July 14, 2025 • 54 mins
Rohit Chopra is a former director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which was created in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. In this episode, we speak with him about the current status of the CFPB under the Trump administration, and Rohit's experience while working at the bureau, including decisions made by regulators during the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and others. Rohit frames his experience as one where he was often dealing with the convergence of old-fashioned banking with lightning-fast technological development. In this context, we also talk about stablecoins (which Rohit says aren't really "crypto," per se), why US banks are now trying to turn themselves into "super apps," and the massive growth of "Buy Now, Pay Later" platforms.
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Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:02):
Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News.
Speaker 2 (00:18):
Hello and welcome to another episode of the All Thoughts podcast.
I'm Tracy Alloway.
Speaker 1 (00:22):
And I'm Joe Wasenthal.
Speaker 2 (00:23):
Joe, if I had said to you a few years
ago that there's a bank and the bank is taking deposits,
you know, checking accounts, and it's putting that money into
US treasuries, and that business model is going to completely fail.
The bank is going to collapse, what would you have said?
Speaker 1 (00:45):
I said, let's short the stock. That's what I would
have said. I said, if you told me that and
you knew the only insight, the only actionable thing there,
I said, all right, let's short it.
Speaker 2 (00:54):
All right, that's the right answer.
Speaker 3 (00:55):
Clearly.
Speaker 2 (00:56):
If you were a banking regulator, what would you have done?
Speaker 1 (00:59):
Well, I don't know anything about big a banking regular
It seems really hard. And regulators in general often get
criticized in various ways, and they're like, oh, you busted
this really small time tiki tech insider trading ring. It's
not that big of a deal. Or oh, here's this
thing that collapsed and why didn't you catch it before?
They're always going to get upset about that. But I
(01:21):
have to say, I have a lot of sympathy for
the regulators because for the most part, my impression is
that the US has one of the most robust, transparent,
high depth capital markets and financial systems in the entire world,
which for the most part does not collapse. And so
I feel like when it comes to regulatory issues, there's
a lot of unseen where what we see is like,
(01:42):
if they're in the news, it's not good. But most
of the time things aren't the news.
Speaker 2 (01:46):
That should be the tagline for America's financial system most
of the time does not collapse. Yeah, and ironically, well
I'm talking of course, or I was talking about Silicon
Valley Bank. Yeah, and the collapse there, And I think
it's still very surprising to me. In one sense it
was an old fashioned bank run, But in another sense,
it's very surprising that here's a bank that's basically buying
(02:08):
a bunch of ultra safe assets US treasuries and still
it ran into trouble. And banks, of course are mandated
to buy treasuries as well. We've talked about this on
the show any number of times now, but I want
to talk more about it.
Speaker 1 (02:23):
Sure, you know. The one thing I'll say too, that
I've been thinking a lot with SVB is. I think
in the wake of the two thousand and eight two
thousand and nine financial crisis, we got very focused on
the asset side of the balance, right, and so it's like,
what they hit, what kind of subprime loans do they have,
and how good are there all of that, et cetera.
But one of the things, you know, like Josh Younger
talked about recently in others. Stephen Kelly had a note
(02:45):
in our newsletter, you know, a lot of it is
the difficulty in modeling the liability side and the slipperiness
of the deposit base and how hard that is to
know because you can have long duration deposits that suddenly
become overnight deposits. It's really tricky, and I still think
these are difficult things to understand.
Speaker 2 (03:03):
Yeah, it feels like we're always fighting the last bank
battle or the last bond battle. Okay, Well, on that note,
we do, in fact have the perfect guest. We are
going to be speaking with ro Hit Chopra. He is,
of course the former director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
also a former FTC commissioner, so really the perfect person
to talk to. If we want to dig into what
(03:25):
happened to SVB, what it means for bank regulation, and
then also what banks are doing right now. Hit Thank
you so much.
Speaker 4 (03:33):
For coming on all thoughts, Thanks for having me.
Speaker 2 (03:35):
Here's my first question. Maybe it's a little pointed, but
does the CFPB still exist? So we just got the
one big beautiful bill that's been passed and it looks
like it slashes funding for the bureau, And of course
we know that Trump isn't exactly a fan of federal agencies,
so I'm curious is it still functioning?
Speaker 1 (03:53):
There's already kind of good at it.
Speaker 4 (03:54):
Yeah, anyway, it's a good question, and it seems by
every single piece of evidence that it's just maybe there
technically but not doing a damn thing. We are hearing
nearly every day about another financial institution that is being
released from obligations. It has been months since there has
(04:16):
been an enforcement action, and many are estimating that this
means billions and billions of dollars that consumers are not
getting back in refunds and frankly a big disadvantage to
all of those financial companies that follow the rules.
Speaker 1 (04:32):
When it was working, when or when it was operating,
describe to me what the remit of the CFPB is.
And one of the criticisms of the people leveled is
they didn't know what the scope was, etc. What is
the formal scope of the CFPP.
Speaker 4 (04:47):
Well, essentially, we saw decades ago that there weren't just
banks in the business of offering consumer loans and products.
It was all sorts of other companies heyday lenders, auto lenders,
and in fact now the bulk of mortgages are originated
outside of banks, the bulk of auto loans, and so
(05:09):
after the subprime mortgage crisis, there was broad agreement that
the Federal Reserve Board and other agencies just didn't focus
and have the attention on making sure that existing consumer
law was being followed. So the CFPB is responsible for
inspecting the largest financial institutions and taking them to court
(05:35):
when they break the law. Of course, also administering all
sorts of rules that keep the mortgage markets, the credit report,
credit reporting companies, and so many others in line.
Speaker 2 (05:46):
How does the CFPB interact with all the other bank
policy stakeholders, because there seems to be quite a few.
Speaker 4 (05:54):
You mean, the other regulators. The CFPB is the only
regulate that oversees that gigantic non bank consumer lending apparatus,
and also it has primary and exclusive jurisdiction overall banks
and credit unions over ten billion in assets. That means
(06:14):
every credit card company, every big player in the market
is primarily overseen by the CFPB. So the fact that
it is now functionally a dead fish is leaving a
very very big gap that no one can even legally
fill in.
Speaker 1 (06:33):
Where do you see the biggest gap manifesting right now
when you look at the consumer financial landscape, What isn't
being enforced or what isn't being examined that in your
view merite enforcement or examination.
Speaker 4 (06:46):
Well, I think the top priority is always trying to
understand the linkage between the biggest markets and the broader economy.
We saw that that linkage with the mortgage market was
pretty damn big, and its failure really crashed not just
the US financial system but the entire global marketplace. So,
(07:08):
of course, making sure that mortgages are fair and transparent,
that key rules like the qualified Mortgage Rule, which sets
some of the core standards to make sure there is
not predatory mortgage lending, but also the nuts and bolts
most of the issues that come in are people who
have errors on their credit report they say, that's not
(07:30):
even my name, or people whose bank accounts were illegally
debited or cleaned out due to fraud. There's all sorts
of issues that protect specific populations, military members, and so
many other pieces that keep the markets working. So I
(07:51):
don't want to pinpoint anything other than to say that
when I took office, it was after another few years
where there really wasn't much going on there, and we
saw how financial firms not just push the envelope, but
sometimes outright took advantage of people without any accountability.
Speaker 2 (08:11):
Well, speaking of accountability, you know, we mentioned SVB at
the top of the show, and one thing I've heard
there's a little bit of a chicken and egg situation
when people are analyzing the root cause of that particular
bank collapse. So some people say, well, interest rates went
up and that led to paper losses on the bank's
(08:32):
bond holdings, and so people got nervous and started pulling
their money. And then other people say, well, people started
pulling their money even though the bond losses didn't necessarily
need to be crystallized anytime soon. So I'm curious, can
you pinpoint the spark that set off the latest bank crisis.
Speaker 4 (08:51):
Well for me, it really was March eighth, twenty twenty three.
Two things happened that day. One was the wind down
of a bank called Silvergate Bank, which was heavily involved
in banking some of the major crypto trading platforms. There
(09:11):
was a flight of deposits out of that bank after
the crypto winter and the collapse of FTX. We had
been tracking I Serve on the FDIC board and we
were tracking Silvergate Bank, and on that day they announced
that they were not going to need to be put
into receivership, they would be self liquidating. And simultaneously, on
(09:33):
that same day, we had an announcement by Silicon Valley Bank,
which was a little bit of a goofy press release
they issued saying they're experiencing some real losses on their
securities portfolio and they're going to be looking for capital.
It raised a lot of red flags and suspicions about
(09:57):
whether they were viable. And this is something that is
just so fundamental about banking and deposit taking is that
it really is based on a belief that your money
is going to be there. And the truth is is
with federal deposit insurance and Federal Reserve discount window lending.
(10:18):
It always is, except when you have a bank that
is over ninety percent uninsured deposits. This is something that
is really unusual, and some would argue as not even
really a bank when you are that dependent on very
very large depositors that you grew so quickly, and so
(10:42):
then the run began.
Speaker 1 (10:44):
How much would you ascribe it to the high percentage
of non insured deposits versus the concentration so in very
specific industries. So you mentioned the crypto one, but also
here are all of these startups. It had raised a
ton of money in twenty twenty and twenty twenty one.
(11:05):
A bunch of them apparently just put their money on
a bank, which is kind of weird to me, non insured,
and then we had the stock market plunge in twenty
twenty two. Funding dried up. There was no very little
new VC fundraising, so new dry powder to be put
into the bank. Startups drawing down their own deposits just
to make payroll or whatever else. And so you have
two things going on. One is the high level of
(11:27):
uninsured deposits, but also the concentration, so that there was
this one specific sector that was all going through the
cycle at the same time.
Speaker 4 (11:34):
So let me just push on that because even though
it is one sector, and I agree with you, the
concentration was an important factor in this. But let's remember
that the individual firms that were funded by venture capital,
many of them were doing fine. There was not necessarily
something specifically or systemically wrong with those businesses. But I think,
(12:01):
and I agree with every small and mid sized business
out there. If I am launching a startup, whether it
is an AI company or a dry cleaner, it doesn't
rank in the top twenty reasons of my business failing
that my bank is going to fail. Sure, And so
what you start hearing is that these businesses, which are
(12:23):
highly networked as well as much faster communication, you get
the advice from your funders and others that you need
to run. And it was very clear that it was
not just happening at SVB, it then was happening all
over the system.
