November 19, 2024 • 50 mins
In this episode, Elizabeth Economy, Matt Pottinger, and Evan Medeiros discuss where the US-China relationship stands at the end of the Biden administration, to the second Trump administration’s possible approach to China policy, as Trump has already promised significant increases on tariffs of Chinese imports.
ABOUT THE SPEAKERS
Matt Pottinger is a distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution. He previously served in the Trump Administration for four years in senior roles on the National Security Council staff, including as Senior Director for Asia and Deputy National Security Advisor, where he coordinated the full spectrum of national security policy. Previously, Pottinger worked in China as a reporter for Reuters and the Wall Street Journal. He then fought in Iraq and Afghanistan as a US Marine during three combat deployments between 2007 and 2010. Following active duty, he founded and led an Asia-focused risk consultancy, ran Asia research at an investment fund in New York and is now at Garnaut Global.
Dr. Evan S. Medeiros is the Penner Family Chair in Asian Studies in the School of Foreign Service and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in U.S.-China Studies. He has published several books related to China and East Asia and regularly provides advice to global corporations and commentary to the international media. He was also President Obama's top advisor on the Asia-Pacific, serving as the Senior Director for Asia from 2013 to 2015 and was responsible for coordinating U.S. policy in the region across the areas of diplomacy, defense policy, economic policy, and intelligence.
Elizabeth Economy is the Hargrove Senior Fellow and co-director of the Program on the US, China, and the World at the Hoover Institution. From 2021-2023, she took leave from Hoover to serve as the senior advisor for China to the US secretary of commerce. Before joining Hoover, she was the C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and director, Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. She is the author of four books on China, including most recently The World According to China (Polity, 2021), and the co-editor of two volumes. She serves on the boards of the National Endowment for Democracy and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. She is a member of the Aspen Strategy Group and Council on Foreign Relations and serves as a book reviewer for Foreign Affairs.
RELATED SOURCES
Matt Pottinger
- Book: The Boiling Moat: Urgent Steps to Defend Taiwan
- Foreign Affairs Article: No Substitute for Victory: America’s Competition With China Must Be Won, Not Managed
Evan Medeiros
- Book: Cold Rivals
- Foreign Affairs Article: The Delusion of Peak China: America Can’t Wish Away Its Toughest Challenger
ABOUT THE SERIES
China Considered with Elizabeth Economy is a Hoover Institution podcast series that features in-depth conversations with leading political figures, scholars, and activists from around the world. The series explores the ideas, events, and forces shaping China’s future and its global relationships, offering high-level expertise, clear-eyed analysis, and valuable insights to demystify China’s evolving dynamics and what they may mean for ordinary citizens and key decision makers across societies, governments, and the private sector.
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
>> Elizabeth Economy (00:06):
Welcome to China Considered, a podcast that brings fresh
insights and informed discussion to one ofthe most consequential issues of our time,
how China is changing andchanging the world.
I'm Liz Economy, Hargrove senior fellowand co-director of the US, China and
the World Program at the HooverInstitution at Stanford University.
Every two weeks,
I'll be joined in conversation by seniorgovernment officials, business leaders,
(00:29):
and prominent activists andauthors from around the world.
We'll discuss China's most importantpolitical and economic trends, its foreign
policy ambitions, and its relations withthe United States and other countries.
The China Considered podcast isproduced by the Hoover Institution, and
you can subscribe to it viathe Hoover Institution YouTube channel or
your favorite podcast platform.
(00:50):
Today, we're gonna focuson US-China relations,
where the biggest news comes not fromChina, but from the United States,
where Donald Trump was just re-elected forhis second term as President.
To help us understand what this electionis likely to mean for the US-China
relationship, I've invited two ofthe US's foremost China strategists,
Matt Pottinger and Evan Medeiros,to provide us with their take.
(01:10):
Matt and Evan share the distinction ofhaving served as special assistant to
the president and senior director forAsia and the National Security Council.
Matt during the first Trump administrationand Evan during the Obama administration.
Matt also served asDeputy National Security Advisor and
is currently a Visiting DistinguishedFellow at the Hoover Institution
as well as a principal at Garnaut Global.
Evan Medeiros is a renownedscholar of US-China relations and
(01:32):
is the Penner Family Chairin Asian Studies and
Kling Family Senior Fellow in US-ChinaRelations at Georgetown University.
He is also a senioradvisor at the Asia Group.
Welcome to both of you.
>> Evan Medeiros (01:43):
Thanks, Liz. >> Elizabeth Economy
we're about to embark on Donald Trump'ssecond term as President of
the United States, and there's a lotof speculation about what he may or
may not do vis-a-vis China.
But before we talk about what we'relikely to see in a Trump second term,
I want to level set andask where US-China policy is today.
Evan, let me start with you.
The Biden administration identified Chinaas the most consequential long term
(02:05):
strategic threat to the United States.
Do you agree with this assessment,and how would you characterize
the Biden administration'sstrategy to manage this threat?
So I do agree with that assessment of the China challenge.
The DoD likes to call it the pacingthreat or the pacing challenge.
I think that accuratelycaptures the range of economic,
(02:25):
diplomatic, militarychallenges that China poses.
I think the Biden administration hasactually been very clear about what their
China strategy is.
They have a bumper sticker,invest, align, and compete.
But let me talk about itin more academic terms.
It's what political scientists would calla combination of internal balancing and
(02:46):
external balancing.
Internal balancing means investingmore in your capabilities at home.
So that's military modernization,but also economic modernization,
whether it's the CHIPS Act orthe Inflation Reduction Act.
It's about making substantial investmentsat home, so the US can compete with China
in key economic sectors andtechnology sectors over the long term.
(03:07):
And then there's external balancing.
External balancing is aboutforging alliances and
security partnerships withcountries all over the world.
The Biden administration came in and
found that a variety of those alliancesin Europe and Asia needed some work.
They needed to be repaired.
And so they went about doing that.
And then after the Russian invasionof Ukraine, the Biden administration
(03:29):
found that there was an even morepermissive environment for updating,
expanding, and modernizing them.
And I think one of the most interestingaspects, Liz, has been how the US has
used the Ukraine crisis to sort of linkalliances in Asia to alliances in Europe.
So I think the Biden administration'sactually had a very consistent approach
(03:51):
from the beginning, and I think thatthey've racked up lots of successes.
>> Elizabeth Economy (03:56):
What would you say is probably the biggest success in
your mind?
>> Evan Medeiros (04:00):
Probably the way in which they reconfigured shaped
the external security environment in Asia,specifically the alliances and
partnerships, in a way that I think shapedChinese views and Chinese preferences.
Because, at the heart of your Chinastrategy is you wanna deter certain bad
behaviors.
(04:20):
Bad behaviors that the trifecta I liketo use is Chinese deterring Chinese
predation, Chinese coercion,and Chinese aggression.
And what became very clear in previousadministrations is that trying
to negotiate restraints or constraintson China didn't really work, right?
(04:40):
As China became stronger,they just sort of played for
time in negotiations orblew off their commitments.
And what we found over time, and
this is one of the ideas behind theoriginal Obama pivot, was that the best
way to shape China is by shaping thestrategic environment around China, right?
By sort of creating an environmentin which the Chinese realize certain
(05:05):
behaviors are not going to work andmay actually be costly for them.
And so I think the Biden teamdid great work on the alliances.
But to me, one of the most interestingdimensions of their policy was they
didn't just improve what we callthe hub and the spoke system.
The hub and spoke being the US is the hub,the five allies being the spoke,
(05:27):
but they created an environment inwhere in which you began to have
spoke-to-spoke interaction.
In other words, Japan and Australia,Australia and India, Vietnam and Japan.
This is what Ambassador Rahm Emanuelcalls the lattice work.
And to me, creating an environment wherehub and spoke is not just bigger and
(05:49):
better, but you begin to have thissort of lattice work framework.
To me, improves the abilityto deter the predation,
the coercion, andthe aggression that we've seen.
>> Elizabeth Economy (06:02):
And presumably this lattice works.
Lattice formation is somethingthat could continue through to
the next administration,whatever President Trump may decide to do
in terms of the US relationshipwith allies or with China.
>> Evan Medeiros (06:17):
Maybe, maybe not.
Because I think the lattice work,
the lattice system only works ifthe hub and spoke is strong, right?
And so we'll sort of see how it plays out.
You could argue that if the US Becomesless reliable, that Japan,
Australia, Korea, look formore partners in the region, but
(06:40):
the reality is nothing can really replacea credible and capable US presence.
>> Elizabeth Economy (06:47):
Okay, so perfect entry point for Matt.
Matt, you spent four years working for
President Trump as histop adviser on China.
What were his priorities whenit came to China policy, and
what do you expect to see fromhim on China this time around?
Do you see a lot of continuity ordo you see a lot of change coming?
>> Matt Pottinger (07:09):
Yeah, I think he'll pick up in many ways where he left off in
focusing on trade first, looking atthe trade relationship as a proxy for
the problems in the broaderrelationship between China and
the United States and tariffs.
He viewed tariffs in the firstadministration as something
(07:31):
that was both an end in of itself,but also a tool for
building leverage to go into a negotiationwith China for a trade deal.
And he actually achieved a trade deal,that on paper, was actually quite good.
The phase one agreement thatcame out in January 2020,
(07:51):
right before COVID hitthe world like a tidal wave,
was novel in many ways becauseit gave the United States.
Unilateral ability to applyremedies if China was cheating or
failing to uphold its end of the deal.
And it also maintained tariffs untilChina complied, rather than doing
(08:12):
what the United States has donerepeatedly over the prior 30 years,
which was we would reset or refrainfrom imposing tariffs in a show of good
faith to Beijing and then Beijing would,would sort of tap us along and,
you know, things wouldn't improve interms of IP protection and so forth.
(08:33):
So the problem is that Beijing did notreally uphold its end of the deal with,
with even the phase one agreement.
And so I think that if there's going tobe a difference in his approach on trade,
President Trump might be more inclinedto pursue significant tariffs on China,
a significant increase on tariffs without,without the, the goal necessarily.
(08:57):
He'll be open to a negotiation, but
without the goal of it leadingto a phase two agreement.
Given that every, you know, the assemblageof, of Chinese trade deals that
it's made with us and with other partnersthat has accumulated over the decades,
you know, China just doesn'thold up its end of the bargain.
