Dr. Elizabeth Economy and Ely Ratner sit down to discuss challenging security environment in the Indo-Pacific region, the specific goals and ambitions of China in the Western Pacific and East Asia, their experiences in the Biden Administration and the state of the alliance system in the region, based off his recent Foreign Affairs Piece, “The Case for a Pacific Defense Pact”. The two scholars touch on continuity between both the Biden and Trump administrations’ strategy in the Indo-Pacific, but also increasing intra-Asian cooperation and awareness between nations as the China threat grows. They conclude with a conversation about what a Pacific Defense Pact would look like, including the importance of long-term credible deterrence, how other partners could be brought in, and aligning objectives to help create a viable collective defense.
Recorded on June 11, 2025.
ABOUT THE SPEAKERS
Ely Ratner is Principal at the Marathon Initiative. From 2021 to 2025, he served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs in the Biden administration. From 2015 to 2017, he was Deputy National Security Adviser to then-Vice President Joe Biden. He previously served in the State Department’s office of Chinese and Mongolian affairs and as a staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He previously held the Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellowship for China studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and was Executive Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security.
Elizabeth Economy is the Hargrove Senior Fellow and co-director of the Program on the US, China, and the World at the Hoover Institution. From 2021-2023, she took leave from Hoover to serve as the senior advisor for China to the US Secretary of Commerce. Before joining Hoover, she was the C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and director, Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. She is the author of four books on China, including most recently The World According to China (Polity, 2021), and the co-editor of two volumes. She serves on the boards of the National Endowment for Democracy and the National Committee on US-China Relations. She is a member of the Aspen Strategy Group and Council on Foreign Relations and serves as a book reviewer for Foreign Affairs.
ABOUT THE SERIES
China Considered with Elizabeth Economy is a Hoover Institution podcast series that features in-depth conversations with leading political figures, scholars, and activists from around the world. The series explores the ideas, events, and forces shaping China’s future and its global relationships, offering high-level expertise, clear-eyed analysis, and valuable insights to demystify China’s evolving dynamics and what they may mean for ordinary citizens and key decision makers across societies, governments, and the private sector.
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
(00:00):
[MUSIC]
>> Elizabeth Economy (00:08):
Welcome to China Considered,
a podcast that brings fresh insight andinformed discussion to one of the most
consequential issues of our time (00:14):
how China is changing and changing the world.
I'm Liz Economy, Hargrove Senior Fellowand co-director of the program on
the U.S.-China and the World at the HooverInstitution at Stanford University.
Today we're going to be talkingabout US national security,
specifically what the United States shouldbe doing in the Indo Pacific in the face
of an increasingly powerful andassertive China.
(00:36):
Most of the focus of the Trumpadministration for the past five months
has been on trade and on the bilateraltrade deficit, on what we should do about
fentanyl and its precursors comingto the United States from China, and
how we should balance our trade,our technology, and our national security.
But there are other issuesin the US China relationship
that also deserve our attention, likeChina's growing military capabilities and
(00:59):
presence in the Indo Pacific.
So to help us understandwhy this issue matters,
what the Trump administration strategy is,and what more we should be doing,
I'm delighted to welcome Dr. Ely Ratner.
Ely is a principal atthe Marathon Initiative and
formerly served asthe Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Indo-Pacific Security Affairsin the Biden administration.
(01:21):
Welcome, Ely.
>> Ely Ratner (01:22):
Great to be here, Liz.
>> Elizabeth Economy (01:24):
So, Ely, let's start with the basics.
What is the Indo Pacific andwhy should we care about it?
>> Ely Ratner (01:30):
Well, maybe I'll just start from a defense and security perspective,
since you've obviously talked to a lot ofdifferent experts about Asia and China.
And from my perspective, looking out,
what we see is a very challengingsecurity environment insofar as for
several decades we had greatpower peace in the Indo Pacific.
(01:53):
We had a system that was guided byUS Alliances in the Indo Pacific and
that provided the foundations forjust the remarkable economic growth that
we've seen throughout the region and,frankly, throughout the world.
But what we've seen in the lastfew decades is big changes,
obviously in the PRC with veryrapid military modernization.
(02:16):
But that is not only justmilitary modernization.
The real challenge is that that has beenconjoined with what we understand is,
frankly, ambition in Beijing to reorder,refashion the international system.
And you heard repeatedly duringthe Biden administration,
whether it was in the nationaldefense strategy or
the national security strategy, thatChina was the only country in the world
(02:37):
with both the will and increasinglythe capability to change the international
system in a way that would reallydisadvantage the United States.
So we see that potential coming, andit would happen in ways that could be very
destabilizing to trade, to technology,and, frankly, to U.S. interests.
So from the perspective of the Pentagonduring the Biden administration,
(02:58):
we articulated China as what we calledthe pacing challenge, which was
the principal effort that the Pentagonneeded to focus on to maintain peace and
stability in the Indo Pacific.
>> Elizabeth Economy (03:11):
So if you were to say sort of what are China's top three
ambitions?
You talked about sort of reorderingthe international system or
reshaping the international system.
But if you were just to focuson the Indo Pacific itself,
what would you say were China'ssort of top three ambitions for
changing the structure of therelationships or the architecture there?
>> Ely Ratner (03:31):
Well, I think the overriding goal is to dominate
the Western Pacific andthe East Asian littoral.
And the specific objectives thereinwould be, number one, the seizure and
control of Taiwan, number two, effectivecontrol of the South China Sea, and
number three, undermining, breaking apart,if possible, but at least undermining and
(03:54):
weakening US Alliances such that Chinahad effective control of its periphery
all the way up from the East China Seadown through the Taiwan Strait and
through the South China Sea.
And thereby it's notjust a military issue.
Once you control the, the sea lanes,you are therefore controlling the flow of
people and commerce and technology andultimately diplomacy and politics as well.
>> Elizabeth Economy (04:19):
And what do you see as its strategy for doing this?
I mean, you mentioned it's gota very aggressive military buildup.
Is it building bases?
Is it forging new security relationshipswith actors in the region?
How's it going about tryingto realize its objectives?
>> Ely Ratner (04:36):
It's done a little bit, Liz, of what you just described in terms
of trying to build strongersecurity ties with other countries.
It is, has been pursuingoverseas basing opportunities.
We could,we could talk about that separately.
But primarily it has been building up itsown capability to unilaterally achieve
these objectives through aggression.
(04:58):
And the way it's doing that is a littlebit different vis a vis Taiwan or
in other areas.
But it has been very focused onbuilding the capability to prevent
the United States from being able tointervene into the Western Pacific to
defend its allies and partners.
So that's at the high levelof military operations.
And then, as you know, it's beenworking in a, in a very coercive,
(05:21):
day to day fashion through a combinationof its military, its coast guard,
what's called its maritime militia,civilian,
supposedly civilian vessels that arecoordinating with its defense agencies and
bit by bit, chipping away at some ofthe norms and international law and
sovereignty of other countries inthe region to try to more slowly and
(05:43):
incrementally achieve its goals.
So it is on the one hand,trying to achieve its revisionist aims
without fighting, while also preparing foruse aggression if necessary.
>> Elizabeth Economy (05:54):
So you were one of the chief
architects of the US Indo-Pacific Strategyduring the Biden administration.
How did you approachthe challenge that you saw?
What were sort of the key elements ofthe Biden administration Indo Pacific
strategy?
>> Ely Ratner (06:12):
Well, the dominant principle was one of deterrence.
So the primary question was how dowe sustain stability and peace and
how do we prevent Chinese aggression?
So that's always important to point outbecause the United States does not have
territorial ambitions in the Indo Pacific,it does not have offensive aims.
(06:33):
It's not planning to, for, forany reason attack China itself.
So it's very much about defendingthe territorial status quo and
defending the sovereigntyof our allies and partners.
So that's the overriding objective.
The ways that we did that were througha variety of means designed to strengthen
deterrence.
(06:53):
And for folks who aren't steeped ininternational relations theory, what that
means very simply is ensuring that thecosts of conflict are sufficiently high
for Beijing that it chooses alternativepaths to try to achieve its aims,
that it does not reach for the militarylever or does not choose aggression,
(07:13):
because the costs of doing that wouldbe beyond its willingness to do so.
And that was important because ourunderstanding was that Beijing's
aspirations, for instance, forTaiwan or in the South China Sea,
were situated in the context of itsgoals for its overall development.
So it was not yet willing to put atrisk its entire economic growth or
(07:37):
its diplomatic and political goalsaround the world to achieve these
nearer term territorial ambitions.
So what that means is if the costsare sufficiently high from a military and
economic and
diplomatic perspective, then Xi Jinpingwould decide it wasn't worth it.
One of the shorthands that youheard U.S officials use for
(07:57):
that quite often is thatwe want Xi Jinping.
To wake up in the morning, look out thewindow, consider the cost of conflict, and
say to himself, you know what?
Today is not the day.
The costs are too high,the risks are too high.
So that was our goal,to strengthen deterrence.
And the way that we did that wasthrough a few different ways.
One was through investing inUS Capabilities that are particular
(08:21):
to operational challengesin the Indo Pacific.
For many years, the US Military wasfocused on counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism in the Middle East.
So it has been a shift back to thinkingabout great power competition.
And our budgets reflected that in the kindof things that we were investing in
capabilities relevant to the Indo Pacific.
(08:44):
The Pentagon has also beendeveloping new operational concepts,
which just means the way that the USMilitary fights, which has had to be
revised because of China's strategy, whichhas been designed in particular to defeat
what I would describe as the old Americanway of war that we saw, for instance,
(09:04):
in Operation Desert Storm in Iraq andother places in the post Cold War era.
So the United States needs not just newhardware, but also a new way of fighting.
So new operational concepts.
We also updated the US Forceposture in the western Pacific,
which means just the disposition of U.S.forces where they have been situated.
(09:28):
We traditionally have hadthe predominance of our forces be in
Northeast Asia at major operatingbases in South Korea and Japan.
One of the things that we did throughoutthe Biden administration is developing
a more distributed, more mobile,more resilient force posture that
(09:49):
distributed within Japan, andthen grew more opportunities for
military operations, whether it'sin the Philippines or Australia.
