May 29, 2025 • 45 mins
What if everything we believe about “clean energy” is built on a myth?
French historian Jean-Baptiste Fressoz joins Power Struggle to challenge the dominant narrative of energy transition. From coal in electric cars to the illusion of hydrogen aircraft, Fressoz unpacks how modern societies haven’t replaced fossil fuels — they’ve layered more and more energy on top. This episode questions climate optimism, explores the real drivers of energy growth, and argues why sufficiency — not just innovation — must be part of the path forward.
The energy conversation is polarizing. But the reality is multidimensional. Get the full story with host Stewart Muir.
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Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (00:00):
There is no shift from coal to oil.
It doesn't work like that.
Actually, when oil is expandingin the 20th century, it is a
very strong stimulus for theconsumption of coal, for a very
simple reason oil mainly servesto power automobiles, and to
build an automobile you need atremendous amount of coal.
In the 1930s you need 7 tons ofcoal to produce a car.
(00:22):
Nowadays, in China, it's aroundthree tons of coal.
So coal is a major ingredientof the automobile sector, and
all the oil infrastructure iscompletely dependent on steel
and therefore on coal.
So we have to get rid of allthis narrative, be they
political or something else.
It doesn't work at all.
Stewart Muir (00:52):
If you're enjoying Power Struggle, make sure to
subscribe, share this episodeand leave us a review.
It helps us keep fact-basedenergy conversations going and
gets these voices into more ears.
My guest today is Jean-BaptisteVersoes, a French historian of
science and technology and theauthor of More and More and More
, an all-consuming history ofenergy.
It's a sweeping look at whymodern societies can't stop
(01:14):
growing.
He's a researcher at the FrenchNational Center for Scientific
Research in Paris, and his workhas challenged some of the core
assumptions behind our energyand climate debates, especially
the idea of an energy transition.
Instead, frissot argues, weaccumulate, we don't transition.
Layer upon layer, growth upongrowth.
(01:37):
Today, we're going to explorewhy that matters and what it
means for anyone trying to buildthe future of energy.
Jean-baptiste, welcome to theshow.
I've got a question for you.
What is energy transition?
I?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (01:50):
think nowadays it means something that
will solve the climate issue,that will stop climate change,
so something that will allow usto get out of fossil fuels in
three or four decades globally.
Basically, that is what isunderstood in the climate debate
(02:11):
nowadays.
What I think is interesting isthat most of the time people
referring to energy transition,very often they have a history
in mind, but it is a falsehistory.
They explain that what we haveto do is a new energy transition
.
Like John Kerry, the US envoyfor climate change under the
(02:37):
previous American administration, explained that the energy
transition is like a newindustrial revolution, as if
there was something in ourhistory that was similar to what
we have to do nowadays facingclimate change.
Industrialization or theindustrial revolution is
certainly not an energytransition.
It is the expansion of allenergies and all raw materials.
(02:59):
So what I was interested in asa historian is the fact that
history and a bad history ofenergy, a stagist history of
energy has played a discrete butcentral ideological role in the
plausibility of an energytransition, as if we were able
to shift entirely from a fossilfuel-based economy to a
(03:21):
renewable or nuclear-basedeconomy globally in three
decades.
This is meaningless.
I mean this is absurd andthat's why I was interested by
this political use of historyand I thought it was important
to retell the history of energyin a different way not as a
story of successive transitions,which is the classic way of
telling history of energy, butas a history of symbiotic
(03:42):
expansion of energies andmaterials together.
Stewart Muir (03:45):
In French what was the name of the book when it
was first published?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (03:48):
the French title it was called Sans
Transition, Une NouvelleHistoire de.
L'energie.
And what is that in English?
Without Transition, A NewHistory of Energy.
And then there was a banneraround the book which stated La
transition n'aura pas lieu thetransition will not happen, will
not take place.
And I think most of thecomments were about the banner,
(04:12):
because people were not veryhappy that an historian would
talk about the future.
It seemed as a completeintellectual fault.
But I think good history, goodhistory of energy, can help us
understand what will happen inthe next 20 or 30 years.
Stewart Muir (04:27):
Just to stay with the title.
The English language title isdifferent than out transition.
It's more and more and more so.
It's kind of the other side ofhow we have energy in our lives.
Was that a deliberate decisionto not go with the French
meaning no?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (04:43):
it's because sans transition sounds
good.
In French it's a.
There is a pun here In English.
It didn't work very well.
So a colleague of mine saidit's better, more and more and
more.
It's actually what the book isabout, actually, and it's not
only about energy, it's aboutall raw materials, which I think
is a very problematic point.
I mean, it's not only energywhich is cumulative, it's not
(05:04):
only energy which is cumulative,it's the consumption of all and
every raw material.
So yeah, more and more and moredescribe this dynamic of
accumulation and not transition.
Stewart Muir (05:15):
You have a quote from an American forester in
1928.
You have to go to the footnotesto find out the background.
By the way, you have the bestfootnotes I always.
I learned in grad school.
You start a good book readingthe last sentence of every
chapter and then read thefootnotes.
But what was that quotationfrom the American forester in
1928?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (05:35):
Basically , he was walking through
Manhattan, which was being builtwith skyscrapers made of
concrete, bricks and steel, andhe said don't worry, you know,
trees will be needed, forestswill be needed, because raw
materials are never obsolete.
And this is a 1928 statementwhich has been perfectly
(05:57):
verified by the followinghistory Along the 20th century,
we have consumed a wider arrayof raw material and each raw
material is consumed in greaterquantity.
So this was a very interestingprediction and it has proven to
be completely true.
Actually, raw materials arenever obsolete despite all the
(06:17):
innovations.
And I think this is really oneof the key arguments of the book
is that we tend to confusehistory of technology with
history of materials.
When you think about thedynamics of technology, you can
find technologies becomingobsolete.
It's not the case with rawmaterials.
The history of technology ismade of shifts, of
transformation, of big changes.
(06:39):
The history of raw materials ismuch more boring.
Everything is expanding all thetime, more and more rapidly.
Actually.
Stewart Muir (06:47):
Don't confuse the history of technology with the
history of materials.
Yeah, exactly, they're twodifferent things.
You have Another similar phrasedon't confuse the history of
technology with the history ofinnovation.
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (06:59):
Yes, this is a key point.
I mean this is inspired from agreat historian of technology
called David Edgerton, who madethis point very clear in a book
called Shock of the Old, and itis true that when you think
about our conversation abouttechnology nowadays, it is
always focused on innovation weare talking not about.
(07:19):
In fact, when you read newspaperand the technology pages of
newspaper, they're not abouttechnology.
They are about very particularkind of technologies.
Most of the time they are aboutactually IT, artificial
intelligence, computers and theyconfuse all the technology that
we use with the technologicalfrontier.
(07:39):
But the technological frontier,the innovation, it's a very
limited set of technologies andit has had a very, very negative
effect on our understanding ofthe climate challenge, because
most of the time when we reflectupon what we should do to solve
the climate issue, we're goingto talk about innovations, new
(08:01):
technologies that are going todecarbonize this or that sector,
but you know, innovations is avery limited part of the
material world.
I mean, what creates climatechange is all the accumulation
of old techniques and old waysof doings and we have to talk
about all these.
Stewart Muir (08:20):
Let's start at the beginning.
You mentioned political history, and in the book you write
about the attraction there isfor the political history of
energy.
But that's also, you say, itsflaw this tendency to present
climate change as a capitalistconspiracy.
You're for it, and you also saythat getting out of carbon will
(08:42):
be far more difficult thangetting out of capitalism.
Yeah, and that is a conditionthat is probably necessary, but
it's not even enough.
What is the root of thisunderstanding?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (08:54):
I mean to understand this idea, you have
to know a little bit about thehistoriography of energy.
Basically, since we are talkingmassively about climate change,
there is a new generation ofenergy historians who have tried
to propose a political readingof the history of energy,
explaining that, for instance,the shift from coal to oil was a
(09:16):
way for capitalists tocircumvent the miners and the
trade unions of the miners.
That were very powerful becausethey had in their hands the
flow of energy in the economy.
And, of course, oil is muchmore, is fluid, is liquid, it's
less labor intensive.
They believe it's more capitalintensive, so it gives more
power to the capitalists.
(09:37):
So this kind of history isflawed in a very deep way
because it's two stages.
There is no shift from coal tooil.
It doesn't work like that.
Actually, when oil is expandingin the 20th century, it is a
very strong stimulus for theconsumption of coal, for a very
simple reason.
It is that oil mainly serves topower automobiles.
And to build an automobile youneed a tremendous amount of coal
(10:00):
.
In the 1930s you need seventons of coal to produce a car.
Nowadays in China it's aroundthree tons of coal.
So coal is a major ingredientof the automobile sector.
It is the first actuallyingredient of an automobile
right, and all the oilinfrastructure is completely
dependent on steel and thereforeon coal.
(10:20):
So we have to get rid of allthese stages narrative, be they
political or something else.
It doesn't work at all.
