October 22, 2024 • 50 mins
Discover why the traditional military doctrines are being upended as we engage with Dave Smith, a former major in the Canadian Armed Forces who made the extraordinary leap to volunteer as a fighter in Ukraine. Listen to Dave's compelling narrative about leaving a secure military career to join the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment, a unit of Belarusian Partisans opposing Alexandr Lukashenko and fighting to defend Ukraine against the Russian invasion.
J. Alex Tarquinio and Frank Radford, our hosts in The Delegates Lounge, spoke from New York, while Dave spoke from Ukraine via web conference. This is Part 1 of our conversation, which began in July with Dave's account of his journey and his insights into the war up until that point. He was about to go on a major operation. Tune in next week for Part 2. We followed up with Dave as he was ending his latest rotation on Ukraine's Eastern Front in October. As he relates his battlefield experiences, listeners will catch a rare glimpse into how international policies directly impact those on the front lines.
References:
Dave Smith co-authored the following article in Real Clear Defense with Julian Spencer-Churchill:
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/07/03/a_view_from_the_trenchline_1041979.html
Dave’s recent articles in Merion West:
https://merionwest.com/2024/08/29/a-portrait-of-a-stubborn-ukrainian/
https://merionwest.com/2024/10/06/the-origins-of-a-partisan/
Dave joined the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment of Belarusian volunteers fighting in support of Ukraine.
https://kalinouski.org/en/
Dave mentioned the “Leeroy Jenkins” battle cry from this video game meme.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mLyOj_QD4a4
Credits:
Music: Adobe Stock
Photo: Dave Smith
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
J. Alex Tarquinio (00:08):
Welcome to the Delegates Lounge.
Pull up a chair.
I'm Alex Tarquinio, ajournalist based at the United
Nations here in New York Cityand your emcee for this podcast
featuring some of the mostinfluential minds in the world
today.
Settle in for some rivetingtete-a-tete, available wherever
you listen to podcasts.
Welcome back.
(00:42):
Today we're introducing you to aCanadian volunteer on the
Ukrainian battle lines.
Dave Smith walked away from hiscareer with the Canadian Armed
Forces to become a volunteerfighter with the Kalinowski
Regiment.
Many of these fighters won'tspeak with the press over
concerns about the potentialpersecution of their families in
Belarus.
Even before Russia's full scaleinvasion of their neighboring
country, many of them werealready opponents of Alexander
(01:04):
Lukashenko, who they believe hadlost the 2020 presidential
election in their country.
To Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.
As an aside, we interviewed athis summer at NATO's Washington
Summit, so look for thatepisode in our playlist.
Dave's story is so compellingthat we're bringing it to you in
two parts.
In this episode, you'll hearour interview with him in July,
(01:27):
when he had just returned toUkraine and right before heading
back into battle.
We hope you'll come back tolisten to part two.
We followed up with Dave inOctober when he delved into
anecdotes from the battlefieldFor both conversations.
Frank and I spoke with Dave,who joined us from Ukraine via
web conference.
Frank, do you want to tell ushow you met Dave?
Frank Radford (01:46):
Yeah, you bet.
I got in touch with Davethrough Julian Spencer Churchill
, a professor at Canada'sConcordia University, after
meeting Dave in a Zoom meeting.
Dave is a classic unassumingsoul, one of those who, of their
own volition, chooses to takeup arms against a sea of
troubles and to oppose them bydeliberately going into harm's
way.
To take up arms against a seaof troubles and to oppose them
by deliberately going intoharm's way.
Knowing full well the dangersthat await him, he was disgusted
(02:08):
by what he saw as theineffectual response to Russia's
aggression against Ukraine.
Dave made the hard choice toresign from his rank as Major
after 15 years on a fast-trackcareer path in the Canadian
Armed Forces.
He chose the BelarusianRegiment, where like-minded
volunteers understood the dangerposed by Russia, not just to
Ukraine but to everyone that'sfree and wants to remain that
(02:29):
way.
J. Alex Tarquinio (02:30):
We'll include a link in the show notes to an
article in Real Clear Defencethat Dave co-authored with
Julian Spencer Churchill.
We didn't want to interrupt theflow of conversation with Dave
to explain military terminology.
So, frank, can you help usdecipher the jargon?
For instance, in the firstminute Dave refers to leaving
the CAF.
Frank Radford (02:48):
The CAF is the Canadian Armed Forces.
J. Alex Tarquinio (02:51):
Okay, he also refers to a recce team.
Frank Radford (02:53):
That's reconnaissance.
J. Alex Tarquinio (02:55):
And what are cam nets?
Frank Radford (02:56):
Cam nets are camouflage nets.
J. Alex Tarquinio (02:59):
What's the size of a battalion?
How many soldiers are in one?
Frank Radford (03:02):
I would say anything from four to six
hundred.
J. Alex Tarquinio (03:10):
And how would you explain to a civilian what
military doctrine is?
And how would an army adapt it?
Frank Radford (03:14):
Doctrine is the method of war that is practiced
by an army, so it's based oncurrent threats.
If you're not to be caught onthe battlefield and completely
outclassed by a differenttechnology or a different modus
operandi of the other side, youneed to have a doctrine that is
(03:35):
flexible and constantly beingupgraded.
It's, like you know, a software.
J. Alex Tarquinio (03:42):
Okay.
Well, you guys had quite aninteresting discussion about
drones.
Explain the difference betweenMQ-9s and FPVs.
Frank Radford (03:51):
Sure can.
Yeah, dave was making a point.
It's a question of bang for thebuck.
The MQ-9 Reaper, as it's calledat the moment, is a
high-altitude remotely piloteddrone.
It carries state-of-the-artordnance, electronic warfare and
surveillance suites.
It needs a dedicated pilot.
(04:12):
Now it can be flown a continentaway, but can also get shot
down by just about anythinghooties or the backdraft of a
MiG-29.
Contrast that drone with theFPV, the first person viewer,
which is what you see on thefront lines of Ukraine,
generally a quadcopter which hasfour rotary blades enabling it
(04:33):
to land and take off vertically,which means it can be placed
right next to the line ofengagement, better known as a
zero line.
But, more importantly, it canbe flown by a Gen Z who's played
video games.
So what's the difference?
The cost An MQ-9 is $30 millionplus An FPV can be anything
(04:53):
from $500 to maybe a couple ofthousand, and clearly a game
changer in modern warfare.
J. Alex Tarquinio (05:00):
You and Dave spoke and he understood
immediately when you asked himabout the Glorious Revolution.
For our listeners who are notconversant in 17th century
English history, maybe you couldexplain why you thought the
Glorious Revolution was a goodanalogy.
Frank Radford (05:18):
Well, back in 1688, the then King of England,
King James II, was a Catholicking, and a stubborn one at that
.
His subjects were Protestant,and when William of Orange
landed in the southwest ofEngland and he was a Protestant
rival, then there was theprospect of civil war, but and
this is what makes this theglorious revolution James II
(05:38):
opted to leave.
Now, when Sviatlana spoke to us, she made it clear that she
desired for Belarus a peacefultransition.
So the analogy is that ifLukashenko could be induced to
shuffle off to Russia, thenBelarus could celebrate a
glorious revolution of their own.
J. Alex Tarquinio (05:58):
Now, my personal favorite was Dave's
creative use of Leeroy Jenkinsfrom the world of Warcraft, a
massively multiplayer onlinerole-playing game, may be
familiar to some of ourlisteners, but not all.
Urban Dictionary definespulling a Leeroy Jenkins as
destroying all hope of successby rushing into battle without
(06:19):
following strategy, and it stemsfrom an incident when a player
used his character name as abattle cry.
Oh my god, he just ran in.
And on that note, let's getstarted.
Dave Smith, thanks for joiningus in the Delegates Lounge and
(06:49):
thanks for making time for usfrom eastern Ukraine.
Perhaps you could start byexplaining how you became a
volunteer fighter for Ukraineand, within that, how you, as a
Canadian, began working with aBelarusian unit of volunteers.
Dave Smith (07:06):
Yeah, I was an infantry officer in the Canadian
Army for 15 years.
I joined in 2008 after Ifinished university, and then
2022, after the full-scaleinvasion started I was deployed
to Europe.
I was embedded in a USS taskforce headquarters assisting the
(07:27):
Ukrainians.
When they announced the Legionon February 27th 2022, I went
into work the next day and toldmy boss like I'm quitting, I'm
leaving the CAF, I'm going tojoin the Legion.
And my boss was like hang on,hang on.
Like we're sending a recce teamto Europe to find out what the
Americans are doing.
We're going to get you overthere with the 18 Airborne Corps
(07:50):
.
And you know it was good it was.
You know I'm glad I did it.
It was a very importantprofessional experience for me.
But when I came home inNovember, I went into my
colonel's office the next dayand said I won't be here next
spring when the counteroffensivestarts.
Don't expect me to be here in acubicle with you guys.
(08:13):
I will be with the Ukrainiansfighting the fight.
You'll all be here reading morearticles and writing briefing
notes about what the Ukrainiansare doing.
Everybody thought I was insaneinsane.
Two of my best friends had anintervention with me.
My boss pulled me into hisoffice probably five times to
talk me out of it, but I I knewlike I could.
(08:34):
I could tell the magnitude ofwhat was going on.
Like this wasn't just russiaversus the west, this was the
free world versus the unfreeworld.
The writings were already onthe wall.
The international communitysucks.
There's no other way to put it.
They had no idea what they'redoing and Canada was the worst
(08:56):
offender in my opinion.
So when I came home from thatdeployment I got home in
November of 2022.
I did Christmas leave and thenI went in after that and just
submitted my resignation and Ijust bought a bunch of gear,
flew to Ukraine and joined theLegion.
How I came to be in theBelarusian regiment is unusual.
(09:19):
Like most Westerners that comehere join in one of the
international squadrons.
So I won't get into like thelegion is organized because it's
constantly changing, butthere's several different units
in the international legion.
There's a couple that are likestraight up mishmash Westerner
units, which are mostly formerNATO soldiers, and then there's
(09:44):
the Georgians have a unit,there's a Russian unit and
there's a Belarusian unit.
So when I got here and thensorry, and then there's also
like the Ukrainian brigades willalso hire foreigners on like an
individual basis or a teambasis.
So it's not like you get hereand there's one monolithic
entity that you're joining.
You kind of have to find theright fit.
(10:08):
So when I heard there was aBelarusian unit, I was super
excited to meet them because ofthe job.
I used to have my last jobbefore I left.
I was a targeting officer oneastern europe portfolio,
specifically looking at therussian threat.
I was super cognizant of whatwas going on in 2020 when
Sviatlana ended up winning thepresidency because Lukashenko
(10:31):
didn't think a woman could beathim, and I knew most of the
dudes in the regiment weredefectors, right.
