September 24, 2025 • 17 mins
The Albanese government has been on an unprecedented campaign of diplomatic activism in the Pacific Islands – all to keep China’s military at a distance.
At the same time, AUKUS is remaking our defence strategy, with eight nuclear-powered submarines, expanded facilities for US forces, and plans for a new east-coast submarine base.
For some watching on, those two approaches are at odds – the diplomacy aims to prevent a Chinese foothold, while AUKUS gives them the exact reason why they need one.
Today, the director of the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute, Sam Roggeveen, on the contradiction at the heart of Australia’s Pacific policy – and whether there’s a safer way to defend our region.
If you enjoy 7am, the best way you can support us is by making a contribution at 7ampodcast.com.au/support.
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Guest: Director of the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute, Sam Roggeveen.
Photo: AAP Image/Lukas Coch
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:01):
I'm Ruby Jones and you're listening to seven AM. Australia
has been everywhere in the Pacific Islands recently, with four
security agreements underway and a Prime minister turning up for
signings that didn't eventuate or to keep China's military at
a distance. At the same time, ORCUS is remaking our
(00:24):
defense strategy with eight nuclear powered submarines, expanded facilities for
US forces, and plans for a new East Coast submarine base.
For some watching on, those two approaches are at odds.
The diplomacy aims to prevent a Chinese foothold, while ORCUS
gives them the exact reason why they need one. Today,
(00:44):
Director of the International Security Program at the Low Institute,
Sam Rogavin on the contradiction at the heart of Australia's
Pacific policy and if there's a safer way to defend
our region. It's Thursday, September twenty five, So Sam, Australia
(01:09):
is currently working on for security arrangements in the Pacific
Islands with different nations. So do you mind just laying
out for me what those arrangements are and why it
is that we want them.
Speaker 2 (01:20):
Yeah, Well, I think the four you're referring to her
with Tavalu, Naru, Vanuatu and now Papua New Guinea. It's
important to note that for Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea,
those haven't actually been secured yet. There were some slightly
embarrassing delays for Prime Minister Albanesi when on both occasions
he went to both those countries for signing ceremonies and
(01:43):
then the local governments decided at the last minute that
they weren't quite ready to agree to the fine printed,
so the signing ceremonies have been delayed.
Speaker 3 (01:49):
It's the government I hope to emerge from the Pacific
over the last two weeks holding aloft two documents or
two treaties, one from Vanuatu, the Nakamal Agreement that it
hoped to sign last week, and this defense treaty that
has been talked about so widely and so broadly for
the last three or four weeks in particular, and in
the end it's emerging with none.
Speaker 2 (02:10):
But nevertheless, the direction of movements pretty clear on all four.
And in fact you could go beyond those four and
say Australia's struck new agreements with various Pacific island countries
and has stepped up its Pacific diplomatic and aid game
considerably since twenty eighteen, or maybe even slightly before. And
(02:33):
look to my mind as a security expert, what all
this effort has in common is a greater sense of
concern about China's position in the Pacific Islands region. And
we know that China has been very busy in the
region in the last decade. China became the second largest
aid donor in the Pacific Islands region, really from out
(02:55):
of nowhere. We also know it achieved a security agreement
with the Solomon Islands in twenty twenty two, and off
the back of that, proposed a region wide security deal
with twelve Pacific Island countries, which the Pacific Island countries
thankfully declined to participate in. But nevertheless, when it comes
(03:17):
to security, when one side wins, another side tends to lose.
Security is zero some So we're really worried about China
setting up new security arrangements in the Pacific Islands region
and we're trying to counteract that, or in some cases,
I think in the case of those four that we mentioned,
we're trying to preempt China.
Speaker 1 (03:36):
And you mentioned that Not all of these deals are
necessarily going smoothly. Some haven't been finalized yet. So what
are the sticking points and what role does climate change
our response to it play.
Speaker 2 (03:48):
Look, climate change plays a part here because while Australia
is very much consumed with great power politics and we're
seeing the Pacific Islands region as a kind of board
for great power politics, the Pacific island countries themselves chafe
a little bit at that idea because I think it
kind of excludes them, and they think that what it
(04:09):
does is it sidelines the very thing that the very
security issue that they are most worried about, which is
climate change.