And it is true that I thinkframing the climate issue as the
kind of end results ofcapitalism of course capitalism
is clearly a driving force forthe accumulation of wealth and
(10:41):
therefore of emissions.
Obviously, I mean it'scompletely, completely trivial.
Nevertheless, getting out offossil fuels is a much deeper
change than just changing theownership of, of private
property.
It is probable that if you wantto be serious about climate
change, you need to transformownership.
(11:01):
I mean you cannot leave justwealthy people decide where they
invest because, I mean,extracting oil is lucrative,
right, so they're going to dothat, obviously.
But getting out of oil and coaland gas has tremendous impact
for all sorts of sectors.
Has tremendous impact for allsorts of sectors, like
agriculture, for instance.
In a socialist system, you needto eat and you will need gas to
(11:23):
produce fertilizer, you willneed plastic to package the food
.
So I mean agriculture iscompletely embedded into a
fossil fuel economy.
Today, I mean, you wouldn'thave the possibility to feed 8
billion people without a massiveinflux of fossil fuels in the
(11:45):
agricultural system.
And the same goes with concrete.
I mean, concrete is a veryuseful material.
It is very widely used becauseit is cheap, it is convenient.
On the other hand, it is usedto make very useless things like
building huge skyscrapers.
So we can imagine, with achange in the economic system
there would, there would be lessskyscrapers and more useful
(12:09):
buildings, hospitals and schoolsand so on, but nevertheless you
would still need the cement youknow to produce the bridges,
for instance, and these goes onand on and on.
So it's so.
It's an extremely deeptransformation of the material
world in an extremely shortperiod of time.
It is a kind of, I think,technological fantasy.
Stewart Muir (12:28):
One of the things you talk about and I think it's
great because you bring this tolife through your storytelling
you must be a great teacher,because you have all these good
examples in the book, and onethat was talked about a lot when
it first came out was the coalmining and wood, the idea that,
okay, coal is coming along, sowood will become obsolete
because coal is better, it'sbetter fuel, it's more heat,
(12:48):
everything.
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (12:49):
What really happened, I mean when you
teach the history ofindustrialization most of the
time you say that the industrialrevolution is a shift from a
wood-based energy system to acoal-based energy system, which
is true from a certain point ofview, but it is false when you
look seriously at materials.
For one simple reason toextract coal you need an
(13:11):
enormous amount of timber pigprops, timber mining, pick props
, timber mining to the extentthat Britain in the 20th century
consumed more wood in the formof pick props than Britain burn
in the 18th century.
So the more you extract coal,the more you need timber
actually.
So that I mean when you thinkabout coal you need to think
(13:34):
about timber.
They are not in competition,they are in symbiosis.
And without abundant timber,industrialized countries would
have had very little coal.
Therefore no steam, no steel,no red waste, et cetera, et
cetera.
So timber is not like asecondary factor for the energy
system of rich countries in the20th century.
(13:55):
It is a central aspect of thehistory of energy in the 20th
century in.
It is a central aspect of thehistory of energy in the 20th
century in the industrializedworld.
Right, and it goes even furtherthan that, actually, the
consumption of wood energy inrich countries in the 20th
century, despite coal anddespite oil, does increase.
You consume more and more woodtoday to produce electricity.
(14:17):
In Europe, for instance, youconsume more and more wood to
power the packaging industry,because most of the packaging is
based on paper and the paperindustry is a huge industrial
consumer of energy, the fourthindustrial consumer of energy
globally.
And this symbiosis betweenenergy you know they extend in a
(14:40):
, they have far-reachingconsequences.
In the 20th century you have agrowing economy which is fueled
by coal and oil.
That creates more and moregoods.
Those goods need to be packaged, so you consume more and more
paper, cardboard and the paperindustry consumes more and more
wood energy.
So the more you've got oil andcoal, the more you've got wood
energy.
In the paper industry consumedmore and more wood energy.
So the more you got oil andcoal, the more you got wood
energy in the paper industry,for instance.
(15:00):
You really have to think aboutthe history of energies and
material together and they arecompletely intricated, embedded,
connected together.
The major drawback in thehistory of energy, as it is told
till today it is that most ofthe time historians have been
interested in the competitionbetween energies, in how energy
(15:21):
systems are shifting, how coaldisplays wood in the tea
industry, for instance.
But this is just one part ofthe story.
You know, of course energiescan be in competition in certain
sectors, but globally, what hashappened is rather the
symbiotic expansion ofeverything Of everything, except
for one thing.
Stewart Muir (15:39):
You mentioned one commodity in the world that
we're using less of.
What is it?
Sheep wool, because ofsynthetic fibers, nylons.
So everything else has gone up,so it's really an energy
addition, not a transition.
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (15:53):
It's more than addition.
Sorry, it's more than anaddition, because addition gives
the impression that you canjust.
You know the things areseparated, that you can take off
one bit and replace it byanother, but in fact it's
completely intricate.
You know, there is a verysimple example like an electric
car.
Of course it's better than apetroleum engine car.
(16:14):
Nevertheless, to build anelectric car you need a
tremendous amount of coal.
That's why there are three tonsof coal in cars in China.
So I mean, it's not that theyare just adding up on top of
each other.
The energies are completelyintertwined.
Stewart Muir (16:30):
So what's a better term for me to use than energy
addition, if it's more?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (16:34):
subtle.
I mean the word I use is energysynthesis, so that describes
quite well what has happened inthe 20th century.
I hope it will not describewhat will happen in the 21st
century, but for the moment weare still completely in the
energy synthesis.
Stewart Muir (16:48):
Well, you don't want to see an energy synthesis
continue.
You called for something muchmore dramatical, a term that
everyone, when they hear it,will probably wince You're
calling for an energy amputation.
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (17:00):
I mean I'm not calling for this or that
.
I just I mean just underlinethe very, very simple fact that
the point is not just to seerenewable expand.
If it was only that, it wouldbe easy, because you know you
can put money on the table tobuild solar panels or wind
turbines.
It's not a problem.
The problem is to get rid offossil fuels, which is which is
(17:20):
a much, much more difficultthing to do I mean incredibly
more difficult and, in a way,capitalism.
Capitalism has been good atinnovating and putting up new
stuff.
It has been very bad at takingoff things and stuff and
energies.
I mean history of capitalism.
It's, I mean, of course it.
It has been told in aSchumpeterian way, inspired by
Joseph Schumpeter, asdestructive creation, but in
(17:43):
fact the destructive part is notthat important.
I mean, in material terms therehas been no destruction, just
increase.
Stewart Muir (17:51):
So you talk a little about some of the
different energy forms.
You've already mentionedrenewables, which means wind and
solar, and hydro and geothermal.
Maybe there's some others thatfit in the bucket.
You also talk about hydrogenpowered aircraft as a hypothesis
, because we don't have them yet.
Fusion or a third industrialrevolution, whatever that might
(18:15):
be.
We're also talking at the IPCCabout more carbon capture,
utilization and storage, ccus.
We're talking about anythingthat will help to either
sequester carbon or prevent morecarbon from going out into the
atmosphere.
Is that a pretty gooddescription of the options we
have?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (18:36):
You could add up nuclear to the.
Stewart Muir (18:39):
Nuclear, not just fusion, but traditional, yeah,
traditional nuclear, yeah wellthe first three, I mean you're.
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (18:45):
I think the thing that is missing
massively is sufficiencyreduction of demands.
I mean that's something we havenot been talking about it so
much, especially in the IPCCreport, which I think is a big
problem.
But if we were serious aboutclimate change and we are not
serious about climate changethat would be actually a key
topic of discussion.
What is really useful?
(19:06):
What do we really need?
What is the welfare associatedto this or that CO2 emission?
That should be the key topic ofdiscussion, and instead of that
we've got discussion abouthydrogen airplanes, about CCS,
like future technology that willprobably not exist even in the
far-away future.
So that's why I think all thisfocus on innovation has been a
(19:32):
powerful tool for doing nothing,for justifying procrastination.
I mean, the case of hydrogenairplane is perfect because when
you listen to the expert, theyexplain why it's not doable.
Hydrogen is three times lessdense than kerosene, than jet
fuel, aviation fuel.
So you need huge reservoirs.
(19:55):
You need to completely changethe shape of airplanes, so you
need to change theinfrastructure of airports.
To produce the hydrogen, youneed a tremendous amount of
electricity.
I mean, for the case of France,I made some very rough
calculations to produce the jetfuels that France uses today,
(20:15):
you would need the whole nuclearfleet to produce the green
hydrogen to produce these jetshells.
So I mean, we know that willnot happen.
There won't be hydrogenairplanes flying sooner, even
and later.
So what is the use of all thisblah blah about hydrogen
airplane?
Frankly, what is it used for?
(20:36):
So Airbus is still talkingabout hydrogen airplane, frankly
, what is it used for?
So Airbus is still talkingabout hydrogen airplane, but
Boeing has said no, we won't bedoing hydrogen airplane.
You know, this is rubbish.
And this is where history isinteresting, because the project
of an hydrogen airplane is veryold.
I found article from 1974talking about hydrogen airplane.
