June 12, 2025 • 28 mins
Welcome to the third edition of "Undercurrents," an ongoing series in The Delegates Lounge podcast about the oceans and seas that unite us, and sometimes, divide us.
In this episode, we're continuing our conversation with Michelle Wiese Bockmann, a former longtime analyst with Lloyd's List, one of the world’s oldest continuously running journals that has provided shipping news from London for centuries.
Beneath, above, and at the surface of global shipping lanes, a new era of maritime threats is emerging with potentially devastating consequences for world trade, communications, and security.
Our conversation with Michelle plunges immediately into the rise of cable cutting incidents in the Baltic Sea, where vessels have severed critical undersea infrastructure connecting nations and communications networks. She describes how difficult it is to prove sabotage in these cases, even as NATO deploys artificial intelligence to track suspicious vessel movements. The shadowy "dark fleet" of vessels operating outside international norms presents a particular challenge, with ships engaged in deceptive practices that make monitoring difficult.
Drone warfare has changed maritime security calculations. From the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea using unmanned explosive boats to targeted strikes against commercial vessels, these relatively inexpensive weapons have forced shipping companies to abandon crucial trade routes. The economic impact is staggering. Rerouting around Africa's Cape of Good Hope adds approximately one million dollars in fuel costs per container ship journey, costs ultimately shouldered by consumers worldwide.
Most concerning is the growing inability of international governance frameworks to address these evolving threats. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was drafted long before modern drone warfare and cable cutting incidents, while Michelle says the International Maritime Organization has become paralyzed by geopolitical divisions. As she sees it, the United States has retreated from its traditional leadership role in these forums, leaving critical environmental and security decisions in limbo.
From the Arctic's opening passages to the complexities of Panama Canal operations, this conversation offers rare insights into the vulnerabilities of our ocean-dependent global economy. Join us for this essential exploration of maritime security challenges that affect everything from the products on our store shelves to the internet connections powering our digital lives.
Subscribe to The Delegates Lounge for more critical insights into the maritime undercurrents shaping global politics, economics, and environmental security.
Speakers:
J. Alex Tarquinio (host) is a resident correspondent at the United Nations in New York and co-founder of The Delegates Lounge podcast. @alextarquinio of @delegateslounge on X and @thedelegateslounge on Instagram.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (guest) is a maritime analyst and former longtime writer with Lloyd’s List, one of the world’s oldest continuously running journals. @Michellewb_ on X.
References:
Recent articles by our guest include this opinion piece in the Financial Times.
https://www.ft.com/content/7a89f7ae-cf3b-4e53-88bb-b87916f3eeef
Our host mentions in this episode that she interviewed Michelle for an article in The New York Times when the sanctions were relatively new.
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
J. Alex Tarquinio (00:08):
Welcome to The Delegates Lounge.
Pull up a chair.
I'm Alex Tarquinio, ajournalist based at the United
Nations here in New York Cityand your emcee for this podcast
featuring some of the mostinfluential minds in the world
today.
Settle in for some rivetingtete-a-tete, available wherever
you listen to podcasts.
Welcome back to the thirdepisode of our new series,
(00:39):
called "Undercurrents," aboutthe oceans and seas that unite
us and sometimes divide us.
Today we're continuing ourconversation with Michelle Wiese
Bockmann, a maritime securityanalyst and former longtime
writer with Lloyd's List, one ofthe world's oldest continuously
running journals that hasprovided shipping news from
London for centuries.
(00:59):
This is the second part of ourextended conversation with
Michelle.
In this episode, ourconversation explores many of
the most pressing threats tomaritime security, including
cable cutting, aerial and seadrones and piracy.
Michelle sheds light on thesuitability and effectiveness of
the International MaritimeOrganization, a specialized
(01:21):
agency of the United Nations,and the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea UNCLOS Ahead of nextweek's UN Ocean Conference to
be held in Nice, the third suchgathering focused on
conservation efforts.
She gives a bleak descriptionof the failed efforts to
decarbonize the globalcommercial shipping industry,
which transports approximately80% of international trade, as
(01:45):
the Greek Prime Minister put itwhile chairing a UN Security
Council debate about maritimesecurity organized by his
country
Greek Prime Minister (01:54):
We should not disregard the need to
enhance the protection andsecurity of the two million
seafarers who secureinternational maritime transport
and uninterrupted operation ofglobal trade.
As an old maritime mottounderlines, without them, half
of the world would freeze andhalf of the world would starve.
J. Alex Tarquinio (02:18):
Our conversation ends with
Michelle's time living in Panamain the 1990s, where she covered
the preparations for thehandover of the Panama Canal.
Here's our conversation.
(02:53):
Michelle, you focused on globalshipping for most of your
career.
Have you noticed an increase inrisk factors, and are there
certain risk factors that havemoved into view that weren't
really present early in yourcareer?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (03:04):
Well, I think the big one now is the
risk of cable cutting, sabotage,which we've seen in the Baltic.
So there were three cases inthe last 15 months.
So the most recent one was atanker called the Eagles that
was detained by the Finnishauthorities after it was found
to have dragged its anchor forover 100 kilometers, severing a
(03:26):
really important electricitycable linking Estonia, and some
other communication cables aswell were damaged.
There was also a Chineseflagged bulk carrier that also
damaged some cables.
That was detained well, notreally detained, but stuck in
Danish waters for a while whilethe Chinese argued with the
authorities there about whetherthey were responsible or not.
(03:48):
And then there was anothercontainer ship, also
Chinese-owned, that was order totry and deter and to keep a
(04:09):
closer eye on those threats.
So I think that's the bigmaritime security challenge in
my area here in Europe.
J. Alex Tarquinio (04:17):
What, if anything, can the maritime
authorities do to try andprevent this or reduce the risk
of cable cutting, to try andprevent it or reduce?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (04:23):
the risk of cable cutting.
Well, it's really difficult toactually prove whether or not
it's sabotage, which is why, inthe three cases that I cited
before, I think the Finnishauthorities haven't really
definitively made any charges.
