February 21, 2025 • 50 mins
Get ready to explore the turbulent waters of transatlantic relations with our guest, French political scientist Célia Belin. Discover how the Trump administration's controversial actions, including remarks from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Vice President JD Vance, have sent ripples across Europe, particularly in response to the tensions over Ukraine. With President Macron at the helm, rallying European leaders to counter these shifts, Celia provides a nuanced perspective on the strategic and emotional dynamics at play in European capitals as they brace for potentially profound changes in US foreign policy.
We'll navigate the shifting political currents within Europe, where figures like Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Marine Le Pen are recalibrating their positions in light of global developments. As we dissect the responses from the far-right, including Germany's AfD and France's Reconquête, you'll gain insight into how these parties are juggling admiration for Trump with the real-world implications of his alignment with Kremlin narratives. The episode also delves into JD Vance's incendiary address at the Munich Security Conference, sparking dialogue on free speech, political realignments, and the future of European security.
As we round out our discussion, we'll confront the broader implications of a potential second Trump administration on the transatlantic alliance, exploring how European leaders are responding to the existential question of strategic autonomy. From Macron's calls for a European army to the historical context of French skepticism towards NATO, we assess Europe's readiness to assert its significance in global affairs amid unsettling US rhetoric. Immerse yourself in this comprehensive examination of a relationship under strain and the strategies European leaders are employing to navigate these uncharted waters.
Speakers:
J. Alex Tarquinio (host). @alextarquinio of @delegateslounge on X.
https://foreignpolicy.com/author/j-alex-tarquinio/
Célia Belin, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and head
of its Paris office (guest). @celiabelin on X.
https://ecfr.eu/profile/celia-belin/
References:
The host has quoted the guest in the following Foreign Policy articles.
Macron’s China Trip Is a Fool’s Errand
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/06/macron-france-china-visit-pension-protests/
Putin’s War is Shaking Up the French Election
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/10/russia-war-france-elections-macron/
The Education of Pap Ndiaye
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/17/france-politics-culture-war-education-pap-ndiaye-education-minister/
Credits:
Music: Adobe Stock
Photos: Adobe Stock/Karen Mandau; filter applied by The Delegates Lounge LLC. Headshot (in some formats): Célia Belin
Mark as Played
Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
J. Alex Tarquinio (00:08):
Welcome to the Delegates Lounge.
Pull up a chair.
I'm Alex Tarquinio, ajournalist based at the United
Nations here in New York Cityand your emcee for this podcast
featuring some of the mostinfluential minds in the world
today.
Settle in for some rivetingtete-a-tete, available wherever
you listen to podcasts.
Welcome back.
(00:40):
It feels as if the Trumpadministration is trying to put
the lights out all over Europeby switching off the
transatlantic alliance.
Fortunately, our guest in thisepisode is an expert on
transatlantic relations.
As a French political scientist, she sheds light on the
thinking in European capitals.
Newly minted Defense SecretaryPete Hegseth landed the first
(01:01):
blow of President Donald Trump'sone, two, three punch At last
week's meeting of the NATOdefense ministers in Brussels,
where he rattled off a litany ofconcessions that he said
Ukraine should make to Russia.
Critics accused him ofsquandering a strong American
hand in any future negotiations.
In rapid succession, vicePresident JD Vance administered
(01:23):
the second shock with hisValentine's Day speech in Munich
, where at times he seemed tomistake the annual security
conference for the nationalprayer breakfast.
It was no Valentine's Daymessage, unless you're thinking
of the St Valentine's Daymassacre.
Vance had been expected to layout the administration's vision
for ending the war, but insteadtook the opportunity to deliver
(01:46):
a blistering attack on Europeandemocracies.
Trump didn't need to leave hissouthern White House, mar-a-lago
, to inflict the third blow.
After a long chat with VladimirPutin, trump reiterated a
number of Kremlin talking points.
He called Zelensky a dictatorwithout elections on social
media and during a speech inFlorida.
That's a favorite Kremlintalking point, by the way, but
(02:10):
Ukraine's constitution forbidselections during martial law.
It's not uncommon for countriesto suspend elections during
wartime, and Britain pointed outthat it did so during the
Second World War.
Putin has been remarkably quietthroughout this period.
Never interrupt your enemy whenhe is making a mistake, a quote
widely attributed to Napoleon.
(02:31):
The White House has ordered thePentagon to prepare for
far-reaching budget cuts.
If implemented over the nextfive years, these would bring US
defense expenditures down from3.4 percent of the gross
domestic product to around 2percent.
Ironically, trump has belittledNATO allies for spending 2% of
their GDP on defense and saidthey should be spending 5%.
(02:52):
In an era when Beijing andMoscow are dramatically
increasing their defense outlays, it's becoming clear this
administration wants to reducethe American military footprint.
The next act in this drama maywell play out on my stomping
ground, the UN headquarters,this coming Monday, february
24th, the third anniversary ofRussia's full-scale invasion of
(03:14):
Ukraine, the UN General Assemblyis scheduled to vote on a draft
resolution reaffirming itscommitment to the sovereignty,
independence, unity andterritorial integrity of Ukraine
within its internationallyrecognized borders.
A diplomatic source told methis morning that so far more
than 50 countries have agreed toco-sponsor the draft resolution
(03:35):
, but there's deep suspicionthat the United States might not
be among the co-sponsors onMonday.
That would be a dramatic turnof events.
Former United States AmbassadorLinda Thomas-Greenfield and her
team were instrumental inrounding up votes for previous
resolutions supporting Ukraine.
That's worth keeping an eye on.
Critics have compared Trump'srecent performance with Neville
(03:57):
Chamberlain in Munich 1938.
But that's unfair to the memoryof Chamberlain.
Historians believe the Britishprime minister clearly
understood that his countrywasn't militarily prepared to
face off against Nazi Germany in1938, and his policy of
appeasement was meant to buytime while Britain rearmed.
But Chamberlain never publiclyheaped praise on Adolf Hitler,
(04:21):
never bragged about his closepersonal relationship with the
Fuhrer.
Many Europeans feel traumatized.
Macron invited on short noticea number of European leaders for
an informal emergency sessionon Monday at the Elysee, the
French presidential palace.
Two days later he pulledtogether an even larger
gathering of leaders in a videoconference that included more
(04:42):
Eastern Europeans who areneighbors or near neighbors of
Russia, as well as Canada'sPrime Minister, justin Trudeau.
Macron's second meeting onWednesday coincided with my
conversation with our guest inthis episode.
Celia Berlin is a Senior ForeignPolicy Fellow at the European
Council on Foreign Relations andhead of its Paris office From
(05:04):
2017 to 2022,.
She was a visiting fellow atthe Center on the United States
and Europe of the BrookingsInstitution in Washington DC.
We've spoken often over theyears and I've quoted her
occasionally in my articles inForeign Policy there.
I've said it, so I'll includethose links in the show notes,
as I always do when I mentionarticles my own and others.
(05:24):
Celia gave an unvarnished viewfrom the other side of the pond
on how the Trump administrationremarks are splintering the
previously solid oaktransatlantic relationship.
Here's our conversation.
(05:46):
Celia Bilan, thank you so muchfor joining us in the Delegates'
Lounge.
We are very pleased and honoredto have your perspectives from
Paris about all of the changeswe have been seeing recently.
Welcome to the Delegates'Lounge, thank you.
I'm very happy to be here.
Well, we're happy to have you.
You have a perspective,particularly from the point of
view of Paris.
(06:06):
You're a French politicalscientist.
You've also spent a fair amountof time, of course, in
Washington and Brookings, so youcan talk about both French and
American politics andtransatlantic relations.
I want to start out by gettingyour view from 36,000 feet,
post-munich conference and alsoall that we've seen in the new
(06:27):
Trump administration whatappears as a rapprochement with
Putin and some of the concern ofsome other allies.
What have you been hearing fromyour European colleagues?
How they're responding to thisreally massive change in
transatlantic relations?
Celia Belin (06:47):
So thank you for the question.
There are two ways to answerthat.
The one way is to look at youknow whether governments have
been prepared or Europeans aretaking into account the new
changes to make differentpolicies.
But the other level is theemotional level, and I would say
on the first part, the partthat is more policy oriented
(07:10):
there had been preparation inEurope for the possibility of a
second Trump administration.
It had been envisaged.
Quite a few teams at all levelof governments in European
countries had been working ondifferent scenarios scenarios on
trade, scenarios on Ukraine,scenarios that included this
possible rapprochement withRussia, and so in some ways
(07:32):
there is a level-headedness andyou know a sense of that this
was coming and that Europeanswould be prepared for it.
But the truth is is that there'salso an emotional level and
that it's one thing to sort ofimagine a scenario developing.
It's something else when itactually happens in front of
(07:52):
your very eyes.
And I think this is the shockthat came out of the first few
weeks of the Trumpadministration, including at the
Munich Security Conference,including at the Munich Security
Conference with the speech ofVice President JD Vance, but
also with President Trump'sphone call with Putin and his
dismissal of Zelensky.
(08:13):
All of this is really takingshape now and we have to reckon
the fact that this is anentirely different America, that
it will advance at light speedin all directions, including
internal, and that, you know,europe, for whatever preparation
(08:34):
they may have done, it willnever have been enough, because
it will go so extremely fastthat we have to, you know, pick
up pace as well.
So there's this emotionalelement that is very strong and
I must say it permeates all theconversation, even the ones that
are trying to be as pragmaticas possible.
J. Alex Tarquinio (08:53):
And many European parties on the left and
right, both in France andelsewhere in Europe.
For example, in Germany, therewere some on the left and right
that appeared to have, shall wesay, a better opinion of Putin
and of Russia than the morecentrist parties.
