March 13, 2025 • 38 mins
Dr. Elizabeth Economy sits down with NED’s Christopher Walker to discuss the importance of democratic systems, how they benefit a given country’s citizens, and the challenges democracy faces in a new era. Walker argues that political rights often lead to economic prosperity and while China is one of the few countries where that does not apply, he states that China’s fastest period of economic growth came during a period of liberalization. Walker and Econony discuss the threat China poses in seeking to spread its repressive political system abroad, touching on the PRC censorship abroad, and the country’s desire to reshape international institutions and shape the information and idea realm globally. The two conclude by touching on the importance of continuing to support free and prosperous democracies despite the many challenges being faced.
Recorded on February 20, 2025.
ABOUT THE SPEAKERS
Christopher Walker is Vice President for Studies and Analysis at the National Endowment for Democracy, an independent, nonprofit, grant-making foundation supporting freedom around the world. Walker oversees the multidimensional department that is responsible for NED’s analytical and thought leadership efforts, which pursues its goals through several interrelated initiatives: the leading edge work of the International Forum for Democratic Studies, which uses an interdisciplinary approach to map and explore critical themes relating to democratic development, including in the modern information and emerging technology spheres; the Journal of Democracy, the world’s leading publication on the theory and practice of democracy; the Reagan-Fascell fellowship program for international democracy activists, media professionals, and scholars; and the Center for International Media Assistance that is dedicated to improving efforts to promote independent media in emerging democracies and developing economies around the world.
Prior to joining the NED, Walker was Vice President for Strategy and Analysis at Freedom House. Walker has testified before legislative committees in the U.S. and abroad, appears frequently in the media, and frequently conducts briefings on critical issues relating to democratic development. He has been at the forefront of the thought leadership on modern authoritarian influence on open political systems, including through the exertion of sharp power, a concept he and his colleagues developed.
Elizabeth Economy is the Hargrove Senior Fellow and co-director of the Program on the US, China, and the World at the Hoover Institution. From 2021-2023, she took leave from Hoover to serve as the senior advisor for China to the US secretary of commerce. Before joining Hoover, she was the C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and director, Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. She is the author of four books on China, including most recently The World According to China (Polity, 2021), and the co-editor of two volumes. She serves on the boards of the National Endowment for Democracy and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. She is a member of the Aspen Strategy Group and Council on Foreign Relations and serves as a book reviewer for Foreign Affairs.
FOLLOW OUR GUEST ON SOCIAL MEDIA
- China Beige Book on X: Christopher Walker
- Leland Miller on LinkedIn: Christopher Walker
ABOUT THE SERIES
China Considered with Elizabeth Economy is a Hoover Institution podcast series that features in-depth conversations with leading political figures, scholars, and activists from around the world. The series explores the ideas, events, and forces shaping China’s future and its global relationships, offering high-level expertise, clear-eyed analysis, and valuable insights to demystify China’s evolving dynamics
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
>> Elizabeth Economy (00:06):
Welcome to China Considered, a podcast that brings fresh
insights and informed discussion to one ofthe most consequential issues of our time,
how China is changing andchanging the world.
I'm Liz Economy, Hargrove, senior fellowand co-director of the US, China and
the World Program at the HooverInstitution at Stanford University.
Today I'm delighted towelcome Chris Walker.
He's the Vice President for Studies and
(00:27):
Analysis at the National Endowment forDemocracy.
He's also well known forhaving coined the term China sharp power.
He's written extensively onauthoritarianism and democracy, and
his most recent book is DefendingDemocracy in an Age of Sharp Power,
which he co edited with Will Dobson andTarek Massoud.
Welcome, Chris.
>> Christopher Walker (00:45):
Thanks so much, Liz.
It's great to be with you.
>> Elizabeth Economy (00:47):
So let me start off with, I think,
just the foundational question,
which is why do we care whether anotherstate is authoritarian or democratic?
How does it actually affect US Economicinterests or national security?
>> Christopher Walker (01:02):
So thanks very much for that fundamental question.
There are three things I would cite.
The first is that democraciestend to be more secure.
As a practical matter, the evidence tellsus they don't fight wars with each other.
They also have the mechanismsinternally to channel
(01:22):
discontent through institutionsin ways that temper wild
swings that you might findin non democratic settings.
Democracies also tend to be safer.
We can think of Amarche Sen's observationthat there aren't famines in democracies.
And then critically,democracies tend to be more prosperous and
(01:46):
free and open societies with rule of law,
the evidence tells us,deliver more prosperity.
And I think it's fair to say juston the other side of the ledger,
repressive regimes tend to perform morepoorly on human development indicators.
And all of these things weredown to the benefit of,
(02:10):
of democracies in the United States interms of who their partners are and
how we can advance our own prosperity.
>> Elizabeth Economy (02:19):
So you're sort of arguing that US Business benefits from
this, our security benefits from this.
But what about China?
I mean, it's a, it's a countrythat you've written a lot about.
And one could argue that China has been,you know, stable for the past, you know,
several decades, that it certainly hashad an incredible economic rise and,
(02:40):
you know, at least 600 million peoplemight be considered prosperous out
of 1.2 billion people.
Does China defy your,your case, your argument?
>> Christopher Walker (02:53):
Well, China, of course, is in a way a sui generis case.
There are very few examples ofsocieties that have operated
without political rights,that have generated economic growth.
Of course, some Observers have asked howmuch more prosperous China might have
(03:16):
been had the system been open with therule of law rather than the path it took.
It's a counterfactual.
We won't know.
I think it's also fair to saythat the price of that economic
growth has also been enormousin terms of the brutality
leveled against minorities in the country,
(03:39):
not least the Uyghur community,the sacrificing of rights that so
many have had to makea part of the bargain.
And I think we're also seeing now somereal question marks about whether this
bargain of sacrificing or ceding politicalrights and freedom of expression and
(04:01):
the like for economic growth isstarting to hit some real bumps.
The levers at the disposal of theleadership to pivot are pretty limited,
and we're seeing, among other things,deep problems in the financial sector,
the real estate sector, extraordinarilyhigh levels of youth unemployment,
(04:24):
by some measures upwards of 30%.
And I think all of thisspeaks to what are, in a way,
the limitations of systems that don'tpermit meaningful competition and
freedom of expression and other basicvalues that you would find in democracies.
>> Elizabeth Economy (04:42):
Yeah, I mean that's a fair point.
I suppose a lot of people make the casethat, you know, China's fastest, you know,
period of fastest economic growthcertainly happened when it was more open,
you know,during the period of Deng Xiaoping and
Jiang Zemin up through Hu Jintao.
And, you know, we've seen a partlynatural slowdown of growth,
(05:02):
but also, I think, to your point,probably much of many of
the repressive measures thatXi Jinping has taken have, in fact,
constrained some importantsectors of the Chinese economy.
And so that's, I think,a reasonable argument to make.
But I guess time will only tell whether.
