The United Nations Adrift in a Sea of Change

Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:08):
Welcome to the Delegates Lounge.
Pull up a chair.
I'm Alex Tarquinio, ajournalist based at the United
Nations here in New York Cityand your emcee for this podcast
featuring some of the mostinfluential minds in the world
today.
Settle in for some rivetingtete-a-tete, available wherever
you listen to podcasts.
Welcome back.

(00:39):
We have a fascinatingconversation in store for you
with Richard Gowen, the Directorof UN and Multilateral
Diplomacy at the InternationalCrisis Group, a non-governmental
organization committed topreventing, mitigating and
resolving deadly conflict.
Richard oversees their advocacywork at the United Nations in
New York, liaising withdiplomats and UN officials.

(01:00):
He was our very first podcastguest and he's now our first
repeat guest.
In this episode we discuss thepotential impact of the Trump
administration on the UnitedNations and the multilateral
system more broadly, touching onmany of the current conflict
zones, from Gaza to Afghanistanto Syria.

(01:22):
We also cover the election of anew UN Secretary General and
the budget woes of theorganization.
Our conversation was recordedin a studio at the UN
headquarters while Trump andPutin were speaking by phone.
On Tuesday, the White Housereadout of the call hit my phone
as we were chatting.
We hadn't yet seen theKremlin's readout, the only one

(01:44):
to mention Moscow's demands, aslisteners will know by now,
putin rejected a proposal byWashington and Kiev for a
general ceasefire, and there'sbeen no let up on Russia's air
assault on Ukraine.
Nevertheless, richard had someoff-the-cuff commentary about
the readout from the White House, so stick around for that.

(02:04):
Here's our conversation,richard Gowd, welcome back in
the Delegates Lounge.
You have a unique distinctionof being both our first guest on

(02:25):
the podcast and also our firstfriend of the pod.
You are the first person we'vehad back as a repeat guest, so
welcome back.

Speaker 2 (02:34):
It's great to be back .
I feel like those stars who getto host Saturday Night Live
multiple times.
I think they get a blazer.
They get a blazer.
Do I get a?

Speaker 1 (02:44):
blazer.
We were actually joking aboutthat.
Well, first of all, that isfive times that they get a
blazer.
They get a blazer.
Do I get a blazer?
We were actually joking aboutthat.
Well, first of all, that is afive times that they get the
blazer.
I do intend to design somecoffee mugs with our logo and I
had been thinking about that ofmaking that the friend of the
pod gift.
Sadly, I have to admit that wehave not yet designed the coffee
mugs, so you'll have to take arain check on that.
During uin week I had somethingkind of cute.

(03:05):
I don't know if you rememberwhere I was giving people
virtual cookies.
You know those UN cookies withthis design of the UN building
or the UN logo.
I was giving virtual cookiesand at first I was buying
cookies but they were actuallyrather expensive.
So after a while I just had onecookie that I brought around to
different settings.
I finally did eat that virtualcookie.

(03:26):
But no, I'll make sure youdon't get a virtual gift but a
real gift and you will get oneof our.
In fact, I'll give you our veryfirst coffee mug.
That's a promise.
And I should mention we'remeeting once again in the same
room at the United NationsHeadquarters building in New
York as we met for our firstepisode.
Much has changed since then.
Much has changed as we met forour first episode.
Much has changed since then.

(03:46):
Much has changed.
I should also mention this willbe podcast soon, but we are
meeting while we believe thephone call may still be going on
between Trump and Putin.
That's happening today andhopefully by the time we get to
discussing the Trumpadministration in more depth, we
may actually have some news.
First of all, I did want to askyou about some of your very
interesting coverage recently.
There's been some speculationthings that still seem a bit

(04:09):
wild but you could not even haveimagined discussing a few
months ago, including that theUS would withdraw for the UN
entirely Not just those bitsthat Trump finds particularly
distasteful, like the HumanRights Council, the Climate
Accord and, of course, thePalestinian aid group UNRWA, but
entirely.
You've written that you don'tthink that that would happen.

(04:32):
Tell us your reasoning.

Speaker 2 (04:34):
Well, the idea that Trump could pull out of the UN
has been around for a while.
I remember that in 2020, at theend of his first term, while I
remember that in 2020, at theend of his first term, diplomats
were talking about the USquitting the UN quite seriously,
but it seems to me that Trumpis probably going to stay inside

(04:55):
the institution, even though heis already doing a great deal
of damage to the multilateralsystem.
I think, ultimately, even thisadministration recognizes that
if it were to quit the UNcompletely which only one state,
indonesia, has ever done andIndonesia only stayed out for

(05:17):
about two years if the US wereto leave, it wouldn't have its
veto in the Security Council andall of a sudden, the Security
Council would be a space whereUS rivals such as China would
have a lot more influence, andthey would probably use that
influence to pass resolutionsputting pressure on Israel.
They would pass resolutions,you know, damaging to other US

(05:42):
interests, and so I just don'tbelieve that Trump is going to
let that happen.
I think Trump also sees the UNas a place where he can do a
little bit of his big powerdiplomacy with Russia, and it
was very striking that on the24th of February, on the third
anniversary of Russia's all outaggression against Ukraine, the

(06:03):
US and the Russians actuallyworked together on a Security
Council resolution calling foran early peace and sort of
overriding the preferences ofboth the Ukrainians and the
Europeans.
So I think at the politicallevel the US will stay.
I think the headache for all UNofficials is that it's quite

(06:25):
possible that the US will staybut effectively zero out funding
to the organization or at leastvery, very significantly reduce
funding to the organization.
And the US is absolutelycrucial to the finances of the
UN across the system.
And if the US stops puttingmoney into the UN, then it is

(06:48):
going to have to curtail a lotof its humanitarian activities,
a lot of its other activities,and so you could see the UN
shrinking very significantlybecause of a lack of American
support.
But there would still be a USambassador sitting in New York
holding on to that veto,blocking initiatives, you know,

(07:10):
ensuring that the UN doesn'tstart to actively damage US
interests, as Trump defines them.

Speaker 1 (07:17):
Well, you've touched on a lot of the things we want
to talk about this hour.
It did occur to me one otherreason that Trump might not want
to quit the organizationentirely is the outsized
influence on the upcomingcampaign to replace the
secretary-general.
He has less than two years inhis term.
Campaigning will probably bestarting pretty soon, if it's

(07:37):
not already going on in thewhispers in all ways.
Typically, the US isa P5 memberand the largest funder of the?
U, the UN, would have a lot ofinfluence on who the next
Secretary General is.
That's going to happen inTrump's term, so his new
ambassador will have a lot ofinfluence there.
How do you see that playing out?

