May 16, 2025 • 41 mins
The Delegates Lounge podcast commences our third season in a timely conversation with Victor Cha, the well-known Korea watcher who is both president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a foreign policy think tank based in Washington, D.C. He served in an advisory role to the secretary of defense in the Joe Biden administration and served on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration.
In this episode, we delve into the complex geopolitical landscape facing South Korea today, as the country heads into a critical special election on June 3. One month is all that separates the balloting next month from the selection of the candidates vying to replace impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol. What distinguishes this election cycle, however, is the unprecedented role of relations between United States and South Korea as a campaign issue. Unlike past elections, when the United States enjoyed consistently high approval ratings among South Koreans, the Trump Administration's tariff policies have created significant economic challenges.
This new dynamic creates challenges for the trilateral relationship between the United States, Japan, and South Korea. The historic Camp David accord reached in 2023 represented unprecedented cooperation, but its future remains uncertain with leadership changes in all three countries. While Japan and South Korea have made progress under Yoon's government in moving beyond historical grievances, the election outcome could determine whether this forward-looking approach continues or reverts to past animosities.
Perhaps the most alarming development in the region is the strengthening alliance between North Korea and Russia. North Korea's direct support for Russia's war in Ukraine by providing ammunition, missiles, and even troops that helped Russia regain parts of Kursk has yielded substantial benefits for Kim Jong-un's regime. The flow of money, food, fuel, and technology from Russia to North Korea has effectively broken the UN sanctions regime, placing North Korea in a much stronger position than when it previously engaged with the Trump administration.
Speakers:
J. Alex Tarquinio (host) is a resident correspondent at the United Nations in New York and co-founder of The Delegates Lounge podcast. @alextarquinio of @delegateslounge on X.
Victor Cha (guest) is president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Georgetown University professor, and a former member of the U.S. National Security Council. @VictorDCha, the @CSISKoreaChair @CSISGeopolitics of @CSIS on X.
References:
Our guest in this episode has his own podcast. Listen to The Impossible State on the CSIS website.
https://www.csis.org/podcasts/
Victor Cha is the author of eight books. His two most recent works are mentioned in this episode.
Korea: A New History of North and South
https://www.amazon.com/Korea-New-History-South-North/dp/0300259816
The Black Box: Demystifying the Study of Korean Unification and North Korea
https://www.amazon.com/Black-Box-Demystifying-Unification-Contemporary/dp/0231211090
Credits:
Music: Adobe Stock
Map: Ad
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Transcript
Episode Transcript
Available transcripts are automatically generated. Complete accuracy is not guaranteed.
Speaker 1 (00:08):
Welcome to the Delegates Lounge.
Pull up a chair.
I'm Alex Tarquinio, ajournalist based at the United
Nations here in New York Cityand your emcee for this podcast
featuring some of the mostinfluential minds in the world
today.
Settle in for some rivetingtete-a-tete, available wherever
you listen to podcasts.
Welcome back.
(00:37):
We're turning our attentiontowards Korea in this episode of
the Delegates Lounge.
It's a crucial moment in SouthKorea, where voters will head to
the polls next month to replaceformer President Yoon Suk-yol.
As you know, yoon was impeachedin response to his imposition
of martial law in the Republicof Korea in December, and the
impeachment was upheld by thecountry's constitutional court
(00:58):
in April.
On Saturday, may 3rd, yoon'sconservative party, the People
Power Party, held a conventionand selected Kim Moon-soo as
their candidate for the snapelection on June 3rd.
He will face off against LeeJae-myung, the candidate of
South Korea's Democratic Party,who narrowly lost the last
presidential election to Yoon.
Both of the major politicalparties have their fair share of
(01:21):
baggage.
While emotions are stillrunning high for the martial law
and impeachment saga, liJianming faces multiple
corruption trials.
Four debates are scheduled thismonth, with campaign issues
touching on bread and butter,concerns, social affairs and the
menace from North Korea.
