June 20, 2025 • 46 mins
Zichen Wang is the writer of the Pekingnology newsletter, which translates important speeches and articles from China into English, and contextualizes them for Western readers. Over the past year, he's been a master's degree student at Princeton University, although he's recently returned home to resume his career at a think tank in China. His stint in the US obviously came at a very interesting time, both due to the rising US-China tensions, and also the growing restrictions on Chinese students in the US. So before making his trip back home he joined us for another episode of Odd Lots. We discussed his experience here in America, his assessment of the state of US-China relations, and what his message will be upon his return to China.
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Speaker 1 (00:02):
Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News.
Speaker 2 (00:18):
Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast.
Speaker 3 (00:21):
I'm Joe Wisenthal and I'm Tracy Allaway.
Speaker 2 (00:24):
Tracy, we're recording this June fifth. President she Shinping and
President Trump just held a phone call.
Speaker 3 (00:29):
Wouldn't you like to be a fly on the wall
for that conversation?
Speaker 4 (00:32):
I would. I don't know what that means.
Speaker 2 (00:33):
Markets moved on it. I'm always surprised how hard it
is to set up phone, just pick up the phone,
But I'm always at surprised that these are like bigger news.
It should be noted that this was reported first by
the Shinwan News agency out of China, and there was
a headline that the news agency specified that the phone
call was at Trump's request. They made a point of saying.
Speaker 3 (00:55):
That I still have this image of Trump sitting in
the Oval office by the phone, just like twittally his
thumbs waiting for shehian Ping to call, like hoping is
he gonna call me? Should I wait two days? Should
I wait three days before responding that kind of thing.
Speaker 2 (01:08):
There was an Ultra Journal article from a few weeks
ago which made the observation which I had not realized
outside of the September eleventh terrorist attacks, there's never been
a contact between the US and China that was initiated
by China, which I hadn't realized before. I assume it's true.
Speaker 3 (01:24):
So Sheishan Ping is sitting in his office twiddling waiting
for the Trump.
Speaker 2 (01:28):
Yeah, okay, and then he decided, but he decides to
either take the call anyway. All of this sort of
speaks that to the fact, you know, we sort of
confused by all this, and there's still just so much
that I think Americans in particular, but I'm sure it
goes to both directions, like genuinely don't understand about the
other country. And given a time of increased tension obviously
(01:49):
the trade war heightened geopolitical concerns, it's not great. I
think it would be better even if we sort of
accept the premise of there is the very intense competition
that the two countries and the populations and the governments
and the people going to governments just know more about
how they work.
Speaker 5 (02:03):
Absolutely.
Speaker 3 (02:04):
Have you ever read an English translation of the way
China academics write and talk about American society and American politics?
Speaker 2 (02:13):
I should read this.
Speaker 3 (02:14):
It's really really interesting.
Speaker 2 (02:16):
Should send me some links?
Speaker 3 (02:17):
Yeah, okay, I will, but I know a person who
has done this and translated it and done the work,
and he will definitely send you some links.
Speaker 2 (02:24):
So I am very excited to say that we have
a I think it should be a special episode. We've
talked to him on the podcast before. We're going to
be speaking with Zishen Wog. He is the author of
the creator of the Pechnology Substack, which essentially looks at
public comments from officials, academics, leaders in China and then
writes about them and translates them for an American audience
(02:46):
and actually sort of helps an American audience understand what
this sort of like public discourse is. And anyway, over
the last year, he's been getting his master's degree in
public policy at the Princeton School of Public International Affairs.
So he's been in Princeton over the last year. But
he's going back to China and he's going to return
for where he was working at the think tank, the
(03:07):
Center for China and Globalization.
Speaker 3 (03:09):
Right, So this is his exit interview from America.
Speaker 2 (03:12):
Basically, when I heard that he was leaving town, I
was like, let's do an exit interview. And of course
the other added context, which I think is very relevant here,
is that this comes a time of extreme scrutiny on
the mere existence of Chinese students at American universities, particularly
out of the Trump administration. It's an American export US universities,
and there's this major crackdown. We've seen all these concerns
(03:35):
about visas, et cetera. So there's a perfect time to
do this exit interview. So Zishan, thank you so much
for coming on the podcast.
Speaker 5 (03:43):
Well, thank you for having me here back again.
Speaker 2 (03:45):
You run a great newsletter and we had a great
episode with you. And as a student in the US,
you're sort of situated at a very interesting time. But
let's like back up, Like what prompted you to come
to the US to study in the first place. I mean,
you did this program at Princeton.
Speaker 5 (04:02):
How come before coming to the mid career Master in
Public Policy program at the Princeton School of Public International
Affairs formerly known as the Rural Wilson School, I'd already
been working for thirteen years, so I was like at
the middle of my professional trajectory and I were thinking
about getting another advanced education, and of course the United
(04:23):
States is the top destination.
Speaker 4 (04:26):
One other thing.
Speaker 5 (04:27):
Is that, to the credit of Princeton, the Policy School
offers fully funded education, so that means they examined all
the tuition and the healthcare coverany.
Speaker 4 (04:37):
No export revenue for US, yes.
Speaker 5 (04:39):
Exactly in this case, yes, and also a living stipend.
And so I turned down some other offers from the UK,
from Singapore and came here. And also, as you correctly
mentioned at the very beginning, you know, China US relations
is perhaps the most consequential bilacual relations for someone whose
past career was in journalism and nonas in tank. I
(05:00):
couldn't think of a better place to be here in
the US. But you know, here we are, and I
feel like being overwhelmed by all these news.
Speaker 3 (05:09):
So on that note, was the plan always to go
back to China after you completed your degree or is
this something new.
Speaker 5 (05:16):
That was like eighty or nineteen percent of my plan?
Mainly for personal reasons, but also I think the political
atom sphere is a bit overwhelming. I did have some
kind offers from potential employers here, but I decided against them.
The State Department announced, actually, you know, they are going
to aggressively revoke Chinese students visas as well as imposed
(05:40):
you know, further scrutiny on future Chinese students visa applications.
Speaker 4 (05:45):
Let's say I stay on for one more year.
Speaker 5 (05:47):
I would be on opt or CPT, which is a
post training upon graduation from a US college, but that
status would be linked to your student visa, your FM visa.
So the potential consequences for Chinese students is not just
currently enrolled students, but also other you know, people who
are on o BTCBT students.
Speaker 3 (06:09):
Here out of curiosity, is Princeton providing guidance on visas
because I can only imagine being a college student and
having to deal with immigration issues on top of everything else.
Speaker 5 (06:20):
In light of what happened at Harvard, let me think
of a way of not putting Princeton in jeopardy again.
I did get I think, not just me, but everywhere else.
Did get some emails from you know, sort of guidance
from the university which says it took notice of recent
news and it is offering resources basically, I guess, you know,
(06:42):
counseling as well as potential legal resources for people to
not to be against the administration, but to comply with
all the laws and regulations in this country.
Speaker 2 (06:51):
This was a one year program obviously, say versus ten
years ago, the sort of level of suspicion and anxiety
about the press and a lot of Chinese students at
American universities has grown quite a bit. What about even
in the last year, how do things feel shifted? And
when you talk to other Chinese students, you know, is
it just like noise coming out of DC or does
(07:13):
it change the campus environment?
Speaker 5 (07:15):
Well, I think it definitely has already had a chilly
in fact, And I mean for me personally, I feel
very welcomed and I feel all the hospitality and warmth
from my American professors, you know, school administrators, and the
prison community of neighbors and my local friends. But for
(07:38):
you know, most of the Chinese students who are currently
in this situation perhaps too scare to speak up, and
especially after the news last week, I think they are
under a bit of stress because the announcement out of
the state partament is very broad, it doesn't use very
exact language to ascertain who will exactly be in trouble.
(08:00):
There are currently I think two hundred and seventy thousands
Chinese students here in the United States. China is the
second largest origin of international students here in the US,
and so was the first India. So for many years
China was the largest source of international students here in America,
but that number has come down since bilateral relations.
Speaker 4 (08:22):
Worthen.
Speaker 5 (08:22):
The United States has a proud history of welcoming Chinese
students who come to the United States. In the beginning
of the twentieth century, when China was still governed by
the Qing dynasty, there was this Boxer indemnities, basically the
compensations paid by dan Qing dynasty to various Western powers.
And at that time, the US was kind enough and
(08:44):
smart enough to turn those compensations into a scholarship program.
Speaker 3 (08:48):
Which was part of their money diplomacy of the early
nineteen hundreds, right.
Speaker 5 (08:53):
Well before Joseph Knight created the concept of soft power,
and the US has been practicing that. So they ceded
the top university in Beijing and sponsored to one thousand
and three hundred Chinese students to come to the United States.
And after the bilactual ties were established, you know, since
the two countries normalized the diplomatic relations, Republican and the
(09:17):
Democratic presidents both welcomed the Chinese students. There was this
very famous episode where Chinese top leader Don't Selping at
the time asked, you know, if he could send something
like five thousand Chinese students to the US, and President Cutter,
according to his own recollections, he responded that, well, tell him,
tell them to send one hundred thousand students to America.
(09:39):
I also read President Ronald Reagan actually received the Chinese
students and made remarks in some sort of reception welcoming them.
And let's remember that was a time when China was
much less open and dynamic than it is today. So
what is happening is really unfortunate. I think because of
this long history, many Chinese for granted the opportunities to
(10:02):
come here and study in America if they are good
enough to be offered the admission letters. But the larger
background is, of course, I guess globalization, because for many,
many years, people just believe, you know, everyone is going
to be more connected and we will benefit from more
people to people exchanges, from commerce, from you know, research collaborations.
Speaker 4 (10:23):
But unfortunately that.