(05:23):
Whether the Chinese leadership is ableto pivot and, you know, revitalize
the Chinese economy for yet anotherround of impressive economic growth.
Go ahead.Sorry.
>> Christopher Walker (05:35):
I was going to say, in a sense,
one of the things to keep an eye on,not only in China, but
other systems where the leadershiphas offered this bargain,
such as it is,is to the extent the economy slows and
performance legitimacy is challenged,you invariably see more repression.
(05:55):
And this is happening acrossa host of authoritarian regimes.
And then related to this, and
coming back to your original questionabout the advantages of democracies,
I think you can also seepeople voting with their feet.
And in so many of these cases,if we step back away from China for
(06:15):
a moment andlook at settings like Venezuela or Russia,
people are not beatinga path to these countries?
On the contrary.
And the numbers suggestin China's case as well,
that the outflow of people looking foropportunity in other parts of the world,
often in democracies,is outstripping anyone,
(06:36):
the numbers of people lookingto find their way to the prc.
>> Elizabeth Economy (06:41):
Yeah, I think that is a good point.
So let's focus on China a little bit morebecause it's the country that certainly
the first Trump administration andthe Biden administration both identified
as posing sort of the greatest long termstrategic threat to the United States.
(07:01):
Do you agree with that?
What do you see as sorta the elementsof China's policy that are most
challenging for the United States?
What do you see as China's objectivesreally with regard to the US Policy?
>> Christopher Walker (07:15):
So I think the objective at a basic level is China
seeking to displace the US asthe world's most influential country.
And part of this, as China hasmethodically asserted itself globally,
is to pull countries into its orbit andthrough that process gain privileged
(07:36):
access to markets, ports, naturalresources and the like from governments
that then are technologically andeconomically dependent on Beijing.
We've done a good deal of work onthe technological aspirations of
the Chinese leadership andhow this plays out across the globe.
And of course,to the extent that ambition is successful.
(08:00):
This will play tothe disadvantage of the US And
I think at least over the last decade orso, the United States
has taken a more clear eyedlook at the China challenge.
But the scope and comprehensiveness,the domains in which China is operating,
(08:21):
I think calls foreven greater attention the US and
its partners,to make sure that we don't slip behind.
>> Elizabeth Economy (08:31):
When you talk about the technological aspect, you're talking
about the digital Silk Road, China'sefforts to sort of deploy everything
from subsea cables all the way tosatellite systems throughout emerging and
middle income economies,>> Christopher Walker: for sure.
I think part of what we've seen,just to allude to a couple
(08:52):
of things we've done in the recent past,is a very coherent playbook for
spreading technology of Chineseorigin around the world.
And that includes providing incentives,
having know how accompany the hardwarethat China makes available,
(09:15):
particularly soin the developing world in Africa, and
a lot of state subsidies that undergirdthat to provide an advantage.
Now, what also accompaniesthis technology, and
this is something for the US andother free societies to keep in mind,
(09:35):
is capabilities andaffordances for censorship and
surveillance that's typicallybaked into these systems.
And on that count, there often isan inadequate understanding of exactly
what's coming along with these techpackages in the settings they're arriving.
(09:56):
And this cries out forgreater information and
discussion of both the way in whichdeals around tech are consummated,
but at the same timeunderstanding the tech itself.
Just last week we soundedthe alarm with a report titled
Data Centric Authoritarianismthat focused on the next
(10:19):
generation of technologiesthat China's prioritizing that
could really give the PRC a legup in areas including, but
not limited to AI surveillance tech,different sorts of applications,
neuro and immersive technologies,quantum tech and digital currencies.
(10:40):
And Valentin Weber, who authored thisreport for us, really stressed the need
for the free world to pay more attentionto China's ambitions in this regard.
Okay, I want to come back to, you know, what you think the U.S.
and its, you know, partners andits allies should be doing.
But I do want to ask then, you know,the Trump administration started with,
(11:05):
you know, the first Trump administration,you know, had its clean network effort.
The Biden administration,I think was called Trusted Network.
So there has been some effort on the U.S.side to compete, I think with Huawei,
with ZTE, with other Chineseproviders of digital infrastructure.
(11:26):
Have you seen any that the US hasmade any headway in this competition?
>> Christopher Walker (11:33):
So I think both the US and
Europe alike have madeefforts in this sphere.
There's Still a lot more to do, I think,
both in terms of the scopeof the challenge,
the efforts to have clean networksessentially to afford opportunities for
use of technology thatdoesn't have the affordances.
(11:56):
And in a sense, the baggage thatcomes along with technology of
Chinese origin is going toshape the future of freedom and
democratic governance around the world.
So I think, if anything,we need to step up those efforts in
ways that are commensuratewith the challenge.
>> Elizabeth Economy (12:17):
Okay, and I wanna come and have you talk a little bit about
what the National Endowment for Democracyis doing in this space and in others.
But first, let me just pop ina question about sharp power,
because I think you werethe first to use this.
It's become part of every China Watcher,China App analyst,
(12:38):
government official, of the lexicon thatwe use when we talk about sort of the,
the range of Chinese powerfrom soft to sharp to hard.
What is actually sharp power andhow does China exercise it and
what should the US Be doing to counter it?
>> Christopher Walker (12:59):
So fundamentally, the effects of sharp power limit free
expression, curb pluralism, anddistort the political environment.
And just to talk about how we gotto that point and made the case for
something different than either soft orhard power,
this really came about from thingswe were seeing out in the field.
(13:23):
Many of the groups we work with and
support were referencing engagementfirst and foremost from China,
but it's also true with Russia,which has pretty sweeping
investments in non kinetic formsof influence around the world.
But China certainly was at the topof the pyramid in terms when
(13:46):
coming to the scope anddepth of engagement around the world.
And contrary to this ideathat engagement in media or
education orculture was simply resulting in greater
mutual understanding orhelping to persuade or attract,
(14:06):
we often found that the featuresof this engagement had significant
elements of political censorship,of monopolizing.
The partner organizationsthat were engaging with
PRC actors were their surrogates.
And it,it simply wasn't fitting cleanly or
(14:28):
coherently in any sort ofrubric that was out there.
And it was slowly being brought to scale.
And so the more we thought about it and
the more we looked at whatwe were coming across,
we were finding far too many instancesof where there were efforts to
sideline discussion,intimidate partners, coerce partners.
(14:54):
And it led us to, I feel prettystrongly that it would be useful
to have a different wayof thinking about this,
at a minimum to stimulate moreconcerted discussion on these issues.
And I have to say the Australians werereally at the front of the line on this.
(15:14):
And we had some terrificcontributors to our work,
including the scholar John Fitzgerald,
who contributed to our Defending Democracyin an Age of Sharp Power.
I might just mention one ofthe things he cites in the chapter.
Chapter in the book is going back now,two decades ago
when he was testifying beforethe Australian Senate and
(15:38):
he alluded to the case ofChen Yong Lin in 2005.
And this was a junior PRCdiplomat who had sought
asylum in the PRCs in Sydney at the time,and
through those conversations hadoutlined the extensive network of CCD.