So stretching out the US Troop presence inAsia in a way that increases deterrence.
And then finally, we worked with,and certainly not last,
certainly not least, we workedwith allies and partners in really
(10:13):
unprecedented ways to try to make thewhole greater than the sum of the parts.
And we did that through a lot ofdifferent constellations of partnerships.
But that was, I think, one of the notableachievements of the administration.
And just all of that collectively,I'll say.
I mean, I think the way wethought about deterrence is
(10:35):
that all of those activitiescollectively increased risk and
cost sufficiently forChina that we achieved.
What we said at the time wasthat deterrence is real and
deterrence is strong, andinvasion of Taiwan in particular,
we argued at the time,was neither imminent nor inevitable.
(10:55):
And we were right in that regard in termsof the period of the Biden administration.
And I think that's the legacy that wehanded off to the Trump administration of
that strength and deterrence andwe'll see if they can carry that forward.
>> Elizabeth Economy (11:08):
Yeah, I mean, I think, you know, one of the things that
was so striking to me looking at what wastaking place in terms of our, you know,
overall military strategy, was Ithink that last part that you raised,
which was all those newarrangements like Aukus, right.
With the UK and Australia andthe United States and
then the minilaterals with Japan,the Philippines, the United States,
(11:31):
South Korea, the United States and Japan,there just seemed to be this proliferation
of arrangements that I think at somepoint somebody was calling a lattice.
I don't think, I don't know that thatname stuck, but it did seem that we were
developing a kind of web or a sort ofreinforced network of capabilities.
(11:52):
And, and also I think there was a sort of,
it launched in some respects,new relationships among our partners.
Right.So, so that notion that it was hub and
spoke sort of didn't hold as much.
I think it was a deliberatepolicy at the administration,
correct me if I'm wrong, to enable andto support our allies and
(12:16):
partners forming theirown arrangements and
their own set of sort of partnershipsin the defense and security arena.
>> Ely Ratner (12:26):
Yeah, yeah, I think you, you described it well.
And it's a really, really important trend.
And for those of work on East Asiansecurity issues, it is an exciting time,
frankly, because this is somethingthat folks have been talking about for
15, 20 years as an aspiration that,hey, as you described,
(12:47):
we have this hub and spoke model whereunlike Europe, where we've got a big
collective defense agreement in,in the United States or in, in Asia,
the only formal security treatiesoutside of maybe one between China and
North Korea are treaties that countrieshave singularly with the United States.
(13:07):
There are no Intra-Asian defense treaties.
So.
But what we did see, I think, you know,credit to the Biden administration for
bringing partners together.
But at the same time we wereriding a wave of trends that was
enabling this in ways never before.
And, and one of those trends was thatwhat we saw in our, our closest partner
(13:28):
countries is that they themselves werebecoming increasingly alarmed about
the China challenge in terms of their,the direct threat to their interests,
whether it was India, Australia,Japan, Philippines, others.
It wasn't the United Statesgoing into these meetings and
saying, don't you realize that you'refacing this threat from China?
(13:48):
Or maybe that's what it was five,10 years ago,
that this time around it was fascinatingfor me to walk into these meetings and
feel like the recitation we werehearing from our partners was very
similar to what we weredescribing ourselves.
And so these countries in many wayswere already underway in terms of their
own strategic transformation.
(14:09):
India talking about China rather thanPakistan as its primary national
security threat.
The Australians talking about the threatto Australia rather than believing
that China was sort ofthis distant issue and
its military ought to be off in the Middleeast doing stabilization operations.
And of course,what we've seen in the Philippines,
(14:31):
a total transformation from a defensestrategy focused on internal security
to one focused on external security.
And then Japan in many ways leading theway in terms of thinking about some really
fundamental changes to its historicallymuch more reticent military and
defense strategy.
So these changes are all underway, and theUnited States is meeting these countries
(14:54):
in the middle wheretheir partnerships are.
And then second, exactly as you described,the degree of intra Asian cooperation
has been really interesting andencouraging over the last several years.
And that was also in the context ofthese partners wanting to work more with
the United States.
So it was not a just a hedge or somehow amovement away from the United States, but
(15:16):
it was behavior that was happeningindependent of Washington.
And the, the relationship, forinstance, between Australia and Japan,
you have experts describingthat as alliance like, and
all of these new cooperative efforts and,and diplomatic efforts.
So you're right,we were able to harness those together.
Rahm Emanuel and others diddescribe it as, as lattice work.
(15:40):
I think we struggled to find the rightmetaphor for this kind of activity.
But a web or a network, as you described,I think is the best description.
And really the important point ofthis is that as I would describe it,
these are complementary andoverlapping institutions.
It was not that one was the primeat the expense of others.
(16:01):
And that's important because withASEAN there, the Southeast Asia
centered regional organization,it was important to be seen as being
complementary to what was going on inthe region and not exclusive to that.
But I think these were more fit forpurpose.
And the different constellationsof countries were in many
(16:24):
ways working on problems thatthey could all unite around.
And that was one ofthe important features.
But it was a really exciting period.
And I'll say it was a challenge too,from a strategic perspective,
because we went from a period where,again, folks had been aspiring to have
this kind of cooperation for a long timewith our partners in these new ways.
(16:46):
And very quickly we wentfrom just dialogue and
meetings to actual military cooperation.
And there was even an excess ofopportunity all of a sudden.
So it required more prioritization about,okay, which of these really matter if
we're going to send our leaders together,how should we focus?
But a really important evolution inthe regional security structure.
>> Elizabeth Economy (17:08):
Okay, so I think you can safely say that you left office
having dramatically improvedthe sort of security
architecture in the Indo Pacific andthe US Position within it.
Enter the Trump administration.
Early on, we heard talk of somespheres of influence, I think,
(17:30):
leading some people to believethat the United States,
you know, was simply going to befocused on north and South America.
We were basically ceding Europe to Russia,and
China was going to have the Asia orthe Indo Pacific.
But I think that's not quite right.
And I think what we've seen, and I want toget your take on this, is that, you know,
(17:52):
Secretary Hexa, Secretary of Defense Hexa,former National Security Advisor Waltz,
Secretary of State Rubio,really, you know, quietly.
And then I think with Secretary Hegseth'sspeech at Shangri La dialogue,
not so quietly.
What they seem to be doing sounds a lotlike what the Biden administration
was doing.
It seems that there's morecontinuity than change.
(18:14):
Doesn't seem as though we'reactually ceding the Indo or
the Asia Pacific to China, and
that maybe our sort of position withregard to Russia and Europe is different
from our position with regard to China andthe Indo or Asia Pacific.
So how do you understandthe Trump administration strategy?
(18:35):
I haven't seen a great articulation of it,except for
Secretary Hegseth's speech at Shangri La.
I don't know whether you were there,but I'd be interested to get your take
on what exactly how you thinkthat the strategy is shaping up.
>> Ely Ratner (18:49):
Yeah, again, I think you've,
you've provided a good context there, Liz.
The I don't think yet we have seeneither a coherent presentation
of a singular grand strategyfrom the Trump administration or
for that matter, of a,of a China strategy per se.
I think we have seen different elements ofthat on the defense and security space.
(19:13):
I think there is a little more clarity,which is what you're describing,
which is that a lot of the early moves bythe Trump administration, particularly as
it relates to NATO and Europe,did present a certain orientation and
skepticism toward alliances andpartnerships.
And folks frankly were watching to see howwould that map on to the Indo Pacific.
(19:34):
And thankfully, from my perspective,I think it has looked quite different that
the Secretary Hegseth first made his firsttrip to the region to Philippines and
Japan, and sent a very traditional messagethere of US Commitment to the region.
And then as you mentioned justrecently out in Singapore for
the Shangri La dialogue, articulateda set of priorities on defense policy.
(19:58):
Now, there were parts of the speech thatwere uniquely to the Trump administration,
but when it came to the part of the speechof okay, on a no kidding activities,
operations, exercises perspective,defense and
security policy perspective, whatare the priorities of the administration?
And what they ticked through werevery familiar focus areas that,
(20:21):
that we were working on over the lastseveral years, including force posture,
as I described that building out thatmore distributed, mobile, resilient,
lethal force posture, more cooperationon defense industrial base and
efforts to strengthen the capabilitiesof our allies and partners, and
many of the activities thatSecretary Hegseth has advanced, broadened,
(20:45):
strengthened, continued, do have theirroots in the Biden administration.
So I think that that's a good thing.
And the overriding message of one of USCommitment to the region and US Commitment
to allies and partners was welcomein the region and is a good message.
So I do hope that continues.
The challenge, of course,is that in the areas of economics and
(21:09):
foreign assistance andon some other diplomatic measures,
you do have actions that are being takenthat are creating a lot of stir and
tension within these broader bilateralrelationships in the region.
And I think the questionis what is the push and
pull going to be between what seemsto be an effort in Washington, but
(21:30):
also in the region to continueon the defense cooperation and
the security cooperation becauseof the challenges from China and
North Korea as well, butfrom particularly from China?
On the one hand, that has a verystrong motivator behind it.
On the other hand,some of the economic and trade and
tariff issues do create headwinds.
So at what point do the politics andthe economics of the tariffs become so
(21:55):
overriding that they become verynegative upon the trade the defense and
security, that's a big question.
It hasn't happened yet.
So the, the ability to silo,we have seen to date,
but there are probably limits to that.
But to your broader question, I think for
now we have seen relative continuity and,and also reporting that the Trump
(22:17):
administration has put outan interim national defense strategy
internally to the department with Chinaas a priority for the department.
And that national defense strategy isreportedly due to the secretary at
the end of August.
So we may see the first formalarticulation of at least defense strategy,
if not a national security strategy,by the end of the summer.
>> Elizabeth Economy (22:42):
Let me ask you, because, you know, in the trade space,
of course, you know,
people were describing the range ofperspectives within the cabinet and
among the sort of senior advisors as,you know, a team of rivals, right.
You had very different perspectives.
Everybody from deeply engagedin trade with China on
(23:02):
the sort of Elon Musk side toPeter Navarro, who would be,
forget about strategic decoupling,let's just decouple the two economies.