There were people that eitherescaped Belarus legitimately or
escaped prison and then escapedbelarus, um.
So psychologically I felt mostaligned with them because
(10:51):
they're all true believers,right.
So I hate to say this, but thelegion, especially in the early
days, you know, the first sixmonths of the war it attracted
all kinds of types that youthink will fight in foreign wars
uh, more mercenary mentalityguys.
And when I met the Belarusians,it was a meeting of the minds,
(11:13):
if you will.
You know they like they.
They understood that the war inukraine is part of a broader um
strategic shift that's going onin Eastern Europe, and I
honestly do think that if theWest had realized in the middle
(11:33):
of the pandemic how importantthat Belarusian election was in
2020 and supported Sviatlana'sgovernment, I don't think we
would have had the invasion ofUkraine right, for multiple
reasons.
Number one I think that just theshow of solidarity behind a
country that wants to be aliberal democracy would have
frightened the tyrants.
But number two is, militarily,putin was reliant on Belarusian
(11:57):
territory to get into Ukraine,to pre-positioned forces in
belarus in april of 2021 andhave that huge build-up.
So strategically, militarilyand psychologically, I felt that
it was the unit that I shouldbe part of and I also just, you
(12:20):
know, really dug their soldiersmentality you know what I mean
like the average worked in it orsome other kind of white collar
job came to ukraine and theylearned to fight war at war with
the russian army.
You know that, like, those arehard dudes, you know, and they
(12:41):
can't go home, which is the bigdifference between them and all
the other foreign fighters.
Everyone else can leave, right,they don't have a home to go
home to.
So that brings a lot morestability to the organization.
That's why I, you know, I leftand went on leave over Christmas
last year and when I came backI rejoined.
J. Alex Tarquinio (13:00):
And, to be clear, you don't have I mean, I
know you're Canadian, but youdon't have a Belarusian family
connection.
Dave Smith (13:06):
Nor Ukrainian.
J. Alex Tarquinio (13:08):
Because when we did speak with Sviatlana
Tsikhanouskaya recently, she hadmentioned that she can't say
too much about the guys in theBelarusian regiment because some
of them may still have familyin Belarus and there could be re
..
Frank Radford (13:26):
Not may most of them do.
A lot of them have already beentargeted.
Like several of them they'reyou know they can't contact
their families because they're.
The Belarusian KGB knows thatthey're here.
J. Alex Tarquinio (13:33):
So the reason you're able to speak with us
today is because you're with theregiment, but you're not
Belarusian.
You don't have family at perilin Belarus.
Dave Smith (13:42):
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Frank Radford (13:45):
Well, Dave, I've got some specific questions.
Do you see a lot morevolunteers coming over, or is it
sort of passe?
Dave Smith (13:54):
No, I would say it's stabilized.
I would say in the last six toeight months we're seeing a
steady inflow, but it's smallcomparatively.
It's me and the only guys thatI, the only former officers that
I know, have all been herelonger than me, um, so they're
just in it for the long haul,they're in it to win it, um, but
(14:15):
there's like dude, we couldhave a bi-weekly potluck.
There's so few of us if wewanted to.
The problem ukraine has withthe foreign fighters and I don't
think it's a problem you canfix is that organizationally it
will always be unstable becauseevery foreigner is one bad day
away from just throwing therifle down and going home.
(14:37):
So it's very hard to plan right.
It's very hard to like.
You won't know what's your unitstrength six months from now.
You have no idea right.
Frank Radford (14:46):
The exponential growth of drones towards
possibly autonomous weaponsystems must be impacting.
Just by observation of what'sgoing on, how on earth do you
actually do a doctrinal changethat can deal with that?
Dave Smith (15:02):
Frank, you are hitting the exact problem that
me and my unit are at right now.
Infantry are obsolete right now, like thermal drones, glide
bombs and FPVs, like we can't goanywhere, we can't start an
assault, we can't hold a pieceof terrain, we can't do anything
(15:24):
, a piece of trade, we can't doanything, because the moment we
show up, an fpv just kills us,you know.
And that problem is not goingto be solved by us, like it
doesn't matter how good our camnets are, it doesn't matter how
good our, you know, radiodiscipline is, we're not going
to fix that problem.
It you need an operationallevel commander with a plan and
(15:47):
the technology to back up thatplan to solve that problem, and
I firmly believe the Ukrainianswill solve it before the RAND
Corporation or any R&D agency.
Frank Radford (15:58):
But the issue is will the Russians solve it
faster?
Dave Smith (16:01):
The you I think,..
we attribute undefined a bit toomuch intelligence to the
Russians.
Like, like they, they like theyare learning, they're adapting,
they're better.
definitely better than theywere were six months ago, a year
ago, two years ago, but I thinkthey get better at a cost of
(16:23):
bodies.
That is like just unacceptable.
Like you won't win if.
If every lesson learned takesthat many casualties, you won't
win.
They also don't innovate thesteel right.
Like they don't learn.
They learn what the ukrainiansUkrainians are doing.
You know the Ukrainians do itto them.
They figure it out right.
(16:43):
The Ukrainians are actuallyinnovators, and I know because I
see it like they show up andthey're like we have this new
drone, we want to go test itwith you.
You watch them, you're like youguys are amazing, right.
And then six months later, theRussians have it too right,
because they reverse engineerwhat the Ukrainians are doing.
So if this were, you know, acapitalist free market, russia
(17:03):
is the cheap knockoff of anApple product like Steve Jobs
will innovate, everyone elsewill copy him, you know, and
it's like yes, will you get theproduct cheaper?
Frank Radford (17:15):
but nevertheless there's a gap between you know.
Obviously the Ukrainians are atthe the forefront and the
Russians are six months behindthem or less, but where's nato?
Dave Smith (17:29):
No, NATO's in the Stone Age NATO.
It doesn't matter how muchevidence you produce that like
guys, stop building strategictheater-level drones.
Like MQ-9s are stupid.
Stop building them, because assoon as you build it, you're
afraid you'll lose it, so younever use it you know what.
I mean, no matter how much youtry to tell defense industrial
(17:53):
complex, it's like build small,cheap, disposable right now.
They won't do it.
They're in the Stone Age.
Frank Radford (18:03):
The IDF and I think NATO in particular, are
flummoxed by the prospect ofbeing swarmed by FPVs, and the
question is whether or notRussia can adapt faster than
they can create a doctrine todeal with it.
Dave Smith (18:21):
I'm positive in terms of like the way they're
using thermal guns right now.
Nato won't figure it out untila bunch of people get killed,
until they actually go to aflight and an entire battalion
gets wiped out in one day byFPVs.
Nato won't figure it out.
You can send all the lessonslearned people you want to
Ukraine.
The RAND Corporation can writepapers, it won't matter.
(18:45):
Until a battalion of dudes getskilled in three hours by fpvs,
they won't figure it out.
Europe still doesn't get it.
You know, I mean the european.
I mean there's Kaja Kallas inEstonia.
Uh, is my hero.
I wish she was in charge ofeverything.
(19:05):
Kaja Kallas in Estonia.
She gets it, and I think theEstonians get it, the Poles get
it.
Emmanuel Macron, who is theonly major European leader in my
opinion, was trying to act likea leader in the last year.
So you're going to see by theend of this decade, in Dave
Smith's opinion, like the, theunfree world that has nuclear
(19:29):
weapons is just going to dividethe world up the way they want
it, and the rest of us are justgoing to have to accept it
because we refuse to do anythingabout it.
And I mean honestly, I've beenlike calling out dictators for
years.
I'm offended that Wagnerimploded before they put me on
their kill list, you know.
I mean, I don't know what moreI have to do.
(19:49):
Uh, putin has never tried tohoneypot me or even novichok my
tea, and I've been calling himout on the dark web for a decade
J. Alex Tarquinio (20:01):
Now how would you call him out on the Dark
Web?
That's very interesting.
Was it certain channels youwere on?
Dave Smith (20:06):
Well, there was a short time when I was in cyber I
made it a personal vendetta togo after these Russian.
I call them cyber privateers.
Like we pretend they're justcriminals that are ransom
wearing hospitals and whatnot,but really what they are is
they're building strategicweapons for the Russian
government, the FSB government,the FSB, and we all just kind of
(20:29):
pretend they're like teenagersin their mom's basements that
are ransom wearing pipelines inthe Eastern US, and really what
they are is they're privateers.
Right, like Putin has anunwritten agreement with them
where he says okay, listen,don't come after me, don't come
after the oligarchs, whateveryou do to America is free game.
J. Alex Tarquinio (20:45):
So was this to?
To be clear, this is when youwere with the canadian military
it was in military cyber for avery short period.
Dave Smith (20:53):
I like, like I said, I'm an infantry officer.
I came home from deployment in2019.
Cyber needed an operationsofficer, which is a role that I
was qualified for, and Ivolunteered for it and I just
ended up kind of planning uhmissions with ukraine,
essentially, um, because at thetime, we had this huge training
(21:15):
this was going on withukrainians to try and help them
get more postured to be a natocountry, and in 2016, nato had
published this huge report withI like 150 some recommendations
for how the Ukrainian militarycould become more suitable for
NATO membership.
And there was a lot of thisstuff that they were doing
(21:37):
themselves right, like justtypical stuff infantry training
or small unit tactics or, youknow, upgrading weapons systems,
things like that but then therewas a bunch of stuff they had
no idea how to do, whichincluded being more cyber secure
right.
So they were literally lookingfor countries to show them how
to harden their networks andlock out Russian intrusions.
(22:01):
That's how I ended up workingwhile I was in the Canadian
military.
I was back in Canada with cyber, so that was how I had been on
the Russian file already, butthat was really how I started
working directly with Ukraine.
So by the time the invasionstarted, you know my team back
at the operational command wewere like some of the few people
(22:21):
that were telling everybodythis invasion is definitely
going to happen.
Me and my band of nerds, wewere like the few half dozen
people that were standing infront of the generals being like
no sir, they're definitelygoing to invade, like they're
moving blood bags to the front.
Wake up.
J. Alex Tarquinio (22:36):
Do you think part of it was the attention was
elsewhere because of the globalpandemic?
Dave Smith (22:41):
No, I think that Western leaders believe what
they want to believe, like theyhonestly think that everyone is
rational the way they are.
They like they don't even tothis day right.
Like there's still people thatthink you know, putin's just an
irrational actor.
Like I can't tell you thenumber of articles I read.
It's like putin's just clearlynot a rational actor.
(23:03):
It's like no, you justmistakenly think that the way
you think is the only way to berational.
Frank Radford (23:11):
Now, especially from a former NATO officer's
point of view, we don'tunderstand the pecking order in
their command structure, Inother words, FSB dictates and
then the military you knowundertakes, Whereas that's
certainly not the case in NATOmilitaries.
Dave Smith (23:32):
Okay.