Speaker 5 (10:25):
Era seems to be ending right now. Well, it may
have begun to be ending quite a few years Ago Joe.
Speaker 3 (10:33):
Just as an aside, there's a really good book called
Fortunate Sons about some Chinese students who were sent to
a Connecticut school in I think the late eighteen hundreds.
Speaker 2 (10:43):
I'd love to read that.
Speaker 3 (10:44):
It's really good. I read it when I bought that
house in Connecticut to try to bridge the gap I
guess between Hong Kong and where I was living. I
(11:08):
wanted to ask, what's the difference or differences from your
perspective in terms of what you would learn in a
public policy degree in China versus a public policy degree
at some place like Princeton.
Speaker 4 (11:22):
Well, that's a very good question.
Speaker 5 (11:23):
I think there is. This key difference is, for example,
policy schools are mostly for early career and mid career
professionals in public service sector, and here I think for example,
at Harvard Kendidate's school, at the Jackson School of Global Affairs,
at the year at PRINCETON'SBIA, they are offered full time.
And that's because not just the US, but also many
(11:45):
governments across the world they have the flexibility to allow
their people to basically take a year or two year
off their professional career and come here. But back in China,
I think many of those programs are taught as a
part time process, although like they are labeled a full
time process because the I think sometimes the rigidity of
(12:08):
personnel management system means that it's very difficult for people
to basically leave work for a year or two and
get a full time education at you know, maybe Chinhuaan
and Peking University.
Speaker 4 (12:18):
And also here in the US, I.
Speaker 5 (12:20):
Think the policy schools benefits greatly from first of all,
former policymakers like retired former sistants, Secretary of State and
so here we have like many very good practitioners who
are becoming you know, teachers. We have, for example, Princeton Speer,
some former Biden administration officials who just exited the administration. Well,
(12:42):
I think in Chinese universities, to be fair, I haven't
gone to those policy schools, but that would be rare.
And secondly, this place benefits from a much broader well,
I guess this is a toxic world now diversity here. Now,
for example, my class is highlighted like over half of
the classmates I international students, and also the faculty members,
(13:05):
some of them even come from foreign governments. I really
benefited from the global perspectives. I get from Princeton here.
Speaker 2 (13:12):
What did you do for undergrade?
Speaker 5 (13:13):
Well, I went to a Chinese college and major lea
in finance.
Speaker 2 (13:16):
Actually, I don't know much about Chinese universities. The only
thing I ever hear these days about Chinese universities is
usually in the context of tech competition in the number
of STEM graduates, and you hear a lot about the
number of hundreds of thousands of STEM graduates and the
advantages that sheer scale confers. You know, when I think
(13:37):
of American universities, there's STEM, but I also think a
lot about the heavy importance on liberal arts degrees and
literature and history, and people can go on to you know,
careers in tech and finance even from a history degree.
Can you compare contrast that sort of like intellectual environment
at the Chinese colleges in terms of the non technical fields.
Speaker 5 (13:57):
Well, this is something I think that has been observed
and they talked about in the past few years when
people compare you know, Chinese and American universities, but also
between Chinese and I guess Indian universities, because based on
what I read, which may not be like very accurate,
it's like India also trains a lot of like lawyers
and you know, social sciences majors. But the general perception
(14:21):
is that the Chinese colleges and universities are training many
more STEM grads and you know in semiconductor related in
you know, mechanical and yeah.
Speaker 2 (14:31):
I mean, this is just what everyone's talking about these
days because of this anxiety about tech competition.
Speaker 4 (14:37):
Oh yeah, that's correct. And almost all.
Speaker 5 (14:39):
Universities in China are state run. All the IVY leagues
are privately around universities here in the US, maybe because
I think China is still to some extent a transition economy.
So China initiated as a reform and opening up in
nineteen seventy eight, but before that it was a totally
planned economy where the government basically tells every one what
to do, uh, you know, in their schools and in
(15:01):
their professional journeys, and based on those you know paradigms,
a lot of Chinese universities are set up like to
train people in a specific field. For example, there is
this Beijing Aeronautics University which basically trains people you know
in space related technology and maybe rocket science. And then
(15:24):
there is also you know, comprehensive universities. But for for
many years there was this maybe legacy China learned from
the Soviet Union to have specialized colleges and universities in
training STEM grads. And also, you know, China has one
point four billion people. It is now the second most
populous country on Earth, so naturally you would see, you know,
(15:45):
there are just many, many more Chinese students there, and
the Chinese they put heavy emphasis on science and technology.
Speaker 4 (15:53):
Can I share with one detail with you?
Speaker 5 (15:55):
Because I graduated from finance and I went down to
join a new studency in China, Yes, the same news agency.
And my mother used to tell me, why don't you
learn something real like finance and journalism? They are not
like real professional Well, I guess I didn't test very
well in Chinese college and trance examination. For many years
(16:18):
there was this quote in China, and I think it
still rings true, and it maybe it rings even truer today. Well,
in Chinese it's called hortually, like if you learn mathematics
and the physics and chemistry, you can go everywhere and
do and do well. And that is still on many
Chinese minds. And so for example in Ai, I think
(16:39):
Jason Juan of Nvidia, he.
Speaker 4 (16:41):
Said, like a few weeks ago.
Speaker 5 (16:43):
I think he was citing Marco Polo I think tank
here formally affiliated with the Postle Institute, is that fifty
percent of the global AI talent is Chinese or maybe
having some sort of Chinese heritage. So that does speak
to the enormous training capacity of the Chinese education and
which also makes many people wander here. You know, AI
(17:04):
is going to shape everything in the future, and the
two countries seem to be lucked in a competition that
the US really want to shut out such a large
talent poll in Ai. And these students, Chinese students, you know,
after completing their undergrad degrees, they come to the United States,
they contribute to meaningfully, to groundbreaking research. And I think
(17:26):
this is one thing that many people have a maybe
an inaccurate understanding of how graduate level education, especially in
stem Field's work, this is not an extractive process. It's
not that you know, Chinese, Indian. You know, students from
global thouts come to the US universities, they learned, they
(17:47):
sat in classrooms, they learned from their American professors and peers,
and then they leave and brought the knowledge back with them.
Speaker 4 (17:54):
That's not the case.
Speaker 5 (17:56):
Yes, they benefit enormously from the education system here, which
is just spectacular, but they make meaningful contributions in conducting
research and collaborating with the American peers and professors. They
stay in labs for days and months and which would
result in papers in top American journals. They actually contribute
to the creation of knowledge and the sharing of knowledge here.
(18:18):
They contribute in the process. It's a symbiotic process, not
an extractive process. So by having them here, and some
of them, you know, would remain here legally, I should say,
you know, to work in the US, become entrepreneurs and
researchers and American taxpayers to pursue their American dreams, and
some of them would leave the US and go back
(18:38):
to China, India, and you know, everywhere on Earth, and
they would become, you know, informal ambassadors of American openings,
of American inclusiveness, of American.
Speaker 4 (18:47):
Hospitality, and they would serve as.
Speaker 5 (18:50):
One of the defense lines in terms of China US
relations as decreasing mutual strategic misunderstanding and the miscalculations.
Speaker 4 (18:59):
So this truly.
Speaker 5 (19:00):
Something very important in my mind, and I'm really saddened
to see you know, the crackdown on Chinese students to
come to the United States.
Speaker 3 (19:07):
When you go back to China, what nice things are
you going to say about America.
Speaker 5 (19:11):
Well, the first thing I'll tell them is that I
have the enormous privilege of coming to outlaws on Princeton
I Bloomberg, I'm sorry, And that's really.
Speaker 2 (19:22):
That's the first thing.
Speaker 4 (19:23):
Okay, what's number two?
Speaker 5 (19:25):
Well, number two is I think I benefit a lot
from all the critical discussions on colleges. It's not just
you know, pro Trump against Trump. We have very different
views on all sorts of subjects. Some professors are rightfully
worried about, for example, rule of law here, but we
have also some classmates who have faculties who are very
(19:48):
sympathetic to what the broader Republican agenda is doing here
in the United States. So I think this clash of
different ideas, the market of free ideas is something simulating
for me personally. And the other reason is that, for example,
I'm fully founded by Princeton spar here, and so I
(20:09):
benefit truly from the hospitality and the generosity of the
American people here. Is the private university is the money
coming in from private donations I'm truly grateful for that,
and I don't think like any other country on the
Earth has simply has the financial capacity to do something
like that, So this is something.
Speaker 4 (20:30):
Really should be cherished. Here.
Speaker 5 (20:32):
I will certainly carry, you know, all these lessons and
appreciations back to China.
Speaker 3 (20:39):
We started this conversation talking about deteriorating US China relations,
and I don't think anyone would disagree with that premise.
But the question I wanted to ask you is, as
someone who's worked in both Chinese and Western institutions, or
at least studied at a Western institution, what do you
think is the biggest understanding between the US and China.
(21:03):
What's the biggest sticking point?
Speaker 5 (21:05):
You mentioned the subsect I did technology and all those
for example. I also have the privilege of being invited
to some of the major thing thanks here to share
my views with you know, fellow think tank analysts and
for officials. I think, if I really want to summarize,
like what I've been doing is to normalize China, because
(21:26):
China has a vastly different political system from the United States,
from all the major westerns and industrial the economiess I
think people fundamentally see China as a different beast, but
China also has politics. The Chinese government has many government departments, ministries.
They compete with one another. There is politics between different departments,
(21:48):
politics between different people inside one government department. The Chinese
make five year plans and they seem to be implementing
that quite well. For example, the China twenty twenty five
come into mind. But sometimes they are also very short sighted.
The Chinese have good accomplishments, they also make stupid mistakes.
(22:10):
That's just human nature.
