Edward Glaeser on Zoning, Land Use Regulation, and Urban Economics

Jon Hartley and Edward Glaeser discuss the latter’s seminal work on urban economics, zoning, land use regulation, and economic growth. They also discuss industrial policy, the important role of human capital and education in economic growth, as well as why crime has rebounded in recent years.

Recorded on August 26, 2024.

ABOUT THE SPEAKERS:

Edward L. Glaeser is the Fred and Eleanor Glimp Professor of Economics at Harvard University, where he has taught economic theory and urban economics since 1992. He also leads the Urban Economics Working Group at the National Bureau of Economics Research, co-leads the Cities Programme of the International Growth Centre, and co-edits the Journal of Urban Economics. He has written hundreds of papers on cities, infrastructure and other topics, and has written, co-written and co-edited many books including Triumph of the City, Survival of the City (with David Cutler) and Fighting Poverty in the U.S. and Europe: A World of Difference (with Alberto Alesina).

Ed has served as director of the Taubman Center for State and Local Government and the Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston, editor of the Quarterly Journal of Economics, and chair of Harvard’s Economics Department. He is a fellow of the National Academy of Sciences, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American Academy of Political and Social Science, and the Econometric Society. He received the Albert O. Hirschman prize from the Social Science Research Council. He earned his A.B. from Princeton University in 1988 and his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Chicago in 1992.   

Jon Hartley is a Research Associate at the Hoover Institution and an economics PhD Candidate at Stanford University, where he specializes in finance, labor economics, and macroeconomics. He is also currently a Research Fellow at the Foundation for Research on Equal Opportunity (FREOPP) and a Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. Jon is also a member of the Canadian Group of Economists, and serves as chair of the Economic Club of Miami.

Jon has previously worked at Goldman Sachs Asset Management as well as in various policy roles at the World Bank, IMF, Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, US Congress Joint Economic Committee, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, and the Bank of Canada.  Jon has also been a regular economics contributor for National Review Online, Forbes, and The Huffington Post and has contributed to The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, USA Today,
It's about fundamentally giving propertyowners the right to do what they want with
their own property.
That sits with somethingvery deep within my soul.
And two, it's good for poor people, right?
It's an area in which if youallow more housing to be built,
it means the prices of housing isgoing to go down for ordinary people.
And so it's both progressive andlibertarian.

>> Jon Hartley (00:29):
This is the Capitalism and Freedom in the 21st Century podcast,
an official podcast of the HooverInstitution Economic Policy Working Group,
where we talk about economics,markets, and public policy.
I'm Jon Hartley, your host.
Today, My guest is Ed Glaeser,who is the Fred and
Eleanor Glimp professor ofeconomics at Harvard University,
where he's taught economic theory andurban economics since 1992.

(00:51):
He also leads the Urban economicsworking Group at the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
He co leads the cities program ofthe International Growth center and
co edits the Journal of Urban Economics.
He has written hundreds of papers oncities, infrastructure and other topics,
and written, co written and co edited manybooks, including Triumph of the City,

(01:12):
Survival of the City with David Cutler,and Fighting Poverty in the US and
Europe, A World of Differencewith the late Alberto Ole Sino.
He received his Ab fromPrinceton University in 1988 and
his PhD in economics fromthe University of Chicago in 1992.
Thanks so much for joining us, Ed.

>> Edward Glaeser (01:31):
Thank you so much for having me on.

>> Jon Hartley (01:33):
I want to get back and start with your early life.
Where did you grow up?
How did you first getinterested in economics?

>> Edward Glaeser (01:42):
So I grew up in New York City.
I grew up in a time in which the city wasspiraling out of control in the 1970s,
and then it experiencedsomething of a renaissance.
I think that experience in New York helpedto fuel my lifelong interest in cities.
My interest in economicsprobably had mostly to do with
just wanting to understand the amazingthings that were happening around me.

(02:05):
But I will tell a very particularanecdote of my first introduction to
anything involving economics.
I had been, occasionally, when school wasout, I'd gone with my mother when I was
about ten to her Columbiabusiness school classes.
My mother was going back in her thirtiesand getting an MBA at Columbia,
and she andI started to talk about things.
I remember one of the more amazingthings in my life intellectually was,

(02:28):
she explained, Bertrand,competition to me.
It was done in the framework oftwo people selling shoes, and
each one was undercutting each other.
And we got down to marginal costof production through doing that.
And I just thought,
ten year old me thought this was just themost amazing thing in the world, that you
could have this sort of mental constructto understand how prices worked and

(02:49):
the competition could make surethat consumers got a decent deal.
And that was sort of the first time that Ihad ever thought about economics at all.
It was really a sort of seminal moment forme.

>> Jon Hartley (02:59):
Well, that's incredible.
And so you grew up in New York City.
You did your undergrad at Princeton, and
then you did your PhD atthe University of Chicago.
How did your time at Princeton andthe University of Chicago inform you in
your intellectual journey andbecoming an economist?

>> Edward Glaeser (03:19):
So I would say, I mean, I had some amazing teachers at Princeton.
Orly Ashenfelter taught meeconometrics with a lot of discussion
about wine prices andhot summers predicting it.
Avinash Diksit taughtme international trade.
Still one of my heroes, John Campbell,wrote one of my recommendations for
graduate school.

(03:40):
And, you know, John has been mycolleague now for about 30 years.
So I had pretty amazing people.
But I would say that I was sort of slow tofigure out what I actually wanted to do.
I mean, I went into economics,like many undergraduates,
thinking that this was a pre Wall streetconcentration, a pre Wall street major.
And I really expected up to my senior yearthat I would probably go to Wall Street.

(04:02):
But somehow or
other, the bug of doing a bit of economicresearch had gotten around in my head.
So I applied to onlythree graduate programs,
and at the same time,I was interviewing with Drexel Burnham.
This very fortuitous thing happened to me,
which is the bottom fell out ofthe stock market in October 1987.
And so because of this crash, there wasn'ta lot of interest in giving me a really

(04:25):
highly paid job tradingbonds at Solomon Brothers.
But the University of Chicago gaveme a very nice fellowship, and
I thought that sounded like a greatplace to wait out four years.
Now, I didn't think I wasnecessarily becoming an academic.
Although my father taught at Cooper Union,my father has a PhD, so
certainly wasn't impossible forme to be one.