I mean, do you sense that there'sa similar debate or range of perspectives
on the defense and security sidewhen it comes to the Indo Pacific?
I mean, I have been struck by some ofthe appointments that seem to be more
(23:24):
in the Taiwan doesn't need to be a,you know,
strategic national priority forthe United States.
It's not essential toour national security.
You know, there seems to be a littlebit of difference of opinion.
If you look at some voices inthe administration again, they,
they don't seem to be, you know,at the forefront right now.
But I wonder whether you haveany thoughts about, you know,
(23:48):
is there a kind of team of rivalsas well on the security and
defense part when it comes toour China security strategy?
>> Ely Ratner (23:57):
I think there, there are different perspectives throughout
the administration as,as you've described.
And there,there are folks who come from more of a,
what's often called a restrainerbackground which wants to
see the United States lessinvolved in international affairs.
I think that is predominantly beena reaction to wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan and some of ourpolicies in the Middle east and
(24:20):
even possibly some of the ways inwhich we've been engaged in Ukraine.
So in some ways that element or thatnational security orientation has been
more focused on reducing or undoingcommitments in other parts of the world
and hasn't always been veryfocused on the Indo Pacific.
So I think the arguments of thatcommunity are maybe stronger,
(24:42):
more strongly applied to other places.
You do have the prioritizers orthe China hawks or as they're described,
who want to put forward a, a nationalsecurity strategy more focused on China.
And then I think you have folks inthe administration who aren't particularly
concerned about geopolitics in general and
(25:02):
come to the region withthat economic orientation.
So I think we are seeingdifferent bits and pieces of that.
But at least the Pentagonseems to be driving pretty
clearly from a prioritizationperspective of the prc.
And we have, like you said, some ofthose more skeptical voices may still be
(25:23):
existent, but haven't,haven't really manifested themselves.
But I think it is the interplay in partbetween the national security folks and
the economic policy folks that,that may be determinative here.
>> Elizabeth Economy (25:38):
Okay, so I think that's a perfect segue to your great piece
in foreign affairs calling fora Pacific Defense Act.
I think it threads the needle in waysthat really smart between not actually
committing us to too much more in waysthat might appeal to those restrainers,
but also being forward leaning andactually doing things that bolster our
(26:01):
security andthe security of our allies and partners.
So talk to us about whatthe specific security or
defense pact would actually look like.
>> Ely Ratner (26:14):
Yeah, happy to, happy to do that.
And this is all building upon the earlierpart of our conversation about
the trends of greater strategicalignment between the United States and
some of its core partners visa vis the China challenge, and
then that growing intraAsian cooperation as well.
And thinking about as we weredoing that building of networks,
(26:37):
that building of webs, that lattice work.
How do we think about that interms of a longer term strategy?
And it's my view that the Bidenadministration was a really important
period in terms of generatingmomentum in that regard, but
that the existing panoply of informalorganizations is not going to
(26:58):
be sufficient in the long term fortrue combat credible deterrence
because it is Important it isbringing our allies together.
In terms of the current mechanisms.
We do have some cooperative productprojects, but when you come,
when it comes to no kidding, militaryoperations and exercises, it isn't.
(27:20):
It lacks the formality that you needto actually do no kidding, command and
control, no kidding military planning,operations and exercises, et cetera.
So to truly achieve what we're going toneed in terms of that whole being greater
than the sum of the parts,we need more formal military mechanisms.
(27:41):
It can't just be a sort of a pickupgame that happens every once in a while.
So the proposal that I put forwardin Foreign affairs said, look,
we need to move in this direction.
The military challenge from China issufficient that it's going to require more
focused deterrent power from allies andpartners.
And if you look historically,there have been both conceptual and
(28:04):
real efforts to try to build somekind of collective defense or
multilateral securityorganization in the past.
But it all, it has always stumbled overthe fact that it's a very big region,
you've got a lot of differentkinds of partners with
different kinds of interests, and
a pan regional organization like NATOdoesn't make sense in the Indo Pacific.
(28:25):
So one of the important parts ofthe proposal that I put forward,
it is limited on at least starting withthe core group of Australia, Japan,
Philippines and the United States as thatset of countries that is most aligned
on the challenge and most cooperativelyworking together already and
most prepared to be moving forwardin a collective defense arrangement.
(28:49):
So that's the proposal so far.
I also think, you know, one aspect ofthis that we haven't talked about so
far that we did hear from SecretaryHegseth in Singapore has been a call for
US Allies and partners to domore in these relationships.
That the context has changed,the military is balance has changed, and
(29:09):
it's not going to work anymore to havea region essentially configured such that
the United States is the primarydefender of our allies and partners.
We need to be doing that more together.
They need to be stepping up more.
And that is a, I think,a shared view on both sides of the aisle.
I don't think that's just.
And frankly, among the American people andpublic opinion polling, they like
(29:30):
alliances, but they want the allies to becontributing more in the strategic and
political environment is calling for that.
So as they're stepping up too, as they'reworking more with each other and as we're
all more aligned on China, I think itcreates the context for an actual viable
collective defense arrangement that hasn'tbeen necessarily possible historically.
>> Elizabeth Economy (29:53):
So One of the things that surprised me when I, when as I was
reading through, you know, and then youaddress it a little bit later is I think,
what about South Korea, you know,or how to bring in Vietnam?
I mean, there are clearly other,you know, allies and
partners that, you know,we'd want to have included in some form.
Is it a matter of sequencing where you'restarting with, you know, these four and
(30:17):
then you would imagine bringing othersin as time goes on, or are there sort of
tangential ways that they can be alignedwith, if not formally in the organization?
>> Ely Ratner (30:27):
Well, I would say yes to all of those things.
So first thing to say again isthat this is not the proposal,
is not that this is the end all and be allof security cooperation in the region and
everyone else be damned, that US Allianceswith Korea, cooperation with Korea and
Japan in the Quad Aukus, all of thoseother configurations could still continue.
(30:53):
So this is not again,at the expense of other relationships and
partnerships and whatnot.
But the Korea question, the South Koreaquestion is a really good one.
I think.
You're not alone.
It's the question I get most frequentlyfrom a perspective of the membership
question.
And the answer is, look,it's a decision for Seoul.
(31:13):
It's not a decision for Washington andSouth Korea's even, even prior to
the election they've just had that hasbrought in a more progressive government,
even under conservative,national security minded,
what some would consider hawkish,defense oriented governments.
In Seoul, their focus has beenalmost squarely on North Korea and
they have been hesitant to be engaging inwhat regional security cooperation that
(31:39):
distracts them from that or takesa sharper position at times against China.
So that was something we tried to advanceduring the Biden administration to draw
and work with South Korea inother parts of the region.
Their own national securitystrategy called for
that themselves to be doing more inSoutheast Asia and the Pacific islands.
(31:59):
But those efforts are very nascent.
They have a vibrantdefense industrial base.
They're active on security cooperation,but
from an operational perspectivewith their military, they have yet
to be a really robust partner inthe South China Sea or the East China Sea.
So they would have to reorient theirnational defense and security strategy in
(32:20):
a pretty significant way away fromthat singular focus on North Korea.
And they would also have to bewilling to work with Japan and
cooperate with Japan morethan they have to date.
So my answer would bethe door is absolutely open.
They would make a splendid contribution,but I'm not.
I'm not sure they're readyto walk through that door.
(32:40):
And there are others like New Zealand,who potentially, over time,
might be interested in,in joining an organization like this.
And then I think the way that youdescribed it is right, that for
other countries, whether it's India orVietnam, there could be
opportunities to plug in in variousways as we have informal observers or
(33:01):
other types of participants andregional organizations.
But I think as it stands now,a country like India or
Vietnam is not going to be willingto join a security pact, period,
much less one that is quite focused on,on the China challenge.
But that's okay.
(33:21):
And I think waiting for all ofthe stars to align of every US Ally and
partner in the region is going toleave us waiting for Godot here.
So I think it's important that we,you know,
move forward with a ready constellation.
And frankly, if you look atthe combination of Australia and Japan and
the Philippines, I think you geta lot of the way that you need to go.
(33:44):
Again, if we're talking aboutthe practicalities of deterrence in
the western Pacific, that set of countriesprovides a very strong foundation.
>> Elizabeth Economy (33:54):
Yeah, no, I thought it was an exciting idea.
Another thing that struck me,it reminded me a little bit of that moment
in the Biden administration wherethere seemed to be a push for
closer coordination between ourAsian allies and partners and NATO.
And, and then it seemed as thoughit didn't get quite the formal
(34:15):
construct that maybe we were hoping for.
But I guess I'm asking,do you see the potential then for
involvement from European allies andpartners in this construct, as you say,
not, not immediately, not initially,but would you see that as a,
as a positive, or would it be somethingthat you think would trigger China in
(34:36):
a way that would be moredangerous than not?
How do you think about that, you know,sort of bridge from, from the Indo Pacific
to Europe and the kind of coordination andcooperation that might be useful?
>> Ely Ratner (34:51):
Yeah, so those are Two really important questions.
And let me answer specifically as itrelates to the pac, but I want to broaden
that out a little bit because I thinkit's an important question strategically.
I agree with the Trump administration'sgeneral focus vis a vis Europe.
To say Europe you got to,
(35:12):
you should be focused primarily onEurope in terms of a defense partner
that is not at the exclusion ofcooperation in the Indo Pacific.
But I think the it is important for
the Europeans to be playing a much moresignificant role on the continent.
And right now, conceiving of Europeanpowers playing a really significant
(35:34):
operational role in the Indo Pacificin a sort of a planning perspective,
I think is probably a bridge too far.
So I would say I think that'simportant to look at down the road.
It's not something that I would reach forright this minute more broadly to
sort of caveat further what Ijust said about Europe's role.
(35:55):
I do think the we have seen reportingthat the Trump administration has been
really skeptical of the value of Europeat all participating in the Indo Pacific.
And I think they just need tobe more flexible in that regard.
And I think we're seeingsome of that already.