Speaker 4 (04:14):
Climate change and sea level raise is the single greatest
threat facing small island euloping states, including those in the
Pacific where Solomon Islands is.
Speaker 2 (04:30):
There's no point worrying about great powers jostling over military
basing and military influence if your country is itself physically
disappearing before your eyes.
Speaker 4 (04:40):
It's affecting our communities and it is a very expensive
excess for us to keep on rebuilding every year whenever
you have saclans.
Speaker 2 (04:50):
And I think these kind of security agreements do chafe
a little bit against what they consider to be their
top priority. And so you can see in some of
the language that our leaders use around these agreements that
they at the very least acknowledge the fact that, yes,
the Pacific Islands countries are worried about climate change. Above all,
(05:11):
this government has a claim to being a bit more
a bit more sympathetic to those concerns than the previous
Liberal National Coalition government.
Speaker 5 (05:20):
We are all members of the Pacific family and it's
important that we cooperate on economic issues, on national security
and in dealing with the challenge of climate chain.
Speaker 2 (05:32):
But nevertheless, I'm sure the Pacific Islands countries feel we're
not doing enough.
Speaker 1 (05:36):
And these arrangements, as you say on Australia's end, are
designed to try and limit China's influence in the region
for security purposes. So is that working so far?
Speaker 2 (05:47):
I think it is. I mean, there is good evidence
that in the case of p and G and Vanawatu,
that the late in the last decade did make forays,
did make entreaties to both of those governments suggesting a
permanent Chinese military presence. Those efforts were headed off, partly
(06:11):
by Australian diplomatic action. But Australia has some natural advantages here.
First of all, we're really close to the Pacific Islands
region physically, so that means if there's either a natural
disaster or some kind of political crisis where they need
help from the outside, Australia is always going to be
there first, as long as we maintain certain basic capabilities.
(06:32):
The other thing we have in that advantage is a
certain sort of cultural and economic closeness that the Chinese
will never have. We're part of the Pacific Islands for
them and China is not. We have a Pacific Island
worker scheme and so does New Zealand, which ties us
economically to the Pacific in the way that again that
(06:53):
China can't match. But I think above all of that,
there's an imbalance of resolve in the sense that the
Pacific Islands are always going to matter more to us
than it will to China. So China has a lot
of resources, but at best the Pacific Islands is going
to be a second and maybe a third order priority
for China. It's first order for Australian always will be.
Speaker 1 (07:12):
So is there anything in Australia's foreign policy then that
is getting in the way of that goal to maintain
our influence and reduce China's well.
Speaker 2 (07:20):
I would argue that ucas in a word, is the
thing that's getting in the way. So it kind of
incentivizes China to have a greater presence in the region
because after all, we are setting up a new submarine
base on the west coast.
Speaker 5 (07:32):
So crucial Henderson Shipyards in Western Australia will get a
twelve billion dollar upgrade.
Speaker 2 (07:38):
Early estimates of what Henderson will cost is in the
order of twenty five millions.
Speaker 1 (07:41):
So this is not the whole.
Speaker 2 (07:44):
In future, we will set up a submarine base on
the East coast, both for Australia and American and potentially
British nuclear powered submarines to use. And the upgrade of
an Air Force base at a leaf Tindall just south
of Darwin, which is going to be capable of hosting
American strategic bombers, long range bombers like the B fifty two.
(08:05):
The purpose of all these capabilities is really to face
up to China and to operate well north of Australia
in a possible conflict with China. I mean, that's why
you get nuclear powered submarines so that you can operate
thousands of kilometres north of Australia, potentially off the Chinese
coast and maybe even firing missiles onto the Chinese mainland,
(08:28):
which the Australian Aucust submarines are going to be capable of.
So if the objective is to keep China's military out
of the Pacific Islands region, then I would argue UCUST
does the opposite.
Speaker 1 (08:40):
Job coming up. What would it take for Australia to
walk away from Aucust? So sam, this running government is
going to pretty big lengths here to try and stop
China from having any sort of military base in the Pacific.