(04:46):
But I thought maybe I'm going to go forfour years and then go into finance, or
maybe I'm gonna go for four years andbecome a central banker.
I don't really know.
So that's what happened to meas I was going off to Chicago.
Now, I will say within four daysat the University of Chicago,
I was completely hooked on usingeconomics to understand the world.
And I have never looked back.
And that's just a sign ofjust how powerful this

(05:09):
dose of Chicago magic can be.
Particularly as delivered byGary Becker and Bob Lucas,
who sort of taught the two firstclasses in the first year quarter.
>> And I think above all, it was the sortof magical thing of Gary sort of pushing
you to be a creator of theoryrather than a consumer of theory.
Of teaching to look at the world and

(05:29):
to sort of see all these interestingproblems and to understand.
Your job is to craft a modelthat makes sense of that.
And that was just so exciting, so heady,to understand the sort of creativity that
was inherent in economics, that,that has fueled my life ever since.

>> Jon Hartley (05:44):
That's amazing.
And I think applyingsome of my cultural price
theory to problems in urban economics,
lawn economics,political economy, I think,
has really marked a lot ofyour great contributions.
I'm curious, just thinkingback to University of Chicago,

(06:07):
folks like Gary Becker andthose that really espoused price theory.
Was there a point at Chicago where youmaybe first got very interested in urban
economics?
I know you also attended the Universityof Chicago around the same time as your
longtime co author, Joe Gyourko.
How did that early zoning workwith Joe that really first

(06:31):
emerged about 20 years ago?
How did that all start?
Did that happen atthe University of Chicago?
Did that happen after?

>> Edward Glaeser (06:38):
No, no, that happened completely after.
And we came upon citiesin a totally different.
I came upon cities ina totally different way.
Joe had been quite a few yearsearlier than me at Chicago.
We shared in common one ofour mentors in Sherwin Rosen.
And Sherwin is typically thoughtof as a great labor economist,

(06:58):
really just a great economist.
But his contribution to the Rosen Robackmodel to thinking about the spatial
equilibrium is really a seminalcontribution in urban.
And Sherwin was a reallyimportant part of my life.
I was probably less close to him thanI was to my other three advisors,
though actually other four.
There's Bob Topel.
I was not closer to Bob Topel than I wasto Joe, although I admire Bob greatly.

(07:19):
And Bob was probably the mostempirically oriented of my advisors.
The other three were Eddie Lazear,who was a very precious person in my life.
And if anything,
my modeling style looks more likeEddie's than it does like anyone else.
Eddie, Gary, Sherwin, Bob Topel,and of course, Josiah Schengler.

>> Jon Hartley (07:38):
And that was your committee?

>> Edward Glaeser (07:40):
That was my committee.
Let me see.
I give it Eddie,Bob Sherwin, Gary and Jose.
And Jose was really my doctor father.
So Gary was like this intellectual brightlight that I spent the rest of my life
sort of trying to work to.
But in terms of the person whoinvested me in a daily basis and
just made me the scholar that I am today.
No one did Did more for me than Jose, andI just owe him an unending gift, I mean,

(08:03):
I owe all of them an unending gift.
But Jose just really, really invested.
And it was really,to a certain extent, Jose,
that pushed me towardscities in different ways.
The first kind of subtle way was wewere starting to do research in our
second year.
And Jose encouraged me to takeurban as a field rather than,
I did labor as a field, andI'd already gotten that done.

(08:27):
But to do urban as a fieldinstead of theory.
Because urban had its examearlier in the year, and so
we could get done with that andpivot to doing research.
So that's what got meto do urban as a field.
I studied with Matt Kahn for that field.
And then we started working on the paperof ours, which became growth in cities,
which was really motivated by somethingtotally different in the air at

(08:47):
the University of Chicago, which wasinterested in the new growth theory.
Which was the ideas that another ofJose's student, Paul Roemer, had sort
of developed the model where, because of,you could get increasing returns.
That are compatible withcompetition through externalities,
particularly the externality of knowledge.
Bob Lucas's paper on the mechanicscalled it human capital externalities.

(09:09):
And it was Bob Lucas's onthe mechanics of human capital,
which actually then ledback to Jane Jacobs.
And led back to thinking about cities asplaces where people learn from people
around them.
The interesting irony about this is thisprocess of human capital externalities and
learning, like I wasexperiencing as a student,
that very phenomenon,as I learned about it, right?

(09:30):
It was precisely because theseideas were in the air at Chicago.
And with that, we then put togetherour paper, growth in cities.
Andrei Schleifer entered into the fray,Andre was not an official advisor of mine.
But he's been continues to bean intellectual partner of mine for
37 years later.
And we wrote this paper to try andtest between different theories.
And we tried to organize theoriesthat would emphasize large scale.

(09:54):
And we call those Marshallarrow roamer externalities.
And ones that would emphasizehaving lots of small firms.
And we called those porter,and some of them were Jacobs.
And we sort of testedbetween these theories, and
we had a paper in which sort of growthseems to be very oriented towards places
that had lots of industrial diversity andlots of little firms.
And those facts stillkind of seem to be true.

(10:16):
Especially the sort of small firms whichI think now think of as entrepreneurial
human capital.
But that was really the paperthat got me started.
And then I was hired at Harvardwas Harvard was looking to hire
an urbanization.
And I was told, well, if you're labor,nobody has any interest in hiring you at
Harvard, but if you're urban,we got a slot for you.
So, heck, who was I to turn that down?

(10:37):
I mean, I had offers from other placeswho were happy to take me as a labor
economist, butthe Harvard thing seemed to work.
And I came to Harvard,I was told, the job is an urban.
And I think with that little bit ofnudging, I realized urban was this field
with incredibly great questions andnot enough talent working on it.
So there were some great peoplein urban when I came in.

(10:59):
I don't wanna in any sense suggest thatthere weren't really wonderful people for
me to look up to, whether ornot they were Ed Mills or Jan Bruckner or
will strange or Robert Hemsley.
I mean, wonderful people, but
there weren't enough relative to just thecaliber and importance of the problems.
And so it felt to me like this wasan intellectual arbitrage opportunity in
which if I went into finance,
there were thousands of people workingon this narrow set of questions.

(11:19):
Whereas if I go to urban,boy, the world's my oyster.

>> Jon Hartley (11:23):
Great, yeah, I'm surprised that there was even
an urban field exam back in at that time.
I don't think many departments haveurban field exams now, I could be wrong.