(16:01):
The efforts and agents in Australiathat were monitoring Chinese Australian
activists and religious believersthrough the PRC's Sydney consulate.
And it was among the firstinstances where there
was a public airing ofthe sort of manipulative and
coercive efforts that fallunder the sharp power rubric.
(16:25):
I would argue.
And Fitzgerald made the caseultimately that through the really good
work of investigative journalists andacademics in Australia,
they in essence unearthed what was a,what he called an integrative
network of control that was being operatedby China within Australia, a democracy.
>> Elizabeth Economy (16:49):
But so just to put maybe get a little bit more granular.
So China uses basicallythe strength of its market,
of its economy to do what it buysmeat into media, into local media.
And shapes the narrative.
What kind of pressure would it bring on,you know,
Chinese citizens that it's spying on?
(17:09):
So it's more than just the spying on them.
Right.It's trying to shape their behavior in
some way.
>> Christopher Walker (17:17):
So that's true, I think, maybe just sticking with
the political censorship angle andthe free expression angle.
Another incredible case inthe Australian context,
which squares with other thingswe've seen subsequently.
It was about a decade ago thatthe Australian Broadcasting Company
(17:40):
engaged in what seemed tobe pretty straightforward
partnership with Chinese state media,
essentially to sharecontent in both directions.
But one of the secret componentsof the deal they agreed to
at the time was to suppressthe Mandarin service of the abc.
(18:06):
And that only came out after the fact.
It was a scandal.
It was unearthed byjournalists in Australia.
And I think the notion thatdecision makers at an independent
media institution operatingwithin a democracy would
concede that sort of thingwas also an indication a,
(18:29):
of the ambition of the Chinese sideessentially to limit speech or
the capability of coveringissues that the Chinese
authorities feel should be off limits andto seek to induce
partners in open societiesto take that kind of action.
(18:50):
So that's one part of it, of course.
Similarly pernicious.
Even more pernicious are the examplesin any number of settings.
We've seen this in Canada, Australia,
the US of intimidation ofpeople within free societies.
What is effectivelytransnational repression to
(19:12):
either do the bidding ofthe Chinese party state or.
Or to hold their tongueson certain issues.
And I think this has similarly beena part of the star power pattern.
Absolutely.
Does not fall in a soft power context.
(19:34):
And this is, I think,part of what we're grappling with.
>> Elizabeth Economy (19:37):
Yeah, and
I think it's important to recognizethe US has not been immune.
Has faced its own challenges withthis in a number of industries.
I think in particular,maybe, you know, Hollywood.
The film industry has often comeunder pressure from Chinese partners
to shape the narrative, to make surethat China's not painted as the enemy or
(20:04):
to ensure that a map reflects Chinesesovereignty over the South China Sea or
over Taiwan, or else, you're not gonnaget market access for your failure.
>> Christopher Walker (20:17):
Exactly.
And we have a terrific chapter inthe book by Aynne Kokas of the University
of Virginia who looks atthe challenge in Hollywood.
And I think one of the thingswe have to reckon with at
this point is to the extentkey institutions or
figures within them internalizethe wishes of the party state,
(20:41):
that is to say,in the entertainment industry.
And I think this transcends Hollywood.
I think it's true in other parts of theworld that something that is perceived to
be undesirable or wouldn't be welcomed byBeijing would never even be thought about,
say, by a screenwriter orscriptwriter in the first instance.
(21:05):
And sothen you've achieved what's in essence,
the anaconda andthe chandelier at scale by having
the internalization of the wishesof authoritarian powers.
And I think this is something wesee even in the very difficult
decisions that authors make whentheir books are published and
(21:28):
then translated to reachmarkets within the prc.
I think more often than not these days,for certain issues,
they will accede to the preferencesof the editors in Beijing.
And there, too, just as a theoreticalexercise, over time, if we keep
(21:49):
widening the circle of topics or issuesthat are understood to the off limits
from the perspective of the leadershipin China, where will that lead us?
15 years ago, it might have simply beenTaiwan, Tibet, and Tiananmen Square.
Today, it surely includes,in many instances,
issues relating to the corruptionof the party leadership in China.
(22:14):
In instances in other parts ofthe world where China's engagement
may be running afoul of local norms,those things might not be
covered by local news outlets whoperceive it to be out of bounds.
And I think from a freedom of expressionand censorship point of view,
there's a lot of space fromthe perspective of free societies to
(22:38):
really think about where to drawtheir own bottom line and to refresh.
Defense of freedom of expression.
>> Elizabeth Economy (22:47):
Yep.
So, that, I think,raises an important point about.
I think in a bigger picture, we are inthe midst of a big debate in the US
over to what extent we should supportpeople globally who are fighting for
their own freedom anddemocratic institutions.
(23:08):
How do you think about this issue?
I mean, what do you think is at stake?
And I think you talked a bitabout this right up front in
our discussion about the value forthe United States of
having a majority of the world'scountries be democracies.
(23:28):
But.
But what do you thinkfundamentally is at risk here?
>> Christopher Walker (23:34):
Well,
I think there is what one couldconsider the noble side of the work,
which is to support people who themselvesare struggling for their own freedom.
And this is very much inthe American tradition,
people who are looking to enjoythe rights that we're all blessed with,
(23:56):
living in open and free societies.
Why shouldn't.
They be able to enjoy themselves.
And if they're willing to fight for it,
there's a very strong argument tosupport them in that noble endeavor.
At the same time,there's a very practical argument for
(24:16):
this, which is to say we're ina tough period right now where
certainly the leadership incapitals like Beijing and Moscow.
And Tehran, they're feeling their oats,
they feel like the wind in somerespects is at their back.
And supporting people who believein freedom helps to shine
(24:38):
a light on the activities and
the ambitions of the leadership inthose countries as they do this.
And so if we want to have a worldwhere there's more transparency,
where there's more freedom,there's more opportunity for innovation.
We need more countries that are morefree and enjoying liberty and
(25:02):
are more prosperous, and
we need to support natural allies whothemselves are working towards that end.
And I think the workthat my colleagues and
I have done at the National Endowment forDemocracy at a top order level.
Helps to counter threats from regimeslike those in Iran and Russia,
North Korea, Cuba and China.
(25:24):
This is something we've done foryears and years.
And just talking about the challengeposed by China, as we discussed earlier.
I would contend that the leadership inChina has made pretty considerable headway
in spreading their vision of freedomof expression and censorship globally.
(25:48):
They have a very clearvision domestically.
That's reflected in the way theybrutalize independent media,
don't permit meaningfulalternative voices,
really put the screws to any sortof independent civil society.
In a sense, it's a regime of censorship.
And because China now hasinterests around the world,
(26:13):
they have clearly taken,to the extent they're able.
And to the extent local circumstances inother countries permit that vision for
censorship to other parts of the world.
And so Ned has really beensquarely focused on fighting
the CCP's censorship anddocumenting the party states.