You know you have Melenchon onthe left and Le Pen on the right
(09:16):
who've spoken with someadmiration of Putin, and I
should mention, with Le Pen, shedid moderate that somewhat
after the full scale invasion.
Is there any sense on the farleft and the far right in Europe
that they're welcoming thischange or, now that the rubber
has hit the road, so to speak,that there's a real possibility
that the US withdraws some ofits security support for Europe?
(09:39):
You know, are any of thoseopinions by people on the left
and the right moderating nowthat they're faced with more of
the reality?
Celia Belin (09:46):
So, I think we really have to distinguish here
far left and far right and thedifference between the two in
the way they might have embracedRussia at times or Putin, in
the way they might have embracedRussia at times or Putin.
If you look at the far left andin France, france Insoumise, in
particular Jean-Luc Mélenchon,has had at times, you know, kind
(10:09):
words for Vladimir Putin.
It stems out very much of asort of third worldism
perspective or the idea that theAmerican global order was
militaristic, was predatory,that it was supportive of sort
of alternative to the dominationof the West in many ways.
(10:31):
And now that you know a Trumpwould align with a Putin.
In any case it doesn't makesense anymore for protecting the
little guy.
These groups are being quiet atthe moment and definitely not
in support of Trump.
They are highly critical ofTrump's economic policies,
(10:52):
trump's trade policies,extremely critical of Elon Musk,
trump's trade policies,extremely critical of Elon Musk,
extremely doubtful of the sortof libertarianism that is
emanating from this government.
So all these groups will not beinclined to support this new
rapprochement and will feelprobably, you know, it will
probably even tame some of theinterests they might have had in
(11:14):
the past for Russia.
But it's a different story.
On the far right and with allits variety across Europe and
there you also have todistinguish, I think, between
two groups.
One is more of an ideologicalfar right.
That you know.
I think that JD Vance, vicePresident Vance, talked to when
he addressed the crowd, ortalked about when he addressed
(11:37):
the crowd in a Munich securityconference and sort of voiced
his support for this ideologicalconservative ultra-right that
is very, very enthused with thesort of strong-armed, you know,
broligarchy that is emanatingfrom Washington, the
rapprochement with Putin.
(11:59):
They see, you know the liberalWest as the morally corrupt.
They see, they value the fightagainst immigration and even
against immigrants.
Sometimes Some of thesefar-right parties, such as the
AFD in Germany or Reconquête inFrance, eric Zemmour's party,
are just applauding.
(12:20):
They're applauding Putin,they're applauding Trump, musk,
etc.
They're really darlings of thismovement.
And I would say there's anothercrowd, maybe a crowd that seeks
power, a crowd that you know, insome ways Melanie belongs to
because she's in power, she'sclose to Musk, she wants to be
(12:40):
in the good graces of Trump, butshe also wants to stick, you
know, has influence in Europeanpolitics.
She does not want to alienateall of her European partners
immediately.
She doesn't want to be ViktorOrban, so she's at the moment,
uncomfortably trying to play abit of both sides.
And then another sort ofpragmatism, maybe a sovereignist
(13:03):
, nationalistic approach, is theRassemblement National, the
national rally in France, whichyou know is supportive of this
patriotic, populist movement ofthe ultra-right all over Europe,
but is also really mindful ofthe fact that some of Trump's
trade policies will come backand bite us and be really tough
(13:25):
on France and maybe tough onFrench workers, that Trump will
exert pressure on France to do X, y and Z, and fundamentally,
these parties are sovereignists.
What they really aim for is tobe sovereign.
Y and Z, and fundamentally theseparties are sovereignists.
What they really aim for is tobe sovereign from Europe, but
also sovereign from the US.
They probably want to see apeace deal between Ukraine and
(13:50):
Russia and are not losing anysleep over it, but fundamentally
, the idea is that they don'twant to fight for or to support
Ukraine anymore.
That's the main angle.
So you see, there's likevariety all across Europe and
even though the Trumpadministration is really trying
to rally in a sort ofreactionary international, as
(14:15):
Macron said, they might have,you know, political groups that
are not as enthusiastic asothers.
J. Alex Tarquinio (14:23):
That's a very nuanced analysis of European
reactions across the politicalspectrum.
Now you mentioned JD Vance'sremarks at the beginning of the
Munich Security Conference.
His essentially dressing down ofEuropean political and military
leaders present there almost itcame across almost like a
schoolmarm calling them.
(14:44):
They were really bad boys andgirls, and he had like two
different criticisms, primarycriticisms.
One was on free speech or theirinterpretation of free speech,
where he plucked this oneexample of someone who had been
praying outside of an abortionclinic, and that to me felt like
it was really primarily aimedat the US domestic audience, who
(15:07):
may have gotten outtakes of hisspeech.
They're unlikely to have heardthe entire speech, but they
might have seen that play onsocial media, and obviously part
of the Trump administration'selectoral support came from
those conservatives who areopposed to abortion.
So it was still odd that heplucked that example out at a
conference that's aimed atsecurity policy.
The other thing, though, is heparticularly accused Germany
(15:31):
which of course has thisimminent election at the time of
the Munich Security Conference,where many countries are
sensitive to what might happenin the polls in a few days and
accused them of not giving afair break to the AfD, the
Alternative for Germany, whichother German political parties
have said they wouldn't includein a coalition government.
Traditionally, world leaderstry to avoid discussing other
(15:56):
countries' domestic politics ingeneral and particularly try and
avoid talking about theirinternal elections right before
polling, first of all.
Can you think of any otherexample?
Celia Belin (16:07):
No, someone was mentioning to me that the speech
that Putin gave at the MunichSecurity Conference in 2007 was
very geopolitical, not ondomestic politics, but felt the
same kind of earth shatteringand alienating to the audience
presence in the room.
When you try to basicallyredraw, you destroy the
(16:31):
consensus that prevailed and yousort of redraw new lines and
shed new lights.
But I can't think of this typeof political interference before
because indeed this has onlybeen done when the free world or
(16:52):
the liberal world order or theliberal West was pushing and
criticizing and is criticizingauthoritarian dictators, or is
criticizing when during the ColdWar, was criticizing the Soviet
Union and the regime, or isstill criticizing, you know,
illiberal, autocratic regimearound the world, illiberal
(17:19):
autocratic regime around theworld.
And the fact of seeing anAmerican president do that from
the inside to its own allies andgo inside, you know, talking
about its own system but aboutallied political system and ways
of government is, I don't knowif it's completely unprecedented
, but it's definitely shockingand striking.
J. Alex Tarquinio (17:36):
Yeah, I mean, first of all, those are very
telling comparisons that youcame up with on the spur of the
moment, but it is.
It does seem to me that there'sa distinction between trying to
influence broad geostrategicchanges and clearly that's at
the base of JD Vance's remarks.
The Trump administrationclearly prefers the right-wing
(17:58):
parties in Europe and he's madeno secret of his support, for
example, for the AFD candidate.
But there's a differencebetween broadly trying to
influence a realignment andactually trying to say things to
influence an election that isdays away in a foreign country
that also happens to be along-standing ally.
Celia Belin (18:21):
Yeah, that's the part, that's, that's that's
saying right, it's the fact thatit's a long, long-standing
allies and and a fully, fullyfledged democracy and with the
values shared, because otherwise, you know, the US or even other
Western countries would have noproblem criticizing the
(18:41):
election or the you know of thisand that leader advancing a
political agenda.
But if I can be a bit of acontrarian here, I've been told
(19:01):
by Trumpist affiliates, peoplewho support the Trump
administration, that one I'vebeen given this example twice by
them that you know, europeansdid not refrain from criticizing
the domestic affairs of the USand that we are the ones
moralizing the United Statesconstantly.
(19:22):
And they gave this example ofthe European Parliament voting
to condemn the overturn of Roe vWade in the wake of the Supreme
Court decision to overturn itand replace it.
And the European Parliamentadded to this condemnation, of
course, their own, you know,support for abortion services in
(19:44):
Europe, etc.
Even though there's many, manynuances on the European
continent actually on that topic.
But the idea that Europeanlawmakers would send a signal on
, ultimately, a very domesticaffair was taken as a point of
argument, saying, well, you'vebeen lecturing us for decades,
(20:07):
so they haven't given me otherexamples, but at least that's
the sentiment they're going with, that this sort of ultra-right,
republican, conservative trendin USS politics has felt
alienated.
And now you know they're inpower, they have the tools, they
can be the one lecturing Europeand they have no shame over
(20:28):
this.
So I don't think there's amoral equivalency here, but I
think that they feel it's thecase.
J. Alex Tarquinio (20:37):
That's a valid point.
On their concern, there hasbeen a lot of European criticism
of political developments inthe United States.
But yeah, that sounds like aparliamentary decision
criticizing a political decisionin another country.
Also, the US Supreme Court isobviously a separate branch of
government and obviously it'snot going to be influenced by
anything, but that does stillappear to me to be different.
(20:58):
Whether a head of state orgovernment or, in this case, a
vice president, who's next inline.
Extremely, it's politicalinterference.
Celia Belin (21:05):
I was just trying to maybe explain a bit of the
justification that they areusing to engage in this, but
(21:27):
clearly, since the beginning ofthis administration, they see no
problem into pushing activelyfor supporting the type of
European leaders that they wantto see in power in order to
advance their agenda, theiragenda of transforming the
liberal democracies that we knowof into versions that are way
(21:51):
more conservative, more in linewith what they perceive to be
their interest.
And so that, I think, was theshock for the audience at the
Munich Security Conference, theshock of a new world where the
United States is now treatingits closest allies as foreign
powers which you would hopewould change in order to be
(22:12):
closer to your own interests.
And that's just massive.
And I think this happenedduring the same week when Donald
Trump made a phone call toVladimir Putin, when Donald
Trump heavily criticizedZelensky, when Pete Hecht, the
new Secretary of Defense,explained that the objective was
a ceasefire, not almost,whatever the conditions, it's a
(22:37):
change of footing for the US.