(09:18):
It's not a rule of law society.
So the idea that you could havean agreement that would work with another
rule of law society,
it doesn't really hold when you'redealing with a mercantilist dictatorship.
So I think that that'sgoing to be a change.
>> Elizabeth Economy (09:34):
So, I mean, he's pledged already 60% increase, right,
on tariffs already in some goods.
We have 25% tariffs.
So it takes to 85% tariffs on someChinese goods coming to the country.
What do you think the impactof that's going to be?
And do you expect that he'llactually live up to that pledge?
>> Matt Pottinger (09:53):
Yeah, I think he'll probably go big.
It's an open question as towhether he does this in phases or
whether he just goes bigright at the outset.
I'm sure that that'll be a discussion anddebate between him and
his cabinet when he installs his cabinet.
(10:13):
But I do think that the effectswill be to start shifting more
American investment andmore foreign investment back to
the United States andalso to other countries that are at
least rule of law friendlyeconomies to the United States.
(10:33):
We saw that to some extent already fromjust the existing tariffs President Trump
put in place.
It shifted a lot of foreign directinvestment out of China, but to other
economies, some of it to the US I'd liketo see more of that into US Manufacturing,
but a lot of it's gone to Mexico.
A lot of it's gone to Indonesia,Vietnam, and places like that.
>> Elizabeth Economy (10:54):
So, okay, picking up on that point, I think one of the things
that Evan identified,, as one ofthe hallmarks of the Biden administration
strategy was the investment at home chipsand science, the inflation reduction act,
the bipartisan infrastructure law,all of these sought to increase investment
in innovation andadvanced manufacturing here at home.
(11:16):
In addition,we have the sort of focus on alliances.
To what extent do you think Trump,President Trump is going to continue
with these elements of a Bidenadministration strategy?
Are you [INAUDIBLE] to concede that theCHIPS and science will remain in place and
Inflation Reduction Act will remainin place and that we're going
(11:36):
to continue to have the pursuit ofrobust alliances with Europe and Asia?
>> Matt Pottinger (11:41):
Well, look, on CHIPS and Science,
President Trump is generallysuspicious of subsidies.
He likes tariffs, which is a differentkind of subsidy in a way, but
it's his preferred tool.
He's been critical of CHIPS andSciences, but
I think that if once he hasa chance to really look at it and
(12:02):
hear from his team about some ofthe good aspects of that bill.
I think there are a lot of good aspectsof the bill, namely bringing the most
cutting edge semiconductor manufacturersfrom Asia to the United States.
And that has accelerated under CHIPS andSciences.
You've got Samsung building in Texas,
(12:24):
you've gotTaiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp.,
which is by far the leading producerof advanced semiconductors building.
And you've read a lot about hiccups,but it's actually coming along.
I've got, I've just got a briefing.
It's looking pretty good.
And I'd like to see, you know,chips and sciences leveraged to
(12:48):
get TSMC to invest in, in follow on phasesof fab capacity in the United States.
Now President Trump believes that Taiwansort of stole the American chip industry.
That's actually not the case.
The US shot itself in the footby making poor decisions,
poor forecasts about what the chip,
(13:10):
what the market would need inthe way of semiconductors.
We thought that it would just be Intelx86 infrastructure type chips that
we used to have on our desktop computerswhen desktop computers were still a thing.
In fact the world went on to smartphonesand then to GPUs for making AI,
(13:33):
and Intel made the wrong decisions andsort of got left in the dust.
And Intel in any case never reallydid have a contract fab model for
making chips.
That was a wholly newindustry invented by TSMC.
So I would like to see TSMCbuild more in the United States.
(13:53):
And President Trump.
One of the things that peoplemisunderstand about President Trump is
that he's a jobs nationalist.
He is not a brands nationalist.
That is to say he wants to see people makestuff in America, irrespective of whether
they're Japanese companies orTaiwanese companies or Korean or German.
He doesn't say it has tobe an American brand.
(14:16):
He just wants to see thisstuff made in America and
to employ American labor andtalent to do it.
And so that creates an opportunity for->> Evan Medeiros: [INAUDIBLE] think that
includes Chinese investment, Matt,and how would that play out?
Because obviously, at the state levelthere's a lot of governors that are very
skeptical [INAUDIBLE].
Well, look, this is a really interesting one.
(14:36):
This is one where President Biden,in a way, sort of outdid
President Trump in one area, andthat is on electric vehicles.
President Trump,I think that his, his instinct.
President Trump's instinct was to say,look,
I'm going to put tariffs on Chinese EVs,but Chinese EVs are welcome to come
to the United States to buildfactories here to make their cars.
(14:59):
That, that was sort of where he'straditionally been over the decades on,
on foreign investmentinto the auto sector.
What President Biden's team did was.
And Liz,you were at the Commerce Department.
The Commerce Department used itsnew authority to investigate
the national security risks of allowingChinese EVs on American roads,
(15:20):
even if those EVs werebuilt in the United States.
And what the Biden administrationdetermined, I think rightly,
was that the national security riskof having, these aren't really cars,
as Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondosays, they're smartphones on wheels.
That there are significant dangersinherent in having Chinese software,
(15:44):
Chinese hardware that connects back,that listens to all of
your conversations, that couldbe used to actually shut down or
sabotage ordo other things to endanger drivers.
Or even significant.
Parts of the economy by shuttingdown part of our transportation.
And so they actually bannednot long ago the import of
(16:08):
Chinese EV software and other in,you know, architecture.
And so I think President Trump willprobably see the wisdom of that and
inherit that and say, yeah, look, we'renot going to build Chinese EVs in America.
We're gonna build other countries EVs.
And ideally, what the Trump, new Trumpteam really needs to do, quickly,
(16:29):
what the real competition about is, look,China's not going to take American cars.
They don't take American cars,now, practically,
we are not going to take Chinese cars.
And so the competition is going to beover the software and supply chains and
connectivity, all the Internetconnectivity of cars.
(16:51):
And it's going to be a battle for
whose standard will be dominantin the rest of the world.
And we've got to make sure that weare working with the Europeans and
the Japanese and the Koreans andothers to have a common standard, so
that our collective EV standardsare the ones that dominate in the world.
And China is sort of the oddman out with its own
(17:15):
sort of exotic infrastructure andstandards.
>> Elizabeth Economy (17:20):
All right, let me push you a little bit more on this point,
because that then presumes that we arecontinuing to work with our European and
Asian allies in forums likethe US EU Trade and Technology Council or
the Indo Pacific Economic Forum.
Or a number of the innersort of international and
regionally based institutions thatthe Biden administration set up to talk
(17:42):
about precisely these issues.
President Trump was not known, forhis collaborative speech spirit,
particularly with our European allies.
Do you see that changing in a second term?
>> Matt Pottinger (17:53):
Well, look, the Biden administration put in a very good effort
in trying to pull the Europeans on side,if you will, with, with limited success.
Because I think the problem isnot with the United States,
it's actually with Europe.
Europe needs to make a decision.
Does it want to be sort of, an appendageof China's manufacturing tsunami,
(18:19):
you know, basically a market toabsorb Chinese overcapacity and
which will destroy even moremanufacturing in Europe, or
does Europe want to band togetherwith fellow democracies and
rule of law societies?
I think Europe is the one thatneeds to prove itself now more than
(18:40):
the United States.
Because I know how much effortthe Biden team put into this, and
I haven't seen as muchprogress as I'd like to.
I don't blame the Biden team for that.
I blame Europe for being Myopic.
By the way, the Japanese are readyto play ball on this point.
And actually, President Trump,during his administration,
(19:03):
we made a lot of progress on sortof laying the architecture for,
data sharing standards that would protectprivacy, protect intellectual property,
but allow shared pools of databetween the United States and Japan.
That's the kind of thing thatEurope should try to plug into.
(19:24):
There's already some work that's been donethere during the first Trump term and
also during Biden's term, but balls inEurope's court, not President Trump's.
>> Elizabeth Economy (19:33):
So then let me just take a quick step back from policy and
ask you about policymaking,because I think for many people,
the National Security Council,where you both served, is a black box.
Hard to have a real sense for what happenswhen you walk through the very grand doors
of the Executive Office Building,which is,
right next to the West Wingof the White House.
(19:54):
Can you just offer us a few insightsinto what it was like to work there?
What your daily, sort of what you didon a daily basis on an average day.
>> Evan Medeiros (20:04):
My guess is that Matt's days were probably very different than my
days, just to guess that the Obamaadministration was different than
the Trump administration.
So, Matt, I'll let you go first.
>> Matt Pottinger (20:17):
Look, the National Security Council staff, its superpower,
is that it is the only arm ofthe United States executive branch
that has the authority to convenethe rest of our government,
the rest of the executive branch.
The State Departmentsometimes tries to lead and
tell the, build strategies and tell the.
(20:39):
Sort of whack them into place,right, Matt?
Yeah, yeah, yeah, exactly.
So that, that's really it.
The other super power.
>> Evan Medeiros (20:46):
Or the Commerce Department,
I've heard that they've gotten veryconfident in their new capabilities.
>> Matt Pottinger (20:53):
[LAUGH] So, yeah, we'll talk more about commerce.
But, but look,it is the President's staff, because,
the other departments and agencies havetheir own sort of parochial interests.
And, even a loyal, highly competentCabinet secretary often gets pulled into
many of the sort of parochial interestsof the bureaucracy that he or she leads.
(21:19):
And so the NSC is the one thing it worksfor the president to try to convene and
the rest of the government to come upwith good options for the president and
to give the President a sense of, givehim peripheral vision so that he knows
what the unintended consequences, the prosand cons of any policy option would be.
(21:42):
And, the other superpowers have proximityto the president himself because they
work, you know, down the hall andin the National Security Advisor suite or
right across the street in the OldExecutive Office Building where most of
the NSC staff reside.
So look,I think the first Trump administration
(22:02):
had four National Security Advisors.
That was, that was, quite turbulent in,in the sense of that.
It was a regular turnover, butas if you look at, the sig,
this, how significantly policieschanged in so many areas.
(22:23):
Middle east, on China.
I think that's a credit to the NationalSecurity Advisors who did serve
President Trump and his staffs.