Speaker 2 (22:11):
What are some examples of short sighted? Because Americans love
to go to China and then they come back and
they say they think in the centuries, I'm like us
who just think. You know, it's these very cliches, these
very cliched commentary that you just hear over and over against,
like we just think about the next quarterly estimate or
hitting the next GDP. You say, obviously, any society is
(22:32):
going to be richer than these sort of cliche tropes
that you know when you look back at decisions, Because
you mentioned seems like the mad and twenty twenty five
stuff worked out really well, but where do you see
it breaking down? At times?
Speaker 5 (22:44):
For example, let's talk about Eve's right, you know, the
electric vehicles.
Speaker 4 (22:49):
So everyone now knows.
Speaker 5 (22:51):
That China is leading on EV's and people talk about
bid about you know, cell me, the former smartphonemaker turned
automobile maker, and it seems like, you know, Ford and
other US auto giants are falling behind. So many people
attribute to some sort of Chinese state subsidies and industrial strategy.
(23:11):
But there also in mind that before this evy boom,
there were like a dozen Chinese automobile makers. Almost all
of them were state around automobile companies, because China implemented this.
When foreign comakers come to China, you have to form
joint ventures with Chinese planners, and in many cases the
(23:32):
Chinese partners have to be in control of fifty one
percent of the joint venture.
Speaker 4 (23:37):
But all these Chinese.
Speaker 5 (23:38):
Stay around automobile giants are actually falling behind. Now what
you are seeing in the EV boom in China, the
names coming to mind are all very new private around
Chinese automobile makers. They didn't exist, They didn't benefit from
the sort of state monopoly or preferential loans and maybe
(23:58):
land and all the in kind subsidies for those they
basically partnered with. BMW with all these American and the
European commakers, but look they are falling behind now.
Speaker 2 (24:11):
It's on the other hand sorry, But on the other hand,
I could listen to that story and say, because of
this requirement for jvs, the only possibility of actual private
automobile development in China was for domestic companies, and international
companies never had that chance to actually sort of be
truly autonomous within the Chinese domestic market. Seems like that
(24:35):
worked out very well in the grand scheme of things
for ensuring that the only companies with complete agility, et
cetera in the Chinese market ended up being Chinese.
Speaker 5 (24:43):
Well, first of all, that could be some sort of
a good policy advice for the Cormon administration, I guess,
and also maybe European governments. And secondly, I'm very down.
Speaker 2 (24:51):
With please bring bid in a JV or something like that.
I wanted uid gigafactor in Georgia or something like that.
I've said that before anyway, going.
Speaker 5 (25:00):
What I was trying to say is there is this discrepancy.
Speaker 4 (25:03):
With you know, all the power of our.
Speaker 5 (25:06):
Industrial strategies, but at the same time it's the private
ingenuity of the innovation of the hard work of the
private Chinese companies which have somehow come out on the
top all the states around companies, they are are falling behind,
at least in the automobile sector. And that shows that
I think people tend to see China as a country
(25:32):
with the Communist Party of China sitting atop the state
tells everyone what to do and marshaling all the resources.
But it is also at the same time just spectacularly
competitive and the innovative place where private ingenuity and hard
work really plays a very big rule. There is this
say in China you know five six, seven, eight nine
(25:54):
basically says you know, over half of the GDP, of
the taxation, of the new employ ooyment are all created
by private companies. And so that's something when Americans perceive China,
they think of just one very coherent, I don't know, Bechman,
where you know, there is this larger central brain telling
(26:14):
everyone to do everything else. And yes, the the like
the Chinese government, the Commanist Party of China enjoys enormous
power in telling in shaping the Chinese society compared with
Western powers. But do not discount and actually I think
much more emphasis should be put on the non state
part of the Chinese society.
Speaker 3 (26:35):
You mentioned your mom thinking that doing finance and journalism
was not very valuable, And one thing you sometimes hear
is that China places greater importance or value on people
studying stem going into tech. And I guess I'm curious
how much has that changed over the years, Like, if
I was a high school student in China in I
(26:58):
don't know the nineteen nineties, would be encouraged to be
a doctor or a lawyer or a teacher, or would
I be encouraged to go into tech? Like basically, how
has that culture of which subject is most valued changed
over time?
Speaker 4 (27:14):
You are very sharp eyed.
Speaker 5 (27:15):
I think if it was in the nineteen nineties, people
wanted to go to I don't want to name names,
like certain finance schools in China, and after graduation, like
they would want to work in Goldman Sucks and Morgan Stanley.
Speaker 4 (27:34):
That's like the top jobs.
Speaker 5 (27:36):
Maybe when I graduated from college in twenty eleven, that's
still the case what the people wanted to do because
it makes huge money. It makes very big money. But
especially in the past decade, I think I'm.
Speaker 4 (27:50):
Sure you have reported this.
Speaker 5 (27:51):
There is a large casts to the income to the
wages of Chinese financial engineering, and even when to the
Internet sector, Facebook now known as Matter and all those
booms they contribute to consumer internet that was the thing
in China as well. Like Ali Baba and Tencent, what
(28:12):
they do is they popularize some technologies which makes lives
much easier for everyday consumers and also businesses. But in
a sense, I think now more value is put into
the sort of technologies that would really boost the productivity
in you know, industrial process For example, even doctors and
(28:36):
hospitals can identify certain diseases. It's not just you know,
I can go out and get a delivery much easier
from a from a restaurant. So the term technology I
think has taken out a new meaning. And if I
can make a recommendation. There is this Dan Wound who
who I think.
Speaker 4 (28:56):
Is in.
Speaker 2 (28:58):
To recommend Dan long.
Speaker 4 (29:01):
Audience.
Speaker 2 (29:01):
We've had about several times. I'm sure we'll do a
big thing when his book comes out. Both Tracy and
I have copies of it on our desk. You should
go pre order it on Amazon raw.
Speaker 5 (29:10):
So basically I think China is wishing to make Yeah,
basically these hot technologies more sexy than you know, just
joining a tech firm.
Speaker 2 (29:21):
It's interesting. It sort of feels this is becoming an
international phenomenon that everyone is getting very anxious about their
country's capacity to do quote hard tech. You are returning
to China and you're going to go back to the
think tank, the Center for China and Globalization. It's interesting.
I'm looking at the controversy section in the Wikipedia page
(29:43):
for it, and Marco Rubio, who's now the Secretary of State,
in twenty eighteen, he actually blasted your school. He blasted
the Woodrow Wilson School for inviting a scholar from the CCG,
and he said the retire to the Chinese Communist Party.
And CCG, according to Wikipedia, is a member of an
alliance of think tanks coordinated by the International Department of
the Chinese Communist Party that support the Belton Road initiative,
(30:06):
which we've talked about.
Speaker 4 (30:08):
On the show.
Speaker 2 (30:10):
Now, granted, your situation strikes me as a little bit
unique because most students coming to the US from China
are not going to a public policy school and a
one year funded thing. Why shouldn't American lawmakers, however, be
concerned about training many of the next generation of leaders
in a country that is perceived to be a major rival,
(30:32):
and doing work with them and training them in Ai
and all of these things that there is so much
sort of almost everyone accepts that there is going to
be some degree of, you know, either geopolitical and business competition.
Speaker 5 (30:45):
First of all, about the Wikipedia page you was Jess mentioned, Yeah,
I know, it's very very thorough research over here.
Speaker 2 (30:51):
I click out a Lincoln Our School of a controversy section,
but I wanted to, you know, I saw both your
think tank and the Wilson School have come under controversy
for connections.
Speaker 5 (31:02):
The joke I typically make in this sort of conversation
is that, well, I came from the State Ground News agency.
I was a proper Chinese government personnel, and now people
would characterize me as some sort of you know, the
term United Front. That's like semi government. You're done grading me, like,
I was a proper Chinese government for eleven years and
(31:26):
I left, you know, in October tenty twenty two. And
if we have time, I'd be happy to dive into
the details of you know, the difference between a government
rund thing tank and a non governmental thing tank in China.
But to your larger point, is that there is this
term which says keep your friends close and keep your
(31:47):
enemy closer. I'm not sure exactly if China and US
are enemies at the moment, but just from that inside,
I think it would be very beneficial for the US,
especially policy schools, but also other you know, social sciences
and universities, to try to have Chinese contributions, to have
Chinese students' presence here, so that's you know, when push
(32:09):
comes to shop, they have someone to call, They know
what the Chinese are really thinking about, and that is
I think one of the tragedies from the crackdown for example. However,
than have the Chinist school.
Speaker 2 (32:35):
You mentioned that there's a difference between properly state run
think tanks and non state run think tanks. I think
in the US there is a perception, and this actually
goes back to the talk about companies, including car companies,
et cetera. There's a perception that there's actually no private
companies that implicitly, even the private companies, the byds, et cetera,
(32:55):
are at some level, you know, at the back and
call of the state, and some more literally. The other
is even those incredible book about Walkway talks, a lot
about there's a Communist party leadership within the company. It
engages in making sure itch members who are employers of
the company and engage in more moral behavior and aren't
doing things like gambling, et cetera. Why shouldn't we think
(33:18):
that every country within China, regardless of how it's incorporated,
answers up to political leadership invasion.
Speaker 5 (33:25):
I think on macro level, I do not see a
drastic difference between for example, a US president wants.
Speaker 4 (33:34):
To have like Nvadia or Apple to.
Speaker 5 (33:37):
Become the dominant forces in the world, and from the
Chaps Actor, from the Inflation Reduction Act to offering you know,
generous subsidies to American companies. In China, there is this
support for Chinese companies, but in many cases not from.
Speaker 4 (33:56):
The very start.
Speaker 5 (33:57):
It's like, you know how we studied very little, and
it was competing with UH with European telecom vendors at
the very beginning, and for many years, you know, China Mobile,
China Unicom, all the state telecomation firms, they just wanted
the equipment from the European suppliers and yeah, and probably
had to go to the European markets to increase its customers.