I think in the case of thefirst container ship, the new
(04:58):
New Polar Bear, the Chinese haveactually just recently charged
the Swedish authorities thatsaid you know, look, we really
don't have enough evidence tosay either way, because the
Chinese allowed them to get onboard the ship to conduct an
investigation, but they didn'thave proper access or full
access in order to determine.
So yeah, it's a really complexissue, and you're also seeing
(05:20):
that with China and Taiwan.
There have been some cablecutting incidents there as well.
So that's a new threat, I think, to be watching.
J. Alex Tarquinio (05:31):
Because of, obviously, geopolitical tensions
.
The Baltic Sea and the TaiwanStrait those are the two main
areas of concern, but are therethings they could do where the
most sensitive cables are?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (05:41):
Well, interestingly, nato's deployed
artificial intelligence to trackvessels and to look for unusual
activity over where the cablesare.
So that's something that's onlystarted, I think, less than six
months ago.
So they're deploying thosesorts of technologies to try and
identify suspicious movements,but it's one of those things
(06:02):
where you don't know until thedamage is being done's
fascinating because obviously,as artificial intelligence is
growing exponentially, but ofcourse it's more difficult
because they're going to usethese subterfuges and turn off
their transponders.
J. Alex Tarquinio (06:15):
Are there still ways they could I mean
perhaps moderate with drones, sothat if vessels are turning off
their transponders, they canstill track them and then use AI
to anticipate these threats?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (06:28):
I don't know.
And then this is one of theproblems is that the illicit and
deceptive shipping practicesare so sophisticated and there's
another form of vessel trackingcalled LRIT long-range
identification tracking andthat's only available to flag
states.
So mostly ships won't turn offtheir LRIT they used to not do
(06:53):
it, but I think you know it'sall bets are off when it comes
to the Dark Fleet.
So it is a challenge and in thecase of the Eagle S, that was a
Dark Fleet tanker that wasinvolved in the Christmas Day
event.
That was a ship that I wroteabout that actually had
previously been equipped withspying equipment to spy on NATO.
(07:15):
It had been taken off the shipbefore this event.
But the Dark Fleet are kind ofbeing we know are being used in
many ways by Russian security toalso serve a dual purpose.
J. Alex Tarquinio (07:32):
And speaking of drones, that's also a
relatively new risk.
Yeah, in the Red Sea, yeah, andit really was pioneered in the
Ukraine war.
That showed the effectivenessof sea drones in particular.
The difference in cost betweena drone and a cruiser is they
could inflict a lot of economicpain for relatively little cost.
(07:55):
But, as we saw recently, alsoaerial drones.
There was the incident whereIsrael targeted a ship in
international waters off ofMalta with a drone strike, where
Israel targeted a ship ininternational waters off of
Malta with a drone strike.
Is that a growing threat to theshipping industry and is that
something that the industry islooking at, both in terms of
state and non-state actors usingdrones with ever longer ranges?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (08:16):
Well, I think in the Red Sea not only
are there drones, but there'salso unmanned surface boats that
come in laden with explosivesand they just like sail straight
through and I think for thefirst time you saw those used
against merchant shipping by theHouthis.
J. Alex Tarquinio (08:32):
That's almost like the old fire ship.
I'm thinking of Nelson.
They would use fire ships asjust updated with new technology
, but it's the same principle asthe fire ships, right, yeah?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (08:42):
And terrifying for the crew.
I've seen uh vision that's beentaken from, you know, on the
ship and just just awful.
And you know some of the thetechnology that's being used
against or was being usedagainst, um, those, those ships
that were, you know, people justdoing their jobs, going from a
to A to B with the ship, wereawful.
J. Alex Tarquinio (09:07):
I'm just thinking.
In World War I and World War IIthere were convoys.
Obviously the high seas aren'tas dangerous as they were during
the two world wars, but ifdrones become a bigger threat
from either state or non-stateactors, are cargo ships
potentially going to need moreprotection against those threats
?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (09:24):
I think one of the things you saw with
the Red Sea is that thereweren't enough naval assets in
order to provide proper convoysfor ships, which is why they
decided that they were going togo around the Cape of Good Hope
and not go through at all.
And how much does that add interms of cost to go around the
(09:48):
Cape of Good Hope versus the RedSea?
Well, depending on the shipsize, about a million dollars in
extra fuel for a container shipthat's going, say, from China
through to Europe.
J. Alex Tarquinio (09:53):
And presumably that cost eventually
gets through to the consumers.
Yes, it gets passed on to theconsumer.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (10:00):
Yeah, but we were talking about
security you just reminded me ofthat, yeah, but the other thing
too is there weren't enoughnaval assets deployed in the Red
Sea to provide convoys aroundthe Gulf of Aden.
There was a limited convoysystem, but you know, it's very,
(10:28):
very hard to provide that levelof protection for all of the
global fleet.
J. Alex Tarquinio (10:34):
Yeah, you don't really hear about the
Somali pirates anymore.
And how did they reduce thatthreat?
I mean, it's good to look at, Iguess a success story from the
point of view of maritimeshipping, they put armed guards
on board who shot pirates, to beblunt.
So it's essentially the idea ofthe convoys just protecting the
ships when they go through themost dangerous waters.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (10:56):
Well, the armed guards were deployed
on the individual ships as theywent through.
Okay, and that was a deterrent.
I think there were some veryhigh-profile incidents where
skiffs came for these ships totry and attack them and the
armed guards shot them, andafter a while, because every
single ship in the area hadarmed guards.
(11:16):
It was not possible becauseSomali pirates were quite
unsophisticated compared to whatthe Houthis were doing.
That's how the threat and therewas some capacity building as
well in Somalia, but ultimatelythat's how it was addressed.
J. Alex Tarquinio (11:31):
So that is, I guess, a rare success story at
this point.
What are some of the majorchoke points demonstrated in the
evergreen episode block in theSuez Canal?
I think that's when it reallybecame clear to the general
public at least.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (11:49):
Yeah, the Strait of Hormuz, which is
where 20% of the world's oilgoes through from the Middle
East Red Sea.
You've got the Baltic Sea asthey come out through the Danish
Straits and down through theEnglish Channel.