That is massive and its alliesare barely coping with it.
J. Alex Tarquinio (22:44):
The Trump administration and JD Vance
refer to any criticism ofdisinformation as repression of
free speech.
But then, on the other hand,you have Donald Trump himself
repeating, effectively, talkingpoints that the Kremlin has put
out on social media for well,certainly throughout the
full-scale invasion, if notlonger, and I should tell for
(23:05):
the benefit of listeners thatwe're speaking about an hour
after Donald Trump sent thisvery lengthy tweet actually
screenshot tweet on WednesdayFebruary 19th, Actually
screenshot tweet on WednesdayFebruary 19th, Critical of
Zelensky, basically repeatingmuch of what Putin and the
Kremlin has said.
I won't get into all thespecifics.
Celia Belin (23:40):
He calls him a modestly successful comedian
accuses him of what says allkinds of numbers that clearly
are inflated on what the US hasspent and basically blamed
Zelensky for the war.
She accuses him of being adictator and retaining elections
because of the martial law.
So he's accusing him.
J. Alex Tarquinio (23:50):
One thing we should point out is that the
United Kingdom didn't haveelections during World War II.
Celia Belin (23:56):
But not only that.
I must say that the largerpicture here is that with this
rant and this position, he'salso advocating for regime
change in Kiev in many ways, andregime change is Putin's war
objective.
So he's advancing Putin's warobjective by doing so.
J. Alex Tarquinio (24:16):
And aren't you saying that was the
principal war objective?
I mean also to take length, butwhen they went for Kiev three
years ago.
I mean, I don't think anyonereally doubts, even supporters,
that that was the objective.
Celia Belin (24:30):
Yes, it was the stated objective of Vladimir
Putin to be done with what hecalled the neo-Nazi regime of
Kyiv, and this is, in otherwords, exactly what Donald Trump
just tweeted about.
So it's mind boggling.
We knew that this could happen,that some form of rationale will
(24:53):
build up in Trump's circles,that there was an interest for
him not to align fully onRussian interests, but at the
current moment Trump seems tothink otherwise that full
alignment with Russians' viewsand talking points is in his
interest.
I'm not sure how or why, butthat's what he's coming up with
(25:15):
and we have to realize, asEuropeans we are left to be
squeezed between these twonarratives that turn out to be
the same narrative, and that wehave to continue holding up our
side of the narrative thatUkraine has been invaded, that
Ukraine is not the attacker here, it's the victim of Russia's
(25:36):
invasion, that it's not the onethat wants to pursue this war.
But it's also a war that itcannot lose for the sake of its
existence, its sovereignty andfor the sake of Europe's defense
as well.
So it's an extremely tough timewe should not kid ourselves for
(25:57):
transatlantic relations, forEurope, for Ukraine.
Obviously Extremely tough time,but Europe will have to play
with its strength and will haveto put forward suggestions, will
have to continue to demonstratethat it knows what it wants and
that there's a good reason todo that, including for
Americans' interests, thatAmericans' interests do not
(26:20):
align fully with Russians'interests, and I think Europe
has to make the case and stateits own interest in doing so.
But it's kind of scary.
J. Alex Tarquinio (26:31):
Many European leaders clearly feel sidelined
by the Trump administration inits ongoing conversations with
Putin and his emissaries withLavrov and others.
On the other hand, the CEO ofGermany's largest defense
contractor, rheinmetall,recently said that Europe only
had itself to blame for sittingat the kids' table, as he called
(26:53):
it, because of chronicunderinvestment in defense.
Now we should acknowledgethere's obviously some
self-interest here.
European defense contractorstocks have been up this week
and actually last I checked USwere down because there's some
thought that Trump is going touse this to disinvest somewhat
or to reduce the budget of thePentagon and is across the board
(27:13):
cost cutting, whereas Europe isgoing to invest more.
So there is some self-interestin the CEO of the largest
defense contractor in Germanysaying this.
But on the other hand, does hehave a point?
Is Europe quote unquote sittingat the kids table for a reason?
Celia Belin (27:30):
Yes, there has been structural under investment in
defense for decades, even thoughthese have picked up
dramatically after Crimea in2014, and obviously even more
after Russia's invasion ofUkraine is concerned, germany
(27:51):
has had to live with thehistorical burden of its crimes
in World War II, and one way tosolidify its own democracy has
been to refuse to bemilitaristic and to believe in a
liberal world order that wouldpromote peace and security
through trade and exchanges andsecurity through trade and
(28:16):
exchanges.
Somehow Germany has been on thelosing side of that bargain,
because that's not how the worldhas evolved and it should have
woken up much earlier toRussia's sort of return into the
geopolitical competition.
But don't we all wish right nowthat Germany's way would have
been the best?
(28:37):
You know, it would have meant amuch better, much safer world.
So European leaders weregathered in Paris a couple of
days ago to discuss after thesedeclarations on Russia and
Ukraine, to discuss how to reactand, among the decisions taken,
offering even more support toUkraine or offering potentially
(29:00):
security guarantees to Ukraine.
One of the decisions is also toramp up even more strongly
defence spending and to try andencourage everyone to reach 2%
of GDP in defence spending asquickly as possible, but
basically to put in place theinstruments that are needed for
this ramping up to be also aEuropean effort.
(29:22):
So Europe builds itself incrises very often, europe has
also invested in citizens'health or in the climate
transition, or in education orin many other different ways
that felt, and are still, very,very important to Europeans.
So it was a political choice.
(29:43):
I think now the pendulum isswinging back to more defense
spending out of necessity, notout of choice, not out of the
type of world we wanted to livein, but the type of world we are
inheriting now.
J. Alex Tarquinio (29:59):
Was Macron right about a strategic autonomy
?
I mean, is this a justificationof his theory that Europe needs
its own European army?
Of course he famously referredto NATO as brain dead a few
years ago, to NATO was braindead a few years ago.
Then, during the interimbetween the first and second
Trump administration, he seemedto walk that back a little bit,
implying perhaps that really hehad been speaking about the US
(30:22):
leadership under the Trumpadministration when he made the
reference to NATO being braindead.
Was he right all along?
Celia Belin (30:30):
Yes, of course, To be fair, European strategic
autonomy is not just a Macronidea.
It's been a French idea fordecades.
Macron has even insisted evenmore on defence and to develop
European strategic autonomybecause fundamentally, it had it
(30:58):
believed very deeply that, youknow, American interests and
European interests would notnecessarily always align and in
that case, when Americaninterests were to be defended
and, you know, when America wasto make its own choices, such as
invading Iraq, Europe decided.
Parts of Europe, includingFrance and Germany, decided not
(31:21):
to follow and to criticize thatdecision.
On the opposite side, Europemay have wanted to take some
foreign policy initiative forwhich the US was not necessarily
supportive.
So that's why the French feltit was important to be able to
stand partly on their own twofeet, but at the same time, it
recognized that because of lackof investment, but also because
(31:45):
the US had, technologically werevery advanced and still very
needed in a whole range ofenablers, strategic enablers it
was even better to be together,you know, in a NATO format,
really working hand in hand.
Macron, I think, fundamentallyduring the Biden years, believed
(32:08):
in pushing European strategicautonomy while at the same time
showing itself to be a reallygood NATO ally, so doing both at
the same time.
Reinforcing Europe within NATO,for example, was one of the
elements that France wassupporting.
J. Alex Tarquinio (32:26):
It's a very fine line to walk.
And of course you mentionedChirac.
Jacques Chirac was, I'm sureour listeners will remember, a
very fierce opponent of thesecond Iraq war.
But on the other hand Francehas always kind of had on and
off again opinions of NATO.
It was in the command structure, then it left the command
(32:47):
structure, then it was back inthe command structure.
So I guess we're saying isperhaps that's an inherently
French skepticism.
Celia Belin (32:53):
Yeah, that's so.
You have these historicalreasons.
But but one element that haschanged there.
So you know, france was alwaysthe one that you know dragging
its feet sometimes into beingfully transatlantic partner, or
sometimes yes, some elementswere critical of NATO or not, or
(33:14):
pushing a little bit too muchthe European side rather than
pushing the transatlantic side,but by and large, it was always
there within the alliance.
It supported the US after 9-11.
It worked with the US in Libya.
It was there in Syria, even ifit was aborted as a mission.
It was there during the wholeISIS campaign, etc.
(33:39):
Etc.
So there's no shortage.
And the US were there tosupport France in its military
intervention in Mali, etc.
There's no shortage of exampleof how well these two countries
have worked together, andtogether with Europe as well.
So, whatever the speech onEuropean strategic autonomy, it
(34:00):
has never prevented France orEurope to work very closely with
the US.
What has changed, however, isthat now it's the US that have
become the unreliable partner,become the unreliable partner
From the first Trumpadministration.
That when you know alreadysowing doubt into Article 5 or
(34:21):
US commitment to its NATO allies, then you know the Biden
administration swings in theother direction, back, being
very forceful in its support ofEurope, of Ukraine, great ally,
you know, great solidarity, andnow we're back to a way worse
situation with really highAmerican skepticism.
J. Alex Tarquinio (34:45):
So these swings are gigantic and it's
hard to Now, it's the US as anunreliable partner.
I don't know if you're sayingsomething similar about France,
because of course France, likeother NATO countries, as I think
our listeners will know, theonly time Article 5 has really
been invoked was after the 9-11attacks.
French forces were in the warin Afghanistan from what 2001 to
(35:10):
2014.
Celia Belin (35:13):
They did not join the war in Iraq, but that's the
only one.
J. Alex Tarquinio (35:17):
It's not that they didn't support Article 5
or they didn't support theUnited States.
He drew a line in the sand, soto speak.