Speaker 2 (12:43):
I was on a train to Connecticut around that time
and someone was sitting kind of close to me, and
it turned out they were banking with SVB. Their company was,
and I could hear the panic and their voice as
they tried to digest the news of what was happening.
But on that note, why did corporate treasurers, why did
they put all their deposits in a single bank when
(13:04):
presumably they know that there's a cap on FDIC insurance.
Speaker 4 (13:08):
Yeah, it's a good question. I think there are some
practical issues for some small and mid sized businesses about
when you're running payroll or when you're getting in a
lot of receipts. I don't have as much sympathy for
some of the very large companies that we have learned
through public reporting put a whole lot of funds in
(13:29):
that bank, including really their entire cash reserves. So at
the end of the day, though the regulators had, we
saw an active run that was occurring, and of course
those insured depositors, the insured depositors really through the entire crisis,
did not really run. It was those uninsured started at
(13:54):
Silicon Valley Bank after that Wednesday release. By fry Day morning,
they were dead. We had actually voted the night before
or maybe at the pre dawn hours to accept it
into receivership, and I believe by the time it was
closed it had roughly one hundred billion dollars queued up
(14:17):
of outbound wires. So this was an enormous and fast run.
And many of those techno libertarians that we often hear
about who want no regulation, they were actively beating the
drum online asking for a Baila.
Speaker 1 (14:34):
Well, this is actually interesting point. I was going to
go there next. And I think again it was a
thing that Stephen Kelly wrote for us. But one of
the things about twenty twenty three, I think it said
it wasn't a crisis of regional banks. It was a
regional bank crisis, as in specifically the region of California,
because then there were other parts of there were other
banks that got into a lot of trouble, and the
(14:56):
all thing they had in common was that they were
all sort of in some way connected to California. I
think I remember like people were going out looking for
any bank that had California in the title in some
way and betting against them. But talk to us about
regulating banks and monitoring runs in the world of these networks,
whether the the public networks on social media or just
(15:18):
the sort of networks of like mind individuals who are
all in the same WhatsApp group.
Speaker 4 (15:22):
Yeah, I'm a believer that we can never fight and
We shouldn't want to fight the speed of communication. We
want markets to have live information. I will say this,
we saw the run start first at Silicon Valley Bank,
and then I think because of the confluence of factors
(15:42):
with Silvergate, it wasn't just California as anything that seemed
to have any crypto or tech adjacency. Of course, the
second bank that we closed that Sunday was Signature Bank,
which operated a crypto network but also had a very
real business. It is a New York City bank that
(16:04):
was deeply involved in New York City multifamily real estate.
You at the same time, Joe had people worried about
commercial real estate. But what we were seeing was that
the banks with the highest percentage of uninsured deposits, they
were being badly battered almost immediately.
Speaker 2 (16:41):
So ultimately a decision was made to expand the deposit
insurance net and basically bail out SVB customers and others.
What was the decision making process like building up to
that and how big a deal is that? Is there
like a legacy from that decision.
Speaker 4 (16:57):
It's a very big deal, and it's one that in
many ways is still hard to live with the decision,
even though it was the right decision, I think. Here's
how it works. The federal law basically directs the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation the FDIC, to resolve a failed bank
at the least cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund. That's
(17:21):
the fund that everyone pays into with their bank deposits,
and it builds up a fund to pay for certain
bank failures and make sure deposits are made whole. And
here's what was interesting about Silicon Valley Bank and Signature
Bank and then later First Republic. It was a super
majority of uninsured deposits. That means a bank failure is
(17:48):
not that expensive to resolve. The cost to the Deposit
Insurance Fund for a bank that is ninety percent plus
uninsured is going to be pretty low. And if the
law says resolve it at the least cost, in many ways,
the best case is sometimes to liquidate it, make as
(18:12):
many people whole as possible, and top them up with
the deposit Insurance Fund. But there is a proviso in
the law which says that if a failure is likely
to lead to systemic effects or to threaten the viability
of the US financial system, there's a process of key
(18:34):
turning that a series of regulators must go through to
recommend to the Treasury Secretary, who must consult with the
President to authorize the FDIC to take a different path.
So over the weekend the Sunday after the failure of
Silicon Valley Bank, and Sunday morning, roughly Signature Bank was
(18:58):
taken into receivership. First Republic was a zombie and basically
dead already. There was a decision where the FDIC board
we voted to turn that key, and the Federal Reserve
Board had voted to turn that key, and ultimately the
Treasury Secretary discussed it with the President and activated that authority.
(19:24):
The authority essentially led to the backstopping of all uninsured deposits.
That meant that everyone would be made whole in the
case of the failure, and it was a tough decision.
I think there was a question I was arguing and questioning,
(19:45):
should we be maybe raising the limit dramatically, perhaps to
twenty five or fifty million dollars. What we were seeing
in the system was active movement of uninsured deposits everywhere,
and ultimately the decision to invoke that exception really did
(20:06):
calm the system for the most part with the big
exception of First Republic Bank.
Speaker 2 (20:12):
So the other thing that happened other than the expanded
deposit insurance was the creation of a new FED Lending
facility another acronym, the BTFP. How big a deal was
that one?
Speaker 4 (20:26):
That one was weird. All banks have the ability to
access the discount window through the Federal Reserve, but the
Federal Reserve used some bailout authorities to launch this bank
term funding program. This allowed banks to pledge their treasury
securities at par and draw funds from the Federal Reserve.
(20:49):
I think there were a lot of us who raised
our eyebrows at this. If the banks already had access
to the discount window, why did they need this special program.
I worried about the precedent setting of this. It was
justified on the basis that there is stigma of going
to the discount window. Ultimately, we saw some financial institutions
(21:14):
game and arbitrage the program by drawing on it but
then earning interest on reserves. I think we just have
to be really careful when the Fed engages in lots
of bailout programs, because it sends a signal to the
market that they can expect it the next time.
Speaker 1 (21:35):
Around as a regulator. There are many people who say this,
and you had a high level of scrutiny towards companies
that banked crypto companies, and many of them claimed that
they were treated unfairly. What is it just from a
high level, let's start there. From a high level, what
issues emerge when, if any issues emerge from a bank
(21:55):
that tries to build up a business among crypto companies.
Speaker 4 (21:58):
I think this is a bit of a conspiracy theory. Yeah.
Speaker 1 (22:01):
No, look, I'm but I'm just from a regulatory person.
Speaker 4 (22:04):
Okay, go on, because because the truth is is that
the issues with Silicon Valley Bank, as you know and
described earlier, was really about being so deeply underwater on
their treasure securities.
Speaker 1 (22:18):
But there's sure whether we're talking about Signature Bank, which
did have a pretty big crypto book. But also you
just get all these crypto companies like, oh, we don't
have it's so difficult for us to find a bank account.
Is it difficult for them to do banking?
Speaker 4 (22:31):
Yeah, so let's see what we mean about banking for
crypto lending. Certainly there are going to be some banks
who feel they have no expertise in this, I think
the really interesting question is about deposit taking.
Speaker 1 (22:46):
Yes, definitely, I'm not talking about crypto. I'm talking about
the deposit taking from crypto, native com cryptic company deposit taking.
Speaker 4 (22:53):
There are a set of issues that banks always are
going to want to look at when it comes to
taking very very large deposits with a lot of in
and out activity, and much of that is related to
their own obligations for money laundering as well as what
was mentioned before, deposit concentration. So when you are a
(23:15):
bank that has a couple of depositors who are the
super majority of your deposit base, you're obviously going to
take some steps to be careful around that. And I
would say that the crypto issues in this run were
fairly muted. It was really the perception about the potential
(23:36):
exposures that we saw through the market, though I feel
that within a few days the fixation again was on
uninsured deposits.
Speaker 2 (23:47):
When it comes to the bond losses, it strikes me
that the FED is kind of in a difficult position because,
on the one hand, it has to conduct monetary policy.
If inflation is high, it has to raise benchmark rates,
But on the other hand, it also has a financial
stability mandate. It's not part of the dual mandate, but
it is a regulator, and raising interest rates in this
(24:09):
case sparked a bank run. It seems how is the
Fed supposed to balance these two goals.
Speaker 4 (24:16):
I don't see that as a balance at all. Okay,
I think there is a lot that the Federal Reserve
has really missed in many of the situations involving financial
stability around Lehman Brothers, as well as even including COVID,
(24:37):
But certainly this one was a more clear linkage where
when you have high concentrations of bond portfolios that are underwater,
you need to be extra careful to not make sure
that they are under capitalized, that they lack liquidity, and frankly,
(24:58):
that you are not turning upnd I when you are
supervising that institution. The warning signs with Silicon Valley Bank
were there for months, and I do think there was
a bit of a culture at the Federal Reserve of
really taking a light touch in the years leading up
(25:19):
to the crisis that I think has proven to be costing.
Speaker 1 (25:38):
I want to go back to crypto because I want
to talk, not just I understand the obligations that a
bank has in terms of money laundering, in terms of
lots of in and out transactions, et cetera. However, from
a regulatory perspective, were banks that built up a crypto
book of business? Did they get extra scrutiny in somewhere
(25:59):
does that man extra scrutiny?
Speaker 4 (26:01):
I think you always want to make sure that rules
are as clear as possible, and I do think bank
regulation has turned into really a messy set of rules. Frankly,
I think to accommodate the largest players rather than simple,
bright line rules when it comes to new types of activities.
(26:23):
There's no question that novel activities are going to need
a little bit more look than say a straightforward mortgage
or a straightforward small business loan. So when you have,
particularly a bank that doesn't have experience in a product,
that may pose some real risks to them, I don't
(26:47):
think it's unreasonable for a bank regulator to kick the
tires in what.
Speaker 1 (26:51):
Is kicking the tires look like? Specifically?
Speaker 4 (26:54):
I think it can take a wide range of activities.