You've got Bosphorus, Black Seainto the Mediterranean, and
(12:10):
Singapore-Malacca Straits.
So they're the sort of keyareas.
J. Alex Tarquinio (12:15):
I did want to ask you also, though, about the
UN Convention of the Law of theSea, unclos, because we've been
talking about drones and cablecutting, and UNCLOS was drafted
before the widespread use ofdrones, and I guess there was
the risk of cable cutting, butperhaps cables were not as
important as they are now so.
does UNCLOS need to be updatedto take into account these
(12:37):
greater risks, or is itsufficient?
Can it be used to address therisk of drones and cable cutting
?
Can it be used to address therisk of drones and cable?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (12:44):
cutting .
Well, I think there's a lot ofmaritime legal debate about the
suitability and effectiveness ofUNCLOS and I don't really want
to get into that debate.
But I do note that becauseUNCLOS does provide ships with
this right of innocent passage,it does make investigations into
(13:06):
any suspected sabotage reallydifficult to undertake, and
we've seen that in the threecases that I spoke about earlier
in the Baltic.
Not only do you have to be ableto prove that it's sabotage,
but you have to be able tointerdict or intercept the ship.
To be able to interdict orintercept the ship, and those
(13:28):
provocative interpretations ofUNCLOS have not been undertaken
in any of the cases that I'vementioned as yet.
J. Alex Tarquinio (13:33):
Is this the sort of thing you talked about
in Malta?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (13:36):
Yeah, One of the problems with the IMO
is that it's got 180-plusmember states and it makes
agreement by consensus.
So when the IMO met, like thelegal committee met, for example
, to talk about the dark fleetand the problems with, you know,
fraudulent registries and falseflagging and all of the
geopolitical detritus that ithas to sort out, it completely
(14:02):
lost the plot and there was aworking group established.
There was, you know it was avery fractious meeting.
The outcome was watered downand really you found that
countries divided alonggeopolitical lines.
So those that want something tobe done about fraudulent
(14:22):
flagging and all of thedeceptive shipping practices
were usually, you know, westernallies, and those that didn't
want anything done werecountries that were benefiting
from cheap oil or actuallyshipping these commodities and
their proxies.
So you know, the IMO has become, you know it's become highly
politicized.
(14:42):
It wasn't a United Nationsagency that was known for that,
but over the last, you know,three or four years in
particular, it has.
So I wouldn't rely on the IMOto deal with these issues at the
moment, because they're findingit hard enough to deal with
decarbonization, let alonesorting out the problems that
have arisen from the geopoliticsunder play now.
J. Alex Tarquinio (15:03):
Yeah, it sounds, unfortunately, like a
lot of the United Nations at themoment.
So you say it used to be lesspoliticized and it has become
more so.
Is that in the last three years, with all the sanctions since
Russia's full-scale invasion ofUkraine, or has it been going on
for longer than that?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (15:20):
A little bit longer than that, I
think it all started playing out.
I mean, a lot of it istechnical, important work and,
you know, done by you know,specialists in their common but
differentiated responsibilities.
I can't remember the way thateveryone….
J. Alex Tarquinio (15:51):
And those that are benefiting from cheap
oil and gas are less in a hurry,shall we say, to decarbonize
the global shipping fleet.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (16:01):
Yeah.
So the interventions ondecarbonisation debates, you
know you'll see.
You know your Saudi Arabias andyour United Arab Emirates stand
up and have a particular viewthat aligns with the government.
And you'll see Chinesegovernment.
You know the Chineserepresentative will have his
view.
And then you'll have Westernviews, western views and, and
(16:28):
interestingly, um, the, the us,is playing.
You know, for the first time atthe legal committee, um
actually stood up and their,their representative, said you
know what we're not, we're notgoing to make interventions,
we're not going to have anythingto say, because we're reviewing
all our policies and oursilence does not necessarily
mean we agree with anything.
And then they stepped back andand stepped out and they didn't
turn up at the IMO for therecent decarbonization debate.
(16:48):
When did the US representativesay that?
So they didn't turn up to theMEC, the Marine Environmental
Protection Committee.
J. Alex Tarquinio (17:01):
And when and where was?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (17:02):
that that was in April.
So they had a really keymeeting in April to decide.
But you said before that, ohthat was the legal committee.
That was in March, and theystood up and they said we're
here but we're not going to besaying anything.
But just because we're notsaying anything doesn't mean we
agree with anything.
(17:22):
And then that was the last weheard from them on the floor.
And then for the next bigmeeting, which was the MEPC
Marine Environment ProtectionCommittee, they actually didn't
even bother sending anybody toone of the most important
debates that shipping had on theenvironment in literally
decades.
J. Alex Tarquinio (17:40):
Are these meetings all in London?
I mean, that's where the IMO is.
These are at the IMO.
Obviously, you're really in theweeds.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (17:48):
In the weeds is the very good way to
describe it.
J. Alex Tarquinio (17:51):
Maybe I should say in the waves yeah, it
feels like weeds.
Seaweeds the seaweeds, that'sgood.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (18:02):
I'm going to borrow that.
J. Alex Tarquinio (18:03):
I think you should absolutely use it from
now on.
Yeah, you came up with that, itwas a state of play, but that's
yours In the series.
By the way, we have the UNOcean Conference coming up and
the US is not sending anyone tothat Unsurprising, of course.
That's dealing with things likedeep sea mining, which
(18:24):
obviously the Trumpadministration is interested in,
but perhaps from the other side, also fisheries.
You know, stocks of fisheries?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (18:37):
Yeah, the US at the IMO, I think, was
once viewed as a safe andreliable old pair of hands.
Once viewed as a safe andreliable old pair of hands, they
had, you know, some verywell-respected people that,
would you know, represent the USand they're just not there
anymore.
J. Alex Tarquinio (18:52):
I mean, are they literally not there?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (18:54):
You think that some of the US hands
Well, one guy retired, butcertainly I've not gone and sort
of strolled across the floor todo a meet and greet with the US
delegation.
J. Alex Tarquinio (19:11):
It's a different crowd, a whole new
crew.