Speaker 2 (07:55):
Just before we get to the Secretary General race.
I would say there's anotherreason that Trump will want to
stay in the UN and that'sbecause he does enjoy I mean, we
know this from his first term.
He does enjoy coming to the UNevery September for the General
Assembly and, frankly, havingother leaders fawn on him.

(08:16):
You know, he's a New Yorker, helikes to come back to New York
and he does enjoy the theaterand he does enjoy the prestige
of being the sort of big star ofthe General Assembly.
So that's another reason hewill stay.

Speaker 1 (08:30):
Well, that's an excellent point.
Having grown up here as a NewYorker, he would have seen from
his earliest memories every yearthat the cavalcade of high
level world leaders andambassadors coming here every
September.
So you know, that would be abig deal.
Well, to any world leader, butto a New Yorker.
Now the other interesting thingis because this is the 80th
anniversary.

(08:50):
There's questions if Chinamight come.
I believe Xi only came once forthe 70th anniversary.

Speaker 2 (08:57):
Potentially the last time that either Xi Jinping or
Vladimir Putin attended theGeneral Assembly in person was
2015.
It was for the 70th anniversaryand, depending on how
relationships develop betweenBeijing, moscow and Washington,
I can easily imagine Trumpmaking a bit of a personal

(09:20):
effort to get both Putin and Xito come to the UN and
essentially to show that theyare the troika that now runs the
world.
I think that would actually bevery uncomfortable for some
other leaders who are normallystars at the UN General Assembly
, like President Macron ofFrance.
I think that if Trump were tobring Putin in, macron and

(09:45):
others would would recoil, butyou can see how that again would
appeal to his sense of boththeater but also geopolitical
messaging.

Speaker 1 (09:54):
But it could cement the realignment that we saw with
that vote when US voted withRussia and was basically working
with Russia on a rivalresolution to the one by Kiev
and its allies.
That was a very visiblerealignment with the US and

(10:19):
Russia.

Speaker 2 (10:20):
Yeah, I mean, I think that this is clearly how Trump
sees the world.
He sees the world in terms ofbig powers and he cares about
diplomacy with other big powers.
He's talking to Vladimir Putinright now, as we speak.
We know that he's quite keen tomeet with Xi Jinping in Beijing

(10:42):
.
He tried to get Xi Jinping tocome to his inauguration and
that's the sort of major powerbargaining that appeals to
Trump's worldview.
And I think that when Trumplooks at the UN, he doesn't
worry about the 190 odd smallnations, about the 190 odd small

(11:09):
nations.
He doesn't worry about all thesort of human rights nonsense
that Europeans seem to worryabout.
He just sees it as a spacewhere, you know, maybe sometimes
the big powers can do somedeals.
And you know that in some waysactually does echo the design of
the UN.
I mean, fdr, back in the 1940s,designed a UN that was meant to
be a space where the big powersran the world.
That may be how Trump sees ittoo.

(11:31):
And so, yeah, in September wecould see Trump standing between
Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putinand just sort of sending a
symbolic message to the rest ofthe world's leaders that you
know, these are the countriesthat matter and the rest of you
don't.
But I mean we should get backto the Secretary General.

Speaker 1 (11:49):
Well, before we get back to the Secretary General,
you're reminding me of somethingthat Biden's UN ambassador,
linda Thomas-Greenfield, aseasoned career diplomat, in her
final press conference she didsay that she had made a point
during her term to meet with allof the countries except for the

(12:10):
handful I think about half adozen that the US doesn't talk
to, that it doesn't havediplomatic relations.
But otherwise she had met withthe ambassadors of all of those
countries and, as she put it, sothat they felt heard.
So what you're saying is you donot expect Trump's ambassador
to go around on a listening tour, but the focus will be on the
major powers.
She's not here yet, by the way,so we can't ask her.

Speaker 2 (12:30):
I think that's probably right.
I mean so the Bidenadministration, especially after
Russia's all out aggressionagainst Ukraine, did make a real
point of showing that it caredabout the views of the wider UN
membership, and Biden and LindaThomas-Greenfield at the UN
framed their support for Ukraineas essentially supporting the

(12:55):
right of small and middle-sizedcountries to defend their
sovereignty, to defend theirterritorial integrity, as
guaranteed by the UN Charter,and that was a line that I think
was pretty successful in 2022and into 2023, although it
rather came off the rails afterthe 7th of October and the Hamas

(13:15):
atrocities, because when itcame to Israel, it turned out
that actually Biden did not givetwo hoots about the views of
the wider UN membership, and soto some extent, I think the
shine went off that positioning.
But overall, yeah, the Bidenadministration saw the UN as a
space to show that Washingtonwas listening to the global

(13:37):
south, washington was listeningto the interests of developing
countries, washington caredabout the wider world.
Trump, I don't think, wants tosend any of those messages at
all and we don't know how EliseStefanik, his nominee to be
ambassador, will play her role,but I think there may be some

(14:00):
parallels with Nikki Haley, whowas Trump's first ambassador in
New York in 2017.
Haley, she wasn't unpleasant toambassadors from smaller
countries, but I remember therepresentative of one, shall we
say, smaller European countrysaying that Haley really cared
about a few big states, about afew big states, and she just

(14:27):
didn't have the time orinclination to talk to smaller
countries about their concernsor their development needs.
And I think that that is how wewould expect Stefanik to behave
too.

Speaker 1 (14:34):
Before we get too far down that road, let's talk
about the Secretary Generalcampaign.

Speaker 2 (14:41):
So the UN Secretary General, the current
officeholder, antonio Guterres.
His term ends at the end ofnext year, 2026.
And the formal sort ofcompetition to replace him will
kick off about a year from now,in the early spring of 2026,

(15:02):
when candidates will havehearings before the whole UN
membership.
At the General Assembly they'lllay out their platforms and
then at some point in the fall,probably October the Security
Council gets to winnow down thelist of candidates to one.
So we're still almost a yearaway from the formal race, but

(15:24):
people are starting to throwtheir hats into the ring.
People are starting to positionthemselves and testing the
waters.
Due to a sort of informal UNconvention, the job rotates
between regions.
The general view is that thisis Latin America's turn.
Now there's one candidate, miaMotley, the prime minister of

(15:44):
Barbados, who's been fairlyopenly campaigning for at least
three or four years for the job.
But Motley faces quite a lot ofopposition from
Spanish-speaking Latin Americancountries because she's not a
Spanish speaker, she's anAnglophone.
And I think if you're sittingin Buenos Aires or if you're
sitting in Quito, barbadosdoesn't really represent you.