(34:21):
Numbers and revenue and after a few years and especially
when the industry became more strategic and uh, and then
the Chinese comment, would you know, take a look at
of the potential players and believe, oh, this is perhaps
an industry that's going to be of strategical value in
the future, and would provide some sort of assistance to them.
(34:45):
But I wouldn't think that there is a CCP committee
overseeing Huawei on a daily basis telling them, you know,
this is something you should do in the Southeast Asia
and this is something you should work on in Africa.
And if that were the case, Huawei wouldn't be where
it is today, Which is also why I sincerely believe
(35:08):
the US persecution of Quawei and other properly private Chinese
companies is a strategic mistake, because these companies were on
their way to making China more dynamic, more private, having
more private elements in the Chinese society, to have more
(35:29):
international exposure, to allow people to have a career path
a meaningful one, a financially rewarding one.
Speaker 4 (35:37):
Outside the apparatus.
Speaker 5 (35:39):
These companies are helping China to become more open, more
aligned with international standards. So these are positive forces from
a market perspective that to help align China with the
globalization process, with the so called rule based international order.
Speaker 4 (35:58):
And this is also the reasons.
Speaker 5 (36:00):
For example, the US has imposed many export controls and
has for example, sanctioned Russia and other states and companies
that are deemed hostile to US national interests, and many
of the Chinese private companies are well silently just abide
by all these sanctions because they want to globalize. They
(36:22):
want to have markets and the partners and supplies across
the world.
Speaker 4 (36:27):
But I guess this.
Speaker 5 (36:28):
Is the year ten twenty five. There is no way
to turn around this phenomena. I guess.
Speaker 3 (36:33):
Well, on this note, this actually leads into a question
I wanted to ask, and I think this will be
the last question for me.
Speaker 4 (36:39):
But one of my.
Speaker 3 (36:40):
Pet theories right now is that the US is starting
to look a lot more like China, and China is
starting to look a lot more like the US. So
just recently, for instance, you've seen Chinese policy makers try
to boost consumer spending, which is a page out of
the US playbook. After financial crises, they've been enhancing their
(37:00):
social safety net, which again kind of looks American, although
you can debate how strong the American social net is. America, meanwhile,
has been making more strategic investments in certain industries. Industrial
policy has become a thing again. China's liberalizing part of
its market. The US says it's going to keep Chinese
(37:21):
investors out of its market, like it feels like they're
taking on each other's characteristics to some degree. I guess
my question is would you agree with that? And I
have to say Michael Pettis did not agree with me,
but a couple others Victor Schwetz over at McCrory agreed
with me. And then right after I wrote my piece
about this, there was a big foreign policy article basically
(37:43):
saying the same thing. So I would love to get
your opinion.
Speaker 5 (37:46):
Well, I think I've heard the term called beating China
by becoming China. And I do think that the United
States has its legitimate interests in strengthening its supply chain,
in safeguarding the resilience of its industries. Like I totally
understand that the US doesn't want to rely one hundred
(38:09):
percent on ppees during COVID. It wants to ensure a
certain level of self reliance when it comes to manufacturing capacity.
Maybe i'mshore or maybe friendly shoring like in allies, you know,
Transatlantic allies. I get that, and I think when it
comes to China, what you were mentioning, and I guess
(38:29):
maybe Michael Pattis doesn't fully agree, is that many people
believe the process in China of you know, showing up
the consumer spending and strengthening the social safety that that
should be accelerated, that should go much faster than it
is happening today, because you know, the Chinese government they
have officially, according to their policy papers, recognizes that. In
(38:54):
the Chinese minds, it's not about basically learning from American
way of establishing a social safety nets, maybe from the Europeans,
I guess, but because it is fundamentally helpful and beneficial
for the Chinese society, for the Chinese people to have
a relatively robust healthcare coverage insurance so that they could
spend money on more iPhones and other consumer electronics. This
(39:18):
is fundamentally good something good. It's not about learning from
the rest of the world, but a phenomena. You just
mentioned that there is some sort of convergence. I do
hope they converge. I'm being more open. I'm being more humane.
I'm being more humanitarian, being more.
Speaker 4 (39:39):
Hospitable to people to persons.
Speaker 5 (39:42):
And if I may have some sort of last word
on this, I'm really saddened and sometimes I'm angry that
it's the students. They are at their early twenties or
maybe like nineteen years ago, they are being made points
in this game. Come on, they are innocent, these strategical right. Yes,
take all your measures against the military industrial complex and
(40:04):
even maybe huaweis, but leave the people alone from this
and let's you know, people to people experience and student
experience happen, and they will try to safeguard the long
term stability of the two countries because I mean, as
competitive as hawkish as the US Trump administration hopes to
be in China. Although I haven't read the latest read
(40:27):
out of the phone call, but nobody wants the two
countries to go to war, and to just prevent something catastrophic.
Against that, we need people to people, you know, dialogues,
and the Chinese leaders have been receiving US guests. For example,
the Vice President of China recently, just I think yesterday
or today, received the US nonamental players in China. The
(40:49):
Chinese leaders met for example, John L. Thornton, the former
CEO of gold Man SAX. They met Graham Allison, the
founding dam of the Harvard the Kennedy School. So you
have many news in China from Chinese leaders receiving non
governmental guests from the US officially reported in China legitimizing
the non governmental visits from the US to China, but
(41:12):
the other way around. I don't see any news, even
under Biden administration, that the US government openly receives you know,
non governmental visitors, scholars, entrepreneurs, and the Chinese. You know,
for example, she didn't be met with you know, dozens
of US companies and the Western and the European company CEOs.
So in that thing, the Chinese legitimizing the Western interactions
(41:34):
coming into China. But unfortunately, I'm not seeing any of
that here here. What we have is like delegitimizing any
Chinese government and the non governmental people coming here. And
I think I've heard that, you know, the US government
is also meeting with non governmental Chinese actors, scholars well,
working in state around universities and think tanks, but they're
(41:55):
not saying anything about that. And uh, and that's not
something very I think one.
Speaker 2 (42:02):
Thank you so much for coming on odd Laws. Thank
you for doing your aid interview with us. This is
really fascinating. Really glad we got to chat before you
left town. And I hope we continue reading your work.
I hope you're going to keep doing pechronology. Yes, definitely,
that's fantastic because I think for a lot of us
here it's a very useful resource, those of us who
(42:23):
don't speak Chinese or those of us who don't know
who the names that we should actually be paying attention to,
so really appreciate it. And safe travels home.
Speaker 5 (42:31):
Thank you. I'm truly grateful for the opportunity. Thank you
to Tracy and John. And I hope maybe not just
for me, but for Chinese students it's odious not goodbye
real quickly.
Speaker 2 (42:43):
Has there been a change in perception the desirability of
coming here.
Speaker 5 (42:47):
If the Chinese students don't face the restrictions, they certainly still.
Speaker 4 (42:51):
Want to come here.
Speaker 5 (42:52):
Thank you so much, Thank you, my planer.
Speaker 2 (43:06):
First of all, really enjoyed that conversation. It is hard
for me, you know, this sort of really aggressive attempt
to no longer have American universities be a sort of
destination for many of the world's most you know, talented individuals.
It's hard for me to imagine that not being sort
of like a pretty big hit to both the US
(43:27):
economy and it's just sort of like standing.
Speaker 1 (43:29):
In the world.
Speaker 3 (43:30):
Yeah, so Zician's point about, well, you know, Chinese students
who come to America for their education, they largely go
back to China with fond memories of America. I think
the idea that America wouldn't value that is really indicative
of how much less we seem to be valuing soft
(43:50):
power nowadays. It seems like that kind of diplomacy just
isn't as popular as it once was, And so you're
seeing people like the Trump administrations say like, well, why
should we be doing this, You don't get anything out
of it. But then people like Zishen will say, well,
you actually do get something out of it. You get
better relations, and you get that sort of cultural understanding
(44:14):
and that soft diplomacy.
Speaker 2 (44:16):
I do wonder the degree to which the American public
has been sold on the benefits of so called soft power. Right, So,
like a lot of people are saying American influence abroad,
American ideals, what America stands for for freedom and almost
in so many other countries, or maybe did up until recently.
I know, global perceptions have changed, et cetera. But then
(44:38):
I think, you know, maybe there's another argument. It's like, oh,
that's great that all these countries see as a beacon
of freedom or whatever.
Speaker 4 (44:44):
What do I get out of that?
Speaker 2 (44:45):
How does that benefit me? And I think when you
look at some of the political turns, perhaps the case
hasn't been made to the US public in a very
compelling way from the people who believe in sort of
liberal internationalism that the average citizen in the US actually
should care at all about how the rest of the
world views us.
Speaker 3 (45:03):
Look, everyone needs to travel more if they can.
Speaker 5 (45:06):
That's what I say.
Speaker 3 (45:07):
You need to go to a place that loves America,
and then you need to go, I don't know, to
the Middle East or something and talk to someone that
hates America and see what the difference is. There's a
big difference.
Speaker 2 (45:17):
This is a really good perspective and take Okay, shall
we leave it there. Let's leave it there.
Speaker 3 (45:23):
This has been another episode of the Oddlots podcast. I'm
Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway and.
Speaker 2 (45:28):
I'm Jill Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwart.
Follow our guest Zishan Wong. He's at Zishanwong here and
check out his Pecknology substack. I do hope he sustains
it upon return to China. Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez,
Ed Carman Arman, dash Ol Bennett at Dashbot at Kilbrooks
at Kelbrooks. From Oddlots content, go to Bloomberg dot com
(45:49):
slash odd Lots. We have a daily newsletter and all
of our episodes, and you can chat about all of
these topics twenty four to seven in our discord Discord
dot gg slash odd Lots.