The staff, there was staff turnover, but
there were a lot of peoplewho stayed there for all or
most of the four years andI think served the President very well.
(22:46):
There were strategies that werehanded off to President Biden
that were very complete.
They were well integrated.
They had campaign plans forhow to implement, and
that gave President Biden's teamthe option of either tearing them up or
continuing those policies tillthey refine them or replace them.
(23:07):
And that's actually what happenedon the Indo Pacific strategy.
I thought there was a lot of continuity.
President Biden, his team eventuallyupdated their Indo-Pacific strategy, but
there was a lot of continuitybetween the two administrations.
>> Elizabeth Economy (23:20):
And hopefully we'll see the same going from Biden to Trump.
Evan, what about on a daily basis though?
Can you be a little bit more granularabout what you actually did?
>> Evan Medeiros (23:29):
Yeah, so the first thing I would do,
I'd usually get in at about 7:30 inthe morning, and that was my favorite
part of the day because it was usuallypretty quiet and you would read intel.
You had a briefer fromthe CIA that would come and
give you a package of intel andas a scholar and
somebody that likes to read andlearn, it was absolutely fantastic.
(23:50):
Because you have access to thisextraordinary collection of information to
understand what's going on in the IndoPacific, what's going on in China.
And then usually much of the day was asteady stream of internal meetings Matt's
precisely, right?
The two superpowers of the NSCis policy coordination and
advising the President andthe Vice president.
(24:11):
So you spend a lot of time in meetings assenior director chairing those meetings,
trying to get the interagency tocome up with policy recommendations
on hard problem how to respondto Chinese economic coercion,
how to improve relations between Japan andKorea.
(24:32):
And the way the process worked is youwould sort of decide at evan Medeiros,
Matt Pottinger level,
then you would move it up tothe deputy national Security advisor.
And then of course, Matt became the deputyand then to the national Security advisor.
So it was a very orderly process.
What I would say is,in the Obama administration,
there was a heavy emphasis on process.
(24:53):
So it felt like we wereconstantly in meetings and
constantly writing papers forthose meetings.
So I think that's definitely somethingthat could have been improved on.
It was a very process intensive nsc,
which meant that it justtook time to get decisions.
Now, of course, the fun parts of the daywere when Obama was meeting a leader.
(25:17):
I can remember after I became seniordirector in the summer of 2013, the first
leader level meeting I had was with thethen president of Vietnam, President Sang.
And it was a big deal because Obama and
Sang were signingthe US Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership,
which was the first time we had done that.
(25:38):
And it was a big deal for the Vietnamese.
The Vietnamese Politburo hadmet something like four or
five times to make sure thatthey were ready to do that.
And those are sort of, those are the fundays at the nsc because you go
down to the Oval Office, you sit onthe big fluffy couches, pro tip,
don't sit back because you'llsort of get lost in the seat.
(26:02):
And you sit there andyou sort of brief Obama.
Now, briefing Obama was always hardbecause you had given him a paper
beforehand.
He had basically, an eidetic memory, so
he would just remembereverything that you wrote.
And so briefing him was hard because youhad to figure out what your value added
was because he would always come in andsay, guys, thanks for the paper.
(26:23):
Read the paper really good.
Sometimes he had questions, but youwould sort of, you know, set him up for
success in the meeting.
And then the foreign leader wouldcome in the Oval Office, you know,
you'd sort of have the meeting.
There was always something a little bitcrazy that happened that nobody expected.
Then the press would come in.
So that that was sort ofthe fun days at the NSC.
But you basically spend yourtime doing a lot of meetings and
(26:46):
then you get to the end of the day, whichis like meetings you usually didn't meet.
DO meetings past 6:00 and then you justhave this inbox of email, hundreds and
hundreds of emails, including papers thatyou have to review, blah, blah, blah.
And you know, you basically workuntil you fall asleep at your desk,
(27:06):
go home and begin again.
>> Elizabeth Economy (27:09):
That's great.
Thanks, Evan.
Matt, any favorite memoryof yours from NSC days?
>> Matt Pottinger (27:15):
Yeah, look, I mean it was, I think I- Do have a story about
a tweet or something that just liketook everything through, right?
Well, I, I had a policy of having mystaff always print out, you know,
to someone had to be monitoring thePresident's Twitter account and printing
out any tweets that were that touchedon national security or foreign policy.
(27:38):
Because there were times when eventhe national security adviser would
be in a meeting with foreign counterparts.
And they would have justcome in off the street and
the first question they'd have was abouta tweet that was still scalding hot,
had just left the thumbs of Dan Scavino,who was the President's tweeter,
(28:01):
something that the Presidenthad just dictated.
And then they would ask us,[LAUGH] we'd be caught flat footed.
So there are people often runningacross the street carrying
printouts of tweets to get to me or,or Robert O'Brien or
others as we're,as we're going into meetings.
(28:22):
But yeah, look, I think the meetingswith foreign leaders are,
I think the most memorable.
The NSE is amazing cuz it's this mixof politically appointed staff and
also people who are on loan fromother departments and agencies.
And at its best, the NSC is a great
(28:45):
sort of gathering of talent.
And we ended up shrinking the NSCduring the time that I was deputy
National Security Advisor working forRobert O'Brien,
who was the National Security Advisor.
We shrank the number ofpolicy staff down to about,
I think it was around 107 or 108 people,
(29:09):
which was less than half of what it hadbeen four or five years before that.
And it turned out towork better in our view.
We think that what,
what ended up happening was the peoplewho remained had more authority.
It meant that there was less steppingon people's toes where there was
crossover jurisdiction andthere were fewer meetings.
(29:31):
But it also meant that when something gotelevated to the Deputies Committee or
to the national security advisor andthe president.
It had already been worked very thoroughlyat the senior director level so
that it would work more smoothly.
And usually,usually when there was a deputies meeting,
we usually didn't have toreturn to that topic for
(29:52):
a pretty long time because wewould have very clear outcomes,
a summary of conclusions that explainedwhat everyone was expected to do.
So it couldn't be relitigated.
We were good at tamping downefforts to relitigate things,
at least by the final 15,16 months of the administration.
>> Elizabeth Economy (30:12):
That's interesting, maybe more work up front, so
you had less work on the back end.
So let me just ask if you were sitting inZhongnanhai, China's leadership compound,
instead of the White House, how are youlooking at the US Election right now?
What do you think China's leader XiJinping sees as the new opportunities and
(30:32):
challenges of a secondTrump administration?
Do you expect that he's gonnaalter China's policy toward the US
in any meaningful way?
Evan, why don't we start with you?
>> Evan Medeiros (30:44):
Yeah, so I think Beijing looks at the outcome of the election, and
I think they see two verydifferent possibilities.
They look at Trump and they say,okay, do we try to deal with and
encourage Trump the dealmaker?
Right, or are we gonna be dealingwith Trump, the strategic competitor?
(31:05):
And I think that they want the former.
They're concerned about the latter, right?
They understand that Trump, in the firstTrump term, the first couple of years,
were very focused on, you know, tariffs inthe trade one, the phase one trade deal.
The last year, he sort of, Trump obviouslywas frustrated with the Chinese for
a variety of reasons, especially Covid.
(31:25):
And let the strategic competitors, youknow, move forward with a bunch of things.
And so the question is,will the Chinese be able to lean into and
extract maximum concession from Trump,the dealmaker?
Because that would require a sortof degree of restraint and
(31:47):
maneuvering on the part of Beijingthat I haven't really seen to date.
It requires them to be pretty deft, right?
And it probably requires themto absorb some Some potshots and
stray voltage from the Trumpadministration early on.
What I do worry about is they leaninto Trump the dealmaker, and
(32:10):
all sorts of stuff comes on the table,including Taiwan, right?
I worry that Trump looks at Taiwan andhe just sees it,
he doesn't value it,its status, what it represents.
It's important to America'sbroader strategy, and
he just sees it as a bargaining chip.
We've all heard the metaphorwhere he says Taiwan's a Sharpie,
(32:34):
China's the Resolute desk.
And so I worry that Beijing reallyleans into Trump the dealmaker,
but Trump starts to do dealsthat don't have support in
the broader strategic communityin the United States.
But I think it's gonna be tough forBeijing to get there because as Matt
(32:56):
rightly pointed out, Trump looks attariffs as a source of leverage.
And the question is are the Chinesegonna be willing to absorb,
accept all these tariffs andnot get locked into a tit-for-tat
action reaction cyclethat just deteriorates?
(33:16):
And then you have the whole issueof Trump's advisors, right?
There's Trump's view andhis advisor's view.
And the folks around Trump,I think it's fair to say,
are a combination of economicnationalists and national security hawks.
And they're gonna be whispering to Trump,and they're gonna be,
I think, leaning into his instinctsto go hard on strategic competition.
(33:37):
I mean, these are people likeRobert O'Brien, you know,
his article in Foreign Affairs,Matt's article with Mike Gallinger,
I think accuratelycaptures that perception.
So the question is who sees Trump most,who talks to him most about China,
who's in the room last with him on China?
And final point is, so you have that, but
(33:59):
then you've got Elon Musk andSteve Schwarzman,
people that are very closeto Beijing who probably,
are going to encourage him to reducethe intensity of strategic competition,
to find trade space,maybe some cooperation.
(34:19):
So I don't know how it all nets out,but what I think is that the range of
possible outcomes is, is wider than everbefore in the US China relationship.
>> Elizabeth Economy (34:31):
Really interesting, so, Matt, what do you think?
Do you agree largelywith Evan's assessment,
or do you see Beijing ashaving different perspective?
>> Matt Pottinger (34:39):
Well, look, no, I think, I think Evan covers a lot of it.
Xi Jinping Talks a lot inhis internal speeches about
this dialectic of cooperation andstruggle, right?
It sounds like an inherent contradiction.
But to a Leninist [LAUGH] Marxist, right?
(34:59):
Yeah, a Marxist-Leninist like Xi Jinping,it makes perfect sense.
The idea is that you oscillate sometimesyou're pursuing both simultaneously,
but you oscillate betweenoffering cooperation and
that often fools a lot of Americans andothers into thinking,
(35:20):
there must have, there must be some,some fundamental shift underway.
And what it's really about is aboutacquiring leverage by really luring
in interests from the United States,including business interests,
in order to then acquiregreater leverage and influence.