And in fact, Secretary Hegseth was askedabout this out in Singapore during
the Shangri La dialogue, and he gavea much more nuanced answer about, well,
(36:19):
there probably are some opportunitieswhere Europe could make important
contributions that was lessideologically rigid than some of
the earlier statements that we had heard.
So I think that's really good becauseagain, I don't think that Europe's
going to have in the short term a reallybig war fighting role in the Indo Pacific.
But absolutely they have a role to playin strengthening Taiwan's defense and
(36:43):
resilience.
So there are unique capabilities thatthey can be providing to Taiwan to
strengthen deterrenceacross the Taiwan Strait.
They can also be engaging in operationalactivity like Taiwan Strait transits,
freedom of navigation operations.
>> Elizabeth Economy (36:58):
Why wouldn't we want them doing that, right?
I mean, is the press->> Ely Ratner: Exactly.
No, I mean, I mean,the argument is some folks say that's
drawing away from the work theyneed to be doing in Europe.
But I think we can, I think we can do bothif it's, if it's sufficiently measured.
Because I think the issue here is a littlebit from Europe goes a really long way in
(37:18):
the Indo Pacific.
And then there are areas like the PacificIslands, the French are a resident power
there, that, that Europe canplay an important role as well,
not to mention sort of inthe exercise space as well,
where we've seen European powersoperating with the United States and
others in a collective fashionthat has deterrence power.
(37:40):
So again, I think there are meaningful,properly scaled contributions
that Europe can andshould be making to the Indo Pacific.
And also it's not Washington's role or
ability to tell Europe what they can andcan't do.
So the other thing that happened out inShangri La is we had President Macron
there giving the keynote that hadelements of strategic autonomy and,
(38:03):
and Europe as an alternative powerto the United States and Asia.
And that is not in America's interestto have Europe be a straight up
competitor in Asia.
And in many ways we want to becooperating with Europe as it relates to
the China challenge.
So it's not if they're goingto be doing it anyway,
we ought to be coordinating andcooperating as they do it.
(38:26):
Yeah, 100%.
So let me ask you one last questionhere and have you previewed or
did you preview this idea with any ofyour allies and partners in the region?
Like, had the Australians orthe Japanese or
the Filipinos actually heardthis idea from you before?
And if so, what did they say?
Or maybe you've, you've heard fromthem since the article was published.
(38:48):
So I'm just curious,what is the regional reaction?
>> Ely Ratner (38:54):
It's been interesting.
You know, a lot of it is veryquietly behind closed doors.
I can't say this in public, but you'reright, absolutely, we have to do this.
Others are saying, you know, thank you foropening up this debate, which frankly,
was the purpose of the article.
The article was not to hand overa blueprint, go ahead and do this.
(39:15):
It was to generate a discussionabout an idea that has been
batted around for a long time.
And this was an argument forwhy the time may have come and
we ought to have a seriousdiscussion about this.
So I've heard from a lot of quartersin the U.S. government, in the U.S.
military, among our allies andpartners that are very encouraging.
(39:40):
At the same time,political leaders in Canberra and
elsewhere are dealing with some ofthose economic and political tensions.
And it's hard for them to lean forwardright now and say, you know, now's
the time that we need to do somethingreally ambitious with the United States.
So aligning the politics to actuallydo something like this will
(40:02):
take a lot of leadership andthe right sort of political moment.
But at the same time,one of the things that is embedded in
the article is the point thata lot of the foundation for
something like this,the pieces are already being built.
And so this is to say, let's accelerate,let's keep going, let's be focused.
(40:27):
And as we build our cooperativeelements out in the Indo Pacific,
whether it's new command andcontrol efforts in Japan or
in the Philippines, ornew intelligence sharing mechanisms.
Or maritime domain awareness operations,that we think about how to ensure that we
are either including or can includethis constellation of partners.
(40:48):
And so the foundation, the defenseestablishments, can continue moving
forward on this without necessarilypolitical leaders putting up a,
a big banner.
And frankly, also, the amount of workthat needs to be done between now and
the actual rollout of an initiativelike this means that, in practice.
(41:08):
It could be something thathappens subsequent to
Donald Trump's second term asit relates to the calendar.
So maybe that would open up politicalimagination for people as well.
But I recognize the challengingpolitical environment.
That's something that people always say,
how could you be proposingsomething like this at a time where
(41:29):
the Trump administration is sohostile to our alliances?
And the response to that in part is,look at what's actually happening
in the Indo-Pacific, which is a storyof continuity and moving forward.
And also, yeah, we got to figure out howwe're gonna work on to align the economic
piece with the security piece.
So recognize the challenges.
(41:51):
But I think the need for it is so great.
And the sort of megatrends thatare bigger than the Trump administration
are driving us toward this anyway.
>> Elizabeth Economy (41:59):
Yeah and I mean, I think again,
one of the really smart things in thearticle is that it doesn't call out for
a huge new investment ofUS Military resources and funding.
That's not the centerpieceof your argument, right?
What it really is about is coordination,working together, aligning, command and
control, doing these kinds of things.
(42:21):
And so to the, you're not sayingwe need to be spending more,
as the centerpiece of thisnew Pacific defense pact.
And I think that's got to be an appealingelement for the Trump administration.
But as you say.
>> Ely Ratner (42:34):
Not only that.
Let me, let me just build on that for twoseconds because it's worth saying one more
thing about this,which is from the allies perspective,
they already have a treatywith the United States.
They already have a defense treatywith Donald Trump's United States.
And so that already existswhat we're talking about here.
The real novel innovation here isactually the intra Asian connections and
(42:56):
formalizing mutual obligationbetween the partners.
And in many ways that's somethingthat should be an attract,
that should be even more attractive inan environment where there are questions
about where the United States mightcome down on some of these issues.
So the, the big leap isbetween the Asian partners.
And exactly as you're right, exactly asyou're describing from the US perspective,
(43:20):
there are no new obligations or spending.
>> Elizabeth Economy (43:22):
Yeah, okay, so I always end with a couple of quick
questions just to get your,your thoughts and your input so
that our listeners can take awaysome additional piece of advice.
So when you think about the Chinaspace and what article or
book would you recommend to our listeners?
What should they readto get maybe more up to
(43:44):
speed on the kinds of issuesthat you're talking about?
>> Ely Ratner (43:49):
Well, maybe I'll give you a book that was instructive to me as
I've been coming up through the field andit's not one about sort of the guns and
bombs of the PLA.
But I really enjoyed Evan Osnos'sbook Age of Ambition,
which is now maybe 10 plus years old,if not quite a bit older than that,
(44:09):
which was I think, just really interestingto hear about the people in China.
And how they're experiencing all thedifferent forces that are driving through
that country.
Having lived there myself andtraveled extensively around the country.
Even though the writing that I do and thework that I do is often at the national
(44:29):
level and the geopolitical level andabout big structural forces.
Understanding what life in reality lookslike on the ground in that country
at an individual level, I think,is really important and super interesting.
So that is something thathas always stuck with me and
I always enjoy those kinds of books.
>> Elizabeth Economy (44:52):
Yeah, it was a great book and
was of course a nationalBook Award winning.
>> Ely Ratner (44:55):
Right, so it's not just me, I guess.
Yeah, so andhe's sort of a good writer too, that guy.
I don't know if anyone heard of him.
>> Elizabeth Economy (45:01):
And so that you and millions of other people would.
>> Ely Ratner (45:03):
Yes, so maybe all your viewers have already read it, but if not,
go to your local library.
And then the other, I would just saythe other thing that I enjoy reading as
somebody who is not deeplysteeped in economics,
is all the work coming out ofthe Rhodium Group and Dan Rosen.
I think they're doing some of the mostinteresting on the ground economic
(45:24):
analysis.
So much of what we read about the Chineseeconomy is coming from officialdom, and
I think they have a great job,
do a great job of sort of cutting throughthat with a different perspective.
So I consume all of theirwork every chance I get.
>> Elizabeth Economy (45:38):
Yeah, 100% and actually,
you had Dan on the podcastearlier this year.
Okay, if there's an issue that youthink that we need to know more
about when it comes to China andwe don't, what would that be?
>> Ely Ratner (45:54):
Well, I would say one issue that I have been increasingly
interested in talking to allies andpartners has been the role of
Chinese influence in democraciesaround the Indo Pacific.
It is interesting to me, having beenthe role that I was in before and
continuing some of those conversationswith allies and partners.
(46:17):
It's really fascinating the degreeto which, whether it's Australia,
Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia,India, all of these leaders.
They're worried aboutthe national security issues and
the external defense issues.
But they're also really worried aboutwhat's happening in their own politics in
(46:37):
terms of the ways in which parts ofthe Chinese system are affecting and
manipulating their media environment,their political environment.
And they're all going through iton a very individual basis, but
it's a pattern that's replicatedthroughout the region.
So I know that there are folkswho have worked on this issue and
studied this issue.
But from a policy and strategyperspective, it feels to me like one that
(46:59):
merits a little bit more attention becauseof the really significant effect that
it's gonna have on not only our allies andpartners, but on US interests as well.
>> Elizabeth Economy (47:08):
Yeah, I agree. I mean, some countries in the region,
like Australia, certainly Australia wasreally the canary in the coal mine,
I think, when it, comes to this issue.
But there are many others thatare probably not have not mounted as
robust a research ordefense effort as they probably need to.
Okay, one last question.
What do you think is the likelihood ofa Nixon Mao sort of transformative moment
(47:34):
in the US China relationship betweenXi Jinping and Donald Trump?
>> Ely Ratner (47:40):
I would score it as relatively low, and
I don't think that'sbecause of Donald Trump.
We may get something that is announced orlooks or
pretends to be some verysignificant historic breakthrough.
But my personal perspectiveon these issues, Liz,
as is that the United States and Chinahave competing visions of the future.
(48:02):
I don't think there is a lot of overlapin our Venn diagrams of our preferred
outcomes for the Indo Pacific.
And I think it's a challenge of competinginterests that will need to be wrestled
out over time.
And I don't think at this point there isa grand strategic bargain to be struck.
So if one were announced or attempted,
I don't think it would sustain forvery long.
(48:24):
And we're just gonna have towork through this period and
with the proposals we'vebeen talking about today.