(16:10):
And so we are starting to seeother candidates from the region
poking their heads up MichelleBachelet, the former president
of Chile, confirmed what we allknew, which is that she's
interested in running about fouror five days ago, I think.
There are stories of othercandidates in the wings, like

(16:33):
Alicia Barsena, who's been theMexican foreign minister.
Some UN officials from LatinAmerica, such as Rafael Grossi,
the head of the IAEA, the atomicagency, are fairly clearly in
the mix, and I think what we'regoing to see over the next six
months is that they're going tobe making their candidacies more
obvious.
But they have to be careful,because Latin America is a
region with very poor relationswith Donald Trump right now, and

(16:55):
I think that candidates aregoing to have to navigate around
some of the hard questions theymight be asked about how they
would cohabit with the Trumpadministration questions they
might be asked about how theywould cohabit with the Trump
administration.

Speaker 1 (17:10):
Many of the names you mentioned were women.
There's a big push to have thefirst woman Secretary General.
That's been talked about foryears at the UN.
On the other hand, the Trumpadministration is very anti-DEI
diversity, equity, inclusion.
That doesn't mean they wouldoppose a woman.
Obviously they're sending awoman here as ambassador, but
they might not take kindly tothat being argued as the fact
that it is time to have a womanunstoppable.

Speaker 2 (17:31):
I think that people are conscious that if you use
that argument too loudly aroundTrump, he you know he may kick

(17:52):
back and say, no, we needanother man.
I mean, I still think that themajority of UN member states do
want to see a female secretarygeneral.
That was true 10 years ago, butI think it's even more true
today.
I think that you know malecandidates are going to face
some very hard questions frommore progressive parts of the

(18:13):
world about you know why they'restanding in the way of a woman,
and I don't think that theTrump administration will
necessarily oppose a woman onprinciple as a UN leader.
However, they will be lookingfor a woman who takes
conservative positions onabortion, who doesn't represent

(18:35):
their candidacy as a candidacypromoting a very progressive
gender ideology, and so I thinkthat all the candidates are
going to have to be insanelydelicate in how they address
some of those topics whichmatter a lot to some of the

(18:55):
culture warriors around thepresident, do you think there
might be some people who arereal long shots, like they've
got a particular regional issuethat they want to bring
attention to, so they jump inthe race?
and look.
I I think that you know, weknow various names of candidates
, but I also think that there'squite a good chance that new
people will jump into the race.

(19:15):
I think that a lot ofpoliticians, especially more
conservative politicians aroundthe world, will be sticking
their heads up and thinking, hmm, trump brings a high degree of
uncertainty into this game.
Maybe we should give it a whirl.
And you should also rememberthat a lot of people run to be

(19:37):
Secretary General knowingthey're not going to win, but
because it's fun.
You get to fly around the world, you get to meet some important
people, and sometimes failedcandidates use the profile
raising to get other jobs in theinternational system or maybe
to create a platform fordomestic political positions.

(19:57):
So I think this this could be acomplex, long race with a lot
of unexpected people popping up,especially probably again
around September, around thetime of the high level General
Assembly week, which is when Ithink campaigning will really
come out into the open.

Speaker 1 (20:14):
Do they get to really travel all around and make
their case?

Speaker 2 (20:18):
You know, serious candidates do do a lot of travel
.
They're either being funded bytheir home government or they
find other sources of funding.
Yeah, it's a very good way tocarve out a profile on the world
stage, and I'm not sure of thenumbers, but there are always
candidates who come forward whoclearly don't stand a chance.

(20:39):
I mean, the rules are that youneed the support of all five
members of the Security Council,and I can certainly think of
candidates last time around whoknew from the get-go that there
was at least one veto power whowould block them, but that
didn't stop them getting outthere raising their profile, and
I'm sure we'll see some of thatagain.

Speaker 1 (21:00):
Well, that also raises a good point about the
race, because you need theimprimatur of all five on the
Security Council Britain, France, the US, China and Russia so
you really, from the get-go,need someone who's a compromise
candidate.
Now you also did mention inyour answer to my opening
question about the financialdifficulties at the UN.

(21:20):
The Secretary General, as youknow, just announced the UN 80
Initiative.
Sounds like this great event tocelebrate 80 years of the UN,
but it's actually about the factthat the UN is broke and needs
to introduce efficiencies, andthese may be more than just cost
savings.
These may be real cutbacks oreven elimination of programs,

(21:41):
and that's partly because a lotof countries are in arrears,
including some of the big oneslike the US.
There are question marks aboutUS funding under the Trump
administration.
My understanding is that Chinais the second biggest funder, is
also in arrears, but I sort ofhave it on good authority that
they plan to pay after the partyCongress in April.

(22:03):
I don't know if that's whatyou've heard.
I'm sure about that, but chinanormally does come through yes
whereas the us sometimes justdoesn't come through, just
doesn't come, through yeah anduh, and the smaller countries
can't make up the gap.
And also, of course, we havethe the big cuts to usa id, uh,
which is going to filter throughsome un programs.
How much is the UN potentiallygoing to have to cut and also,

(22:28):
how much might that make Trump'snew UN ambassador's job more
difficult?

Speaker 2 (22:34):
Look, the UN has been in a very difficult financial
situation for some time and atthe beginning of 2024, Antonio
Guterres sent a letter to allmember states saying that there
was a risk the organizationcould just run out of money and
would have to stop payingsalaries as it is.

(23:39):
I mean they were able to avoidthat.
But I think, coming into thenew year with very, very big
questions over US funding,there's a really acute sense.
A lot of money from the US.
They're going to have to sortof cut back their operations
very, very significantly aroundliterally asking where do they
stop food supplies and where dothey stop vaccination campaigns,
because there just isn't themoney to do some of that really
basic work.
And apparently Guterres has sortof had some calculations.
He's worked out that he canscrape through this year, but
that's about as far as it can go.
So it's a very, very grimfinancial situation.
I think that what we're goingto see is a lot of developing

(24:04):
countries, countries that relyon assistance from the UN,
becoming more and more vocal intheir criticism of the US.
I think it's going to create avery toxic political dynamic
towards the US and it's notactually only the US that's
going to be in the line of firebecause a number of other
significant, if smaller, donorsto the UN system are also
reducing aid spending.

(24:25):
Within the last month or so,the UK has announced very
significant aid cuts.
The Netherlands has announcedsignificant aid cuts and pulled
money from UN bodies like UNICEF, and so I think that the global
south, the non-alignedcountries, will be saying you

(24:46):
know, the US is the primeculprit for this financial
crisis, but London is at faulttoo, european leaders are at
fault too, and this could leadto a sort of 1970s dynamic here,
where you just have sort ofendless arguments, endless
toxicity between richer andpoorer countries at the UN

(25:19):
particularly since Russia'sfull-scale invasion of Ukraine
in 2022.