(35:41):
And then struggle is expendingthat leverage in ways
that are very painful forChina's adversaries.
And so I think Evan's rightthat Beijing is gonna be
trying to leverage the US Businesscommunity as their main ally or
(36:04):
portions of the business communityto do their fighting for them.
To try to constrain orrestrain President Trump
by having them plead forless pressure on China.
Because pressure on China meanspressure on those businessmen
(36:26):
who have entangled themselves,unfortunately, over the years.
But look, I do think that the thing thathas changed most radically over the last
four years is, is that you nowhave a proper axis in place.
This predates the Biden administrationin the sense that Xi Jinping
(36:49):
has always [LAUGH] wanted, has beenworking since his first trip abroad
to build closer ties with Vladimir Putin.
But now you've got the blossomingof a pretty deadly flower.
This is China,at the core of it is the main economic and
technology provider as well asthe main financial provider.
(37:12):
And then you've got thesetentacles in the form of Russia,
certainly Iran, North Korea.
I'd throw in Venezuela for good measure.
And they are,they are behaving like an axis.
They're increasingly well coordinated.
And so the first job that PresidentTrump's gonna have is going to be
(37:34):
to restore deterrence.
Because right now, the fact thatwe've got reports in the news
this week that Russia was working todetonate bombs in US Bound cargo planes.
We've got stories from the last fewdays that Russia has been providing
the satellite targeting data tothe Houthi rebels to target US Ships in
(37:58):
the Red Sea andother international shipping.
Beijing, as President Biden'sadministration has said,
which NATO has said isthe decisive enabler of the war.
So, and you've got a division of troopsfrom North Korea going to fight in Europe,
the largest war in Europe since 1945.
(38:20):
We're in a really dangerous world now.
And so I think his, in addition tothe trade aspects that we've been talking
about and the technology competition,
the other key element of this isjust gonna be to restore deterrence.
>> Elizabeth Economy (38:32):
So I'm guessing from the very dark picture that you just
painted, and Evan's also prettybleak picture, that there's not that
much room for renewed areas of cooperationbetween the United States and China.
Or am I reading you both wrong?
I mean, the Biden administrationestablished a number of areas or
(38:54):
channels of communication on issues likeclimate change and trade and investment.
Thinking about the global,
the macroeconomic picture,controlling fentanyl.
So should these areas continue in a Trump,too, or
are there new areas weshould be thinking about?
(39:15):
Or is there not really a point and
this is just a waste of time andenergy for the US?
>> Matt Pottinger (39:23):
Look, I'm in favor of dealing with the fentanyl crisis and
China helping us with that, butChina is the source of that problem.
China is the main source of greenhousegases that are heating the atmosphere.
(39:43):
China is fueling war inthe Middle east and in Europe.
So, I mean, at a certain point,[LAUGH] the idea that at a certain point,
you have to shift to actually imposingcosts before you're gonna get
to a production Productivesort of conversation.
I think we've let things go way,way, way too far,
(40:07):
and we've kidded ourselves fortoo long that Beijing
is interested in the commongood of humanity.
Beijing's interested in seizing power andexpanding its power worldwide,
and it's now using war andproxy warfare to do that,
(40:27):
as well as continuing tosend chemical precursors.
And by the way, Chinese organizedcrime is now overwhelmingly
the number one money launderer forall drug trade, not just the illicit
fentanyl that is killing 100,000Americans a year roughly.
But also for the cocaine,the amphetamine, methamphetamines,
(40:51):
all of the illicit drug trade,more than 90%, according to the U.S.
government, DEA agents andformer DEA agents.
That is now all in the handsof Chinese organized crime.
Beijing has the authority andcertainly the wherewithal and
knowledge to act if it wanted to there.
(41:14):
It clearly doesn't wantto act in those areas.
So we have to give thema reason to want to act, and
that is to impose really stiff costs for
Beijing doing somuch damage to our people.
>> Elizabeth Economy (41:29):
Okay, Evan, any thoughts, cooperation, expand, shrink?
>> Evan Medeiros (41:35):
So I'm not as dark as Game of Thrones about the world as Matt
is, but he made a very,very important point,
which is the Chineseconsistently seek cooperation.
Whether it's on climate change, globalpandemics, whatever it is, as a concession
(41:55):
to the United States as opposed tosupporting a global public good.
And I think until they see it not asa gift to us, but is contributing to
a world in which they have substantial andgrowing interests, we're very
likely to see any kind of consistentcooperation on the part of Beijing.
(42:17):
I do think China's views have evolvedover time from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao.
There were lots of internal debates,you and I, Liz,
have written about this invarious books and articles.
As Chinese scholars and policymakerstried to figure out what it means for
(42:37):
China to have a great power mentality,for example.
So they sort of they were debating and
playing around with this idea ofcontributing to global public goods.
I think what shifted wasthe arrival of Xi Jinping.
I think he sort of put a definitive endto that and the emergence of the era of
strategic competition where the Chineseare constantly searching for leverage.
(43:03):
So when we go to them and say, hey,let's cooperate on North Korea,
maybe North Korean troops shouldn't befighting for the Russians in Ukraine.
They don't say, you're right,this is a very dangerous
destabilizing development that couldtrigger war on the Korean peninsula.
They look at that and they say, aha,
we have a source of leveragefrom the Americans.
(43:24):
How can we use it?
And that very narrow definitionof their self-interest,
I think is one of the long term structuralfeatures of the US/China relationship.
As we all know fromthe history of the Cold War,
the Cold War had its different phases.
And it was only after some verydifficult experiences in the 50s and
(43:45):
the early 60s that the US andthe Soviets, both collectively embraced
the concept of strategic restraintas serving their interests, right?
And that, that's what put the US andthe Soviets on the pathway to,
to arms control.
We haven't reached that pointin the US/China relationship,
and we may never reach it.
(44:05):
Let's see how the relationship evolves.
>> Elizabeth Economy (44:08):
Okay, that was maybe slightly more optimistic than what Matt
had to say, but not.
>> Evan Medeiros (44:12):
Yeah, that's sort of less Game of Thrones and
a little bit more Sopranos.
Does that work for you, Liz?
>> Elizabeth Economy (44:19):
Okay, I think that's reasonable.
All right, I think we're comingto the end of our time, but
let me just do a quicklightning round of questions.
Just, you know, less than 10word answers from each of you.
First question, and Evan,we'll start with you.
What is your must read book orarticle on China?
>> Evan Medeiros (44:39):
So that's a freebie, Liz.
It's my new book, Cold the New Eraof US China Strategic Competition.
I say that because it's the mostsystematic approach that includes multiple
scholars, including a greatchapter by you, Liz,
to understand how did we get here?
How did we get to this eraof strategic competition?
What does it mean and where might we go?
>> Elizabeth Economy (45:03):
Okay, Matt, you wanna give boiling moat?
>> Matt Pottinger (45:06):
[LAUGH] I see your book and raise you wanna, except it's out of
reach, I'd have to run across the room andI might not be wearing pants.
I actually am wearing pants.
But the John Pomfret's book, which is theBeautiful Country in the Middle Kingdom
is just a great history of US/Chinarelations going all the way back to 1776.
(45:31):
And he published it about a decade ago,but it still holds up wonderfully.
>> Elizabeth Economy (45:35):
Right, Evan,
what's the job you would most wannahave in a new administration?
>> Evan Medeiros (45:40):
Well, given the fact that Trump just got elected,
this seems like a very distant question,but sure.
>> Elizabeth Economy (45:45):
Four years from now, Evan, four years from now.
>> Evan Medeiros (45:47):
Yeah, the dream job for
me would be to be chairman ofthe National Intelligence Council.
I think we need somebody whoworks on Asia sort of leading
the analytic community inthe United States about global politics.
>> Elizabeth Economy (46:01):
Okay, Matt?
>> Matt Pottinger (46:01):
I would go to the Commerce Department, to the Bureau of
Industry and Security, and once andfor all, close all of the loopholes.
This the sieve of leaky,leaky, leaky licenses that
get granted andwaivers that get granted there so
that we really could put Chinain a much tougher position.
(46:26):
Squeeze the chokehold that prevents Chinafrom being, you know, industry leader in
some of the most important technologies,including semiconductor manufacturing,
possibly the toughest jobin any administration.
>> Elizabeth Economy (46:39):
Okay, Evan, what one thing do you wish the US had done
differently with regard toChina when you were in office?
>> Evan Medeiros (46:46):
Well, look, Hindsight is always 2020, Liz, but
I wish that we had recognized China'sisland reclamation plan quicker.
I wish that we had responded quicker andmore forcefully.
>> Elizabeth Economy (46:59):
Okay, Matt, look, I think there that I would like to see
the US and this is really a public privatepartnership, find ways to help Chinese
people communicate with the outside worldand with one another more securely.
>> Matt Pottinger (47:14):
I think I just don't think we're doing enough there.
We're playing defense because now Beijingcontrols our Internet platforms here
in the United States.
We should do a jiu jitsu move andflip that on its head.
>> Elizabeth Economy (47:29):
Okay, one China issue that we don't know enough about.
>> Evan Medeiros (47:34):
How the Politburo Standing Committee works.
I think we really don'tunderstand how elite politics at
the top of the Chinese system operate.
>> Elizabeth Economy (47:45):
Okay, Matt.
>> Matt Pottinger (47:46):
Yeah, look,
China's economy and how weak it isright now and how broadly despised
I'm hearing Xi Jinping is evenby people within his government.
That doesn't mean that peopleare going to be able to organize,
you know,some kind of a rebellion necessarily.
But understanding that reallythe last pillar of his economy that
(48:08):
they're standing on is massive exports.
So I think it's shame on us if wecollude with that to let Beijing
continue exporting its excess capacityto the United States and to Europe.
It's really his entirestrategic plan right now,
he's weakened every otherelement of his economy.
>> Elizabeth Economy (48:29):
Okay, and last one.
On a scale of 1 to 10,how likely are we to see a Nixon Mao
moment in the US China relationshipwithin the next decade?
>> Evan Medeiros (48:40):
0 being low probability, 10 being high probability, Liz.
>> Elizabeth Economy (48:43):
Yes, yes.
>> Evan Medeiros (48:44):
Yeah, I would say I'll give it a one.