It was Lockheed who was workingon a hydrogen airplane and they
were pointinged who was workingon a hydrogen airplane and they
(20:59):
were pointing to problems whichare still not resolved today.
So I think the use of talkingabout hydrogen airplane is just
to keep planes flying and peopletaking the plane without
worrying too much, just thinkingthat in a few decades their
children will be flying withoutchanging the climate.
But this is rubbish, this is afalse premise.
Stewart Muir (21:18):
In 2023, the world gathered in Dubai for the
annual climate summit and therewas a stock take document that
resulted from that.
And that is always interestingwhen you have that, because it
means that it has to beunanimous.
So all the countries of theworld that were there which is
basically all the countries ofthe world 200, call it agreed
(21:41):
that if we could do the all ofthe above solution more natural
gas, more hydro, more renewables, more, did I say, nuclear, more
carbon capture if we do all ofthese things, we will be, in the
eyes of all humanities,representatives who went to
(22:01):
Dubai in November, december 2023in the right direction.
Were they right or wrong?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (22:07):
I mean I think that shows that the COP
are probably not about climateanymore.
They've become kind ofindustrial expo, universal expo,
where fossil fuel interests areextremely powerful, so they are
more and more criticized.
I mean being just a kind ofgathering of various interests
(22:31):
and the climate movement hasbeen kind of co-opted by the
international, the UNO, all theclimate system.
It has become a kind of ritualin a way.
The international communitygather together they say we care
about the climate change, butit's just for the show.
Stewart Muir (22:55):
Now you said that transition puts capital on the
right side of the climate battle, which is kind of an extension
of what you've just said, andyou are concerned about this.
But I would like to take thedevil's advocate position.
I would like to say look at allthe evidence that investment in
energy efficiency, investmentin better environmental
(23:16):
practices, in better hardware,better regulations, better
everything has allowed the worldas it exists today to get us
moving in the right direction.
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (23:27):
I mean, you're totally right that
capitalism innovation has beenpretty good at making the
economic system more efficientin material ways, but it is not
new.
I mean there have been hugegains in efficiency in the past
(23:48):
and I'm not sure there will besuch important gains in the
future.
Just to give you a few examplesIn the 1920s the industrialists
got rid of their steam engineand they replaced them with
electric motors.
Suddenly they divided by 10 thecarbon intensity of industrial
(24:09):
force in the industry.
Nowadays, with solar panels, wedivide by 10 the carbon
intensity of electricityproduction compared to gas power
plants.
What I want to say is we havebeen here before and nowadays
we're not on the threshold of acomplete change in the material
dynamics of capitalism whichmake it compatible to our
(24:30):
climate objective in 20 or 30years time.
This is really an illusion.
So I mean what I want tounderline.
My book is certainly not acritique of innovation and
technological progress.
I mean these things do exist.
Industrial processes aregetting more and more efficient,
but it is far from enough.
What we have to do is ofanother order of magnitude.
(24:52):
It's a different nature, andwhat worries me is that with
this idea of energy transition,we cultivate in the general
public the illusion that in 20or 30 years we'll have solved
the issue once and for all andthe economy will be able to
expand for the next followingcenturies without changing the
(25:14):
climate.
This is a very deepmisunderstanding of what will
happen.
I mean, the issue of climatechange will be with us for the
centuries to come and the issueof decreasing carbon emission
will be with us for thecenturies to come, and the issue
of decreasing carbon emissionwill be with us for the
centuries to come.
It's not a question of decades.
This is clearly false.
Stewart Muir (25:34):
We see countries that are quite proud of what
they call their climate progress, but in most cases they've
actually exported thoseemissions to other countries, to
countries like China that aremanufacturing goods with high
emissions and then exportingthem back.
I believe in the case of theUnited Kingdom they actually
have double the emissions as acountry, if you count that in.
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (25:55):
Half of the emissions of countries like
Britain or France comes from theimports of what French people
or British people are consuming.
So it's a very I mean so it's avery deep illusion when British
press is very proud of sayingthat Britain has got out of coal
.
Stewart Muir (26:14):
It is just true for the electricity production,
but it is certainly not true forthe British way of life, which
is completely dependent on thecoal for the production of steel
and the coal that goes in theimports to Britain the recent
news from Spain on significantblackouts, supposedly connected
to their net zero policies, andI don't know if that's true or
(26:36):
not Perhaps there's moreinformation to come but it
certainly resulted in many, manycommentators making that
connection and talking about it.
What do you make of thisdiscussion?
Is Spain, and therefore othercountries that are pursuing a
rapid adoption of wind?
Are they all headed for thesame problem of consistency?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (26:55):
I think we don't have yet a serious
report about what caused theblackout, so we should not rush
to conclusion.
I think there is a lot ofdisinformation about renewable
and electricity production.
It's probably not that easy toget a completely renewable
electric system.
To be clear, it's verychallenging.
(27:16):
I think it is costly, obviously.
But I think we should becareful because it is the only
place where there is some goodnews from the technology.
It is electricity.
I mean the fact that solarpanels are getting cheaper and
cheaper, that wind power is alsocompetitive is the only good
news in the technological domain.
(27:37):
So I think we should be reallycareful about not throwing the
baby with the water of the bath.
In the case of France, it isquite clear that all the
discourses against renewable arevery often connected to the
nuclear lobby.
So we should be I mean reallycautious about all the
discussion on energy.
Transition is problematicbecause very often it is about
(28:02):
certain lobbies pushing fortheir solutions.
You know it is very impressivethat part of the scientific
literature is the reflection ofthis fight between competing
lobbies, and that's why it hasbecome difficult to have, you
know, kind of honest appraisalof what is really doable with
(28:22):
renewable.
Can we completely decarbonizethe electric system entirely
with renewable.
It's not very clear where youcan have a kind of completely
trustworthy source ofinformation on this topic, which
is very damaging.
Stewart Muir (28:37):
Is there a litmus test that a reasonable person
could have in their hip pocketfor these to tell what's true?
How do I know if this is maybean industrial lobby message
that's gotten into things?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (28:50):
I think one of the best sources of
information is the annualInternational Energy Agency
report, because they are notabout future prospects, they're
about what is happening on theground.
So I think it's the best testthat every year in October there
is a report saying what hashappened last year in the energy
(29:10):
world.
And the very disappointingthing is that every year they
hope that, for instance, coalwill peak, and every year they
postpone the peak of coal For along time.
It was thought that 24 would bethe year of the absolute
consumption of coal.
Now they say it might be before2030.
(29:31):
So I mean and the problem isnot only peak, of course,
because the date of the peak isnot really important what is
important is what will happenafter the peak.
Will it be like a very rapidslope towards zero, or will it
be more like a plateau?
And the probability is that itwill be more like a plateau, and
it's what the report of theInternational Energy Agency is
(29:56):
now predicting.
Stewart Muir (29:58):
We've seen a global shift towards the use of
a lower carbon energy solutionfor a higher carbon one.
I'm talking about LNG andnatural gas.
It's really one of the bigglobal trends, especially since
the Russian invasion of Ukraine,but it was already well
underway for a long time.
What's your read on this trend?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (30:17):
I'm not really an expert on that so I
prefer not to comment on that.
For the climate issue, it'sprobably not a good news because
it makes gas more carbonintensive than gas from
pipelines.
So it's not such a good newsbecause you need to liquefy the
gas and then you need tore-treat it again into a gas
(30:38):
form.
So I mean it's certainly not agood news.
It's also a good news of gasbecause Europe at one point was
really paying enormous amountsof money to the US to buy
liquefied gas.
So it means that there was avery strong incentive to find
other sources of energy.
(30:58):
And you know it's not what hashappened.
So I mean it shows a very, verystrong dependency of even the
most advanced economies to gas.
Yes, certainly not an energy ofthe past.
It will grow in the future.
It has very strong decadesahead of it.
Stewart Muir (31:15):
Now we've seen France, which I think is widely
known, a country very heavilyreliant on nuclear energy, which
I think checks the boxes as apositive type of energy for
climate.
But even France is nowimporting LNG for natural gas.
I believe they just signed along-term contract with a Middle
(31:36):
Eastern country to haveshiploads of LNG In Canada.
We've seen the Quebecgovernment, which often has an
affinity with France forcultural reasons, have an
opportunity to send natural gasas LNG to France.
That sea voyage is really justa few days and very efficient.
(31:56):
Some of the negatives of LNGthat you don't want it on the
sea for too long because it willproduce its energy amount.
Long because it will produceits energy amount.
But instead of getting it fromCanada, france is getting it
from a source in the Middle East.
Due to instability in the RedSea and the Suez Canal, a lot of
those LNG cargos are actuallycoming along the Cape of Good
(32:18):
Hope route down the south end ofAfrica and all the way up.
It's a very, very long way toget LNG.
Even a progressive climateforward country like France that
is proud of its nuclear recordis doing this.
Why do you think that is?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (32:34):
It's what I just explained.
I mean there is a very strongdependency on gas for various
industrial sectors to producefertilizer, to produce chemicals
.