Speaker 1 (25:21):
It sounds like what you're saying is under Trump, US
and Russia might get along muchbetter and those closed-door
meetings on the Security Councilmight be slightly less tough
because of that, but the Trumpadministration will get along
much less well with the rest ofthe world.

Speaker 2 (25:37):
I think that is a real possibility, that you sort
of end up with the US and Russiahunkered down at the top of the
system, but then the Europeansunhappy because of Washington's
reconciliation with Moscow.
If that happens, and the globalsouth unhappy because they're
not going to get what they wanton aid, on debt relief, on

(25:59):
global public health, it willlead to a lot of anger, it will
lead to a lot of shouting and Ialso worry that a lot of
countries have already beenquestioning what they get out of
the UN.
Last September, when Joe Bidencame to the UN General Assembly
for the last time, lastSeptember, when Joe Biden came
to the UN General Assembly forthe last time, I met with a lot
of diplomats from differentparts of the world, and so many

(26:23):
of them were just starting withthe question of like, what do we
get out of the UN anymore?
Is this place really working?
Is it delivering for our voters?
If leaders from the globalsouth in particular look at the
UN and say, well, it's not evendelivering us the level of aid
that we were getting before, youcan't go to the UN to sort of

(26:43):
extract resources from richercountries, now why bother?
It would seem to make moresense to focus on alternative
groupings like the BRICS ormaybe the African Union if
you're in Africa and try andsort of like build up
cooperation with thosestructures rather than a
universal body like the UN,which just will not be providing

(27:06):
the goods that a lot of peoplewant it to give.

Speaker 1 (27:09):
Interesting.
There's been so muchspeculation on whether the Trump
administration would leave theUN, but what you're saying is
the first country to leave theUN should that happen.
This is speculation, but itmight actually be from the
global south.

Speaker 2 (27:23):
I don't think we're going to see countries leaving
the UN, and I think it's alsoworth remembering that there are
sort of bits of the UN,especially away from New York
and places like Geneva, thatsort of manage things like mail
between states.
You know, the Universal PostalUnion statistics bits of the UN
system will keep, I think, sortof chuntering on.

(27:46):
But I think that what you wouldsee is just, you know, quite a
lot of disengagement.
And you know it's already quitedifficult for some countries to
attract really good diplomatsto serve in New York because
they say we'd rather be wherethe action is in the world, we'd
rather be in Shanghai, we'drather be in Singapore.
So there is a sort of a riskthat the UN sort of becomes, on

(28:10):
the one hand, sort of a spacefor very angry arguments about
sort of global justice andinjustice in terms of
development and economics andthen, on the other hand, just a
bit more abundant as a sort of areal space for solving global
problems.
And I do worry that this is thecourse we're currently set on,
unless we can find ways tochange course sooner rather than
later.

Speaker 1 (28:31):
What do you think are the chances that China will try
and move in and take advantageof the US either defunding or
quitting certain programs of theUN?
You wrote a very interestingpiece recently about China
making a play to be thepenholder on the Afghan file.

(28:55):
For our listeners, the penholderis the UN Security Council
member who essentially takes thelead in drafting resolutions
and mandates and things relatedto a certain file could be a
country or an issue.
China has not typically beenthe penholder.
I believe that most recently itwas Japan right, which ended
its term.
So now that position is openand tell us a little bit about

(29:16):
that.

Speaker 2 (29:18):
Okay.
So just before we get into thisspecific case, there's been a
lot of talk in the last twomonths about how China can fill
the vacuum created by the US,and actually this is a talking
point that friends of the UNrepeatedly use because they
think that it's a way to getattention in Washington and they
think that you may not get theTrump administration to love the

(29:40):
UN, but you can at least getthe Trump administration to fear
that China will take it overand you can use that argument to
support continued US engagementin the UN system.
I am a little skeptical thatthe Chinese really want to take
over this system.
I think there are bits of theUN where they will put in more

(30:01):
money.
There are bits of the UN whichthey do see as supporting their
global economic strategy, andyou know they may put more money
, for example, into the WorldHealth Organization, because
that's a good way to wingoodwill and sort of distract
from discussions of where COVIDcame from.
But actually you know theChinese are quite cost conscious

(30:23):
.
Their economy is not doing aswell as it's been doing in past
years.
It's been very notable in NewYork budget debates that the
Chinese actually don't likespending lots of money at the UN
.
They're quite cost conscious.
And I don't think that lots ofmoney at the UN.
They're quite cost-conscious.
And I don't think that theChinese necessarily think that

(30:47):
it's in their interest to bailout an institution that is still
very largely run by Western orWestern-friendly officials.
So I think the Chinese takeoverof the UN narrative is
overstated.
Nonetheless, it is interestingthat China is still looking to
get more influence on certainfiles around the UN system, and
one of them is Afghanistan.
China borders Afghanistan.

(31:09):
It's not a very big border, butthey do border one another.
The Chinese see the UN'scontinued presence in
Afghanistan as being in theirinterest.
It provides some stability ontheir border, and I think that
the Chinese, in the long term,want to normalize relations with
the Taliban, and so, in thatcontext, late last year, the
Chinese said that, yes, theywould like to start drafting UN

(31:33):
Security Council resolutionsrelating to Afghanistan,
resolutions relating toAfghanistan, just as the US
drafts on Haiti or France hasdrafted on resolutions on
Francophone Africa.
It was a step forward for theChinese.
They haven't played this sort ofrole very often before.
Actually, most UN men, mostSecurity Council members,
thought fair enough.

(31:53):
You know, no one else has beenable to get Afghanistan right.
You have a go, but the US, bothunder Biden and then under
Trump, responded hugelynegatively and fought really
really hard to stop Chinaplaying this role as the
diplomatic lead on Afghanistan,and I think that probably tells

(32:16):
us that you know the US is goingto be continuing to try and
place some limits on whatinfluence China has in the
multilateral system, even if, aswe were discussing, trump
builds some sort of personalrelationship with Xi.
There's a US knee-jerk reaction, which is Chinese influence of
the UN is, by definition, bad.

(32:39):
I mean to end that story, acompromise was worked out.
You have to have a resolutionevery year in Afghanistan to
keep the UN assistance missionthere.
Denmark ended up tabling aresolution.
Everyone was fine with it.
It wasn't actually about thesubstance, but it was just about
this question of how muchinfluence should China have?

Speaker 1 (33:01):
That's very interesting, but it still has no
pinholder right, Because Ithink you said that both South
Korea and Pakistan were alsointerested in that role.
South Korea would be a naturalswap for Japan.
You know one US ally in theregion for another, Pakistan
would have less enthusiasm,perhaps from the Trump
administration, but it also hasvery clear border issues.