(09:03):
What would it mean for us as a country if
we were to fail on that front and a Pacific
island nation decided that they would allow China to set
up a base.
Speaker 2 (09:14):
Well, one base in the Pacific Islands region would be
a squadron of maritime patrol aircraft or potentially a small
floatilla with a destroyer and a replenishmentship or something similar.
That would be irritating for Australia. But if there were
several Chinese military bases in our region, well that's more
than an irritant. That's then a direct threat to Australia
(09:36):
because they can be mutually reinforcing, and in wartime they
could actually be used to threaten the Australian land mass
and the military bases on our soil, so we'd have
to beef up our defenses substantially to deal with something
like that, and so on that level. The diplomatic effort
that we're making right now is really smart and really
(09:57):
good because we're making a relatively small diplomatic investment in
trying to prevent something that would be extremely expensive to
counteract if we didn't make that diplomatic effort.
Speaker 1 (10:08):
Okay, So while we do that, though, we are also,
as you say, pursuing ORCAS. You mentioned the submarines and
their bases that will come with that agreement. Tell me
more about the capacity of those submarines.
Speaker 2 (10:21):
At the heart of ORCAS is an agreement to supply
Australia with eight nuclear powered submarines. Important distress, nuclear powered,
not nuclear armed. Australia is not beging to become a
nuclear armed country. But these boats would be powered by
nuclear reactors, which means they have basically infinite range and
infinite endurance. That's a really potent capability to have if
(10:41):
your plan is to operate off the Chinese coast alongside
the US Navy. Right, if you want to simply defend
the Australian land mass, you know there's a huge opportunity
cost because they're incredibly expensive. So a very potent capability,
but a capability that generates interest raises Chinese awareness of us.
(11:03):
The time to attack a nuclear powered submarine is before
it goes underwater. The time to do that is in port.
And so these facilities, the one we're building in Western
Australia and the one we're proposing to build on the
East coast, it'll probably be in Port Kembler, those are
going to be targets for China.
Speaker 1 (11:20):
Right, So you're making the argument that ORCAS ultimately makes
us less safe in Australia because it makes us more
of a target to China. So what do you think
it would take for the Australian government to walk away
from the deal?
Speaker 2 (11:34):
I think it's possible to imagine a kind of crisis
that may have been unimaginable under the previous administration. So
when you consider the way that Trump has treated Zelenski,
the way he has treated the Canadian government, for instance,
the South African government as well India, more recently came
in for some really rough treatment from the Trump administration.
(11:59):
It's not at all silly to see a crisis occurring
in the bilateral relationship that sours Australia on the Orchest deal.
A crisis that could have nothing to do with defense.
It could be to do with our pharmaceutical benefit scheme,
for instance, or some other economic or trade measure. It
could be to do with the sale of iron ore
to China. It's easy to imagine various scenarios where the
(12:23):
Americans just say no, sorry, We're not going to put
up with this anymore. So the scope for a crisis
is much wider now than it's ever been under any
previous administration, and that could cause Australia to reconsider. But nevertheless,
I think the more likely possibility is that cancelation of
at least the American portion of the submarine deal that's
(12:45):
initiated by the United States rather than by US. The
American shipbuilding enterprise is in a bad way and they
are having trouble ramping up their submarine production. They have
an ambition to have sixty six submarines of their own
by the middle of the century. They're currently behind to
achieve that. So it's a really big question whether they
can even meet their own audiobook, never mind adding the
(13:08):
three or maybe as many as five submarines for Australia
as well.
Speaker 1 (13:12):
Yeah, publicly, at least, you only ever hear the Australian
government being supportive of the Orcus arrangement. But do you
think that there is some disquiet.
Speaker 2 (13:21):
Well, there is simply no political motivation or incentive for
anyone in the Labor Party to break away at the moment.
There is still a fear I think in the Labor
Party of looking soft on national security and a kind
of a breakaway, a big dramatic break from Orcus, would
(13:43):
open up that territory again for the opposition, and I
think that scares the.
Speaker 1 (13:47):
Government and so in not wanting to appear a week
on national security, in your view, we are becoming ultimately weaker.