I mean gas is not only anenergy, it's also a material, a
raw material for the chemicalindustry.
But I mean the worst, probably,is that France imports gas from
(32:56):
Russia, but not throughpipeline but through LNG, so
there is a dependency on Russiaeven after the Ukraine war.
So I mean it just demonstratesthat there is no easy
technological solution in manydifferent sectors and we have to
talk about different topics.
(33:18):
It's not about finding atechnological solution.
It's about changing profoundlywhat we consume and the amount
we consume.
I mean, the example of theClimate Citizen Assembly which
was gathered in 2019 in Franceis a very good example More than
100 citizens taken completelyrandomly across France and they
(33:39):
end up with excellent proposalsto reduce CO2 emissions.
You know it's about puttingvegetarian meals in the canteen
at school.
It's about increasing bicyclelanes, it's about insulating
homes.
You know, like serious, seriouschanges which necessitate money
(34:00):
, public money, investment, andthere is no magic wand, magic
technological wand in theproposal they have come with.
So, yeah, I think more and morepeople will agree that we need
to have this kind of discussion,because the other way is just
relying on technology, and rightnow what is the most popular
(34:22):
technology to reduce CO2emission is carbon capture and
storage.
I mean, britain has just put onthe table more than 20 billion
quid in the next decade tofinance CCS in the Northern Sea
and this money goes straightinto the pocket of Equinor,
statoil, eni, the Italiancompany, shell.
(34:46):
So it's really money goingstraight to the pocket of the
polluters and this is not goingto be accepted.
People will complain If youwant to do CCS on a massive
scale, you need to build a wholenew network of pipelines for
CO2 across the country.
People will not accept that itis public money, public green
money, going in the pocket ofall companies.
(35:10):
That doesn't sound very goodand it's not very popular.
So I think the more we willhave the effect of climate
change, the more that we willrealize that the technological
promises were just emptypromises, the more the
discussion will shift towards amuch more democratic and
political discussion about whatwe should do.
Stewart Muir (35:30):
That's completely fascinating.
You know, from my perspectivehere in Western Canada, I'm
obviously quite well aware of aproposal for carbon capture to
be installed in the oil sands innorthern Alberta, where the
idea is that, look, the oilsands produce a heavy land.
(35:52):
It's in very heavy demand inparts of the United States.
It's also now going toCalifornia by sea and now for
the first time in quantities, toChina, to Thailand, to India,
because of a new pipeline wehave.
And the industry is saying we,not just one company, but a
group of companies, five or sixcompanies have gotten together
(36:15):
to say we need a monumentalinvestment, like $30 billion,
into a carbon capture processwhere carbon is captured from
the refinery, it's piped to ageological storage site also in
Alberta where it can be storedindefinitely.
And if they succeed in doingthat, then they will have bought
(36:37):
a longer life for thisincredible resource that exists
in Northern Canada.
So from that point of view itmakes sense.
The technology seems to checkout.
Based on what you've said aboutcarbon capture, I don't think
you would be sympathetic to thisproposal.
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (36:55):
I mean, carbon capture and storage is a
kind of scam.
It consumes an enormous amountof energy.
It is polluting to capture theCO2 because you need chemical
substances to capture themolecules of CO2.
That creates other problems.
You need an enormousinfrastructure to transport the
(37:15):
CO2.
You need boats, you know, toput the CO2 into the sea, for
instance.
But the boats, you know we aretalking about gigatons of CO2.
If it has to be on scale, itmeans we have to create ex nilo,
a kind of new oilinfrastructure, but it will not
be producing oil, it will bejust storing CO2.
You know, this is really strange.
(37:36):
This is really a very, verystrange technological proposal.
We have to take it as it is.
I think it is a bluff, you know, and it shouldn't be taken
seriously.
There won't be like thousandsof boats specializing in
transporting liquefied CO2across the world.
It's not true.
We won't be building all thismassive infrastructure to
(37:58):
transport CO2, you know.
And once again, the energyconsumption of capturing CO2 is
important.
And what strikes me is thatmore recently I've studied the
history of CO2, of carboncapture and storage, and for the
21st years of the climatedebate, from the 1980s onward to
the year 2000,.
It was seen as rubbish, not asa serious proposal, for one
(38:20):
simple reason is that if youwant to do, for instance, coal
electricity with CCS, for everytwo or three coal power plants
you need to construct a third orfourth power plant to produce
the electricity to power the CCSequipment right.
So it is very inefficient.
And around the year, in one ofthe IPCC reports around the year
(38:44):
early 2000, they explained thatthat would make electricity
from coal with CCS moreexpensive than nuclear
electricity.
So what is the point?
It is meaningless.
And, interestingly enough, whohas pushed CCS?
It is clearly the fossil fuelindustries coal, oil, steel,
(39:06):
concrete, cement and from the1990s onward they push CCS.
There are three governmentsthat really push CCS One is USA,
the second is Norway and thethird is Canada.
And you know, for a long periodof time expertise was very
critical of this.
It was clearly seen as a kindof obvious delaying tactics.
(39:29):
And around the year in 2005,there is an IPCC report group
three report on CCS and suddenlyCCS became acceptable.
But when you look at theliterature that this report used
to demonstrate that CCS isdoable, it is all coming from
the fossil fuel industry.
So you've got an interestingcase where a technology which
(39:49):
seemed completely ludicrousbecame a green technology thanks
to IPCC, group 3, and now isreceiving plenty of public money
.
But, to be frank, I mean to beat scale.
We are talking about biggertons of CO2.
We are talking about a quantityof liquefied CO2, which will be
equivalent to the quantity ofoil that we are extracting and
(40:11):
transporting.
It took hundreds of billions Imean trillions of dollars to
create this oil infrastructure.
We won't be investing trillionsof dollars into an
infrastructure that does notcreate value.
Stewart Muir (40:24):
It has provided the oil and gas industry, the
emitting industries, with somehope to be able to mitigate
something, because it's not theindustry that is responsible for
demand, it's consumers whoconsume.
That's where demand comes from.
The oil and gas industryobviously facilitates that and
(40:48):
does so very profitably, but itis not the demand source.
And this really comes back tothe whole original problem.
Here I mean that the path aheadwill inevitably lead to
humanity giving up the qualityof life it has attained only
(41:08):
because of energy beingavailable.
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (41:11):
I think we have to.
Just, we need to have a seriousdiscussion about all these
technological promises, and weshould not believe the hype
about CCS.
We should not believe the hypeabout hydronic airplanes.
We should not believe the hypeof clean coal or clean cement or
clean steel.
These are not clean and theywon't be clean even in the
(41:33):
far-right future.
So we have to restrict ourtechnological hope to sectors
where technological solutionsare available right now at an
accessible cost, and it ismainly in the electricity sector
.
For all the rest, we need totalk about the level of
consumption, obviously.
But I agree with you, it's notjust the fossil fuel industry,
(41:53):
the whole demand, it's the, it'sour civilization which is
problematic.
I entirely agree with you andit is too comfortable to say
that this.
You know, climate change,change is just the result of bad
people, be they fossil fuellobbyists or whatever.
This is too comfortable for thegeneral public.
We are part of the problem,obviously.
I mean, because of all thesefalse promises under the banner
(42:15):
of energy transition, we don'thave the right political
discussion of climate change,which is mainly an issue of
redistribution.
I mean, what strikes me is thatthe biggest issue about climate
change is the North-South divide.
Basically, you've got climatechange which has been produced
by industrialized countries,which has very strong effect on
(42:37):
the poorest population not onthe average rich world poorest
population, not on the averagerich world, and this is the very
strong injustice that we haveto address.
This is really the key issueabout climate change and for
that it is completely normalthat the rich country talk about
degrowth, about what is reallyuseful or not useful, about the
(43:03):
differential usefulness of CO2.
I mean, obviously, for the caseof cement.
Let's take the case of cement.
Cement is extraordinarilydifficult to decarbonize.
Cement can be used to do usefulstuff.
Stewart Muir (43:14):
It can be used to do completely useless things,
and this is the discussion weneed to have Jean-Baptiste, I
know you're a father, you're acitizen of France, you're in the
biggest city of the country.
What gives you hope as you lookaround, your home and your city
and your country?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (43:35):
Not much for the moment, to be honest,
but I think we should notunderstand climate change as a
kind of apocalyptic thing,especially for the wealthiest
part of the population in theworld.
Once again, I mean, since youare mentioning my family, I'm
not worried about my kids, it'snot the issue.
(43:58):
What is really worrying is whatwill happen for subsistence
farmers who are completelydependent on climate for for,
for their life, for theirlivelihood.
This is really what.
What is at stake.
What's at stake is certainlynot the Paris or, or Vancouver,
or Toronto or whatever.
Stewart Muir (44:17):
If you could, through your work, your latest
book more and more and more, andyour future books, if you could
change one assumption thateverybody could take forward
from your work what would thatone thing be?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (44:35):
Do not expect the material world to
change radically in the next 20or 30 years.
I mean, technology will change,but the material basis of
civilization will remain similar.
There won't be a massive changesuddenly because we need to do
something about climate change.