>> Edward Glaeser (11:38):
It was the hangover of the first wave.
So there was a whole bunch of Federal and
Ford Foundation funding on urbantopics in the late 60s, early 70s.
And this kind of created urban as a field.
And so George Tolley was the one whotaught the urban class, and as the exam,
George had been a big grant receiver forthe University of Chicago in his day.

(11:59):
And that was the thing that sort ofcreated urban in the sixties, seventies.
But in those days, it was a field that wasdriven more by the presence of outside
funding than it was about sort ofdeep engagement with the topics.
And there were somemistakes that were made.
So two of my mentors at Harvard,John Meyer and John Kane,
used a whole lot of resources whenJohn Meyer ran the NBER in the 1970s to

(12:21):
create the urban simulation model,we've now moved to stuff like that today.
I think now we're teched up in a waythat Steve Redding can do this magic and
it works out, andwe have the computing power.
We did not have the computingpower to do this in 1975, and yet
the NBR threw a lot of resources at it andit just didn't work out.

>> Jon Hartley (12:39):
It's amazing, and
also I feel like the insight tolook at Sherwin Rosen's work and
Rosen Roebuck model that I feellike it took a long time for
the Rosen Roebuck model tobecome really appreciated.
I think in part thanks toyour own contributions,
but just myself learningit a few times in class,

(13:03):
it's such a brilliant andalmost simple framework.
But yeah, I feel like over time,it's taken a while for
some of these things to becomea bit more appreciated, including,
I think, just zoning and land useregulation and its role in home prices and
home price growth,which is soaring in US coastal markets,

(13:28):
almost all Canadian real estate markets,and many other urban real estate
markets around the world,whether it's a, say, London or in, say,
Israel or elsewhere,it's truly a relatively global phenomenon.
There's some, I think, exceptions tosome supply constrained markets and

(13:48):
prices, residential real estateprices soaring as a result.
Look at Japan or Houston orelsewhere, but I'm just curious.
I really want to follow thiswhole zoning story because it's
really amazing to me how it emergedroughly, say, 20 years ago.
I don't know if,I think that's first roughly appeared.

(14:13):
And here we are today in 2024.
And just the other week,former President Barack Obama was at
the Democratic National Convention talkingabout why we need land use deregulation.
And I'm just curious what your thoughtsare on that whole intellectual

(14:34):
journey of really, I think beingamong the first academics and
really the first to, in the publicsphere really kinda beat this drum that,
the reason why home pricesare skyrocketing in many of these places.
Coastal real estate markets in the US or
elsewhere has to do with the fact thatnew housing isn't being built and

(14:57):
it has something to do withthose land use regulations.
I'm curious,what has that journey been like for you?
And I mean, maybe it soundslike being like, I don't know,
having to beat the drum andrepeat yourself many times over,
but now we see the whole socalled NIMBY movement.

(15:19):
A lot of people have jumped onto it.
Interestingly, the Democrat Partyin the US has, I think,
been a little bit more amenable topicking it up than, say, Republicans.
And maybe that's because there'sless vested interest in the side of
the Democratic Party and
smaller fraction of the Democratic Partymembers are homeowners.

(15:42):
But then you also look north to, say,Canada, where Canadian Conservative Party
leader Pierre Poilievre has taken up theidea of withholding federal infrastructure
funds for municipalities that aren'tgrowing their housing stocks.
So in Canada,it's very much emerged from, I guess,
the more conservative side of things.
I'm curious, are you [INAUDIBLE].
Surprised at all that zoning and

(16:03):
land use regulations has hit sortof national federal politics?
Did you ever think it would get here, or
did it at many times feel like itwas kind of an impossible goal?

>> Edward Glaeser (16:18):
Yeah, sure, I'm surprised.
I'm surprised and kind of amazed.
That's right.
I mean, my feeling about,I often get asked,
are you disappointed by the limitationson the success of the movement?
I think exactly the opposite.
When I started working on this, therewere, like three libertarian economists
who thought zoning was important andnobody else did.

(16:40):
And now you've got a whole movement.
When you see a dog playing chess,
you don't ask how he'd doagainst Bobby Fischer.
There's a quote that dates me.
No, totally.
Now, I wanna set this scene a little bitas to how my life with zoning happened.

(17:01):
First of all, I want to make it clear,like, I did not invent this topic.
Bob Elixon wrote his masterpiece in 1975,helping us understand the law around land.
Larry Katz did his work withKen Rosen on land use controls in
California starting in the 1970s.
So there were unquestionably papers thatlooked at different aspects of this.

(17:23):
And so we were not unique.
That being said, it was a pretty barrenlandscape when we entered into this.
I mean, Larry's career was basedon human capital, labor markets.
He had not spent his life doing land.
And there were papers, butthere were relatively few.
I got interested in this issue andjust give a little bit on this.
Starting in the late 1990s,actually, I think it was 1999.

(17:44):
I was put on Harvard's Universityphysical planning committee just after I
got tenure.
And the outgoing president,Neil Rudenstein, was very keen to
build a contemporary art museumdesigned by the great architect
Renzo Piano on a site that Harvardowned right on the Charles River.

(18:05):
Now, this museum,which would be an architectural glory and
a business draw for Cambridge, wouldunfortunately slightly mar the view of one
middle-level employee ata public radio station, okay?
This mid-level employee was fairlyeffective at organizing, I don't know,
14 neighbors.
And single handedly, they were essentiallyable to stop Harvard from doing this.

(18:28):
And the whole thing eventuallydied when Neil left, and
his successor was notinterested in doing it.
I was amazed by the power of just a verysmall number of people to do something
that you would have thought wasstrongly against the interest
of the community as a whole.
And that was the first thing thatstarted me thinking about this.
Then I went on leave in the year 2000,2001.