>> Elizabeth Economy (48:47):
Okay, Matt?
>> Matt Pottinger (48:49):
Yeah, I think as long as Xi Jinping is the leader,
it's not gonna happen becauseXi Jinping had his Nixon MA moment.
It was forhim to go in early 2013 to Russia and
to tell Vladimir Putin, I've got,I've got an idea for you.
Over the next decade, we're gonnasow chaos in the world together.
(49:10):
So that was the moment, [LAUGH] and
we're not gonna break thosetwo lovers from their embrace.
We've just got to prepare forwhat comes after and
try to lay a favorable ground forwhat comes after.
>> Elizabeth Economy (49:25):
Okay, so a long struggle in front of us with not much hope
for a breakthrough inthe US China relationship.
On that note, let me thank both of you fortaking the time to speak with me, and
I really hope that you both find your wayback to the White House to help lead us to
a better future for US China relations.
(49:45):
If you enjoyed this podcast andwant to hear more reasoned discourse and
debate on China, I encourage you tosubscribe to China Considered via
The Hoover Institution YouTube channel orpodcast platform of your choice.
In the next episode, I'll be speakingwith leading economic analyst and
Rhodium Group co-founder Dan Rosen.
We'll be talking about the currentstate of the Chinese economy,
(50:05):
which came up in our discussion today,whether it's poised for a rebound and
what it all means for the United States.
Thank you very much.
[MUSIC]
Welcome to China Considered, a podcast that brings fresh
insights and informed discussion to one ofthe most consequential issues of our time,
how China is changing andchanging the world.
I'm Liz Economy, Hargrove senior fellowand co-director of the US, China and
the World Program at the HooverInstitution at Stanford University.
Every two weeks,
I'll be joined in conversation by seniorgovernment officials, business leaders,
(00:29):
and prominent activists andauthors from around the world.
We'll discuss China's most importantpolitical and economic trends, its foreign
policy ambitions, and its relations withthe United States and other countries.
The China Considered podcast isproduced by the Hoover Institution, and
you can subscribe to it viathe Hoover Institution YouTube channel or
your favorite podcast platform.
(00:50):
Today, we're gonna focuson US-China relations,
where the biggest news comes not fromChina, but from the United States,
where Donald Trump was just re-elected forhis second term as President.
To help us understand what this electionis likely to mean for the US-China
relationship, I've invited two ofthe US's foremost China strategists,
Matt Pottinger and Evan Medeiros,to provide us with their take.
(01:10):
Matt and Evan share the distinction ofhaving served as special assistant to
the president and senior director forAsia and the National Security Council.
Matt during the first Trump administrationand Evan during the Obama administration.
Matt also served asDeputy National Security Advisor and
is currently a Visiting DistinguishedFellow at the Hoover Institution
as well as a principal at Garnaut Global.
Evan Medeiros is a renownedscholar of US-China relations and
(01:32):
is the Penner Family Chairin Asian Studies and
Kling Family Senior Fellow in US-ChinaRelations at Georgetown University.
He is also a senioradvisor at the Asia Group.
Welcome to both of you.
>> Evan Medeiros (01:43):
Thanks, Liz. >> Elizabeth Economy
we're about to embark on Donald Trump'ssecond term as President of
the United States, and there's a lotof speculation about what he may or
may not do vis-a-vis China.
But before we talk about what we'relikely to see in a Trump second term,
I want to level set andask where US-China policy is today.
Evan, let me start with you.
The Biden administration identified Chinaas the most consequential long term
(02:05):
strategic threat to the United States.
Do you agree with this assessment,and how would you characterize
the Biden administration'sstrategy to manage this threat?
So I do agree with that assessment of the China challenge.
The DoD likes to call it the pacingthreat or the pacing challenge.
I think that accuratelycaptures the range of economic,
(02:25):
diplomatic, militarychallenges that China poses.
I think the Biden administration hasactually been very clear about what their
China strategy is.
They have a bumper sticker,invest, align, and compete.
But let me talk about itin more academic terms.
It's what political scientists would calla combination of internal balancing and
(02:46):
external balancing.
Internal balancing means investingmore in your capabilities at home.
So that's military modernization,but also economic modernization,
whether it's the CHIPS Act orthe Inflation Reduction Act.
It's about making substantial investmentsat home, so the US can compete with China
in key economic sectors andtechnology sectors over the long term.
(03:07):
And then there's external balancing.
External balancing is aboutforging alliances and
security partnerships withcountries all over the world.
The Biden administration came in and
found that a variety of those alliancesin Europe and Asia needed some work.
They needed to be repaired.
And so they went about doing that.
And then after the Russian invasionof Ukraine, the Biden administration
(03:29):
found that there was an even morepermissive environment for updating,
expanding, and modernizing them.
And I think one of the most interestingaspects, Liz, has been how the US has
used the Ukraine crisis to sort of linkalliances in Asia to alliances in Europe.
So I think the Biden administration'sactually had a very consistent approach
(03:51):
from the beginning, and I think thatthey've racked up lots of successes.
>> Elizabeth Economy (03:56):
What would you say is probably the biggest success in
your mind?
>> Evan Medeiros (04:00):
Probably the way in which they reconfigured shaped
the external security environment in Asia,specifically the alliances and
partnerships, in a way that I think shapedChinese views and Chinese preferences.
Because, at the heart of your Chinastrategy is you wanna deter certain bad
behaviors.
(04:20):
Bad behaviors that the trifecta I liketo use is Chinese deterring Chinese
predation, Chinese coercion,and Chinese aggression.
And what became very clear in previousadministrations is that trying
to negotiate restraints or constraintson China didn't really work, right?
(04:40):
As China became stronger,they just sort of played for
time in negotiations orblew off their commitments.
And what we found over time, and
this is one of the ideas behind theoriginal Obama pivot, was that the best
way to shape China is by shaping thestrategic environment around China, right?
By sort of creating an environmentin which the Chinese realize certain
(05:05):
behaviors are not going to work andmay actually be costly for them.
And so I think the Biden teamdid great work on the alliances.
But to me, one of the most interestingdimensions of their policy was they
didn't just improve what we callthe hub and the spoke system.
The hub and spoke being the US is the hub,the five allies being the spoke,
(05:27):
but they created an environment inwhere in which you began to have
spoke-to-spoke interaction.
In other words, Japan and Australia,Australia and India, Vietnam and Japan.
This is what Ambassador Rahm Emanuelcalls the lattice work.
And to me, creating an environment wherehub and spoke is not just bigger and
(05:49):
better, but you begin to have thissort of lattice work framework.
To me, improves the abilityto deter the predation,
the coercion, andthe aggression that we've seen.
>> Elizabeth Economy (06:02):
And presumably this lattice works.
Lattice formation is somethingthat could continue through to
the next administration,whatever President Trump may decide to do
in terms of the US relationshipwith allies or with China.
>> Evan Medeiros (06:17):
Maybe, maybe not.
Because I think the lattice work,
the lattice system only works ifthe hub and spoke is strong, right?
And so we'll sort of see how it plays out.
You could argue that if the US Becomesless reliable, that Japan,
Australia, Korea, look formore partners in the region, but
(06:40):
the reality is nothing can really replacea credible and capable US presence.
>> Elizabeth Economy (06:47):
Okay, so perfect entry point for Matt.
Matt, you spent four years working for
President Trump as histop adviser on China.
What were his priorities whenit came to China policy, and
what do you expect to see fromhim on China this time around?
Do you see a lot of continuity ordo you see a lot of change coming?
>> Matt Pottinger (07:09):
Yeah, I think he'll pick up in many ways where he left off in
focusing on trade first, looking atthe trade relationship as a proxy for
the problems in the broaderrelationship between China and
the United States and tariffs.
He viewed tariffs in the firstadministration as something
(07:31):
that was both an end in of itself,but also a tool for
building leverage to go into a negotiationwith China for a trade deal.
And he actually achieved a trade deal,that on paper, was actually quite good.
The phase one agreement thatcame out in January 2020,
(07:51):
right before COVID hitthe world like a tidal wave,
was novel in many ways becauseit gave the United States.
Unilateral ability to applyremedies if China was cheating or
failing to uphold its end of the deal.
And it also maintained tariffs untilChina complied, rather than doing
(08:12):
what the United States has donerepeatedly over the prior 30 years,
which was we would reset or refrainfrom imposing tariffs in a show of good
faith to Beijing and then Beijing would,would sort of tap us along and,
you know, things wouldn't improve interms of IP protection and so forth.
(08:33):
So the problem is that Beijing did notreally uphold its end of the deal with,
with even the phase one agreement.
And so I think that if there's going tobe a difference in his approach on trade,
President Trump might be more inclinedto pursue significant tariffs on China,
a significant increase on tariffs without,without the, the goal necessarily.
(08:57):
He'll be open to a negotiation, but
without the goal of it leadingto a phase two agreement.
Given that every, you know, the assemblageof, of Chinese trade deals that
it's made with us and with other partnersthat has accumulated over the decades,
you know, China just doesn'thold up its end of the bargain.
(09:18):
It's not a rule of law society.
So the idea that you could havean agreement that would work with another
rule of law society,
it doesn't really hold when you'redealing with a mercantilist dictatorship.
So I think that that'sgoing to be a change.
>> Elizabeth Economy (09:34):
So, I mean, he's pledged already 60% increase, right,
on tariffs already in some goods.
We have 25% tariffs.
So it takes to 85% tariffs on someChinese goods coming to the country.
What do you think the impactof that's going to be?
And do you expect that he'llactually live up to that pledge?
>> Matt Pottinger (09:53):
Yeah, I think he'll probably go big.
It's an open question as towhether he does this in phases or
whether he just goes bigright at the outset.
I'm sure that that'll be a discussion anddebate between him and
his cabinet when he installs his cabinet.
(10:13):
But I do think that the effectswill be to start shifting more
American investment andmore foreign investment back to
the United States andalso to other countries that are at
least rule of law friendlyeconomies to the United States.
(10:33):
We saw that to some extent already fromjust the existing tariffs President Trump
put in place.
It shifted a lot of foreign directinvestment out of China, but to other
economies, some of it to the US I'd liketo see more of that into US Manufacturing,
but a lot of it's gone to Mexico.
A lot of it's gone to Indonesia,Vietnam, and places like that.