It really depends on what type of new business that
that bank is offering. But at the core, making sure
that that bank is well capitalized and liquid is always
the top priority. But if you know, banks play a
major role in the financial state craft of America and
(27:18):
one of the big reasons and benefits of the reserve
currency is the role in detecting and deterring terrorism, finance,
drug cartels, and more. And federal law puts some real obligations.
Speaker 2 (27:30):
On them for that. Okay, So speaking of novel businesses,
I want to widen the net a little bit and
maybe talk about fintech and what banks are doing right now.
And here I have to issue a disclaimer, which is
I'm very jaded about fintech in general. I used to
cover it at the FT and I heard the same stories,
the same themes over and over again, like big tech
(27:53):
is coming for the banks, or retail is coming for
the banks, like Walmart starting a financial product, and things
like that. Fast forward to today, I mean, it does
seem like this is something that is actually happening. What's
the ultimate ambition there in the payment space?
Speaker 4 (28:11):
Well, payments is really something that has so rapidly changed.
Many of it is very good. It's easier to move money,
particularly with mobile devices. It's faster than it used to be.
I do think that we have some real concerns about
the playbook that many of the firms who are moving money,
(28:34):
how are they monetizing it. A lot of our payments
companies and big tech companies, I think are really drooling
over what they see in China where Ali pay and
we Chat pay are trafficking almost all of the consumer
payments non cash payments in pay.
Speaker 2 (28:54):
In cash at a Starbucks in Beijing. I know from
personal experience.
Speaker 3 (28:59):
And we happen.
Speaker 4 (29:00):
There's a lot of questions about what is the monetization
scheme there. When I was at the CPPB, we led
a study that looked at all of these major payment platforms,
and I think there was a desire to monetize a
lot of that payment's information through surveillance, being able to
(29:22):
know exactly not just the amount someone is paying, but
the skew level data in their basket, ultimately feeding a
foundational algorithm that ultimately could serve up personalized prices. There
was lots of issues we dealt with when it comes
to fraud and identity theft. There were certainly issues when
(29:46):
it comes to the shift of where money was being stored.
Many people believed that the app they were using to
send money had money in a bank account somewhere, but
in fact maybe it was in an uninsured account. So
I think that we should be looking at payments in
terms of what is the ambitions of those companies and
(30:09):
why do they want it. We worked hard with global
central banks and regulators to inject more competition. Apple, for example,
had a real choke hold over iOS devices, only allowing
Apple Pay to be used. Europe has banned that practice.
Other countries are looking to restrict it as well. So
(30:33):
I think that stable coin, and once stable coin becomes
part of the broader ecosystem, which it may, it will
open up some additional issues about how payments in America
will ultimately work.
Speaker 1 (30:49):
Yeah, I was just gonna ask about that, actually, because
to some extent that seems like a potentially good thing.
If I'm worried about Okay, there's a handful of Internet giants,
a handful of commerce giants who want to have more
and more skew level data about myself and what I buy.
To my mind, it seems possible that stable coins and
(31:11):
having your own distributed wallet on your phone or something
like that could change the architecture of the Internet such
that there isn't such a information bottleneck that only a
few giant companies have access to.
Speaker 4 (31:25):
Yeah, it depends on who's issuing them. When I was
at the Federal Trade Commission, Mark Zuckerberg, Cheryl Sandberg others
announced the Libra project, which I think was completely a
way to cement more of a mode of Facebook and
now Meta's empire of being able to track and trace
(31:46):
the flow of money and ultimately to be able to
ensure that merchants operating in their ecosystem would use their
currency of choice. So I think it's really important that
we do not have payments and money controlled by any
(32:06):
real big commercial player. It is if there is a
stable coin that is issued completely separately that is not
affiliated with one of those companies. But I worry that
the market could easily tip to award an existing big
tech network, and ultimately that might provide huge advantages to
(32:30):
that firm, but not necessarily the whole economy.
Speaker 1 (32:34):
Tracy, you know it's funny to me, is you know,
you have all the crypto people and a lot of
them got really upset about Libra again and how that
thing holl failed. But to my mind, if you think
about it, many of those same tech people hated the
speech regulations that it existed on the big social networks
in the early twenty twenties and the late tens, and
(32:54):
the idea of shadow banning and all of this stuff.
And it's like, imagine if they did that to payments, right, Like,
do you really want to invest that same power that
they have to decide what is appropriate speech and not
appropriate speech into the realm of Okay, Now they also
have the ability to regulate what is appropriate payments and
inappropriate payments. That's a lot of investiture of power.
Speaker 2 (33:14):
This is the issue that came up in the UK,
right there was already some drama about who was it
Nigel Frage's bank account being taken away because of his politics,
So yeah, that concern is definitely there.
Speaker 4 (33:25):
And we have that here where PayPal had sent out
some terms and conditions that allowed PayPal to find people
for their speech, presumably off platform. And I think we
need to be really careful about giving any of those
(33:49):
firms the ability to really have a big footprint, either
on speech or on commerce. And that is part of
the reason why developed countries have separated banking and commerce.
But we are now potentially in a new era and
I would argue stable coin is not really about crypto.
(34:11):
That might certainly be the technology, but it is essentially
a new type of payments and banking.
Speaker 2 (34:17):
Charter wait talk more about that, because most people when
they think of stable coins, they probably think of a
money market fund. But as you point out, there's a
huge overlap with banking in the sense that stable coin
issuers are taking in people's money and for the most
part supposedly putting it into things like US treasuries, maybe gold,
ultra safe assets, and the whole business is built on
(34:40):
the premise that depositors are always going to get their
money back, right. That seems like an echo of a bank.
Speaker 4 (34:48):
That's right, and I think over time we have seen
how the line has blurred between a bank and other
types of deposit instruments. Essentially, the Federal Reserve has multiple
times needed to stabilize money market funds, and in fact
(35:10):
has a facility at the New York Federal Reserve, the
Overnight Reverse Repo program that one could consider a sort
of daily bailout program to keep it stable and transmit
monetary policy. I really worry that if we keep having
enormous flows from banks to these money funds, we are
(35:32):
essentially going to create problems with how we transmit and
intermediate credit to the real economy. I would argue that
a stable coin, if it was a tokenized bank deposit
versus a tokenized money market fund, has a lot of
different effects. Long term, most of us know that banks
(35:54):
are still the key to lend to small businesses, to
lend to farms, and to lend to the real economy.
If you are essentially putting a thumb on the scale
toward money market funds or tokenized money market funds, the
beneficiaries are very large firms, sovereigns, and others who can
(36:14):
access those money markets. So we should really want to
make sure that banks or there is some something that
takes the place of filling in the gap for small businesses, farmers,
and others who depend on bank credit.
Speaker 1 (36:30):
So the Senate in June passed the Genius Act to
start creating a more robust set of stable coin regulations,
but it did not allow for yield bearing stable coins.
So it's a great business if you're in the stable
coin business collect all that yield, but you don't have
to pass it out unlike a bank. What's your perspective
on that Is this about preserving the importance of deposit
(36:53):
taking bank institutions so that they're not disremediated into this way,
or is this just a stop to the bank so
that normal ol deposits are still a good business.
Speaker 4 (37:03):
It's a very messy piece of legislation. I think there
is some arguments that yield chasing of a uninsured product
is probably a recipe for more bailouts and more mess.
On the other hand, we can't be setting federal laws
to advantage banks. They often get what they want anyway.
(37:25):
I would argue that one of the best ways to
pursue some tokenized payment systems that could potentially disintermediate the
incumbent payment networks would be to use tokenized bank deposits,
and just like we could have paper cash, each issued
by a different regional federal Reserve bank, our digital wallets
(37:50):
could host tokenized bank deposits that are sitting in banks
across the country and being intermediated into credit to the
real economy. I think what we see is largely a
legislative framework that is going to benefit the big crypto incumbents. Well.
Speaker 2 (38:09):
Speaking of benefiting the big another large ish trend in
the banking system is consolidation, of course, and post the
financial crisis, I think we saw the number of small banks,
regional banks out there absolutely plunge, and I think it
took a few years before we actually got a new
bank set up, a Denovo Bank, and it was I
(38:30):
think in Pennsylvania Amish Country, which was kind of funny.
I guess my question is, like, presumably you want a
diverse network of lenders out there because you want to
avoid the too big to fail problem and you want
people to have access to credit. To your point earlier,
how do you encourage a more diverse or dynamic banking
system and avoid the outcome where Joe and I always
(38:54):
like to throw up the charts of how JP Morgan
or Wells Fargo came into being, and it's just a
story of them snapping up lots and lots of companies.
Speaker 4 (39:04):
Decades ago, there was a Supreme Court case that was
very precient that warned that consolidation in the banking system
would ultimately contribute to mass consolidation in the real economy.
And you're right, the number of small community banks has dwindled,
and there's all sorts of reasons for this, including changing technology,
(39:27):
consumer preferences, so much more. But I think one of
the real big reasons is that there is a perception
that the very largest banks, as you mentioned, will be protected.
When Silicon Valley Bank was failing, where was all the
money flowing to? They were taking their money out of
(39:50):
Silicon Valley Banks, Signature Bank and others. It went to
the very big guys. Because every investor leaves that these
banks are essentially always going to be protected, they are
able to raise money with that implicit guarantee, and that
(40:13):
means they are able to out compete on so many
dimensions unfairly. I think they're smaller counterparts. So I really
think we need to be careful about giving benefits and
picking winners and losers, and that's what we have been doing,
is essentially picking the very largest banks as the winners
(40:36):
and others as the losers.
Speaker 1 (40:54):
We recently had the Robin Hood CEO on the podcast,
and they're very excited about tokenization of all kinds of things,
including a tokenization of stock for that matter. And due
to crypto technology of some sorts, there's enforcing borders in
terms of defining what a regulatory perimeter even is from
(41:15):
a geographical standpoint is really hard. And due to smart
contracts and stable coins, et cetera, it's very plausible that
you could somewhere in the world, maybe in an offshore
or a lightly regulated country, create some token that tracks
some regulated instrument and it trades like a regulated instrument
(41:35):
up until maybe something goes bust. Is there a danger
that regulating consumer facing financial products, that law won't be
able to keep up, that there's this sort of like
technological explosion of things, and that to some extent, because
anyone who has access to a stable coin wallet and
access to the internet can theoretically trade it anything anywhere
(41:55):
that it would just be a crisis from the regulatory
perspective and keeping a hand on everything that's going on.