So one person retired, someothers may have been retired,
not by choice, who knows Right.
Well, another area, of course,deep sea mining and fisheries,
obviously, that the Trumpadministration will be
interested in from the otherside.
Another area I wanted to askyou about is the Arctic.
(19:31):
Do we?
have any idea.
I mean, obviously there's a lotof change.
I mean there may be newshipping lanes opening up soon
thanks to global warming orcaused by global warming.
I don't know if we can thank itcaused by global warming, I
don't know if we can thank it.
Do we have any idea when thenorthern route will be more
viable year-round, At what pointin the century, and are there
special risks, both ecologicaland security, to that opening?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (19:56):
up.
Well, I think it will only openup quote-unquote when it makes
financial sense, and so thereare only certain cargoes where
the eight or nine day shortervoyage from Europe is going to
make any sort of financial sense.
And also, you have to rememberthat you're going through
(20:16):
Russian waters and at the momentyou also need to hire
Russia-owned nuclear icebreakersto go with you, and so there's
a cost there.
So I think geopolitics mayreduce the attractiveness of the
route for a lot of northernEuropean countries, but it may
(20:36):
not reduce it, but it mayincrease the attractiveness for
Russia-Chinese shipments, whichI think is something to watch.
J. Alex Tarquinio (20:43):
Right, and China has described itself as a
near-Arctic nation, somethingthat the members of the Arctic
Council do not agree with, or atleast those I don't know.
Russia has taken a position onthis, but the other members?
I mean the US has expressedinterest in this across both the
Biden and Trump administration,because of course, biden
announced that at NATO lastsummer that they would have an
(21:05):
icebreaker agreement withFinland.
Because of the, I mean most ofthe icebreakers in the Arctic
are Russian.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (21:13):
Good luck with getting your
Finnish-built nuclear icebreakerflagged in the US anyway, given
all the laws that you'reputting through at the moment,
and then, secondly, getting itto enter Russian waters.
J. Alex Tarquinio (21:26):
Clearly the Trump administration has an
interest in that region and theshipping lanes in that region,
whether that would really bepossible or viable with the
Russian.
I mean it was the northeast andthe northwest passage.
I don't know if the northwestpassage becomes more navigable.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (21:44):
There's a lot of LNG liquid natural gas
projects that are partiallydeveloped by Russia in the
Arctic as well, and that'sobviously you know.
One thing about Russia is thattheir Arctic shipbuilding and
Arctic navigational skills are,you know, well-beating, and
(22:06):
certainly until Russia invadedUkraine, the government-owned
ship-only company Sovconflot wasregarded as a world leader in
Arctic transits and Arctictransport.
J. Alex Tarquinio (22:23):
Is this another concern, an ecological?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (22:26):
concern .
A lot of it's dealt with at theIMI, but there are some issues
with black carbon and theparticular uses of fuel that are
used on ships there.
What is black carbon?
So black carbon is theirshipping emissions and they're
(22:46):
very, very harmful.
In the Arctic and there hasbeen, you know, for the last
five or six years, there's beendebate at the Environmental
Committee about how best toreduce black carbons, with
various degrees of success.
J. Alex Tarquinio (22:59):
Black carbon is a term, a term of art, of the
shipping industry, but thoseare the emissions that come from
the ship.
Yeah, it's called black carbon.
Into the air yeah, into the airor into the water, or both.
Into the air.
Into the air, okay, but theArctic environment would, I
guess, be more ecologicallyfragile.
First of all, it is remote.
(23:19):
I mean that's part of the wholewonder and appeal in our
imagination of the far north andit does have a certain
romanticism to it.
I mean even Generation Z likesthe sea shanties.
Yeah, I know they were popularfor a time.
Is that right?
It's very atavistic, you know,drawing your livelihood, the
fishes and the minerals from thesea, you know.
(23:42):
Can you talk a little bit aboutwhat drew you to covering the
maritime industry?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (23:49):
Well, I ended up in Panama with my then
boyfriend, now husband.
He was posted there as a LatinAmerican correspondent for the
ABC, the Australian BroadcastingCorporation.
That was 30 years ago, and as ayoung freelance journalist who
didn't speak any Spanish, I hadto find a way of making a living
very quickly and, of course,everyone spoke English in the
(24:11):
shipping community.
You had Panama Canal, the portswere being privatized, you had
the Panama flag register, and soI just started freelancing for
some global shipping titles, andthen, when we got married in
Panama, I went back to Australia.
I had my titles, and then, whenwe got married in Panama, I
went back to Australia, I had mytwins, and then I got a job in
Miami, actually as the America'seditor for a shipping magazine
(24:34):
called Fair Play.
J. Alex Tarquinio (24:35):
That's no longer around, and that was that
30 years ago was veryinteresting in Panama because,
while the agreement may havebeen struck by Carter in the 70s
?
Wasn't it actually the mid-90s?
When exactly did it revert toPanamanian control?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (24:52):
So it went to Panamanian control, I
think at the end of 1999.
J. Alex Tarquinio (24:57):
And you were there in Panama as a freelance.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (25:00):
No, I left before the handover, but
when I was there, the US had amilitary base there, but they
were in the throes of handingover the Panama Canal, so the
ports were being privatized.
So the agreement that hascaused so much controversy now
with Hutchinson Port Holdingsthey had just won that
concession when I was there.
(25:22):
So that was something that wasreally interesting to write
about.
J. Alex Tarquinio (25:25):
Wait, Hutchinson Port Holdings.
I don't know the year thatagreement was struck.
That was while you were therein the 90s, yeah.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (25:32):
They've been there for ages because
they were selling off the portsback then and the privatization
was part of the transitionFascinating.
J. Alex Tarquinio (25:41):
And why do you think I mean other than, of
course, the political, thechange, the Trump administration
?
Why do you think it has becomean issue now?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (25:49):
I think it's geopolitics, the way that
the canal is structured, sothere's a mile of land either
way on each side of the canalthat used to be US-owned, that
was handed back and it's allopen and the ports.
There's no way you could takecontrol of the canal.