So you're bringing up a greatpoint.
You're bringing up somethingthat's a hobby horse for me or a
bugbear, I don't know what youcall it, but I don't have any
visibility on the inner workingsof the Ukrainian command
structure, the general staff,the security service, like I,
like I'm literally just lastnight I was a dude walking
(23:54):
around in the woods, um, youknow, hoping I had enough water,
right, so I don't want to makeit seem like I have access to
information that I don't have.
I say here's one thing I'veidentified culturally that is
very different between thepost-Soviet sphere and the NATO
countries.
In the military that I comefrom, the military culture that
(24:18):
I was raised in, we kind ofidolize special forces units,
SOF units, the Seal Teams, theRangers, SAS.
You know, in Canada we have theJTF2 and CSOR.
In the post-Soviet world it'sall intelligence, right, they're
elite units, they're allintelligence organizations, uh,
(24:40):
whether it's military orsecurity services and that's
true in ukraine as well.
Like you can spot them on thebattlefield when you see the
guys with really cool gear andtricked out vehicles and such,
it's either UR, SBU or someother intelligence outfit.
So there's a relationshipbetween FSB and the regular
(25:04):
military that NATO doesn'tunderstand.
But it's not the same as, likethe way the CIA, the US military
works right, or the way CSISand the Canadian military work.
We have these very sharp policyand legal boundaries between
what militaries do versus whatintelligence agencies do.
Intelligence agencies likeintelligence, you know.
(25:27):
For them to become an actionarm that delivers effects,
especially on a battlefield, isextremely difficult.
Like policy-wise, I've workedwith the US military and
government.
The three-letter agencies arearound, but anytime you go to a
meeting with them, there's apolicy advisor and a legal
advisor sitting right next towhoever the decision maker is
saying you know, sir, anintelligence agency can't do
(25:47):
that, or sir that's collectingon US citizens, or sir you can't
.
Or, ma'am, you know, like no,no, no, no, no, like the
boundary between intelligence,what the intelligence agency
does and what the military does,is very palpable, and I think
that's true of all NATOcountries, although I can't
speak from firsthand experience.
That is not the case here.
From intelligence to decisionmaker to action arm, that chain,
(26:17):
if you will, is much faster andstronger and more reactive in
Ukraine and Russia than it is inany NATO country.
I'm not saying it works all thetime.
I think if you look at thefirst six weeks of the war, it
was clear there was no militarypeople in charge.
You know, like if I was ageneral advising Putin, you know
I'd say, sir, we've spent eightyears in the east spreading
(26:43):
this narrative that there areRussian speakers and ethnic
Russians in Donbass who arebeing genocided by Nazis.
That's the military objective.
Is the East, it's Donbass,right.
It's not to Leeroy Jenkins atthe Kyiv.
You know like, that's not.
Like any military planner wouldsay this is insane, this is
(27:05):
ludicrous.
Only intelligence spooks couldthink that was a good idea.
Frank Radford (27:11):
The way the war unfolded in the Southern theater
, especially taking, you know,the Isthmus, and then going in
and taking Mariupol andBerdyansk and then Kherson.
Dave Smith (27:25):
We've never been in the South right, so all the
foreigners we're essentiallylight infantry.
Everything going down inKherson, Mariupol and even most
of Zaporizhia is all mechanizedwarfare that we're not part of.
You know what I mean, so Ihaven't spent considerable time
in the portion of the theaterthat you're talking about.
Frank Radford (27:47):
They got close to Odessa.
If you take Odessa, it's over.
Dave Smith (27:53):
They got close geographically.
They did not get closefeasibility-wise as you would
think looking at the map.
Frank Radford (28:02):
The instead focused on Kyiv, which was
ludicrous from a military pointof view.
Had they diverted force wherethey were successful?
Dave Smith (28:11):
The first five, six weeks of the war, I do not
believe there was any militarypeople in charge, and you'll
notice when the credit to theRussians were credits due after
those first six weeks and the65- kilometer convoy of shame
that got blown up across thecountry.
When they pulled back to theeast, they had a lot of success
(28:34):
April-ish April, June of 2022,when they pulled back to the
east.
That's when they started makingground towards Odessa along the
coast.
It wasn't in the opening days,right, it was like two months
into.
It is when they really startedto make gains and when they
really really started to takethe east right.
Because, if you think about itthis way, the opening days of
(28:57):
the war, they have 13 axes ofadvance going towards all parts
of the country Poltava, Odessa.
Right, it was not Ukrainiancrack units fighting in Bucha,
you know, it was reservists andit was guerrillas and it was
people that were handed an AK-47on February 25th.
(29:17):
The good units were stillfighting in the east.
So if you look at Donbass inMarch, April, June, you see this
shift where it's like, well,the Russians weren't really in
control of anything, to by themiddle of the summer, where it
was like they're in control ofterritory they did not have on
February 24th and they're makingan end run to Odessa and it's
(29:38):
looking quite successful.
So I believe what happened wasafter the first six years of the
war, Putin realized like theseintelligence spooks don't know
what the hell they're doing andI'm putting the general staff
back in charge, and thatincluded the Prigozhin.
And then eventually it was theKherson fight with Surovikin and
Surovikin, you know, wasactually a decent commander and
(30:01):
then Prigozhin and Wagner, whois like terrifying to fight like
.
I can tell you, Wagner, they'reevil and they're barbaric.
They knew what they were doing.
They destroyed themselvestaking Bakhmut.
They knew how to fight.
So whenever the Russianmilitary forces, in my opinion,
(30:21):
were making the decisions,they've had considerable success
, at least in the first year,year and a half of the war.
I think it's when they wereletting the intelligence, people
like Putin, you know, when theywere letting people like Putin
make military decisions, I thinkthe battlefield was turning
against them and this idea thatyou can use information, warfare
(30:43):
and assassinations to makebattlefield victories, I think
is mistaken.
And it's definitely mistakenwhen you're fighting another
post-Soviet military right,because the Ukrainians know that
game the Ukrainian SSO, whichis their special forces.
They trained the stay-behindsthat stayed in the occupied
territories between about 2015and 2022.
(31:05):
If you think it was justUkrainian national identity that
suddenly rose up in Februaryand that's why these old ladies
were yelling at Russian soldiersin the street corner, I hate to
break it to you.
That was the Ukrainian specialforces training citizens to
plant car bombs and assassinatepeople.
The Ukrainians are extremelygood at that stuff, and it's a
whole world that NATO militaries.
(31:26):
We know nothing about.
Frank Radford (31:29):
I don't think that's appreciated the extent of
that.
No, I don't think so either.
It's very SOE, very Frenchresistance Totally.
Dave Smith (31:37):
Yeah, resistance like we throw it around, you
know what I mean, but here it'sreal, like when you meet them,
you know these farmers in theseoccupied territories and I think
it's why the Russians thoughtthey had the monopoly on that
game, not realizing Ukrainiansare from the same military and
(31:57):
intelligence heritage, so it'sreciprocal.
You know, like they know how todo it too, you know?
Frank Radford (32:12):
Okay, let's just quickly talk about your
experiences with the Ukrainianforces operational level at the
division.
Dave Smith (32:15):
I couldn't tell you I'm not at the operational level
.
Like I'm way down in the weedsat the tactical level.
But I will say I've never seenanything larger than a company
level op conducted here.
Now I have a very narrowexperience.
I'm light infantry.
Frank Radford (32:27):
Now, how many officers of your rank formerly
in NATO are serving, as I meanyou say you're basically on the
front line as almost a gruntright.
Dave Smith (32:38):
There's probably a handful, if that there was a
handful when I got here.
There's me and one other guythat I know of right now left so
Frank Radford (32:46):
what you have to say is is is worthy of note.
Dave Smith (32:50):
Yeah.
The other thing that I say isthat it because the Ukrainians
are actually fighting aconventional war that we haven't
seen anybody else fight indecades.
It's really easy to look atthem and say like, oh my god,
they don't understand theoperational level of war right I
can tell you from firsthandexperience Canada don't
understand the operational levelof war right.
I can tell you from firsthandexperience Canada doesn't
understand the operational levelof war.
We're retarded at it, we suck.
(33:12):
I was at the operational levelof command, right.
You guys call them COCOMs, wejust call it the Joint
Operational Command.
You know, other than, like yourwell-oiled machine militaries,
which at this point wouldprobably only be the US, I don't
know anybody that's good at theoperational level of war and I
(33:33):
know that whenever I was ondeployments in the past with
Brits and Australians, all wedid was complain about how no
one knew what the hell the pointof an operational headquarters
was, of an operationalheadquarters was.
You know, like I, like me andseveral, if you ever want to
strike up a conversation with aBritish, you know, mid-level
officer, like a major lieutenantcolonel type, just walk into a
(33:55):
bar, buy him a beer and saydon't you hate the operational
level of war.
And you, they'll just bitch allnight.
So it's really easy to point atthe Ukrainians and be like well
, they have a general staff andthey have brigade commanders and
they have nothing in betweenbecause they don't understand
the operational level of war.
Well, I put it to you like,show me someone who does Other
than Team America.
Frank Radford (34:17):
NATO just says that China is the decisive
enabler of Russia.
You're on the battlefield.
Are you noticing anysignificant changes because of
Chinese equipment?
Dave Smith (34:42):
I couldn't really say I don't like.
I haven't ripped apart anywreckage of missiles and seen if
there's chinese parts of them.
I found the language ofdecisive enabler very
questionable.
I I'm sure they're an enable,you know.
I'm sure china is happilysupporting russia in all the
ways that it thinks it can,without getting itself into too
much trouble.
Decisive though I think.
(35:04):
If Xi J inping was like Vladbro, we're not giving you any
computer chips or missileequipment or thermals or
anything, I don't think thatwould stop the war right.
I don't think putin would belike oh darn, China's not on
board anymore, so we're going tohave to go home.
Whatever support China's giving, I'm sure it's bad, but I don't
(35:28):
think it's decisive.
Frank Radford (35:29):
Well, that's fair enough.
You're on the front line.
So I mean, obviously they'vegot motorcycles and these golf
cart things and they're nothardly decisive yeah.
They're not hardly decisive.
Dave Smith (35:40):
Yeah, I also think the West is quick to see Chinese
writing on military technologyin Eastern Ukraine as a sign of
China supporting Russia, and Ijust I think that's
misinterpreting the widespreadavailability of Chinese
technology.
We buy from China.
I guarantee it, like if I couldgo on Amazon right now and buy
(36:04):
drones for my whole unit thatwere made in China, we would do
it.
You know what I mean.
That doesn't mean China issuddenly supporting the
Belarusian regiment in easternUkraine.
It means Chinese technology isvery easy to get.
Frank Radford (36:13):
They were over there doing an exercise with the
Belarusians at the same timeNATO conference.
Dave Smith (36:19):
I think there's two things that are important to
remember.