You're not drawing thecomparison there between the US
skeptical of Ukraine then, theUS supporting Ukraine during
Biden and now.
Celia Belin (35:33):
No, on the contrary , I think it's from Ukraine.
J. Alex Tarquinio (35:36):
I mean, you're not saying that the
Chirac's decision about Iraq wascomparable to that.
I just want to make that clear.
Celia Belin (35:43):
No, no, no.
On the contrary, I think thatFrance, even though it has
always vocalized Europe'sstrategic autonomy discourse and
pushed for more investment inEuropean defense all the while
and during the whole time, hasbeen a steadfast and reliable
(36:04):
NATO ally to the US All ofdecades, has never wavered
fundamentally in the ideas ofcollective defense of NATO and
has been also present in a widevariety of military intervention
or even just as politicalsupport for the US.
(36:26):
It's not about disagreeing onthis or that decision to proceed
, etc.
We are talking about somethingcompletely different.
Now that the Trumpadministration is putting into
question is the alliance itself.
So thankfully, there has beenno conversation on NATO just yet
(36:50):
and I don't want to push thatconversation now.
But the idea that the Americanpresident has now taken the
perspective of Russia in thebiggest land war that Europe has
known since the end of theSecond World War and that this
new American president comes inand takes the perspective of the
(37:12):
adversary and pushes for theadversary's interest, it's just
of a completely different nature.
It's not just about being agrumpy ally there.
It's about fundamentallychanging the sides on which
we're standing.
So it's still early.
I wish we could hope that theseare mere negotiation tactics,
(37:33):
that the Trump administrationwill realize that the American
interest is not fully aligned onRussian interest, that it will
understand that it's importantas well to take the perspective
of allies.
But the first, the early signscoming out of this
administration are deeplyworrying, and I think that's
where we are now.
(37:54):
We're still extremely early inthis administration, so I don't
want to pass definite judgment,because that makes no sense
whatsoever.
I'm just reflecting on the pastmonth that has everyone really
on edge at this moment in Europeand really hoping that we can
accommodate a way to proceedthat does not rupture entirely
(38:17):
our relationship to the US, thatprotects NATO and the interests
of the transatlantic allies,that protects the existence and
sovereignty of Ukraine, and thatwe find some form of agreement
around these most basicprinciples that we, up until now
(38:37):
, we thought we shared with theUS.
J. Alex Tarquinio (38:41):
So Ukraine obviously is the topic A, I
would guess, in Europe this week.
But I want to talk a little bitmore broadly about sovereignty.
And there is a question ofsovereignty there because the
details we're hearing about thedeal that they tried to get
President Zelensky to sign theyhave been compared to
reparations that were demandedby Germany in Versailles.
(39:03):
But obviously in this casethey're not being asked of the
aggressor, but more broadlyabout sovereignty, which is
according to the United NationsCharter.
Un countries are supposed torespect the sovereignty,
territorial integrity andpolitical independence of other
states.
So not only is Ukraine'ssovereignty very clearly being
(39:24):
challenged, but comments thatTrump made both before and after
he took office about, forexample, greenland a territory
of Denmark, that's EU territoryand also another NATO ally,
canada, that are somewhathostile and threatening.
Is this also something thatconcerns Europeans, that the
(39:46):
United States, which has beenthe champion of sovereignty and
territorial integrity for theseeight decades since World War II
?
Is that a concern as well?
Celia Belin (40:27):
The US commitment to sovereignty of other
countries when it's perceivedthat its existential interests
were threatened, such as in thecase of Iraq, even if mistaken,
they II, when it made choices onother countries' sovereignty as
well.
But what's incredibly shockingis that we are talking about
nations at peace, nations thatare neighboring, nations that
are allies, trading partners,closest to the United States as
any other nation, and the typeof predatory engagement that
(40:51):
this administration is doing, orthis president, with this
country is baffling.
I don't even know how todescribe it.
It's so imperialistic.
It dates back from anothercentury, 19th century type of
doctrine where that can imaginethat you know, as long as a
(41:14):
territory has natural resources,it is up for grabs by the most
powerful nation that borders it.
J. Alex Tarquinio (41:22):
And you're thinking particularly of Canada,
of Denmark, canada, greenland,both.
Yeah, it really applies to both.
Celia Belin (41:31):
Which is, I suppose that's what it's all about.
But it is so incrediblyinsulting to Canadians, to Danes
, to Greenlanders that theAmerican president would say you
know, we should just integratethat country.
How can this be remotely OK?
I have heard from Canadianfriends and experts that they
(41:54):
are incredibly mad about this,as they should be, and not just
worried but very, very, veryfurious about it.
J. Alex Tarquinio (42:06):
Well, there is a long shared history.
Obviously, they fought side byside in many wars.
I mean really all the majorwars you know, from the last
century to the present.
They're also, of course, a hugetrading partner, and I remember
conservatives, republicans inthe US not so long ago were
fighting tooth and nail to getthe pipeline, you know, and they
(42:27):
wanted more trade with Canadaand you know they were critical
of, you know, environmentalistsor whatever that opposed the
Keystone pipeline.
And now they're actuallythreatening higher tariffs and
trying to reduce trade withCanada.
So that's another abrupt switch.
Celia Belin (42:46):
So I suppose part of the method is the provocation
is to go in the most outlandishway and threaten and have
maximalist threats in order toobtain a more minimal agreement
on part of the partner you'rethreatening.
I suppose that's the technique,but at this point we have no
(43:08):
guarantee that the buck is goingto stop somewhere.
You know, when Donald Trumpdoes not refuse to rule out
force as a method to annexGreenland, which is what he
should have done when askedabout it, you know we are still
trying to interpret this asthat's a tactic.
That's the art of the deal, butwho's to say?
(43:32):
Who has the guarantee now?
So what type of uncertainty ishe creating by doing that?
At least the Danes are deeplyworried and deeply offended as
well, and overall, this is thekind of mistrust that he's
voluntarily creating with hisallies.
J. Alex Tarquinio (43:50):
Yeah, you're talking about when Trump was
asked whether he would rule outmilitary or force or economic,
and he refused to rule outeither.
Macron obviously had this bigmeeting on Monday, where he
gathered on very short notice alot of European leaders for an
emergency meeting after thestatements that were made both
(44:12):
at the NATO defense meeting lastweek and in the Munich Security
Conference, and he's havinganother meeting today.
Actually, I think as we'respeaking, they have a visual
conference in which they broughtin many more Eastern European
countries, including countriesthat are neighboring on or near
neighbors of Russia so alsoCanada, by the way Also Canada
very important.
So what can Europeans do if theUS is increasingly backing away
(44:37):
from a support of Ukraine andpotentially even withdraws
support for Europe in terms oftroops or strategic intelligence
logistics?
I mean, those are things thattake many years to build.
It's not just investment ofmoney, it's building whole
systems, because there arethings that the US has provided
that I don't believe Europe isreally ready to immediately step
(45:00):
in on.
So I don't know if those arethe level of questions they're
dealing with in these emergencymeetings online today.
But first of all, are youhearing anything from your perch
in Paris and what do youbelieve they can do these
leaders' meetings?
Celia Belin (45:14):
So in these leaders' meetings, the
importance is to try to come upwith a form of a consensus, and
the consensus was, and emergedfrom it, that there would be no
acceptance of a dry ceasefirewithout negotiating a peace deal
, meaning that Russia has tomake concessions, has to also
demonstratively show that if itwants a peace deal, it has to
(45:39):
offer some guarantees to Ukraine.
That's number one.
Number two that Europeans wereready to put effort and
potentially troops on the groundand to be part of the solution
within those negotiations.
I think they send that signalto the negotiating team of the
Trump administration whennegotiating with Russians, in
(46:00):
order for them to know that ifthey want to make a good deal,
they have to take at heartEuropean and Ukrainian interests
and in that case they will havesome contributions from
Europeans and from Ukrainians.
The third point that came out ofit is a collective decision to
ramp up defense production.
So, yes, it's not going tohappen overnight.
(46:21):
That part is not going tohappen overnight.
It's not going to happenovernight.
That part is not going tohappen overnight.
But you also have to realizethat the US can threaten all
they want or be disruptive asthey want, if they do pull out
entirely of Europe or if they do, you know, engage in a trade
war with Europe etc.
Are going to damage themselves.
(46:42):
First and foremost, they woulddamage their own prosperity.
A trade war with Europe wouldbe catastrophic for the US
economy on top of the Europeaneconomy.
If they were to pull out alltroops, they would weaken their
strategic advantage all over theworld, including when it comes
to other fronts, etc.
So the military would probablynot be happy about this.
(47:06):
They have to sell their weaponssomewhere.
They have a huge defenseindustry and Europeans are the
one buying a lot of theseweapons.
You know the US needs Europe alot.
It's not just Europe needingthe US and there's some
decisions or some.
You know Europeans need todemonstrate or to remind the US
(47:31):
that they need them.
Maybe he needs, you know,president Trump needs a little
reminding, but ultimately, Ithink Europeans, european
leaders, by showing consensus,by showing some strength, by
showing that they can putsomething on the table but they
can also retaliate, want todemonstrate that they need to be
taken into account, and ifthey're not taken into account,
(47:53):
there's going to be consequences.
So I think it might appear notenough, but it was a show of
force from.
J. Alex Tarquinio (48:00):
Europeans to do these two meetings, and I
guess the other question is whowould be present?
I mean, there's the famousKissinger line on if I want to
talk to Europe, who do I call?
The field has been winnoweddown with the EU, but are they
also discussing, I guess, howand in what form their
participation would take?
Celia Belin (48:17):
No, I haven't heard that part and I think it's just
slightly too early.
No one wants to be the Trumpwhisperer at this time.
I think the idea is to gocollective, yeah, and messaging
to the administration thatEurope has interest, that Europe
(48:39):
has power, that Europe will notjust lie there and be walked
all over.