(26:10):
I mean it's just not physicallyfeasible.
I mean it's just one of thecraziest ideas that I've heard
in the maritime sector for along, long time.
Taking back the Panama Canal.
I mean it functions really well.
The Panamanian governmentthey've had it for nearly what?
25 years and they've done afantastic job.
(26:30):
They've expanded it, they'vemaximized and increased tolls.
But I mean it's their asset andthey're entitled to do that.
Just like the Suez Canal cancontrol the canal.
J. Alex Tarquinio (26:43):
Michelle, thanks for joining us in The
Delegates Lounge.
It is a fascinatingconversation that I think will
be of great interest to ourlisteners.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (26:52):
Thanks very much for having me, Alex,
lovely to chat.
Frank Radford (27:00):
And that's it from The Delegates Lounge.
We'd like to thank our esteemedguests who've graciously
allowed us to share theirhard-earned insights into what
really matters.
And then there's you, ourlisteners, who we hope are
sufficiently edified to clamorfor more of the same.
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(27:23):
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(27:45):
yours truly executive producer,Frank Radford.
Until next time, keep calm andcurious.
Welcome to The Delegates Lounge.
Pull up a chair.
I'm Alex Tarquinio, ajournalist based at the United
Nations here in New York Cityand your emcee for this podcast
featuring some of the mostinfluential minds in the world
today.
Settle in for some rivetingtete-a-tete, available wherever
you listen to podcasts.
Welcome back to the thirdepisode of our new series,
(00:39):
called "Undercurrents," aboutthe oceans and seas that unite
us and sometimes divide us.
Today we're continuing ourconversation with Michelle Wiese
Bockmann, a maritime securityanalyst and former longtime
writer with Lloyd's List, one ofthe world's oldest continuously
running journals that hasprovided shipping news from
London for centuries.
(00:59):
This is the second part of ourextended conversation with
Michelle.
In this episode, ourconversation explores many of
the most pressing threats tomaritime security, including
cable cutting, aerial and seadrones and piracy.
Michelle sheds light on thesuitability and effectiveness of
the International MaritimeOrganization, a specialized
(01:21):
agency of the United Nations,and the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea UNCLOS Ahead of nextweek's UN Ocean Conference to
be held in Nice, the third suchgathering focused on
conservation efforts.
She gives a bleak descriptionof the failed efforts to
decarbonize the globalcommercial shipping industry,
which transports approximately80% of international trade, as
(01:45):
the Greek Prime Minister put itwhile chairing a UN Security
Council debate about maritimesecurity organized by his
country
Greek Prime Minister (01:54):
We should not disregard the need to
enhance the protection andsecurity of the two million
seafarers who secureinternational maritime transport
and uninterrupted operation ofglobal trade.
As an old maritime mottounderlines, without them, half
of the world would freeze andhalf of the world would starve.
J. Alex Tarquinio (02:18):
Our conversation ends with
Michelle's time living in Panamain the 1990s, where she covered
the preparations for thehandover of the Panama Canal.
Here's our conversation.
(02:53):
Michelle, you focused on globalshipping for most of your
career.
Have you noticed an increase inrisk factors, and are there
certain risk factors that havemoved into view that weren't
really present early in yourcareer?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (03:04):
Well, I think the big one now is the
risk of cable cutting, sabotage,which we've seen in the Baltic.
So there were three cases inthe last 15 months.
So the most recent one was atanker called the Eagles that
was detained by the Finnishauthorities after it was found
to have dragged its anchor forover 100 kilometers, severing a
(03:26):
really important electricitycable linking Estonia, and some
other communication cables aswell were damaged.
There was also a Chineseflagged bulk carrier that also
damaged some cables.
That was detained well, notreally detained, but stuck in
Danish waters for a while whilethe Chinese argued with the
authorities there about whetherthey were responsible or not.
(03:48):
And then there was anothercontainer ship, also
Chinese-owned, that was order totry and deter and to keep a
(04:09):
closer eye on those threats.
So I think that's the bigmaritime security challenge in
my area here in Europe.
J. Alex Tarquinio (04:17):
What, if anything, can the maritime
authorities do to try andprevent this or reduce the risk
of cable cutting, to try andprevent it or reduce?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (04:23):
the risk of cable cutting.
Well, it's really difficult toactually prove whether or not
it's sabotage, which is why, inthe three cases that I cited
before, I think the Finnishauthorities haven't really
definitively made any charges.
I think in the case of thefirst container ship, the new
(04:58):
New Polar Bear, the Chinese haveactually just recently charged
the Swedish authorities thatsaid you know, look, we really
don't have enough evidence tosay either way, because the
Chinese allowed them to get onboard the ship to conduct an
investigation, but they didn'thave proper access or full
access in order to determine.
So yeah, it's a really complexissue, and you're also seeing
(05:20):
that with China and Taiwan.
There have been some cablecutting incidents there as well.
So that's a new threat, I think, to be watching.
J. Alex Tarquinio (05:31):
Because of, obviously, geopolitical tensions
.
The Baltic Sea and the TaiwanStrait those are the two main
areas of concern, but are therethings they could do where the
most sensitive cables are?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (05:41):
Well, interestingly, nato's deployed
artificial intelligence to trackvessels and to look for unusual
activity over where the cablesare.
So that's something that's onlystarted, I think, less than six
months ago.
So they're deploying thosesorts of technologies to try and
identify suspicious movements,but it's one of those things
(06:02):
where you don't know until thedamage is being done's
fascinating because obviously,as artificial intelligence is
growing exponentially, but ofcourse it's more difficult
because they're going to usethese subterfuges and turn off
their transponders.
J. Alex Tarquinio (06:15):
Are there still ways they could I mean
perhaps moderate with drones, sothat if vessels are turning off
their transponders, they canstill track them and then use AI
to anticipate these threats?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (06:28):
I don't know.
And then this is one of theproblems is that the illicit and
deceptive shipping practicesare so sophisticated and there's
another form of vessel trackingcalled LRIT long-range
identification tracking andthat's only available to flag
states.