Speaker 3 (45:59):
And if you enjoy odd Lots, if you like it
when we conduct exit interviews with Chinese students studying at Princeton,
then please leave us a positive review at your favorite
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All you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel
on Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening.
Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News.
Speaker 2 (00:18):
Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots podcast.
Speaker 3 (00:21):
I'm Joe Wisenthal and I'm Tracy Allaway.
Speaker 2 (00:24):
Tracy, we're recording this June fifth. President she Shinping and
President Trump just held a phone call.
Speaker 3 (00:29):
Wouldn't you like to be a fly on the wall
for that conversation?
Speaker 4 (00:32):
I would. I don't know what that means.
Speaker 2 (00:33):
Markets moved on it. I'm always surprised how hard it
is to set up phone, just pick up the phone,
But I'm always at surprised that these are like bigger news.
It should be noted that this was reported first by
the Shinwan News agency out of China, and there was
a headline that the news agency specified that the phone
call was at Trump's request. They made a point of saying.
Speaker 3 (00:55):
That I still have this image of Trump sitting in
the Oval office by the phone, just like twittally his
thumbs waiting for shehian Ping to call, like hoping is
he gonna call me? Should I wait two days? Should
I wait three days before responding that kind of thing.
Speaker 2 (01:08):
There was an Ultra Journal article from a few weeks
ago which made the observation which I had not realized
outside of the September eleventh terrorist attacks, there's never been
a contact between the US and China that was initiated
by China, which I hadn't realized before. I assume it's true.
Speaker 3 (01:24):
So Sheishan Ping is sitting in his office twiddling waiting
for the Trump.
Speaker 2 (01:28):
Yeah, okay, and then he decided, but he decides to
either take the call anyway. All of this sort of
speaks that to the fact, you know, we sort of
confused by all this, and there's still just so much
that I think Americans in particular, but I'm sure it
goes to both directions, like genuinely don't understand about the
other country. And given a time of increased tension obviously
(01:49):
the trade war heightened geopolitical concerns, it's not great. I
think it would be better even if we sort of
accept the premise of there is the very intense competition
that the two countries and the populations and the governments
and the people going to governments just know more about
how they work.
Speaker 5 (02:03):
Absolutely.
Speaker 3 (02:04):
Have you ever read an English translation of the way
China academics write and talk about American society and American politics?
Speaker 2 (02:13):
I should read this.
Speaker 3 (02:14):
It's really really interesting.
Speaker 2 (02:16):
Should send me some links?
Speaker 3 (02:17):
Yeah, okay, I will, but I know a person who
has done this and translated it and done the work,
and he will definitely send you some links.
Speaker 2 (02:24):
So I am very excited to say that we have
a I think it should be a special episode. We've
talked to him on the podcast before. We're going to
be speaking with Zishen Wog. He is the author of
the creator of the Pechnology Substack, which essentially looks at
public comments from officials, academics, leaders in China and then
writes about them and translates them for an American audience
(02:46):
and actually sort of helps an American audience understand what
this sort of like public discourse is. And anyway, over
the last year, he's been getting his master's degree in
public policy at the Princeton School of Public International Affairs.
So he's been in Princeton over the last year. But
he's going back to China and he's going to return
for where he was working at the think tank, the
(03:07):
Center for China and Globalization.
Speaker 3 (03:09):
Right, So this is his exit interview from America.
Speaker 2 (03:12):
Basically, when I heard that he was leaving town, I
was like, let's do an exit interview. And of course
the other added context, which I think is very relevant here,
is that this comes a time of extreme scrutiny on
the mere existence of Chinese students at American universities, particularly
out of the Trump administration. It's an American export US universities,
and there's this major crackdown. We've seen all these concerns
(03:35):
about visas, et cetera. So there's a perfect time to
do this exit interview. So Zishan, thank you so much
for coming on the podcast.
Speaker 5 (03:43):
Well, thank you for having me here back again.
Speaker 2 (03:45):
You run a great newsletter and we had a great
episode with you. And as a student in the US,
you're sort of situated at a very interesting time. But
let's like back up, Like what prompted you to come
to the US to study in the first place. I mean,
you did this program at Princeton.
Speaker 5 (04:02):
How come before coming to the mid career Master in
Public Policy program at the Princeton School of Public International
Affairs formerly known as the Rural Wilson School, I'd already
been working for thirteen years, so I was like at
the middle of my professional trajectory and I were thinking
about getting another advanced education, and of course the United
(04:23):
States is the top destination.
Speaker 4 (04:26):
One other thing.
Speaker 5 (04:27):
Is that, to the credit of Princeton, the Policy School
offers fully funded education, so that means they examined all
the tuition and the healthcare coverany.
Speaker 4 (04:37):
No export revenue for US, yes.
Speaker 5 (04:39):
Exactly in this case, yes, and also a living stipend.
And so I turned down some other offers from the UK,
from Singapore and came here. And also, as you correctly
mentioned at the very beginning, you know, China US relations
is perhaps the most consequential bilacual relations for someone whose
past career was in journalism and nonas in tank. I
(05:00):
couldn't think of a better place to be here in
the US. But you know, here we are, and I
feel like being overwhelmed by all these news.
Speaker 3 (05:09):
So on that note, was the plan always to go
back to China after you completed your degree or is
this something new.
Speaker 5 (05:16):
That was like eighty or nineteen percent of my plan?
Mainly for personal reasons, but also I think the political
atom sphere is a bit overwhelming. I did have some
kind offers from potential employers here, but I decided against them.
The State Department announced, actually, you know, they are going
to aggressively revoke Chinese students visas as well as imposed
(05:40):
you know, further scrutiny on future Chinese students visa applications.
Speaker 4 (05:45):
Let's say I stay on for one more year.
Speaker 5 (05:47):
I would be on opt or CPT, which is a
post training upon graduation from a US college, but that
status would be linked to your student visa, your FM visa.
So the potential consequences for Chinese students is not just
currently enrolled students, but also other you know, people who
are on o BTCBT students.
Speaker 3 (06:09):
Here out of curiosity, is Princeton providing guidance on visas
because I can only imagine being a college student and
having to deal with immigration issues on top of everything else.
Speaker 5 (06:20):
In light of what happened at Harvard, let me think
of a way of not putting Princeton in jeopardy again.
I did get I think, not just me, but everywhere else.
Did get some emails from you know, sort of guidance
from the university which says it took notice of recent
news and it is offering resources basically, I guess, you know,
(06:42):
counseling as well as potential legal resources for people to
not to be against the administration, but to comply with
all the laws and regulations in this country.
Speaker 2 (06:51):
This was a one year program obviously, say versus ten
years ago, the sort of level of suspicion and anxiety
about the press and a lot of Chinese students at
American universities has grown quite a bit. What about even
in the last year, how do things feel shifted? And
when you talk to other Chinese students, you know, is
it just like noise coming out of DC or does
(07:13):
it change the campus environment?
Speaker 5 (07:15):
Well, I think it definitely has already had a chilly
in fact, And I mean for me personally, I feel
very welcomed and I feel all the hospitality and warmth
from my American professors, you know, school administrators, and the
prison community of neighbors and my local friends. But for
(07:38):
you know, most of the Chinese students who are currently
in this situation perhaps too scare to speak up, and
especially after the news last week, I think they are
under a bit of stress because the announcement out of
the state partament is very broad, it doesn't use very
exact language to ascertain who will exactly be in trouble.
(08:00):
There are currently I think two hundred and seventy thousands
Chinese students here in the United States. China is the
second largest origin of international students here in the US,
and so was the first India. So for many years
China was the largest source of international students here in America,
but that number has come down since bilateral relations.
Speaker 4 (08:22):
Worthen.
Speaker 5 (08:22):
The United States has a proud history of welcoming Chinese
students who come to the United States. In the beginning
of the twentieth century, when China was still governed by
the Qing dynasty, there was this Boxer indemnities, basically the
compensations paid by dan Qing dynasty to various Western powers.
And at that time, the US was kind enough and
(08:44):
smart enough to turn those compensations into a scholarship program.
Speaker 3 (08:48):
Which was part of their money diplomacy of the early
nineteen hundreds, right.
Speaker 5 (08:53):
Well before Joseph Knight created the concept of soft power,
and the US has been practicing that. So they ceded
the top university in Beijing and sponsored to one thousand
and three hundred Chinese students to come to the United States.
And after the bilactual ties were established, you know, since
the two countries normalized the diplomatic relations, Republican and the
(09:17):
Democratic presidents both welcomed the Chinese students. There was this
very famous episode where Chinese top leader Don't Selping at
the time asked, you know, if he could send something
like five thousand Chinese students to the US, and President Cutter,
according to his own recollections, he responded that, well, tell him,
tell them to send one hundred thousand students to America.
(09:39):
I also read President Ronald Reagan actually received the Chinese
students and made remarks in some sort of reception welcoming them.
And let's remember that was a time when China was
much less open and dynamic than it is today. So
what is happening is really unfortunate. I think because of
this long history, many Chinese for granted the opportunities to
(10:02):
come here and study in America if they are good
enough to be offered the admission letters. But the larger
background is, of course, I guess globalization, because for many,
many years, people just believe, you know, everyone is going
to be more connected and we will benefit from more
people to people exchanges, from commerce, from you know, research collaborations.
Speaker 4 (10:23):
But unfortunately that.
Speaker 5 (10:25):
Era seems to be ending right now. Well, it may
have begun to be ending quite a few years Ago Joe.
Speaker 3 (10:33):
Just as an aside, there's a really good book called
Fortunate Sons about some Chinese students who were sent to
a Connecticut school in I think the late eighteen hundreds.
Speaker 2 (10:43):
I'd love to read that.