>> Elizabeth Economy (10:54):
So, okay, picking up on that point, I think one of the things
that Evan identified,, as one ofthe hallmarks of the Biden administration
strategy was the investment at home chipsand science, the inflation reduction act,
the bipartisan infrastructure law,all of these sought to increase investment
in innovation andadvanced manufacturing here at home.
(11:16):
In addition,we have the sort of focus on alliances.
To what extent do you think Trump,President Trump is going to continue
with these elements of a Bidenadministration strategy?
Are you [INAUDIBLE] to concede that theCHIPS and science will remain in place and
Inflation Reduction Act will remainin place and that we're going
(11:36):
to continue to have the pursuit ofrobust alliances with Europe and Asia?
>> Matt Pottinger (11:41):
Well, look, on CHIPS and Science,
President Trump is generallysuspicious of subsidies.
He likes tariffs, which is a differentkind of subsidy in a way, but
it's his preferred tool.
He's been critical of CHIPS andSciences, but
I think that if once he hasa chance to really look at it and
(12:02):
hear from his team about some ofthe good aspects of that bill.
I think there are a lot of good aspectsof the bill, namely bringing the most
cutting edge semiconductor manufacturersfrom Asia to the United States.
And that has accelerated under CHIPS andSciences.
You've got Samsung building in Texas,
(12:24):
you've gotTaiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp.,
which is by far the leading producerof advanced semiconductors building.
And you've read a lot about hiccups,but it's actually coming along.
I've got, I've just got a briefing.
It's looking pretty good.
And I'd like to see, you know,chips and sciences leveraged to
(12:48):
get TSMC to invest in, in follow on phasesof fab capacity in the United States.
Now President Trump believes that Taiwansort of stole the American chip industry.
That's actually not the case.
The US shot itself in the footby making poor decisions,
poor forecasts about what the chip,
(13:10):
what the market would need inthe way of semiconductors.
We thought that it would just be Intelx86 infrastructure type chips that
we used to have on our desktop computerswhen desktop computers were still a thing.
In fact the world went on to smartphonesand then to GPUs for making AI,
(13:33):
and Intel made the wrong decisions andsort of got left in the dust.
And Intel in any case never reallydid have a contract fab model for
making chips.
That was a wholly newindustry invented by TSMC.
So I would like to see TSMCbuild more in the United States.
(13:53):
And President Trump.
One of the things that peoplemisunderstand about President Trump is
that he's a jobs nationalist.
He is not a brands nationalist.
That is to say he wants to see people makestuff in America, irrespective of whether
they're Japanese companies orTaiwanese companies or Korean or German.
He doesn't say it has tobe an American brand.
(14:16):
He just wants to see thisstuff made in America and
to employ American labor andtalent to do it.
And so that creates an opportunity for->> Evan Medeiros: [INAUDIBLE] think that
includes Chinese investment, Matt,and how would that play out?
Because obviously, at the state levelthere's a lot of governors that are very
skeptical [INAUDIBLE].
Well, look, this is a really interesting one.
(14:36):
This is one where President Biden,in a way, sort of outdid
President Trump in one area, andthat is on electric vehicles.
President Trump,I think that his, his instinct.
President Trump's instinct was to say,look,
I'm going to put tariffs on Chinese EVs,but Chinese EVs are welcome to come
to the United States to buildfactories here to make their cars.
(14:59):
That, that was sort of where he'straditionally been over the decades on,
on foreign investmentinto the auto sector.
What President Biden's team did was.
And Liz,you were at the Commerce Department.
The Commerce Department used itsnew authority to investigate
the national security risks of allowingChinese EVs on American roads,
(15:20):
even if those EVs werebuilt in the United States.
And what the Biden administrationdetermined, I think rightly,
was that the national security riskof having, these aren't really cars,
as Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondosays, they're smartphones on wheels.
That there are significant dangersinherent in having Chinese software,
(15:44):
Chinese hardware that connects back,that listens to all of
your conversations, that couldbe used to actually shut down or
sabotage ordo other things to endanger drivers.
Or even significant.
Parts of the economy by shuttingdown part of our transportation.
And so they actually bannednot long ago the import of
(16:08):
Chinese EV software and other in,you know, architecture.
And so I think President Trump willprobably see the wisdom of that and
inherit that and say, yeah, look, we'renot going to build Chinese EVs in America.
We're gonna build other countries EVs.
And ideally, what the Trump, new Trumpteam really needs to do, quickly,
(16:29):
what the real competition about is, look,China's not going to take American cars.
They don't take American cars,now, practically,
we are not going to take Chinese cars.
And so the competition is going to beover the software and supply chains and
connectivity, all the Internetconnectivity of cars.
(16:51):
And it's going to be a battle for
whose standard will be dominantin the rest of the world.
And we've got to make sure that weare working with the Europeans and
the Japanese and the Koreans andothers to have a common standard, so
that our collective EV standardsare the ones that dominate in the world.
And China is sort of the oddman out with its own
(17:15):
sort of exotic infrastructure andstandards.
>> Elizabeth Economy (17:20):
All right, let me push you a little bit more on this point,
because that then presumes that we arecontinuing to work with our European and
Asian allies in forums likethe US EU Trade and Technology Council or
the Indo Pacific Economic Forum.
Or a number of the innersort of international and
regionally based institutions thatthe Biden administration set up to talk
(17:42):
about precisely these issues.
President Trump was not known, forhis collaborative speech spirit,
particularly with our European allies.
Do you see that changing in a second term?
>> Matt Pottinger (17:53):
Well, look, the Biden administration put in a very good effort
in trying to pull the Europeans on side,if you will, with, with limited success.
Because I think the problem isnot with the United States,
it's actually with Europe.
Europe needs to make a decision.
Does it want to be sort of, an appendageof China's manufacturing tsunami,
(18:19):
you know, basically a market toabsorb Chinese overcapacity and
which will destroy even moremanufacturing in Europe, or
does Europe want to band togetherwith fellow democracies and
rule of law societies?
I think Europe is the one thatneeds to prove itself now more than
(18:40):
the United States.
Because I know how much effortthe Biden team put into this, and
I haven't seen as muchprogress as I'd like to.
I don't blame the Biden team for that.
I blame Europe for being Myopic.
By the way, the Japanese are readyto play ball on this point.
And actually, President Trump,during his administration,
(19:03):
we made a lot of progress on sortof laying the architecture for,
data sharing standards that would protectprivacy, protect intellectual property,
but allow shared pools of databetween the United States and Japan.
That's the kind of thing thatEurope should try to plug into.
(19:24):
There's already some work that's been donethere during the first Trump term and
also during Biden's term, but balls inEurope's court, not President Trump's.
>> Elizabeth Economy (19:33):
So then let me just take a quick step back from policy and
ask you about policymaking,because I think for many people,
the National Security Council,where you both served, is a black box.
Hard to have a real sense for what happenswhen you walk through the very grand doors
of the Executive Office Building,which is,
right next to the West Wingof the White House.
(19:54):
Can you just offer us a few insightsinto what it was like to work there?
What your daily, sort of what you didon a daily basis on an average day.
>> Evan Medeiros (20:04):
My guess is that Matt's days were probably very different than my
days, just to guess that the Obamaadministration was different than
the Trump administration.
So, Matt, I'll let you go first.
>> Matt Pottinger (20:17):
Look, the National Security Council staff, its superpower,
is that it is the only arm ofthe United States executive branch
that has the authority to convenethe rest of our government,
the rest of the executive branch.
The State Departmentsometimes tries to lead and
tell the, build strategies and tell the.
(20:39):
Sort of whack them into place,right, Matt?
Yeah, yeah, yeah, exactly.
So that, that's really it.
The other super power.
>> Evan Medeiros (20:46):
Or the Commerce Department,
I've heard that they've gotten veryconfident in their new capabilities.
>> Matt Pottinger (20:53):
[LAUGH] So, yeah, we'll talk more about commerce.
But, but look,it is the President's staff, because,
the other departments and agencies havetheir own sort of parochial interests.
And, even a loyal, highly competentCabinet secretary often gets pulled into
many of the sort of parochial interestsof the bureaucracy that he or she leads.
(21:19):
And so the NSC is the one thing it worksfor the president to try to convene and
the rest of the government to come upwith good options for the president and
to give the President a sense of, givehim peripheral vision so that he knows
what the unintended consequences, the prosand cons of any policy option would be.
(21:42):
And, the other superpowers have proximityto the president himself because they
work, you know, down the hall andin the National Security Advisor suite or
right across the street in the OldExecutive Office Building where most of
the NSC staff reside.
So look,I think the first Trump administration
(22:02):
had four National Security Advisors.
That was, that was, quite turbulent in,in the sense of that.
It was a regular turnover, butas if you look at, the sig,
this, how significantly policieschanged in so many areas.
(22:23):
Middle east, on China.
I think that's a credit to the NationalSecurity Advisors who did serve
President Trump and his staffs.
The staff, there was staff turnover, but
there were a lot of peoplewho stayed there for all or
most of the four years andI think served the President very well.
(22:46):
There were strategies that werehanded off to President Biden
that were very complete.
They were well integrated.
They had campaign plans forhow to implement, and
that gave President Biden's teamthe option of either tearing them up or
continuing those policies tillthey refine them or replace them.
(23:07):
And that's actually what happenedon the Indo Pacific strategy.
I thought there was a lot of continuity.
President Biden, his team eventuallyupdated their Indo-Pacific strategy, but
there was a lot of continuitybetween the two administrations.
>> Elizabeth Economy (23:20):
And hopefully we'll see the same going from Biden to Trump.
Evan, what about on a daily basis though?
Can you be a little bit more granularabout what you actually did?
>> Evan Medeiros (23:29):
Yeah, so the first thing I would do,
I'd usually get in at about 7:30 inthe morning, and that was my favorite
part of the day because it was usuallypretty quiet and you would read intel.
You had a briefer fromthe CIA that would come and
give you a package of intel andas a scholar and
somebody that likes to read andlearn, it was absolutely fantastic.
(23:50):
Because you have access to thisextraordinary collection of information to
understand what's going on in the IndoPacific, what's going on in China.
And then usually much of the day was asteady stream of internal meetings Matt's
precisely, right?
The two superpowers of the NSCis policy coordination and
advising the President andthe Vice president.
