Episode Transcript
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Speaker 1 (00:01):
From Schwartz Media. I'm Daniel James. This is seven AM.
A sleek Chinese made ute is suddenly one of the
most popular vehicles on Australian roads. It's cheap, fast and
packed with tech. But behind its rise, our questioned security
(00:23):
agencies are struggling to grapple with because the cars we
drive today are no longer just cars. They are also
data collection tools, and in a tense geopolitical climate, the
lines between convenience and surveillance are blurring today. Senior follow
at the Lower Institute and contributed to Australian Foreign Affairs
(00:44):
Richard McGregor on the BYD Shark, China's quietly tightening technological
grip on Australian infrastructure and what it means for national security.
It's Monday, JUNEO, So, Richard, I wanted to start with BYD.
(01:08):
These cars are everywhere on Australian roads right now. What
can you tell me about them and how they became
so popular here?
Speaker 2 (01:15):
Well? BYD is actually quite an old company by Chinese standards,
at least twenty years old. It was originally a battery company,
you know, a Chinese entrepreneur and Shenzen set it up
more than a decade ago, Warren Buffett invested in BYD,
but it really didn't, you know, start to develop rapidly
as a company and as a global company and as
(01:36):
a global car company until about three four years ago
when their models went well. I guess they started making
better cars. When Chinese EV manufacturing generally started to develop
rapidly and in fact become much better, much cheaper, even
in some respects more technologically advanced than Western models, and
(01:58):
it just became a BMH and Paul, we're sitting inside
the bod Shark today. We're going to redo some of
the tests and Bad's most popular car in Australia is
a Yuit called the Shark six. Is it faster, Yes
it is. Has it got more tech in it? Yes
it does. Is it cheaper also, yes?
Speaker 1 (02:22):
So it's winning at the moment, isn't it.
Speaker 2 (02:26):
It's a hybrid, not an EV, but it's past all
of the most stringent sort of off road tests that
Ossie's throw up for their utes, even more so than Toyota.
Speaker 3 (02:36):
One of the things I wanted to do was really
push the limit of the Shark.
Speaker 1 (02:41):
To do that, you've got to go and cross the
simps and desert. I reckon.
Speaker 2 (02:45):
It became massively popular very quickly in Australia this year,
and I think became one of the largest selling cars
in the country in a matter of months.
Speaker 1 (02:56):
So for a lot of people, these cars are appealing
because they're relatively affordable electrical hybrid vehicles. That's not necessarily
how Canberra season, how are they looking at this situation
as it's unfolding.
Speaker 2 (03:09):
Yeah, I guess the first thing the slight qualification. They're
not just affordable, they're good. You know, Chinese tech used
to be cheap but not necessarily good. Now Chinese tech
is cheap or competitively priced, but also often the best.
So that's a totally new ballgame. I guess that's why
Canberra is looking at it with such anxiety. And I
(03:31):
guess the key issue here is that everything these days
is effectively bundles of software controlled by the host country
or companies in the host country and updated by them
and having access to them. Now, according to Chinese law,
any Chinese company, private, public, or otherwise must give complete
(03:54):
access to that country's security services if asked. You know,
there's no system of warrants or judicial view or you know,
judges looking at it or anything like that. It's just
one and part of the entire system. So countries like
Australia which don't have a trusted relationship with China, are
we happy with having large parts of the data generated
(04:19):
by our economy are potentially open to the Chinese government
and Chinese security services.
Speaker 1 (04:26):
So what are the concerns that the national security agencies have?
I mean, what kind of scenarios are they imagining that
can happen with China having access to all of this data.
Speaker 2 (04:37):
Yeah, it sounds kind of conspiratorial and crazy, but I
think it's pretty straightforward. Let's take the example of cars again,
you know cars, electric cars and the like, you know,
which in turn are going to become sort of driverless cars.
They're always training themselves on the surrounds. In other words,
they're little data collecting machines. So they're filming where they're going,
(05:00):
they're processing that data. Often they're filming where they're going
and filming faces on the street, for example, and you know,
collecting information about citizens. Now, in some respects that's quite normal.
You know, evs in America do that as well. That
they're all training themselves to be better cars, as it were.