Speaker 2 (13:55):
I'm yet to persuade ministers in the government, but that
is certainly my view. Yeah, there are safer and less
provocative ways for Australia to defend itself. I wrote a
book a couple of years ago called the Ekidne Strategy.
You know, the metaphor of the Echidna is that you
look safe and unthreatening to those that mean you no harm,
but you look prickly and undigestible to those that do.
(14:19):
What I'm arguing for is for Australia to adopt a
defense strategy that is purely defensive. So again the ekidna
metaphor is useful here because an ekidna doesn't go out
looking for enemies. It's not a hunter, but you wouldn't
want to mess with it because it can end badly
for you if you try to attack it, because it's
prickly and it's hard to digest. It's a strategy that
(14:40):
makes it extremely painful and costly and difficult for an
adversary to operate in the air and maritime approaches around Australia.
But it's not an approach that is any threat to them.
And so what that means essentially for Australia is that
we need a defense force that is really good at
(15:01):
shooting down missiles and aircraft if they ever come at us,
and sinking ships if they ever come at us. Now,
you need various ways to do all those things, but
that is an affordable defense strategy for in Australia. It's
even one that we can afford in the event that
we don't get as much help from the Americans as
we might currently be relying on. And I think that
(15:21):
is a future that we need to plan for.
Speaker 1 (15:28):
Well, Sam, thank you so much for your time today.
Speaker 2 (15:30):
I appreciate it. Thank you so much.
Speaker 1 (15:48):
Also in the news today, the ABC has been ordered
to pay one hundred and fifty thousand dollars for unlawfully
sacking journalist Antonette Latouf after she shared a Human Rights
Watch post on Gaza. The penalty has been levied in
the Federal court, which found the public broadcaster breached workplace
law when it sacked miss Latoufe from her casual role
on ABC Radio Sydney's Mornings program in twenty twenty three.
(16:11):
The ABC has twenty eight days to pay the fine,
which comes in addition to the seventy thousand dollars in
damages she was previously awarded. And the Palestinian Envoy at
the United Nations has used his address to the Security
Council to plead for humanitarian aid access to Gaza. Riard
Mansau told the Council that women and children have been
the primary targets of Israeli military action in Gaza and
(16:34):
are the most vulnerable. It comes as one hundred and
fifty seven UN member states have recognized the State of
Palestine as a sovereign nation.
Speaker 2 (16:42):
I'm Ruby Jones.
Speaker 1 (16:43):
This is seven am. Thanks for listening.
I'm Ruby Jones and you're listening to seven AM. Australia
has been everywhere in the Pacific Islands recently, with four
security agreements underway and a Prime minister turning up for
signings that didn't eventuate or to keep China's military at
a distance. At the same time, ORCUS is remaking our
(00:24):
defense strategy with eight nuclear powered submarines, expanded facilities for
US forces, and plans for a new East Coast submarine base.
For some watching on, those two approaches are at odds.
The diplomacy aims to prevent a Chinese foothold, while ORCUS
gives them the exact reason why they need one. Today,
(00:44):
Director of the International Security Program at the Low Institute,
Sam Rogavin on the contradiction at the heart of Australia's
Pacific policy and if there's a safer way to defend
our region. It's Thursday, September twenty five, So Sam, Australia
(01:09):
is currently working on for security arrangements in the Pacific
Islands with different nations. So do you mind just laying
out for me what those arrangements are and why it
is that we want them.
Speaker 2 (01:20):
Yeah, Well, I think the four you're referring to her
with Tavalu, Naru, Vanuatu and now Papua New Guinea. It's
important to note that for Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea,
those haven't actually been secured yet. There were some slightly
embarrassing delays for Prime Minister Albanesi when on both occasions
he went to both those countries for signing ceremonies and
(01:43):
then the local governments decided at the last minute that
they weren't quite ready to agree to the fine printed,
so the signing ceremonies have been delayed.
Speaker 3 (01:49):
It's the government I hope to emerge from the Pacific
over the last two weeks holding aloft two documents or
two treaties, one from Vanuatu, the Nakamal Agreement that it
hoped to sign last week, and this defense treaty that
has been talked about so widely and so broadly for
the last three or four weeks in particular, and in
the end it's emerging with none.