Try to find a way to thread the needleto maintain peace and stability through
a period that, from my perspective,will be a very contested environment that
in some ways, is separated from thepersonalities of the leaders themselves.
>> Elizabeth Economy (48:45):
Well, Ely I can't thank you enough for taking the time to
speak with me today and for sharing reallyjust a fascinating set of insights and
vision, I think, forthe future of Indo-Pacific security.
I think you are always on the cutting edgewhen it comes to thinking about new ideas
(49:06):
for the United States and what we needto do to advance our regional security.
So really appreciate your ideas andyour time and of course,
your service and look forward tothe next administration when perhaps
you won't just beAssistant Secretary of Defense.
But who knows what role you might playin the next Democratic administration?
(49:28):
So thank you so much for joining us.
>> Ely Ratner (49:32):
Yeah, thanks so much, Liz.
Great discussion.
>> Elizabeth Economy (49:34):
So if you enjoyed this podcast and
want to hear more reasoned discourse anddebate on China, I encourage you to
subscribe to China Considered viaThe Hoover Institution YouTube channel or
podcast platform of your choice.
[MUSIC]
[MUSIC]
>> Elizabeth Economy (00:08):
Welcome to China Considered,
a podcast that brings fresh insight andinformed discussion to one of the most
consequential issues of our time (00:14):
how China is changing and changing the world.
I'm Liz Economy, Hargrove Senior Fellowand co-director of the program on
the U.S.-China and the World at the HooverInstitution at Stanford University.
Today we're going to be talkingabout US national security,
specifically what the United States shouldbe doing in the Indo Pacific in the face
of an increasingly powerful andassertive China.
(00:36):
Most of the focus of the Trumpadministration for the past five months
has been on trade and on the bilateraltrade deficit, on what we should do about
fentanyl and its precursors comingto the United States from China, and
how we should balance our trade,our technology, and our national security.
But there are other issuesin the US China relationship
that also deserve our attention, likeChina's growing military capabilities and
(00:59):
presence in the Indo Pacific.
So to help us understandwhy this issue matters,
what the Trump administration strategy is,and what more we should be doing,
I'm delighted to welcome Dr. Ely Ratner.
Ely is a principal atthe Marathon Initiative and
formerly served asthe Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Indo-Pacific Security Affairsin the Biden administration.
(01:21):
Welcome, Ely.
>> Ely Ratner (01:22):
Great to be here, Liz.
>> Elizabeth Economy (01:24):
So, Ely, let's start with the basics.
What is the Indo Pacific andwhy should we care about it?
>> Ely Ratner (01:30):
Well, maybe I'll just start from a defense and security perspective,
since you've obviously talked to a lot ofdifferent experts about Asia and China.
And from my perspective, looking out,
what we see is a very challengingsecurity environment insofar as for
several decades we had greatpower peace in the Indo Pacific.
(01:53):
We had a system that was guided byUS Alliances in the Indo Pacific and
that provided the foundations forjust the remarkable economic growth that
we've seen throughout the region and,frankly, throughout the world.
But what we've seen in the lastfew decades is big changes,
obviously in the PRC with veryrapid military modernization.
(02:16):
But that is not only justmilitary modernization.
The real challenge is that that has beenconjoined with what we understand is,
frankly, ambition in Beijing to reorder,refashion the international system.
And you heard repeatedly duringthe Biden administration,
whether it was in the nationaldefense strategy or
the national security strategy, thatChina was the only country in the world
(02:37):
with both the will and increasinglythe capability to change the international
system in a way that would reallydisadvantage the United States.
So we see that potential coming, andit would happen in ways that could be very
destabilizing to trade, to technology,and, frankly, to U.S. interests.
So from the perspective of the Pentagonduring the Biden administration,
(02:58):
we articulated China as what we calledthe pacing challenge, which was
the principal effort that the Pentagonneeded to focus on to maintain peace and
stability in the Indo Pacific.
>> Elizabeth Economy (03:11):
So if you were to say sort of what are China's top three
ambitions?
You talked about sort of reorderingthe international system or
reshaping the international system.
But if you were just to focuson the Indo Pacific itself,
what would you say were China'ssort of top three ambitions for
changing the structure of therelationships or the architecture there?
>> Ely Ratner (03:31):
Well, I think the overriding goal is to dominate
the Western Pacific andthe East Asian littoral.
And the specific objectives thereinwould be, number one, the seizure and
control of Taiwan, number two, effectivecontrol of the South China Sea, and
number three, undermining, breaking apart,if possible, but at least undermining and
(03:54):
weakening US Alliances such that Chinahad effective control of its periphery
all the way up from the East China Seadown through the Taiwan Strait and
through the South China Sea.
And thereby it's notjust a military issue.
Once you control the, the sea lanes,you are therefore controlling the flow of
people and commerce and technology andultimately diplomacy and politics as well.
>> Elizabeth Economy (04:19):
And what do you see as its strategy for doing this?
I mean, you mentioned it's gota very aggressive military buildup.
Is it building bases?
Is it forging new security relationshipswith actors in the region?
How's it going about tryingto realize its objectives?
>> Ely Ratner (04:36):
It's done a little bit, Liz, of what you just described in terms
of trying to build strongersecurity ties with other countries.
It is, has been pursuingoverseas basing opportunities.
We could,we could talk about that separately.
But primarily it has been building up itsown capability to unilaterally achieve
these objectives through aggression.
(04:58):
And the way it's doing that is a littlebit different vis a vis Taiwan or
in other areas.
But it has been very focused onbuilding the capability to prevent
the United States from being able tointervene into the Western Pacific to
defend its allies and partners.
So that's at the high levelof military operations.
And then, as you know, it's beenworking in a, in a very coercive,
(05:21):
day to day fashion through a combinationof its military, its coast guard,
what's called its maritime militia,civilian,
supposedly civilian vessels that arecoordinating with its defense agencies and
bit by bit, chipping away at some ofthe norms and international law and
sovereignty of other countries inthe region to try to more slowly and
(05:43):
incrementally achieve its goals.
So it is on the one hand,trying to achieve its revisionist aims
without fighting, while also preparing foruse aggression if necessary.
>> Elizabeth Economy (05:54):
So you were one of the chief
architects of the US Indo-Pacific Strategyduring the Biden administration.
How did you approachthe challenge that you saw?
What were sort of the key elements ofthe Biden administration Indo Pacific
strategy?
>> Ely Ratner (06:12):
Well, the dominant principle was one of deterrence.
So the primary question was how dowe sustain stability and peace and
how do we prevent Chinese aggression?
So that's always important to point outbecause the United States does not have
territorial ambitions in the Indo Pacific,it does not have offensive aims.
(06:33):
It's not planning to, for, forany reason attack China itself.
So it's very much about defendingthe territorial status quo and
defending the sovereigntyof our allies and partners.
So that's the overriding objective.
The ways that we did that were througha variety of means designed to strengthen
deterrence.
(06:53):
And for folks who aren't steeped ininternational relations theory, what that
means very simply is ensuring that thecosts of conflict are sufficiently high
for Beijing that it chooses alternativepaths to try to achieve its aims,
that it does not reach for the militarylever or does not choose aggression,
(07:13):
because the costs of doing that wouldbe beyond its willingness to do so.
And that was important because ourunderstanding was that Beijing's
aspirations, for instance, forTaiwan or in the South China Sea,
were situated in the context of itsgoals for its overall development.
So it was not yet willing to put atrisk its entire economic growth or
(07:37):
its diplomatic and political goalsaround the world to achieve these
nearer term territorial ambitions.
So what that means is if the costsare sufficiently high from a military and
economic and
diplomatic perspective, then Xi Jinpingwould decide it wasn't worth it.
One of the shorthands that youheard U.S officials use for
(07:57):
that quite often is thatwe want Xi Jinping.
To wake up in the morning, look out thewindow, consider the cost of conflict, and
say to himself, you know what?
Today is not the day.
The costs are too high,the risks are too high.
So that was our goal,to strengthen deterrence.
And the way that we did that wasthrough a few different ways.
One was through investing inUS Capabilities that are particular
(08:21):
to operational challengesin the Indo Pacific.
For many years, the US Military wasfocused on counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism in the Middle East.
So it has been a shift back to thinkingabout great power competition.
And our budgets reflected that in the kindof things that we were investing in
capabilities relevant to the Indo Pacific.
(08:44):
The Pentagon has also beendeveloping new operational concepts,
which just means the way that the USMilitary fights, which has had to be
revised because of China's strategy, whichhas been designed in particular to defeat
what I would describe as the old Americanway of war that we saw, for instance,
(09:04):
in Operation Desert Storm in Iraq andother places in the post Cold War era.
So the United States needs not just newhardware, but also a new way of fighting.
So new operational concepts.
We also updated the US Forceposture in the western Pacific,
which means just the disposition of U.S.forces where they have been situated.
(09:28):
We traditionally have hadthe predominance of our forces be in
Northeast Asia at major operatingbases in South Korea and Japan.
One of the things that we did throughoutthe Biden administration is developing
a more distributed, more mobile,more resilient force posture that
(09:49):
distributed within Japan, andthen grew more opportunities for
military operations, whether it'sin the Philippines or Australia.
So stretching out the US Troop presence inAsia in a way that increases deterrence.
And then finally, we worked with,and certainly not last,
certainly not least, we workedwith allies and partners in really
(10:13):
unprecedented ways to try to make thewhole greater than the sum of the parts.
And we did that through a lot ofdifferent constellations of partnerships.
But that was, I think, one of the notableachievements of the administration.
And just all of that collectively,I'll say.
I mean, I think the way wethought about deterrence is
(10:35):
that all of those activitiescollectively increased risk and
cost sufficiently forChina that we achieved.
What we said at the time wasthat deterrence is real and
deterrence is strong, andinvasion of Taiwan in particular,
we argued at the time,was neither imminent nor inevitable.
(10:55):
And we were right in that regard in termsof the period of the Biden administration.
And I think that's the legacy that wehanded off to the Trump administration of
that strength and deterrence andwe'll see if they can carry that forward.