Speaker 4 (42:01):
Well, I think we do have a jump ball right
now on the future of the dollar. We do see
the Trump administration very interested I think in fundamentally rethinking
the role of the dollar in the system. You raise
this example of technology, but for years we have seen
(42:21):
I believe it's a fourteen trillion dollar market of offshore
dollars euro dollars, which poses very serious and significant issues
for the entire.
Speaker 1 (42:33):
Regulars of eurostocks, like literally not the Eurostocks index, but
something that resembles in trading a US listed regulated stock,
except it's on some digital exchange. It's a decentralized exchange,
but it moves in the same way. And how do
you even begin to wrap your head around here?
Speaker 4 (42:53):
Yeah? Well, I think the way in which you want
to is constantly to figure out how do we solve
real problems in the economy and how do you build
for that, rather than allowing for product services to create
it purely based on arbitrage. I also think we want
(43:13):
to make sure that we don't try and create something
so complex that it will always be arbitraged around. And
we need a lot more simple bright lines that investors, consumers,
everyone can really easily understand and easily follow. Ultimately, the
(43:34):
US is going to be the place where people want
to do business because of strong rule of law and
a good legal system and all of those things, and
that's one of the most important things to safeguard.
Speaker 2 (43:48):
Speaking of novel businesses, and I guess the idea of
policy kind of chasing after new tech, I'm just going
to go all Seinfeld on this question and ask what's
the deal with buy now, pay later? Because that is
everywhere nowadays. And obviously the question. The wider question it
poses is whether or not consumers are just taking on
(44:10):
a load of credit in a new way that possibly
isn't accounted for very well.
Speaker 4 (44:15):
Well, it's always interesting. There's a table published by the
Federal Reserve about consumer credit outstanding, and it is always
missing many things, including by Now Pay Later, which we
have seen surge through the pandemic, growing more than ten x.
It has really changed quite a bit. Tracy by Now
(44:37):
pay Later, strangely was not really homegrown in America. It
came from other jurisdictions. It was popular in Sweden, Australia,
and now it is a major form of credit. Just
so everyone understands what it is. You take out alone
often pay in four. It does not have an interest rate,
(45:01):
but the buy now, Pay later lender takes a cut
from the merchant, just like a credit card company does.
So you have seen a lot of consumers believe that
this is a better way because it is no interest.
But the CFPB did extensive study on it and found
that there's very significant issues when it comes to people
(45:24):
returning goods and not necessarily getting it credited. There's issues
of people having multiple buy now, pay later loans, across
different lenders and are levered up. I would hear actually
complains from auto lenders who would say to me, how
am I supposed to write this auto loan if I
don't know what the buy and now pay later loans
(45:44):
are because they're not on the credit report.
Speaker 1 (45:46):
Yeah, this strikes me as super interesting. I mean, just
like how inadequate right now is our tracking, both in
terms of the scale of it, just when we think about, okay,
we want to have aggregate sense of consumer consumer indebtedness,
and then how much of a struggle is it for
actual lenders to judge the credit worthiness of consumers because
(46:09):
of the lack of visibility and to be npl.
Speaker 4 (46:11):
The faster it grows, the more difficult it will be.
And I think a key piece of this is we
are seeing all sorts of buy now, pay later like
products go beyond the traditional lenders. We're seeing banks and
credit card companies say, use my card and then go
online and you can convert it to buy now, pay later,
(46:32):
or some people thinking about how to connect it to
community bank debit cards. So I do believe it is
a big blind spot about consumer credit outstanding right now.
Obviously it is a relatively modest piece of the overall
(46:53):
unsecured debt. But if it continues its trajectory, even if
it slows its growth, it will be a big piece
of that pie.
Speaker 2 (47:01):
I mean, presumably by now pay later would fall or
could fall under the remit of the CFPB. But well,
it does, it does, But I mean the CFPB is
not really functioning anymore. That seems like an issue.
Speaker 4 (47:17):
Well, what we are seeing is that the protections that
the CFPB tried to put in place for buy now,
pay later borrows some basic ones. You can get some
statements that you're able to return goods and get it credited.
It looks like a lot of that is just being
thrown into trash or just not enforced. We are seeing
(47:39):
states all over the country though, looking to beef up
protections because they see how this could create a treadmill
of debt for people.
Speaker 2 (47:49):
Just one more question for me. So you were head
of the CFPB under the Bien administration, and you were
at the FTC under the first Trump administration, and you
got to experience some of the second Trump administration. What's
your sense of the difference between Trump one and Trump
(48:10):
two point zero and how that administration is operating and
thinking about things like regulation.
Speaker 4 (48:16):
Yeah, I think that there is when it comes to finance,
a real sense of concern about how they want to
think about the dollar and how they want to think
of the future of treasury securities. I see Secretary Beson
talk very deliberately about wanting stable coin, for example, to
(48:37):
be a way to boost demand for treasuries. Of course,
there's lots of issues with that, but I think more broadly,
the first Trump administration was a lot less organized, and
now there is a clearly a plan that they are
executing on, even if it seems chaotic. So I think
(49:01):
for those who have concerns about it, I don't think
they should write it off as just chaos or craziness.
I think there is a lot of things that are
being done that will have lasting effects on the financial system.
Speaker 2 (49:18):
All right, ro hit Chopra, thank you so much for
coming on all thoughts. That was so interesting and really
good to get a regulator's actually perspective.
Speaker 3 (49:27):
Thanks for having Thank you so much, Joe.
Speaker 2 (49:42):
That was really interesting and I'm so glad we could
have ro hit On to give a sort of fly
on the wall perspective of a regulator. Dearing you know
what was a pretty dramatic time.
Speaker 1 (49:51):
There's so many interesting things happening in Finnrag right now
in general, just obviously the sort of like turning of
the dial, you know, I think, like a really big
picture story that doesn't get a lot of attention because
we focus a lot on the changing administrations because the
financial crisis was a really long time ago. These things
(50:12):
always ebb and flow, right, So you have a crisis
and everyone cracks down and you sort of you know,
you do the max and then memories fade. You're like,
why do we have the Like this is I feel
like it's human nature. As the two thousand and nine
twenty ten reforms go further into the past, we're just
going to have this sort of natural loosening until the
financial crisis of twenty forty five or whatever it is.
Speaker 2 (50:34):
Well, I mean, why do we have the CFPP. The
whole answer is it was created after the two thousand
and eight financial crisis. The other thing I thought was
really interesting, and this gets to the consolidation point, which
I think is a massive, massive story in the US
financial industry. But it's just that idea of Okay, if
you're worried about your deposit at a smaller bank, the
(50:54):
natural thing is to move it into a too big
to fail bank because you know that the US government,
based on precedent, is not going to let them go.
And so that again seems to give the big banks
a sort of unnatural edge perhaps in terms of deposit taking.
Speaker 1 (51:09):
I mean, I I know, we talked about this after
SVB in multiple episodes, but the sheer number of banks
in the United States that still exist like boggles the mind.
There's no other country in the world that has as
many Canada's like six banks. We're so heavily banked in
this country. It's still today the random.
Speaker 2 (51:31):
There used to be a lot more, a lot more, Yeah.
Speaker 1 (51:33):
But I mean, it's staggering the number of community banks
and regional banks that exist in the United States, even
with all the consulidations.
Speaker 2 (51:41):
Do you want to be like Canada, Joe, that's the question.
Speaker 1 (51:44):
No, I don't know. I mean, I like genuinely don't
know what the optimal distribution is or anything. But given
the advantages that the big banks have, the perception of safety,
they're technological capabilities that they can invest in that a
community bank will never be able to replicate. Brand et cetera.
The proliferation of banks is still like a sort of
(52:04):
interesting phenomenon of our financial system.
Speaker 2 (52:07):
The other thing that struck me from that conversation was
the buy now, pay later stuff, which you know.
Speaker 1 (52:12):
Got to do more on that period.
Speaker 2 (52:13):
Absolutely, it's becoming a really interesting story. But it just
kind of blows my mind that no one is actually
tracking that credit because the whole thing is supposed to
be technology driven. It's plugged into the checkout process of
a website, it's really easy to do. It seems insane
to me that like the credit bureaus can't track it
at the same time, and it seems like a huge,
(52:35):
huge data hole for the US economy.
Speaker 1 (52:37):
That's a huge story. I completely agree. And then you know,
we sort of talked about at the end. I mean,
I think it's such an interesting question the degree to which,
if it happens, we'll see stable coins become part of
the payment's landscape in a meaningful way rather than just
a way to get money onto cryptocurrency trading websites, which
is where they began. And then all of the things
(53:00):
around tokenization of equity. I mean, it's just a fact
that Robin Hood, whose CEO we had on unilaterally announced
that at some point there's going to be some version
of tokenized equity or tokens that correspond to equity in
private companies doing it unilatterly. How regulators are going to
(53:22):
actually get their handle on this? I have no idea.
Speaker 2 (53:25):
Yeah, tokens, tokens everywhere, and not a bank to lend.
I think that was ro HiT's point, right, All right,
shall we leave it there?
Speaker 1 (53:31):
Let's leave it there.
Speaker 2 (53:32):
This has been another episode of the Odd Lots podcast.
I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy.
Speaker 1 (53:37):
Alloway and I'm Joe Wisenthal. You can follow me at
the Stalwart. Follow our guest Roe Hit Chopra. He's at
Chopra USA. Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Arman,
dash Ol Bennett at Dashbock and kel Brooks at Keil Brooks.
More Odd Lots content go to Bloomberg dot com slash
odd Lots. We have a daily newsletter and all of
our episodes, and you can chat about all of these
(53:58):
topics twenty four to seven in our disc discord do
Gg slashlins.