This is a very naive vision ofthe material world.
Stewart Muir (44:53):
Jean-Baptiste Fersoz, you've joined me today
from Paris.
Thanks so much for devotingyour time and thought and for
the work you do.
It's been great having you onPower Struggle Thank you very
much, Stuart.
There is no shift from coal to oil.
It doesn't work like that.
Actually, when oil is expandingin the 20th century, it is a
very strong stimulus for theconsumption of coal, for a very
simple reason oil mainly servesto power automobiles, and to
build an automobile you need atremendous amount of coal.
In the 1930s you need 7 tons ofcoal to produce a car.
(00:22):
Nowadays, in China, it's aroundthree tons of coal.
So coal is a major ingredientof the automobile sector, and
all the oil infrastructure iscompletely dependent on steel
and therefore on coal.
So we have to get rid of allthis narrative, be they
political or something else.
It doesn't work at all.
Stewart Muir (00:52):
If you're enjoying Power Struggle, make sure to
subscribe, share this episodeand leave us a review.
It helps us keep fact-basedenergy conversations going and
gets these voices into more ears.
My guest today is Jean-BaptisteVersoes, a French historian of
science and technology and theauthor of More and More and More
, an all-consuming history ofenergy.
It's a sweeping look at whymodern societies can't stop
(01:14):
growing.
He's a researcher at the FrenchNational Center for Scientific
Research in Paris, and his workhas challenged some of the core
assumptions behind our energyand climate debates, especially
the idea of an energy transition.
Instead, frissot argues, weaccumulate, we don't transition.
Layer upon layer, growth upongrowth.
(01:37):
Today, we're going to explorewhy that matters and what it
means for anyone trying to buildthe future of energy.
Jean-baptiste, welcome to theshow.
I've got a question for you.
What is energy transition?
I?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (01:50):
think nowadays it means something that
will solve the climate issue,that will stop climate change,
so something that will allow usto get out of fossil fuels in
three or four decades globally.
Basically, that is what isunderstood in the climate debate
(02:11):
nowadays.
What I think is interesting isthat most of the time people
referring to energy transition,very often they have a history
in mind, but it is a falsehistory.
They explain that what we haveto do is a new energy transition
.
Like John Kerry, the US envoyfor climate change under the
(02:37):
previous American administration, explained that the energy
transition is like a newindustrial revolution, as if
there was something in ourhistory that was similar to what
we have to do nowadays facingclimate change.
Industrialization or theindustrial revolution is
certainly not an energytransition.
It is the expansion of allenergies and all raw materials.
(02:59):
So what I was interested in asa historian is the fact that
history and a bad history ofenergy, a stagist history of
energy has played a discrete butcentral ideological role in the
plausibility of an energytransition, as if we were able
to shift entirely from a fossilfuel-based economy to a
(03:21):
renewable or nuclear-basedeconomy globally in three
decades.
This is meaningless.
I mean this is absurd andthat's why I was interested by
this political use of historyand I thought it was important
to retell the history of energyin a different way not as a
story of successive transitions,which is the classic way of
telling history of energy, butas a history of symbiotic
(03:42):
expansion of energies andmaterials together.
Stewart Muir (03:45):
In French what was the name of the book when it
was first published?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (03:48):
the French title it was called Sans
Transition, Une NouvelleHistoire de.
L'energie.
And what is that in English?
Without Transition, A NewHistory of Energy.
And then there was a banneraround the book which stated La
transition n'aura pas lieu thetransition will not happen, will
not take place.
And I think most of thecomments were about the banner,
(04:12):
because people were not veryhappy that an historian would
talk about the future.
It seemed as a completeintellectual fault.
But I think good history, goodhistory of energy, can help us
understand what will happen inthe next 20 or 30 years.
Stewart Muir (04:27):
Just to stay with the title.
The English language title isdifferent than out transition.
It's more and more and more so.
It's kind of the other side ofhow we have energy in our lives.
Was that a deliberate decisionto not go with the French
meaning no?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (04:43):
it's because sans transition sounds
good.
In French it's a.
There is a pun here In English.
It didn't work very well.
So a colleague of mine saidit's better, more and more and
more.
It's actually what the book isabout, actually, and it's not
only about energy, it's aboutall raw materials, which I think
is a very problematic point.
I mean, it's not only energywhich is cumulative, it's not
(05:04):
only energy which is cumulative,it's the consumption of all and
every raw material.
So yeah, more and more and moredescribe this dynamic of
accumulation and not transition.
Stewart Muir (05:15):
You have a quote from an American forester in
1928.
You have to go to the footnotesto find out the background.
By the way, you have the bestfootnotes I always.
I learned in grad school.
You start a good book readingthe last sentence of every
chapter and then read thefootnotes.
But what was that quotationfrom the American forester in
1928?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (05:35):
Basically , he was walking through
Manhattan, which was being builtwith skyscrapers made of
concrete, bricks and steel, andhe said don't worry, you know,
trees will be needed, forestswill be needed, because raw
materials are never obsolete.
And this is a 1928 statementwhich has been perfectly
(05:57):
verified by the followinghistory Along the 20th century,
we have consumed a wider arrayof raw material and each raw
material is consumed in greaterquantity.
So this was a very interestingprediction and it has proven to
be completely true.
Actually, raw materials arenever obsolete despite all the
(06:17):
innovations.
And I think this is really oneof the key arguments of the book
is that we tend to confusehistory of technology with
history of materials.
When you think about thedynamics of technology, you can
find technologies becomingobsolete.
It's not the case with rawmaterials.
The history of technology ismade of shifts, of
transformation, of big changes.
(06:39):
The history of raw materials ismuch more boring.
Everything is expanding all thetime, more and more rapidly.
Actually.
Stewart Muir (06:47):
Don't confuse the history of technology with the
history of materials.
Yeah, exactly, they're twodifferent things.
You have Another similar phrasedon't confuse the history of
technology with the history ofinnovation.
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (06:59):
Yes, this is a key point.
I mean this is inspired from agreat historian of technology
called David Edgerton, who madethis point very clear in a book
called Shock of the Old, and itis true that when you think
about our conversation abouttechnology nowadays, it is
always focused on innovation weare talking not about.
(07:19):
In fact, when you read newspaperand the technology pages of
newspaper, they're not abouttechnology.
They are about very particularkind of technologies.
Most of the time they are aboutactually IT, artificial
intelligence, computers and theyconfuse all the technology that
we use with the technologicalfrontier.
(07:39):
But the technological frontier,the innovation, it's a very
limited set of technologies andit has had a very, very negative
effect on our understanding ofthe climate challenge, because
most of the time when we reflectupon what we should do to solve
the climate issue, we're goingto talk about innovations, new
(08:01):
technologies that are going todecarbonize this or that sector,
but you know, innovations is avery limited part of the
material world.
I mean, what creates climatechange is all the accumulation
of old techniques and old waysof doings and we have to talk
about all these.
Stewart Muir (08:20):
Let's start at the beginning.
You mentioned political history, and in the book you write
about the attraction there isfor the political history of
energy.
But that's also, you say, itsflaw this tendency to present
climate change as a capitalistconspiracy.
You're for it, and you also saythat getting out of carbon will
(08:42):
be far more difficult thangetting out of capitalism.
Yeah, and that is a conditionthat is probably necessary, but
it's not even enough.
What is the root of thisunderstanding?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (08:54):
I mean to understand this idea, you have
to know a little bit about thehistoriography of energy.
Basically, since we are talkingmassively about climate change,
there is a new generation ofenergy historians who have tried
to propose a political readingof the history of energy,
explaining that, for instance,the shift from coal to oil was a
(09:16):
way for capitalists tocircumvent the miners and the
trade unions of the miners.
That were very powerful becausethey had in their hands the
flow of energy in the economy.
And, of course, oil is muchmore, is fluid, is liquid, it's
less labor intensive.
They believe it's more capitalintensive, so it gives more
power to the capitalists.
(09:37):
So this kind of history isflawed in a very deep way
because it's two stages.
There is no shift from coal tooil.
It doesn't work like that.
Actually, when oil is expandingin the 20th century, it is a
very strong stimulus for theconsumption of coal, for a very
simple reason.
It is that oil mainly serves topower automobiles.
And to build an automobile youneed a tremendous amount of coal
(10:00):
.
In the 1930s you need seventons of coal to produce a car.
Nowadays in China it's aroundthree tons of coal.
So coal is a major ingredientof the automobile sector.
It is the first actuallyingredient of an automobile
right, and all the oilinfrastructure is completely
dependent on steel and thereforeon coal.
(10:20):
So we have to get rid of allthese stages narrative, be they
political or something else.
It doesn't work at all.
And it is true that I thinkframing the climate issue as the
kind of end results ofcapitalism of course capitalism
is clearly a driving force forthe accumulation of wealth and
(10:41):
therefore of emissions.
Obviously, I mean it'scompletely, completely trivial.
Nevertheless, getting out offossil fuels is a much deeper
change than just changing theownership of, of private
property.