(26:34):
For example, egregious persecutionagainst religious minorities and
Chinese dissidents abroad in the contextof transnational repression.
And this is as important today,I would contend,
as it's been sincethe end of the Cold War.
>> Elizabeth Economy (26:51):
So let me just take you a half a step back because you raised
Russia, Iran, Cuba, obviouslythere's North Korea and Venezuela.
To what extent do you see, andI know you testified last month
actually on what's becomeconsidered an axis of Russia,
(27:13):
Iran, North Korea and China.
So I testified before the US economic andSecurity Review Commission.
What do you see asthe relationship among them?
Are they independent actorswho share a vision and
pursue parallel opportunities andpolicies or
are they in some way working together orare they learning from each other?
(27:36):
How do you think aboutthe relationship among these sort
of leading authoritarian powers?
>> Christopher Walker (27:45):
Thanks for the question.
I testified before the commission,
they were grappling with this questionof whether there's an axis or not.
In a sense, I think the question,it may not be essential to answer that
question definitively becauseI think what we're seeing is.
And this is a trajectoryover quite a few years,
(28:08):
is unquestionably more cooperation.
And I think part of what hasemerged over time is that China's
leadership over the last period,as we've discussed,
has been committed to projecting morepower internationally in its own right.
But less obvious has beenthe extent to which China has used,
(28:30):
we could call it a web of relationshipswith other autocracies to enhance
leverage and where possible,to achieve multiplier effects.
And then I would argue more generallyto guide the world in a direction
that's more friendly to the CCP'sinterests and preferences.
(28:50):
And as Beijing over this period, say overthe last 5 to 10 years, has deepened
its strategic coordination with countriesthat include Russia, Iran, North Korea.
China's also played a pretty keyrole in helping make the whole of
these groupings of countriesstronger than any single part.
(29:12):
One example of this,which is it's such a ghastly case, but
it's Russia's unprovoked attack onUkraine where I think if you and
I had had this chat several years ago andI had said.
I can imagine a time where Russia waswaging full scale war on Ukraine,
(29:32):
Belarus was offering itself asthe leadership in that country,
as a staging area for Russia.
Iran would be producing thousands andthousands of kamikaze drones.
That North Korea would havethousands of soldiers on
European soil fighting onRussia's behalf against Ukraine,
(29:54):
and that China would,would be providing a range of support.
Diplomatic material as we understand it,and
very importantly in the information andmedia domain.
Where today China's globalpropaganda apparatus systematically
helps Russian arguments reverberateabout the nature of the war,
(30:19):
who started the war,who's responsible for it.
And that's no small thing giventhe billions of dollars that the PRC
invests annually in theiroutward facing communication.
So that's just one example, but
I think it's fair to say byjust about any measure today.
There's more of a stitching togetherof these authoritarian powers in
(30:43):
ways that gives them more lift togetherrather than in any individual case.
>> Elizabeth Economy (30:50):
What do you think it would take at this point for
the United States and together,really, with its allies and partners.
To be able to compete effectively with,I think,
what you've quite accurately demonstratedto be an extremely significant challenge,
(31:11):
even threat to democracy andfreedom on the global stage.
>> Christopher Walker (31:16):
And I really appreciate the question, Liz.
I think the competition we're in,going back, say,
a generation ago,has been grossly underestimated.
And now we find ourselvesin what is an intense
competition with formidable rivals.
(31:36):
And as we've discussed duringthe course of our conversation,
the Chinese party state is investingacross a wide range of domains.
Of course, they're investingin the military sphere, and
the trajectory of thatinvestment is rising.
And I think the US andother democracies properly need to
think about the sort of investmentsin that sphere that are.
(31:59):
Suitable forthe environment we find ourselves in.
That's beyond my ken.
What we focused on isthe non military sphere.
And there too,I think we really underestimated the level
of commitment and purpose that China.
And other authoritarianstates had in this sphere in
(32:21):
the information technology,media, cultural education and
other such domains wherethey've invested very heavily.
It is by many measures in the many,many billions of dollars that
China alone is investing inthe outward facing information and
(32:42):
communications sphere,just to give that example.
And I think we have to recognize thatif we're going to be successful,
the United States andother free societies in this competition.
We also have to havea level of preparation and
investment that'scommensurate to the task so
that we can compete at a higherlevel in the battle of ideas.
(33:05):
The Chinese leadership is makingan argument, they're essentially
making an argument that it isn'tnecessary to have liberty and
freedom as an ingredient that'sessential to prosperity.
I think their own experience nowis starting to offer some free,
pretty rough internalcontradictions about that.
(33:26):
But I don't think we should underestimatethe sort of traction that those arguments
are getting in differentparts of the world.
And if we're not in the fight competing,it's going to be very hard for
other countries to do so themselves.
And so we have a huge opportunityboth to help share information and
(33:47):
educate the world about the ambitionsof the Chinese party state,
to assert its own vision andits forms of control.
And on the one hand, andat the same time to offer an affirmative
alternative that privileges freedom andprosperity.
And I think that's wherethe real opportunities are going
(34:09):
to come in the coming period.
>> Elizabeth Economy (34:13):
So let me just ask one last thing.
And I think, have painteda picture that suggests that we've
been a little bit slow off the mark,that we haven't really
appreciated I think the enormity ofthe challenge that is before us.
Is there anything elsethat you think an issue or
(34:35):
a topic with regard toChina in particular,
tIhat where you think we're missingthe reality of the story somehow.
Some issue about China that wedon't really know enough about,
we need to learn more.
>> Christopher Walker (34:50):
I think the issue of how China seeks to shape
the information andideas realm is crucial because in
a sense what we've seen,it's often done subtly, but
it's become a feature ofthe external engagement.
All authoritarian regimes,China in this case in particular,
(35:14):
is trying to delegitimize the ideas and
even the political systems of the US andits allies.
And by doing that, seeking to corrodeinternational confidence in free systems.
And I think unless we havethe sorts of arguments
that can respond to what is now a systemic
(35:39):
strategy that Beijinghas around the world.
It's going to be very hard for
all of us to have a clear eyedview of what we're up against.
And so among the wide rangeof issues that we're facing,
I think the challenge inthe idea sphere that's on offer.
And being put out by the leadership inBeijing really deserves more granular and
(36:06):
focused andsystemic attention from all of us.
>> Elizabeth Economy (36:12):
Well, Chris, I want to thank you really on several fronts.
First, just for reminding us whydemocracy and freedom matter so
much and matter not only just forus here in the United States.
But it matters to us that other countriesare able to share the opportunities and
(36:34):
benefits that derive from free andopen societies.
And thank you too foryour sobering analysis of
the challenge that we face inprotecting those values and
rights that we have had for solong, and for your call to arms.
(36:55):
And for your articulation ofwhat we need to do now to
push back againstauthoritarian countries that
seek to undermine freedom and democracy.
And replicate their own societies andtheir own values and interests globally.
So thanks for coming on the podcast andfor delivering such a powerful message.