Speaker 2 (54:02):
And if you enjoy Odlots, if you like it when
we do autopsies of failed banks with regulators. Then please
leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform.
And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can
listen to all of our episodes absolutely a free All
you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel on
Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there.
Speaker 3 (54:22):
Thanks for listening.
Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News.
Speaker 2 (00:18):
Hello and welcome to another episode of the All Thoughts podcast.
I'm Tracy Alloway.
Speaker 1 (00:22):
And I'm Joe Wasenthal.
Speaker 2 (00:23):
Joe, if I had said to you a few years
ago that there's a bank and the bank is taking deposits,
you know, checking accounts, and it's putting that money into
US treasuries, and that business model is going to completely fail.
The bank is going to collapse, what would you have said?
Speaker 1 (00:45):
I said, let's short the stock. That's what I would
have said. I said, if you told me that and
you knew the only insight, the only actionable thing there,
I said, all right, let's short it.
Speaker 2 (00:54):
All right, that's the right answer.
Speaker 3 (00:55):
Clearly.
Speaker 2 (00:56):
If you were a banking regulator, what would you have done?
Speaker 1 (00:59):
Well, I don't know anything about big a banking regular
It seems really hard. And regulators in general often get
criticized in various ways, and they're like, oh, you busted
this really small time tiki tech insider trading ring. It's
not that big of a deal. Or oh, here's this
thing that collapsed and why didn't you catch it before?
They're always going to get upset about that. But I
(01:21):
have to say, I have a lot of sympathy for
the regulators because for the most part, my impression is
that the US has one of the most robust, transparent,
high depth capital markets and financial systems in the entire world,
which for the most part does not collapse. And so
I feel like when it comes to regulatory issues, there's
a lot of unseen where what we see is like,
(01:42):
if they're in the news, it's not good. But most
of the time things aren't the news.
Speaker 2 (01:46):
That should be the tagline for America's financial system most
of the time does not collapse. Yeah, and ironically, well
I'm talking of course, or I was talking about Silicon
Valley Bank. Yeah, and the collapse there, And I think
it's still very surprising to me. In one sense it
was an old fashioned bank run, But in another sense,
it's very surprising that here's a bank that's basically buying
(02:08):
a bunch of ultra safe assets US treasuries and still
it ran into trouble. And banks, of course are mandated
to buy treasuries as well. We've talked about this on
the show any number of times now, but I want
to talk more about it.
Speaker 1 (02:23):
Sure, you know. The one thing I'll say too, that
I've been thinking a lot with SVB is. I think
in the wake of the two thousand and eight two
thousand and nine financial crisis, we got very focused on
the asset side of the balance, right, and so it's like,
what they hit, what kind of subprime loans do they have,
and how good are there all of that, et cetera.
But one of the things, you know, like Josh Younger
talked about recently in others. Stephen Kelly had a note
(02:45):
in our newsletter, you know, a lot of it is
the difficulty in modeling the liability side and the slipperiness
of the deposit base and how hard that is to
know because you can have long duration deposits that suddenly
become overnight deposits. It's really tricky, and I still think
these are difficult things to understand.
Speaker 2 (03:03):
Yeah, it feels like we're always fighting the last bank
battle or the last bond battle. Okay, Well, on that note,
we do, in fact have the perfect guest. We are
going to be speaking with ro Hit Chopra. He is,
of course the former director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
also a former FTC commissioner, so really the perfect person
to talk to. If we want to dig into what
(03:25):
happened to SVB, what it means for bank regulation, and
then also what banks are doing right now. Hit Thank
you so much.
Speaker 4 (03:33):
For coming on all thoughts, Thanks for having me.
Speaker 2 (03:35):
Here's my first question. Maybe it's a little pointed, but
does the CFPB still exist? So we just got the
one big beautiful bill that's been passed and it looks
like it slashes funding for the bureau, And of course
we know that Trump isn't exactly a fan of federal agencies,
so I'm curious is it still functioning?
Speaker 1 (03:53):
There's already kind of good at it.
Speaker 4 (03:54):
Yeah, anyway, it's a good question, and it seems by
every single piece of evidence that it's just maybe there
technically but not doing a damn thing. We are hearing
nearly every day about another financial institution that is being
released from obligations. It has been months since there has
(04:16):
been an enforcement action, and many are estimating that this
means billions and billions of dollars that consumers are not
getting back in refunds and frankly a big disadvantage to
all of those financial companies that follow the rules.
Speaker 1 (04:32):
When it was working, when or when it was operating,
describe to me what the remit of the CFPB is.
And one of the criticisms of the people leveled is
they didn't know what the scope was, etc. What is
the formal scope of the CFPP.
Speaker 4 (04:47):
Well, essentially, we saw decades ago that there weren't just
banks in the business of offering consumer loans and products.
It was all sorts of other companies heyday lenders, auto lenders,
and in fact now the bulk of mortgages are originated
outside of banks, the bulk of auto loans, and so
(05:09):
after the subprime mortgage crisis, there was broad agreement that
the Federal Reserve Board and other agencies just didn't focus
and have the attention on making sure that existing consumer
law was being followed. So the CFPB is responsible for
inspecting the largest financial institutions and taking them to court
(05:35):
when they break the law. Of course, also administering all
sorts of rules that keep the mortgage markets, the credit report,
credit reporting companies, and so many others in line.
Speaker 2 (05:46):
How does the CFPB interact with all the other bank
policy stakeholders, because there seems to be quite a few.
Speaker 4 (05:54):
You mean, the other regulators. The CFPB is the only
regulate that oversees that gigantic non bank consumer lending apparatus,
and also it has primary and exclusive jurisdiction overall banks
and credit unions over ten billion in assets. That means
(06:14):
every credit card company, every big player in the market
is primarily overseen by the CFPB. So the fact that
it is now functionally a dead fish is leaving a
very very big gap that no one can even legally
fill in.
Speaker 1 (06:33):
Where do you see the biggest gap manifesting right now
when you look at the consumer financial landscape, What isn't
being enforced or what isn't being examined that in your
view merite enforcement or examination.
Speaker 4 (06:46):
Well, I think the top priority is always trying to
understand the linkage between the biggest markets and the broader economy.
We saw that that linkage with the mortgage market was
pretty damn big, and its failure really crashed not just
the US financial system but the entire global marketplace. So,
(07:08):
of course, making sure that mortgages are fair and transparent,
that key rules like the qualified Mortgage Rule, which sets
some of the core standards to make sure there is
not predatory mortgage lending, but also the nuts and bolts
most of the issues that come in are people who
have errors on their credit report they say, that's not
(07:30):
even my name, or people whose bank accounts were illegally
debited or cleaned out due to fraud. There's all sorts
of issues that protect specific populations, military members, and so
many other pieces that keep the markets working. So I
(07:51):
don't want to pinpoint anything other than to say that
when I took office, it was after another few years
where there really wasn't much going on there, and we
saw how financial firms not just push the envelope, but
sometimes outright took advantage of people without any accountability.
Speaker 2 (08:11):
Well, speaking of accountability, you know, we mentioned SVB at
the top of the show, and one thing I've heard
there's a little bit of a chicken and egg situation
when people are analyzing the root cause of that particular
bank collapse. So some people say, well, interest rates went
up and that led to paper losses on the bank's
(08:32):
bond holdings, and so people got nervous and started pulling
their money. And then other people say, well, people started
pulling their money even though the bond losses didn't necessarily
need to be crystallized anytime soon. So I'm curious, can
you pinpoint the spark that set off the latest bank crisis.
Speaker 4 (08:51):
Well for me, it really was March eighth, twenty twenty three.
Two things happened that day. One was the wind down
of a bank called Silvergate Bank, which was heavily involved
in banking some of the major crypto trading platforms. There
(09:11):
was a flight of deposits out of that bank after
the crypto winter and the collapse of FTX. We had
been tracking I Serve on the FDIC board and we
were tracking Silvergate Bank, and on that day they announced
that they were not going to need to be put
into receivership, they would be self liquidating. And simultaneously, on
(09:33):
that same day, we had an announcement by Silicon Valley Bank,
which was a little bit of a goofy press release
they issued saying they're experiencing some real losses on their
securities portfolio and they're going to be looking for capital.
It raised a lot of red flags and suspicions about
(09:57):
whether they were viable. And this is something that is
just so fundamental about banking and deposit taking is that
it really is based on a belief that your money
is going to be there. And the truth is is
with federal deposit insurance and Federal Reserve discount window lending.
(10:18):
It always is, except when you have a bank that
is over ninety percent uninsured deposits. This is something that
is really unusual, and some would argue as not even
really a bank when you are that dependent on very
very large depositors that you grew so quickly, and so
(10:42):
then the run began.
Speaker 1 (10:44):
How much would you ascribe it to the high percentage
of non insured deposits versus the concentration so in very
specific industries. So you mentioned the crypto one, but also
here are all of these startups. It had raised a
ton of money in twenty twenty and twenty twenty one.
(11:05):
A bunch of them apparently just put their money on
a bank, which is kind of weird to me, non insured,
and then we had the stock market plunge in twenty
twenty two. Funding dried up. There was no very little
new VC fundraising, so new dry powder to be put
into the bank. Startups drawing down their own deposits just
to make payroll or whatever else. And so you have
two things going on. One is the high level of
(11:27):
uninsured deposits, but also the concentration, so that there was
this one specific sector that was all going through the
cycle at the same time.
Speaker 4 (11:34):
So let me just push on that because even though
it is one sector, and I agree with you, the
concentration was an important factor in this. But let's remember
that the individual firms that were funded by venture capital,
many of them were doing fine. There was not necessarily
something specifically or systemically wrong with those businesses. But I think,
(12:01):
and I agree with every small and mid sized business
out there. If I am launching a startup, whether it
is an AI company or a dry cleaner, it doesn't
rank in the top twenty reasons of my business failing
that my bank is going to fail. Sure, And so
what you start hearing is that these businesses, which are
(12:23):
highly networked as well as much faster communication, you get
the advice from your funders and others that you need
to run. And it was very clear that it was
not just happening at SVB, it then was happening all
over the system.