It is probable that if you wantto be serious about climate
change, you need to transformownership.
(11:01):
I mean you cannot leave justwealthy people decide where they
invest because, I mean,extracting oil is lucrative,
right, so they're going to dothat, obviously.
But getting out of oil and coaland gas has tremendous impact
for all sorts of sectors.
Has tremendous impact for allsorts of sectors, like
agriculture, for instance.
In a socialist system, you needto eat and you will need gas to
(11:23):
produce fertilizer, you willneed plastic to package the food
.
So I mean agriculture iscompletely embedded into a
fossil fuel economy.
Today, I mean, you wouldn'thave the possibility to feed 8
billion people without a massiveinflux of fossil fuels in the
(11:45):
agricultural system.
And the same goes with concrete.
I mean, concrete is a veryuseful material.
It is very widely used becauseit is cheap, it is convenient.
On the other hand, it is usedto make very useless things like
building huge skyscrapers.
So we can imagine, with achange in the economic system
there would, there would be lessskyscrapers and more useful
(12:09):
buildings, hospitals and schoolsand so on, but nevertheless you
would still need the cement youknow to produce the bridges,
for instance, and these goes onand on and on.
So it's so.
It's an extremely deeptransformation of the material
world in an extremely shortperiod of time.
It is a kind of, I think,technological fantasy.
Stewart Muir (12:28):
One of the things you talk about and I think it's
great because you bring this tolife through your storytelling
you must be a great teacher,because you have all these good
examples in the book, and onethat was talked about a lot when
it first came out was the coalmining and wood, the idea that,
okay, coal is coming along, sowood will become obsolete
because coal is better, it'sbetter fuel, it's more heat,
(12:48):
everything.
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (12:49):
What really happened, I mean when you
teach the history ofindustrialization most of the
time you say that the industrialrevolution is a shift from a
wood-based energy system to acoal-based energy system, which
is true from a certain point ofview, but it is false when you
look seriously at materials.
For one simple reason toextract coal you need an
(13:11):
enormous amount of timber pigprops, timber mining, pick props
, timber mining to the extentthat Britain in the 20th century
consumed more wood in the formof pick props than Britain burn
in the 18th century.
So the more you extract coal,the more you need timber
actually.
So that I mean when you thinkabout coal you need to think
(13:34):
about timber.
They are not in competition,they are in symbiosis.
And without abundant timber,industrialized countries would
have had very little coal.
Therefore no steam, no steel,no red waste, et cetera, et
cetera.
So timber is not like asecondary factor for the energy
system of rich countries in the20th century.
(13:55):
It is a central aspect of thehistory of energy in the 20th
century in.
It is a central aspect of thehistory of energy in the 20th
century in the industrializedworld.
Right, and it goes even furtherthan that, actually, the
consumption of wood energy inrich countries in the 20th
century, despite coal anddespite oil, does increase.
You consume more and more woodtoday to produce electricity.
(14:17):
In Europe, for instance, youconsume more and more wood to
power the packaging industry,because most of the packaging is
based on paper and the paperindustry is a huge industrial
consumer of energy, the fourthindustrial consumer of energy
globally.
And this symbiosis betweenenergy you know they extend in a
(14:40):
, they have far-reachingconsequences.
In the 20th century you have agrowing economy which is fueled
by coal and oil.
That creates more and moregoods.
Those goods need to be packaged, so you consume more and more
paper, cardboard and the paperindustry consumes more and more
wood energy.
So the more you've got oil andcoal, the more you've got wood
energy.
In the paper industry consumedmore and more wood energy.
So the more you got oil andcoal, the more you got wood
energy in the paper industry,for instance.
(15:00):
You really have to think aboutthe history of energies and
material together and they arecompletely intricated, embedded,
connected together.
The major drawback in thehistory of energy, as it is told
till today it is that most ofthe time historians have been
interested in the competitionbetween energies, in how energy
(15:21):
systems are shifting, how coaldisplays wood in the tea
industry, for instance.
But this is just one part ofthe story.
You know, of course energiescan be in competition in certain
sectors, but globally, what hashappened is rather the
symbiotic expansion ofeverything Of everything, except
for one thing.
Stewart Muir (15:39):
You mentioned one commodity in the world that
we're using less of.
What is it?
Sheep wool, because ofsynthetic fibers, nylons.
So everything else has gone up,so it's really an energy
addition, not a transition.
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (15:53):
It's more than addition.
Sorry, it's more than anaddition, because addition gives
the impression that you canjust.
You know the things areseparated, that you can take off
one bit and replace it byanother, but in fact it's
completely intricate.
You know, there is a verysimple example like an electric
car.
Of course it's better than apetroleum engine car.
(16:14):
Nevertheless, to build anelectric car you need a
tremendous amount of coal.
That's why there are three tonsof coal in cars in China.
So I mean, it's not that theyare just adding up on top of
each other.
The energies are completelyintertwined.
Stewart Muir (16:30):
So what's a better term for me to use than energy
addition, if it's more?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (16:34):
subtle.
I mean the word I use is energysynthesis, so that describes
quite well what has happened inthe 20th century.
I hope it will not describewhat will happen in the 21st
century, but for the moment weare still completely in the
energy synthesis.
Stewart Muir (16:48):
Well, you don't want to see an energy synthesis
continue.
You called for something muchmore dramatical, a term that
everyone, when they hear it,will probably wince You're
calling for an energy amputation.
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (17:00):
I mean I'm not calling for this or that
.
I just I mean just underlinethe very, very simple fact that
the point is not just to seerenewable expand.
If it was only that, it wouldbe easy, because you know you
can put money on the table tobuild solar panels or wind
turbines.
It's not a problem.
The problem is to get rid offossil fuels, which is which is
(17:20):
a much, much more difficultthing to do I mean incredibly
more difficult and, in a way,capitalism.
Capitalism has been good atinnovating and putting up new
stuff.
It has been very bad at takingoff things and stuff and
energies.
I mean history of capitalism.
It's, I mean, of course it.
It has been told in aSchumpeterian way, inspired by
Joseph Schumpeter, asdestructive creation, but in
(17:43):
fact the destructive part is notthat important.
I mean, in material terms therehas been no destruction, just
increase.
Stewart Muir (17:51):
So you talk a little about some of the
different energy forms.
You've already mentionedrenewables, which means wind and
solar, and hydro and geothermal.
Maybe there's some others thatfit in the bucket.
You also talk about hydrogenpowered aircraft as a hypothesis
, because we don't have them yet.
Fusion or a third industrialrevolution, whatever that might
(18:15):
be.
We're also talking at the IPCCabout more carbon capture,
utilization and storage, ccus.
We're talking about anythingthat will help to either
sequester carbon or prevent morecarbon from going out into the
atmosphere.
Is that a pretty gooddescription of the options we
have?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (18:36):
You could add up nuclear to the.
Stewart Muir (18:39):
Nuclear, not just fusion, but traditional, yeah,
traditional nuclear, yeah wellthe first three, I mean you're.
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (18:45):
I think the thing that is missing
massively is sufficiencyreduction of demands.
I mean that's something we havenot been talking about it so
much, especially in the IPCCreport, which I think is a big
problem.
But if we were serious aboutclimate change and we are not
serious about climate changethat would be actually a key
topic of discussion.
What is really useful?
(19:06):
What do we really need?
What is the welfare associatedto this or that CO2 emission?
That should be the key topic ofdiscussion, and instead of that
we've got discussion abouthydrogen airplanes, about CCS,
like future technology that willprobably not exist even in the
far-away future.
So that's why I think all thisfocus on innovation has been a
(19:32):
powerful tool for doing nothing,for justifying procrastination.
I mean, the case of hydrogenairplane is perfect because when
you listen to the expert, theyexplain why it's not doable.
Hydrogen is three times lessdense than kerosene, than jet
fuel, aviation fuel.
So you need huge reservoirs.
(19:55):
You need to completely changethe shape of airplanes, so you
need to change theinfrastructure of airports.
To produce the hydrogen, youneed a tremendous amount of
electricity.
I mean, for the case of France,I made some very rough
calculations to produce the jetfuels that France uses today,
(20:15):
you would need the whole nuclearfleet to produce the green
hydrogen to produce these jetshells.
So I mean, we know that willnot happen.
There won't be hydrogenairplanes flying sooner, even
and later.
So what is the use of all thisblah blah about hydrogen
airplane?
Frankly, what is it used for?
(20:36):
So Airbus is still talkingabout hydrogen airplane, frankly
, what is it used for?
So Airbus is still talkingabout hydrogen airplane, but
Boeing has said no, we won't bedoing hydrogen airplane.
You know, this is rubbish.
And this is where history isinteresting, because the project
of an hydrogen airplane is veryold.
I found article from 1974talking about hydrogen airplane.
It was Lockheed who was workingon a hydrogen airplane and they
were pointinged who was workingon a hydrogen airplane and they
(20:59):
were pointing to problems whichare still not resolved today.
So I think the use of talkingabout hydrogen airplane is just
to keep planes flying and peopletaking the plane without
worrying too much, just thinkingthat in a few decades their
children will be flying withoutchanging the climate.