It turns out that Kim Jong-unand Vladimir Putin scratching
each other's backs is mutuallyenabling.
(01:43):
Their growing militarypartnership is increasing the
threat level to neighboringdemocracies.
In recent elections from Canadato Australia, arguably the
Trump administration tariffshave also weighed heavily on
voters' minds.
Yun, it will be remembered, waspart of the historic Camp David
summit with President Joe Bidenand Japan's Prime Minister
(02:05):
Kishida Fumio, who met two yearsago to discuss strengthening
trilateral relations.
Then the Japanese and SouthKorean leaders attended the NATO
Summit in Washington last yearas Indo-Pacific partners of the
Transatlantic Alliance.
Now all three leaders havegotten the old heave-ho.
The Korea question has longheld a particular fascination
(02:27):
for me.
I was honored to be selected asa Kim Koo fellow in the Korea
Society's professional lectureseries in New York.
I owe that entirely to my goodfortune to be invited twice to
South Korea by the nation'spreeminent journalism
organization.
By chance, that's where I wasin March 2018, when the news
broke that Trump would meet withNorth Korea's leader.
(02:48):
It was so unreal that, as oneof only two Americans on the
press tour, I initially thoughtthey were teasing me.
When they told me about it, itwas immediately clear that we
were entering a new era inUS-Korea relations, although
it's still unclear what thatmeans.
We couldn't find a better guideto this surprising new era than
(03:10):
our guest in this episode.
Victor Cha is president of theGeopolitics and Foreign Policy
Department and Korea chair atthe Center for Strategic and
International Studies, a thinktank in Washington DC, often
referred to as CSIS.
He is also professor ofgovernment at Georgetown
University.
In 2021, he was appointed bythe Biden administration to
(03:31):
serve on the Defense PolicyBoard in an advisory role to the
Secretary of Defense.
He served on the NationalSecurity Council during the
George W Bush administrationfrom 2004 to 2007, when he was
responsible for Japan, korea,australia, new Zealand and
Pacific Island nations.
He received two outstandingservice commendations during his
tenure at the NSC and served asthe US Deputy Head of
(03:54):
Delegation at the Six-PartyTalks aimed at ending North
Korea's nuclear program throughnegotiations involving the
United States, north and SouthKorea, japan, china and Russia.
Dr Cho is the author of eightbooks.
His two most recent titles areKorea A New History of North and
South A Popular History of theKorean Peninsula, published by
Yale University Press in 2023,and the Black Box Demystifying
(04:18):
the Study of Korean Unificationin North Korea Korea, published
by Columbia University Press in2024.
It's a scholarly study of thepotential reunification of the
peninsula, which Dr Cha believeswill happen at some point.
The history book isaffectionately referred to as
the pink book because of itsbright pink cover with two
snarling tigers, and the newbook could be called a yellow
(04:41):
book with its fluorescent yellowcover featuring a picture of
Kim Il-sung, the first SupremeLeader of North Korea.
Dr Cha also hosts a podcast.
The Impossible State runs onthe CSIS podcast platform, where
each episode examines an aspectof the Korean Peninsula or the
wider region relative to it.
Since 2018, he and hiscolleagues have explored the
(05:04):
challenges facing this crucialpart of the world in more than
100 podcast episodes.
We're honored that he was ableto join us in the Delegates
Lounge to share his thoughts onthis pivotal moment in Korea
with our listeners.
Here's our conversation VictorCha, thank you so much for
(05:28):
joining us today in theDelegates' Lounge.
It is a pleasure and an honorto have you, especially at this
historically important time.
Korea is heading into a veryinteresting election on June 3rd
.
There's a lot of polarizationin South Korea right now, after
the impeachment I think that'sfair to say and some pretty
vibrant protests, for lack of abetter word.
(05:50):
How much would you expect keyissues to factor into the
campaign, beginning with theobvious how each candidate is
likely to handle Trump?
Speaker 2 (06:02):
It's a sprint to the finish.