Speaker 2 (12:43):
I was on a train to Connecticut around that time
and someone was sitting kind of close to me, and
it turned out they were banking with SVB. Their company was,
and I could hear the panic and their voice as
they tried to digest the news of what was happening.
But on that note, why did corporate treasurers, why did
they put all their deposits in a single bank when
(13:04):
presumably they know that there's a cap on FDIC insurance.
Speaker 4 (13:08):
Yeah, it's a good question. I think there are some
practical issues for some small and mid sized businesses about
when you're running payroll or when you're getting in a
lot of receipts. I don't have as much sympathy for
some of the very large companies that we have learned
through public reporting put a whole lot of funds in
(13:29):
that bank, including really their entire cash reserves. So at
the end of the day, though the regulators had, we
saw an active run that was occurring, and of course
those insured depositors, the insured depositors really through the entire crisis,
did not really run. It was those uninsured started at
(13:54):
Silicon Valley Bank after that Wednesday release. By fry Day morning,
they were dead. We had actually voted the night before
or maybe at the pre dawn hours to accept it
into receivership, and I believe by the time it was
closed it had roughly one hundred billion dollars queued up
(14:17):
of outbound wires. So this was an enormous and fast run.
And many of those techno libertarians that we often hear
about who want no regulation, they were actively beating the
drum online asking for a Baila.
Speaker 1 (14:34):
Well, this is actually interesting point. I was going to
go there next. And I think again it was a
thing that Stephen Kelly wrote for us. But one of
the things about twenty twenty three, I think it said
it wasn't a crisis of regional banks. It was a
regional bank crisis, as in specifically the region of California,
because then there were other parts of there were other
banks that got into a lot of trouble, and the
(14:56):
all thing they had in common was that they were
all sort of in some way connected to California. I
think I remember like people were going out looking for
any bank that had California in the title in some
way and betting against them. But talk to us about
regulating banks and monitoring runs in the world of these networks,
whether the the public networks on social media or just
(15:18):
the sort of networks of like mind individuals who are
all in the same WhatsApp group.
Speaker 4 (15:22):
Yeah, I'm a believer that we can never fight and
We shouldn't want to fight the speed of communication. We
want markets to have live information. I will say this,
we saw the run start first at Silicon Valley Bank,
and then I think because of the confluence of factors
(15:42):
with Silvergate, it wasn't just California as anything that seemed
to have any crypto or tech adjacency. Of course, the
second bank that we closed that Sunday was Signature Bank,
which operated a crypto network but also had a very
real business. It is a New York City bank that
(16:04):
was deeply involved in New York City multifamily real estate.
You at the same time, Joe had people worried about
commercial real estate. But what we were seeing was that
the banks with the highest percentage of uninsured deposits, they
were being badly battered almost immediately.
Speaker 2 (16:41):
So ultimately a decision was made to expand the deposit
insurance net and basically bail out SVB customers and others.
What was the decision making process like building up to
that and how big a deal is that? Is there
like a legacy from that decision.
Speaker 4 (16:57):
It's a very big deal, and it's one that in
many ways is still hard to live with the decision,
even though it was the right decision, I think. Here's
how it works. The federal law basically directs the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation the FDIC, to resolve a failed bank
at the least cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund. That's
(17:21):
the fund that everyone pays into with their bank deposits,
and it builds up a fund to pay for certain
bank failures and make sure deposits are made whole. And
here's what was interesting about Silicon Valley Bank and Signature
Bank and then later First Republic. It was a super
majority of uninsured deposits. That means a bank failure is
(17:48):
not that expensive to resolve. The cost to the Deposit
Insurance Fund for a bank that is ninety percent plus
uninsured is going to be pretty low. And if the
law says resolve it at the least cost, in many ways,
the best case is sometimes to liquidate it, make as
(18:12):
many people whole as possible, and top them up with
the deposit Insurance Fund. But there is a proviso in
the law which says that if a failure is likely
to lead to systemic effects or to threaten the viability
of the US financial system, there's a process of key
(18:34):
turning that a series of regulators must go through to
recommend to the Treasury Secretary, who must consult with the
President to authorize the FDIC to take a different path.
So over the weekend the Sunday after the failure of
Silicon Valley Bank, and Sunday morning, roughly Signature Bank was
(18:58):
taken into receivership. First Republic was a zombie and basically
dead already. There was a decision where the FDIC board
we voted to turn that key, and the Federal Reserve
Board had voted to turn that key, and ultimately the
Treasury Secretary discussed it with the President and activated that authority.
(19:24):
The authority essentially led to the backstopping of all uninsured deposits.
That meant that everyone would be made whole in the
case of the failure, and it was a tough decision.
I think there was a question I was arguing and questioning,
(19:45):
should we be maybe raising the limit dramatically, perhaps to
twenty five or fifty million dollars. What we were seeing
in the system was active movement of uninsured deposits everywhere,
and ultimately the decision to invoke that exception really did
(20:06):
calm the system for the most part with the big
exception of First Republic Bank.
Speaker 2 (20:12):
So the other thing that happened other than the expanded
deposit insurance was the creation of a new FED Lending
facility another acronym, the BTFP. How big a deal was
that one?
Speaker 4 (20:26):
That one was weird. All banks have the ability to
access the discount window through the Federal Reserve, but the
Federal Reserve used some bailout authorities to launch this bank
term funding program. This allowed banks to pledge their treasury
securities at par and draw funds from the Federal Reserve.
(20:49):
I think there were a lot of us who raised
our eyebrows at this. If the banks already had access
to the discount window, why did they need this special program.
I worried about the precedent setting of this. It was
justified on the basis that there is stigma of going
to the discount window. Ultimately, we saw some financial institutions
(21:14):
game and arbitrage the program by drawing on it but
then earning interest on reserves. I think we just have
to be really careful when the Fed engages in lots
of bailout programs, because it sends a signal to the
market that they can expect it the next time.
Speaker 1 (21:35):
Around as a regulator. There are many people who say this,
and you had a high level of scrutiny towards companies
that banked crypto companies, and many of them claimed that
they were treated unfairly. What is it just from a
high level, let's start there. From a high level, what
issues emerge when, if any issues emerge from a bank
(21:55):
that tries to build up a business among crypto companies.
Speaker 4 (21:58):
I think this is a bit of a conspiracy theory. Yeah.
Speaker 1 (22:01):
No, look, I'm but I'm just from a regulatory person.
Speaker 4 (22:04):
Okay, go on, because because the truth is is that
the issues with Silicon Valley Bank, as you know and
described earlier, was really about being so deeply underwater on
their treasure securities.
Speaker 1 (22:18):
But there's sure whether we're talking about Signature Bank, which
did have a pretty big crypto book. But also you
just get all these crypto companies like, oh, we don't
have it's so difficult for us to find a bank account.
Is it difficult for them to do banking?
Speaker 4 (22:31):
Yeah, so let's see what we mean about banking for
crypto lending. Certainly there are going to be some banks
who feel they have no expertise in this, I think
the really interesting question is about deposit taking.
Speaker 1 (22:46):
Yes, definitely, I'm not talking about crypto. I'm talking about
the deposit taking from crypto, native com cryptic company deposit taking.
Speaker 4 (22:53):
There are a set of issues that banks always are
going to want to look at when it comes to
taking very very large deposits with a lot of in
and out activity, and much of that is related to
their own obligations for money laundering as well as what
was mentioned before, deposit concentration. So when you are a
(23:15):
bank that has a couple of depositors who are the
super majority of your deposit base, you're obviously going to
take some steps to be careful around that. And I
would say that the crypto issues in this run were
fairly muted. It was really the perception about the potential
(23:36):
exposures that we saw through the market, though I feel
that within a few days the fixation again was on
uninsured deposits.
Speaker 2 (23:47):
When it comes to the bond losses, it strikes me
that the FED is kind of in a difficult position because,
on the one hand, it has to conduct monetary policy.
If inflation is high, it has to raise benchmark rates,
But on the other hand, it also has a financial
stability mandate. It's not part of the dual mandate, but
it is a regulator, and raising interest rates in this
(24:09):
case sparked a bank run. It seems how is the
Fed supposed to balance these two goals.
Speaker 4 (24:16):
I don't see that as a balance at all. Okay,
I think there is a lot that the Federal Reserve
has really missed in many of the situations involving financial
stability around Lehman Brothers, as well as even including COVID,
(24:37):
But certainly this one was a more clear linkage where
when you have high concentrations of bond portfolios that are underwater,
you need to be extra careful to not make sure
that they are under capitalized, that they lack liquidity, and frankly,
(24:58):
that you are not turning upnd I when you are
supervising that institution. The warning signs with Silicon Valley Bank
were there for months, and I do think there was
a bit of a culture at the Federal Reserve of
really taking a light touch in the years leading up
(25:19):
to the crisis that I think has proven to be costing.
Speaker 1 (25:38):
I want to go back to crypto because I want
to talk, not just I understand the obligations that a
bank has in terms of money laundering, in terms of
lots of in and out transactions, et cetera. However, from
a regulatory perspective, were banks that built up a crypto
book of business? Did they get extra scrutiny in somewhere
(25:59):
does that man extra scrutiny?
Speaker 4 (26:01):
I think you always want to make sure that rules
are as clear as possible, and I do think bank
regulation has turned into really a messy set of rules. Frankly,
I think to accommodate the largest players rather than simple,
bright line rules when it comes to new types of activities.
(26:23):
There's no question that novel activities are going to need
a little bit more look than say a straightforward mortgage
or a straightforward small business loan. So when you have,
particularly a bank that doesn't have experience in a product,
that may pose some real risks to them, I don't
(26:47):
think it's unreasonable for a bank regulator to kick the
tires in what.
Speaker 1 (26:51):
Is kicking the tires look like? Specifically?
Speaker 4 (26:54):
I think it can take a wide range of activities.
It really depends on what type of new business that
that bank is offering. But at the core, making sure
that that bank is well capitalized and liquid is always
the top priority. But if you know, banks play a
major role in the financial state craft of America and
(27:18):
one of the big reasons and benefits of the reserve
currency is the role in detecting and deterring terrorism, finance,
drug cartels, and more. And federal law puts some real obligations.