Totalitarian regimes nevertrust each other.
They can't so anytime you seethem working together.
It's a marriage of convenience,and I think it's a mistake to
over-interpret their cooperation.
(36:39):
If Xi Jinping thought it wouldbe politically advantageous to
him to undermine VladimirPutin's war in Ukraine, he would
do it, you know.
And the second thing is, if youimagine the free world and the
unfree world and there's a linedown the middle between the two
of them, there's a box right inthe middle of that line with
(37:01):
three compartments in it.
The three compartments are theBlack Sea, Ukraine and Belarus.
Right, the unfree world needsthose three compartments to get
into Europe.
Right, the war path to Europeis through Belarus or through
Ukraine, or through the BlackSea.
Right now it's one of theunsung stories of the war
(37:24):
there's an entire naval wargoing on in the Black Sea that
isn't even making it to thecover of the New York Times
because the Ukrainians arewinning it so decisively.
Ukraine is the compartmentthat's contested.
Belarus is held by Russia.
The Belarusians that I workwith, they all say Belarus is
not a country, it's occupiedterritory.
It's the equivalent of occupiedKherson or occupied Donetsk or
(37:48):
Luhansk.
The tyrants need Belarus.
Putin couldn't have launchedhis war in Ukraine without
Belarus.
They can't credibly maintaintheir threat to NATO countries
without Belarus.
They can't maintain they can'tcredibly maintain their threat
to NATO countries withoutBelarus.
If Belarus were to get flippedand become, you know, an EU
member or a NATO-friendlydemocratic country, that would
(38:11):
be a huge blow for Putin and XiJinping.
J. Alex Tarquinio (38:15):
Is that getting back to your Belarusian
colleagues there in the regiment?
Is that how the majority ofthem see it?
Dave Smith (38:21):
For them, it's a lot more local right.
For me, I live in thisgeostrategic world.
For them, it's about theirfamilies in Brest and Minsk and
whatnot.
A lot of them I think I don'twant to say have given up hope
on Belarus, but they knowthey're in this for a long time.
(38:44):
Like this is the differencebetween talking to a Belarusian
soldier here and your averageWesterner that comes here for
three months or six months orwhatever.
Um, they know they are in thiswar for a long time, and when I
say a long time, I mean likegenerational.
Several of them are trying toget Ukrainian citizenship and
(39:05):
buy houses here and get married.
They know like there's no pointpretending that they're going
home anytime soon.
So the the biggest difference,I would say, between them and
your average foreign fighter islike, even if they win in
Ukraine, they're like this isn'tover.
You know.
They're like freedom has notcome to Eastern Europe yet.
(39:26):
I don't want to say they'rehopeless, but their psychology
is much more the long game.
Their repression apparatus hasescalated through the roof.
I can't tell you how many dudesI know here that were in prison
after the 2020 elections,tortured.
Um people disappear in thenight like it's the soviet union
again families beingintimidated, uh, routinely and
(39:48):
systematically, uh, so that's ahuge difference is what's
happened since 2020.
And the number two the war hasthe regime in a really sticky
situation.
You, you know what I mean.
Like they don't want toover-support Russia, but they
know they can't under-supportRussia because now the Russian
(40:08):
army is fully mobilized.
They're on a wartime economy.
If Vlad wants to roll the tanksacross the border into Belarus,
for whatever objective, hecould do it.
So they have to worry aboutthat in a way that I don't think
they had to worry about it fiveyears ago.
Frank Radford (40:23):
To go all historical, if you look at 1688
and the Glorious Revolution, youhave James II, who was a
Catholic, but everybody else isProtestant, but the catalyst was
William of Orange.
Now is it feasible to see theBelarusian regiment or volunteer
corps as that sort of lingeringthreat?
Dave Smith (40:47):
They would be the ones to go back and lead the
color revolution in the wings.
The threat of them is important.
You need Lukashenko to wake up.
When he looks outside hispalace and he sees a bunch of 25
year old women waving thenon-official flag, he needs to
(41:08):
worry.
If I send in the police tobreak up that protest, will they
actually do it?
And if they do try to do it,will a bunch of freedom fighters
roar up on pickup trucks?
And you need that fear in hisbrain, otherwise your revolution
will not succeed.
If you study revolutions, youknow and I'm sure um you'll have
(41:29):
listeners that are smarter onthis than I am.
But if you look at revolutionsme as a military person I can
tell you there's two sides to it.
Right and in unconventionalwarfare, we talk about left of
bang, and right of bang.
Bang is like when does it goviolent?
So if you imagine, you know, atthe start of the revolutionary
movement, right, you have thepopulace's ability to wage
(41:52):
violence on the regime and youhave the regime's ability to
wage violence on the populace,and what you're trying to do,
left of bang, equalize those asmuch as possible.
So you're trying to do left ofbang is equalize those as much
as possible.
So you're trying to deterioratethe security services.
You're trying to deterioratethe police forces.
You're trying to make themilitary members question their
(42:13):
loyalty to the regime, becausewhat you want to do is get it to
the point where the leaders ofthe regime are actually afraid
that if they order crowd controlofficers to go beat protesters,
they want the regime to bethinking they might not listen.
And the best example I canthink of that's contemporary, is
(42:36):
like Prigoz thought he hadtipped the balance right when he
set off from Rostov to gotowards Moscow.
He thought all of thecheckpoints were going to open
up, right.
He thought all of the policeservices and the military were
going to support him on hismarch.
And he was right to a degree.
Like when he went into Rostov,they're all waving flags and
(42:57):
taking selfies with them andthey're all super happy.
Wagner was there.
But then as he started to godown the highway, it became
harder and harder to get throughthe checkpoints because he had
not deteriorated the securityservices.
Frank Radford (43:08):
Well, what's the wish list for your Belarusian
compatriots?
What would they like to see?
Dave Smith (43:15):
The thing you will hear is they want to be a normal
country.
You will hear this word all thetime.
They want to be a normalcountry.
You will hear this word all thetime.
They want to be a normalcountry.
To them, what that means issome semblance of like they can
get rid of their leaders whenthey don't like them.
It doesn't necessarily mean arepublic versus a democracy or
(43:38):
the electoral college systemversus first pass votes, but in
their minds minds they want someway to get rid of leaders they
don't like.
They want to be taken seriouslyby the rest of the world right,
they want to be allowed totravel.
They want other people to feelthe desire to come travel to
their country.
Right, and Lukashenko knowsthese things.
(44:00):
He's usually, in the Englishlanguage world, portrayed as a
stooge for Putin, but he is notlike when he wants to stick it
to Putin or remind Putin that hehas does have levers to pull
over the Kremlin.
He can do it, and you know,last week the regime announced
(44:21):
visafree travel to Belarus for35 different European countries.
So there's a bit of aschizophrenia that exists in
Lukashenko's regime.
And Belarusians on average, youknow, considering they live
under an authoritarian regime.
They tend to be quitewell-traveled.
Almost all of them speak manylanguages.
Like the dudes I work with,they all speak at least Russian,
(44:43):
Belarusian, most of themUkrainian, a lot of them English
.
The cultural dynamics and thedifferences between the
Belarusians and the Ukrainiansare actually never cease to
amaze me.
The Ukrainians make a huge dealout of their language, right,
huge because it's been outlawedand suppressed so many times and
it's a very important thing tothem, which makes it also kind
(45:05):
of a sticking point a lot of thetime.
You know, because, like, firstof all, a lot of people in
eastern ukraine don't speakukrainian very much.
They they might understand it,but it's not their day-to-day
language, whereas anywhere, evenwest, you know, if you speak
russian, you get confronted inpublic, like people say don't
speak the language of theinvaders.
The Belarusians don't have thisproblem and I think it's one of
(45:29):
the reasons that I was able togel with the regiment pretty
quickly is that they've been.
Language is so fluid to themand, like, first of all, the
Belarusians, it's a deadlanguage.
Like I'll tell you, it's veryfew people speak it.
All the people I know who speakin Putin I can name on one hand,
but most of them.
You know day to day, like wework in four to five different
(45:52):
languages, right, they all speakRussian to each other.
Some of the old guys speakBelarusian.
They speak Belarusian to theyoung guys.
The young guys try to speakBelarusian back to them.
They speak Belarusian to theyoung guys.
The young guys try to speakBelarusian back to them.
A lot of them speak Polish.
A lot of them learned Ukrainiansince coming here and almost
all of them try to learn English.
Right, like, when they meetEnglish speakers, they really,
really start to make the effortto try and learn English words
(46:13):
and speak English because theyknow that English is the lingua
franca of the free world andthey go after it hard, like they
really really like dudes that Imet, you know, a year and a
half ago.
We didn't speak a single wordof English.
I can now talk to fluently justbecause I talk to them every
day.
J. Alex Tarquinio (46:33):
How did the people you come into contact
with on a daily basis view theupcoming U S presidential
election in November?
Dave Smith (46:40):
But I got to like, day to day, we don't really talk
US politics here.
I spend most of my time withother foreigners.
Keep that in mind.
Right, all my friends areWesterners and Belarusians.
So, like I do spend time aroundthe Ukrainian units that we're
supporting and whatnot, but Idon't think anyone's sitting
(47:02):
around going like, oh my God,happen if the us election turns
one way or the other.
I think there's a generalawakening going on in europe
that, like europeans, can't relyon the us security umbrella and
at least the smart foreignpolicy people are thinking like
what is life, life like withoutAmerica to protect us?
(47:23):
And it's not going well for them.
Frank Radford (47:26):
Well, if you're saying that the impact won't be
psychologically, it may not beas bad as some suggest, but in
terms of the logistic support ofUkraine,
Dave Smith (47:38):
There isn't a whole lot of qualitative difference
between Trump and Biden.
Right, it's like Trump is, he'seasily influenced.
Right, he's now got a vicepresident, uh, nominee who has a
, you know, pretty vocal youcould say I wouldn't say
anti-ukrainist stance, but he'santi-us support team.
That's not a whole lot ofdifference than the Biden policy
(48:02):
of like give them the weaponsbut don't let them hit targets.
That will make a difference.
Like saying here's, attack thembut you're not allowed to use
them on the things that arefiring from Russia, so very
popular right now.
To compare the early 2020s tothe 1930s, and I would say the
major difference right betweenright now and the 1930s is we're
(48:25):
facing like half a dozenHitlers and every single free
country is run by Chamberlain.
In 1939, the bad guys weren'tworking together yet the Axis
didn't exist until like two,three years into the war.
Right, they weren't waging acoordinated attack on the Allies
(48:46):
.
The difference now is, you know, China, Russia and North Korea
like they're literally bandingtogether and making decisions.
J. Alex Tarquinio (48:54):
Dave, thanks so much for your time.
We look forward to speakingwith you again.
Dave Smith (48:58):
Of course.