(18:50):
I had just gotten divorced.
And this was my way of sortof getting out of town.
And I went down to Washington forthe year.
But I struck up a deal with Wharton, whereI would come to Wharton one day a week,
sometimes two, I guess,but mostly just one.
And during that time,
I discovered one of the greatintellectual partnerships of my life and

(19:11):
one of my favorite people in the wholeworld, your former mentor, Joe Jerko.
And Joe and I, because we're both SherwinRose people, we think the same way.
We think using Chicago price theory,we think using the Rosen-Roback model.
The core insight of our paper was if itcosts a whole lot more to buy something

(19:32):
than it costs to build something,than something screwing up this market.
All of our early papers were about thiswas basically using the Chicago price
theory thing,
which is we can figure out how muchit physically costs to build a unit.
Why doesn't it cost thatmuch to buy a unit?
Well, the only possible reason is we'vegot something that stops people from

(19:54):
putting up more units.
So this was done in our 2005Journal of Law and Economics paper,
where we just said, look,
the marginal cost of adding an extra unitin New York City is just the next floor.
So it doesn't require more land,it doesn't require more stuff.
And we actually have lots of goodestimates of how much it costs to build
an extra floor.
And so it's that basicChicago price theory thing.

(20:14):
Going back even earlier, we had a paper,I think, in the Cato Regulatory Journal
in 2002 that focused on the value ofland if it sits under a new house,
versus the value of land ifit extends an existing house.
Exactly the same logic, right, whereif land seems to be worth a lot when it
sits under an existing house, whichmeans take the value of the total house,

(20:37):
subtract the physical construction cost,and look at what's left.
If that land cost ten times as muchas just land that extends a lot,
then it must be something elsethat's giving that land value,
which is the right to have a house on it.
That paper, I will say,
I received a lovely note fromThomas Sowell of the Hoover Institution,
maybe in 2003, telling me that if we wereright, that this was really important,

(21:00):
which I treasure that note, butthat was how we got started on it.
And then we did a whole bunch of workon this around this time period,
and then we move in andout on this, and we're still doing,
we have a new paper that relates to this.
The reason why this is myfavorite policy issue.
So one of the beauties of beingan academic with some sense of wanting

(21:21):
to participate in public policy debateis you get to choose your issue, right?
I'm not the chairman of the CA.
I don't have to have a view onevery policy that comes across.
I get to choose what I want to work on.
What I love about land use reform is, one,it's about free people and free markets.
It's about fundamentally giving propertyowners the right to do what they want with

(21:41):
their own property.
That sits with somethingvery deep within my soul.
And two, it's good for poor people, right?
It's an area in which if youallow more housing to be built,
it means the prices of housing isgonna go down for ordinary people.
And so it's both progressive andlibertarian.
And why not choose something thatleans in both directions in a way,
that's in a way that sort ofis appealing rather than.

(22:02):
I'm against minimum wages, too, but it'sa lot harder cuz there are poor people who
actually are helped by minimum wages,although they do screw up labor markets.
Again, depends a lot on where andhow much.
I mean, I think a $20 minimum wagein West Virginia would be insanity.
I think in Seattle it probablydoes much less damage.
But why choose this messy area whereI've got a whole lot of difficult

(22:25):
distributional issues to deal with versusan area in which the distributional stuff
seems to be just as goodas the freedom stuff?

>> Jon Hartley (22:31):
Absolutely, I'm curious, I guess,
just to think a little bit out loudhere about political economy issues.
I fully agree with you.
And it's one of the things that makes,zoning and zoning reform,
such an important issue andsuch a low hanging fruit in my mind.
And also, Joe Jerko, forthose watching or listening, Joe,

(22:53):
I took his real estatemarkets class at Wharton, and
it definitely was by far one of the bestclasses I've ever taken in my life.
And it's almost kind of, I should say,a hugely eye opening type of class.
And just explanation for why is it thatthese coastal real estate markets are so
expensive?
But I'm curious, what do you think aboutthe political economy dynamics that makes

(23:17):
zoning reform so difficult?
Which is it puts the incumbent homeownersagainst the non-incumbent homeowners,
maybe the renters orpeople that haven't bought a home yet.
And I feel like there's still a challengewhere even probably middle class,
even like lower middle class individualswho are homeowners would maybe still

(23:39):
be opposed to zoning reformjust because they're in their
mind is some sort of a short runhit to their own home values.
And there are a considerableamount of people in the us and
around the world who do buildtheir wealth through housing.
And maybe that's notthe optimal way to go about it.
But I'm curious,what do you think about these political.

(24:00):
Economy roadblocks togetting more housing built.

>> Edward Glaeser (24:04):
So I think that if we are just looking at the smaller
the jurisdiction, the more impossibleit is to contemplate zoning reform.
There's no way you're gonna walkinto a suburban area dominated
by homeowners andconvince them to do zoning.
You're right, for most of them, the valueof the home is the most important asset,

(24:25):
and anything that promotesaffordability is impoverishing them.
So you're gonna lose fundamentally.
On top of that,I think the natural human fear of change,
completely exaggerated, right?
But I think in terms of people think thatthis new housing development is gonna do
terrible things to their neighborhood,and it almost never does.
But that adds on it interms of making it hard.

(24:49):
The larger the jurisdiction, the morelikely you are to have some support.
And actually, we see this in a statisticalsense in the job market paper of
Clemence Tricote, who shows that whensmaller jurisdictions get merged into
bigger jurisdictions in France.
You end up seeing morebuilding in the small,
formerly smaller area that'snow part of a bigger area.

(25:09):
I experienced this in the US inthe sense that big city mayors
typically do want to reform themselves.
They've got a lot of rentersthey want to take care of.
They've got business owners whodon't want to pay that much.
They've got, they've got bankers,they've got developers.
They've got lots ofpeople who want to build.
So those are an area in whichyou can just talk to them,

(25:31):
try to figure out waysto make things better.
The larger the states are actually whereI think the most important action is.
If you ask me where the frontlinebattleground is for zoning,
it is in the California state legislature.
That is where the decisions are gonnabe made that are gonna make the biggest
decisions.
The biggest impact onhousing in the biggest and

(25:51):
most important housing marketin some sense in the world.
And then once you get tothe federal government.
I have been speaking with people at HUDsince the Clinton administration about
these issues, andthey have always wanted zoning reform.
They have always wanted less local zoning,
which I think explains whyPresident Obama is saying, this is why
many Republicans are happy to say they'dlike to see less red tape in building.

(26:13):
But the problem is the mismatchbetween their desire,
because they do see the downsides of thiswith the sort of real difficulties of
the federal government influencinghyper local land use regulation.
Especially since it really has torun through the state legislatures,
which is why I like this idea of tyingfederal funding to infrastructure.
That goes to the states to makingmeaningful change on the housing front.

>> Jon Hartley (26:35):
That's fascinating.
You're absolutely right thatstates have this power preemption
where they can attempt to compelmunicipalities to enact zoning.
And I think you're absolutely right.
It's one way to overcome thesesorts of political economy issues.