(33:24):
China has expressed a lot ofinterest in the minerals in
Afghanistan in the past, evenbefore the fall of the Taliban.
Could that also be of wherethis is going in Afghanistan?

Speaker 2 (33:37):
Yeah, I think that this is one reason that the
Chinese want to keep the UN inAfghanistan, because they do see
big opportunities for mineralextraction, other forms of
economic activity there.
But, quite reasonably, theChinese have some questions
about whether it's wise to gointo an economic partnership

(33:59):
with a group like the Talibanand they actually quite like
having the UN there to providesome stability.
And I think that the Chinesewould like to see the UN
ultimately maybe providing theTaliban with more economic
advice, more development advice,because that would make it
easier for Beijing to meet itseconomic goals.

(34:21):
So the Chinese interest inAfghanistan is not purely out of
the goodness of Chinese hearts,it's driven by national
interests.
But let's keep in mind that fora long time, you know, the UN
was in Afghanistan as an adjunctto the US-led military
operation there.
I mean, everyone has interests,everyone has national
priorities.

Speaker 1 (34:42):
I just checked.
The White House, pool reported,said the call has wrapped up.
There'll be a readout soon.
Since we don't actually havethe readout and it looks like we
probably won't have it in time,this is your speculation on how
Donald Trump's call withVladimir Putin could impact
their relationship with the UNCharter, the idea of sovereignty

(35:02):
and territorial integrity.

Speaker 2 (35:05):
Well, as we were saying, the Biden administration
in New York really framed theirsupport for Ukraine as
fulfilling the core principlesof the UN.
Charter and the Bidenadministration worked very
effectively actually with theEuropeans and with the
Ukrainians to explain to othercountries that this wasn't just

(35:25):
a European territorial tiff.
It was a Russia was assaultingthe principle of non-aggression,
the principle of sovereigntyand the principle of territorial
integrity.
You know it was.
There were always questionsabout how the West could square
that rhetoric with the realitythat a ceasefire would involve

(35:45):
Ukraine having to accept thatRussia held 20% of its territory
roughly.
The idea that Vladimir Putinmight end up in a war crimes
tribunal was going to have to bethrown out of the window and so
on and so forth.
The Biden team never squaredthat circle.
Trump just isn't interested insquaring that circle.
He has made it clear in the USresolution on Ukraine that Trump

(36:11):
pushed through the SecurityCouncil with the Russians on the
24th of February.
Just say you know we need peaceand we will make this implicit.
It will be peace ontransactional terms.
It will be based on the balanceof power.
It will not be based on, youknow, any of the fine language
of the UN Charter and I thinkthat there will be a lot of UN

(36:31):
member states who see that andreally wonder if the UN Charter
is worth the paper that it isprinted upon.
I think it's also worth saying,though, that there are quite a
lot of UN member states from theglobal south who, despite
sympathy for Ukraine and despitea belief in the UN Charter,

(36:51):
just want the war to be overanyway and this is something
which the Chinese have beensaying, something that Brazil
has been saying there's been avery strong feeling that
continuing the war and NATOcontinuing to arm Ukraine has
raised unacceptable risks.
It's raised risks of nuclearescalation.
It's distracted Western powersfrom other issues like

(37:13):
development.
It has taken up a vast amountof time in the UN system and so,
quietly, there are a lot ofdiplomats here who are saying if
Trump can get it done, let himget it done and we'll work out
the matters of principleafterwards.

Speaker 1 (37:28):
On the one hand, I hear what you're saying A lot of
people at the UN have beensaying a long time.
It is a distraction from issueswhere they could actually make
some progress at the UN.
Obviously, their hands are tiedat the UN on Russia because of
Russia's veto.
On the other hand, I've alsoheard people from smaller
countries say that the UNCharter is all they've got.

(37:50):
That's their only guarantee ofsovereignty and territorial
integrity, because they simplydon't have the resources to
defend themselves from morepowerful neighbors.
All they have is internationallaw.
So I would think they don'twant to go too far in the other
direction, because the benefitof international law is the same
with the UN Charter.
It's the confidence you putinto it.
Once that faith is gone, howmuch is there there?

Speaker 2 (38:14):
Yeah, I think there is.
You know, there's a lot ofconcern amongst smaller states
that if you create a precedentfor land grabs, for ignoring
countries' territorial integrity, that you know that will be
catching.
You have Somalia, which is afragmented country where

(38:38):
neighboring powers are lookingfor bits of territory.
You have Guyana, which hasfaced territorial threats from
Venezuela.
You have both Denmark andPanama, which have faced about
Ukraine, marking the beginningof a might-equals-right world

(39:04):
where core principles of the UNCharter no longer matter as much
.
All that said, I do thinkthere's also still even quite
small global South countries whojust feel that they're you know
in the old phrase they're theants amongst the elephants that
you know.
As long as the war goes on,they're just put in difficult

(39:25):
positions.
They're having to makestatements on topics where they
have very little influencearound European security.
They would still just like thisto be over.

Speaker 1 (39:35):
Typically the larger powers the P5, work with their
natural allies on the counciland that's how resolutions are
passed.
So, even if the US and Russiahave a closer relationship, the
Trump administration has beendoing a lot to alienate its
natural allies on the council,both Panama and Denmark, which,

(39:55):
of course, Greenland is aterritory of Denmark.
How is that going to impactSecurity Council meetings, and
particularly the behind-doornegotiations?
And I'm also wondering, youknow, one huge question when
Russia and the United Stateswork together to get their
resolution through on theSecurity Council, One of the big

(40:17):
questions was whether eitherthe UK or France would exercise
their veto, which they haven'tdone since 1989.

Speaker 2 (40:25):
So in February, when the US introduced its Security
Council resolution on peace inUkraine that didn't refer to
territorial integrity and soforth, my understanding is that
there was a discussion at the UKmission to the UN that lasted
perhaps half an hour aboutwhether to use the veto, and

(40:47):
then I think the French talkedabout it for about two hours,
but mainly so that the Frenchcould say they talked about it
longer than the UK.
And I don't think eithermission really thought that it
would be wise to veto a USresolution which, at the end of

(41:07):
the day, didn't contain anythingactionable.
It was a non-binding 63-wordresolution and although it
didn't say the right things, itsaid nothing fundamentally
objectionable.
And I think that the Europeansconcluded that if they voted
against it, firstly they wouldinfuriate Trump, who was meeting

(41:30):
Macron and Starmer shortlyafter the vote, and also they
would just look you know theywould look a bit foolish to
global south countries who wouldsay are you now against peace?
That might be under Chapter 7of the UN Charter, making it
legally binding.