>> Elizabeth Economy (11:08):
Yeah, I mean, I think, you know, one of the things that
was so striking to me looking at what wastaking place in terms of our, you know,
overall military strategy, was Ithink that last part that you raised,
which was all those newarrangements like Aukus, right.
With the UK and Australia andthe United States and
then the minilaterals with Japan,the Philippines, the United States,
(11:31):
South Korea, the United States and Japan,there just seemed to be this proliferation
of arrangements that I think at somepoint somebody was calling a lattice.
I don't think, I don't know that thatname stuck, but it did seem that we were
developing a kind of web or a sort ofreinforced network of capabilities.
(11:52):
And, and also I think there was a sort of,
it launched in some respects,new relationships among our partners.
Right.So, so that notion that it was hub and
spoke sort of didn't hold as much.
I think it was a deliberatepolicy at the administration,
correct me if I'm wrong, to enable andto support our allies and
(12:16):
partners forming theirown arrangements and
their own set of sort of partnershipsin the defense and security arena.
>> Ely Ratner (12:26):
Yeah, yeah, I think you, you described it well.
And it's a really, really important trend.
And for those of work on East Asiansecurity issues, it is an exciting time,
frankly, because this is somethingthat folks have been talking about for
15, 20 years as an aspiration that,hey, as you described,
(12:47):
we have this hub and spoke model whereunlike Europe, where we've got a big
collective defense agreement in,in the United States or in, in Asia,
the only formal security treatiesoutside of maybe one between China and
North Korea are treaties that countrieshave singularly with the United States.
(13:07):
There are no Intra-Asian defense treaties.
So.
But what we did see, I think, you know,credit to the Biden administration for
bringing partners together.
But at the same time we wereriding a wave of trends that was
enabling this in ways never before.
And, and one of those trends was thatwhat we saw in our, our closest partner
(13:28):
countries is that they themselves werebecoming increasingly alarmed about
the China challenge in terms of their,the direct threat to their interests,
whether it was India, Australia,Japan, Philippines, others.
It wasn't the United Statesgoing into these meetings and
saying, don't you realize that you'refacing this threat from China?
(13:48):
Or maybe that's what it was five,10 years ago,
that this time around it was fascinatingfor me to walk into these meetings and
feel like the recitation we werehearing from our partners was very
similar to what we weredescribing ourselves.
And so these countries in many wayswere already underway in terms of their
own strategic transformation.
(14:09):
India talking about China rather thanPakistan as its primary national
security threat.
The Australians talking about the threatto Australia rather than believing
that China was sort ofthis distant issue and
its military ought to be off in the Middleeast doing stabilization operations.
And of course,what we've seen in the Philippines,
(14:31):
a total transformation from a defensestrategy focused on internal security
to one focused on external security.
And then Japan in many ways leading theway in terms of thinking about some really
fundamental changes to its historicallymuch more reticent military and
defense strategy.
So these changes are all underway, and theUnited States is meeting these countries
(14:54):
in the middle wheretheir partnerships are.
And then second, exactly as you described,the degree of intra Asian cooperation
has been really interesting andencouraging over the last several years.
And that was also in the context ofthese partners wanting to work more with
the United States.
So it was not a just a hedge or somehow amovement away from the United States, but
(15:16):
it was behavior that was happeningindependent of Washington.
And the, the relationship, forinstance, between Australia and Japan,
you have experts describingthat as alliance like, and
all of these new cooperative efforts and,and diplomatic efforts.
So you're right,we were able to harness those together.
Rahm Emanuel and others diddescribe it as, as lattice work.
(15:40):
I think we struggled to find the rightmetaphor for this kind of activity.
But a web or a network, as you described,I think is the best description.
And really the important point ofthis is that as I would describe it,
these are complementary andoverlapping institutions.
It was not that one was the primeat the expense of others.
(16:01):
And that's important because withASEAN there, the Southeast Asia
centered regional organization,it was important to be seen as being
complementary to what was going on inthe region and not exclusive to that.
But I think these were more fit forpurpose.
And the different constellationsof countries were in many
(16:24):
ways working on problems thatthey could all unite around.
And that was one ofthe important features.
But it was a really exciting period.
And I'll say it was a challenge too,from a strategic perspective,
because we went from a period where,again, folks had been aspiring to have
this kind of cooperation for a long timewith our partners in these new ways.
(16:46):
And very quickly we wentfrom just dialogue and
meetings to actual military cooperation.
And there was even an excess ofopportunity all of a sudden.
So it required more prioritization about,okay, which of these really matter if
we're going to send our leaders together,how should we focus?
But a really important evolution inthe regional security structure.
>> Elizabeth Economy (17:08):
Okay, so I think you can safely say that you left office
having dramatically improvedthe sort of security
architecture in the Indo Pacific andthe US Position within it.
Enter the Trump administration.
Early on, we heard talk of somespheres of influence, I think,
(17:30):
leading some people to believethat the United States,
you know, was simply going to befocused on north and South America.
We were basically ceding Europe to Russia,and
China was going to have the Asia orthe Indo Pacific.
But I think that's not quite right.
And I think what we've seen, and I want toget your take on this, is that, you know,
(17:52):
Secretary Hexa, Secretary of Defense Hexa,former National Security Advisor Waltz,
Secretary of State Rubio,really, you know, quietly.
And then I think with Secretary Hegseth'sspeech at Shangri La dialogue,
not so quietly.
What they seem to be doing sounds a lotlike what the Biden administration
was doing.
It seems that there's morecontinuity than change.
(18:14):
Doesn't seem as though we'reactually ceding the Indo or
the Asia Pacific to China, and
that maybe our sort of position withregard to Russia and Europe is different
from our position with regard to China andthe Indo or Asia Pacific.
So how do you understandthe Trump administration strategy?
(18:35):
I haven't seen a great articulation of it,except for
Secretary Hegseth's speech at Shangri La.
I don't know whether you were there,but I'd be interested to get your take
on what exactly how you thinkthat the strategy is shaping up.
>> Ely Ratner (18:49):
Yeah, again, I think you've,
you've provided a good context there, Liz.
The I don't think yet we have seeneither a coherent presentation
of a singular grand strategyfrom the Trump administration or
for that matter, of a,of a China strategy per se.
I think we have seen different elements ofthat on the defense and security space.
(19:13):
I think there is a little more clarity,which is what you're describing,
which is that a lot of the early moves bythe Trump administration, particularly as
it relates to NATO and Europe,did present a certain orientation and
skepticism toward alliances andpartnerships.
And folks frankly were watching to see howwould that map on to the Indo Pacific.
(19:34):
And thankfully, from my perspective,I think it has looked quite different that
the Secretary Hegseth first made his firsttrip to the region to Philippines and
Japan, and sent a very traditional messagethere of US Commitment to the region.
And then as you mentioned justrecently out in Singapore for
the Shangri La dialogue, articulateda set of priorities on defense policy.
(19:58):
Now, there were parts of the speech thatwere uniquely to the Trump administration,
but when it came to the part of the speechof okay, on a no kidding activities,
operations, exercises perspective,defense and
security policy perspective, whatare the priorities of the administration?
And what they ticked through werevery familiar focus areas that,
(20:21):
that we were working on over the lastseveral years, including force posture,
as I described that building out thatmore distributed, mobile, resilient,
lethal force posture, more cooperationon defense industrial base and
efforts to strengthen the capabilitiesof our allies and partners, and
many of the activities thatSecretary Hegseth has advanced, broadened,
(20:45):
strengthened, continued, do have theirroots in the Biden administration.
So I think that that's a good thing.
And the overriding message of one of USCommitment to the region and US Commitment
to allies and partners was welcomein the region and is a good message.
So I do hope that continues.
The challenge, of course,is that in the areas of economics and
(21:09):
foreign assistance andon some other diplomatic measures,
you do have actions that are being takenthat are creating a lot of stir and
tension within these broader bilateralrelationships in the region.
And I think the questionis what is the push and
pull going to be between what seemsto be an effort in Washington, but
(21:30):
also in the region to continueon the defense cooperation and
the security cooperation becauseof the challenges from China and
North Korea as well, butfrom particularly from China?
On the one hand, that has a verystrong motivator behind it.
On the other hand,some of the economic and trade and
tariff issues do create headwinds.
So at what point do the politics andthe economics of the tariffs become so
(21:55):
overriding that they become verynegative upon the trade the defense and
security, that's a big question.
It hasn't happened yet.
So the, the ability to silo,we have seen to date,
but there are probably limits to that.
But to your broader question, I think for
now we have seen relative continuity and,and also reporting that the Trump
(22:17):
administration has put outan interim national defense strategy
internally to the department with Chinaas a priority for the department.
And that national defense strategy isreportedly due to the secretary at
the end of August.
So we may see the first formalarticulation of at least defense strategy,
if not a national security strategy,by the end of the summer.
>> Elizabeth Economy (22:42):
Let me ask you, because, you know, in the trade space,
of course, you know,
people were describing the range ofperspectives within the cabinet and
among the sort of senior advisors as,you know, a team of rivals, right.
You had very different perspectives.
Everybody from deeply engagedin trade with China on
(23:02):
the sort of Elon Musk side toPeter Navarro, who would be,
forget about strategic decoupling,let's just decouple the two economies.
I mean, do you sense that there'sa similar debate or range of perspectives
on the defense and security sidewhen it comes to the Indo Pacific?
I mean, I have been struck by some ofthe appointments that seem to be more
(23:24):
in the Taiwan doesn't need to be a,you know,
strategic national priority forthe United States.
It's not essential toour national security.
You know, there seems to be a littlebit of difference of opinion.
If you look at some voices inthe administration again, they,
they don't seem to be, you know,at the forefront right now.
But I wonder whether you haveany thoughts about, you know,
(23:48):
is there a kind of team of rivalsas well on the security and
defense part when it comes toour China security strategy?
>> Ely Ratner (23:57):
I think there, there are different perspectives throughout
the administration as,as you've described.
And there,there are folks who come from more of a,
what's often called a restrainerbackground which wants to
see the United States lessinvolved in international affairs.
I think that is predominantly beena reaction to wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan and some of ourpolicies in the Middle east and
(24:20):
even possibly some of the ways inwhich we've been engaged in Ukraine.