They have about 30 days tocampaign and in South Korea it's
a direct presidential election,so the people vote directly for
their president.
There is no electoral collegeand it's a simple majority, so
it's about as direct a democracyas you can imagine.
There is clearly the backdropof the impeachment of the former
(06:24):
president, and that willcertainly be a topic that will
be discussed during the campaignby the opposition party, in
particular of pre-electioncampaigns.
They have to do with theeconomy.
They have to do withunemployment.
(06:53):
Korea is famous for being anovereducated society in which
it's been difficult for peoplewith undergraduate and graduate
degrees to get a full-time job.
There's a lot of part-time jobsand it's hard to get a
full-time job.
The price of real estate in thecapital city of Seoul is
incredibly high now that even ina dual-income family, both of
them being professionals adoctor and a professor, for
(07:13):
example can't even dream ofbuying their own place in the
capital city of Seoul becauseprices are so high.
Questions about the dominanceof the Chebel or the large
conglomerates that are squeezingout small and medium-sized
enterprises in terms offinancing and broader
opportunities for innovationthese are kind of the bread and
butter issues that we've alwaysseen in current campaigns.
(07:34):
But the one thing that I thinkwill be different is that we
have this huge issue of tariffsfrom the Trump administration,
because they are being hit bylike the quadruple whammy.
There's a 10% baseline tariff,there's the auto tariffs and
auto parts tariffs.
There's a reciprocal tariffthat 25% that Trump has put on
(07:58):
South Korea, and then there'salso the tariffs on Mexico,
which are affecting Koreanindustry in a major way, because
a lot of Korean manufacturinghad set up shop in Mexico and
was exporting into the UnitedStates.
So, essentially, first time ina long time that the United
States is a key issue in thecampaign.
It's not been the case, becausegenerally, popularity in the
(08:18):
United States is 80-85% amongthe Korean public.
Tariffs will be an issue.
Speaker 1 (08:23):
Has that been affected by the so-called
liberation?
I don't know if you're feelingliberated yet, but in Trump's
liberation day speech he didn'tspare South Korea or Japan so
much for the trilateralrelationship.
He announced a 25 percent yeah,so-called reciprocal tariff on
Korea before pausing it tonegotiate.
(08:45):
However, you know, as the Trumpadministration well knows,
during much of that negotiationperiod that 90-day period South
Korea doesn't really have agovernment, and I think it's
fair to call it a caretakergovernment now, before the June
3rd election, which doesn'tleave much time to negotiate
tariffs for the new government.
(09:06):
So would you expect that to bea key factor in this
presidential race?
Speaker 2 (09:12):
Sure, I think so.
I mean the acting governmentnow has sent a delegation to the
United States to negotiate withEssence and with Jameson Greer.
Whether they'll make anyprogress, it's very difficult to
say.
And it's very difficultpolitically for Korea because
(09:34):
the acting president has sentthe negotiating team to
Washington and the oppositionparty and the head of the
opposition party are actuallynow against the government,
negotiating an agreement withTrump that they would then be
stuck with if they took office.
So it's an extremelycomplicated position on the one
hand for green businesses andfor consumers.
(09:54):
Of course they would like thetariff exemptions to be
permanent, not just 90 days, butthe politics of the
presidential election iscomplicating this very much the
politics of the presidentialelection is complicating this
very much.
Speaker 1 (10:06):
You know, trump is fond of talking about cards and
having more cards.
I mean, south Korea does havesome cards and actually I was
looking into maritime issues.
I was kind of amazed.
I knew there were a lot of bigshipbuilders but actually that
part of the world does almostall of the shipbuilding and
South Korea is the largestshipbuilder among democracies,
second only to China, and thenJapan is third.
(10:29):
So there you have it.
Is this a bargaining chip inthe tariff negotiation with
Trump?