(24:11):
So you spend a lot of time in meetings assenior director chairing those meetings,
trying to get the interagency tocome up with policy recommendations
on hard problem how to respondto Chinese economic coercion,
how to improve relations between Japan andKorea.
(24:32):
And the way the process worked is youwould sort of decide at evan Medeiros,
Matt Pottinger level,
then you would move it up tothe deputy national Security advisor.
And then of course, Matt became the deputyand then to the national Security advisor.
So it was a very orderly process.
What I would say is,in the Obama administration,
there was a heavy emphasis on process.
(24:53):
So it felt like we wereconstantly in meetings and
constantly writing papers forthose meetings.
So I think that's definitely somethingthat could have been improved on.
It was a very process intensive nsc,
which meant that it justtook time to get decisions.
Now, of course, the fun parts of the daywere when Obama was meeting a leader.
(25:17):
I can remember after I became seniordirector in the summer of 2013, the first
leader level meeting I had was with thethen president of Vietnam, President Sang.
And it was a big deal because Obama and
Sang were signingthe US Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership,
which was the first time we had done that.
(25:38):
And it was a big deal for the Vietnamese.
The Vietnamese Politburo hadmet something like four or
five times to make sure thatthey were ready to do that.
And those are sort of, those are the fundays at the nsc because you go
down to the Oval Office, you sit onthe big fluffy couches, pro tip,
don't sit back because you'llsort of get lost in the seat.
(26:02):
And you sit there andyou sort of brief Obama.
Now, briefing Obama was always hardbecause you had given him a paper
beforehand.
He had basically, an eidetic memory, so
he would just remembereverything that you wrote.
And so briefing him was hard because youhad to figure out what your value added
was because he would always come in andsay, guys, thanks for the paper.
(26:23):
Read the paper really good.
Sometimes he had questions, but youwould sort of, you know, set him up for
success in the meeting.
And then the foreign leader wouldcome in the Oval Office, you know,
you'd sort of have the meeting.
There was always something a little bitcrazy that happened that nobody expected.
Then the press would come in.
So that that was sort ofthe fun days at the NSC.
But you basically spend yourtime doing a lot of meetings and
(26:46):
then you get to the end of the day, whichis like meetings you usually didn't meet.
DO meetings past 6:00 and then you justhave this inbox of email, hundreds and
hundreds of emails, including papers thatyou have to review, blah, blah, blah.
And you know, you basically workuntil you fall asleep at your desk,
(27:06):
go home and begin again.
>> Elizabeth Economy (27:09):
That's great.
Thanks, Evan.
Matt, any favorite memoryof yours from NSC days?
>> Matt Pottinger (27:15):
Yeah, look, I mean it was, I think I- Do have a story about
a tweet or something that just liketook everything through, right?
Well, I, I had a policy of having mystaff always print out, you know,
to someone had to be monitoring thePresident's Twitter account and printing
out any tweets that were that touchedon national security or foreign policy.
(27:38):
Because there were times when eventhe national security adviser would
be in a meeting with foreign counterparts.
And they would have justcome in off the street and
the first question they'd have was abouta tweet that was still scalding hot,
had just left the thumbs of Dan Scavino,who was the President's tweeter,
(28:01):
something that the Presidenthad just dictated.
And then they would ask us,[LAUGH] we'd be caught flat footed.
So there are people often runningacross the street carrying
printouts of tweets to get to me or,or Robert O'Brien or
others as we're,as we're going into meetings.
(28:22):
But yeah, look, I think the meetingswith foreign leaders are,
I think the most memorable.
The NSE is amazing cuz it's this mixof politically appointed staff and
also people who are on loan fromother departments and agencies.
And at its best, the NSC is a great
(28:45):
sort of gathering of talent.
And we ended up shrinking the NSCduring the time that I was deputy
National Security Advisor working forRobert O'Brien,
who was the National Security Advisor.
We shrank the number ofpolicy staff down to about,
I think it was around 107 or 108 people,
(29:09):
which was less than half of what it hadbeen four or five years before that.
And it turned out towork better in our view.
We think that what,
what ended up happening was the peoplewho remained had more authority.
It meant that there was less steppingon people's toes where there was
crossover jurisdiction andthere were fewer meetings.
(29:31):
But it also meant that when something gotelevated to the Deputies Committee or
to the national security advisor andthe president.
It had already been worked very thoroughlyat the senior director level so
that it would work more smoothly.
And usually,usually when there was a deputies meeting,
we usually didn't have toreturn to that topic for
(29:52):
a pretty long time because wewould have very clear outcomes,
a summary of conclusions that explainedwhat everyone was expected to do.
So it couldn't be relitigated.
We were good at tamping downefforts to relitigate things,
at least by the final 15,16 months of the administration.
>> Elizabeth Economy (30:12):
That's interesting, maybe more work up front, so
you had less work on the back end.
So let me just ask if you were sitting inZhongnanhai, China's leadership compound,
instead of the White House, how are youlooking at the US Election right now?
What do you think China's leader XiJinping sees as the new opportunities and
(30:32):
challenges of a secondTrump administration?
Do you expect that he's gonnaalter China's policy toward the US
in any meaningful way?
Evan, why don't we start with you?
>> Evan Medeiros (30:44):
Yeah, so I think Beijing looks at the outcome of the election, and
I think they see two verydifferent possibilities.
They look at Trump and they say,okay, do we try to deal with and
encourage Trump the dealmaker?
Right, or are we gonna be dealingwith Trump, the strategic competitor?
(31:05):
And I think that they want the former.
They're concerned about the latter, right?
They understand that Trump, in the firstTrump term, the first couple of years,
were very focused on, you know, tariffs inthe trade one, the phase one trade deal.
The last year, he sort of, Trump obviouslywas frustrated with the Chinese for
a variety of reasons, especially Covid.
(31:25):
And let the strategic competitors, youknow, move forward with a bunch of things.
And so the question is,will the Chinese be able to lean into and
extract maximum concession from Trump,the dealmaker?
Because that would require a sortof degree of restraint and
(31:47):
maneuvering on the part of Beijingthat I haven't really seen to date.
It requires them to be pretty deft, right?
And it probably requires themto absorb some Some potshots and
stray voltage from the Trumpadministration early on.
What I do worry about is they leaninto Trump the dealmaker, and
(32:10):
all sorts of stuff comes on the table,including Taiwan, right?
I worry that Trump looks at Taiwan andhe just sees it,
he doesn't value it,its status, what it represents.
It's important to America'sbroader strategy, and
he just sees it as a bargaining chip.
We've all heard the metaphorwhere he says Taiwan's a Sharpie,
(32:34):
China's the Resolute desk.
And so I worry that Beijing reallyleans into Trump the dealmaker,
but Trump starts to do dealsthat don't have support in
the broader strategic communityin the United States.
But I think it's gonna be tough forBeijing to get there because as Matt
(32:56):
rightly pointed out, Trump looks attariffs as a source of leverage.
And the question is are the Chinesegonna be willing to absorb,
accept all these tariffs andnot get locked into a tit-for-tat
action reaction cyclethat just deteriorates?
(33:16):
And then you have the whole issueof Trump's advisors, right?
There's Trump's view andhis advisor's view.
And the folks around Trump,I think it's fair to say,
are a combination of economicnationalists and national security hawks.
And they're gonna be whispering to Trump,and they're gonna be,
I think, leaning into his instinctsto go hard on strategic competition.
(33:37):
I mean, these are people likeRobert O'Brien, you know,
his article in Foreign Affairs,Matt's article with Mike Gallinger,
I think accuratelycaptures that perception.
So the question is who sees Trump most,who talks to him most about China,
who's in the room last with him on China?
And final point is, so you have that, but
(33:59):
then you've got Elon Musk andSteve Schwarzman,
people that are very closeto Beijing who probably,
are going to encourage him to reducethe intensity of strategic competition,
to find trade space,maybe some cooperation.
(34:19):
So I don't know how it all nets out,but what I think is that the range of
possible outcomes is, is wider than everbefore in the US China relationship.
>> Elizabeth Economy (34:31):
Really interesting, so, Matt, what do you think?
Do you agree largelywith Evan's assessment,
or do you see Beijing ashaving different perspective?
>> Matt Pottinger (34:39):
Well, look, no, I think, I think Evan covers a lot of it.
Xi Jinping Talks a lot inhis internal speeches about
this dialectic of cooperation andstruggle, right?
It sounds like an inherent contradiction.
But to a Leninist [LAUGH] Marxist, right?
(34:59):
Yeah, a Marxist-Leninist like Xi Jinping,it makes perfect sense.
The idea is that you oscillate sometimesyou're pursuing both simultaneously,
but you oscillate betweenoffering cooperation and
that often fools a lot of Americans andothers into thinking,
(35:20):
there must have, there must be some,some fundamental shift underway.
And what it's really about is aboutacquiring leverage by really luring
in interests from the United States,including business interests,
in order to then acquiregreater leverage and influence.
(35:41):
And then struggle is expendingthat leverage in ways
that are very painful forChina's adversaries.
And so I think Evan's rightthat Beijing is gonna be
trying to leverage the US Businesscommunity as their main ally or
(36:04):
portions of the business communityto do their fighting for them.
To try to constrain orrestrain President Trump
by having them plead forless pressure on China.
Because pressure on China meanspressure on those businessmen
(36:26):
who have entangled themselves,unfortunately, over the years.
But look, I do think that the thing thathas changed most radically over the last
four years is, is that you nowhave a proper axis in place.
This predates the Biden administrationin the sense that Xi Jinping
(36:49):
has always [LAUGH] wanted, has beenworking since his first trip abroad
to build closer ties with Vladimir Putin.
But now you've got the blossomingof a pretty deadly flower.
This is China,at the core of it is the main economic and
technology provider as well asthe main financial provider.
(37:12):
And then you've got thesetentacles in the form of Russia,
certainly Iran, North Korea.
I'd throw in Venezuela for good measure.
And they are,they are behaving like an axis.
They're increasingly well coordinated.
And so the first job that PresidentTrump's gonna have is going to be
(37:34):
to restore deterrence.
Because right now, the fact thatwe've got reports in the news
this week that Russia was working todetonate bombs in US Bound cargo planes.