(42:07):
That might contain clauses thatKiev would struggle with and
that the Europeans wouldstruggle with, if the Europeans
think that this is fundamentallya really bad deal, and the
Russians and the Americans bringit to the Security Council,
which is still some way away.
I would expect whatever ishappening while we're speaking
between Trump and Putin, but ifthat's the reality, then I can
imagine that France and the UKwould use their vetoes, if they

(42:32):
had to, to block it.
But they would be doing sobecause I think at that point
they would have felt sofundamentally let down by the US
that they wouldn't worry aboutdamaging the US relationship.
It would still be.
I think it would still be asort of like traumatic moment
with a lot of heartburn for bothcountries.
The idea of breaking publiclywith the US in that way at the

(42:55):
UN on a European security issue.
You know that would be very,very tough for them.

Speaker 1 (43:02):
That would be a historic turning point and they
haven't used again.
They haven't used their vetosince 1989.

Speaker 2 (43:08):
It's ironic, though there's a certain circularity
about all this, with Panama backon the Council.
The last time France and the UKused their veto was actually to
block a resolution condemningthe US invasion of.

Speaker 1 (43:20):
Panama.
So, in fact, what goes aroundcomes around because we haven't
gotten into the bombing of Yemenand the Houthis.
You can't do anything aboutgeography the same places are
still focal points.

Speaker 2 (43:32):
Just to say in the meantime I mean so everyone is
talking about the fact that, youknow, on this one resolution
around Ukraine, the Russianslined up with the US and the
Chinese, although the Chinese inthat case seemed a little bit
confused.
They didn't really seem to knowwhat was going on.
It is worth saying that therehas been one other case in

(43:54):
recent weeks where the Russiansand US have lined up in the
Security Council, which was overthe very serious violence in
Western Syria, and previouslyRussia and the US have been very
divided over Syria.
This time again they made apoint of showing a common front,
saying calling a SecurityCouncil meeting on the violence
together, which did look likeanother signal of better

(44:18):
Russia-US cooperation at the UN.
But other than that, actuallywe've been hearing that on Iran,
that on Bosnia, on some othertopics which have been debated
recently around the UN, thingshave not changed.
The US is still siding with theEuropeans on those topics the
Russians are still very critical.
The Russians have been criticalover the US action against the

(44:41):
Houthis.
So we shouldn't you know, Idon't think we should just let
one admittedly very, verystartling vote shape our view of
how the council is working as awhole, there is still a degree
of cooperation between theEuropeans and the US on other
files.

Speaker 1 (44:57):
Well, speaking of the Syria file, switzerland and
Brazil were the co-pinholdersand their terms have now ended.
Has it been reassigned?

Speaker 2 (45:08):
Denmark has indicated that it wants to lead on
resolutions on humanitarianaffairs in Syria.
There was a little bit of toand fro around that, but
actually no one is reallyobjecting, and what's very
interesting about Syria at themoment is that this file, which

(45:28):
from 2011 until 2024 was one ofthe most divisive in the
Security Council, is now onearea where actually everyone is
still cautiously open tocooperation.
After the fall of Assad, theRussians signaled that their guy
had gone.
They now wanted to work throughthe UN to see what would come

(45:53):
afterwards in Syria.
No one has a better idea.
Meetings on Syria, even behindclosed doors, are generally
reported to be comparativelymature, comparatively
constructive.
It is odd that this war, whichwas so associated with the

(46:13):
collapse of US-Russian relationsin the UN in the last decade,
is now a small island ofagreement.

Speaker 1 (46:21):
It's interesting, of course, for how long?
Because there are the reprisalsagainst the Alawites in Syria.
There's the fact that Assad isstill on the wings, so we don't
know what's going to happenthere.
It's still important to havethe penholder and to have that
file, but we don't know what'sgoing to happen there.

Speaker 2 (46:39):
And it's also worth saying that the new authorities
in Syria, including al-Sharaa,the president, you know want to
work with the UN on humanitarianissues, but they're very
skeptical of the UN having asignificant political role in
the country's you know processtowards democracy and stability,

(47:01):
because obviously, theyassociate the Security Council
with over a decade of failureand compromise with Assad.
So the council may be unified,but it may not be able to
actually achieve very muchpolitically because of facts on
the ground.

Speaker 1 (47:15):
Well, it's a sign of how much news there is in
general now, and especiallytoday, that it's taken us this
long to get to Gaza, despite thefact that the Gaza ceasefire is
just broken down.
We don't know what will happenthere, but could this be at risk
of taking over the SecurityCouncil and the UN agenda again?

Speaker 2 (47:32):
We've always known that the Trump administration
would double down on the Bidenadministration's policy of
support for Israel at the UN,and Elise Stefanik, the nominee
to be ambassador, is slightlymore pro-Israel than Prime

(47:53):
Minister Netanyahu.

Speaker 1 (47:54):
Well, we all saw, of course, her grilling and her
drive really to get thoseuniversity presidents overturned
.

Speaker 2 (48:03):
Yeah, I fear that what we're going to see if we
have a renewed conflict in Gazais that it will just not be
possible for Algeria, as theArab member of the Security
Council, to table a ceasefireresolution.
I think that most councilmembers would support that

(48:24):
resolution and the US will vetoit.
And then, as has been the caseagain and again since the the
atrocities on the 7th of October, the issue will go to the
General Assembly.
A big majority of members ofthe General Assembly will
support a ceasefire call and theUS will vote against it, along

(48:44):
with a very, very limited numberof other countries.
But the Trump administrationwill firstly just use this to
say look, we're standing up forIsrael.
That plays very well with thedomestic audience, and the
Israelis will ignore all thecriticism from the UN, just as

(49:04):
they have been ignoring itbefore.
I think the one very bigquestion which does worry a lot
of UN officials is how does thisvery likely set of arguments
over the Middle East intersectwith the funding discussions
that we're talking about?
Because if there is one issuethat is going to motivate the US

(49:24):
administration to cut even morefrom the UN budget, it is going
to be the claim that the UN isstanding up for the Palestinians
against the Israelis.

Speaker 3 (49:38):
And.

Speaker 2 (49:39):
I think that if that sort of turns into a really
nasty diplomatic downward spiral, then we're approaching the
case where the US just doesn'tpay the UN anything at all in
response to criticisms ofIsraeli policy.

Speaker 1 (49:55):
What did that mean for, in essence, the UN brand?
I mean, this is the ultimatearena for soft power brand.
I mean, this is the ultimatearena for soft power.
I'm thinking in particular ofthis really eccentric video I'm
sure you saw it going aroundwith the belly dancers.
I mean, all I have to say isbearded belly dancers on the
beach, and I think everyoneknows what video I'm talking

(50:16):
about AI generated showing Trumpandanyahu sort of celebrating
in Gaza.
That looks a bit likeMar-a-Lago.
That already has to have takena hit with the US impression
with some UN members.
Is that again something that'sgoing to make the new UN
ambassador's role here moretouchy or fraught?