So in some ways that element or thatnational security orientation has been
more focused on reducing or undoingcommitments in other parts of the world
and hasn't always been veryfocused on the Indo Pacific.
So I think the arguments of thatcommunity are maybe stronger,
(24:42):
more strongly applied to other places.
You do have the prioritizers orthe China hawks or as they're described,
who want to put forward a, a nationalsecurity strategy more focused on China.
And then I think you have folks inthe administration who aren't particularly
concerned about geopolitics in general and
(25:02):
come to the region withthat economic orientation.
So I think we are seeingdifferent bits and pieces of that.
But at least the Pentagonseems to be driving pretty
clearly from a prioritizationperspective of the prc.
And we have, like you said, some ofthose more skeptical voices may still be
(25:23):
existent, but haven't,haven't really manifested themselves.
But I think it is the interplay in partbetween the national security folks and
the economic policy folks that,that may be determinative here.
>> Elizabeth Economy (25:38):
Okay, so I think that's a perfect segue to your great piece
in foreign affairs calling fora Pacific Defense Act.
I think it threads the needle in waysthat really smart between not actually
committing us to too much more in waysthat might appeal to those restrainers,
but also being forward leaning andactually doing things that bolster our
(26:01):
security andthe security of our allies and partners.
So talk to us about whatthe specific security or
defense pact would actually look like.
>> Ely Ratner (26:14):
Yeah, happy to, happy to do that.
And this is all building upon the earlierpart of our conversation about
the trends of greater strategicalignment between the United States and
some of its core partners visa vis the China challenge, and
then that growing intraAsian cooperation as well.
And thinking about as we weredoing that building of networks,
(26:37):
that building of webs, that lattice work.
How do we think about that interms of a longer term strategy?
And it's my view that the Bidenadministration was a really important
period in terms of generatingmomentum in that regard, but
that the existing panoply of informalorganizations is not going to
(26:58):
be sufficient in the long term fortrue combat credible deterrence
because it is Important it isbringing our allies together.
In terms of the current mechanisms.
We do have some cooperative productprojects, but when you come,
when it comes to no kidding, militaryoperations and exercises, it isn't.
(27:20):
It lacks the formality that you needto actually do no kidding, command and
control, no kidding military planning,operations and exercises, et cetera.
So to truly achieve what we're going toneed in terms of that whole being greater
than the sum of the parts,we need more formal military mechanisms.
(27:41):
It can't just be a sort of a pickupgame that happens every once in a while.
So the proposal that I put forwardin Foreign affairs said, look,
we need to move in this direction.
The military challenge from China issufficient that it's going to require more
focused deterrent power from allies andpartners.
And if you look historically,there have been both conceptual and
(28:04):
real efforts to try to build somekind of collective defense or
multilateral securityorganization in the past.
But it all, it has always stumbled overthe fact that it's a very big region,
you've got a lot of differentkinds of partners with
different kinds of interests, and
a pan regional organization like NATOdoesn't make sense in the Indo Pacific.
(28:25):
So one of the important parts ofthe proposal that I put forward,
it is limited on at least starting withthe core group of Australia, Japan,
Philippines and the United States as thatset of countries that is most aligned
on the challenge and most cooperativelyworking together already and
most prepared to be moving forwardin a collective defense arrangement.
(28:49):
So that's the proposal so far.
I also think, you know, one aspect ofthis that we haven't talked about so
far that we did hear from SecretaryHegseth in Singapore has been a call for
US Allies and partners to domore in these relationships.
That the context has changed,the military is balance has changed, and
(29:09):
it's not going to work anymore to havea region essentially configured such that
the United States is the primarydefender of our allies and partners.
We need to be doing that more together.
They need to be stepping up more.
And that is a, I think,a shared view on both sides of the aisle.
I don't think that's just.
And frankly, among the American people andpublic opinion polling, they like
(29:30):
alliances, but they want the allies to becontributing more in the strategic and
political environment is calling for that.
So as they're stepping up too, as they'reworking more with each other and as we're
all more aligned on China, I think itcreates the context for an actual viable
collective defense arrangement that hasn'tbeen necessarily possible historically.
>> Elizabeth Economy (29:53):
So One of the things that surprised me when I, when as I was
reading through, you know, and then youaddress it a little bit later is I think,
what about South Korea, you know,or how to bring in Vietnam?
I mean, there are clearly other,you know, allies and
partners that, you know,we'd want to have included in some form.
Is it a matter of sequencing where you'restarting with, you know, these four and
(30:17):
then you would imagine bringing othersin as time goes on, or are there sort of
tangential ways that they can be alignedwith, if not formally in the organization?
>> Ely Ratner (30:27):
Well, I would say yes to all of those things.
So first thing to say again isthat this is not the proposal,
is not that this is the end all and be allof security cooperation in the region and
everyone else be damned, that US Allianceswith Korea, cooperation with Korea and
Japan in the Quad Aukus, all of thoseother configurations could still continue.
(30:53):
So this is not again,at the expense of other relationships and
partnerships and whatnot.
But the Korea question, the South Koreaquestion is a really good one.
I think.
You're not alone.
It's the question I get most frequentlyfrom a perspective of the membership
question.
And the answer is, look,it's a decision for Seoul.
(31:13):
It's not a decision for Washington andSouth Korea's even, even prior to
the election they've just had that hasbrought in a more progressive government,
even under conservative,national security minded,
what some would consider hawkish,defense oriented governments.
In Seoul, their focus has beenalmost squarely on North Korea and
they have been hesitant to be engaging inwhat regional security cooperation that
(31:39):
distracts them from that or takesa sharper position at times against China.
So that was something we tried to advanceduring the Biden administration to draw
and work with South Korea inother parts of the region.
Their own national securitystrategy called for
that themselves to be doing more inSoutheast Asia and the Pacific islands.
(31:59):
But those efforts are very nascent.
They have a vibrantdefense industrial base.
They're active on security cooperation,but
from an operational perspectivewith their military, they have yet
to be a really robust partner inthe South China Sea or the East China Sea.
So they would have to reorient theirnational defense and security strategy in
(32:20):
a pretty significant way away fromthat singular focus on North Korea.
And they would also have to bewilling to work with Japan and
cooperate with Japan morethan they have to date.
So my answer would bethe door is absolutely open.
They would make a splendid contribution,but I'm not.
I'm not sure they're readyto walk through that door.
(32:40):
And there are others like New Zealand,who potentially, over time,
might be interested in,in joining an organization like this.
And then I think the way that youdescribed it is right, that for
other countries, whether it's India orVietnam, there could be
opportunities to plug in in variousways as we have informal observers or
(33:01):
other types of participants andregional organizations.
But I think as it stands now,a country like India or
Vietnam is not going to be willingto join a security pact, period,
much less one that is quite focused on,on the China challenge.
But that's okay.
(33:21):
And I think waiting for all ofthe stars to align of every US Ally and
partner in the region is going toleave us waiting for Godot here.
So I think it's important that we,you know,
move forward with a ready constellation.
And frankly, if you look atthe combination of Australia and Japan and
the Philippines, I think you geta lot of the way that you need to go.
(33:44):
Again, if we're talking aboutthe practicalities of deterrence in
the western Pacific, that set of countriesprovides a very strong foundation.
>> Elizabeth Economy (33:54):
Yeah, no, I thought it was an exciting idea.
Another thing that struck me,it reminded me a little bit of that moment
in the Biden administration wherethere seemed to be a push for
closer coordination between ourAsian allies and partners and NATO.
And, and then it seemed as thoughit didn't get quite the formal
(34:15):
construct that maybe we were hoping for.
But I guess I'm asking,do you see the potential then for
involvement from European allies andpartners in this construct, as you say,
not, not immediately, not initially,but would you see that as a,
as a positive, or would it be somethingthat you think would trigger China in
(34:36):
a way that would be moredangerous than not?
How do you think about that, you know,sort of bridge from, from the Indo Pacific
to Europe and the kind of coordination andcooperation that might be useful?
>> Ely Ratner (34:51):
Yeah, so those are Two really important questions.
And let me answer specifically as itrelates to the pac, but I want to broaden
that out a little bit because I thinkit's an important question strategically.
I agree with the Trump administration'sgeneral focus vis a vis Europe.
To say Europe you got to,
(35:12):
you should be focused primarily onEurope in terms of a defense partner
that is not at the exclusion ofcooperation in the Indo Pacific.
But I think the it is important for
the Europeans to be playing a much moresignificant role on the continent.
And right now, conceiving of Europeanpowers playing a really significant
(35:34):
operational role in the Indo Pacificin a sort of a planning perspective,
I think is probably a bridge too far.
So I would say I think that'simportant to look at down the road.
It's not something that I would reach forright this minute more broadly to
sort of caveat further what Ijust said about Europe's role.
(35:55):
I do think the we have seen reportingthat the Trump administration has been
really skeptical of the value of Europeat all participating in the Indo Pacific.
And I think they just need tobe more flexible in that regard.
And I think we're seeingsome of that already.
And in fact, Secretary Hegseth was askedabout this out in Singapore during
the Shangri La dialogue, and he gavea much more nuanced answer about, well,
(36:19):
there probably are some opportunitieswhere Europe could make important
contributions that was lessideologically rigid than some of
the earlier statements that we had heard.
So I think that's really good becauseagain, I don't think that Europe's
going to have in the short term a reallybig war fighting role in the Indo Pacific.
But absolutely they have a role to playin strengthening Taiwan's defense and
(36:43):
resilience.
So there are unique capabilities thatthey can be providing to Taiwan to
strengthen deterrenceacross the Taiwan Strait.
They can also be engaging in operationalactivity like Taiwan Strait transits,
freedom of navigation operations.
>> Elizabeth Economy (36:58):
Why wouldn't we want them doing that, right?
I mean, is the press->> Ely Ratner: Exactly.
No, I mean, I mean,the argument is some folks say that's
drawing away from the work theyneed to be doing in Europe.
But I think we can, I think we can do bothif it's, if it's sufficiently measured.
Because I think the issue here is a littlebit from Europe goes a really long way in
(37:18):
the Indo Pacific.