Speaker 2 (02:10):
But nevertheless, the direction of movements pretty clear on all four.
And in fact you could go beyond those four and
say Australia's struck new agreements with various Pacific island countries
and has stepped up its Pacific diplomatic and aid game
considerably since twenty eighteen, or maybe even slightly before. And
(02:33):
look to my mind as a security expert, what all
this effort has in common is a greater sense of
concern about China's position in the Pacific Islands region. And
we know that China has been very busy in the
region in the last decade. China became the second largest
aid donor in the Pacific Islands region, really from out
(02:55):
of nowhere. We also know it achieved a security agreement
with the Solomon Islands in twenty twenty two, and off
the back of that, proposed a region wide security deal
with twelve Pacific Island countries, which the Pacific Island countries
thankfully declined to participate in. But nevertheless, when it comes
(03:17):
to security, when one side wins, another side tends to lose.
Security is zero some So we're really worried about China
setting up new security arrangements in the Pacific Islands region
and we're trying to counteract that, or in some cases,
I think in the case of those four that we mentioned,
we're trying to preempt China.
Speaker 1 (03:36):
And you mentioned that Not all of these deals are
necessarily going smoothly. Some haven't been finalized yet. So what
are the sticking points and what role does climate change
our response to it play.
Speaker 2 (03:48):
Look, climate change plays a part here because while Australia
is very much consumed with great power politics and we're
seeing the Pacific Islands region as a kind of board
for great power politics, the Pacific island countries themselves chafe
a little bit at that idea because I think it
kind of excludes them, and they think that what it
(04:09):
does is it sidelines the very thing that the very
security issue that they are most worried about, which is
climate change.
Speaker 4 (04:14):
Climate change and sea level raise is the single greatest
threat facing small island euloping states, including those in the
Pacific where Solomon Islands is.
Speaker 2 (04:30):
There's no point worrying about great powers jostling over military
basing and military influence if your country is itself physically
disappearing before your eyes.
Speaker 4 (04:40):
It's affecting our communities and it is a very expensive
excess for us to keep on rebuilding every year whenever
you have saclans.
Speaker 2 (04:50):
And I think these kind of security agreements do chafe
a little bit against what they consider to be their
top priority. And so you can see in some of
the language that our leaders use around these agreements that
they at the very least acknowledge the fact that, yes,
the Pacific Islands countries are worried about climate change. Above all,
(05:11):
this government has a claim to being a bit more
a bit more sympathetic to those concerns than the previous
Liberal National Coalition government.
Speaker 5 (05:20):
We are all members of the Pacific family and it's
important that we cooperate on economic issues, on national security
and in dealing with the challenge of climate chain.
Speaker 2 (05:32):
But nevertheless, I'm sure the Pacific Islands countries feel we're
not doing enough.
Speaker 1 (05:36):
And these arrangements, as you say on Australia's end, are
designed to try and limit China's influence in the region
for security purposes. So is that working so far?
Speaker 2 (05:47):
I think it is. I mean, there is good evidence
that in the case of p and G and Vanawatu,
that the late in the last decade did make forays,
did make entreaties to both of those governments suggesting a
permanent Chinese military presence. Those efforts were headed off, partly
(06:11):
by Australian diplomatic action. But Australia has some natural advantages here.
First of all, we're really close to the Pacific Islands
region physically, so that means if there's either a natural
disaster or some kind of political crisis where they need
help from the outside, Australia is always going to be
there first, as long as we maintain certain basic capabilities.
(06:32):
The other thing we have in that advantage is a
certain sort of cultural and economic closeness that the Chinese
will never have. We're part of the Pacific Islands for
them and China is not. We have a Pacific Island
worker scheme and so does New Zealand, which ties us
economically to the Pacific in the way that again that
(06:53):
China can't match. But I think above all of that,
there's an imbalance of resolve in the sense that the
Pacific Islands are always going to matter more to us
than it will to China. So China has a lot
of resources, but at best the Pacific Islands is going
to be a second and maybe a third order priority
for China. It's first order for Australian always will be.