(50:38):
Or does the Trumpadministration, the new
ambassador, just don't care?

Speaker 2 (50:42):
I think that if you're Elise Stefanik, you want
to have a fight over Israel atthe UN.
You know, nikki Haley at onepoint ended up voting alone on a
UN resolution, I think,regarding Hamas.
And to this day, un officialssay, well, wasn't it

(51:02):
embarrassing for Nikki Haley tobe voting alone in support of
Israel?
Wasn't that a diplomaticfailure?
But if you looked at some ofNikki Haley's campaign materials
when she was running forpresident, that vote and the
fact that she stood alone forIsrael was a key plank of her
foreign policy case.
And Stefanik too, who's someonewith longer term ambitions, I

(51:24):
think would be delighted if theUN served up a series of votes
where she could hang tough andshow support for Israel.
So the US certainly doesn'tcare.
I think that if you look at thewider UN membership I mean
firstly, the wider UN membershiphas just been horrified by this
war and they again, just asthey want the Ukraine war to

(51:45):
stop, they want this war to stop.
But I think at a diplomaticlevel, a lot of other member
states were quite relieved whenTrump supported the Biden
ceasefire push because theythought, okay, this takes
Israel-Palestine off the tableas an early flashpoint for

(52:06):
really serious rows.
I mean, yes, we're going to bearguing over UNRWA, the UN
agency supporting thePalestinians, but if there's a
ceasefire, maybe we can put itto one side and focus on areas
where there's more space forcooperation with the Americans.
I suspect that right now thereare a lot of ambassadors reading
the news that's coming out ofGaza and their hearts are

(52:29):
sinking because they know thismeans there will be a full-on
grade A row with the US thatthey deeply, deeply wish to
avoid.

Speaker 1 (52:40):
Yeah, okay.
So from Gaza to Africa, there'sbeen a lot of talk, of course,
on African solutions for Africanproblems.
We have touched on Somalia, notas much Sudan, where there's a
terrible humanitarian crisisfighting At the same time, the
Trump administration recentlyexpelled the ambassador from

(53:03):
South Africa, calling him a racebaiting politician.
I mean, that's their directquote.
Again, that's a, that's abilateral relationship.
If you're looking at thecontext of the African Union
countries in the UN, how arethey going to approach the new
Trump administration coming in?

Speaker 2 (53:24):
So I think this is a dilemma for the African group at
the UN because the Bidenadministration, especially
towards the end, was quitesensitive to African concerns,
in part because they wantedAfrican countries to vote with
them on Ukraine at the UN.
But also the Bidenadministration did focus on some

(53:48):
major crises on the continent,like the war in Sudan.
Since taking office, the Trumpadministration hasn't
demonstrated very much interestin Africa at all.
You know the US has been absent, I think diplomatically, over
Sudan, although it did support astatement on Sudan in the

(54:10):
Security Council.
Recently the US supported aSecurity Council resolution over
the violence in the DemocraticRepublic of Congo.
But everyone understands that.
You know these are a long waydown the American foreign policy
agenda.
You know, relative to Ukraine,relative to Gaza, I think the

(54:30):
African group also facingdevelopment cuts, facing
humanitarian cuts, I thinkthey're going to struggle in
some cases to get positiveattention from from the new
administration.
And south africa faces a veryspecific problem, which is that
there are people close to the um, the president, who you know

(54:55):
are trying to relitigate the endof apartheid and I believe
you're talking about presidenttrump's new best buddy, elon
musk, a South African immigrantwho has issues, shall we say,
with the current South Africarepeating narratives that I
think South Africans of allraces find extremely
uncomfortable and degrading,claiming that there's mass

(55:27):
persecution of whites in thecountry.

Speaker 1 (55:32):
Well, also offering asylum to white South Africans,
but not necessarily Venezuelans,afghans, countries that the UN
would recognize as difficultsituations deserving recognition
for refugee status.

Speaker 2 (55:49):
I mean it is somewhat bizarre.
So I think the South Africans,you know, who have also been
amongst the most vocalsupporters of the Palestinians,
who took the Israelis to theInternational Court of Justice,
claiming that there's genocidein Gaza.

Speaker 1 (56:07):
Considering that both Trump and Stefanik are wholly
in Israel's camp, could itreally be that that as much as
Elon is his influencerdecision-making on South Africa?

Speaker 2 (56:20):
I simply couldn't pretend to know what is going on
inside the White House on theseissues.
But what is undeniably true isthat I think for a lot of UN
members, if they look back overthe last 50 years, especially if
they look back to the laterCold War period, global South

(56:41):
countries would say you know,there were two great causes that
animated the UN in the 1970sand 1980s.
One of them was the fightagainst apartheid, which was a
huge issue in the UN in the 80sin particular, and the other was
the fight for a Palestinianstate, and two or three years
ago I think diplomats would havesaid you know, looking back,

(57:03):
the UN triumphed in the fightagainst apartheid and it failed
the Palestinians.
Well, now we have a USadministration that is very
negative towards thePalestinians and wants to bring
apartheid back up and relitigatethat.
It is the perfect combinationof factors not only to alienate
South Africa, but to alienatepretty much every country that

(57:24):
escaped from colonialism after1945.
And so I think some of theselines are going to prove
absolutely explosive in the UN,and especially in places where
the US has pulled out, like theHuman Rights Council in Geneva.
The US may be out, but it canstill face a lot of criticism

(57:45):
from other countries for some ofits stances.

Speaker 1 (57:47):
Most UN ambassadors and obviously they get the
direction from their capitalshave not been too vocal about
this yet, and that could be alsobecause you know Stefanik is
not here yet.

Speaker 2 (57:57):
Whatever the undercurrents of feelings in the
diplomatic community, a lot ofambassadors are hedging and you
know a lot of ambassadors arewaiting for Elise Stefanik to
arrive and they at least hopethat once you have someone who
is senior, who represents theTrump administration, you can at
least do business with them.
You can at least sort of workout what their political

(58:19):
strategy is.
Until, she arrives, I thinkeveryone is strongly inclined to
hedge.