Speaker 2 (10:36):
The only way that this can be resolved is that the
so-called trade deal would haveto go beyond simply tariffs and
non-tariff barriers and thingsof that nature, for two reasons
One, because there probablyisn't enough in terms of tariffs
and non-tariff barriers,especially if that would satisfy
(10:57):
Trump, and two, the US positionis actually very rigid the 10%
baseline tariffs will stay,steel and aluminum tariffs will
stay, the auto tariffs will stay, but everything else is
negotiable, which is likebasically saying like here you
can have a piece of the pizzapie, but you can only have this
(11:19):
one bit of crust.
That's about it.
So it would have to be enlarged, and one of the ways to enlarge
the negotiation would be tolook at things like shipbuilding
, where Trump has clearlyexpressed an interest in
cooperating with others to rampup US shipbuilding to compete
with China.
There could be things done onenergy.
(11:39):
There's a lot of energy inAlaska that Trump wants to sell
to Asia.
That might be another area.
There's burden sharing on thesecurity side, where Trump wants
South Koreans to pay more forthe cost of stationing US forces
in Korea.
South Korea pays about abillion a little over a billion
dollars a year, but Trump sayshe wants more.
(12:00):
So enlarging the negotiationinto some of these things like
shipbuilding, strategic energydefense, cost sharing and
foreign direct investment mightbe one of those to try to come
up with a package buildingblocks of alliances.
There's the trilateral, thequad.
Speaker 1 (12:10):
Obviously, korea is not in all of those.
Trump, of course, famously fromhis first term, made it clear
(12:32):
he preferred bilateral talks.
What is your hope for the wholeCamp David process going
forward?
Obviously, all three leaders,their terms have ended, and not
in happy ways President Biden,prime Minister Kishida and South
Korean President Yoon.
Do you think there is acontinuation, a legacy of Camp
(12:54):
David?
Speaker 2 (12:54):
So I think the Camp David accord that was reached in
August of 2023 between US,japan and South Korea was
historic.
I think that it cannot continueright now until South Korea has
a new president.
Japan also has its own upperhouse elections this summer, but
once we get through those inJune and July, I think there is
(13:17):
the possibility that the threeleaders could try to continue
that tradition.
I think the main reason forJapan and South Korea is
self-evident, which is that thisis a critical three-way
relationship to balance againstChina and Russia and DPRK and
Russia together.
(13:37):
But what might entice Trump themost in terms of doing this?
The thing that would be mostinteresting to him would be he
would see it as a way of gettingleverage over China that the
United States, japan and SouthKorea are together.
And if you talk to people inthe first Trump administration,
they very much feel that thewhole trilateral effort was
started when they were first inoffice and then Biden really
(14:00):
took it to new heights.
So they don't deny thesuccesses Biden has had and I
think there's an inclination tocontinue it.
But for Trump it wouldn't beabout common values, the three
prominent democracies in Asia.
It would really be about havingleverage over Xi Jinping.
Speaker 1 (14:17):
What kind of leverage ?
Because obviously China hasbeen courting US trading
partners in the region well andall over the world since the
Liberation Day announcementabout the tariffs.
It's hard to imagine how SouthKorea and China could have a
larger trading partnerrelationship.
They already have a huge amountof trade.
(14:37):
So would this be gainingleverage over China economically
?
Because right now it seems tobe moving in the opposite
direction.
Speaker 2 (14:50):
So two things.
One is, I think, on thesecurity side, the idea that the
three allies are comingtogether, they're doing missile
defense, exercising together,they're intelligent, sharing
together anti-submarine warfare,these sorts of things, I think,
would certainly be seen byChina as a sign of strength Of
(15:10):
the three.
That might make China lessassertive, as it has been in the
South China Sea, in the EastChina Sea, philippines, across
the Taiwan Strait, into SouthKorean airspace and naval space.
They've been quite aggressiveand assertive.
But your point on tariffs isabsolutely right.
I mean, I think that what thesereciprocal tariffs are doing is
(15:32):
they are giving an opening toChina to try to find ways to
improve their relationships withsome of the US major allies in
the region.