Speaker 2 (27:30):
On them for that. Okay, So speaking of novel businesses,
I want to widen the net a little bit and
maybe talk about fintech and what banks are doing right now.
And here I have to issue a disclaimer, which is
I'm very jaded about fintech in general. I used to
cover it at the FT and I heard the same stories,
the same themes over and over again, like big tech
(27:53):
is coming for the banks, or retail is coming for
the banks, like Walmart starting a financial product, and things
like that. Fast forward to today, I mean, it does
seem like this is something that is actually happening. What's
the ultimate ambition there in the payment space?
Speaker 4 (28:11):
Well, payments is really something that has so rapidly changed.
Many of it is very good. It's easier to move money,
particularly with mobile devices. It's faster than it used to be.
I do think that we have some real concerns about
the playbook that many of the firms who are moving money,
(28:34):
how are they monetizing it. A lot of our payments
companies and big tech companies, I think are really drooling
over what they see in China where Ali pay and
we Chat pay are trafficking almost all of the consumer
payments non cash payments in pay.
Speaker 2 (28:54):
In cash at a Starbucks in Beijing. I know from
personal experience.
Speaker 3 (28:59):
And we happen.
Speaker 4 (29:00):
There's a lot of questions about what is the monetization
scheme there. When I was at the CPPB, we led
a study that looked at all of these major payment platforms,
and I think there was a desire to monetize a
lot of that payment's information through surveillance, being able to
(29:22):
know exactly not just the amount someone is paying, but
the skew level data in their basket, ultimately feeding a
foundational algorithm that ultimately could serve up personalized prices. There
was lots of issues we dealt with when it comes
to fraud and identity theft. There were certainly issues when
(29:46):
it comes to the shift of where money was being stored.
Many people believed that the app they were using to
send money had money in a bank account somewhere, but
in fact maybe it was in an uninsured account. So
I think that we should be looking at payments in
terms of what is the ambitions of those companies and
(30:09):
why do they want it. We worked hard with global
central banks and regulators to inject more competition. Apple, for example,
had a real choke hold over iOS devices, only allowing
Apple Pay to be used. Europe has banned that practice.
Other countries are looking to restrict it as well. So
(30:33):
I think that stable coin, and once stable coin becomes
part of the broader ecosystem, which it may, it will
open up some additional issues about how payments in America
will ultimately work.
Speaker 1 (30:49):
Yeah, I was just gonna ask about that, actually, because
to some extent that seems like a potentially good thing.
If I'm worried about Okay, there's a handful of Internet giants,
a handful of commerce giants who want to have more
and more skew level data about myself and what I buy.
To my mind, it seems possible that stable coins and
(31:11):
having your own distributed wallet on your phone or something
like that could change the architecture of the Internet such
that there isn't such a information bottleneck that only a
few giant companies have access to.
Speaker 4 (31:25):
Yeah, it depends on who's issuing them. When I was
at the Federal Trade Commission, Mark Zuckerberg, Cheryl Sandberg others
announced the Libra project, which I think was completely a
way to cement more of a mode of Facebook and
now Meta's empire of being able to track and trace
(31:46):
the flow of money and ultimately to be able to
ensure that merchants operating in their ecosystem would use their
currency of choice. So I think it's really important that
we do not have payments and money controlled by any
(32:06):
real big commercial player. It is if there is a
stable coin that is issued completely separately that is not
affiliated with one of those companies. But I worry that
the market could easily tip to award an existing big
tech network, and ultimately that might provide huge advantages to
(32:30):
that firm, but not necessarily the whole economy.
Speaker 1 (32:34):
Tracy, you know it's funny to me, is you know,
you have all the crypto people and a lot of
them got really upset about Libra again and how that
thing holl failed. But to my mind, if you think
about it, many of those same tech people hated the
speech regulations that it existed on the big social networks
in the early twenty twenties and the late tens, and
(32:54):
the idea of shadow banning and all of this stuff.
And it's like, imagine if they did that to payments, right, Like,
do you really want to invest that same power that
they have to decide what is appropriate speech and not
appropriate speech into the realm of Okay, Now they also
have the ability to regulate what is appropriate payments and
inappropriate payments. That's a lot of investiture of power.
Speaker 2 (33:14):
This is the issue that came up in the UK,
right there was already some drama about who was it
Nigel Frage's bank account being taken away because of his politics,
So yeah, that concern is definitely there.
Speaker 4 (33:25):
And we have that here where PayPal had sent out
some terms and conditions that allowed PayPal to find people
for their speech, presumably off platform. And I think we
need to be really careful about giving any of those
(33:49):
firms the ability to really have a big footprint, either
on speech or on commerce. And that is part of
the reason why developed countries have separated banking and commerce.
But we are now potentially in a new era and
I would argue stable coin is not really about crypto.
(34:11):
That might certainly be the technology, but it is essentially
a new type of payments and banking.
Speaker 2 (34:17):
Charter wait talk more about that, because most people when
they think of stable coins, they probably think of a
money market fund. But as you point out, there's a
huge overlap with banking in the sense that stable coin
issuers are taking in people's money and for the most
part supposedly putting it into things like US treasuries, maybe gold,
ultra safe assets, and the whole business is built on
(34:40):
the premise that depositors are always going to get their
money back, right. That seems like an echo of a bank.
Speaker 4 (34:48):
That's right, and I think over time we have seen
how the line has blurred between a bank and other
types of deposit instruments. Essentially, the Federal Reserve has multiple
times needed to stabilize money market funds, and in fact
(35:10):
has a facility at the New York Federal Reserve, the
Overnight Reverse Repo program that one could consider a sort
of daily bailout program to keep it stable and transmit
monetary policy. I really worry that if we keep having
enormous flows from banks to these money funds, we are
(35:32):
essentially going to create problems with how we transmit and
intermediate credit to the real economy. I would argue that
a stable coin, if it was a tokenized bank deposit
versus a tokenized money market fund, has a lot of
different effects. Long term, most of us know that banks
(35:54):
are still the key to lend to small businesses, to
lend to farms, and to lend to the real economy.
If you are essentially putting a thumb on the scale
toward money market funds or tokenized money market funds, the
beneficiaries are very large firms, sovereigns, and others who can
(36:14):
access those money markets. So we should really want to
make sure that banks or there is some something that
takes the place of filling in the gap for small businesses, farmers,
and others who depend on bank credit.
Speaker 1 (36:30):
So the Senate in June passed the Genius Act to
start creating a more robust set of stable coin regulations,
but it did not allow for yield bearing stable coins.
So it's a great business if you're in the stable
coin business collect all that yield, but you don't have
to pass it out unlike a bank. What's your perspective
on that Is this about preserving the importance of deposit
(36:53):
taking bank institutions so that they're not disremediated into this way,
or is this just a stop to the bank so
that normal ol deposits are still a good business.
Speaker 4 (37:03):
It's a very messy piece of legislation. I think there
is some arguments that yield chasing of a uninsured product
is probably a recipe for more bailouts and more mess.
On the other hand, we can't be setting federal laws
to advantage banks. They often get what they want anyway.
(37:25):
I would argue that one of the best ways to
pursue some tokenized payment systems that could potentially disintermediate the
incumbent payment networks would be to use tokenized bank deposits,
and just like we could have paper cash, each issued
by a different regional federal Reserve bank, our digital wallets
(37:50):
could host tokenized bank deposits that are sitting in banks
across the country and being intermediated into credit to the
real economy. I think what we see is largely a
legislative framework that is going to benefit the big crypto incumbents. Well.
Speaker 2 (38:09):
Speaking of benefiting the big another large ish trend in
the banking system is consolidation, of course, and post the
financial crisis, I think we saw the number of small banks,
regional banks out there absolutely plunge, and I think it
took a few years before we actually got a new
bank set up, a Denovo Bank, and it was I
(38:30):
think in Pennsylvania Amish Country, which was kind of funny.
I guess my question is, like, presumably you want a
diverse network of lenders out there because you want to
avoid the too big to fail problem and you want
people to have access to credit. To your point earlier,
how do you encourage a more diverse or dynamic banking
system and avoid the outcome where Joe and I always
(38:54):
like to throw up the charts of how JP Morgan
or Wells Fargo came into being, and it's just a
story of them snapping up lots and lots of companies.
Speaker 4 (39:04):
Decades ago, there was a Supreme Court case that was
very precient that warned that consolidation in the banking system
would ultimately contribute to mass consolidation in the real economy.
And you're right, the number of small community banks has dwindled,
and there's all sorts of reasons for this, including changing technology,
(39:27):
consumer preferences, so much more. But I think one of
the real big reasons is that there is a perception
that the very largest banks, as you mentioned, will be protected.
When Silicon Valley Bank was failing, where was all the
money flowing to? They were taking their money out of
(39:50):
Silicon Valley Banks, Signature Bank and others. It went to
the very big guys. Because every investor leaves that these
banks are essentially always going to be protected, they are
able to raise money with that implicit guarantee, and that
(40:13):
means they are able to out compete on so many
dimensions unfairly. I think they're smaller counterparts. So I really
think we need to be careful about giving benefits and
picking winners and losers, and that's what we have been doing,
is essentially picking the very largest banks as the winners
(40:36):
and others as the losers.
Speaker 1 (40:54):
We recently had the Robin Hood CEO on the podcast,
and they're very excited about tokenization of all kinds of things,
including a tokenization of stock for that matter. And due
to crypto technology of some sorts, there's enforcing borders in
terms of defining what a regulatory perimeter even is from
(41:15):
a geographical standpoint is really hard. And due to smart
contracts and stable coins, et cetera, it's very plausible that
you could somewhere in the world, maybe in an offshore
or a lightly regulated country, create some token that tracks
some regulated instrument and it trades like a regulated instrument
(41:35):
up until maybe something goes bust. Is there a danger
that regulating consumer facing financial products, that law won't be
able to keep up, that there's this sort of like
technological explosion of things, and that to some extent, because
anyone who has access to a stable coin wallet and
access to the internet can theoretically trade it anything anywhere
(41:55):
that it would just be a crisis from the regulatory
perspective and keeping a hand on everything that's going on.