(26:56):
There's this other idea that you'vewritten about quite at length,
which is getting, say,a federal government to require, or
I guess state governments could dothis as well, to varying degrees.
That your federal governmentwithholds infrastructure funds or
some sort of federal benefits that themunicipality gets if they do not hit some

(27:19):
sort of a housing growth target.
This is something that's actuallybeing proposed in Canada.
And Pierre Polyev becomes primeminister about a year from now.
It's a huge part of his platform and
something that he will undoubtedly do orattempt to do.
You've written quite a bitabout this in the US and

(27:40):
how the US federalgovernment should do this.
Can you explain a bit more what you meanby housing supply growth requirement?
And also having heard a bitabout the debates here,
what should that optimal housingsupply growth target be?
Some people might think, well,isn't that a bit top down?

(28:01):
What's the right number andhow would you monitor it and so forth?
I'm curious,how does that work out in your mind?

>> Edward Glaeser (28:10):
So I think one of the differences between Canada and
the US is that there is enough fundingflowing directly from the federal
government to localities that you canactually threaten them through this.
In the US, the money all throughgoes through the states.
So it gives you this intervening layer.
And it really has to be that the statelegislature of California is threatened

(28:32):
by losing their highway funds,that they then take action.
And then the statelegislature of California,
they can do anythingthey want to localities.
They can completely take awaythe ability of localities to zone.
In fact,in California you already have targets.
California has a clear process forallocating housing units to localities.
We can obviously debate what those unitsshould be, but they have a process.

(28:56):
The question is,what are they gonna do to enforce that?
The nuclear option is the socalled builder's remedy,
which means you just get a get out ofjail free card if you're a developer.
And you get to follow the statedevelopment regulations instead of
the local ones.
That's a very powerful tool.
We have something similar to that inMassachusetts called chapter 40 B,

(29:17):
which means that essentially forcommunities that are unaffordable.
And if you're building somethingthat has enough affordable housing,
you can basically bypassthe local rules as well.
So that's a very powerful tool for
doing this in terms ofcreating growth targets.
I think it's useful to compare this withthe last time the federal government tried

(29:40):
to bully the states to do something whichwas back with the minimum drinking age.
And being someone who was just onthe wrong side of that drinking age in
the early 1980s andconstantly seeing it go out of reach,
I certainly didn't view that federalintervention in a positive light.
So maybe this should give me pauseabout what I'm proposing but

(30:00):
in that case,there was a very clear legislative goal.
So it was really easy for the feds to say,just change this, or else with housing,
doing it around a legislative thing isa mistake because there's no one rule
that makes a difference for housing.
There are a 1000 ways tosay no to any project.
And saying,
you can't have minimum lot sizes thatare greater than a quarter acre.

(30:23):
What good will that do?
They'll come up with a wetlandsregulation that says,
you can't do this if there's a spotted owlwithin 1000 miles, you can't do whatever.
There are so many ways that youcan turn down a housing project.
Anything that goes throughthe sort of that says we're
gonna have a legislativetarget doesn't work.
You need to have a building target.
And that building target should reallyreflect two things, one of which is

(30:46):
existing density levels and the secondof which is the level of current demand.
And I think in any area in which you haverelatively low density and relatively
high current demand, that those are placesthat you should have pretty high quotas.
I'm not averse having a system in whichwealthy suburbs can buy their way out of

(31:07):
this by inducing other places to build.
But you should have some clearly wellregulated market that figures out how you
trade off one for the other.
But I would have sort of a two-factormodel to determine these quotas.

>> Jon Hartley (31:22):
I want to, just before we wrap up on zoning, I want to sort of test
your, or just get your thinking in termsof what the history of zoning is like.
How did we get here?
And I think a lot of peopledon't fully appreciate that.
Zoning is a historically new phenomenon.
And at least Euclidean zoning,which is sort of this idea that you have

(31:44):
specific zones forspecific land use purposes,
was something that kind of cameout of Germany in the late 1800s.
And was very rapidly adopted inthe US largely in the 1920s.
If you look at some estimates.
Estimates that roughly 40% ofthe US population was living

(32:05):
in a zone by the end of the 1920s andwas much,
almost zero at the beginning of the 1920s,early 1910s.
And I'm curious,there was obviously the Euclid versus
Ambler Supreme Court decisionthat was very monumental.
And of all people was actuallyHerbert Hoover as secretary

(32:28):
of commerce in the variousrepublican administrations in 1920s,
was the one who helped enacta number of state zoning laws.
I'm curious what your thoughts are interms of what in part contributed to
the cause of zoning to begin with.
I sort of have a theory or in some,maybe some empirical evidence that says

(32:50):
migration in the 1920shad a lot to do with it.
There was a lot going on in the 1920s.
Economists talk a lot about the 1930s andthink a lot about the depression.
But 1920s, there was a lot changing,
whether it was onthe international side of things,
sort of thinking about the aftermathof Treaty of Versailles.
Or thinking about immigration laws inthe US were changing quite rapidly.

(33:16):
And essentially the whole concept ofthings like passports and the sort
of border having a border as we see ittoday, was largely created in that period.
And then you add zoning too.
And I feel like these things,both immigration or
restriction on migrants from outsidethe US and restriction on individuals,

(33:38):
say moving to your municipality withinthe US are completely unrelated.
But then would you agree that sort ofzoning, maybe that set the seeds for
zoning, which didn't necessarilybite till the 1970s and 1980s?
You got things like NEPA, which isthe National Environment Policy Act,
and under Nixon andoften its various state components,

(34:01):
say CEQA, are often some ofthe biggest barriers to zoning today.
Is that history right in yourmind in terms of the timeline
of how zoning got started andstarted to buy?
Before the 1900s, it was largely,if you had a land use dispute,
you'd go to a court, you wouldn't have todeal with the zoning board and so forth.
Is that-.

>> Edward Glaeser (34:21):
I think that history is largely correct.
I think one of my favorite bookson this is called Zoned American,
which you may know by a Penn law professorcalled Toll, who was writing in 1969.
Which creates a particularly readable and
enjoyable way of gettingsome of this history.
It's important to emphasize that land usecontrols or building regulations are not.