>> Christopher Walker (37:18):
Thank you so much for this opportunity.
I'm sorry if it was maybe too sobering,but in a sense,
if we're not able to frame andsee a challenge clearly,
it's really hard to devise a responsethat can meet that challenge.
So I really appreciate the opportunityto speak with you today.
Liz,>> Elizabeth Economy: thanks again.
(37:41):
If you enjoyed this podcast andwant to hear more reason, discourse and
debate on China.
I encourage you to subscribeto China Considered via
The Hoover Institution YouTube channel orpodcast platform of your choice.
In our next episode,I'll be speaking with Matt Turpin,
visiting Fellow atthe Hoover Institution and
former Senior National Security Officialin the first Trump Admin.
>> Presenter (38:01):
This podcast is a production of the Hoover Institution,
where we generate andpromote ideas advancing freedom.
For more information about our work,to hear more of our podcasts or
view our video content,please visit hoover.org.
[MUSIC]
Welcome to China Considered, a podcast that brings fresh
insights and informed discussion to one ofthe most consequential issues of our time,
how China is changing andchanging the world.
I'm Liz Economy, Hargrove, senior fellowand co-director of the US, China and
the World Program at the HooverInstitution at Stanford University.
Today I'm delighted towelcome Chris Walker.
He's the Vice President for Studies and
(00:27):
Analysis at the National Endowment forDemocracy.
He's also well known forhaving coined the term China sharp power.
He's written extensively onauthoritarianism and democracy, and
his most recent book is DefendingDemocracy in an Age of Sharp Power,
which he co edited with Will Dobson andTarek Massoud.
Welcome, Chris.
>> Christopher Walker (00:45):
Thanks so much, Liz.
It's great to be with you.
>> Elizabeth Economy (00:47):
So let me start off with, I think,
just the foundational question,
which is why do we care whether anotherstate is authoritarian or democratic?
How does it actually affect US Economicinterests or national security?
>> Christopher Walker (01:02):
So thanks very much for that fundamental question.
There are three things I would cite.
The first is that democraciestend to be more secure.
As a practical matter, the evidence tellsus they don't fight wars with each other.
They also have the mechanismsinternally to channel
(01:22):
discontent through institutionsin ways that temper wild
swings that you might findin non democratic settings.
Democracies also tend to be safer.
We can think of Amarche Sen's observationthat there aren't famines in democracies.
And then critically,democracies tend to be more prosperous and
(01:46):
free and open societies with rule of law,
the evidence tells us,deliver more prosperity.
And I think it's fair to say juston the other side of the ledger,
repressive regimes tend to perform morepoorly on human development indicators.
And all of these things weredown to the benefit of,
(02:10):
of democracies in the United States interms of who their partners are and
how we can advance our own prosperity.
>> Elizabeth Economy (02:19):
So you're sort of arguing that US Business benefits from
this, our security benefits from this.
But what about China?
I mean, it's a, it's a countrythat you've written a lot about.
And one could argue that China has been,you know, stable for the past, you know,
several decades, that it certainly hashad an incredible economic rise and,
(02:40):
you know, at least 600 million peoplemight be considered prosperous out
of 1.2 billion people.
Does China defy your,your case, your argument?
>> Christopher Walker (02:53):
Well, China, of course, is in a way a sui generis case.
There are very few examples ofsocieties that have operated
without political rights,that have generated economic growth.
Of course, some Observers have asked howmuch more prosperous China might have
(03:16):
been had the system been open with therule of law rather than the path it took.
It's a counterfactual.
We won't know.
I think it's also fair to saythat the price of that economic
growth has also been enormousin terms of the brutality
leveled against minorities in the country,
(03:39):
not least the Uyghur community,the sacrificing of rights that so
many have had to makea part of the bargain.
And I think we're also seeing now somereal question marks about whether this
bargain of sacrificing or ceding politicalrights and freedom of expression and
(04:01):
the like for economic growth isstarting to hit some real bumps.
The levers at the disposal of theleadership to pivot are pretty limited,
and we're seeing, among other things,deep problems in the financial sector,
the real estate sector, extraordinarilyhigh levels of youth unemployment,
(04:24):
by some measures upwards of 30%.
And I think all of thisspeaks to what are, in a way,
the limitations of systems that don'tpermit meaningful competition and
freedom of expression and other basicvalues that you would find in democracies.
>> Elizabeth Economy (04:42):
Yeah, I mean that's a fair point.
I suppose a lot of people make the casethat, you know, China's fastest, you know,
period of fastest economic growthcertainly happened when it was more open,
you know,during the period of Deng Xiaoping and
Jiang Zemin up through Hu Jintao.
And, you know, we've seen a partlynatural slowdown of growth,
(05:02):
but also, I think, to your point,probably much of many of
the repressive measures thatXi Jinping has taken have, in fact,
constrained some importantsectors of the Chinese economy.
And so that's, I think,a reasonable argument to make.
But I guess time will only tell whether.
(05:23):
Whether the Chinese leadership is ableto pivot and, you know, revitalize
the Chinese economy for yet anotherround of impressive economic growth.
Go ahead.Sorry.
>> Christopher Walker (05:35):
I was going to say, in a sense,
one of the things to keep an eye on,not only in China, but
other systems where the leadershiphas offered this bargain,
such as it is,is to the extent the economy slows and
performance legitimacy is challenged,you invariably see more repression.
(05:55):
And this is happening acrossa host of authoritarian regimes.
And then related to this, and
coming back to your original questionabout the advantages of democracies,
I think you can also seepeople voting with their feet.
And in so many of these cases,if we step back away from China for
(06:15):
a moment andlook at settings like Venezuela or Russia,
people are not beatinga path to these countries?
On the contrary.
And the numbers suggestin China's case as well,
that the outflow of people looking foropportunity in other parts of the world,
often in democracies,is outstripping anyone,
(06:36):
the numbers of people lookingto find their way to the prc.
>> Elizabeth Economy (06:41):
Yeah, I think that is a good point.
So let's focus on China a little bit morebecause it's the country that certainly
the first Trump administration andthe Biden administration both identified
as posing sort of the greatest long termstrategic threat to the United States.
(07:01):
Do you agree with that?
What do you see as sorta the elementsof China's policy that are most
challenging for the United States?
What do you see as China's objectivesreally with regard to the US Policy?
>> Christopher Walker (07:15):
So I think the objective at a basic level is China
seeking to displace the US asthe world's most influential country.
And part of this, as China hasmethodically asserted itself globally,
is to pull countries into its orbit andthrough that process gain privileged
(07:36):
access to markets, ports, naturalresources and the like from governments
that then are technologically andeconomically dependent on Beijing.
We've done a good deal of work onthe technological aspirations of
the Chinese leadership andhow this plays out across the globe.
And of course,to the extent that ambition is successful.
(08:00):
This will play tothe disadvantage of the US And
I think at least over the last decade orso, the United States
has taken a more clear eyedlook at the China challenge.