J. Alex Tarquinio (48:47):
Messaging was very important as well.
Well, that's an excellent notefor us to wrap up our
conversation on.
Thank you again for making timefor us today in the Delegates
Lounge.
Thank you, Alex, it was reallygreat to speak with you again.
Frank Radford (49:05):
And that's it from the Delegates Lounge.
We'd like to thank our esteemedguests, who've graciously
allowed us to share theirhard-earned insights into what
really matters.
And then there's you, ourlisteners, who we hope are
sufficiently edified to clamourfor more of the same.
Do drop in for a weekly episodeon Thursday, or, from time to
time if we're on the road, forspecial events, in which case
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(49:25):
Subscribe wherever you listento podcasts and, if you like
what you've heard, please take amoment to rate or review the
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You can connect with us on manypopular social media platforms
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We're a small team so we can'trespond to every message, but we
(49:54):
will read them.
Our show this week was writtenand produced by the host and by
yours truly executive producer,frank Radford.
Until next time, keep calm andcurious.
Welcome to the Delegates Lounge.
Pull up a chair.
I'm Alex Tarquinio, ajournalist based at the United
Nations here in New York Cityand your emcee for this podcast
featuring some of the mostinfluential minds in the world
today.
Settle in for some rivetingtete-a-tete, available wherever
you listen to podcasts.
Welcome back.
(00:40):
It feels as if the Trumpadministration is trying to put
the lights out all over Europeby switching off the
transatlantic alliance.
Fortunately, our guest in thisepisode is an expert on
transatlantic relations.
As a French political scientist, she sheds light on the
thinking in European capitals.
Newly minted Defense SecretaryPete Hegseth landed the first
(01:01):
blow of President Donald Trump'sone, two, three punch At last
week's meeting of the NATOdefense ministers in Brussels,
where he rattled off a litany ofconcessions that he said
Ukraine should make to Russia.
Critics accused him ofsquandering a strong American
hand in any future negotiations.
In rapid succession, vicePresident JD Vance administered
(01:23):
the second shock with hisValentine's Day speech in Munich
, where at times he seemed tomistake the annual security
conference for the nationalprayer breakfast.
It was no Valentine's Daymessage, unless you're thinking
of the St Valentine's Daymassacre.
Vance had been expected to layout the administration's vision
for ending the war, but insteadtook the opportunity to deliver
(01:46):
a blistering attack on Europeandemocracies.
Trump didn't need to leave hissouthern White House, mar-a-lago
, to inflict the third blow.
After a long chat with VladimirPutin, trump reiterated a
number of Kremlin talking points.
He called Zelensky a dictatorwithout elections on social
media and during a speech inFlorida.
That's a favorite Kremlintalking point, by the way, but
(02:10):
Ukraine's constitution forbidselections during martial law.
It's not uncommon for countriesto suspend elections during
wartime, and Britain pointed outthat it did so during the
Second World War.
Putin has been remarkably quietthroughout this period.
Never interrupt your enemy whenhe is making a mistake, a quote
widely attributed to Napoleon.
(02:31):
The White House has ordered thePentagon to prepare for
far-reaching budget cuts.
If implemented over the nextfive years, these would bring US
defense expenditures down from3.4 percent of the gross
domestic product to around 2percent.
Ironically, trump has belittledNATO allies for spending 2% of
their GDP on defense and saidthey should be spending 5%.
(02:52):
In an era when Beijing andMoscow are dramatically
increasing their defense outlays, it's becoming clear this
administration wants to reducethe American military footprint.
The next act in this drama maywell play out on my stomping
ground, the UN headquarters,this coming Monday, february
24th, the third anniversary ofRussia's full-scale invasion of
(03:14):
Ukraine, the UN General Assemblyis scheduled to vote on a draft
resolution reaffirming itscommitment to the sovereignty,
independence, unity andterritorial integrity of Ukraine
within its internationallyrecognized borders.
A diplomatic source told methis morning that so far more
than 50 countries have agreed toco-sponsor the draft resolution
(03:35):
, but there's deep suspicionthat the United States might not
be among the co-sponsors onMonday.
That would be a dramatic turnof events.
Former United States AmbassadorLinda Thomas-Greenfield and her
team were instrumental inrounding up votes for previous
resolutions supporting Ukraine.
That's worth keeping an eye on.
Critics have compared Trump'srecent performance with Neville
(03:57):
Chamberlain in Munich 1938.
But that's unfair to the memoryof Chamberlain.
Historians believe the Britishprime minister clearly
understood that his countrywasn't militarily prepared to
face off against Nazi Germany in1938, and his policy of
appeasement was meant to buytime while Britain rearmed.
But Chamberlain never publiclyheaped praise on Adolf Hitler,
(04:21):
never bragged about his closepersonal relationship with the
Fuhrer.
Many Europeans feel traumatized.
Macron invited on short noticea number of European leaders for
an informal emergency sessionon Monday at the Elysee, the
French presidential palace.
Two days later he pulledtogether an even larger
gathering of leaders in a videoconference that included more
(04:42):
Eastern Europeans who areneighbors or near neighbors of
Russia, as well as Canada'sPrime Minister, justin Trudeau.
Macron's second meeting onWednesday coincided with my
conversation with our guest inthis episode.
Celia Berlin is a Senior ForeignPolicy Fellow at the European
Council on Foreign Relations andhead of its Paris office From
(05:04):
2017 to 2022,.
She was a visiting fellow atthe Center on the United States
and Europe of the BrookingsInstitution in Washington DC.
We've spoken often over theyears and I've quoted her
occasionally in my articles inForeign Policy there.
I've said it, so I'll includethose links in the show notes,
as I always do when I mentionarticles my own and others.
(05:24):
Celia gave an unvarnished viewfrom the other side of the pond
on how the Trump administrationremarks are splintering the
previously solid oaktransatlantic relationship.
Here's our conversation.
(05:46):
Celia Bilan, thank you so muchfor joining us in the Delegates'
Lounge.
We are very pleased and honoredto have your perspectives from
Paris about all of the changeswe have been seeing recently.
Welcome to the Delegates'Lounge, thank you.
I'm very happy to be here.
Well, we're happy to have you.
You have a perspective,particularly from the point of
view of Paris.
(06:06):
You're a French politicalscientist.
You've also spent a fair amountof time, of course, in
Washington and Brookings, so youcan talk about both French and
American politics andtransatlantic relations.
I want to start out by gettingyour view from 36,000 feet,
post-munich conference and alsoall that we've seen in the new
(06:27):
Trump administration whatappears as a rapprochement with
Putin and some of the concern ofsome other allies.
What have you been hearing fromyour European colleagues?
How they're responding to thisreally massive change in
transatlantic relations?
Celia Belin (06:47):
So thank you for the question.
There are two ways to answerthat.
The one way is to look at youknow whether governments have
been prepared or Europeans aretaking into account the new
changes to make differentpolicies.
But the other level is theemotional level, and I would say
on the first part, the partthat is more policy oriented
(07:10):
there had been preparation inEurope for the possibility of a
second Trump administration.
It had been envisaged.
Quite a few teams at all levelof governments in European
countries had been working ondifferent scenarios scenarios on
trade, scenarios on Ukraine,scenarios that included this
possible rapprochement withRussia, and so in some ways
(07:32):
there is a level-headedness andyou know a sense of that this
was coming and that Europeanswould be prepared for it.
But the truth is is that there'salso an emotional level and
that it's one thing to sort ofimagine a scenario developing.
It's something else when itactually happens in front of
(07:52):
your very eyes.
And I think this is the shockthat came out of the first few
weeks of the Trumpadministration, including at the
Munich Security Conference,including at the Munich Security
Conference with the speech ofVice President JD Vance, but
also with President Trump'sphone call with Putin and his
dismissal of Zelensky.
(08:13):
All of this is really takingshape now and we have to reckon
the fact that this is anentirely different America, that
it will advance at light speedin all directions, including
internal, and that, you know,europe, for whatever preparation
(08:34):
they may have done, it willnever have been enough, because
it will go so extremely fastthat we have to, you know, pick
up pace as well.
So there's this emotionalelement that is very strong and
I must say it permeates all theconversation, even the ones that
are trying to be as pragmaticas possible.
J. Alex Tarquinio (08:53):
And many European parties on the left and
right, both in France andelsewhere in Europe.
For example, in Germany, therewere some on the left and right
that appeared to have, shall wesay, a better opinion of Putin
and of Russia than the morecentrist parties.
You know you have Melenchon onthe left and Le Pen on the right
(09:16):
who've spoken with someadmiration of Putin, and I
should mention, with Le Pen, shedid moderate that somewhat
after the full scale invasion.
Is there any sense on the farleft and the far right in Europe
that they're welcoming thischange or, now that the rubber
has hit the road, so to speak,that there's a real possibility
that the US withdraws some ofits security support for Europe?
(09:39):
You know, are any of thoseopinions by people on the left
and the right moderating nowthat they're faced with more of
the reality?
Celia Belin (09:46):
So, I think we really have to distinguish here
far left and far right and thedifference between the two in
the way they might have embracedRussia at times or Putin, in
the way they might have embracedRussia at times or Putin.
If you look at the far left andin France, france Insoumise, in
particular Jean-Luc Mélenchon,has had at times, you know, kind
(10:09):
words for Vladimir Putin.
It stems out very much of asort of third worldism
perspective or the idea that theAmerican global order was
militaristic, was predatory,that it was supportive of sort
of alternative to the dominationof the West in many ways.
(10:31):
And now that you know a Trumpwould align with a Putin.
In any case it doesn't makesense anymore for protecting the
little guy.
These groups are being quiet atthe moment and definitely not
in support of Trump.