Speaker 3 (10:44):
It's really good. I read it when I bought that
house in Connecticut to try to bridge the gap I
guess between Hong Kong and where I was living. I
(11:08):
wanted to ask, what's the difference or differences from your
perspective in terms of what you would learn in a
public policy degree in China versus a public policy degree
at some place like Princeton.
Speaker 4 (11:22):
Well, that's a very good question.
Speaker 5 (11:23):
I think there is. This key difference is, for example,
policy schools are mostly for early career and mid career
professionals in public service sector, and here I think for example,
at Harvard Kendidate's school, at the Jackson School of Global Affairs,
at the year at PRINCETON'SBIA, they are offered full time.
And that's because not just the US, but also many
(11:45):
governments across the world they have the flexibility to allow
their people to basically take a year or two year
off their professional career and come here. But back in China,
I think many of those programs are taught as a
part time process, although like they are labeled a full
time process because the I think sometimes the rigidity of
(12:08):
personnel management system means that it's very difficult for people
to basically leave work for a year or two and
get a full time education at you know, maybe Chinhuaan
and Peking University.
Speaker 4 (12:18):
And also here in the US, I.
Speaker 5 (12:20):
Think the policy schools benefits greatly from first of all,
former policymakers like retired former sistants, Secretary of State and
so here we have like many very good practitioners who
are becoming you know, teachers. We have, for example, Princeton Speer,
some former Biden administration officials who just exited the administration. Well,
(12:42):
I think in Chinese universities, to be fair, I haven't
gone to those policy schools, but that would be rare.
And secondly, this place benefits from a much broader well,
I guess this is a toxic world now diversity here. Now,
for example, my class is highlighted like over half of
the classmates I international students, and also the faculty members,
(13:05):
some of them even come from foreign governments. I really
benefited from the global perspectives. I get from Princeton here.
Speaker 2 (13:12):
What did you do for undergrade?
Speaker 5 (13:13):
Well, I went to a Chinese college and major lea
in finance.
Speaker 2 (13:16):
Actually, I don't know much about Chinese universities. The only
thing I ever hear these days about Chinese universities is
usually in the context of tech competition in the number
of STEM graduates, and you hear a lot about the
number of hundreds of thousands of STEM graduates and the
advantages that sheer scale confers. You know, when I think
(13:37):
of American universities, there's STEM, but I also think a
lot about the heavy importance on liberal arts degrees and
literature and history, and people can go on to you know,
careers in tech and finance even from a history degree.
Can you compare contrast that sort of like intellectual environment
at the Chinese colleges in terms of the non technical fields.
Speaker 5 (13:57):
Well, this is something I think that has been observed
and they talked about in the past few years when
people compare you know, Chinese and American universities, but also
between Chinese and I guess Indian universities, because based on
what I read, which may not be like very accurate,
it's like India also trains a lot of like lawyers
and you know, social sciences majors. But the general perception
(14:21):
is that the Chinese colleges and universities are training many
more STEM grads and you know in semiconductor related in
you know, mechanical and yeah.
Speaker 2 (14:31):
I mean, this is just what everyone's talking about these
days because of this anxiety about tech competition.
Speaker 4 (14:37):
Oh yeah, that's correct. And almost all.
Speaker 5 (14:39):
Universities in China are state run. All the IVY leagues
are privately around universities here in the US, maybe because
I think China is still to some extent a transition economy.
So China initiated as a reform and opening up in
nineteen seventy eight, but before that it was a totally
planned economy where the government basically tells every one what
to do, uh, you know, in their schools and in
(15:01):
their professional journeys, and based on those you know paradigms,
a lot of Chinese universities are set up like to
train people in a specific field. For example, there is
this Beijing Aeronautics University which basically trains people you know
in space related technology and maybe rocket science. And then
(15:24):
there is also you know, comprehensive universities. But for for
many years there was this maybe legacy China learned from
the Soviet Union to have specialized colleges and universities in
training STEM grads. And also, you know, China has one
point four billion people. It is now the second most
populous country on Earth, so naturally you would see, you know,
(15:45):
there are just many, many more Chinese students there, and
the Chinese they put heavy emphasis on science and technology.
Speaker 4 (15:53):
Can I share with one detail with you?
Speaker 5 (15:55):
Because I graduated from finance and I went down to
join a new studency in China, Yes, the same news agency.
And my mother used to tell me, why don't you
learn something real like finance and journalism? They are not
like real professional Well, I guess I didn't test very
well in Chinese college and trance examination. For many years
(16:18):
there was this quote in China, and I think it
still rings true, and it maybe it rings even truer today. Well,
in Chinese it's called hortually, like if you learn mathematics
and the physics and chemistry, you can go everywhere and
do and do well. And that is still on many
Chinese minds. And so for example in Ai, I think
(16:39):
Jason Juan of Nvidia, he.
Speaker 4 (16:41):
Said, like a few weeks ago.
Speaker 5 (16:43):
I think he was citing Marco Polo I think tank
here formally affiliated with the Postle Institute, is that fifty
percent of the global AI talent is Chinese or maybe
having some sort of Chinese heritage. So that does speak
to the enormous training capacity of the Chinese education and
which also makes many people wander here. You know, AI
(17:04):
is going to shape everything in the future, and the
two countries seem to be lucked in a competition that
the US really want to shut out such a large
talent poll in Ai. And these students, Chinese students, you know,
after completing their undergrad degrees, they come to the United States,
they contribute to meaningfully, to groundbreaking research. And I think
(17:26):
this is one thing that many people have a maybe
an inaccurate understanding of how graduate level education, especially in
stem Field's work, this is not an extractive process. It's
not that you know, Chinese, Indian. You know, students from
global thouts come to the US universities, they learned, they
(17:47):
sat in classrooms, they learned from their American professors and peers,
and then they leave and brought the knowledge back with them.
Speaker 4 (17:54):
That's not the case.
Speaker 5 (17:56):
Yes, they benefit enormously from the education system here, which
is just spectacular, but they make meaningful contributions in conducting
research and collaborating with the American peers and professors. They
stay in labs for days and months and which would
result in papers in top American journals. They actually contribute
to the creation of knowledge and the sharing of knowledge here.
(18:18):
They contribute in the process. It's a symbiotic process, not
an extractive process. So by having them here, and some
of them, you know, would remain here legally, I should say,
you know, to work in the US, become entrepreneurs and
researchers and American taxpayers to pursue their American dreams, and
some of them would leave the US and go back
(18:38):
to China, India, and you know, everywhere on Earth, and
they would become, you know, informal ambassadors of American openings,
of American inclusiveness, of American.
Speaker 4 (18:47):
Hospitality, and they would serve as.
Speaker 5 (18:50):
One of the defense lines in terms of China US
relations as decreasing mutual strategic misunderstanding and the miscalculations.
Speaker 4 (18:59):
So this truly.
Speaker 5 (19:00):
Something very important in my mind, and I'm really saddened
to see you know, the crackdown on Chinese students to
come to the United States.
Speaker 3 (19:07):
When you go back to China, what nice things are
you going to say about America.
Speaker 5 (19:11):
Well, the first thing I'll tell them is that I
have the enormous privilege of coming to outlaws on Princeton
I Bloomberg, I'm sorry, And that's really.
Speaker 2 (19:22):
That's the first thing.
Speaker 4 (19:23):
Okay, what's number two?
Speaker 5 (19:25):
Well, number two is I think I benefit a lot
from all the critical discussions on colleges. It's not just
you know, pro Trump against Trump. We have very different
views on all sorts of subjects. Some professors are rightfully
worried about, for example, rule of law here, but we
have also some classmates who have faculties who are very
(19:48):
sympathetic to what the broader Republican agenda is doing here
in the United States. So I think this clash of
different ideas, the market of free ideas is something simulating
for me personally. And the other reason is that, for example,
I'm fully founded by Princeton spar here, and so I
(20:09):
benefit truly from the hospitality and the generosity of the
American people here. Is the private university is the money
coming in from private donations I'm truly grateful for that,
and I don't think like any other country on the
Earth has simply has the financial capacity to do something
like that, So this is something.
Speaker 4 (20:30):
Really should be cherished. Here.
Speaker 5 (20:32):
I will certainly carry, you know, all these lessons and
appreciations back to China.
Speaker 3 (20:39):
We started this conversation talking about deteriorating US China relations,
and I don't think anyone would disagree with that premise.
But the question I wanted to ask you is, as
someone who's worked in both Chinese and Western institutions, or
at least studied at a Western institution, what do you
think is the biggest understanding between the US and China.
(21:03):
What's the biggest sticking point?
Speaker 5 (21:05):
You mentioned the subsect I did technology and all those
for example. I also have the privilege of being invited
to some of the major thing thanks here to share
my views with you know, fellow think tank analysts and
for officials. I think, if I really want to summarize,
like what I've been doing is to normalize China, because
(21:26):
China has a vastly different political system from the United States,
from all the major westerns and industrial the economiess I
think people fundamentally see China as a different beast, but
China also has politics. The Chinese government has many government departments, ministries.
They compete with one another. There is politics between different departments,
(21:48):
politics between different people inside one government department. The Chinese
make five year plans and they seem to be implementing
that quite well. For example, the China twenty twenty five
come into mind. But sometimes they are also very short sighted.
The Chinese have good accomplishments, they also make stupid mistakes.
(22:10):
That's just human nature.
Speaker 2 (22:11):
What are some examples of short sighted? Because Americans love
to go to China and then they come back and
they say they think in the centuries, I'm like us
who just think. You know, it's these very cliches, these
very cliched commentary that you just hear over and over against,
like we just think about the next quarterly estimate or
hitting the next GDP. You say, obviously, any society is
(22:32):
going to be richer than these sort of cliche tropes
that you know when you look back at decisions, Because
you mentioned seems like the mad and twenty twenty five
stuff worked out really well, but where do you see
it breaking down? At times?