So mostly ships won't turn offtheir LRIT they used to not do
(06:53):
it, but I think you know it'sall bets are off when it comes
to the Dark Fleet.
So it is a challenge and in thecase of the Eagle S, that was a
Dark Fleet tanker that wasinvolved in the Christmas Day
event.
That was a ship that I wroteabout that actually had
previously been equipped withspying equipment to spy on NATO.
(07:15):
It had been taken off the shipbefore this event.
But the Dark Fleet are kind ofbeing we know are being used in
many ways by Russian security toalso serve a dual purpose.
J. Alex Tarquinio (07:32):
And speaking of drones, that's also a
relatively new risk.
Yeah, in the Red Sea, yeah, andit really was pioneered in the
Ukraine war.
That showed the effectivenessof sea drones in particular.
The difference in cost betweena drone and a cruiser is they
could inflict a lot of economicpain for relatively little cost.
(07:55):
But, as we saw recently, alsoaerial drones.
There was the incident whereIsrael targeted a ship in
international waters off ofMalta with a drone strike, where
Israel targeted a ship ininternational waters off of
Malta with a drone strike.
Is that a growing threat to theshipping industry and is that
something that the industry islooking at, both in terms of
state and non-state actors usingdrones with ever longer ranges?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (08:16):
Well, I think in the Red Sea not only
are there drones, but there'salso unmanned surface boats that
come in laden with explosivesand they just like sail straight
through and I think for thefirst time you saw those used
against merchant shipping by theHouthis.
J. Alex Tarquinio (08:32):
That's almost like the old fire ship.
I'm thinking of Nelson.
They would use fire ships asjust updated with new technology
, but it's the same principle asthe fire ships, right, yeah?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (08:42):
And terrifying for the crew.
I've seen uh vision that's beentaken from, you know, on the
ship and just just awful.
And you know some of the thetechnology that's being used
against or was being usedagainst, um, those, those ships
that were, you know, people justdoing their jobs, going from a
to A to B with the ship, wereawful.
J. Alex Tarquinio (09:07):
I'm just thinking.
In World War I and World War IIthere were convoys.
Obviously the high seas aren'tas dangerous as they were during
the two world wars, but ifdrones become a bigger threat
from either state or non-stateactors, are cargo ships
potentially going to need moreprotection against those threats
?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (09:24):
I think one of the things you saw with
the Red Sea is that thereweren't enough naval assets in
order to provide proper convoysfor ships, which is why they
decided that they were going togo around the Cape of Good Hope
and not go through at all.
And how much does that add interms of cost to go around the
(09:48):
Cape of Good Hope versus the RedSea?
Well, depending on the shipsize, about a million dollars in
extra fuel for a container shipthat's going, say, from China
through to Europe.
J. Alex Tarquinio (09:53):
And presumably that cost eventually
gets through to the consumers.
Yes, it gets passed on to theconsumer.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (10:00):
Yeah, but we were talking about
security you just reminded me ofthat, yeah, but the other thing
too is there weren't enoughnaval assets deployed in the Red
Sea to provide convoys aroundthe Gulf of Aden.
There was a limited convoysystem, but you know, it's very,
(10:28):
very hard to provide that levelof protection for all of the
global fleet.
J. Alex Tarquinio (10:34):
Yeah, you don't really hear about the
Somali pirates anymore.
And how did they reduce thatthreat?
I mean, it's good to look at, Iguess a success story from the
point of view of maritimeshipping, they put armed guards
on board who shot pirates, to beblunt.
So it's essentially the idea ofthe convoys just protecting the
ships when they go through themost dangerous waters.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (10:56):
Well, the armed guards were deployed
on the individual ships as theywent through.
Okay, and that was a deterrent.
I think there were some veryhigh-profile incidents where
skiffs came for these ships totry and attack them and the
armed guards shot them, andafter a while, because every
single ship in the area hadarmed guards.
(11:16):
It was not possible becauseSomali pirates were quite
unsophisticated compared to whatthe Houthis were doing.
That's how the threat and therewas some capacity building as
well in Somalia, but ultimatelythat's how it was addressed.
J. Alex Tarquinio (11:31):
So that is, I guess, a rare success story at
this point.
What are some of the majorchoke points demonstrated in the
evergreen episode block in theSuez Canal?
I think that's when it reallybecame clear to the general
public at least.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (11:49):
Yeah, the Strait of Hormuz, which is
where 20% of the world's oilgoes through from the Middle
East Red Sea.
You've got the Baltic Sea asthey come out through the Danish
Straits and down through theEnglish Channel.
You've got Bosphorus, Black Seainto the Mediterranean, and
(12:10):
Singapore-Malacca Straits.
So they're the sort of keyareas.
J. Alex Tarquinio (12:15):
I did want to ask you also, though, about the
UN Convention of the Law of theSea, unclos, because we've been
talking about drones and cablecutting, and UNCLOS was drafted
before the widespread use ofdrones, and I guess there was
the risk of cable cutting, butperhaps cables were not as
important as they are now so.
does UNCLOS need to be updatedto take into account these
(12:37):
greater risks, or is itsufficient?
Can it be used to address therisk of drones and cable cutting
?
Can it be used to address therisk of drones and cable?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (12:44):
cutting .
Well, I think there's a lot ofmaritime legal debate about the
suitability and effectiveness ofUNCLOS and I don't really want
to get into that debate.
But I do note that becauseUNCLOS does provide ships with
this right of innocent passage,it does make investigations into
(13:06):
any suspected sabotage reallydifficult to undertake, and
we've seen that in the threecases that I spoke about earlier
in the Baltic.
Not only do you have to be ableto prove that it's sabotage,
but you have to be able tointerdict or intercept the ship.
To be able to interdict orintercept the ship, and those
(13:28):
provocative interpretations ofUNCLOS have not been undertaken
in any of the cases that I'vementioned as yet.
J. Alex Tarquinio (13:33):
Is this the sort of thing you talked about
in Malta?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (13:36):
Yeah, One of the problems with the IMO
is that it's got 180-plusmember states and it makes
agreement by consensus.