They are highly critical ofTrump's economic policies,
(10:52):
trump's trade policies,extremely critical of Elon Musk,
trump's trade policies,extremely critical of Elon Musk,
extremely doubtful of the sortof libertarianism that is
emanating from this government.
So all these groups will not beinclined to support this new
rapprochement and will feelprobably, you know, it will
probably even tame some of theinterests they might have had in
(11:14):
the past for Russia.
But it's a different story.
On the far right and with allits variety across Europe and
there you also have todistinguish, I think, between
two groups.
One is more of an ideologicalfar right.
That you know.
I think that JD Vance, vicePresident Vance, talked to when
he addressed the crowd, ortalked about when he addressed
(11:37):
the crowd in a Munich securityconference and sort of voiced
his support for this ideologicalconservative ultra-right that
is very, very enthused with thesort of strong-armed, you know,
broligarchy that is emanatingfrom Washington, the
rapprochement with Putin.
(11:59):
They see, you know the liberalWest as the morally corrupt.
They see, they value the fightagainst immigration and even
against immigrants.
Sometimes Some of thesefar-right parties, such as the
AFD in Germany or Reconquête inFrance, eric Zemmour's party,
are just applauding.
(12:20):
They're applauding Putin,they're applauding Trump, musk,
etc.
They're really darlings of thismovement.
And I would say there's anothercrowd, maybe a crowd that seeks
power, a crowd that you know, insome ways Melanie belongs to
because she's in power, she'sclose to Musk, she wants to be
(12:40):
in the good graces of Trump, butshe also wants to stick, you
know, has influence in Europeanpolitics.
She does not want to alienateall of her European partners
immediately.
She doesn't want to be ViktorOrban, so she's at the moment,
uncomfortably trying to play abit of both sides.
And then another sort ofpragmatism, maybe a sovereignist
(13:03):
, nationalistic approach, is theRassemblement National, the
national rally in France, whichyou know is supportive of this
patriotic, populist movement ofthe ultra-right all over Europe,
but is also really mindful ofthe fact that some of Trump's
trade policies will come backand bite us and be really tough
(13:25):
on France and maybe tough onFrench workers, that Trump will
exert pressure on France to do X, y and Z, and fundamentally,
these parties are sovereignists.
What they really aim for is tobe sovereign.
Y and Z, and fundamentally theseparties are sovereignists.
What they really aim for is tobe sovereign from Europe, but
also sovereign from the US.
They probably want to see apeace deal between Ukraine and
(13:50):
Russia and are not losing anysleep over it, but fundamentally
, the idea is that they don'twant to fight for or to support
Ukraine anymore.
That's the main angle.
So you see, there's likevariety all across Europe and
even though the Trumpadministration is really trying
to rally in a sort ofreactionary international, as
(14:15):
Macron said, they might have,you know, political groups that
are not as enthusiastic asothers.
J. Alex Tarquinio (14:23):
That's a very nuanced analysis of European
reactions across the politicalspectrum.
Now you mentioned JD Vance'sremarks at the beginning of the
Munich Security Conference.
His essentially dressing down ofEuropean political and military
leaders present there almost itcame across almost like a
schoolmarm calling them.
(14:44):
They were really bad boys andgirls, and he had like two
different criticisms, primarycriticisms.
One was on free speech or theirinterpretation of free speech,
where he plucked this oneexample of someone who had been
praying outside of an abortionclinic, and that to me felt like
it was really primarily aimedat the US domestic audience, who
(15:07):
may have gotten outtakes of hisspeech.
They're unlikely to have heardthe entire speech, but they
might have seen that play onsocial media, and obviously part
of the Trump administration'selectoral support came from
those conservatives who areopposed to abortion.
So it was still odd that heplucked that example out at a
conference that's aimed atsecurity policy.
The other thing, though, is heparticularly accused Germany
(15:31):
which of course has thisimminent election at the time of
the Munich Security Conference,where many countries are
sensitive to what might happenin the polls in a few days and
accused them of not giving afair break to the AfD, the
Alternative for Germany, whichother German political parties
have said they wouldn't includein a coalition government.
Traditionally, world leaderstry to avoid discussing other
(15:56):
countries' domestic politics ingeneral and particularly try and
avoid talking about theirinternal elections right before
polling, first of all.
Can you think of any otherexample?
Celia Belin (16:07):
No, someone was mentioning to me that the speech
that Putin gave at the MunichSecurity Conference in 2007 was
very geopolitical, not ondomestic politics, but felt the
same kind of earth shatteringand alienating to the audience
presence in the room.
When you try to basicallyredraw, you destroy the
(16:31):
consensus that prevailed and yousort of redraw new lines and
shed new lights.
But I can't think of this typeof political interference before
because indeed this has onlybeen done when the free world or
(16:52):
the liberal world order or theliberal West was pushing and
criticizing and is criticizingauthoritarian dictators, or is
criticizing when during the ColdWar, was criticizing the Soviet
Union and the regime, or isstill criticizing, you know,
illiberal, autocratic regimearound the world, illiberal
(17:19):
autocratic regime around theworld.
And the fact of seeing anAmerican president do that from
the inside to its own allies andgo inside, you know, talking
about its own system but aboutallied political system and ways
of government is, I don't knowif it's completely unprecedented
, but it's definitely shockingand striking.
J. Alex Tarquinio (17:36):
Yeah, I mean, first of all, those are very
telling comparisons that youcame up with on the spur of the
moment, but it is.
It does seem to me that there'sa distinction between trying to
influence broad geostrategicchanges and clearly that's at
the base of JD Vance's remarks.
The Trump administrationclearly prefers the right-wing
(17:58):
parties in Europe and he's madeno secret of his support, for
example, for the AFD candidate.
But there's a differencebetween broadly trying to
influence a realignment andactually trying to say things to
influence an election that isdays away in a foreign country
that also happens to be along-standing ally.
Celia Belin (18:21):
Yeah, that's the part, that's, that's that's
saying right, it's the fact thatit's a long, long-standing
allies and and a fully, fullyfledged democracy and with the
values shared, because otherwise, you know, the US or even other
Western countries would have noproblem criticizing the
(18:41):
election or the you know of thisand that leader advancing a
political agenda.
But if I can be a bit of acontrarian here, I've been told
(19:01):
by Trumpist affiliates, peoplewho support the Trump
administration, that one I'vebeen given this example twice by
them that you know, europeansdid not refrain from criticizing
the domestic affairs of the USand that we are the ones
moralizing the United Statesconstantly.
(19:22):
And they gave this example ofthe European Parliament voting
to condemn the overturn of Roe vWade in the wake of the Supreme
Court decision to overturn itand replace it.
And the European Parliamentadded to this condemnation, of
course, their own, you know,support for abortion services in
(19:44):
Europe, etc.
Even though there's many, manynuances on the European
continent actually on that topic.
But the idea that Europeanlawmakers would send a signal on
, ultimately, a very domesticaffair was taken as a point of
argument, saying, well, you'vebeen lecturing us for decades,
(20:07):
so they haven't given me otherexamples, but at least that's
the sentiment they're going with, that this sort of ultra-right,
republican, conservative trendin USS politics has felt
alienated.
And now you know they're inpower, they have the tools, they
can be the one lecturing Europeand they have no shame over
(20:28):
this.
So I don't think there's amoral equivalency here, but I
think that they feel it's thecase.
J. Alex Tarquinio (20:37):
That's a valid point.
On their concern, there hasbeen a lot of European criticism
of political developments inthe United States.
But yeah, that sounds like aparliamentary decision
criticizing a political decisionin another country.
Also, the US Supreme Court isobviously a separate branch of
government and obviously it'snot going to be influenced by
anything, but that does stillappear to me to be different.
(20:58):
Whether a head of state orgovernment or, in this case, a
vice president, who's next inline.
Extremely, it's politicalinterference.
Celia Belin (21:05):
I was just trying to maybe explain a bit of the
justification that they areusing to engage in this, but
(21:27):
clearly, since the beginning ofthis administration, they see no
problem into pushing activelyfor supporting the type of
European leaders that they wantto see in power in order to
advance their agenda, theiragenda of transforming the
liberal democracies that we knowof into versions that are way
(21:51):
more conservative, more in linewith what they perceive to be
their interest.
And so that, I think, was theshock for the audience at the
Munich Security Conference, theshock of a new world where the
United States is now treatingits closest allies as foreign
powers which you would hopewould change in order to be
(22:12):
closer to your own interests.
And that's just massive.
And I think this happenedduring the same week when Donald
Trump made a phone call toVladimir Putin, when Donald
Trump heavily criticizedZelensky, when Pete Hecht, the
new Secretary of Defense,explained that the objective was
a ceasefire, not almost,whatever the conditions, it's a
(22:37):
change of footing for the US.
That is massive and its alliesare barely coping with it.
J. Alex Tarquinio (22:44):
The Trump administration and JD Vance
refer to any criticism ofdisinformation as repression of
free speech.
But then, on the other hand,you have Donald Trump himself
repeating, effectively, talkingpoints that the Kremlin has put
out on social media for well,certainly throughout the
full-scale invasion, if notlonger, and I should tell for
(23:05):
the benefit of listeners thatwe're speaking about an hour
after Donald Trump sent thisvery lengthy tweet actually
screenshot tweet on WednesdayFebruary 19th, Actually
screenshot tweet on WednesdayFebruary 19th, Critical of
Zelensky, basically repeatingmuch of what Putin and the
Kremlin has said.
I won't get into all thespecifics.
Celia Belin (23:40):
He calls him a modestly successful comedian
accuses him of what says allkinds of numbers that clearly
are inflated on what the US hasspent and basically blamed
Zelensky for the war.
She accuses him of being adictator and retaining elections
because of the martial law.
So he's accusing him.
J. Alex Tarquinio (23:50):
One thing we should point out is that the
United Kingdom didn't haveelections during World War II.