But the scope and comprehensiveness,the domains in which China is operating,
(08:21):
I think calls foreven greater attention the US and
its partners,to make sure that we don't slip behind.
>> Elizabeth Economy (08:31):
When you talk about the technological aspect, you're talking
about the digital Silk Road, China'sefforts to sort of deploy everything
from subsea cables all the way tosatellite systems throughout emerging and
middle income economies,>> Christopher Walker: for sure.
I think part of what we've seen,just to allude to a couple
(08:52):
of things we've done in the recent past,is a very coherent playbook for
spreading technology of Chineseorigin around the world.
And that includes providing incentives,
having know how accompany the hardwarethat China makes available,
(09:15):
particularly soin the developing world in Africa, and
a lot of state subsidies that undergirdthat to provide an advantage.
Now, what also accompaniesthis technology, and
this is something for the US andother free societies to keep in mind,
(09:35):
is capabilities andaffordances for censorship and
surveillance that's typicallybaked into these systems.
And on that count, there often isan inadequate understanding of exactly
what's coming along with these techpackages in the settings they're arriving.
(09:56):
And this cries out forgreater information and
discussion of both the way in whichdeals around tech are consummated,
but at the same timeunderstanding the tech itself.
Just last week we soundedthe alarm with a report titled
Data Centric Authoritarianismthat focused on the next
(10:19):
generation of technologiesthat China's prioritizing that
could really give the PRC a legup in areas including, but
not limited to AI surveillance tech,different sorts of applications,
neuro and immersive technologies,quantum tech and digital currencies.
(10:40):
And Valentin Weber, who authored thisreport for us, really stressed the need
for the free world to pay more attentionto China's ambitions in this regard.
Okay, I want to come back to, you know, what you think the U.S.
and its, you know, partners andits allies should be doing.
But I do want to ask then, you know,the Trump administration started with,
(11:05):
you know, the first Trump administration,you know, had its clean network effort.
The Biden administration,I think was called Trusted Network.
So there has been some effort on the U.S.side to compete, I think with Huawei,
with ZTE, with other Chineseproviders of digital infrastructure.
(11:26):
Have you seen any that the US hasmade any headway in this competition?
>> Christopher Walker (11:33):
So I think both the US and
Europe alike have madeefforts in this sphere.
There's Still a lot more to do, I think,
both in terms of the scopeof the challenge,
the efforts to have clean networksessentially to afford opportunities for
use of technology thatdoesn't have the affordances.
(11:56):
And in a sense, the baggage thatcomes along with technology of
Chinese origin is going toshape the future of freedom and
democratic governance around the world.
So I think, if anything,we need to step up those efforts in
ways that are commensuratewith the challenge.
>> Elizabeth Economy (12:17):
Okay, and I wanna come and have you talk a little bit about
what the National Endowment for Democracyis doing in this space and in others.
But first, let me just pop ina question about sharp power,
because I think you werethe first to use this.
It's become part of every China Watcher,China App analyst,
(12:38):
government official, of the lexicon thatwe use when we talk about sort of the,
the range of Chinese powerfrom soft to sharp to hard.
What is actually sharp power andhow does China exercise it and
what should the US Be doing to counter it?
>> Christopher Walker (12:59):
So fundamentally, the effects of sharp power limit free
expression, curb pluralism, anddistort the political environment.
And just to talk about how we gotto that point and made the case for
something different than either soft orhard power,
this really came about from thingswe were seeing out in the field.
(13:23):
Many of the groups we work with and
support were referencing engagementfirst and foremost from China,
but it's also true with Russia,which has pretty sweeping
investments in non kinetic formsof influence around the world.
But China certainly was at the topof the pyramid in terms when
(13:46):
coming to the scope anddepth of engagement around the world.
And contrary to this ideathat engagement in media or
education orculture was simply resulting in greater
mutual understanding orhelping to persuade or attract,
(14:06):
we often found that the featuresof this engagement had significant
elements of political censorship,of monopolizing.
The partner organizationsthat were engaging with
PRC actors were their surrogates.
And it,it simply wasn't fitting cleanly or
(14:28):
coherently in any sort ofrubric that was out there.
And it was slowly being brought to scale.
And so the more we thought about it and
the more we looked at whatwe were coming across,
we were finding far too many instancesof where there were efforts to
sideline discussion,intimidate partners, coerce partners.
(14:54):
And it led us to, I feel prettystrongly that it would be useful
to have a different wayof thinking about this,
at a minimum to stimulate moreconcerted discussion on these issues.
And I have to say the Australians werereally at the front of the line on this.
(15:14):
And we had some terrificcontributors to our work,
including the scholar John Fitzgerald,
who contributed to our Defending Democracyin an Age of Sharp Power.
I might just mention one ofthe things he cites in the chapter.
Chapter in the book is going back now,two decades ago
when he was testifying beforethe Australian Senate and
(15:38):
he alluded to the case ofChen Yong Lin in 2005.
And this was a junior PRCdiplomat who had sought
asylum in the PRCs in Sydney at the time,and
through those conversations hadoutlined the extensive network of CCD.
(16:01):
The efforts and agents in Australiathat were monitoring Chinese Australian
activists and religious believersthrough the PRC's Sydney consulate.
And it was among the firstinstances where there
was a public airing ofthe sort of manipulative and
coercive efforts that fallunder the sharp power rubric.
(16:25):
I would argue.
And Fitzgerald made the caseultimately that through the really good
work of investigative journalists andacademics in Australia,
they in essence unearthed what was a,what he called an integrative
network of control that was being operatedby China within Australia, a democracy.
>> Elizabeth Economy (16:49):
But so just to put maybe get a little bit more granular.
So China uses basicallythe strength of its market,
of its economy to do what it buysmeat into media, into local media.
And shapes the narrative.
What kind of pressure would it bring on,you know,
Chinese citizens that it's spying on?
(17:09):
So it's more than just the spying on them.
Right.It's trying to shape their behavior in
some way.
>> Christopher Walker (17:17):
So that's true, I think, maybe just sticking with
the political censorship angle andthe free expression angle.
Another incredible case inthe Australian context,
which squares with other thingswe've seen subsequently.
It was about a decade ago thatthe Australian Broadcasting Company
(17:40):
engaged in what seemed tobe pretty straightforward
partnership with Chinese state media,
essentially to sharecontent in both directions.
But one of the secret componentsof the deal they agreed to
at the time was to suppressthe Mandarin service of the abc.
(18:06):
And that only came out after the fact.
It was a scandal.
It was unearthed byjournalists in Australia.
And I think the notion thatdecision makers at an independent
media institution operatingwithin a democracy would
concede that sort of thingwas also an indication a,
(18:29):
of the ambition of the Chinese sideessentially to limit speech or
the capability of coveringissues that the Chinese
authorities feel should be off limits andto seek to induce
partners in open societiesto take that kind of action.
(18:50):
So that's one part of it, of course.
Similarly pernicious.