(34:43):
Those are actually ancient.
So the city of Boston enacts itsfirst building regulation in 1631,
which is it bans thatched roofs for
fairly understandable reasons,given the fire risk.
And of course, there are heightregulations in Boston prior to New York's
great zoning code of 1916.

(35:03):
Zoning comes out of the samesort of progressive era,
progressive movement group of trying tosort of tamp the demons of density, right?
There are these unattractivethings that come with cities, and
you have a bunch of progressive reformerswho are eager to make changes on them.

(35:23):
Now, they start off mostlyfocusing on the building.
So there's the various tenement acts thatNew York passes in the 19th century,
and then in the earlyyears of the 20th century,
it moves up to sort of large scale zoning.
New York's 1916 Zoning Act being,as you say,
a sort of a real watershedin terms of this.

(35:44):
You also have the perniciousattempts to zone by race,
which occurred during this time period.
I think->> Jon Hartley: That looks struck down in
1917.
1917, correct.
And I, in fact, tell the sort of,I weave these things together,
ending up in Buchanan Worley,which gets rid of the deed restrictions.

(36:05):
But I see it as this sort ofprogressive era thing to try and
make cities better in various ways,some of which is sort of good.
I like clean water.
I think attempts to create goodwater systems are probably right,
some of which certainly hasa decidedly anti immigrant feel or
a decidedly anti african american feel.

(36:28):
Poor people tended to livemessier lives than is now.
And there's a certain amount of middleclass people just not wanting to see
the poor people ornot wanting to live near the poor people.
That's part of the progressive thingduring the late 19th, early 20th century.
This is kind of the worldof Herbert Hoover, right?
Remember, Hoover is certainlya Republican, but he really,

(36:49):
until the Great Depression,
is seen as coming from the liberalwing of the Republican Party.
He is seen as being, it's not thatthere is some clear break between
Teddy Roosevelt or even more so,Taft and Herbert Hoover.
And this is part of the trying to makecities livable for good, God fearing
protestant middle class people were thecore of the Republican Party in the 1920s.

(37:15):
And I think that stuck with us.
Now I agree that it doesn't feel likeit has a huge bite early on, right?
In part because you have this wave inthe 1920s and then in the 1930s, you have
a great depression where nobody's buildinga whole lot during this time period.
And you have enough really vacant landin the years after World War Two that

(37:35):
people like the Levitts really figureout how to mass produce housing.
On top of that, you have the car.
The car and the highway system just opensup vast amounts of land to areas that
are not intensely zoned to begin with,.nareas that are kind of a bunch of farmers
who want to sell their land at top dollarto a bunch of crazy developers who
are going to buy their potato fields forhuge amounts of money.

(37:59):
And so through the 1970s,things work and then they don't,
because then you start runningout of this open land, and
the places that are zonedbecome more intensely zoned.
The one thing that I would add on there,
the other kind of important innovationsare the rise of sort of citizen protest.

(38:20):
There's a very fine bookcalled Megaprojects by my
colleague Alan Al Schauer andDavid Luberoff,
also my colleague, which tells the storyabout opposition to megaprojects.
So think the highway revolts.
Think Robert Moses building in New York.
Jane Jacobs was engaged in the fightagainst the lower Manhattan Expressway,
one of those fights.

(38:40):
And it's really a story in whichcommunity organizers borrow tools that
are being built in the civil rights eradicto figure out how to stop the developers.
The pioneer on this.
And I'm always get upset about this, Imean, I love Jane Jacobs in so many ways,
but she is not responsible for
stopping Robert Moses from running FifthAvenue through Washington Square park.
The woman who did that is hername is Shirley Hayes, and

(39:03):
she does not deserve to be erased fromthe annals of history, even though
the marvelous misses Maisel decides topresent Jane Jacobs as doing all this.
But they figure out how to stop,stop these projects.
They also figure out howto stop private projects.
And so this sort of thing, which Iexperienced in 1999 of like one mid level
manager at a public radio station,public tv station.

(39:26):
Figuring out how to organize thiscommunity, to fight this is something
that's become, you know,it's baked into the urban fabric now.
And this is also about the rise ofhistoric preservation during the fifties
and sixties.
Again, lots of positive things abouthistoric preservation, but again,
like most things, you've givena tool to the community to say no.
You've given an excuse to say no andit makes building even more difficult.

>> Jon Hartley (39:48):
It's fascinating, the whole history is amazing.
And we were talking earlier thatJane Jacobs spent quite a bit of time
in Toronto, where I'm from.
And physically where I am today.
But yeah, she spent some of her lifeliving in New York as well, and you'd

(40:08):
spend time on a panel up here with herwhen she was still alive here in Toronto.
I want to shift a little bit.
We're going to get back tocities at the end here.
But another big theme in your researchis your work on law and economics and
political economy with Andrei Shleifer andAlbert Alsina.
I'm really interested in some of, I think,your biggest contributions there.

(40:33):
The things that really come to mindare things like The Doing Business index,
legal origins.
How did those ideas kind of happen?
So legal origins has this kind ofhistory with Hayek wrote about legal
origins a bit, but I askedJerome Acemoglu recently on the podcast

(40:54):
what his best case forcolonial origins or legal origins was.
And his argument was that legalorigins was too broad and
that you could have sort of differentimplementations of different types of,
say, French law in differentparts of the world.
And I'm just curious what yourthoughts are on the legacy

(41:14):
of your research on legal origins.
I mean, there's still, I think,many papers being published today on,
on legal origins andtheir long-term effects.
But it's interesting how you do havethis argument that common law is
just more efficient than civil law,I think is really compelling.
And you're seeing certain countries like,say, the UAE adopting common law courts.

(41:39):
And I feel like that's certainlyis a win for legal origins,
and I think it certainly haspaid some of the success for
UAE's recently resurgent economy.
I'm curious, what do you think about whenyou think about the legacy of your work?

>> Edward Glaeser (41:56):
So I don't think I deserve.
So both The Doing Business report wasdone by Simeon Djankov and Andre.
I have certainly written papers thatrelate to The Doing Business report.
In fact, we have a recent paper in the AERthat uses a module from The Doing Business
report that tries to understandwhy procurement practices are so
different across space.
But I had nothing to do withthe original implementation of
The Doing Business report andeven legal origins.

