central banks that way. The other thing is also
(20:06):
like the fiscal situation. So if there's big, big debts
to finance, right, and then there's going to be often
pressure for the lower interest rates or to monetize the
debt tracy.
Speaker 3 (20:16):
By the way, just as we're recording this headline from
the AP, all this stuff about criticism of the FED,
it turns out Chris Rugerberg Josh Bolke of the AP
reporting much of these costs were associated in twenty twenty
with Trump officials demanding that there'll be more marble at
the FED instead of glass. So a new wrinkle to
(20:36):
the cost of these office constructions.
Speaker 2 (20:38):
Anyway, you gotta have that marble. Trump loves marble, marble
and gold. He does have a very Louis the fifteenth style,
I guess tastes in interior design. Anyway, maybe we should
do an interior design. Yeah, yeah, I don't like that.
Speaker 4 (20:54):
Okay.
Speaker 2 (20:54):
Anyway, On a serious note, given those concerns around trusting
unelected bureaucrats and the idea that maybe you know, central
banks started to overstep their traditional roles post two thousand
and eight or something like that. What's the best way of,
I guess, ensuring that central banks are in some way
(21:16):
answerable to the electorate or in some way you know,
there's accountability there without sacrificing that independence.
Speaker 4 (21:26):
Yeah. I mean, this is a really important topic to
me and something I focus a lot on in my
book and in some of my other research. But I
think that making sure that the role of the FED
or the Central Bank is limited to something like price
stability and having a lot of transparency about how they're
achieving that is really important. So the FED has a
(21:48):
dual mandate. Having the price stability and the employment side
of the mandate gives them a lot of discretion because
sometimes those two goals can come into conflict and then
they need to just decide, well, what are we going
to prioritize right now. The more discretion that unelected technocrats have,
the more room there is for people to try to
pressure them one way or the other. In my book,
(22:11):
I advocate for a nominal GDP or a nominal income target,
which I think would help them achieve both parts of
that dual mandate, but with a single target that they're
going after, and then it makes it really clear at
any given point of time do they need tighter or
looser monetary policy, and there's not as much like wiggle room.
(22:32):
It makes it easier for them to justify their actions
and for the public to say, well, are they doing
what they say they're going to do or not? Versus
if you have an inflation target and kind of full
employment target, then you can always argue kind of for
either way. And yeah, so just keeping the role more limited.
(22:52):
Not lately, but before COVID, there was a lot more
pressure around central banks to do even more beyond those
kind of two parts of the dual mandate, to take
on climate change and inequality and issues like that. And
I think that those are important things that somebody needs
to do, but it's not really the job of the
FED because they're not elected to do that, and those
(23:15):
kinds of political topics need to be addressed by elected officials.
Speaker 3 (23:20):
One of the funny things I used to think of
the twenty tens is that had the FED only had
a single mandate, it's not it's conceivable to me that
policy would have been looser if they were continuing to
fail on its inflation target from the downside in those
days that you know, they continued to miss that two percent.
Had they had a nominal GDP target, a nominal income
(23:43):
target solely, it's possible actually that they might have achieved
the employment part of the mandate sooner because it would
be so sufficient that they were failing to hit that
target anyway, Caro Lebinder really appreciate you coming on. I'm
finding your research to be very fascinated. I'm happy to
have dived into it, so thank you so much for
coming on online.
Speaker 4 (24:04):
Thank you.
Speaker 1 (24:17):
Jo.
Speaker 2 (24:18):
Obviously a very timely episode to get out. I do
think the question you asked about whether or not attacks
on central bank independence might be part of a broader
deterioration norms and what's deemed acceptable by society and political society,
there is an element of that, Like, it does feel
like that.
Speaker 3 (24:38):
No, Like I think so like. I think if you
were to look around the world and you were to say,
find those examples where there is a lot of pressure
or stress on central banks, I think almost always you
would find it associated with other things happening in politics
that are sort of you know, the wheels are coming
off in some way. Turkey strikes me is a great
(25:00):
example of a country where the sort of like democratic
norms have eroded over time, certainly over the last twenty years,
many would say, And which gets to this whole idea
which Carola talked about. Causality is often hard to establish.
So you can point to on the line that this
pressure on a central bank, central bank independence period associated
(25:20):
with this or that inflation. But whether that's because it
was the pressure or because many bad things are going
on at the time, it's hard to disentangle.
Speaker 2 (25:29):
Absolutely, But I guess her broad conclusion that on average
this type of political pressure does lead to higher inflation expectations,
like it does suggest that if your ambition is lower rates,
then maybe this doesn't help.
Speaker 3 (25:45):
I mean, here's the thing. We are almost certainly going
to get a FED chair sometime in the next year.
Whether it's because Paula has been removed from his term
prematurely or just because at the end the next central
banker is perceived as a President Trump loyalist, there is
probably going to be a meaningful difference in the reaction
(26:05):
function of the FED toward faster impulse to cut. Very naturally,
people can assume, therefore that the future would be all
things equal, more inflationary.
Speaker 2 (26:16):
Very naturally, the natural rate will go up. Okay, shall
we leave it there.
Speaker 3 (26:19):
Let's leave it there.
Speaker 2 (26:20):
This has been another episode of the Odd Loots podcast.
I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Chacy Alloway.
Speaker 3 (26:26):
And I'm Joe Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwart.
Follow our guest Carola Binder, She's at c Consis. Follow
our producers Kerman Rodriguez at Kerman ermann Dash, Ob Bennett
at Dashbod and Kelbrooks at Kelbrooks. For more Odd Lots content,
go to Bloomberg dot com slash odd Lots with the
daily newsletter and all of our episodes, and you can
chat about all of these topics twenty four to seven
(26:47):
in our discord discord dot gg slash offlines.
Speaker 2 (26:51):
And if you enjoy Odd Lots, if you want Joe
to run for the next fed chair, then please leave
us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform. And remember,
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Hosts And Creators
Joe Weisenthal
Tracy Alloway
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