Speaker 1 (07:12):
So is there anything in Australia's foreign policy then that
is getting in the way of that goal to maintain
our influence and reduce China's well.
Speaker 2 (07:20):
I would argue that ucas in a word, is the
thing that's getting in the way. So it kind of
incentivizes China to have a greater presence in the region
because after all, we are setting up a new submarine
base on the west coast.
Speaker 5 (07:32):
So crucial Henderson Shipyards in Western Australia will get a
twelve billion dollar upgrade.
Speaker 2 (07:38):
Early estimates of what Henderson will cost is in the
order of twenty five millions.
Speaker 1 (07:41):
So this is not the whole.
Speaker 2 (07:44):
In future, we will set up a submarine base on
the East coast, both for Australia and American and potentially
British nuclear powered submarines to use. And the upgrade of
an Air Force base at a leaf Tindall just south
of Darwin, which is going to be capable of hosting
American strategic bombers, long range bombers like the B fifty two.
(08:05):
The purpose of all these capabilities is really to face
up to China and to operate well north of Australia
in a possible conflict with China. I mean, that's why
you get nuclear powered submarines so that you can operate
thousands of kilometres north of Australia, potentially off the Chinese
coast and maybe even firing missiles onto the Chinese mainland,
(08:28):
which the Australian Aucust submarines are going to be capable of.
So if the objective is to keep China's military out
of the Pacific Islands region, then I would argue UCUST
does the opposite.
Speaker 1 (08:40):
Job coming up. What would it take for Australia to
walk away from Aucust? So sam, this running government is
going to pretty big lengths here to try and stop
China from having any sort of military base in the Pacific.
(09:03):
What would it mean for us as a country if
we were to fail on that front and a Pacific
island nation decided that they would allow China to set
up a base.
Speaker 2 (09:14):
Well, one base in the Pacific Islands region would be
a squadron of maritime patrol aircraft or potentially a small
floatilla with a destroyer and a replenishmentship or something similar.
That would be irritating for Australia. But if there were
several Chinese military bases in our region, well that's more
than an irritant. That's then a direct threat to Australia
(09:36):
because they can be mutually reinforcing, and in wartime they
could actually be used to threaten the Australian land mass
and the military bases on our soil, so we'd have
to beef up our defenses substantially to deal with something
like that, and so on that level. The diplomatic effort
that we're making right now is really smart and really
(09:57):
good because we're making a relatively small diplomatic investment in
trying to prevent something that would be extremely expensive to
counteract if we didn't make that diplomatic effort.
Speaker 1 (10:08):
Okay, So while we do that, though, we are also,
as you say, pursuing ORCAS. You mentioned the submarines and
their bases that will come with that agreement. Tell me
more about the capacity of those submarines.
Speaker 2 (10:21):
At the heart of ORCAS is an agreement to supply
Australia with eight nuclear powered submarines. Important distress, nuclear powered,
not nuclear armed. Australia is not beging to become a
nuclear armed country. But these boats would be powered by
nuclear reactors, which means they have basically infinite range and
infinite endurance. That's a really potent capability to have if
(10:41):
your plan is to operate off the Chinese coast alongside
the US Navy. Right, if you want to simply defend
the Australian land mass, you know there's a huge opportunity
cost because they're incredibly expensive. So a very potent capability,
but a capability that generates interest raises Chinese awareness of us.
(11:03):
The time to attack a nuclear powered submarine is before
it goes underwater. The time to do that is in port.
And so these facilities, the one we're building in Western
Australia and the one we're proposing to build on the
East coast, it'll probably be in Port Kembler, those are
going to be targets for China.
Speaker 1 (11:20):
Right, So you're making the argument that ORCAS ultimately makes
us less safe in Australia because it makes us more
of a target to China. So what do you think
it would take for the Australian government to walk away
from the deal?
Speaker 2 (11:34):
I think it's possible to imagine a kind of crisis
that may have been unimaginable under the previous administration. So
when you consider the way that Trump has treated Zelenski,
the way he has treated the Canadian government, for instance,
the South African government as well India, more recently came
in for some really rough treatment from the Trump administration.