Frank Radford (48:59):
And stay safe.
And that's it from theDelegates Lounge.
We'd like to thank our esteemedguests who've graciously
allowed us to share theirhard-earned insights into what
really matters.
And then there's you, ourlisteners, who we hope are
sufficiently edified to clamorfor more of the same.
Do drop in for a weekly episodeon Thursday, or from time to
(49:22):
time if we're on the road, forspecial events, in which case
there'll be a bonus episode.
Subscribe wherever you listento podcasts and, if you like
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(49:45):
We're a small team so we can'trespond to every message, but we
will read them.
Our show this week was writtenand produced by the host and by
yours truly, executive producer,Frank Radford.
Until next time, keep calm andcurious.
Welcome to the Delegates Lounge.
Pull up a chair.
I'm Alex Tarquinio, ajournalist based at the United
Nations here in New York Cityand your emcee for this podcast
featuring some of the mostinfluential minds in the world
today.
Settle in for some rivetingtete-a-tete, available wherever
you listen to podcasts.
Welcome back.
(00:42):
Today we're introducing you to aCanadian volunteer on the
Ukrainian battle lines.
Dave Smith walked away from hiscareer with the Canadian Armed
Forces to become a volunteerfighter with the Kalinowski
Regiment.
Many of these fighters won'tspeak with the press over
concerns about the potentialpersecution of their families in
Belarus.
Even before Russia's full scaleinvasion of their neighboring
country, many of them werealready opponents of Alexander
(01:04):
Lukashenko, who they believe hadlost the 2020 presidential
election in their country.
To Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.
As an aside, we interviewed athis summer at NATO's Washington
Summit, so look for thatepisode in our playlist.
Dave's story is so compellingthat we're bringing it to you in
two parts.
In this episode, you'll hearour interview with him in July,
(01:27):
when he had just returned toUkraine and right before heading
back into battle.
We hope you'll come back tolisten to part two.
We followed up with Dave inOctober when he delved into
anecdotes from the battlefieldFor both conversations.
Frank and I spoke with Dave,who joined us from Ukraine via
web conference.
Frank, do you want to tell ushow you met Dave?
Frank Radford (01:46):
Yeah, you bet.
I got in touch with Davethrough Julian Spencer Churchill
, a professor at Canada'sConcordia University, after
meeting Dave in a Zoom meeting.
Dave is a classic unassumingsoul, one of those who, of their
own volition, chooses to takeup arms against a sea of
troubles and to oppose them bydeliberately going into harm's
way.
To take up arms against a seaof troubles and to oppose them
by deliberately going intoharm's way.
Knowing full well the dangersthat await him, he was disgusted
(02:08):
by what he saw as theineffectual response to Russia's
aggression against Ukraine.
Dave made the hard choice toresign from his rank as Major
after 15 years on a fast-trackcareer path in the Canadian
Armed Forces.
He chose the BelarusianRegiment, where like-minded
volunteers understood the dangerposed by Russia, not just to
Ukraine but to everyone that'sfree and wants to remain that
(02:29):
way.
J. Alex Tarquinio (02:30):
We'll include a link in the show notes to an
article in Real Clear Defencethat Dave co-authored with
Julian Spencer Churchill.
We didn't want to interrupt theflow of conversation with Dave
to explain military terminology.
So, frank, can you help usdecipher the jargon?
For instance, in the firstminute Dave refers to leaving
the CAF.
Frank Radford (02:48):
The CAF is the Canadian Armed Forces.
J. Alex Tarquinio (02:51):
Okay, he also refers to a recce team.
Frank Radford (02:53):
That's reconnaissance.
J. Alex Tarquinio (02:55):
And what are cam nets?
Frank Radford (02:56):
Cam nets are camouflage nets.
J. Alex Tarquinio (02:59):
What's the size of a battalion?
How many soldiers are in one?
Frank Radford (03:02):
I would say anything from four to six
hundred.
J. Alex Tarquinio (03:10):
And how would you explain to a civilian what
military doctrine is?
And how would an army adapt it?
Frank Radford (03:14):
Doctrine is the method of war that is practiced
by an army, so it's based oncurrent threats.
If you're not to be caught onthe battlefield and completely
outclassed by a differenttechnology or a different modus
operandi of the other side, youneed to have a doctrine that is
(03:35):
flexible and constantly beingupgraded.
It's, like you know, a software.
J. Alex Tarquinio (03:42):
Okay.
Well, you guys had quite aninteresting discussion about
drones.
Explain the difference betweenMQ-9s and FPVs.
Frank Radford (03:51):
Sure can.
Yeah, dave was making a point.
It's a question of bang for thebuck.
The MQ-9 Reaper, as it's calledat the moment, is a
high-altitude remotely piloteddrone.
It carries state-of-the-artordnance, electronic warfare and
surveillance suites.
It needs a dedicated pilot.
(04:12):
Now it can be flown a continentaway, but can also get shot
down by just about anythinghooties or the backdraft of a
MiG-29.
Contrast that drone with theFPV, the first person viewer,
which is what you see on thefront lines of Ukraine,
generally a quadcopter which hasfour rotary blades enabling it
(04:33):
to land and take off vertically,which means it can be placed
right next to the line ofengagement, better known as a
zero line.
But, more importantly, it canbe flown by a Gen Z who's played
video games.
So what's the difference?
The cost An MQ-9 is $30 millionplus An FPV can be anything
(04:53):
from $500 to maybe a couple ofthousand, and clearly a game
changer in modern warfare.
J. Alex Tarquinio (05:00):
You and Dave spoke and he understood
immediately when you asked himabout the Glorious Revolution.
For our listeners who are notconversant in 17th century
English history, maybe you couldexplain why you thought the
Glorious Revolution was a goodanalogy.
Frank Radford (05:18):
Well, back in 1688, the then King of England,
King James II, was a Catholicking, and a stubborn one at that
.
His subjects were Protestant,and when William of Orange
landed in the southwest ofEngland and he was a Protestant
rival, then there was theprospect of civil war, but and
this is what makes this theglorious revolution James II
(05:38):
opted to leave.
Now, when Sviatlana spoke to us, she made it clear that she
desired for Belarus a peacefultransition.
So the analogy is that ifLukashenko could be induced to
shuffle off to Russia, thenBelarus could celebrate a
glorious revolution of their own.
J. Alex Tarquinio (05:58):
Now, my personal favorite was Dave's
creative use of Leeroy Jenkinsfrom the world of Warcraft, a
massively multiplayer onlinerole-playing game, may be
familiar to some of ourlisteners, but not all.
Urban Dictionary definespulling a Leeroy Jenkins as
destroying all hope of successby rushing into battle without
(06:19):
following strategy, and it stemsfrom an incident when a player
used his character name as abattle cry.
Oh my god, he just ran in.
And on that note, let's getstarted.
Dave Smith, thanks for joiningus in the Delegates Lounge and
(06:49):
thanks for making time for usfrom eastern Ukraine.
Perhaps you could start byexplaining how you became a
volunteer fighter for Ukraineand, within that, how you, as a
Canadian, began working with aBelarusian unit of volunteers.
Dave Smith (07:06):
Yeah, I was an infantry officer in the Canadian
Army for 15 years.
I joined in 2008 after Ifinished university, and then
2022, after the full-scaleinvasion started I was deployed
to Europe.
I was embedded in a USS taskforce headquarters assisting the
(07:27):
Ukrainians.
When they announced the Legionon February 27th 2022, I went
into work the next day and toldmy boss like I'm quitting, I'm
leaving the CAF, I'm going tojoin the Legion.
And my boss was like hang on,hang on.
Like we're sending a recce teamto Europe to find out what the
Americans are doing.
We're going to get you overthere with the 18 Airborne Corps
(07:50):
.
And you know it was good it was.
You know I'm glad I did it.
It was a very importantprofessional experience for me.
But when I came home inNovember, I went into my
colonel's office the next dayand said I won't be here next
spring when the counteroffensivestarts.
Don't expect me to be here in acubicle with you guys.
(08:13):
I will be with the Ukrainiansfighting the fight.
You'll all be here reading morearticles and writing briefing
notes about what the Ukrainiansare doing.
Everybody thought I was insaneinsane.
Two of my best friends had anintervention with me.
My boss pulled me into hisoffice probably five times to
talk me out of it, but I I knewlike I could.
(08:34):
I could tell the magnitude ofwhat was going on.
Like this wasn't just russiaversus the west, this was the
free world versus the unfreeworld.
The writings were already onthe wall.
The international communitysucks.
There's no other way to put it.
They had no idea what they'redoing and Canada was the worst
(08:56):
offender in my opinion.
So when I came home from thatdeployment I got home in
November of 2022.
I did Christmas leave and thenI went in after that and just
submitted my resignation and Ijust bought a bunch of gear,
flew to Ukraine and joined theLegion.
How I came to be in theBelarusian regiment is unusual.
(09:19):
Like most Westerners that comehere join in one of the
international squadrons.
So I won't get into like thelegion is organized because it's
constantly changing, butthere's several different units
in the international legion.
There's a couple that are likestraight up mishmash Westerner
units, which are mostly formerNATO soldiers, and then there's
(09:44):
the Georgians have a unit,there's a Russian unit and
there's a Belarusian unit.
So when I got here and thensorry, and then there's also
like the Ukrainian brigades willalso hire foreigners on like an
individual basis or a teambasis.
So it's not like you get hereand there's one monolithic
entity that you're joining.
You kind of have to find theright fit.
(10:08):
So when I heard there was aBelarusian unit, I was super
excited to meet them because ofthe job.
I used to have my last jobbefore I left.
I was a targeting officer oneastern europe portfolio,
specifically looking at therussian threat.
I was super cognizant of whatwas going on in 2020 when
Sviatlana ended up winning thepresidency because Lukashenko
(10:31):
didn't think a woman could beathim, and I knew most of the
dudes in the regiment weredefectors, right.
There were people that eitherescaped Belarus legitimately or
escaped prison and then escapedbelarus, um.
So psychologically I felt mostaligned with them because
(10:51):
they're all true believers,right.
So I hate to say this, but thelegion, especially in the early
days, you know, the first sixmonths of the war it attracted
all kinds of types that youthink will fight in foreign wars
uh, more mercenary mentalityguys.
And when I met the Belarusians,it was a meeting of the minds,
(11:13):
if you will.
You know they like they.
They understood that the war inukraine is part of a broader um
strategic shift that's going onin Eastern Europe, and I
honestly do think that if theWest had realized in the middle
(11:33):
of the pandemic how importantthat Belarusian election was in
2020 and supported Sviatlana'sgovernment, I don't think we
would have had the invasion ofUkraine right, for multiple
reasons.
Number one I think that just theshow of solidarity behind a
country that wants to be aliberal democracy would have
frightened the tyrants.