Speaker 1 (58:25):
Okay, well, it's excellent that we went a bit
long, because within the lastfive minutes we just got the
readout the White House has justsent.
A couple of minutes ago Today,President Trump and President
Putin spoke about the need forpeace and a ceasefire in the
Ukraine war.
Both leaders agreed thisconflict needs to end with a
lasting peace.
They also stressed the need forimproved bilateral relations

(58:46):
between the United States andRussia.
The blood and treasure thatboth Ukraine and Russia have
been spending in this war wouldbe better spent on the needs of
their people.
This conflict should never havestarted and should have been
ended long ago with sincere andgood faith peace efforts.
Other leaders agreed that themovement to peace will begin
with an energy andinfrastructure ceasefire, as
well as technical negotiationson implementation of a maritime

(59:10):
ceasefire in the Black Sea, fullceasefire and permanent peace.
These negotiations will beginimmediately in the Middle East.
The leaders spoke broadly aboutthe Middle East as a region of
potential cooperation to preventfuture conflicts.
They further discussed the needto stop proliferation of
strategic weapons and willengage with others to ensure the

(59:31):
broadest possible application.
The two leaders shared the viewthat Iran should never be in a
position to destroy Israel.
The two leaders agreed that afuture with an improved
bilateral relationship betweenthe United States and Russia has
huge upside.
This includes enormous economicdeals and geopolitical
stability when peace has beenachieved.

(59:53):
Ok, that's much longer thanmost readouts.
So what are your first thoughts?
Just taking that all in?

Speaker 2 (01:00:02):
It's interesting that that proposal for a sort of an
air and sea ceasefire isactually broadly similar to
various ideas that the Europeansand the French and the British
have been floating.
It's actually short of what theUS had got Zelensky to agree to
, which was an immediate totalceasefire.

(01:00:24):
I mean, I think that theUkrainians, I'm guessing, will
probably be relieved that Trumpis at least not publicly buying
into some of Putin's arguments,For example that a ceasefire is
insufficient.
You need an immediate fullpeace deal, which would probably

(01:00:45):
mean carving up the territoryonce and for all, so that will
be a relief to the Ukrainians.
During the height of the Syrianwar, in bad faith Moscow could
be agreeing to something simplywith a view to accusing the

(01:01:08):
Ukrainians of breaking theceasefire and then redoubling
military efforts.
I guess there will also be somequite important technical
questions.

Speaker 1 (01:01:17):
Now, interestingly, they do not mention Crimea and
you know there was speculationbeforehand with the US
unilaterally recognize Crimea asRussia.
There's nothing in here aboutthat.

Speaker 2 (01:01:28):
Those two specific areas for sort of early
agreement.
The no attacks on energyinfrastructure, no attacks, no
maritime attacks those arethings that the Ukrainians and
Russians have been talking about.
Actually, last year they gotquite close to an agreement on

(01:01:50):
not attacking energyinstallations.
We've had the Black Sea GrainInitiative.
There have been talks on andoff about a maritime ceasefire.
Those are fairly low-hangingfruit when the Ukrainians and
Russians have already hadcontacts.
They already understand theterms of what's possible.

(01:02:14):
Those are quite feasible stepsin the right direction.
As I say, it's not far off fromwhat some of the European
countries have been proposing.
And, as I say, it's not far offfrom what some of the European
countries have been proposing,but I still think that both
sides will have a very low levelof trust in each other's
intention to actually fulfillthe ceasefire terms.

(01:02:35):
Ukrainian military may have beenhoping for a full 30-day
ceasefire because they do needsome time to rest and recover,
so this can play in a lot ofdifferent directions, I mean,
the last thing I would say isit's interesting you have a
direct reference to Iran,because it's fairly clear that
Trump, who does not want a warwith Iran, is very much hoping

(01:02:59):
that a side benefit fromreaching out to Moscow over
Ukraine is that Russia will helpthem sort out the Iranian
nuclear issue.
And I think Putin is danglingand probably, beyond Iran, the
US hopes that Russia will helpit sort out the North Korean
nuclear issue down the road.
So you know, yeah, we'refocused on Ukraine right now for

(01:03:22):
obvious reasons, but there is,I think, some sort of idea in
Trump's head that if you get therelationship with Russia right,
that solves a series ofproblems around Russia's
periphery.

Speaker 1 (01:03:33):
Last time we talked about the zombie apocalypse,
which was very redolent of theCOVID era.
Today, I wanted to ask you ifthere's a particular film you
know, classic film in mind thatreminds you of this new era
we're in.

Speaker 2 (01:03:48):
Probably Star Wars, always a classic other than the
US.
I think they do feel right nowa little bit like the Rebel
Alliance, on the run from a sortof a US empire that has

(01:04:09):
suddenly gone over to the darkside.
I'm not saying who in theadministration I would compare
to Darth Vader or who amongstthe UN ambassadors is the Han
Solo figure.
Certainly not saying who isJabba the Hutt, but I do think
that right now, if you talk toeven quite seasoned diplomats,

(01:04:31):
they do feel like they're inthat scene where the rebels are
working out what is the onevulnerability in the Death Star
that they can strike.
There's a real sense ofdisarray and we're just going to
see how strong the resistanceis to some of what the US is
doing in the UN.

Speaker 1 (01:04:49):
You have the best one .
I've thought of a few sci-fi.
All the ones that came to mymind were sci-fi.
Mine was Village of the Damned.
You probably remember that.
It's an English one, it's anold one, it's a sleepy English
village.
I think this is key and why Iwas reminded of it A little bit
of that, since before the Trumpadministration came in, they all

(01:05:12):
pass that at once.
After they wake up, everythingseems to be normal, but nine
months later, all the women givebirth to these geniuses.
I think it may be the Dogekiddos that remind me of the
children in that film, but Iactually think your analogy to
Star Wars is much better.
That's one of my top picks.
Thank you so much again,richard Gowan, for making time

(01:05:33):
for us today.

Speaker 2 (01:05:34):
All right, I look forward to being the person to
come on for the third time.

Speaker 1 (01:05:37):
At that time you will get your Delegates Lounge mug.

Speaker 3 (01:05:46):
Thank you very much, and that's it from the Delegates
Lounge.
We'd like to thank our esteemedguests, who've graciously
allowed us to share theirhard-earned insights into what
really matters.
And then there's you, ourlisteners, who we hope are
sufficiently edified to clamorfor more of the same.
Do drop in for a weekly episodeon Thursday, or from time to
time if we're on the road, forspecial events, in which case
there'll be a bonus episode.
Subscribe wherever you listento podcasts and, if you like

(01:06:09):
what you've heard, please take amoment to rate or review the
show, as it helps others whoshare your abiding interest in
world affairs to find their wayto the Delegates Lounge.
You can connect with us on manypopular social media platforms
or reach out to us directly atinfothedelicatesloungecom.
We're a small team so we can'trespond to every message, but we
will read them.
Our show this week was writtenand produced by the host and by

(01:06:31):
yours truly, executive producerFrank Radford.
Until next time, keep calm andcurious.

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