But this is rubbish, this is afalse premise.
Stewart Muir (21:18):
In 2023, the world gathered in Dubai for the
annual climate summit and therewas a stock take document that
resulted from that.
And that is always interestingwhen you have that, because it
means that it has to beunanimous.
So all the countries of theworld that were there which is
basically all the countries ofthe world 200, call it agreed
(21:41):
that if we could do the all ofthe above solution more natural
gas, more hydro, more renewables, more, did I say, nuclear, more
carbon capture if we do all ofthese things, we will be, in the
eyes of all humanities,representatives who went to
(22:01):
Dubai in November, december 2023in the right direction.
Were they right or wrong?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (22:07):
I mean I think that shows that the COP
are probably not about climateanymore.
They've become kind ofindustrial expo, universal expo,
where fossil fuel interests areextremely powerful, so they are
more and more criticized.
I mean being just a kind ofgathering of various interests
(22:31):
and the climate movement hasbeen kind of co-opted by the
international, the UNO, all theclimate system.
It has become a kind of ritualin a way.
The international communitygather together they say we care
about the climate change, butit's just for the show.
Stewart Muir (22:55):
Now you said that transition puts capital on the
right side of the climate battle, which is kind of an extension
of what you've just said, andyou are concerned about this.
But I would like to take thedevil's advocate position.
I would like to say look at allthe evidence that investment in
energy efficiency, investmentin better environmental
(23:16):
practices, in better hardware,better regulations, better
everything has allowed the worldas it exists today to get us
moving in the right direction.
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (23:27):
I mean, you're totally right that
capitalism innovation has beenpretty good at making the
economic system more efficientin material ways, but it is not
new.
I mean there have been hugegains in efficiency in the past
(23:48):
and I'm not sure there will besuch important gains in the
future.
Just to give you a few examplesIn the 1920s the industrialists
got rid of their steam engineand they replaced them with
electric motors.
Suddenly they divided by 10 thecarbon intensity of industrial
(24:09):
force in the industry.
Nowadays, with solar panels, wedivide by 10 the carbon
intensity of electricityproduction compared to gas power
plants.
What I want to say is we havebeen here before and nowadays
we're not on the threshold of acomplete change in the material
dynamics of capitalism whichmake it compatible to our
(24:30):
climate objective in 20 or 30years time.
This is really an illusion.
So I mean what I want tounderline.
My book is certainly not acritique of innovation and
technological progress.
I mean these things do exist.
Industrial processes aregetting more and more efficient,
but it is far from enough.
What we have to do is ofanother order of magnitude.
(24:52):
It's a different nature, andwhat worries me is that with
this idea of energy transition,we cultivate in the general
public the illusion that in 20or 30 years we'll have solved
the issue once and for all andthe economy will be able to
expand for the next followingcenturies without changing the
(25:14):
climate.
This is a very deepmisunderstanding of what will
happen.
I mean, the issue of climatechange will be with us for the
centuries to come and the issueof decreasing carbon emission
will be with us for thecenturies to come, and the issue
of decreasing carbon emissionwill be with us for the
centuries to come.
It's not a question of decades.
This is clearly false.
Stewart Muir (25:34):
We see countries that are quite proud of what
they call their climate progress, but in most cases they've
actually exported thoseemissions to other countries, to
countries like China that aremanufacturing goods with high
emissions and then exportingthem back.
I believe in the case of theUnited Kingdom they actually
have double the emissions as acountry, if you count that in.
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (25:55):
Half of the emissions of countries like
Britain or France comes from theimports of what French people
or British people are consuming.
So it's a very I mean so it's avery deep illusion when British
press is very proud of sayingthat Britain has got out of coal
.
Stewart Muir (26:14):
It is just true for the electricity production,
but it is certainly not true forthe British way of life, which
is completely dependent on thecoal for the production of steel
and the coal that goes in theimports to Britain the recent
news from Spain on significantblackouts, supposedly connected
to their net zero policies, andI don't know if that's true or
(26:36):
not Perhaps there's moreinformation to come but it
certainly resulted in many, manycommentators making that
connection and talking about it.
What do you make of thisdiscussion?
Is Spain, and therefore othercountries that are pursuing a
rapid adoption of wind?
Are they all headed for thesame problem of consistency?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (26:55):
I think we don't have yet a serious
report about what caused theblackout, so we should not rush
to conclusion.
I think there is a lot ofdisinformation about renewable
and electricity production.
It's probably not that easy toget a completely renewable
electric system.
To be clear, it's verychallenging.
(27:16):
I think it is costly, obviously.
But I think we should becareful because it is the only
place where there is some goodnews from the technology.
It is electricity.
I mean the fact that solarpanels are getting cheaper and
cheaper, that wind power is alsocompetitive is the only good
news in the technological domain.
(27:37):
So I think we should be reallycareful about not throwing the
baby with the water of the bath.
In the case of France, it isquite clear that all the
discourses against renewable arevery often connected to the
nuclear lobby.
So we should be I mean reallycautious about all the
discussion on energy.
Transition is problematicbecause very often it is about
(28:02):
certain lobbies pushing fortheir solutions.
You know it is very impressivethat part of the scientific
literature is the reflection ofthis fight between competing
lobbies, and that's why it hasbecome difficult to have, you
know, kind of honest appraisalof what is really doable with
(28:22):
renewable.
Can we completely decarbonizethe electric system entirely
with renewable.
It's not very clear where youcan have a kind of completely
trustworthy source ofinformation on this topic, which
is very damaging.
Stewart Muir (28:37):
Is there a litmus test that a reasonable person
could have in their hip pocketfor these to tell what's true?
How do I know if this is maybean industrial lobby message
that's gotten into things?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (28:50):
I think one of the best sources of
information is the annualInternational Energy Agency
report, because they are notabout future prospects, they're
about what is happening on theground.
So I think it's the best testthat every year in October there
is a report saying what hashappened last year in the energy
(29:10):
world.
And the very disappointingthing is that every year they
hope that, for instance, coalwill peak, and every year they
postpone the peak of coal For along time.
It was thought that 24 would bethe year of the absolute
consumption of coal.
Now they say it might be before2030.
(29:31):
So I mean and the problem isnot only peak, of course,
because the date of the peak isnot really important what is
important is what will happenafter the peak.
Will it be like a very rapidslope towards zero, or will it
be more like a plateau?
And the probability is that itwill be more like a plateau, and
it's what the report of theInternational Energy Agency is
(29:56):
now predicting.
Stewart Muir (29:58):
We've seen a global shift towards the use of
a lower carbon energy solutionfor a higher carbon one.
I'm talking about LNG andnatural gas.
It's really one of the bigglobal trends, especially since
the Russian invasion of Ukraine,but it was already well
underway for a long time.
What's your read on this trend?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (30:17):
I'm not really an expert on that so I
prefer not to comment on that.
For the climate issue, it'sprobably not a good news because
it makes gas more carbonintensive than gas from
pipelines.
So it's not such a good newsbecause you need to liquefy the
gas and then you need tore-treat it again into a gas
(30:38):
form.
So I mean it's certainly not agood news.
It's also a good news of gasbecause Europe at one point was
really paying enormous amountsof money to the US to buy
liquefied gas.
So it means that there was avery strong incentive to find
other sources of energy.
(30:58):
And you know it's not what hashappened.
So I mean it shows a very, verystrong dependency of even the
most advanced economies to gas.
Yes, certainly not an energy ofthe past.
It will grow in the future.
It has very strong decadesahead of it.
Stewart Muir (31:15):
Now we've seen France, which I think is widely
known, a country very heavilyreliant on nuclear energy, which
I think checks the boxes as apositive type of energy for
climate.
But even France is nowimporting LNG for natural gas.
I believe they just signed along-term contract with a Middle
(31:36):
Eastern country to haveshiploads of LNG In Canada.
We've seen the Quebecgovernment, which often has an
affinity with France forcultural reasons, have an
opportunity to send natural gasas LNG to France.
That sea voyage is really justa few days and very efficient.
(31:56):
Some of the negatives of LNGthat you don't want it on the
sea for too long because it willproduce its energy amount.
Long because it will produceits energy amount.
But instead of getting it fromCanada, france is getting it
from a source in the Middle East.
Due to instability in the RedSea and the Suez Canal, a lot of
those LNG cargos are actuallycoming along the Cape of Good
(32:18):
Hope route down the south end ofAfrica and all the way up.
It's a very, very long way toget LNG.
Even a progressive climateforward country like France that
is proud of its nuclear recordis doing this.
Why do you think that is?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (32:34):
It's what I just explained.
I mean there is a very strongdependency on gas for various
industrial sectors to producefertilizer, to produce chemicals
.
I mean gas is not only anenergy, it's also a material, a
raw material for the chemicalindustry.
But I mean the worst, probably,is that France imports gas from
(32:56):
Russia, but not throughpipeline but through LNG, so
there is a dependency on Russiaeven after the Ukraine war.
So I mean it just demonstratesthat there is no easy
technological solution in manydifferent sectors and we have to
talk about different topics.