So there was word that XiJinping is thinking of attending
APEC, which is to take place inKorea this year.
Xi Jinping never comes to thesethings it's usually the prime
(15:54):
minister who comes, and sothat's clearly a way to try to
make inroads into the spacethat's been opened up by the
tariff order against US alliesand partners.
China has also expressed aninterest in free trade
agreements that many in theEastern Pacific the Colombians,
(16:15):
the Japanese, the Australiansand others have been talking
about which the United Statespulled out of, in the first
Trump administration, somethingcalled CPTPP, in the first Trump
administration, somethingcalled CPTPP.
So the ultimate irony of all ofthis, of course, would be that
all these countries could cometogether free trade area of the
Asia-Pacific, with the UnitedStates not in there.
(16:37):
I say this is the ultimateirony because the United States'
aspiration has always been tocreate a free trade area in the
Asia-Pacific of which the UnitedStates would participate.
I'm not saying it's going tohappen, but theoretically, the
possibility is that that couldcome together, but it would not
include the United States.
Speaker 1 (16:55):
That would really be turning the tables on the whole
post-World War II economic order.
But switching gears moretowards security because you
mentioned that that could be apart of the economic
negotiations might also get into, for example, South Korea's
burden sharing.
Well, recently, Pete Hegsethomitted South Korea from the
itinerary for his firstIndo-Pacific trip as Secretary
(17:18):
of Defense.
Did that concern South Koreans,and might it have concerned
them enough to be a campaignissue?
Speaker 2 (17:25):
This trip was happening at a time when Korea
was it's in the middle of animpeachment crisis.
This was before theConstitutional Court had ruled
(17:54):
that the president should beimpeached.
They were not at that point yet.
Maybe they thought politicallyit was probably a good idea not
to stick their finger in thehornet's nest at that particular
time, but clearly it doesn'tsend a good message.
Some think it's a manifestationof a possible re.
It was certainly noticeablethat he skipped Korea and
(18:16):
hopefully he'll make a tripsometime soon.
Speaker 1 (18:36):
Well, do we have any clarity yet on Trump's
relationship with Kim Jong-un?
Because of course, in his firstadministration he went all the
way from Little Rocket man tothe Singapore Summit and many
Koreans actually favored theSingapore summit.
Are they hoping for a sequel,or is that too hard to imagine
now, with North Korea's directsupport of Russia's war in
(18:59):
Ukraine?
Speaker 2 (19:00):
Based on everything that we've heard, donald Trump
say he's interested inreengaging with Kim Jong-un.
For what purpose, not clear.
There are two things that we'veheard him say.
One is that he does considerKim Jong-un to be his friend and
he would certainly like to seehim again.
The other thing he keeps makingreference to is that he talks
(19:21):
about North Korea as a nuclearpower, which some might say is
just a slip of tongue, but ithas real meaning because it's
basically when the President ofthe United States says that
North Korea is a nuclear power,it's effectively saying that the
United States is recognizingNorth Korea as a nuclear weapon
state, which has not been USpolicy for 35 years.
(19:44):
Whether that's intentional ornot is unclear.
And, as you said, the otherpiece of this that's different
from Singapore is that back whenthey met in 2018, 2019, the
North Korean leader reallywanted to meet the US president
because he was trying to getsanctions lifted.
He was trying to balanceagainst, sort of, the dominant
(20:06):
shadow of China that was hangingover North Korea.
It's a very different situationtoday.
The UN sanctions regime againstNorth Korea is completely
broken.
Russia because of the war inUkraine and North Korea's
provision of ammunition,missiles and troops, troops,
(20:32):
food fuel technology going fromRussia to North Korea.
North Korea is now in a muchbetter position than they were
in 2018 and 2019.
And for that reason we have notbeen, at least for now,
re-engaging with the UnitedStates.
The Biden administration triedover 20 times to engage with
North Korea and got no response.
I don't know if Trump has triedto re-engage, but North Korea
(20:57):
is in a much different positionthan they were when the last
time the two leaders met.