Speaker 5 (22:44):
For example, let's talk about Eve's right, you know, the
electric vehicles.
Speaker 4 (22:49):
So everyone now knows.
Speaker 5 (22:51):
That China is leading on EV's and people talk about
bid about you know, cell me, the former smartphonemaker turned
automobile maker, and it seems like, you know, Ford and
other US auto giants are falling behind. So many people
attribute to some sort of Chinese state subsidies and industrial strategy.
(23:11):
But there also in mind that before this evy boom,
there were like a dozen Chinese automobile makers. Almost all
of them were state around automobile companies, because China implemented this.
When foreign comakers come to China, you have to form
joint ventures with Chinese planners, and in many cases the
(23:32):
Chinese partners have to be in control of fifty one
percent of the joint venture.
Speaker 4 (23:37):
But all these Chinese.
Speaker 5 (23:38):
Stay around automobile giants are actually falling behind. Now what
you are seeing in the EV boom in China, the
names coming to mind are all very new private around
Chinese automobile makers. They didn't exist, They didn't benefit from
the sort of state monopoly or preferential loans and maybe
(23:58):
land and all the in kind subsidies for those they
basically partnered with. BMW with all these American and the
European commakers, but look they are falling behind now.
Speaker 2 (24:11):
It's on the other hand sorry, But on the other hand,
I could listen to that story and say, because of
this requirement for jvs, the only possibility of actual private
automobile development in China was for domestic companies, and international
companies never had that chance to actually sort of be
truly autonomous within the Chinese domestic market. Seems like that
(24:35):
worked out very well in the grand scheme of things
for ensuring that the only companies with complete agility, et
cetera in the Chinese market ended up being Chinese.
Speaker 5 (24:43):
Well, first of all, that could be some sort of
a good policy advice for the Cormon administration, I guess,
and also maybe European governments. And secondly, I'm very down.
Speaker 2 (24:51):
With please bring bid in a JV or something like that.
I wanted uid gigafactor in Georgia or something like that.
I've said that before anyway, going.
Speaker 5 (25:00):
What I was trying to say is there is this discrepancy.
Speaker 4 (25:03):
With you know, all the power of our.
Speaker 5 (25:06):
Industrial strategies, but at the same time it's the private
ingenuity of the innovation of the hard work of the
private Chinese companies which have somehow come out on the
top all the states around companies, they are are falling behind,
at least in the automobile sector. And that shows that
I think people tend to see China as a country
(25:32):
with the Communist Party of China sitting atop the state
tells everyone what to do and marshaling all the resources.
But it is also at the same time just spectacularly
competitive and the innovative place where private ingenuity and hard
work really plays a very big rule. There is this
say in China you know five six, seven, eight nine
(25:54):
basically says you know, over half of the GDP, of
the taxation, of the new employ ooyment are all created
by private companies. And so that's something when Americans perceive China,
they think of just one very coherent, I don't know, Bechman,
where you know, there is this larger central brain telling
(26:14):
everyone to do everything else. And yes, the the like
the Chinese government, the Commanist Party of China enjoys enormous
power in telling in shaping the Chinese society compared with
Western powers. But do not discount and actually I think
much more emphasis should be put on the non state
part of the Chinese society.
Speaker 3 (26:35):
You mentioned your mom thinking that doing finance and journalism
was not very valuable, And one thing you sometimes hear
is that China places greater importance or value on people
studying stem going into tech. And I guess I'm curious
how much has that changed over the years, Like, if
I was a high school student in China in I
(26:58):
don't know the nineteen nineties, would be encouraged to be
a doctor or a lawyer or a teacher, or would
I be encouraged to go into tech? Like basically, how
has that culture of which subject is most valued changed
over time?
Speaker 4 (27:14):
You are very sharp eyed.
Speaker 5 (27:15):
I think if it was in the nineteen nineties, people
wanted to go to I don't want to name names,
like certain finance schools in China, and after graduation, like
they would want to work in Goldman Sucks and Morgan Stanley.
Speaker 4 (27:34):
That's like the top jobs.
Speaker 5 (27:36):
Maybe when I graduated from college in twenty eleven, that's
still the case what the people wanted to do because
it makes huge money. It makes very big money. But
especially in the past decade, I think I'm.
Speaker 4 (27:50):
Sure you have reported this.
Speaker 5 (27:51):
There is a large casts to the income to the
wages of Chinese financial engineering, and even when to the
Internet sector, Facebook now known as Matter and all those
booms they contribute to consumer internet that was the thing
in China as well. Like Ali Baba and Tencent, what
(28:12):
they do is they popularize some technologies which makes lives
much easier for everyday consumers and also businesses. But in
a sense, I think now more value is put into
the sort of technologies that would really boost the productivity
in you know, industrial process For example, even doctors and
(28:36):
hospitals can identify certain diseases. It's not just you know,
I can go out and get a delivery much easier
from a from a restaurant. So the term technology I
think has taken out a new meaning. And if I
can make a recommendation. There is this Dan Wound who
who I think.
Speaker 4 (28:56):
Is in.
Speaker 2 (28:58):
To recommend Dan long.
Speaker 4 (29:01):
Audience.
Speaker 2 (29:01):
We've had about several times. I'm sure we'll do a
big thing when his book comes out. Both Tracy and
I have copies of it on our desk. You should
go pre order it on Amazon raw.
Speaker 5 (29:10):
So basically I think China is wishing to make Yeah,
basically these hot technologies more sexy than you know, just
joining a tech firm.
Speaker 2 (29:21):
It's interesting. It sort of feels this is becoming an
international phenomenon that everyone is getting very anxious about their
country's capacity to do quote hard tech. You are returning
to China and you're going to go back to the
think tank, the Center for China and Globalization. It's interesting.
I'm looking at the controversy section in the Wikipedia page
(29:43):
for it, and Marco Rubio, who's now the Secretary of State,
in twenty eighteen, he actually blasted your school. He blasted
the Woodrow Wilson School for inviting a scholar from the CCG,
and he said the retire to the Chinese Communist Party.
And CCG, according to Wikipedia, is a member of an
alliance of think tanks coordinated by the International Department of
the Chinese Communist Party that support the Belton Road initiative,
(30:06):
which we've talked about.
Speaker 4 (30:08):
On the show.
Speaker 2 (30:10):
Now, granted, your situation strikes me as a little bit
unique because most students coming to the US from China
are not going to a public policy school and a
one year funded thing. Why shouldn't American lawmakers, however, be
concerned about training many of the next generation of leaders
in a country that is perceived to be a major rival,
(30:32):
and doing work with them and training them in Ai
and all of these things that there is so much
sort of almost everyone accepts that there is going to
be some degree of, you know, either geopolitical and business competition.
Speaker 5 (30:45):
First of all, about the Wikipedia page you was Jess mentioned, Yeah,
I know, it's very very thorough research over here.
Speaker 2 (30:51):
I click out a Lincoln Our School of a controversy section,
but I wanted to, you know, I saw both your
think tank and the Wilson School have come under controversy
for connections.
Speaker 5 (31:02):
The joke I typically make in this sort of conversation
is that, well, I came from the State Ground News agency.
I was a proper Chinese government personnel, and now people
would characterize me as some sort of you know, the
term United Front. That's like semi government. You're done grading me, like,
I was a proper Chinese government for eleven years and
(31:26):
I left, you know, in October tenty twenty two. And
if we have time, I'd be happy to dive into
the details of you know, the difference between a government
rund thing tank and a non governmental thing tank in China.
But to your larger point, is that there is this
term which says keep your friends close and keep your
(31:47):
enemy closer. I'm not sure exactly if China and US
are enemies at the moment, but just from that inside,
I think it would be very beneficial for the US,
especially policy schools, but also other you know, social sciences
and universities, to try to have Chinese contributions, to have
Chinese students' presence here, so that's you know, when push
(32:09):
comes to shop, they have someone to call, They know
what the Chinese are really thinking about, and that is
I think one of the tragedies from the crackdown for example. However,
than have the Chinist school.
Speaker 2 (32:35):
You mentioned that there's a difference between properly state run
think tanks and non state run think tanks. I think
in the US there is a perception, and this actually
goes back to the talk about companies, including car companies,
et cetera. There's a perception that there's actually no private
companies that implicitly, even the private companies, the byds, et cetera,
(32:55):
are at some level, you know, at the back and
call of the state, and some more literally. The other
is even those incredible book about Walkway talks, a lot
about there's a Communist party leadership within the company. It
engages in making sure itch members who are employers of
the company and engage in more moral behavior and aren't
doing things like gambling, et cetera. Why shouldn't we think
(33:18):
that every country within China, regardless of how it's incorporated,
answers up to political leadership invasion.
Speaker 5 (33:25):
I think on macro level, I do not see a
drastic difference between for example, a US president wants.
Speaker 4 (33:34):
To have like Nvadia or Apple to.
Speaker 5 (33:37):
Become the dominant forces in the world, and from the
Chaps Actor, from the Inflation Reduction Act to offering you know,
generous subsidies to American companies. In China, there is this
support for Chinese companies, but in many cases not from.
Speaker 4 (33:56):
The very start.
Speaker 5 (33:57):
It's like, you know how we studied very little, and
it was competing with UH with European telecom vendors at
the very beginning, and for many years, you know, China Mobile,
China Unicom, all the state telecomation firms, they just wanted
the equipment from the European suppliers and yeah, and probably
had to go to the European markets to increase its customers.
(34:21):
Numbers and revenue and after a few years and especially
when the industry became more strategic and uh, and then
the Chinese comment, would you know, take a look at
of the potential players and believe, oh, this is perhaps
an industry that's going to be of strategical value in
the future, and would provide some sort of assistance to them.