So when the IMO met, like thelegal committee met, for example
, to talk about the dark fleetand the problems with, you know,
fraudulent registries and falseflagging and all of the
geopolitical detritus that ithas to sort out, it completely
(14:02):
lost the plot and there was aworking group established.
There was, you know it was avery fractious meeting.
The outcome was watered downand really you found that
countries divided alonggeopolitical lines.
So those that want something tobe done about fraudulent
(14:22):
flagging and all of thedeceptive shipping practices
were usually, you know, westernallies, and those that didn't
want anything done werecountries that were benefiting
from cheap oil or actuallyshipping these commodities and
their proxies.
So you know, the IMO has become, you know it's become highly
politicized.
(14:42):
It wasn't a United Nationsagency that was known for that,
but over the last, you know,three or four years in
particular, it has.
So I wouldn't rely on the IMOto deal with these issues at the
moment, because they're findingit hard enough to deal with
decarbonization, let alonesorting out the problems that
have arisen from the geopoliticsunder play now.
J. Alex Tarquinio (15:03):
Yeah, it sounds, unfortunately, like a
lot of the United Nations at themoment.
So you say it used to be lesspoliticized and it has become
more so.
Is that in the last three years, with all the sanctions since
Russia's full-scale invasion ofUkraine, or has it been going on
for longer than that?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (15:20):
A little bit longer than that, I
think it all started playing out.
I mean, a lot of it istechnical, important work and,
you know, done by you know,specialists in their common but
differentiated responsibilities.
I can't remember the way thateveryone….
J. Alex Tarquinio (15:51):
And those that are benefiting from cheap
oil and gas are less in a hurry,shall we say, to decarbonize
the global shipping fleet.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (16:01):
Yeah.
So the interventions ondecarbonisation debates, you
know you'll see.
You know your Saudi Arabias andyour United Arab Emirates stand
up and have a particular viewthat aligns with the government.
And you'll see Chinesegovernment.
You know the Chineserepresentative will have his
view.
And then you'll have Westernviews, western views and, and
(16:28):
interestingly, um, the, the us,is playing.
You know, for the first time atthe legal committee, um
actually stood up and their,their representative, said you
know what we're not, we're notgoing to make interventions,
we're not going to have anythingto say, because we're reviewing
all our policies and oursilence does not necessarily
mean we agree with anything.
And then they stepped back andand stepped out and they didn't
turn up at the IMO for therecent decarbonization debate.
(16:48):
When did the US representativesay that?
So they didn't turn up to theMEC, the Marine Environmental
Protection Committee.
J. Alex Tarquinio (17:01):
And when and where was?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (17:02):
that that was in April.
So they had a really keymeeting in April to decide.
But you said before that, ohthat was the legal committee.
That was in March, and theystood up and they said we're
here but we're not going to besaying anything.
But just because we're notsaying anything doesn't mean we
agree with anything.
(17:22):
And then that was the last weheard from them on the floor.
And then for the next bigmeeting, which was the MEPC
Marine Environment ProtectionCommittee, they actually didn't
even bother sending anybody toone of the most important
debates that shipping had on theenvironment in literally
decades.
J. Alex Tarquinio (17:40):
Are these meetings all in London?
I mean, that's where the IMO is.
These are at the IMO.
Obviously, you're really in theweeds.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (17:48):
In the weeds is the very good way to
describe it.
J. Alex Tarquinio (17:51):
Maybe I should say in the waves yeah, it
feels like weeds.
Seaweeds the seaweeds, that'sgood.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (18:02):
I'm going to borrow that.
J. Alex Tarquinio (18:03):
I think you should absolutely use it from
now on.
Yeah, you came up with that, itwas a state of play, but that's
yours In the series.
By the way, we have the UNOcean Conference coming up and
the US is not sending anyone tothat Unsurprising, of course.
That's dealing with things likedeep sea mining, which
(18:24):
obviously the Trumpadministration is interested in,
but perhaps from the other side, also fisheries.
You know, stocks of fisheries?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (18:37):
Yeah, the US at the IMO, I think, was
once viewed as a safe andreliable old pair of hands.
Once viewed as a safe andreliable old pair of hands, they
had, you know, some verywell-respected people that,
would you know, represent the USand they're just not there
anymore.
J. Alex Tarquinio (18:52):
I mean, are they literally not there?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (18:54):
You think that some of the US hands
Well, one guy retired, butcertainly I've not gone and sort
of strolled across the floor todo a meet and greet with the US
delegation.
J. Alex Tarquinio (19:11):
It's a different crowd, a whole new
crew.
So one person retired, someothers may have been retired,
not by choice, who knows Right.
Well, another area, of course,deep sea mining and fisheries,
obviously, that the Trumpadministration will be
interested in from the otherside.
Another area I wanted to askyou about is the Arctic.
(19:31):
Do we?
have any idea.
I mean, obviously there's a lotof change.
I mean there may be newshipping lanes opening up soon
thanks to global warming orcaused by global warming.
I don't know if we can thank itcaused by global warming, I
don't know if we can thank it.
Do we have any idea when thenorthern route will be more
viable year-round, At what pointin the century, and are there
special risks, both ecologicaland security, to that opening?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (19:56):
up.
Well, I think it will only openup quote-unquote when it makes
financial sense, and so thereare only certain cargoes where
the eight or nine day shortervoyage from Europe is going to
make any sort of financial sense.
And also, you have to rememberthat you're going through
(20:16):
Russian waters and at the momentyou also need to hire
Russia-owned nuclear icebreakersto go with you, and so there's
a cost there.
So I think geopolitics mayreduce the attractiveness of the
route for a lot of northernEuropean countries, but it may
(20:36):
not reduce it, but it mayincrease the attractiveness for
Russia-Chinese shipments, whichI think is something to watch.
J. Alex Tarquinio (20:43):
Right, and China has described itself as a
near-Arctic nation, somethingthat the members of the Arctic
Council do not agree with, or atleast those I don't know.
Russia has taken a position onthis, but the other members?
I mean the US has expressedinterest in this across both the
Biden and Trump administration,because of course, biden
announced that at NATO lastsummer that they would have an
(21:05):
icebreaker agreement withFinland.