Even more pernicious are the examplesin any number of settings.
We've seen this in Canada, Australia,
the US of intimidation ofpeople within free societies.
What is effectivelytransnational repression to
(19:12):
either do the bidding ofthe Chinese party state or.
Or to hold their tongueson certain issues.
And I think this has similarly beena part of the star power pattern.
Absolutely.
Does not fall in a soft power context.
(19:34):
And this is, I think,part of what we're grappling with.
>> Elizabeth Economy (19:37):
Yeah, and
I think it's important to recognizethe US has not been immune.
Has faced its own challenges withthis in a number of industries.
I think in particular,maybe, you know, Hollywood.
The film industry has often comeunder pressure from Chinese partners
to shape the narrative, to make surethat China's not painted as the enemy or
(20:04):
to ensure that a map reflects Chinesesovereignty over the South China Sea or
over Taiwan, or else, you're not gonnaget market access for your failure.
>> Christopher Walker (20:17):
Exactly.
And we have a terrific chapter inthe book by Aynne Kokas of the University
of Virginia who looks atthe challenge in Hollywood.
And I think one of the thingswe have to reckon with at
this point is to the extentkey institutions or
figures within them internalizethe wishes of the party state,
(20:41):
that is to say,in the entertainment industry.
And I think this transcends Hollywood.
I think it's true in other parts of theworld that something that is perceived to
be undesirable or wouldn't be welcomed byBeijing would never even be thought about,
say, by a screenwriter orscriptwriter in the first instance.
(21:05):
And sothen you've achieved what's in essence,
the anaconda andthe chandelier at scale by having
the internalization of the wishesof authoritarian powers.
And I think this is something wesee even in the very difficult
decisions that authors make whentheir books are published and
(21:28):
then translated to reachmarkets within the prc.
I think more often than not these days,for certain issues,
they will accede to the preferencesof the editors in Beijing.
And there, too, just as a theoreticalexercise, over time, if we keep
(21:49):
widening the circle of topics or issuesthat are understood to the off limits
from the perspective of the leadershipin China, where will that lead us?
15 years ago, it might have simply beenTaiwan, Tibet, and Tiananmen Square.
Today, it surely includes,in many instances,
issues relating to the corruptionof the party leadership in China.
(22:14):
In instances in other parts ofthe world where China's engagement
may be running afoul of local norms,those things might not be
covered by local news outlets whoperceive it to be out of bounds.
And I think from a freedom of expressionand censorship point of view,
there's a lot of space fromthe perspective of free societies to
(22:38):
really think about where to drawtheir own bottom line and to refresh.
Defense of freedom of expression.
>> Elizabeth Economy (22:47):
Yep.
So, that, I think,raises an important point about.
I think in a bigger picture, we are inthe midst of a big debate in the US
over to what extent we should supportpeople globally who are fighting for
their own freedom anddemocratic institutions.
(23:08):
How do you think about this issue?
I mean, what do you think is at stake?
And I think you talked a bitabout this right up front in
our discussion about the value forthe United States of
having a majority of the world'scountries be democracies.
(23:28):
But.
But what do you thinkfundamentally is at risk here?
>> Christopher Walker (23:34):
Well,
I think there is what one couldconsider the noble side of the work,
which is to support people who themselvesare struggling for their own freedom.
And this is very much inthe American tradition,
people who are looking to enjoythe rights that we're all blessed with,
(23:56):
living in open and free societies.
Why shouldn't.
They be able to enjoy themselves.
And if they're willing to fight for it,
there's a very strong argument tosupport them in that noble endeavor.
At the same time,there's a very practical argument for
(24:16):
this, which is to say we're ina tough period right now where
certainly the leadership incapitals like Beijing and Moscow.
And Tehran, they're feeling their oats,
they feel like the wind in somerespects is at their back.
And supporting people who believein freedom helps to shine
(24:38):
a light on the activities and
the ambitions of the leadership inthose countries as they do this.
And so if we want to have a worldwhere there's more transparency,
where there's more freedom,there's more opportunity for innovation.
We need more countries that are morefree and enjoying liberty and
(25:02):
are more prosperous, and
we need to support natural allies whothemselves are working towards that end.
And I think the workthat my colleagues and
I have done at the National Endowment forDemocracy at a top order level.
Helps to counter threats from regimeslike those in Iran and Russia,
North Korea, Cuba and China.
(25:24):
This is something we've done foryears and years.
And just talking about the challengeposed by China, as we discussed earlier.
I would contend that the leadership inChina has made pretty considerable headway
in spreading their vision of freedomof expression and censorship globally.
(25:48):
They have a very clearvision domestically.
That's reflected in the way theybrutalize independent media,
don't permit meaningfulalternative voices,
really put the screws to any sortof independent civil society.
In a sense, it's a regime of censorship.
And because China now hasinterests around the world,
(26:13):
they have clearly taken,to the extent they're able.
And to the extent local circumstances inother countries permit that vision for
censorship to other parts of the world.
And so Ned has really beensquarely focused on fighting
the CCP's censorship anddocumenting the party states.
(26:34):
For example, egregious persecutionagainst religious minorities and
Chinese dissidents abroad in the contextof transnational repression.
And this is as important today,I would contend,
as it's been sincethe end of the Cold War.
>> Elizabeth Economy (26:51):
So let me just take you a half a step back because you raised
Russia, Iran, Cuba, obviouslythere's North Korea and Venezuela.
To what extent do you see, andI know you testified last month
actually on what's becomeconsidered an axis of Russia,
(27:13):
Iran, North Korea and China.
So I testified before the US economic andSecurity Review Commission.
What do you see asthe relationship among them?
Are they independent actorswho share a vision and
pursue parallel opportunities andpolicies or
are they in some way working together orare they learning from each other?
(27:36):
How do you think aboutthe relationship among these sort
of leading authoritarian powers?
>> Christopher Walker (27:45):
Thanks for the question.
I testified before the commission,
they were grappling with this questionof whether there's an axis or not.
In a sense, I think the question,it may not be essential to answer that
question definitively becauseI think what we're seeing is.
And this is a trajectoryover quite a few years,
(28:08):
is unquestionably more cooperation.
And I think part of what hasemerged over time is that China's
leadership over the last period,as we've discussed,
has been committed to projecting morepower internationally in its own right.
But less obvious has beenthe extent to which China has used,
(28:30):
we could call it a web of relationshipswith other autocracies to enhance
leverage and where possible,to achieve multiplier effects.
And then I would argue more generallyto guide the world in a direction
that's more friendly to the CCP'sinterests and preferences.
(28:50):
And as Beijing over this period, say overthe last 5 to 10 years, has deepened
its strategic coordination with countriesthat include Russia, Iran, North Korea.
China's also played a pretty keyrole in helping make the whole of
these groupings of countriesstronger than any single part.
(29:12):
One example of this,which is it's such a ghastly case, but
it's Russia's unprovoked attack onUkraine where I think if you and
I had had this chat several years ago andI had said.