We've got stories from the last fewdays that Russia has been providing
the satellite targeting data tothe Houthi rebels to target US Ships in
(37:58):
the Red Sea andother international shipping.
Beijing, as President Biden'sadministration has said,
which NATO has said isthe decisive enabler of the war.
So, and you've got a division of troopsfrom North Korea going to fight in Europe,
the largest war in Europe since 1945.
(38:20):
We're in a really dangerous world now.
And so I think his, in addition tothe trade aspects that we've been talking
about and the technology competition,
the other key element of this isjust gonna be to restore deterrence.
>> Elizabeth Economy (38:32):
So I'm guessing from the very dark picture that you just
painted, and Evan's also prettybleak picture, that there's not that
much room for renewed areas of cooperationbetween the United States and China.
Or am I reading you both wrong?
I mean, the Biden administrationestablished a number of areas or
(38:54):
channels of communication on issues likeclimate change and trade and investment.
Thinking about the global,
the macroeconomic picture,controlling fentanyl.
So should these areas continue in a Trump,too, or
are there new areas weshould be thinking about?
(39:15):
Or is there not really a point and
this is just a waste of time andenergy for the US?
>> Matt Pottinger (39:23):
Look, I'm in favor of dealing with the fentanyl crisis and
China helping us with that, butChina is the source of that problem.
China is the main source of greenhousegases that are heating the atmosphere.
(39:43):
China is fueling war inthe Middle east and in Europe.
So, I mean, at a certain point,[LAUGH] the idea that at a certain point,
you have to shift to actually imposingcosts before you're gonna get
to a production Productivesort of conversation.
I think we've let things go way,way, way too far,
(40:07):
and we've kidded ourselves fortoo long that Beijing
is interested in the commongood of humanity.
Beijing's interested in seizing power andexpanding its power worldwide,
and it's now using war andproxy warfare to do that,
(40:27):
as well as continuing tosend chemical precursors.
And by the way, Chinese organizedcrime is now overwhelmingly
the number one money launderer forall drug trade, not just the illicit
fentanyl that is killing 100,000Americans a year roughly.
But also for the cocaine,the amphetamine, methamphetamines,
(40:51):
all of the illicit drug trade,more than 90%, according to the U.S.
government, DEA agents andformer DEA agents.
That is now all in the handsof Chinese organized crime.
Beijing has the authority andcertainly the wherewithal and
knowledge to act if it wanted to there.
(41:14):
It clearly doesn't wantto act in those areas.
So we have to give thema reason to want to act, and
that is to impose really stiff costs for
Beijing doing somuch damage to our people.
>> Elizabeth Economy (41:29):
Okay, Evan, any thoughts, cooperation, expand, shrink?
>> Evan Medeiros (41:35):
So I'm not as dark as Game of Thrones about the world as Matt
is, but he made a very,very important point,
which is the Chineseconsistently seek cooperation.
Whether it's on climate change, globalpandemics, whatever it is, as a concession
(41:55):
to the United States as opposed tosupporting a global public good.
And I think until they see it not asa gift to us, but is contributing to
a world in which they have substantial andgrowing interests, we're very
likely to see any kind of consistentcooperation on the part of Beijing.
(42:17):
I do think China's views have evolvedover time from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao.
There were lots of internal debates,you and I, Liz,
have written about this invarious books and articles.
As Chinese scholars and policymakerstried to figure out what it means for
(42:37):
China to have a great power mentality,for example.
So they sort of they were debating and
playing around with this idea ofcontributing to global public goods.
I think what shifted wasthe arrival of Xi Jinping.
I think he sort of put a definitive endto that and the emergence of the era of
strategic competition where the Chineseare constantly searching for leverage.
(43:03):
So when we go to them and say, hey,let's cooperate on North Korea,
maybe North Korean troops shouldn't befighting for the Russians in Ukraine.
They don't say, you're right,this is a very dangerous
destabilizing development that couldtrigger war on the Korean peninsula.
They look at that and they say, aha,
we have a source of leveragefrom the Americans.
(43:24):
How can we use it?
And that very narrow definitionof their self-interest,
I think is one of the long term structuralfeatures of the US/China relationship.
As we all know fromthe history of the Cold War,
the Cold War had its different phases.
And it was only after some verydifficult experiences in the 50s and
(43:45):
the early 60s that the US andthe Soviets, both collectively embraced
the concept of strategic restraintas serving their interests, right?
And that, that's what put the US andthe Soviets on the pathway to,
to arms control.
We haven't reached that pointin the US/China relationship,
and we may never reach it.
(44:05):
Let's see how the relationship evolves.
>> Elizabeth Economy (44:08):
Okay, that was maybe slightly more optimistic than what Matt
had to say, but not.
>> Evan Medeiros (44:12):
Yeah, that's sort of less Game of Thrones and
a little bit more Sopranos.
Does that work for you, Liz?
>> Elizabeth Economy (44:19):
Okay, I think that's reasonable.
All right, I think we're comingto the end of our time, but
let me just do a quicklightning round of questions.
Just, you know, less than 10word answers from each of you.
First question, and Evan,we'll start with you.
What is your must read book orarticle on China?
>> Evan Medeiros (44:39):
So that's a freebie, Liz.
It's my new book, Cold the New Eraof US China Strategic Competition.
I say that because it's the mostsystematic approach that includes multiple
scholars, including a greatchapter by you, Liz,
to understand how did we get here?
How did we get to this eraof strategic competition?
What does it mean and where might we go?
>> Elizabeth Economy (45:03):
Okay, Matt, you wanna give boiling moat?
>> Matt Pottinger (45:06):
[LAUGH] I see your book and raise you wanna, except it's out of
reach, I'd have to run across the room andI might not be wearing pants.
I actually am wearing pants.
But the John Pomfret's book, which is theBeautiful Country in the Middle Kingdom
is just a great history of US/Chinarelations going all the way back to 1776.
(45:31):
And he published it about a decade ago,but it still holds up wonderfully.
>> Elizabeth Economy (45:35):
Right, Evan,
what's the job you would most wannahave in a new administration?
>> Evan Medeiros (45:40):
Well, given the fact that Trump just got elected,
this seems like a very distant question,but sure.
>> Elizabeth Economy (45:45):
Four years from now, Evan, four years from now.
>> Evan Medeiros (45:47):
Yeah, the dream job for
me would be to be chairman ofthe National Intelligence Council.
I think we need somebody whoworks on Asia sort of leading
the analytic community inthe United States about global politics.
>> Elizabeth Economy (46:01):
Okay, Matt?
>> Matt Pottinger (46:01):
I would go to the Commerce Department, to the Bureau of
Industry and Security, and once andfor all, close all of the loopholes.
This the sieve of leaky,leaky, leaky licenses that
get granted andwaivers that get granted there so
that we really could put Chinain a much tougher position.
(46:26):
Squeeze the chokehold that prevents Chinafrom being, you know, industry leader in
some of the most important technologies,including semiconductor manufacturing,
possibly the toughest jobin any administration.
>> Elizabeth Economy (46:39):
Okay, Evan, what one thing do you wish the US had done
differently with regard toChina when you were in office?
>> Evan Medeiros (46:46):
Well, look, Hindsight is always 2020, Liz, but
I wish that we had recognized China'sisland reclamation plan quicker.
I wish that we had responded quicker andmore forcefully.
>> Elizabeth Economy (46:59):
Okay, Matt, look, I think there that I would like to see
the US and this is really a public privatepartnership, find ways to help Chinese
people communicate with the outside worldand with one another more securely.
>> Matt Pottinger (47:14):
I think I just don't think we're doing enough there.
We're playing defense because now Beijingcontrols our Internet platforms here
in the United States.
We should do a jiu jitsu move andflip that on its head.
>> Elizabeth Economy (47:29):
Okay, one China issue that we don't know enough about.
>> Evan Medeiros (47:34):
How the Politburo Standing Committee works.
I think we really don'tunderstand how elite politics at
the top of the Chinese system operate.
>> Elizabeth Economy (47:45):
Okay, Matt.
>> Matt Pottinger (47:46):
Yeah, look,
China's economy and how weak it isright now and how broadly despised
I'm hearing Xi Jinping is evenby people within his government.
That doesn't mean that peopleare going to be able to organize,
you know,some kind of a rebellion necessarily.
But understanding that reallythe last pillar of his economy that
(48:08):
they're standing on is massive exports.
So I think it's shame on us if wecollude with that to let Beijing
continue exporting its excess capacityto the United States and to Europe.
It's really his entirestrategic plan right now,
he's weakened every otherelement of his economy.
>> Elizabeth Economy (48:29):
Okay, and last one.
On a scale of 1 to 10,how likely are we to see a Nixon Mao
moment in the US China relationshipwithin the next decade?
>> Evan Medeiros (48:40):
0 being low probability, 10 being high probability, Liz.
>> Elizabeth Economy (48:43):
Yes, yes.
>> Evan Medeiros (48:44):
Yeah, I would say I'll give it a one.
>> Elizabeth Economy (48:47):
Okay, Matt?
>> Matt Pottinger (48:49):
Yeah, I think as long as Xi Jinping is the leader,
it's not gonna happen becauseXi Jinping had his Nixon MA moment.
It was forhim to go in early 2013 to Russia and
to tell Vladimir Putin, I've got,I've got an idea for you.
Over the next decade, we're gonnasow chaos in the world together.
(49:10):
So that was the moment, [LAUGH] and
we're not gonna break thosetwo lovers from their embrace.
We've just got to prepare forwhat comes after and
try to lay a favorable ground forwhat comes after.
>> Elizabeth Economy (49:25):
Okay, so a long struggle in front of us with not much hope
for a breakthrough inthe US China relationship.
On that note, let me thank both of you fortaking the time to speak with me, and
I really hope that you both find your wayback to the White House to help lead us to
a better future for US China relations.
(49:45):
If you enjoyed this podcast andwant to hear more reasoned discourse and
debate on China, I encourage you tosubscribe to China Considered via
The Hoover Institution YouTube channel orpodcast platform of your choice.
In the next episode, I'll be speakingwith leading economic analyst and
Rhodium Group co-founder Dan Rosen.
We'll be talking about the currentstate of the Chinese economy,
(50:05):
which came up in our discussion today,whether it's poised for a rebound and
what it all means for the United States.
Thank you very much.
[MUSIC]
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