Speaker 4 (42:01):
Well, I think we do have a jump ball right
now on the future of the dollar. We do see
the Trump administration very interested I think in fundamentally rethinking
the role of the dollar in the system. You raise
this example of technology, but for years we have seen
(42:21):
I believe it's a fourteen trillion dollar market of offshore
dollars euro dollars, which poses very serious and significant issues
for the entire.
Speaker 1 (42:33):
Regulars of eurostocks, like literally not the Eurostocks index, but
something that resembles in trading a US listed regulated stock,
except it's on some digital exchange. It's a decentralized exchange,
but it moves in the same way. And how do
you even begin to wrap your head around here?
Speaker 4 (42:53):
Yeah? Well, I think the way in which you want
to is constantly to figure out how do we solve
real problems in the economy and how do you build
for that, rather than allowing for product services to create
it purely based on arbitrage. I also think we want
(43:13):
to make sure that we don't try and create something
so complex that it will always be arbitraged around. And
we need a lot more simple bright lines that investors, consumers,
everyone can really easily understand and easily follow. Ultimately, the
(43:34):
US is going to be the place where people want
to do business because of strong rule of law and
a good legal system and all of those things, and
that's one of the most important things to safeguard.
Speaker 2 (43:48):
Speaking of novel businesses, and I guess the idea of
policy kind of chasing after new tech, I'm just going
to go all Seinfeld on this question and ask what's
the deal with buy now, pay later? Because that is
everywhere nowadays. And obviously the question. The wider question it
poses is whether or not consumers are just taking on
(44:10):
a load of credit in a new way that possibly
isn't accounted for very well.
Speaker 4 (44:15):
Well, it's always interesting. There's a table published by the
Federal Reserve about consumer credit outstanding, and it is always
missing many things, including by Now Pay Later, which we
have seen surge through the pandemic, growing more than ten x.
It has really changed quite a bit. Tracy by Now
(44:37):
pay Later, strangely was not really homegrown in America. It
came from other jurisdictions. It was popular in Sweden, Australia,
and now it is a major form of credit. Just
so everyone understands what it is. You take out alone
often pay in four. It does not have an interest rate,
(45:01):
but the buy now, Pay later lender takes a cut
from the merchant, just like a credit card company does.
So you have seen a lot of consumers believe that
this is a better way because it is no interest.
But the CFPB did extensive study on it and found
that there's very significant issues when it comes to people
(45:24):
returning goods and not necessarily getting it credited. There's issues
of people having multiple buy now, pay later loans, across
different lenders and are levered up. I would hear actually
complains from auto lenders who would say to me, how
am I supposed to write this auto loan if I
don't know what the buy and now pay later loans
(45:44):
are because they're not on the credit report.
Speaker 1 (45:46):
Yeah, this strikes me as super interesting. I mean, just
like how inadequate right now is our tracking, both in
terms of the scale of it, just when we think about, okay,
we want to have aggregate sense of consumer consumer indebtedness,
and then how much of a struggle is it for
actual lenders to judge the credit worthiness of consumers because
(46:09):
of the lack of visibility and to be npl.
Speaker 4 (46:11):
The faster it grows, the more difficult it will be.
And I think a key piece of this is we
are seeing all sorts of buy now, pay later like
products go beyond the traditional lenders. We're seeing banks and
credit card companies say, use my card and then go
online and you can convert it to buy now, pay later,
(46:32):
or some people thinking about how to connect it to
community bank debit cards. So I do believe it is
a big blind spot about consumer credit outstanding right now.
Obviously it is a relatively modest piece of the overall
(46:53):
unsecured debt. But if it continues its trajectory, even if
it slows its growth, it will be a big piece
of that pie.
Speaker 2 (47:01):
I mean, presumably by now pay later would fall or
could fall under the remit of the CFPB. But well,
it does, it does, But I mean the CFPB is
not really functioning anymore. That seems like an issue.
Speaker 4 (47:17):
Well, what we are seeing is that the protections that
the CFPB tried to put in place for buy now,
pay later borrows some basic ones. You can get some
statements that you're able to return goods and get it credited.
It looks like a lot of that is just being
thrown into trash or just not enforced. We are seeing
(47:39):
states all over the country though, looking to beef up
protections because they see how this could create a treadmill
of debt for people.
Speaker 2 (47:49):
Just one more question for me. So you were head
of the CFPB under the Bien administration, and you were
at the FTC under the first Trump administration, and you
got to experience some of the second Trump administration. What's
your sense of the difference between Trump one and Trump
(48:10):
two point zero and how that administration is operating and
thinking about things like regulation.
Speaker 4 (48:16):
Yeah, I think that there is when it comes to finance,
a real sense of concern about how they want to
think about the dollar and how they want to think
of the future of treasury securities. I see Secretary Beson
talk very deliberately about wanting stable coin, for example, to
(48:37):
be a way to boost demand for treasuries. Of course,
there's lots of issues with that, but I think more broadly,
the first Trump administration was a lot less organized, and
now there is a clearly a plan that they are
executing on, even if it seems chaotic. So I think
(49:01):
for those who have concerns about it, I don't think
they should write it off as just chaos or craziness.
I think there is a lot of things that are
being done that will have lasting effects on the financial system.
Speaker 2 (49:18):
All right, ro hit Chopra, thank you so much for
coming on all thoughts. That was so interesting and really
good to get a regulator's actually perspective.
Speaker 3 (49:27):
Thanks for having Thank you so much, Joe.
Speaker 2 (49:42):
That was really interesting and I'm so glad we could
have ro hit On to give a sort of fly
on the wall perspective of a regulator. Dearing you know
what was a pretty dramatic time.
Speaker 1 (49:51):
There's so many interesting things happening in Finnrag right now
in general, just obviously the sort of like turning of
the dial, you know, I think, like a really big
picture story that doesn't get a lot of attention because
we focus a lot on the changing administrations because the
financial crisis was a really long time ago. These things
(50:12):
always ebb and flow, right, So you have a crisis
and everyone cracks down and you sort of you know,
you do the max and then memories fade. You're like,
why do we have the Like this is I feel
like it's human nature. As the two thousand and nine
twenty ten reforms go further into the past, we're just
going to have this sort of natural loosening until the
financial crisis of twenty forty five or whatever it is.
Speaker 2 (50:34):
Well, I mean, why do we have the CFPP. The
whole answer is it was created after the two thousand
and eight financial crisis. The other thing I thought was
really interesting, and this gets to the consolidation point, which
I think is a massive, massive story in the US
financial industry. But it's just that idea of Okay, if
you're worried about your deposit at a smaller bank, the
(50:54):
natural thing is to move it into a too big
to fail bank because you know that the US government,
based on precedent, is not going to let them go.
And so that again seems to give the big banks
a sort of unnatural edge perhaps in terms of deposit taking.
Speaker 1 (51:09):
I mean, I I know, we talked about this after
SVB in multiple episodes, but the sheer number of banks
in the United States that still exist like boggles the mind.
There's no other country in the world that has as
many Canada's like six banks. We're so heavily banked in
this country. It's still today the random.
Speaker 2 (51:31):
There used to be a lot more, a lot more, Yeah.
Speaker 1 (51:33):
But I mean, it's staggering the number of community banks
and regional banks that exist in the United States, even
with all the consulidations.
Speaker 2 (51:41):
Do you want to be like Canada, Joe, that's the question.
Speaker 1 (51:44):
No, I don't know. I mean, I like genuinely don't
know what the optimal distribution is or anything. But given
the advantages that the big banks have, the perception of safety,
they're technological capabilities that they can invest in that a
community bank will never be able to replicate. Brand et cetera.
The proliferation of banks is still like a sort of
(52:04):
interesting phenomenon of our financial system.
Speaker 2 (52:07):
The other thing that struck me from that conversation was
the buy now, pay later stuff, which you know.
Speaker 1 (52:12):
Got to do more on that period.
Speaker 2 (52:13):
Absolutely, it's becoming a really interesting story. But it just
kind of blows my mind that no one is actually
tracking that credit because the whole thing is supposed to
be technology driven. It's plugged into the checkout process of
a website, it's really easy to do. It seems insane
to me that like the credit bureaus can't track it
at the same time, and it seems like a huge,
(52:35):
huge data hole for the US economy.
Speaker 1 (52:37):
That's a huge story. I completely agree. And then you know,
we sort of talked about at the end. I mean,
I think it's such an interesting question the degree to which,
if it happens, we'll see stable coins become part of
the payment's landscape in a meaningful way rather than just
a way to get money onto cryptocurrency trading websites, which
is where they began. And then all of the things
(53:00):
around tokenization of equity. I mean, it's just a fact
that Robin Hood, whose CEO we had on unilaterally announced
that at some point there's going to be some version
of tokenized equity or tokens that correspond to equity in
private companies doing it unilatterly. How regulators are going to
(53:22):
actually get their handle on this? I have no idea.
Speaker 2 (53:25):
Yeah, tokens, tokens everywhere, and not a bank to lend.
I think that was ro HiT's point, right, All right,
shall we leave it there?
Speaker 1 (53:31):
Let's leave it there.
Speaker 2 (53:32):
This has been another episode of the Odd Lots podcast.
I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy.
Speaker 1 (53:37):
Alloway and I'm Joe Wisenthal. You can follow me at
the Stalwart. Follow our guest Roe Hit Chopra. He's at
Chopra USA. Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Arman,
dash Ol Bennett at Dashbock and kel Brooks at Keil Brooks.
More Odd Lots content go to Bloomberg dot com slash
odd Lots. We have a daily newsletter and all of
our episodes, and you can chat about all of these
(53:58):
topics twenty four to seven in our disc discord do
Gg slashlins.
Speaker 2 (54:02):
And if you enjoy Odlots, if you like it when
we do autopsies of failed banks with regulators. Then please
leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform.
And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can
listen to all of our episodes absolutely a free All
you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel on
Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there.
Speaker 3 (54:22):
Thanks for listening.
Hosts And Creators
Joe Weisenthal
Tracy Alloway
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