But number two is, militarily,putin was reliant on Belarusian
(11:57):
territory to get into Ukraine,to pre-positioned forces in
belarus in april of 2021 andhave that huge build-up.
So strategically, militarilyand psychologically, I felt that
it was the unit that I shouldbe part of and I also just, you
(12:20):
know, really dug their soldiersmentality you know what I mean
like the average worked in it orsome other kind of white collar
job came to ukraine and theylearned to fight war at war with
the russian army.
You know that, like, those arehard dudes, you know, and they
(12:41):
can't go home, which is the bigdifference between them and all
the other foreign fighters.
Everyone else can leave, right,they don't have a home to go
home to.
So that brings a lot morestability to the organization.
That's why I, you know, I leftand went on leave over Christmas
last year and when I came backI rejoined.
J. Alex Tarquinio (13:00):
And, to be clear, you don't have I mean, I
know you're Canadian, but youdon't have a Belarusian family
connection.
Dave Smith (13:06):
Nor Ukrainian.
J. Alex Tarquinio (13:08):
Because when we did speak with Sviatlana
Tsikhanouskaya recently, she hadmentioned that she can't say
too much about the guys in theBelarusian regiment because some
of them may still have familyin Belarus and there could be re
..
Frank Radford (13:26):
Not may most of them do.
A lot of them have already beentargeted.
Like several of them they'reyou know they can't contact
their families because they're.
The Belarusian KGB knows thatthey're here.
J. Alex Tarquinio (13:33):
So the reason you're able to speak with us
today is because you're with theregiment, but you're not
Belarusian.
You don't have family at perilin Belarus.
Dave Smith (13:42):
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Frank Radford (13:45):
Well, Dave, I've got some specific questions.
Do you see a lot morevolunteers coming over, or is it
sort of passe?
Dave Smith (13:54):
No, I would say it's stabilized.
I would say in the last six toeight months we're seeing a
steady inflow, but it's smallcomparatively.
It's me and the only guys thatI, the only former officers that
I know, have all been herelonger than me, um, so they're
just in it for the long haul,they're in it to win it, um, but
(14:15):
there's like dude, we couldhave a bi-weekly potluck.
There's so few of us if wewanted to.
The problem ukraine has withthe foreign fighters and I don't
think it's a problem you canfix is that organizationally it
will always be unstable becauseevery foreigner is one bad day
away from just throwing therifle down and going home.
(14:37):
So it's very hard to plan right.
It's very hard to like.
You won't know what's your unitstrength six months from now.
You have no idea right.
Frank Radford (14:46):
The exponential growth of drones towards
possibly autonomous weaponsystems must be impacting.
Just by observation of what'sgoing on, how on earth do you
actually do a doctrinal changethat can deal with that?
Dave Smith (15:02):
Frank, you are hitting the exact problem that
me and my unit are at right now.
Infantry are obsolete right now, like thermal drones, glide
bombs and FPVs, like we can't goanywhere, we can't start an
assault, we can't hold a pieceof terrain, we can't do anything
(15:24):
, a piece of trade, we can't doanything, because the moment we
show up, an fpv just kills us,you know.
And that problem is not goingto be solved by us, like it
doesn't matter how good our camnets are, it doesn't matter how
good our, you know, radiodiscipline is, we're not going
to fix that problem.
It you need an operationallevel commander with a plan and
(15:47):
the technology to back up thatplan to solve that problem, and
I firmly believe the Ukrainianswill solve it before the RAND
Corporation or any R&D agency.
Frank Radford (15:58):
But the issue is will the Russians solve it
faster?
Dave Smith (16:01):
The you I think,..
we attribute undefined a bit toomuch intelligence to the
Russians.
Like, like they, they like theyare learning, they're adapting,
they're better.
definitely better than theywere were six months ago, a year
ago, two years ago, but I thinkthey get better at a cost of
(16:23):
bodies.
That is like just unacceptable.
Like you won't win if.
If every lesson learned takesthat many casualties, you won't
win.
They also don't innovate thesteel right.
Like they don't learn.
They learn what the ukrainiansUkrainians are doing.
You know the Ukrainians do itto them.
They figure it out right.
(16:43):
The Ukrainians are actuallyinnovators, and I know because I
see it like they show up andthey're like we have this new
drone, we want to go test itwith you.
You watch them, you're like youguys are amazing, right.
And then six months later, theRussians have it too right,
because they reverse engineerwhat the Ukrainians are doing.
So if this were, you know, acapitalist free market, russia
(17:03):
is the cheap knockoff of anApple product like Steve Jobs
will innovate, everyone elsewill copy him, you know, and
it's like yes, will you get theproduct cheaper?
Frank Radford (17:15):
but nevertheless there's a gap between you know.
Obviously the Ukrainians are atthe the forefront and the
Russians are six months behindthem or less, but where's nato?
Dave Smith (17:29):
No, NATO's in the Stone Age NATO.
It doesn't matter how muchevidence you produce that like
guys, stop building strategictheater-level drones.
Like MQ-9s are stupid.
Stop building them, because assoon as you build it, you're
afraid you'll lose it, so younever use it you know what.
I mean, no matter how much youtry to tell defense industrial
(17:53):
complex, it's like build small,cheap, disposable right now.
They won't do it.
They're in the Stone Age.
Frank Radford (18:03):
The IDF and I think NATO in particular, are
flummoxed by the prospect ofbeing swarmed by FPVs, and the
question is whether or notRussia can adapt faster than
they can create a doctrine todeal with it.
Dave Smith (18:21):
I'm positive in terms of like the way they're
using thermal guns right now.
Nato won't figure it out untila bunch of people get killed,
until they actually go to aflight and an entire battalion
gets wiped out in one day byFPVs.
Nato won't figure it out.
You can send all the lessonslearned people you want to
Ukraine.
The RAND Corporation can writepapers, it won't matter.
(18:45):
Until a battalion of dudes getskilled in three hours by fpvs,
they won't figure it out.
Europe still doesn't get it.
You know, I mean the european.
I mean there's Kaja Kallas inEstonia.
Uh, is my hero.
I wish she was in charge ofeverything.
(19:05):
Kaja Kallas in Estonia.
She gets it, and I think theEstonians get it, the Poles get
it.
Emmanuel Macron, who is theonly major European leader in my
opinion, was trying to act likea leader in the last year.
So you're going to see by theend of this decade, in Dave
Smith's opinion, like the, theunfree world that has nuclear
(19:29):
weapons is just going to dividethe world up the way they want
it, and the rest of us are justgoing to have to accept it
because we refuse to do anythingabout it.
And I mean honestly, I've beenlike calling out dictators for
years.
I'm offended that Wagnerimploded before they put me on
their kill list, you know.
I mean, I don't know what moreI have to do.
(19:49):
Uh, putin has never tried tohoneypot me or even novichok my
tea, and I've been calling himout on the dark web for a decade
J. Alex Tarquinio (20:01):
Now how would you call him out on the Dark
Web?
That's very interesting.
Was it certain channels youwere on?
Dave Smith (20:06):
Well, there was a short time when I was in cyber I
made it a personal vendetta togo after these Russian.
I call them cyber privateers.
Like we pretend they're justcriminals that are ransom
wearing hospitals and whatnot,but really what they are is
they're building strategicweapons for the Russian
government, the FSB government,the FSB, and we all just kind of
(20:29):
pretend they're like teenagersin their mom's basements that
are ransom wearing pipelines inthe Eastern US, and really what
they are is they're privateers.
Right, like Putin has anunwritten agreement with them
where he says okay, listen,don't come after me, don't come
after the oligarchs, whateveryou do to America is free game.
J. Alex Tarquinio (20:45):
So was this to?
To be clear, this is when youwere with the canadian military
it was in military cyber for avery short period.
Dave Smith (20:53):
I like, like I said, I'm an infantry officer.
I came home from deployment in2019.
Cyber needed an operationsofficer, which is a role that I
was qualified for, and Ivolunteered for it and I just
ended up kind of planning uhmissions with ukraine,
essentially, um, because at thetime, we had this huge training
(21:15):
this was going on withukrainians to try and help them
get more postured to be a natocountry, and in 2016, nato had
published this huge report withI like 150 some recommendations
for how the Ukrainian militarycould become more suitable for
NATO membership.
And there was a lot of thisstuff that they were doing
(21:37):
themselves right, like justtypical stuff infantry training
or small unit tactics or, youknow, upgrading weapons systems,
things like that but then therewas a bunch of stuff they had
no idea how to do, whichincluded being more cyber secure
right.
So they were literally lookingfor countries to show them how
to harden their networks andlock out Russian intrusions.
(22:01):
That's how I ended up workingwhile I was in the Canadian
military.
I was back in Canada with cyber, so that was how I had been on
the Russian file already, butthat was really how I started
working directly with Ukraine.
So by the time the invasionstarted, you know my team back
at the operational command wewere like some of the few people
(22:21):
that were telling everybodythis invasion is definitely
going to happen.
Me and my band of nerds, wewere like the few half dozen
people that were standing infront of the generals being like
no sir, they're definitelygoing to invade, like they're
moving blood bags to the front.
Wake up.
J. Alex Tarquinio (22:36):
Do you think part of it was the attention was
elsewhere because of the globalpandemic?
Dave Smith (22:41):
No, I think that Western leaders believe what
they want to believe, like theyhonestly think that everyone is
rational the way they are.
They like they don't even tothis day right.
Like there's still people thatthink you know, putin's just an
irrational actor.
Like I can't tell you thenumber of articles I read.
It's like putin's just clearlynot a rational actor.
(23:03):
It's like no, you justmistakenly think that the way
you think is the only way to berational.
Frank Radford (23:11):
Now, especially from a former NATO officer's
point of view, we don'tunderstand the pecking order in
their command structure, Inother words, FSB dictates and
then the military you knowundertakes, Whereas that's
certainly not the case in NATOmilitaries.
Dave Smith (23:32):
Okay.
So you're bringing up a greatpoint.
You're bringing up somethingthat's a hobby horse for me or a
bugbear, I don't know what youcall it, but I don't have any
visibility on the inner workingsof the Ukrainian command
structure, the general staff,the security service, like I,
like I'm literally just lastnight I was a dude walking
(23:54):
around in the woods, um, youknow, hoping I had enough water,
right, so I don't want to makeit seem like I have access to
information that I don't have.
I say here's one thing I'veidentified culturally that is
very different between thepost-Soviet sphere and the NATO
countries.
In the military that I comefrom, the military culture that
(24:18):
I was raised in, we kind ofidolize special forces units,
SOF units, the Seal Teams, theRangers, SAS.
You know, in Canada we have theJTF2 and CSOR.
In the post-Soviet world it'sall intelligence, right, they're
elite units, they're allintelligence organizations, uh,
(24:40):
whether it's military orsecurity services and that's
true in ukraine as well.