But do we worry about an American car like we
(05:22):
would like a Chinese car. There are some people in
Australia who couldn't care less. There are others who would
be deeply concerned. I think today it's basically common sense
that China would be collecting data and using data, just
as by the way Facebook does, you know, Instagram does,
et cetera, et cetera. Everybody's collecting data, and we as
(05:44):
a country have to think about how that's collected, who's
collecting it, and how it's used. And at the moment
that's dominated by Chinese companies in Australia.
Speaker 1 (05:53):
Is there any way that we can store the daily
that those cars collect on shore in Australia.
Speaker 2 (05:59):
Well, that's one of the debates onshore storage. For example.
You know Donald Trump has tried to find ways for
TikTok to remain available in the US. Was actually banned
by a law passed by Congress. Trump he keeps putting
off that ban. And the particular proposal in the United
States was to get companies owned by Oracle, the software company,
(06:23):
to store TikTok data onshore in the US so it
couldn't potentially be accessed by the parent company in China
and by extension, the Chinese authorities. So yes, that is
one possible thing that we could do. There are others
who say that's not enough or it's not foolproof, because
there are other ways of accessing the data and we
(06:45):
might struggle to monitor that. But to give you another
example about the US, for example, the Biden administration brought
in new rules which banned connected cars in other words,
evs collecting data from untrusted entities. In other words, it's
China from the United States, a rule that comes into
force in twenty twenty seven. Would we do that? You know,
(07:07):
it would be very hard to do that in Australia.
In the US, there aren't many Chinese ebs in Australia.
We don't tariff cars anymore. We gave up our car
industry a bit over a decade ago. So you know,
the influx of Chinese cars has been great for Australian consumers.
And it's the government really going to force consumers to
(07:29):
pay more or force those cars out. That's very difficult
to see. It's a very costly decision, costly economically, of course,
but costly diplomatically as well.
Speaker 1 (07:37):
With China and a great technical challenge too.
Speaker 2 (07:40):
Would imagine it's a technical challenge particularly from middle sized
economy like Australia, which doesn't have the resources of China
or the United States.
Speaker 1 (07:51):
After the break the diplomatic impact of banning Chinese technology, Richard,
we're talking about Canberra's security concerns around Chinese technology and
(08:11):
the Chinese government's access to our data. So has our
government ever acted on these concerns.
Speaker 2 (08:18):
To give you a context here, let me take you
back to twenty eighteen when the then government of Prime
Minister Malcolm Turnbull effectively banned the Chinese Telecommunications Company by
Way from bidding to be the sort of chief contractor
for Australia's five G TELCA network.
Speaker 3 (08:36):
The decision we took was really one based on hedging
against future risks. I mean, the reality is the nature
of the five G network is that you cannot any
longer reasonably distinguish between the core and the radio access network.
Speaker 2 (08:50):
And this was basically because the government decided that they
couldn't be sure that effectively Australia would maintain control and
access to the network. You know, should there be a
conflict of any kind, should relations with China plummet dramatically.
Speaker 3 (09:08):
Intent can change in a heartbeat, so you've got to
hedge and take into how the risk that intent can
change in the years ahead. Remember a threat as a
combination of capability and intent, So in areas of national
security where naturally cautious, prudent and hedging.
Speaker 2 (09:26):
And that was a big decision at the time. It
was one of the tipping points in the change in
attitude of Beijing to Australia and which resulted in China
taking punitive trade measures against Australia in twenty twenty you know,
banning wine, bali, lobsters, coal, et cetera, et cetera.
Speaker 4 (09:47):
And relations between China and Australia appear to be further
deteriorating China's.
Speaker 2 (09:52):
China has banned bali imports from Australia's largest exporter CBH,
claiming the product had harmful weeds in its grain.
Speaker 4 (10:01):
If this is confirmed by the government, the move would
further inflame tensions between the two countries, which appear to
be heading towards a trade hall.
Speaker 2 (10:09):
But if you go fast forward now twenty twenty five,
in retrospect, the Highwai decision looks very easy because it
was cost free. Effectively cost free in this respect, we
didn't have to rip anything out of our telecommunications network.
We just bought a different system from Rickson. But now,
if you look at the Australian consumer and industrial economy
(10:30):
and the evs or hybrid vehicles are part of this,
it's dominated by China evs. Eighty percent or so of
evs and Australia are made in China, including Teslas, by
the way, which are made in the Tesla factory in Shanghai.