(42:18):
I co-authored a paper withAndre called Legal Origins.
I most certainly did that, as I dida number of papers from that time period.
But the original empirical workdocumenting the impact of legal origins,
that's Andre's.
That's really his, not mine.
To the extent to which you believethe model in Legal Origins and
the history that sort of says thatin a country in which in France,

(42:42):
fundamentally, the noblesare more afraid of each other and
of outside conquest,than they are of the king.
And so they're kind of far more eagerto have a strong monarch that's able to
protect them in England because of itsoceans, because of a number of other
institutional details, they're more afraidof the king than they are of each other.
They wanted to restrict the power ofthe king, and that's what that paper is.

(43:03):
And that sort of explainswhat follows afterwards.
And we wrote a number of institutionalpapers during that time,
coes versus ecosians, the regulation paperin the Journal of Economic Literature.
And I'm quite proud of that work, butI don't see of it as necessarily sort of
universally making the case for commonlaw as being the only thing that works.

(43:26):
I do think, in general, things that sortof put brakes on the sovereign are kind of
desirable things, but there are alsoinefficiencies that can come around in
Commonwealth countries as well.

>> Jon Hartley (43:36):
Any thoughts on just institutional or
institutions in general as beingthe fundamental cause of growth?
And you wrote a very famouspaper with Andre and co-authors.

>> Edward Glaeser (43:49):
Yeah, I'll take credit for that one, yeah, 100%.
I'll own that one.
So my view is that most of the time,
institutions are fairly malleable andthat, in fact,
what kind of matters is human capitalin terms of the long run performance?
I mean, if you think aboutsort of Singapore, right?
It's not that Singapore, on independence,had amazing level of institutions.

(44:12):
They had an amazing guy that they gotvery lucky with in Lee Kuan Yew, and
Lee Kuan Yew took them through thisremarkable human capital investment thing,
which is amazing.
Similarly, South Korea was a militarydictatorship at the end of the war.
It wasn't like it had somefantastic institutions, but
it did have a tradition of education thatended up working out reasonably well for

(44:33):
it as it transitioned to democracy.
So I, in general,
certainly am on the view that it's notthat institutions don't matter, they do.
I just see them as beinghighly endogenous and
not likely to be seen as the rightlong-term cause of things.

>> Jon Hartley (44:47):
That maybe growth causes institutional-

>> Edward Glaeser (44:50):
In many cases,
absolutely.

>> Jon Hartley (44:53):
And I think what's great about that paper is, you know,
one of the big institutions things.
And, of course, these things, I thinkinstitutions can mean lots of things.
But for Jerome, andcertainly Jerome's work, obviously,
democracy plays a reallylooms large in that.
And I think the point that you make thatI think is such a fascinating example, or

(45:18):
perhaps counterexample to drone'sclaims that democracy causes
growth in a big way,is that you look at the east Asian tigers,
Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea.
All these countries grew to effectivelywestern living standards or

(45:40):
GDP per capita levels by the 1990s,at which point they
still hadn't transitionedto democracies quite yet.
I mean, some were never,
Hong Kong has never reallytransitioned to being democrat.
But just that counterpoint that you canstill grow to being effectively a country
that's got western living standards undernon democratic regimes is kind of like

(46:05):
this fascinating counterexample tothe argument that at least democracy
causes growth and perhaps there'sother institutional interactions.

>> Edward Glaeser (46:15):
I agree with that.
I do think there's a lot to like aboutsort of limiting the expropriatory power
of the sovereignty, but
there are plenty of non democraticregimes that manage to do that.
I mean, the sort of magic of you thinkabout the transition in terms of
the glorious revolution in England and
the ability of parliament tocommit to pay itself back.

(46:35):
Parliament is a verylimited democracy in 1700.
This is not a, and I think also, Icertainly, I think democracy is generally
a good system and I think it's a goodthing that we have, we have votes.
But I think it's notthe only thing to look for.
I mean, if you ask me, would I be ifyou gave me a choice between the Weimar

(46:57):
republic and living in the stableAustro-Hungarian empire under Franz Josef,
where freedoms were very sacrosanct?
I would take the Habsburgsany day of the week.
So it's speaking of someone whosefather was born in Berlin in 1930 and
watched what the excesses of democracymanaged to do in Germany and
Berlin during his childhood.

>> Jon Hartley (47:16):
Well, it's interesting, too, the East Asian, I mean,
I fully agree.
Democracy, I think its role is,I think historically is really more one
of redistribution rather than,say, causing just overall growth.
But I'm curious, and it's important thatwe have for that reason of redistribution.
But I'm curious, I do hear the Asian Tigerexamples come up a little bit

(47:40):
more recently, but really inthe context of industrial policy.
And some people credit their growth to
different forms of industrial policy.
I don't know if you have any thoughts ortakes on that,
given that there's this research andinterest in industrial.

(48:00):
Policy, nobody seems in my mindto really name it specific
industrial policies that work well,but people like to point to it and
it's this kind of hot word,hop on where obviously,
there's the CHIPS and Science Act andcertain non economic foreign
policy interests with wineoffshore chips away from China.

(48:23):
But I feel it's a different argumentthan the universal argument that,
well, industrial policy isa secret sauce to growth.

>> Edward Glaeser (48:33):
Okay, so here's my take on industrial policy.
When Lee Kuan Yew did it, it was basicallyhuman capital policy masking as industrial
policy, right,hiding as industrial policy.
What happened is he sort of graduallyupskilled his people by starting them off
in light manufacturing andthen moving them up the scale.
And as they built skills,they became more productive, right?

(48:54):
Lee Kuan Yew was able to do things.
Singapore in general is able to dothings that most other countries
aren't able to pull offeffectively at all.
If you told me that it would be possibleto have an industrial policy in the US,
that upscale people,I would say that's conceivable to me.
Do I actually believe that anythingthat would come out of Washington would
actually do that?

(49:14):
No, not in a million years.
Getting industrial policy rightis incredibly hard, right?
Precisely, because I think the best casefor it is it's about upskilling workers
and I just don't see any evidence thatsuggests that America is able to do that.
When I look, I have a new paper whichlooks at road roughness across America.

(49:35):
And in many cities that we are able tolook at, there's basically no correlation
between the subsequentprobability of being repaved and
how rough the roads are, right?
So we look at road roughnessat one point in time.
We look over the next eight months,basically most cities.
Denver is an exception.
But most cities, there's basically nocorrelation between road repaving and
roughness.
If we can't target road repaving properly,right,

(49:56):
how in the world are we gonna becapable of figuring out some complex
industrial policy thatachieves something brilliant?
So I think hubris is a great sin.
I think having realistic views ofwhat we're able to do as a country is
important, and I think we shouldbe focusing on things like,
can we actually improvethe quality of our infrastructure?