Like you can spot them on thebattlefield when you see the
guys with really cool gear andtricked out vehicles and such,
it's either UR, SBU or someother intelligence outfit.
So there's a relationshipbetween FSB and the regular
(25:04):
military that NATO doesn'tunderstand.
But it's not the same as, likethe way the CIA, the US military
works right, or the way CSISand the Canadian military work.
We have these very sharp policyand legal boundaries between
what militaries do versus whatintelligence agencies do.
Intelligence agencies likeintelligence, you know.
(25:27):
For them to become an actionarm that delivers effects,
especially on a battlefield, isextremely difficult.
Like policy-wise, I've workedwith the US military and
government.
The three-letter agencies arearound, but anytime you go to a
meeting with them, there's apolicy advisor and a legal
advisor sitting right next towhoever the decision maker is
saying you know, sir, anintelligence agency can't do
(25:47):
that, or sir that's collectingon US citizens, or sir you can't
.
Or, ma'am, you know, like no,no, no, no, no, like the
boundary between intelligence,what the intelligence agency
does and what the military does,is very palpable, and I think
that's true of all NATOcountries, although I can't
speak from firsthand experience.
That is not the case here.
From intelligence to decisionmaker to action arm, that chain,
(26:17):
if you will, is much faster andstronger and more reactive in
Ukraine and Russia than it is inany NATO country.
I'm not saying it works all thetime.
I think if you look at thefirst six weeks of the war, it
was clear there was no militarypeople in charge.
You know, like if I was ageneral advising Putin, you know
I'd say, sir, we've spent eightyears in the east spreading
(26:43):
this narrative that there areRussian speakers and ethnic
Russians in Donbass who arebeing genocided by Nazis.
That's the military objective.
Is the East, it's Donbass,right.
It's not to Leeroy Jenkins atthe Kyiv.
You know like, that's not.
Like any military planner wouldsay this is insane, this is
(27:05):
ludicrous.
Only intelligence spooks couldthink that was a good idea.
Frank Radford (27:11):
The way the war unfolded in the Southern theater
, especially taking, you know,the Isthmus, and then going in
and taking Mariupol andBerdyansk and then Kherson.
Dave Smith (27:25):
We've never been in the South right, so all the
foreigners we're essentiallylight infantry.
Everything going down inKherson, Mariupol and even most
of Zaporizhia is all mechanizedwarfare that we're not part of.
You know what I mean, so Ihaven't spent considerable time
in the portion of the theaterthat you're talking about.
Frank Radford (27:47):
They got close to Odessa.
If you take Odessa, it's over.
Dave Smith (27:53):
They got close geographically.
They did not get closefeasibility-wise as you would
think looking at the map.
Frank Radford (28:02):
The instead focused on Kyiv, which was
ludicrous from a military pointof view.
Had they diverted force wherethey were successful?
Dave Smith (28:11):
The first five, six weeks of the war, I do not
believe there was any militarypeople in charge, and you'll
notice when the credit to theRussians were credits due after
those first six weeks and the65- kilometer convoy of shame
that got blown up across thecountry.
When they pulled back to theeast, they had a lot of success
(28:34):
April-ish April, June of 2022,when they pulled back to the
east.
That's when they started makingground towards Odessa along the
coast.
It wasn't in the opening days,right, it was like two months
into.
It is when they really startedto make gains and when they
really really started to takethe east right.
Because, if you think about itthis way, the opening days of
(28:57):
the war, they have 13 axes ofadvance going towards all parts
of the country Poltava, Odessa.
Right, it was not Ukrainiancrack units fighting in Bucha,
you know, it was reservists andit was guerrillas and it was
people that were handed an AK-47on February 25th.
(29:17):
The good units were stillfighting in the east.
So if you look at Donbass inMarch, April, June, you see this
shift where it's like, well,the Russians weren't really in
control of anything, to by themiddle of the summer, where it
was like they're in control ofterritory they did not have on
February 24th and they're makingan end run to Odessa and it's
(29:38):
looking quite successful.
So I believe what happened wasafter the first six years of the
war, Putin realized like theseintelligence spooks don't know
what the hell they're doing andI'm putting the general staff
back in charge, and thatincluded the Prigozhin.
And then eventually it was theKherson fight with Surovikin and
Surovikin, you know, wasactually a decent commander and
(30:01):
then Prigozhin and Wagner, whois like terrifying to fight like
.
I can tell you, Wagner, they'reevil and they're barbaric.
They knew what they were doing.
They destroyed themselvestaking Bakhmut.
They knew how to fight.
So whenever the Russianmilitary forces, in my opinion,
(30:21):
were making the decisions,they've had considerable success
, at least in the first year,year and a half of the war.
I think it's when they wereletting the intelligence, people
like Putin, you know, when theywere letting people like Putin
make military decisions, I thinkthe battlefield was turning
against them and this idea thatyou can use information, warfare
(30:43):
and assassinations to makebattlefield victories, I think
is mistaken.
And it's definitely mistakenwhen you're fighting another
post-Soviet military right,because the Ukrainians know that
game the Ukrainian SSO, whichis their special forces.
They trained the stay-behindsthat stayed in the occupied
territories between about 2015and 2022.
(31:05):
If you think it was justUkrainian national identity that
suddenly rose up in Februaryand that's why these old ladies
were yelling at Russian soldiersin the street corner, I hate to
break it to you.
That was the Ukrainian specialforces training citizens to
plant car bombs and assassinatepeople.
The Ukrainians are extremelygood at that stuff, and it's a
whole world that NATO militaries.
(31:26):
We know nothing about.
Frank Radford (31:29):
I don't think that's appreciated the extent of
that.
No, I don't think so either.
It's very SOE, very Frenchresistance Totally.
Dave Smith (31:37):
Yeah, resistance like we throw it around, you
know what I mean, but here it'sreal, like when you meet them,
you know these farmers in theseoccupied territories and I think
it's why the Russians thoughtthey had the monopoly on that
game, not realizing Ukrainiansare from the same military and
(31:57):
intelligence heritage, so it'sreciprocal.
You know, like they know how todo it too, you know?
Frank Radford (32:12):
Okay, let's just quickly talk about your
experiences with the Ukrainianforces operational level at the
division.
Dave Smith (32:15):
I couldn't tell you I'm not at the operational level
.
Like I'm way down in the weedsat the tactical level.
But I will say I've never seenanything larger than a company
level op conducted here.
Now I have a very narrowexperience.
I'm light infantry.
Frank Radford (32:27):
Now, how many officers of your rank formerly
in NATO are serving, as I meanyou say you're basically on the
front line as almost a gruntright.
Dave Smith (32:38):
There's probably a handful, if that there was a
handful when I got here.
There's me and one other guythat I know of right now left so
Frank Radford (32:46):
what you have to say is is is worthy of note.
Dave Smith (32:50):
Yeah.
The other thing that I say isthat it because the Ukrainians
are actually fighting aconventional war that we haven't
seen anybody else fight indecades.
It's really easy to look atthem and say like, oh my god,
they don't understand theoperational level of war right I
can tell you from firsthandexperience Canada don't
understand the operational levelof war right.
I can tell you from firsthandexperience Canada doesn't
understand the operational levelof war.
We're retarded at it, we suck.
(33:12):
I was at the operational levelof command, right.
You guys call them COCOMs, wejust call it the Joint
Operational Command.
You know, other than, like yourwell-oiled machine militaries,
which at this point wouldprobably only be the US, I don't
know anybody that's good at theoperational level of war and I
(33:33):
know that whenever I was ondeployments in the past with
Brits and Australians, all wedid was complain about how no
one knew what the hell the pointof an operational headquarters
was, of an operationalheadquarters was.
You know, like I, like me andseveral, if you ever want to
strike up a conversation with aBritish, you know, mid-level
officer, like a major lieutenantcolonel type, just walk into a
(33:55):
bar, buy him a beer and saydon't you hate the operational
level of war.
And you, they'll just bitch allnight.
So it's really easy to point atthe Ukrainians and be like well
, they have a general staff andthey have brigade commanders and
they have nothing in betweenbecause they don't understand
the operational level of war.
Well, I put it to you like,show me someone who does Other
than Team America.
Frank Radford (34:17):
NATO just says that China is the decisive
enabler of Russia.
You're on the battlefield.
Are you noticing anysignificant changes because of
Chinese equipment?
Dave Smith (34:42):
I couldn't really say I don't like.
I haven't ripped apart anywreckage of missiles and seen if
there's chinese parts of them.
I found the language ofdecisive enabler very
questionable.
I I'm sure they're an enable,you know.
I'm sure china is happilysupporting russia in all the
ways that it thinks it can,without getting itself into too
much trouble.
Decisive though I think.
(35:04):
If Xi J inping was like Vladbro, we're not giving you any
computer chips or missileequipment or thermals or
anything, I don't think thatwould stop the war right.
I don't think putin would belike oh darn, China's not on
board anymore, so we're going tohave to go home.
Whatever support China's giving, I'm sure it's bad, but I don't
(35:28):
think it's decisive.
Frank Radford (35:29):
Well, that's fair enough.
You're on the front line.
So I mean, obviously they'vegot motorcycles and these golf
cart things and they're nothardly decisive yeah.
They're not hardly decisive.
Dave Smith (35:40):
Yeah, I also think the West is quick to see Chinese
writing on military technologyin Eastern Ukraine as a sign of
China supporting Russia, and Ijust I think that's
misinterpreting the widespreadavailability of Chinese
technology.
We buy from China.
I guarantee it, like if I couldgo on Amazon right now and buy
(36:04):
drones for my whole unit thatwere made in China, we would do
it.
You know what I mean.
That doesn't mean China issuddenly supporting the
Belarusian regiment in easternUkraine.
It means Chinese technology isvery easy to get.
Frank Radford (36:13):
They were over there doing an exercise with the
Belarusians at the same timeNATO conference.
Dave Smith (36:19):
I think there's two things that are important to
remember.
Totalitarian regimes nevertrust each other.
They can't so anytime you seethem working together.
It's a marriage of convenience,and I think it's a mistake to
over-interpret their cooperation.
(36:39):
If Xi Jinping thought it wouldbe politically advantageous to
him to undermine VladimirPutin's war in Ukraine, he would
do it, you know.
And the second thing is, if youimagine the free world and the
unfree world and there's a linedown the middle between the two
of them, there's a box right inthe middle of that line with
(37:01):
three compartments in it.
The three compartments are theBlack Sea, Ukraine and Belarus.
Right, the unfree world needsthose three compartments to get
into Europe.
Right, the war path to Europeis through Belarus or through
Ukraine, or through the BlackSea.
Right now it's one of theunsung stories of the war
(37:24):
there's an entire naval wargoing on in the Black Sea that
isn't even making it to thecover of the New York Times
because the Ukrainians arewinning it so decisively.