(11:59):
It's not at all silly to see a crisis occurring
in the bilateral relationship that sours Australia on the Orchest deal.
A crisis that could have nothing to do with defense.
It could be to do with our pharmaceutical benefit scheme,
for instance, or some other economic or trade measure. It
could be to do with the sale of iron ore
to China. It's easy to imagine various scenarios where the
(12:23):
Americans just say no, sorry, We're not going to put
up with this anymore. So the scope for a crisis
is much wider now than it's ever been under any
previous administration, and that could cause Australia to reconsider. But nevertheless,
I think the more likely possibility is that cancelation of
at least the American portion of the submarine deal that's
(12:45):
initiated by the United States rather than by US. The
American shipbuilding enterprise is in a bad way and they
are having trouble ramping up their submarine production. They have
an ambition to have sixty six submarines of their own
by the middle of the century. They're currently behind to
achieve that. So it's a really big question whether they
can even meet their own audiobook, never mind adding the
(13:08):
three or maybe as many as five submarines for Australia
as well.
Speaker 1 (13:12):
Yeah, publicly, at least, you only ever hear the Australian
government being supportive of the Orcus arrangement. But do you
think that there is some disquiet.
Speaker 2 (13:21):
Well, there is simply no political motivation or incentive for
anyone in the Labor Party to break away at the moment.
There is still a fear I think in the Labor
Party of looking soft on national security and a kind
of a breakaway, a big dramatic break from Orcus, would
(13:43):
open up that territory again for the opposition, and I
think that scares the.
Speaker 1 (13:47):
Government and so in not wanting to appear a week
on national security, in your view, we are becoming ultimately weaker.
Speaker 2 (13:55):
I'm yet to persuade ministers in the government, but that
is certainly my view. Yeah, there are safer and less
provocative ways for Australia to defend itself. I wrote a
book a couple of years ago called the Ekidne Strategy.
You know, the metaphor of the Echidna is that you
look safe and unthreatening to those that mean you no harm,
but you look prickly and undigestible to those that do.
(14:19):
What I'm arguing for is for Australia to adopt a
defense strategy that is purely defensive. So again the ekidna
metaphor is useful here because an ekidna doesn't go out
looking for enemies. It's not a hunter, but you wouldn't
want to mess with it because it can end badly
for you if you try to attack it, because it's
prickly and it's hard to digest. It's a strategy that
(14:40):
makes it extremely painful and costly and difficult for an
adversary to operate in the air and maritime approaches around Australia.
But it's not an approach that is any threat to them.
And so what that means essentially for Australia is that
we need a defense force that is really good at
(15:01):
shooting down missiles and aircraft if they ever come at us,
and sinking ships if they ever come at us. Now,
you need various ways to do all those things, but
that is an affordable defense strategy for in Australia. It's
even one that we can afford in the event that
we don't get as much help from the Americans as
we might currently be relying on. And I think that
(15:21):
is a future that we need to plan for.
Speaker 1 (15:28):
Well, Sam, thank you so much for your time today.
Speaker 2 (15:30):
I appreciate it. Thank you so much.
Speaker 1 (15:48):
Also in the news today, the ABC has been ordered
to pay one hundred and fifty thousand dollars for unlawfully
sacking journalist Antonette Latouf after she shared a Human Rights
Watch post on Gaza. The penalty has been levied in
the Federal court, which found the public broadcaster breached workplace
law when it sacked miss Latoufe from her casual role
on ABC Radio Sydney's Mornings program in twenty twenty three.
(16:11):
The ABC has twenty eight days to pay the fine,
which comes in addition to the seventy thousand dollars in
damages she was previously awarded. And the Palestinian Envoy at
the United Nations has used his address to the Security
Council to plead for humanitarian aid access to Gaza. Riard
Mansau told the Council that women and children have been
the primary targets of Israeli military action in Gaza and
(16:34):
are the most vulnerable. It comes as one hundred and
fifty seven UN member states have recognized the State of
Palestine as a sovereign nation.
Speaker 2 (16:42):
I'm Ruby Jones.
Speaker 1 (16:43):
This is seven am. Thanks for listening.
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