Because of the, I mean most ofthe icebreakers in the Arctic
are Russian.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (21:13):
Good luck with getting your
Finnish-built nuclear icebreakerflagged in the US anyway, given
all the laws that you'reputting through at the moment,
and then, secondly, getting itto enter Russian waters.
J. Alex Tarquinio (21:26):
Clearly the Trump administration has an
interest in that region and theshipping lanes in that region,
whether that would really bepossible or viable with the
Russian.
I mean it was the northeast andthe northwest passage.
I don't know if the northwestpassage becomes more navigable.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (21:44):
There's a lot of LNG liquid natural gas
projects that are partiallydeveloped by Russia in the
Arctic as well, and that'sobviously you know.
One thing about Russia is thattheir Arctic shipbuilding and
Arctic navigational skills are,you know, well-beating, and
(22:06):
certainly until Russia invadedUkraine, the government-owned
ship-only company Sovconflot wasregarded as a world leader in
Arctic transits and Arctictransport.
J. Alex Tarquinio (22:23):
Is this another concern, an ecological?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (22:26):
concern .
A lot of it's dealt with at theIMI, but there are some issues
with black carbon and theparticular uses of fuel that are
used on ships there.
What is black carbon?
So black carbon is theirshipping emissions and they're
(22:46):
very, very harmful.
In the Arctic and there hasbeen, you know, for the last
five or six years, there's beendebate at the Environmental
Committee about how best toreduce black carbons, with
various degrees of success.
J. Alex Tarquinio (22:59):
Black carbon is a term, a term of art, of the
shipping industry, but thoseare the emissions that come from
the ship.
Yeah, it's called black carbon.
Into the air yeah, into the airor into the water, or both.
Into the air.
Into the air, okay, but theArctic environment would, I
guess, be more ecologicallyfragile.
First of all, it is remote.
(23:19):
I mean that's part of the wholewonder and appeal in our
imagination of the far north andit does have a certain
romanticism to it.
I mean even Generation Z likesthe sea shanties.
Yeah, I know they were popularfor a time.
Is that right?
It's very atavistic, you know,drawing your livelihood, the
fishes and the minerals from thesea, you know.
(23:42):
Can you talk a little bit aboutwhat drew you to covering the
maritime industry?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (23:49):
Well, I ended up in Panama with my then
boyfriend, now husband.
He was posted there as a LatinAmerican correspondent for the
ABC, the Australian BroadcastingCorporation.
That was 30 years ago, and as ayoung freelance journalist who
didn't speak any Spanish, I hadto find a way of making a living
very quickly and, of course,everyone spoke English in the
(24:11):
shipping community.
You had Panama Canal, the portswere being privatized, you had
the Panama flag register, and soI just started freelancing for
some global shipping titles, andthen, when we got married in
Panama, I went back to Australia.
I had my titles, and then, whenwe got married in Panama, I
went back to Australia, I had mytwins, and then I got a job in
Miami, actually as the America'seditor for a shipping magazine
(24:34):
called Fair Play.
J. Alex Tarquinio (24:35):
That's no longer around, and that was that
30 years ago was veryinteresting in Panama because,
while the agreement may havebeen struck by Carter in the 70s
?
Wasn't it actually the mid-90s?
When exactly did it revert toPanamanian control?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (24:52):
So it went to Panamanian control, I
think at the end of 1999.
J. Alex Tarquinio (24:57):
And you were there in Panama as a freelance.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (25:00):
No, I left before the handover, but
when I was there, the US had amilitary base there, but they
were in the throes of handingover the Panama Canal, so the
ports were being privatized.
So the agreement that hascaused so much controversy now
with Hutchinson Port Holdingsthey had just won that
concession when I was there.
(25:22):
So that was something that wasreally interesting to write
about.
J. Alex Tarquinio (25:25):
Wait, Hutchinson Port Holdings.
I don't know the year thatagreement was struck.
That was while you were therein the 90s, yeah.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (25:32):
They've been there for ages because
they were selling off the portsback then and the privatization
was part of the transitionFascinating.
J. Alex Tarquinio (25:41):
And why do you think I mean other than, of
course, the political, thechange, the Trump administration
?
Why do you think it has becomean issue now?
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (25:49):
I think it's geopolitics, the way that
the canal is structured, sothere's a mile of land either
way on each side of the canalthat used to be US-owned, that
was handed back and it's allopen and the ports.
There's no way you could takecontrol of the canal.
(26:10):
I mean it's just not physicallyfeasible.
I mean it's just one of thecraziest ideas that I've heard
in the maritime sector for along, long time.
Taking back the Panama Canal.
I mean it functions really well.
The Panamanian governmentthey've had it for nearly what?
25 years and they've done afantastic job.
(26:30):
They've expanded it, they'vemaximized and increased tolls.
But I mean it's their asset andthey're entitled to do that.
Just like the Suez Canal cancontrol the canal.
J. Alex Tarquinio (26:43):
Michelle, thanks for joining us in The
Delegates Lounge.
It is a fascinatingconversation that I think will
be of great interest to ourlisteners.
Michelle Wiese Bockmann (26:52):
Thanks very much for having me, Alex,
lovely to chat.
Frank Radford (27:00):
And that's it from The Delegates Lounge.
We'd like to thank our esteemedguests who've graciously
allowed us to share theirhard-earned insights into what
really matters.
And then there's you, ourlisteners, who we hope are
sufficiently edified to clamorfor more of the same.
Do drop in for a weekly episodeon Thursday, or from time to
time if we're on the road, forspecial events, in which case
there'll be a bonus episode.
Subscribe wherever you listento podcasts and if you like what
(27:23):
you've heard, please take amoment to rate or review the
show, as it helps others whoshare your abiding interest in
world affairs to find their wayto the delegates lounge.
You can connect with us on manypopular social media platforms
or reach out to us directly atinfo the delegates loungecom.
We're a small team so we can'trespond to every message, but we
will read them.
Our show this week was writtenand produced by the host and by
(27:45):
yours truly executive producer,Frank Radford.
Until next time, keep calm andcurious.
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