And then there are areas like the PacificIslands, the French are a resident power
there, that, that Europe canplay an important role as well,
not to mention sort of inthe exercise space as well,
where we've seen European powersoperating with the United States and
others in a collective fashionthat has deterrence power.
(37:40):
So again, I think there are meaningful,properly scaled contributions
that Europe can andshould be making to the Indo Pacific.
And also it's not Washington's role or
ability to tell Europe what they can andcan't do.
So the other thing that happened out inShangri La is we had President Macron
there giving the keynote that hadelements of strategic autonomy and,
(38:03):
and Europe as an alternative powerto the United States and Asia.
And that is not in America's interestto have Europe be a straight up
competitor in Asia.
And in many ways we want to becooperating with Europe as it relates to
the China challenge.
So it's not if they're goingto be doing it anyway,
we ought to be coordinating andcooperating as they do it.
(38:26):
Yeah, 100%.
So let me ask you one last questionhere and have you previewed or
did you preview this idea with any ofyour allies and partners in the region?
Like, had the Australians orthe Japanese or
the Filipinos actually heardthis idea from you before?
And if so, what did they say?
Or maybe you've, you've heard fromthem since the article was published.
(38:48):
So I'm just curious,what is the regional reaction?
>> Ely Ratner (38:54):
It's been interesting.
You know, a lot of it is veryquietly behind closed doors.
I can't say this in public, but you'reright, absolutely, we have to do this.
Others are saying, you know, thank you foropening up this debate, which frankly,
was the purpose of the article.
The article was not to hand overa blueprint, go ahead and do this.
(39:15):
It was to generate a discussionabout an idea that has been
batted around for a long time.
And this was an argument forwhy the time may have come and
we ought to have a seriousdiscussion about this.
So I've heard from a lot of quartersin the U.S. government, in the U.S.
military, among our allies andpartners that are very encouraging.
(39:40):
At the same time,political leaders in Canberra and
elsewhere are dealing with some ofthose economic and political tensions.
And it's hard for them to lean forwardright now and say, you know, now's
the time that we need to do somethingreally ambitious with the United States.
So aligning the politics to actuallydo something like this will
(40:02):
take a lot of leadership andthe right sort of political moment.
But at the same time,one of the things that is embedded in
the article is the point thata lot of the foundation for
something like this,the pieces are already being built.
And so this is to say, let's accelerate,let's keep going, let's be focused.
(40:27):
And as we build our cooperativeelements out in the Indo Pacific,
whether it's new command andcontrol efforts in Japan or
in the Philippines, ornew intelligence sharing mechanisms.
Or maritime domain awareness operations,that we think about how to ensure that we
are either including or can includethis constellation of partners.
(40:48):
And so the foundation, the defenseestablishments, can continue moving
forward on this without necessarilypolitical leaders putting up a,
a big banner.
And frankly, also, the amount of workthat needs to be done between now and
the actual rollout of an initiativelike this means that, in practice.
(41:08):
It could be something thathappens subsequent to
Donald Trump's second term asit relates to the calendar.
So maybe that would open up politicalimagination for people as well.
But I recognize the challengingpolitical environment.
That's something that people always say,
how could you be proposingsomething like this at a time where
(41:29):
the Trump administration is sohostile to our alliances?
And the response to that in part is,look at what's actually happening
in the Indo-Pacific, which is a storyof continuity and moving forward.
And also, yeah, we got to figure out howwe're gonna work on to align the economic
piece with the security piece.
So recognize the challenges.
(41:51):
But I think the need for it is so great.
And the sort of megatrends thatare bigger than the Trump administration
are driving us toward this anyway.
>> Elizabeth Economy (41:59):
Yeah and I mean, I think again,
one of the really smart things in thearticle is that it doesn't call out for
a huge new investment ofUS Military resources and funding.
That's not the centerpieceof your argument, right?
What it really is about is coordination,working together, aligning, command and
control, doing these kinds of things.
(42:21):
And so to the, you're not sayingwe need to be spending more,
as the centerpiece of thisnew Pacific defense pact.
And I think that's got to be an appealingelement for the Trump administration.
But as you say.
>> Ely Ratner (42:34):
Not only that.
Let me, let me just build on that for twoseconds because it's worth saying one more
thing about this,which is from the allies perspective,
they already have a treatywith the United States.
They already have a defense treatywith Donald Trump's United States.
And so that already existswhat we're talking about here.
The real novel innovation here isactually the intra Asian connections and
(42:56):
formalizing mutual obligationbetween the partners.
And in many ways that's somethingthat should be an attract,
that should be even more attractive inan environment where there are questions
about where the United States mightcome down on some of these issues.
So the, the big leap isbetween the Asian partners.
And exactly as you're right, exactly asyou're describing from the US perspective,
(43:20):
there are no new obligations or spending.
>> Elizabeth Economy (43:22):
Yeah, okay, so I always end with a couple of quick
questions just to get your,your thoughts and your input so
that our listeners can take awaysome additional piece of advice.
So when you think about the Chinaspace and what article or
book would you recommend to our listeners?
What should they readto get maybe more up to
(43:44):
speed on the kinds of issuesthat you're talking about?
>> Ely Ratner (43:49):
Well, maybe I'll give you a book that was instructive to me as
I've been coming up through the field andit's not one about sort of the guns and
bombs of the PLA.
But I really enjoyed Evan Osnos'sbook Age of Ambition,
which is now maybe 10 plus years old,if not quite a bit older than that,
(44:09):
which was I think, just really interestingto hear about the people in China.
And how they're experiencing all thedifferent forces that are driving through
that country.
Having lived there myself andtraveled extensively around the country.
Even though the writing that I do and thework that I do is often at the national
(44:29):
level and the geopolitical level andabout big structural forces.
Understanding what life in reality lookslike on the ground in that country
at an individual level, I think,is really important and super interesting.
So that is something thathas always stuck with me and
I always enjoy those kinds of books.
>> Elizabeth Economy (44:52):
Yeah, it was a great book and
was of course a nationalBook Award winning.
>> Ely Ratner (44:55):
Right, so it's not just me, I guess.
Yeah, so andhe's sort of a good writer too, that guy.
I don't know if anyone heard of him.
>> Elizabeth Economy (45:01):
And so that you and millions of other people would.
>> Ely Ratner (45:03):
Yes, so maybe all your viewers have already read it, but if not,
go to your local library.
And then the other, I would just saythe other thing that I enjoy reading as
somebody who is not deeplysteeped in economics,
is all the work coming out ofthe Rhodium Group and Dan Rosen.
I think they're doing some of the mostinteresting on the ground economic
(45:24):
analysis.
So much of what we read about the Chineseeconomy is coming from officialdom, and
I think they have a great job,
do a great job of sort of cutting throughthat with a different perspective.
So I consume all of theirwork every chance I get.
>> Elizabeth Economy (45:38):
Yeah, 100% and actually,
you had Dan on the podcastearlier this year.
Okay, if there's an issue that youthink that we need to know more
about when it comes to China andwe don't, what would that be?
>> Ely Ratner (45:54):
Well, I would say one issue that I have been increasingly
interested in talking to allies andpartners has been the role of
Chinese influence in democraciesaround the Indo Pacific.
It is interesting to me, having beenthe role that I was in before and
continuing some of those conversationswith allies and partners.
(46:17):
It's really fascinating the degreeto which, whether it's Australia,
Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia,India, all of these leaders.
They're worried aboutthe national security issues and
the external defense issues.
But they're also really worried aboutwhat's happening in their own politics in
(46:37):
terms of the ways in which parts ofthe Chinese system are affecting and
manipulating their media environment,their political environment.
And they're all going through iton a very individual basis, but
it's a pattern that's replicatedthroughout the region.
So I know that there are folkswho have worked on this issue and
studied this issue.
But from a policy and strategyperspective, it feels to me like one that
(46:59):
merits a little bit more attention becauseof the really significant effect that
it's gonna have on not only our allies andpartners, but on US interests as well.
>> Elizabeth Economy (47:08):
Yeah, I agree. I mean, some countries in the region,
like Australia, certainly Australia wasreally the canary in the coal mine,
I think, when it, comes to this issue.
But there are many others thatare probably not have not mounted as
robust a research ordefense effort as they probably need to.
Okay, one last question.
What do you think is the likelihood ofa Nixon Mao sort of transformative moment
(47:34):
in the US China relationship betweenXi Jinping and Donald Trump?
>> Ely Ratner (47:40):
I would score it as relatively low, and
I don't think that'sbecause of Donald Trump.
We may get something that is announced orlooks or
pretends to be some verysignificant historic breakthrough.
But my personal perspectiveon these issues, Liz,
as is that the United States and Chinahave competing visions of the future.
(48:02):
I don't think there is a lot of overlapin our Venn diagrams of our preferred
outcomes for the Indo Pacific.
And I think it's a challenge of competinginterests that will need to be wrestled
out over time.
And I don't think at this point there isa grand strategic bargain to be struck.
So if one were announced or attempted,
I don't think it would sustain forvery long.
(48:24):
And we're just gonna have towork through this period and
with the proposals we'vebeen talking about today.
Try to find a way to thread the needleto maintain peace and stability through
a period that, from my perspective,will be a very contested environment that
in some ways, is separated from thepersonalities of the leaders themselves.
>> Elizabeth Economy (48:45):
Well, Ely I can't thank you enough for taking the time to
speak with me today and for sharing reallyjust a fascinating set of insights and
vision, I think, forthe future of Indo-Pacific security.
I think you are always on the cutting edgewhen it comes to thinking about new ideas
(49:06):
for the United States and what we needto do to advance our regional security.
So really appreciate your ideas andyour time and of course,
your service and look forward tothe next administration when perhaps
you won't just beAssistant Secretary of Defense.
But who knows what role you might playin the next Democratic administration?
(49:28):
So thank you so much for joining us.
>> Ely Ratner (49:32):
Yeah, thanks so much, Liz.
Great discussion.
>> Elizabeth Economy (49:34):
So if you enjoyed this podcast and
want to hear more reasoned discourse anddebate on China, I encourage you to
subscribe to China Considered viaThe Hoover Institution YouTube channel or
podcast platform of your choice.
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