(34:45):
But I wouldn't think that there is a CCP committee
overseeing Huawei on a daily basis telling them, you know,
this is something you should do in the Southeast Asia
and this is something you should work on in Africa.
And if that were the case, Huawei wouldn't be where
it is today, Which is also why I sincerely believe
(35:08):
the US persecution of Quawei and other properly private Chinese
companies is a strategic mistake, because these companies were on
their way to making China more dynamic, more private, having
more private elements in the Chinese society, to have more
(35:29):
international exposure, to allow people to have a career path
a meaningful one, a financially rewarding one.
Speaker 4 (35:37):
Outside the apparatus.
Speaker 5 (35:39):
These companies are helping China to become more open, more
aligned with international standards. So these are positive forces from
a market perspective that to help align China with the
globalization process, with the so called rule based international order.
Speaker 4 (35:58):
And this is also the reasons.
Speaker 5 (36:00):
For example, the US has imposed many export controls and
has for example, sanctioned Russia and other states and companies
that are deemed hostile to US national interests, and many
of the Chinese private companies are well silently just abide
by all these sanctions because they want to globalize. They
(36:22):
want to have markets and the partners and supplies across
the world.
Speaker 4 (36:27):
But I guess this.
Speaker 5 (36:28):
Is the year ten twenty five. There is no way
to turn around this phenomena. I guess.
Speaker 3 (36:33):
Well, on this note, this actually leads into a question
I wanted to ask, and I think this will be
the last question for me.
Speaker 4 (36:39):
But one of my.
Speaker 3 (36:40):
Pet theories right now is that the US is starting
to look a lot more like China, and China is
starting to look a lot more like the US. So
just recently, for instance, you've seen Chinese policy makers try
to boost consumer spending, which is a page out of
the US playbook. After financial crises, they've been enhancing their
(37:00):
social safety net, which again kind of looks American, although
you can debate how strong the American social net is. America, meanwhile,
has been making more strategic investments in certain industries. Industrial
policy has become a thing again. China's liberalizing part of
its market. The US says it's going to keep Chinese
(37:21):
investors out of its market, like it feels like they're
taking on each other's characteristics to some degree. I guess
my question is would you agree with that? And I
have to say Michael Pettis did not agree with me,
but a couple others Victor Schwetz over at McCrory agreed
with me. And then right after I wrote my piece
about this, there was a big foreign policy article basically
(37:43):
saying the same thing. So I would love to get
your opinion.
Speaker 5 (37:46):
Well, I think I've heard the term called beating China
by becoming China. And I do think that the United
States has its legitimate interests in strengthening its supply chain,
in safeguarding the resilience of its industries. Like I totally
understand that the US doesn't want to rely one hundred
(38:09):
percent on ppees during COVID. It wants to ensure a
certain level of self reliance when it comes to manufacturing capacity.
Maybe i'mshore or maybe friendly shoring like in allies, you know,
Transatlantic allies. I get that, and I think when it
comes to China, what you were mentioning, and I guess
(38:29):
maybe Michael Pattis doesn't fully agree, is that many people
believe the process in China of you know, showing up
the consumer spending and strengthening the social safety that that
should be accelerated, that should go much faster than it
is happening today, because you know, the Chinese government they
have officially, according to their policy papers, recognizes that. In
(38:54):
the Chinese minds, it's not about basically learning from American
way of establishing a social safety nets, maybe from the Europeans,
I guess, but because it is fundamentally helpful and beneficial
for the Chinese society, for the Chinese people to have
a relatively robust healthcare coverage insurance so that they could
spend money on more iPhones and other consumer electronics. This
(39:18):
is fundamentally good something good. It's not about learning from
the rest of the world, but a phenomena. You just
mentioned that there is some sort of convergence. I do
hope they converge. I'm being more open. I'm being more humane.
I'm being more humanitarian, being more.
Speaker 4 (39:39):
Hospitable to people to persons.
Speaker 5 (39:42):
And if I may have some sort of last word
on this, I'm really saddened and sometimes I'm angry that
it's the students. They are at their early twenties or
maybe like nineteen years ago, they are being made points
in this game. Come on, they are innocent, these strategical right. Yes,
take all your measures against the military industrial complex and
(40:04):
even maybe huaweis, but leave the people alone from this
and let's you know, people to people experience and student
experience happen, and they will try to safeguard the long
term stability of the two countries because I mean, as
competitive as hawkish as the US Trump administration hopes to
be in China. Although I haven't read the latest read
(40:27):
out of the phone call, but nobody wants the two
countries to go to war, and to just prevent something catastrophic.
Against that, we need people to people, you know, dialogues,
and the Chinese leaders have been receiving US guests. For example,
the Vice President of China recently, just I think yesterday
or today, received the US nonamental players in China. The
(40:49):
Chinese leaders met for example, John L. Thornton, the former
CEO of gold Man SAX. They met Graham Allison, the
founding dam of the Harvard the Kennedy School. So you
have many news in China from Chinese leaders receiving non
governmental guests from the US officially reported in China legitimizing
the non governmental visits from the US to China, but
(41:12):
the other way around. I don't see any news, even
under Biden administration, that the US government openly receives you know,
non governmental visitors, scholars, entrepreneurs, and the Chinese. You know,
for example, she didn't be met with you know, dozens
of US companies and the Western and the European company CEOs.
So in that thing, the Chinese legitimizing the Western interactions
(41:34):
coming into China. But unfortunately, I'm not seeing any of
that here here. What we have is like delegitimizing any
Chinese government and the non governmental people coming here. And
I think I've heard that, you know, the US government
is also meeting with non governmental Chinese actors, scholars well,
working in state around universities and think tanks, but they're
(41:55):
not saying anything about that. And uh, and that's not
something very I think one.
Speaker 2 (42:02):
Thank you so much for coming on odd Laws. Thank
you for doing your aid interview with us. This is
really fascinating. Really glad we got to chat before you
left town. And I hope we continue reading your work.
I hope you're going to keep doing pechronology. Yes, definitely,
that's fantastic because I think for a lot of us
here it's a very useful resource, those of us who
(42:23):
don't speak Chinese or those of us who don't know
who the names that we should actually be paying attention to,
so really appreciate it. And safe travels home.
Speaker 5 (42:31):
Thank you. I'm truly grateful for the opportunity. Thank you
to Tracy and John. And I hope maybe not just
for me, but for Chinese students it's odious not goodbye
real quickly.
Speaker 2 (42:43):
Has there been a change in perception the desirability of
coming here.
Speaker 5 (42:47):
If the Chinese students don't face the restrictions, they certainly still.
Speaker 4 (42:51):
Want to come here.
Speaker 5 (42:52):
Thank you so much, Thank you, my planer.
Speaker 2 (43:06):
First of all, really enjoyed that conversation. It is hard
for me, you know, this sort of really aggressive attempt
to no longer have American universities be a sort of
destination for many of the world's most you know, talented individuals.
It's hard for me to imagine that not being sort
of like a pretty big hit to both the US
(43:27):
economy and it's just sort of like standing.
Speaker 1 (43:29):
In the world.
Speaker 3 (43:30):
Yeah, so Zician's point about, well, you know, Chinese students
who come to America for their education, they largely go
back to China with fond memories of America. I think
the idea that America wouldn't value that is really indicative
of how much less we seem to be valuing soft
(43:50):
power nowadays. It seems like that kind of diplomacy just
isn't as popular as it once was, And so you're
seeing people like the Trump administrations say like, well, why
should we be doing this, You don't get anything out
of it. But then people like Zishen will say, well,
you actually do get something out of it. You get
better relations, and you get that sort of cultural understanding
(44:14):
and that soft diplomacy.
Speaker 2 (44:16):
I do wonder the degree to which the American public
has been sold on the benefits of so called soft power. Right, So,
like a lot of people are saying American influence abroad,
American ideals, what America stands for for freedom and almost
in so many other countries, or maybe did up until recently.
I know, global perceptions have changed, et cetera. But then
(44:38):
I think, you know, maybe there's another argument. It's like, oh,
that's great that all these countries see as a beacon
of freedom or whatever.
Speaker 4 (44:44):
What do I get out of that?
Speaker 2 (44:45):
How does that benefit me? And I think when you
look at some of the political turns, perhaps the case
hasn't been made to the US public in a very
compelling way from the people who believe in sort of
liberal internationalism that the average citizen in the US actually
should care at all about how the rest of the
world views us.
Speaker 3 (45:03):
Look, everyone needs to travel more if they can.
Speaker 5 (45:06):
That's what I say.
Speaker 3 (45:07):
You need to go to a place that loves America,
and then you need to go, I don't know, to
the Middle East or something and talk to someone that
hates America and see what the difference is. There's a
big difference.
Speaker 2 (45:17):
This is a really good perspective and take Okay, shall
we leave it there. Let's leave it there.
Speaker 3 (45:23):
This has been another episode of the Oddlots podcast. I'm
Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway and.
Speaker 2 (45:28):
I'm Jill Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwart.
Follow our guest Zishan Wong. He's at Zishanwong here and
check out his Pecknology substack. I do hope he sustains
it upon return to China. Follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez,
Ed Carman Arman, dash Ol Bennett at Dashbot at Kilbrooks
at Kelbrooks. From Oddlots content, go to Bloomberg dot com
(45:49):
slash odd Lots. We have a daily newsletter and all
of our episodes, and you can chat about all of
these topics twenty four to seven in our discord Discord
dot gg slash odd Lots.
Speaker 3 (45:59):
And if you enjoy odd Lots, if you like it
when we conduct exit interviews with Chinese students studying at Princeton,
then please leave us a positive review at your favorite
podcast platform. And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber,
you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad free.
All you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel
on Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening.
Hosts And Creators
Joe Weisenthal
Tracy Alloway
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