(33:18):
It's not about finding atechnological solution.
It's about changing profoundlywhat we consume and the amount
we consume.
I mean, the example of theClimate Citizen Assembly which
was gathered in 2019 in Franceis a very good example More than
100 citizens taken completelyrandomly across France and they
(33:39):
end up with excellent proposalsto reduce CO2 emissions.
You know it's about puttingvegetarian meals in the canteen
at school.
It's about increasing bicyclelanes, it's about insulating
homes.
You know, like serious, seriouschanges which necessitate money
(34:00):
, public money, investment, andthere is no magic wand, magic
technological wand in theproposal they have come with.
So, yeah, I think more and morepeople will agree that we need
to have this kind of discussion,because the other way is just
relying on technology, and rightnow what is the most popular
(34:22):
technology to reduce CO2emission is carbon capture and
storage.
I mean, britain has just put onthe table more than 20 billion
quid in the next decade tofinance CCS in the Northern Sea
and this money goes straightinto the pocket of Equinor,
statoil, eni, the Italiancompany, shell.
(34:46):
So it's really money goingstraight to the pocket of the
polluters and this is not goingto be accepted.
People will complain If youwant to do CCS on a massive
scale, you need to build a wholenew network of pipelines for
CO2 across the country.
People will not accept that itis public money, public green
money, going in the pocket ofall companies.
(35:10):
That doesn't sound very goodand it's not very popular.
So I think the more we willhave the effect of climate
change, the more that we willrealize that the technological
promises were just emptypromises, the more the
discussion will shift towards amuch more democratic and
political discussion about whatwe should do.
Stewart Muir (35:30):
That's completely fascinating.
You know, from my perspectivehere in Western Canada, I'm
obviously quite well aware of aproposal for carbon capture to
be installed in the oil sands innorthern Alberta, where the
idea is that, look, the oilsands produce a heavy land.
(35:52):
It's in very heavy demand inparts of the United States.
It's also now going toCalifornia by sea and now for
the first time in quantities, toChina, to Thailand, to India,
because of a new pipeline wehave.
And the industry is saying we,not just one company, but a
group of companies, five or sixcompanies have gotten together
(36:15):
to say we need a monumentalinvestment, like $30 billion,
into a carbon capture processwhere carbon is captured from
the refinery, it's piped to ageological storage site also in
Alberta where it can be storedindefinitely.
And if they succeed in doingthat, then they will have bought
(36:37):
a longer life for thisincredible resource that exists
in Northern Canada.
So from that point of view itmakes sense.
The technology seems to checkout.
Based on what you've said aboutcarbon capture, I don't think
you would be sympathetic to thisproposal.
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (36:55):
I mean, carbon capture and storage is a
kind of scam.
It consumes an enormous amountof energy.
It is polluting to capture theCO2 because you need chemical
substances to capture themolecules of CO2.
That creates other problems.
You need an enormousinfrastructure to transport the
(37:15):
CO2.
You need boats, you know, toput the CO2 into the sea, for
instance.
But the boats, you know we aretalking about gigatons of CO2.
If it has to be on scale, itmeans we have to create ex nilo,
a kind of new oilinfrastructure, but it will not
be producing oil, it will bejust storing CO2.
You know, this is really strange.
(37:36):
This is really a very, verystrange technological proposal.
We have to take it as it is.
I think it is a bluff, you know, and it shouldn't be taken
seriously.
There won't be like thousandsof boats specializing in
transporting liquefied CO2across the world.
It's not true.
We won't be building all thismassive infrastructure to
(37:58):
transport CO2, you know.
And once again, the energyconsumption of capturing CO2 is
important.
And what strikes me is thatmore recently I've studied the
history of CO2, of carboncapture and storage, and for the
21st years of the climatedebate, from the 1980s onward to
the year 2000,.
It was seen as rubbish, not asa serious proposal, for one
(38:20):
simple reason is that if youwant to do, for instance, coal
electricity with CCS, for everytwo or three coal power plants
you need to construct a third orfourth power plant to produce
the electricity to power the CCSequipment right.
So it is very inefficient.
And around the year, in one ofthe IPCC reports around the year
(38:44):
early 2000, they explained thatthat would make electricity
from coal with CCS moreexpensive than nuclear
electricity.
So what is the point?
It is meaningless.
And, interestingly enough, whohas pushed CCS?
It is clearly the fossil fuelindustries coal, oil, steel,
(39:06):
concrete, cement and from the1990s onward they push CCS.
There are three governmentsthat really push CCS One is USA,
the second is Norway and thethird is Canada.
And you know, for a long periodof time expertise was very
critical of this.
It was clearly seen as a kindof obvious delaying tactics.
(39:29):
And around the year in 2005,there is an IPCC report group
three report on CCS and suddenlyCCS became acceptable.
But when you look at theliterature that this report used
to demonstrate that CCS isdoable, it is all coming from
the fossil fuel industry.
So you've got an interestingcase where a technology which
(39:49):
seemed completely ludicrousbecame a green technology thanks
to IPCC, group 3, and now isreceiving plenty of public money
.
But, to be frank, I mean to beat scale.
We are talking about biggertons of CO2.
We are talking about a quantityof liquefied CO2, which will be
equivalent to the quantity ofoil that we are extracting and
(40:11):
transporting.
It took hundreds of billions Imean trillions of dollars to
create this oil infrastructure.
We won't be investing trillionsof dollars into an
infrastructure that does notcreate value.
Stewart Muir (40:24):
It has provided the oil and gas industry, the
emitting industries, with somehope to be able to mitigate
something, because it's not theindustry that is responsible for
demand, it's consumers whoconsume.
That's where demand comes from.
The oil and gas industryobviously facilitates that and
(40:48):
does so very profitably, but itis not the demand source.
And this really comes back tothe whole original problem.
Here I mean that the path aheadwill inevitably lead to
humanity giving up the qualityof life it has attained only
(41:08):
because of energy beingavailable.
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (41:11):
I think we have to.
Just, we need to have a seriousdiscussion about all these
technological promises, and weshould not believe the hype
about CCS.
We should not believe the hypeabout hydronic airplanes.
We should not believe the hypeof clean coal or clean cement or
clean steel.
These are not clean and theywon't be clean even in the
(41:33):
far-right future.
So we have to restrict ourtechnological hope to sectors
where technological solutionsare available right now at an
accessible cost, and it ismainly in the electricity sector
.
For all the rest, we need totalk about the level of
consumption, obviously.
But I agree with you, it's notjust the fossil fuel industry,
(41:53):
the whole demand, it's the, it'sour civilization which is
problematic.
I entirely agree with you andit is too comfortable to say
that this.
You know, climate change,change is just the result of bad
people, be they fossil fuellobbyists or whatever.
This is too comfortable for thegeneral public.
We are part of the problem,obviously.
I mean, because of all thesefalse promises under the banner
(42:15):
of energy transition, we don'thave the right political
discussion of climate change,which is mainly an issue of
redistribution.
I mean, what strikes me is thatthe biggest issue about climate
change is the North-South divide.
Basically, you've got climatechange which has been produced
by industrialized countries,which has very strong effect on
(42:37):
the poorest population not onthe average rich world poorest
population, not on the averagerich world, and this is the very
strong injustice that we haveto address.
This is really the key issueabout climate change and for
that it is completely normalthat the rich country talk about
degrowth, about what is reallyuseful or not useful, about the
(43:03):
differential usefulness of CO2.
I mean, obviously, for the caseof cement.
Let's take the case of cement.
Cement is extraordinarilydifficult to decarbonize.
Cement can be used to do usefulstuff.
Stewart Muir (43:14):
It can be used to do completely useless things,
and this is the discussion weneed to have Jean-Baptiste, I
know you're a father, you're acitizen of France, you're in the
biggest city of the country.
What gives you hope as you lookaround, your home and your city
and your country?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (43:35):
Not much for the moment, to be honest,
but I think we should notunderstand climate change as a
kind of apocalyptic thing,especially for the wealthiest
part of the population in theworld.
Once again, I mean, since youare mentioning my family, I'm
not worried about my kids, it'snot the issue.
(43:58):
What is really worrying is whatwill happen for subsistence
farmers who are completelydependent on climate for for,
for their life, for theirlivelihood.
This is really what.
What is at stake.
What's at stake is certainlynot the Paris or, or Vancouver,
or Toronto or whatever.
Stewart Muir (44:17):
If you could, through your work, your latest
book more and more and more, andyour future books, if you could
change one assumption thateverybody could take forward
from your work what would thatone thing be?
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz (44:35):
Do not expect the material world to
change radically in the next 20or 30 years.
I mean, technology will change,but the material basis of
civilization will remain similar.
There won't be a massive changesuddenly because we need to do
something about climate change.
This is a very naive vision ofthe material world.
Stewart Muir (44:53):
Jean-Baptiste Fersoz, you've joined me today
from Paris.
Thanks so much for devotingyour time and thought and for
the work you do.
It's been great having you onPower Struggle Thank you very
much, Stuart.
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