I can imagine a time where Russia waswaging full scale war on Ukraine,
(29:32):
Belarus was offering itself asthe leadership in that country,
as a staging area for Russia.
Iran would be producing thousands andthousands of kamikaze drones.
That North Korea would havethousands of soldiers on
European soil fighting onRussia's behalf against Ukraine,
(29:54):
and that China would,would be providing a range of support.
Diplomatic material as we understand it,and
very importantly in the information andmedia domain.
Where today China's globalpropaganda apparatus systematically
helps Russian arguments reverberateabout the nature of the war,
(30:19):
who started the war,who's responsible for it.
And that's no small thing giventhe billions of dollars that the PRC
invests annually in theiroutward facing communication.
So that's just one example, but
I think it's fair to say byjust about any measure today.
There's more of a stitching togetherof these authoritarian powers in
(30:43):
ways that gives them more lift togetherrather than in any individual case.
>> Elizabeth Economy (30:50):
What do you think it would take at this point for
the United States and together,really, with its allies and partners.
To be able to compete effectively with,I think,
what you've quite accurately demonstratedto be an extremely significant challenge,
(31:11):
even threat to democracy andfreedom on the global stage.
>> Christopher Walker (31:16):
And I really appreciate the question, Liz.
I think the competition we're in,going back, say,
a generation ago,has been grossly underestimated.
And now we find ourselvesin what is an intense
competition with formidable rivals.
(31:36):
And as we've discussed duringthe course of our conversation,
the Chinese party state is investingacross a wide range of domains.
Of course, they're investingin the military sphere, and
the trajectory of thatinvestment is rising.
And I think the US andother democracies properly need to
think about the sort of investmentsin that sphere that are.
(31:59):
Suitable forthe environment we find ourselves in.
That's beyond my ken.
What we focused on isthe non military sphere.
And there too,I think we really underestimated the level
of commitment and purpose that China.
And other authoritarianstates had in this sphere in
(32:21):
the information technology,media, cultural education and
other such domains wherethey've invested very heavily.
It is by many measures in the many,many billions of dollars that
China alone is investing inthe outward facing information and
(32:42):
communications sphere,just to give that example.
And I think we have to recognize thatif we're going to be successful,
the United States andother free societies in this competition.
We also have to havea level of preparation and
investment that'scommensurate to the task so
that we can compete at a higherlevel in the battle of ideas.
(33:05):
The Chinese leadership is makingan argument, they're essentially
making an argument that it isn'tnecessary to have liberty and
freedom as an ingredient that'sessential to prosperity.
I think their own experience nowis starting to offer some free,
pretty rough internalcontradictions about that.
(33:26):
But I don't think we should underestimatethe sort of traction that those arguments
are getting in differentparts of the world.
And if we're not in the fight competing,it's going to be very hard for
other countries to do so themselves.
And so we have a huge opportunityboth to help share information and
(33:47):
educate the world about the ambitionsof the Chinese party state,
to assert its own vision andits forms of control.
And on the one hand, andat the same time to offer an affirmative
alternative that privileges freedom andprosperity.
And I think that's wherethe real opportunities are going
(34:09):
to come in the coming period.
>> Elizabeth Economy (34:13):
So let me just ask one last thing.
And I think, have painteda picture that suggests that we've
been a little bit slow off the mark,that we haven't really
appreciated I think the enormity ofthe challenge that is before us.
Is there anything elsethat you think an issue or
(34:35):
a topic with regard toChina in particular,
tIhat where you think we're missingthe reality of the story somehow.
Some issue about China that wedon't really know enough about,
we need to learn more.
>> Christopher Walker (34:50):
I think the issue of how China seeks to shape
the information andideas realm is crucial because in
a sense what we've seen,it's often done subtly, but
it's become a feature ofthe external engagement.
All authoritarian regimes,China in this case in particular,
(35:14):
is trying to delegitimize the ideas and
even the political systems of the US andits allies.
And by doing that, seeking to corrodeinternational confidence in free systems.
And I think unless we havethe sorts of arguments
that can respond to what is now a systemic
(35:39):
strategy that Beijinghas around the world.
It's going to be very hard for
all of us to have a clear eyedview of what we're up against.
And so among the wide rangeof issues that we're facing,
I think the challenge inthe idea sphere that's on offer.
And being put out by the leadership inBeijing really deserves more granular and
(36:06):
focused andsystemic attention from all of us.
>> Elizabeth Economy (36:12):
Well, Chris, I want to thank you really on several fronts.
First, just for reminding us whydemocracy and freedom matter so
much and matter not only just forus here in the United States.
But it matters to us that other countriesare able to share the opportunities and
(36:34):
benefits that derive from free andopen societies.
And thank you too foryour sobering analysis of
the challenge that we face inprotecting those values and
rights that we have had for solong, and for your call to arms.
(36:55):
And for your articulation ofwhat we need to do now to
push back againstauthoritarian countries that
seek to undermine freedom and democracy.
And replicate their own societies andtheir own values and interests globally.
So thanks for coming on the podcast andfor delivering such a powerful message.
>> Christopher Walker (37:18):
Thank you so much for this opportunity.
I'm sorry if it was maybe too sobering,but in a sense,
if we're not able to frame andsee a challenge clearly,
it's really hard to devise a responsethat can meet that challenge.
So I really appreciate the opportunityto speak with you today.
Liz,>> Elizabeth Economy: thanks again.
(37:41):
If you enjoyed this podcast andwant to hear more reason, discourse and
debate on China.
I encourage you to subscribeto China Considered via
The Hoover Institution YouTube channel orpodcast platform of your choice.
In our next episode,I'll be speaking with Matt Turpin,
visiting Fellow atthe Hoover Institution and
former Senior National Security Officialin the first Trump Admin.
>> Presenter (38:01):
This podcast is a production of the Hoover Institution,
where we generate andpromote ideas advancing freedom.
For more information about our work,to hear more of our podcasts or
view our video content,please visit hoover.org.
[MUSIC]
Popular Podcasts
Crime Junkie
Does hearing about a true crime case always leave you scouring the internet for the truth behind the story? Dive into your next mystery with Crime Junkie. Every Monday, join your host Ashley Flowers as she unravels all the details of infamous and underreported true crime cases with her best friend Brit Prawat. From cold cases to missing persons and heroes in our community who seek justice, Crime Junkie is your destination for theories and stories you won’t hear anywhere else. Whether you're a seasoned true crime enthusiast or new to the genre, you'll find yourself on the edge of your seat awaiting a new episode every Monday. If you can never get enough true crime... Congratulations, you’ve found your people. Follow to join a community of Crime Junkies! Crime Junkie is presented by audiochuck Media Company.
24/7 News: The Latest
The latest news in 4 minutes updated every hour, every day.
Stuff You Should Know
If you've ever wanted to know about champagne, satanism, the Stonewall Uprising, chaos theory, LSD, El Nino, true crime and Rosa Parks, then look no further. Josh and Chuck have you covered.