Ukraine is the compartmentthat's contested.
Belarus is held by Russia.
The Belarusians that I workwith, they all say Belarus is
not a country, it's occupiedterritory.
It's the equivalent of occupiedKherson or occupied Donetsk or
(37:48):
Luhansk.
The tyrants need Belarus.
Putin couldn't have launchedhis war in Ukraine without
Belarus.
They can't credibly maintaintheir threat to NATO countries
without Belarus.
They can't maintain they can'tcredibly maintain their threat
to NATO countries withoutBelarus.
If Belarus were to get flippedand become, you know, an EU
member or a NATO-friendlydemocratic country, that would
(38:11):
be a huge blow for Putin and XiJinping.
J. Alex Tarquinio (38:15):
Is that getting back to your Belarusian
colleagues there in the regiment?
Is that how the majority ofthem see it?
Dave Smith (38:21):
For them, it's a lot more local right.
For me, I live in thisgeostrategic world.
For them, it's about theirfamilies in Brest and Minsk and
whatnot.
A lot of them I think I don'twant to say have given up hope
on Belarus, but they knowthey're in this for a long time.
(38:44):
Like this is the differencebetween talking to a Belarusian
soldier here and your averageWesterner that comes here for
three months or six months orwhatever.
Um, they know they are in thiswar for a long time, and when I
say a long time, I mean likegenerational.
Several of them are trying toget Ukrainian citizenship and
(39:05):
buy houses here and get married.
They know like there's no pointpretending that they're going
home anytime soon.
So the the biggest difference,I would say, between them and
your average foreign fighter islike, even if they win in
Ukraine, they're like this isn'tover.
You know.
They're like freedom has notcome to Eastern Europe yet.
(39:26):
I don't want to say they'rehopeless, but their psychology
is much more the long game.
Their repression apparatus hasescalated through the roof.
I can't tell you how many dudesI know here that were in prison
after the 2020 elections,tortured.
Um people disappear in thenight like it's the soviet union
again families beingintimidated, uh, routinely and
(39:48):
systematically, uh, so that's ahuge difference is what's
happened since 2020.
And the number two the war hasthe regime in a really sticky
situation.
You, you know what I mean.
Like they don't want toover-support Russia, but they
know they can't under-supportRussia because now the Russian
(40:08):
army is fully mobilized.
They're on a wartime economy.
If Vlad wants to roll the tanksacross the border into Belarus,
for whatever objective, hecould do it.
So they have to worry aboutthat in a way that I don't think
they had to worry about it fiveyears ago.
Frank Radford (40:23):
To go all historical, if you look at 1688
and the Glorious Revolution, youhave James II, who was a
Catholic, but everybody else isProtestant, but the catalyst was
William of Orange.
Now is it feasible to see theBelarusian regiment or volunteer
corps as that sort of lingeringthreat?
Dave Smith (40:47):
They would be the ones to go back and lead the
color revolution in the wings.
The threat of them is important.
You need Lukashenko to wake up.
When he looks outside hispalace and he sees a bunch of 25
year old women waving thenon-official flag, he needs to
(41:08):
worry.
If I send in the police tobreak up that protest, will they
actually do it?
And if they do try to do it,will a bunch of freedom fighters
roar up on pickup trucks?
And you need that fear in hisbrain, otherwise your revolution
will not succeed.
If you study revolutions, youknow and I'm sure um you'll have
(41:29):
listeners that are smarter onthis than I am.
But if you look at revolutionsme as a military person I can
tell you there's two sides to it.
Right and in unconventionalwarfare, we talk about left of
bang, and right of bang.
Bang is like when does it goviolent?
So if you imagine, you know, atthe start of the revolutionary
movement, right, you have thepopulace's ability to wage
(41:52):
violence on the regime and youhave the regime's ability to
wage violence on the populace,and what you're trying to do,
left of bang, equalize those asmuch as possible.
So you're trying to do left ofbang is equalize those as much
as possible.
So you're trying to deterioratethe security services.
You're trying to deterioratethe police forces.
You're trying to make themilitary members question their
(42:13):
loyalty to the regime, becausewhat you want to do is get it to
the point where the leaders ofthe regime are actually afraid
that if they order crowd controlofficers to go beat protesters,
they want the regime to bethinking they might not listen.
And the best example I canthink of that's contemporary, is
(42:36):
like Prigoz thought he hadtipped the balance right when he
set off from Rostov to gotowards Moscow.
He thought all of thecheckpoints were going to open
up, right.
He thought all of the policeservices and the military were
going to support him on hismarch.
And he was right to a degree.
Like when he went into Rostov,they're all waving flags and
(42:57):
taking selfies with them andthey're all super happy.
Wagner was there.
But then as he started to godown the highway, it became
harder and harder to get throughthe checkpoints because he had
not deteriorated the securityservices.
Frank Radford (43:08):
Well, what's the wish list for your Belarusian
compatriots?
What would they like to see?
Dave Smith (43:15):
The thing you will hear is they want to be a normal
country.
You will hear this word all thetime.
They want to be a normalcountry.
You will hear this word all thetime.
They want to be a normalcountry.
To them, what that means issome semblance of like they can
get rid of their leaders whenthey don't like them.
It doesn't necessarily mean arepublic versus a democracy or
(43:38):
the electoral college systemversus first pass votes, but in
their minds minds they want someway to get rid of leaders they
don't like.
They want to be taken seriouslyby the rest of the world right,
they want to be allowed totravel.
They want other people to feelthe desire to come travel to
their country.
Right, and Lukashenko knowsthese things.
(44:00):
He's usually, in the Englishlanguage world, portrayed as a
stooge for Putin, but he is notlike when he wants to stick it
to Putin or remind Putin that hehas does have levers to pull
over the Kremlin.
He can do it, and you know,last week the regime announced
(44:21):
visafree travel to Belarus for35 different European countries.
So there's a bit of aschizophrenia that exists in
Lukashenko's regime.
And Belarusians on average, youknow, considering they live
under an authoritarian regime.
They tend to be quitewell-traveled.
Almost all of them speak manylanguages.
Like the dudes I work with,they all speak at least Russian,
(44:43):
Belarusian, most of themUkrainian, a lot of them English
.
The cultural dynamics and thedifferences between the
Belarusians and the Ukrainiansare actually never cease to
amaze me.
The Ukrainians make a huge dealout of their language, right,
huge because it's been outlawedand suppressed so many times and
it's a very important thing tothem, which makes it also kind
(45:05):
of a sticking point a lot of thetime.
You know, because, like, firstof all, a lot of people in
eastern ukraine don't speakukrainian very much.
They they might understand it,but it's not their day-to-day
language, whereas anywhere, evenwest, you know, if you speak
russian, you get confronted inpublic, like people say don't
speak the language of theinvaders.
The Belarusians don't have thisproblem and I think it's one of
(45:29):
the reasons that I was able togel with the regiment pretty
quickly is that they've been.
Language is so fluid to themand, like, first of all, the
Belarusians, it's a deadlanguage.
Like I'll tell you, it's veryfew people speak it.
All the people I know who speakin Putin I can name on one hand,
but most of them.
You know day to day, like wework in four to five different
(45:52):
languages, right, they all speakRussian to each other.
Some of the old guys speakBelarusian.
They speak Belarusian to theyoung guys.
The young guys try to speakBelarusian back to them.
They speak Belarusian to theyoung guys.
The young guys try to speakBelarusian back to them.
A lot of them speak Polish.
A lot of them learned Ukrainiansince coming here and almost
all of them try to learn English.
Right, like, when they meetEnglish speakers, they really,
really start to make the effortto try and learn English words
(46:13):
and speak English because theyknow that English is the lingua
franca of the free world andthey go after it hard, like they
really really like dudes that Imet, you know, a year and a
half ago.
We didn't speak a single wordof English.
I can now talk to fluently justbecause I talk to them every
day.
J. Alex Tarquinio (46:33):
How did the people you come into contact
with on a daily basis view theupcoming U S presidential
election in November?
Dave Smith (46:40):
But I got to like, day to day, we don't really talk
US politics here.
I spend most of my time withother foreigners.
Keep that in mind.
Right, all my friends areWesterners and Belarusians.
So, like I do spend time aroundthe Ukrainian units that we're
supporting and whatnot, but Idon't think anyone's sitting
(47:02):
around going like, oh my God,happen if the us election turns
one way or the other.
I think there's a generalawakening going on in europe
that, like europeans, can't relyon the us security umbrella and
at least the smart foreignpolicy people are thinking like
what is life, life like withoutAmerica to protect us?
(47:23):
And it's not going well for them.
Frank Radford (47:26):
Well, if you're saying that the impact won't be
psychologically, it may not beas bad as some suggest, but in
terms of the logistic support ofUkraine,
Dave Smith (47:38):
There isn't a whole lot of qualitative difference
between Trump and Biden.
Right, it's like Trump is, he'seasily influenced.
Right, he's now got a vicepresident, uh, nominee who has a
, you know, pretty vocal youcould say I wouldn't say
anti-ukrainist stance, but he'santi-us support team.
That's not a whole lot ofdifference than the Biden policy
(48:02):
of like give them the weaponsbut don't let them hit targets.
That will make a difference.
Like saying here's, attack thembut you're not allowed to use
them on the things that arefiring from Russia, so very
popular right now.
To compare the early 2020s tothe 1930s, and I would say the
major difference right betweenright now and the 1930s is we're
(48:25):
facing like half a dozenHitlers and every single free
country is run by Chamberlain.
In 1939, the bad guys weren'tworking together yet the Axis
didn't exist until like two,three years into the war.
Right, they weren't waging acoordinated attack on the Allies
(48:46):
.
The difference now is, you know, China, Russia and North Korea
like they're literally bandingtogether and making decisions.
J. Alex Tarquinio (48:54):
Dave, thanks so much for your time.
We look forward to speakingwith you again.
Dave Smith (48:58):
Of course.
Frank Radford (48:59):
And stay safe.
And that's it from theDelegates Lounge.
We'd like to thank our esteemedguests who've graciously
allowed us to share theirhard-earned insights into what
really matters.
And then there's you, ourlisteners, who we hope are
sufficiently edified to clamorfor more of the same.
Do drop in for a weekly episodeon Thursday, or from time to
(49:22):
time if we're on the road, forspecial events, in which case
there'll be a bonus episode.
Subscribe wherever you listento podcasts and, if you like
what you've heard, please take amoment to rate or review the
show, as it helps others whoshare your abiding interest in
world affairs to find their wayto the Delegates Lounge.
You can connect with us on manypopular social media platforms
or reach out to us directly atinfothedelicatesloungecom.
(49:45):
We're a small team so we can'trespond to every message, but we
will read them.
Our show this week was writtenand produced by the host and by
yours truly, executive producer,Frank Radford.
Until next time, keep calm andcurious.
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