(50:16):
Can we improve the quality of our schools?
Rather than thinking we're gonna havesome magic around industrial policy.
If you told me you wanted to be opento some sort of ramped up earned
income tax credit, maybe even onethat is regionally delineated,
that sort of was largerin high jobless areas.
I'm open to that, but that's notthe same thing as saying, you know,

(50:37):
what should go in eastern Tennessee.
I know there should be a little bitmore encouragement for people to work in
eastern Tennessee, but I have no ideawhat businesses are going to work there.

>> Jon Hartley (50:45):
That's fascinating and certainly, I think too on infrastructure,
but a lot of implications for how useful,I guess paving roads might be for physical
stimulus, at least as our existingsort of infrastructure system stands.
I wanna talk a little bit about crime.
Any thoughts on recent trends in crime,particularly in coastal urban environments

(51:06):
like San Francisco,including their causes and consequences?

>> Edward Glaeser (51:11):
Sure, so the long arc of this is crime went
crazy in the US from 60 to 75, right?
And then it kind of bubbled around for15 years.
I wrote a paper in 1999 called, why isthere so much crime in cities which seems

(51:31):
to have coincided perfectly withthe decline of crime in cities.
And in fact,
I would have said in 2010 that largelyreducing urban crime was one of
the great urban triumphs that had occurredin the sort of post industrial world.
The fact that New York was much saferthan it had been in my childhood,
the fact that Chicago had gotten safe,all of these were great triumphs.

(51:52):
Now, at the same time,
they were triumphs that occurred withfar too much mass incarceration and
far too much maltreatment ofordinary people on the street.
And we tolerated that for, I guess,understandable political reasons, but
it still was a terriblething that we tolerated.
Now, all of this has blown up over thelast ten years in anger over policing, and

(52:14):
particularly with the horrendousimages of the murder of George Floyd.
And we had this temporary movement,
which was basically like the policeare the problem, not the solution.
And particularly in progressive cities,San Francisco, Seattle,
there was a tendency to accept that wewere just gonna shut down on policing.

(52:34):
We weren't good at it.
The policing was not a thingcities needed to do.
We were gonna defund the police.
Well, I can't think of anything moreidiotic than defunding the police, right?
This is an incredibly foolish thing.
Cities need policing.
The police may badly need reform andI actually believe strongly.
It's one of the cases that we make insurvival of the city that you actually
want to measure how the police are doingnot just on victimization, but

(52:54):
how well people are enjoyingtheir interactions with police.
Are the police treating them with respect?
Are they actually acting in the waythat good public servants should be?
Because what gets measured gets managedas the great Austrian American,
Peter Drucker famously opined,but that doesn't mean defunding.
And I think that there's no free lunch inpolicing as there isn't anywhere else.

(53:18):
And if you want the police to both fightcrime and treat people with respect,
you're gonna have to pay more forit, not less for it.
Whereas this sort of detour that we wentthe other direction, where the whole bunch
of people saw the police fund departmentsas piggy banks, this was just crazy.
And hopefully we're moving back to thatand trying to reclaim the city streets.

>> Jon Hartley (53:38):
Final question on here and this is just back to cities in general.
You've written twoexcellent books on cities,
two tour de forces in my mind ortwo fantastic books in my mind.
The triumph of the city and the survivalof the city and I'm just curious.

(53:58):
In the future, will cities in your mindbe more or less central in your mind?
Given remote work asa technological advance,
climate risks the possibilityof future pandemics,
renewed nuclear power fears, andglobal competition amongst countries.

(54:20):
Where in your mind,do cities stand in the future?
Obviously, forecasting is somethingthat economists should never really do,
or without some humility.
But I'm curious,where do you see cities going?

>> Edward Glaeser (54:33):
Okay, so let's just do geographies on this.
So in the US, I will still make a case forcities continuing to be important, right?
It's been 40 years, 44 years since AlvinToffler wrote the third wave where he
predicted that cities would empty out aswe all just connected in cyberspace for
39 of those years.
He was completely and totally wrong.

(54:53):
Because at least in my interpretation ofit, this face-to-face connections are more
likely to complement electronicinteractions than to substitute from them.
Because globalization and new technologiesradically increase the returns to being
smart and we are social species that getsmart vibing around other smart people.
Yes, it is true, that has been a toughthree or four years for cities.
But I think fundamentally in the USbecause of this tremendous return

(55:14):
that we get from being around otherpeople, both the pleasure of it and
the productivity of it,I'm not counting cities out.
Now, this is a debatable point.
You can put your advisor, Nick Bloom and
I can argue some of this andwe can have a thing.
But if you want to give me sub saharanAfrica or India or Latin America or

(55:35):
any place that isn't the very rich world,all of this stuff is just silly.
Because cities are the future, right, and
there's no non urban alternative forSub-Saharan Africa that looks any good.
And especially on our globallattice of travel and trade, right,
the opposite to urban life in Africatends to be subsistence agriculture.

(55:57):
That's at far more risk from globalwarming than anything else that
goes around.
So I continue to believe, particularly inthe developing world, the future is urban.
I think working on making the citiesof the developing world more humane and
more productive, safer.
This is one of the greatvocations of the 21st century.
And certainly, this is where I plan onspending a lot of my effort in whatever
years I have left on this planet.

>> Jon Hartley (56:19):
Well, it's a huge honor to have you on, really.
I think cities are so essential togrowth and I think economic growth,
what causes economic growth is really,I think the fundamental question
in economics or one of the mostimportant questions in economics.
And I think you've done reallymore incredible work in this

(56:42):
area than almost any otherscholar has in recent decades.
And so I'm just totally amazed by yourthinking and how now it's become so
mainstream to talk about zoning andland use regulations.
Really, an amazing opportunityhere to talk with you on

(57:03):
your incredible career and ideas.
So thank you so much for joining us.

>> Edward Glaeser (57:08):
Thank you so much for having me on.
It was a pleasure.

>> Jon Hartley (57:10):
This is the Capitalism and Freedom in the 21st Century podcast,
an official podcast of the HooverEconomic Policy Working Group where we
talk about economics,markets and public policy.
I'm Jon Hartley, your host.
Thanks so much for joining us.
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