Celia Belin (23:56):
But not only that.
I must say that the largerpicture here is that with this
rant and this position, he'salso advocating for regime
change in Kiev in many ways, andregime change is Putin's war
objective.
So he's advancing Putin's warobjective by doing so.
J. Alex Tarquinio (24:16):
And aren't you saying that was the
principal war objective?
I mean also to take length, butwhen they went for Kiev three
years ago.
I mean, I don't think anyonereally doubts, even supporters,
that that was the objective.
Celia Belin (24:30):
Yes, it was the stated objective of Vladimir
Putin to be done with what hecalled the neo-Nazi regime of
Kyiv, and this is, in otherwords, exactly what Donald Trump
just tweeted about.
So it's mind boggling.
We knew that this could happen,that some form of rationale will
(24:53):
build up in Trump's circles,that there was an interest for
him not to align fully onRussian interests, but at the
current moment Trump seems tothink otherwise that full
alignment with Russians' viewsand talking points is in his
interest.
I'm not sure how or why, butthat's what he's coming up with
(25:15):
and we have to realize, asEuropeans we are left to be
squeezed between these twonarratives that turn out to be
the same narrative, and that wehave to continue holding up our
side of the narrative thatUkraine has been invaded, that
Ukraine is not the attacker here, it's the victim of Russia's
(25:36):
invasion, that it's not the onethat wants to pursue this war.
But it's also a war that itcannot lose for the sake of its
existence, its sovereignty andfor the sake of Europe's defense
as well.
So it's an extremely tough timewe should not kid ourselves for
(25:57):
transatlantic relations, forEurope, for Ukraine.
Obviously Extremely tough time,but Europe will have to play
with its strength and will haveto put forward suggestions, will
have to continue to demonstratethat it knows what it wants and
that there's a good reason todo that, including for
Americans' interests, thatAmericans' interests do not
(26:20):
align fully with Russians'interests, and I think Europe
has to make the case and stateits own interest in doing so.
But it's kind of scary.
J. Alex Tarquinio (26:31):
Many European leaders clearly feel sidelined
by the Trump administration inits ongoing conversations with
Putin and his emissaries withLavrov and others.
On the other hand, the CEO ofGermany's largest defense
contractor, rheinmetall,recently said that Europe only
had itself to blame for sittingat the kids' table, as he called
(26:53):
it, because of chronicunderinvestment in defense.
Now we should acknowledgethere's obviously some
self-interest here.
European defense contractorstocks have been up this week
and actually last I checked USwere down because there's some
thought that Trump is going touse this to disinvest somewhat
or to reduce the budget of thePentagon and is across the board
(27:13):
cost cutting, whereas Europe isgoing to invest more.
So there is some self-interestin the CEO of the largest
defense contractor in Germanysaying this.
But on the other hand, does hehave a point?
Is Europe quote unquote sittingat the kids table for a reason?
Celia Belin (27:30):
Yes, there has been structural under investment in
defense for decades, even thoughthese have picked up
dramatically after Crimea in2014, and obviously even more
after Russia's invasion ofUkraine is concerned, germany
(27:51):
has had to live with thehistorical burden of its crimes
in World War II, and one way tosolidify its own democracy has
been to refuse to bemilitaristic and to believe in a
liberal world order that wouldpromote peace and security
through trade and exchanges andsecurity through trade and
(28:16):
exchanges.
Somehow Germany has been on thelosing side of that bargain,
because that's not how the worldhas evolved and it should have
woken up much earlier toRussia's sort of return into the
geopolitical competition.
But don't we all wish right nowthat Germany's way would have
been the best?
(28:37):
You know, it would have meant amuch better, much safer world.
So European leaders weregathered in Paris a couple of
days ago to discuss after thesedeclarations on Russia and
Ukraine, to discuss how to reactand, among the decisions taken,
offering even more support toUkraine or offering potentially
(29:00):
security guarantees to Ukraine.
One of the decisions is also toramp up even more strongly
defence spending and to try andencourage everyone to reach 2%
of GDP in defence spending asquickly as possible, but
basically to put in place theinstruments that are needed for
this ramping up to be also aEuropean effort.
(29:22):
So Europe builds itself incrises very often, europe has
also invested in citizens'health or in the climate
transition, or in education orin many other different ways
that felt, and are still, very,very important to Europeans.
So it was a political choice.
(29:43):
I think now the pendulum isswinging back to more defense
spending out of necessity, notout of choice, not out of the
type of world we wanted to livein, but the type of world we are
inheriting now.
J. Alex Tarquinio (29:59):
Was Macron right about a strategic autonomy
?
I mean, is this a justificationof his theory that Europe needs
its own European army?
Of course he famously referredto NATO as brain dead a few
years ago, to NATO was braindead a few years ago.
Then, during the interimbetween the first and second
Trump administration, he seemedto walk that back a little bit,
implying perhaps that really hehad been speaking about the US
(30:22):
leadership under the Trumpadministration when he made the
reference to NATO being braindead.
Was he right all along?
Celia Belin (30:30):
Yes, of course, To be fair, European strategic
autonomy is not just a Macronidea.
It's been a French idea fordecades.
Macron has even insisted evenmore on defence and to develop
European strategic autonomybecause fundamentally, it had it
(30:58):
believed very deeply that, youknow, American interests and
European interests would notnecessarily always align and in
that case, when Americaninterests were to be defended
and, you know, when America wasto make its own choices, such as
invading Iraq, Europe decided.
Parts of Europe, includingFrance and Germany, decided not
(31:21):
to follow and to criticize thatdecision.
On the opposite side, Europemay have wanted to take some
foreign policy initiative forwhich the US was not necessarily
supportive.
So that's why the French feltit was important to be able to
stand partly on their own twofeet, but at the same time, it
recognized that because of lackof investment, but also because
(31:45):
the US had, technologically werevery advanced and still very
needed in a whole range ofenablers, strategic enablers it
was even better to be together,you know, in a NATO format,
really working hand in hand.
Macron, I think, fundamentallyduring the Biden years, believed
(32:08):
in pushing European strategicautonomy while at the same time
showing itself to be a reallygood NATO ally, so doing both at
the same time.
Reinforcing Europe within NATO,for example, was one of the
elements that France wassupporting.
J. Alex Tarquinio (32:26):
It's a very fine line to walk.
And of course you mentionedChirac.
Jacques Chirac was, I'm sureour listeners will remember, a
very fierce opponent of thesecond Iraq war.
But on the other hand Francehas always kind of had on and
off again opinions of NATO.
It was in the command structure, then it left the command
(32:47):
structure, then it was back inthe command structure.
So I guess we're saying isperhaps that's an inherently
French skepticism.
Celia Belin (32:53):
Yeah, that's so.
You have these historicalreasons.
But but one element that haschanged there.
So you know, france was alwaysthe one that you know dragging
its feet sometimes into beingfully transatlantic partner, or
sometimes yes, some elementswere critical of NATO or not, or
(33:14):
pushing a little bit too muchthe European side rather than
pushing the transatlantic side,but by and large, it was always
there within the alliance.
It supported the US after 9-11.
It worked with the US in Libya.
It was there in Syria, even ifit was aborted as a mission.
It was there during the wholeISIS campaign, etc.
(33:39):
Etc.
So there's no shortage.
And the US were there tosupport France in its military
intervention in Mali, etc.
There's no shortage of exampleof how well these two countries
have worked together, andtogether with Europe as well.
So, whatever the speech onEuropean strategic autonomy, it
(34:00):
has never prevented France orEurope to work very closely with
the US.
What has changed, however, isthat now it's the US that have
become the unreliable partner,become the unreliable partner
From the first Trumpadministration.
That when you know alreadysowing doubt into Article 5 or
(34:21):
US commitment to its NATO allies, then you know the Biden
administration swings in theother direction, back, being
very forceful in its support ofEurope, of Ukraine, great ally,
you know, great solidarity, andnow we're back to a way worse
situation with really highAmerican skepticism.
J. Alex Tarquinio (34:45):
So these swings are gigantic and it's
hard to Now, it's the US as anunreliable partner.
I don't know if you're sayingsomething similar about France,
because of course France, likeother NATO countries, as I think
our listeners will know, theonly time Article 5 has really
been invoked was after the 9-11attacks.
French forces were in the warin Afghanistan from what 2001 to
(35:10):
2014.
Celia Belin (35:13):
They did not join the war in Iraq, but that's the
only one.
J. Alex Tarquinio (35:17):
It's not that they didn't support Article 5
or they didn't support theUnited States.
He drew a line in the sand, soto speak.
You're not drawing thecomparison there between the US
skeptical of Ukraine then, theUS supporting Ukraine during
Biden and now.
Celia Belin (35:33):
No, on the contrary , I think it's from Ukraine.
J. Alex Tarquinio (35:36):
I mean, you're not saying that the
Chirac's decision about Iraq wascomparable to that.
I just want to make that clear.
Celia Belin (35:43):
No, no, no.
On the contrary, I think thatFrance, even though it has
always vocalized Europe'sstrategic autonomy discourse and
pushed for more investment inEuropean defense all the while
and during the whole time, hasbeen a steadfast and reliable
(36:04):
NATO ally to the US All ofdecades, has never wavered
fundamentally in the ideas ofcollective defense of NATO and
has been also present in a widevariety of military intervention
or even just as politicalsupport for the US.
(36:26):
It's not about disagreeing onthis or that decision to proceed
, etc.
We are talking about somethingcompletely different.
Now that the Trumpadministration is putting into
question is the alliance itself.
So thankfully, there has beenno conversation on NATO just yet
(36:50):
and I don't want to push thatconversation now.
But the idea that the Americanpresident has now taken the
perspective of Russia in thebiggest land war that Europe has
known since the end of theSecond World War and that this
new American president comes inand takes the perspective of the
(37:12):
adversary and pushes for theadversary's interest, it's just
of a completely different nature.