The same goes for solar panels, are same goes for
wind farms. So the five G decision was easy in retrospect.
(10:55):
But imagine the impact of a decision now of the
Australian government to somehow regulate Chinese electric vehicles and hybrid vehicles.
Speaker 1 (11:05):
And as consumers, Richard, do you think people should be
worried about their data being gathered by byd and other
Chinese companies and given to the Chinese government.
Speaker 2 (11:13):
Look, I don't think individual Australians necessarily have to worry.
You know, your data or my data is not particularly
meaningful to the Chinese. But we do have a duty
and obligation to protect parts of the Australian economy, individuals
in Australia who particularly play a role in the national
(11:35):
security establishment. It's basically about sovereignty one way or another.
You know, are we able as a sovereign nation to
manage our own data and stop it being accessed by
foreign entities that we don't trust and that we're in
conflict with on other issues. So you don't want to
induce sort of, you know, widespread paranoia about every bit
(11:58):
of Chinese technology. You've got to make judgments in particular cases,
and if there is a risk, you have to try
and mitigate that risk.
Speaker 1 (12:05):
Have we ever faced a large skyle sober attack from
another country before?
Speaker 2 (12:10):
We have not, as far as I know, we have
faced You know, a lot of entities in Australia have
suffered cyber intrusions or cyber attacks if you like, but
they're usually by private hackers, people we would call hackers
Russians in the like. It might be Chinese entities as well.
It could be all sorts of people, but not by
a nation state, and that's very different. You know, countries
(12:33):
like Taiwan, for example. I think Taiwan is the country
which suffers the most cyber attacks by a state entity,
obviously China in that case. You know, Taiwan is quite
an advanced technological economy, but it is pretty helpless in
the face of Chinese attacks and the like. So we're vulnerable.
(12:55):
Everybody is vulnerable. I guess the issue here is the
intent of a nation state in conducting a cyber attack
on Australia. Why would they be doing it? What would
they attack that The sorts of cyber attacks which have
been rehearsed against the United States by the Chinese is
turning off the water supply at different places for example.
(13:18):
You know, you want to stop troops moving in the country,
cut off the water near them, cut off the electricity
in the light. So it's that sort of thing. Now,
not making a moral point here, you know, I presume
that the Americans are rehearsing the same sort of cyber
intusions as the Chinese. It's a matter of you know,
(13:38):
how a country is smaller country like Australia protects itself
against that if it doesn't stop at how it identifies
that attack, and how it shuts it down and then
recovers from it.
Speaker 1 (13:51):
Richard, thank you so much for your time.
Speaker 2 (13:53):
Thank you very much.
Speaker 1 (13:57):
You can read Richard McGregor's artical Trojan Horses How to
Defend against Chinese Technology in the new edition of Australian
Foreign Affairs. It's out today. Just before we go, I
want to let you know that today's episode is our
lastest part of Schwartz Media. Seven Am will continue in
the same format, with the same team and in the
(14:19):
same feed, but with new owners, an independent media company
called Solstice Media. We love making the show and our
commitment to independent journalism is stronger than ever. We have
some exciting episodes planned and we hope you continue to
follow and support our work. Also in the news tenure,
(14:46):
Plippersek has criticized objections within the Liberal Party to apply
quotas to address gender equity in the party. Pliposek told
ABC News the Coalition is happy to have quotas for
National Party and ps on the front bench, but rejects
quotas to a dressed their unequal balance between men and
women in Federal Parliament. Following Opposition leader Susan Lee's signaling
she's open to the idea of quotas, shadowed Defense Minister
(15:09):
and Lee's rival in the recent leadership stout, Shangus Taylor
said he opposes changes that would promote Liberal women into
winnable seats. Women make up less than a third of
the Liberal Party's parliamentary team and a band LGBTQIA plus
rights rally in Hungary has turned into a mass anti
government demonstration. Tens of thousands of people of march through
(15:29):
Budapest in a major rebuke of Prime Minister Victor Auban,
who has curtailed the rights of the queer community over
the past decade. In March, his government passed a law
that allows pride marches to be banned, ostensibly to protect children.
Victor Auburn faces a national election next year after fifteen
years in power. I'm Daniel James. This is seven am.
(15:50):
We'll be back tomorrow.