It's not just about being agrumpy ally there.
It's about fundamentallychanging the sides on which
we're standing.
So it's still early.
I wish we could hope that theseare mere negotiation tactics,
(37:33):
that the Trump administrationwill realize that the American
interest is not fully aligned onRussian interest, that it will
understand that it's importantas well to take the perspective
of allies.
But the first, the early signscoming out of this
administration are deeplyworrying, and I think that's
where we are now.
(37:54):
We're still extremely early inthis administration, so I don't
want to pass definite judgment,because that makes no sense
whatsoever.
I'm just reflecting on the pastmonth that has everyone really
on edge at this moment in Europeand really hoping that we can
accommodate a way to proceedthat does not rupture entirely
(38:17):
our relationship to the US, thatprotects NATO and the interests
of the transatlantic allies,that protects the existence and
sovereignty of Ukraine, and thatwe find some form of agreement
around these most basicprinciples that we, up until now
(38:37):
, we thought we shared with theUS.
J. Alex Tarquinio (38:41):
So Ukraine obviously is the topic A, I
would guess, in Europe this week.
But I want to talk a little bitmore broadly about sovereignty.
And there is a question ofsovereignty there because the
details we're hearing about thedeal that they tried to get
President Zelensky to sign theyhave been compared to
reparations that were demandedby Germany in Versailles.
(39:03):
But obviously in this casethey're not being asked of the
aggressor, but more broadlyabout sovereignty, which is
according to the United NationsCharter.
Un countries are supposed torespect the sovereignty,
territorial integrity andpolitical independence of other
states.
So not only is Ukraine'ssovereignty very clearly being
(39:24):
challenged, but comments thatTrump made both before and after
he took office about, forexample, greenland a territory
of Denmark, that's EU territoryand also another NATO ally,
canada, that are somewhathostile and threatening.
Is this also something thatconcerns Europeans, that the
(39:46):
United States, which has beenthe champion of sovereignty and
territorial integrity for theseeight decades since World War II
?
Is that a concern as well?
Celia Belin (40:27):
The US commitment to sovereignty of other
countries when it's perceivedthat its existential interests
were threatened, such as in thecase of Iraq, even if mistaken,
they II, when it made choices onother countries' sovereignty as
well.
But what's incredibly shockingis that we are talking about
nations at peace, nations thatare neighboring, nations that
are allies, trading partners,closest to the United States as
any other nation, and the typeof predatory engagement that
(40:51):
this administration is doing, orthis president, with this
country is baffling.
I don't even know how todescribe it.
It's so imperialistic.
It dates back from anothercentury, 19th century type of
doctrine where that can imaginethat you know, as long as a
(41:14):
territory has natural resources,it is up for grabs by the most
powerful nation that borders it.
J. Alex Tarquinio (41:22):
And you're thinking particularly of Canada,
of Denmark, canada, greenland,both.
Yeah, it really applies to both.
Celia Belin (41:31):
Which is, I suppose that's what it's all about.
But it is so incrediblyinsulting to Canadians, to Danes
, to Greenlanders that theAmerican president would say you
know, we should just integratethat country.
How can this be remotely OK?
I have heard from Canadianfriends and experts that they
(41:54):
are incredibly mad about this,as they should be, and not just
worried but very, very, veryfurious about it.
J. Alex Tarquinio (42:06):
Well, there is a long shared history.
Obviously, they fought side byside in many wars.
I mean really all the majorwars you know, from the last
century to the present.
They're also, of course, a hugetrading partner, and I remember
conservatives, republicans inthe US not so long ago were
fighting tooth and nail to getthe pipeline, you know, and they
(42:27):
wanted more trade with Canadaand you know they were critical
of, you know, environmentalistsor whatever that opposed the
Keystone pipeline.
And now they're actuallythreatening higher tariffs and
trying to reduce trade withCanada.
So that's another abrupt switch.
Celia Belin (42:46):
So I suppose part of the method is the provocation
is to go in the most outlandishway and threaten and have
maximalist threats in order toobtain a more minimal agreement
on part of the partner you'rethreatening.
I suppose that's the technique,but at this point we have no
(43:08):
guarantee that the buck is goingto stop somewhere.
You know, when Donald Trumpdoes not refuse to rule out
force as a method to annexGreenland, which is what he
should have done when askedabout it, you know we are still
trying to interpret this asthat's a tactic.
That's the art of the deal, butwho's to say?
(43:32):
Who has the guarantee now?
So what type of uncertainty ishe creating by doing that?
At least the Danes are deeplyworried and deeply offended as
well, and overall, this is thekind of mistrust that he's
voluntarily creating with hisallies.
J. Alex Tarquinio (43:50):
Yeah, you're talking about when Trump was
asked whether he would rule outmilitary or force or economic,
and he refused to rule outeither.
Macron obviously had this bigmeeting on Monday, where he
gathered on very short notice alot of European leaders for an
emergency meeting after thestatements that were made both
(44:12):
at the NATO defense meeting lastweek and in the Munich Security
Conference, and he's havinganother meeting today.
Actually, I think as we'respeaking, they have a visual
conference in which they broughtin many more Eastern European
countries, including countriesthat are neighboring on or near
neighbors of Russia so alsoCanada, by the way Also Canada
very important.
So what can Europeans do if theUS is increasingly backing away
(44:37):
from a support of Ukraine andpotentially even withdraws
support for Europe in terms oftroops or strategic intelligence
logistics?
I mean, those are things thattake many years to build.
It's not just investment ofmoney, it's building whole
systems, because there arethings that the US has provided
that I don't believe Europe isreally ready to immediately step
(45:00):
in on.
So I don't know if those arethe level of questions they're
dealing with in these emergencymeetings online today.
But first of all, are youhearing anything from your perch
in Paris and what do youbelieve they can do these
leaders' meetings?
Celia Belin (45:14):
So in these leaders' meetings, the
importance is to try to come upwith a form of a consensus, and
the consensus was, and emergedfrom it, that there would be no
acceptance of a dry ceasefirewithout negotiating a peace deal
, meaning that Russia has tomake concessions, has to also
demonstratively show that if itwants a peace deal, it has to
(45:39):
offer some guarantees to Ukraine.
That's number one.
Number two that Europeans wereready to put effort and
potentially troops on the groundand to be part of the solution
within those negotiations.
I think they send that signalto the negotiating team of the
Trump administration whennegotiating with Russians, in
(46:00):
order for them to know that ifthey want to make a good deal,
they have to take at heartEuropean and Ukrainian interests
and in that case they will havesome contributions from
Europeans and from Ukrainians.
The third point that came out ofit is a collective decision to
ramp up defense production.
So, yes, it's not going tohappen overnight.
(46:21):
That part is not going tohappen overnight.
It's not going to happenovernight.
That part is not going tohappen overnight.
But you also have to realizethat the US can threaten all
they want or be disruptive asthey want, if they do pull out
entirely of Europe or if they do, you know, engage in a trade
war with Europe etc.
Are going to damage themselves.
(46:42):
First and foremost, they woulddamage their own prosperity.
A trade war with Europe wouldbe catastrophic for the US
economy on top of the Europeaneconomy.
If they were to pull out alltroops, they would weaken their
strategic advantage all over theworld, including when it comes
to other fronts, etc.
So the military would probablynot be happy about this.
(47:06):
They have to sell their weaponssomewhere.
They have a huge defenseindustry and Europeans are the
one buying a lot of theseweapons.
You know the US needs Europe alot.
It's not just Europe needingthe US and there's some
decisions or some.
You know Europeans need todemonstrate or to remind the US
(47:31):
that they need them.
Maybe he needs, you know,president Trump needs a little
reminding, but ultimately, Ithink Europeans, european
leaders, by showing consensus,by showing some strength, by
showing that they can putsomething on the table but they
can also retaliate, want todemonstrate that they need to be
taken into account, and ifthey're not taken into account,
(47:53):
there's going to be consequences.
So I think it might appear notenough, but it was a show of
force from.
J. Alex Tarquinio (48:00):
Europeans to do these two meetings, and I
guess the other question is whowould be present?
I mean, there's the famousKissinger line on if I want to
talk to Europe, who do I call?
The field has been winnoweddown with the EU, but are they
also discussing, I guess, howand in what form their
participation would take?
Celia Belin (48:17):
No, I haven't heard that part and I think it's just
slightly too early.
No one wants to be the Trumpwhisperer at this time.
I think the idea is to gocollective, yeah, and messaging
to the administration thatEurope has interest, that Europe
(48:39):
has power, that Europe will notjust lie there and be walked
all over.
J. Alex Tarquinio (48:47):
Messaging was very important as well.
Well, that's an excellent notefor us to wrap up our
conversation on.
Thank you again for making timefor us today in the Delegates
Lounge.
Thank you, Alex, it was reallygreat to speak with you again.
Frank Radford (49:05):
And that's it from the Delegates Lounge.
We'd like to thank our esteemedguests, who've graciously
allowed us to share theirhard-earned insights into what
really matters.
And then there's you, ourlisteners, who we hope are
sufficiently edified to clamourfor more of the same.
Do drop in for a weekly episodeon Thursday, or, from time to
time if we're on the road, forspecial events, in which case
there'll be a bonus episode.
(49:25):
Subscribe wherever you listento podcasts and, if you like
what you've heard, please take amoment to rate or review the
show, as it helps others whoshare your abiding interest in
world affairs to find their wayto the Delegates Lounge.
You can connect with us on manypopular social media platforms
or reach out to us directly atinfothedelicatesloungecom.
We're a small team so we can'trespond to every message, but we
(49:54):
will read them.
Our show this week was writtenand produced by the host and by
yours truly executive producer,frank Radford.
Until next time, keep calm andcurious.
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