Speaker 1 (21:03):
Well, in fact.
I mean, North Korea's mostrecent missile test was on
Halloween of all days, but itwas also just a few days before
the presidential election.
Do you think?
Was that Kim Jong-un's attemptat an October surprise?
Speaker 2 (21:17):
Well, they do like to do things on our holidays, so
they've done things on July 4th,labor Day, halloween.
That's not one that we've seenbefore.
It's hard to say.
We have seen a tendency ofNorth Korea to increase their
provocations, missiledemonstrations, other acts of
belligerence in US electionyears, and so, in that sense,
(21:42):
this October 31st surprise ispar for the course, and they
have carried out a few otherthings since then as they wait
to see whether the United Statesis going to re-engage.
I mean, I think for North Korea, they're not yearning, they're
not dying for re-engagement withthe United States, given all
they're getting from Russia.
At the same time, they'lllisten, like if the United
(22:04):
States says you know, let's talkabout X, y and Z.
I'm sure they'll listen, butthey feel they're in a much
better, stronger negotiableposition than they were in
2018-2019.
Speaker 1 (22:15):
You talked about all that North Korea is getting from
Russia.
I mean there are tangiblebenefits to their cooperation
with Russia, both in militaryknow-how, new weapons systems,
getting real battlefieldexperience.
Is that an issue, and is thatanother factor that could be an
implication to the election?
Speaker 2 (22:35):
North Korea is, as you said, gaining real combat
experience, practical combatexperience, lots of technology.
They probably completelyreplenished their munition
stockpiles from vintage 1950sera ammunition to much more
modern ammunition as they rampedup production at all their
(22:58):
facilities for Russia, forgiving millions of rounds of
ammunition to Russia.
So this certainly increasesboth the North Korean nuclear as
well as their conventionalthreat, which the United States
and South Korea really have nothad a good response yet, in part
because of the domesticdifficulties in South Korea, in
part because we haven't reallyseen the Trump administration's
(23:22):
security policy when it comes toAsia.
It's been largelydomestic-focused immigration,
fentanyl, and now it's focusedon tariffs, but we really
haven't seen a turn to.
You know what is sort of thetrademark security issue that
Trump's going to focus on inEurope and the Pacific.
Speaker 1 (23:44):
So we're all still waiting for that shoe to drop.
Now South Korean law, as Iunderstand it, prohibits the
direct exportation of weapons toan active conflict zone, but it
has supported Ukraine invarious ways and I don't know
how much of that is alsoinspired or how much has begun
since North Korea's cooperationwith Russia was stepped up, but
(24:05):
before the whole drawn outmartial law impeachment saga,
yun's government was supportingUkraine.
Can you talk a little bit abouthow they did that, and also,
might the election change that?
Speaker 2 (24:16):
Yeah, so they were providing.
You know, at the behest of NATOallies in the United States,
they were providing a lot ofeconomic and humanitarian
assistance.
They were providing somemunitions, not directly to
Ukraine.
They were providing somemunitions not directly to
Ukraine because, as you said,their law doesn't allow them to
provide ammunition directly to awarring party, but they were
(24:36):
supporting other countries thatwere providing ammunition to
Ukraine, including the UnitedStates and Poland, and it was
the other country.
But really, where the SouthKorean support meant the most
was I don't think it meant asmuch on the battlefield, but
where it meant the most was interms of the potential for South
(24:59):
Korean investment inreconstruction of Ukraine after
the war.
You know, I still think that'scertainly a possibility.
If there is some sort of peaceagreement that's reached, south
Korean companies will be very,very focused on helping to
rebuild the infrastructure andthe communications networks in
Ukraine.
But at the same time, if thereis a peace deal that Trump
(25:23):
negotiates that includes thelifting of sanctions against
Russia, I can't imagine thatthere would be any peace deal in
which Putin would not want thesanctions lifted.
That Trump would accommodate.
That also means that South Koreawould be able to normalize its
economic relations with Russiain terms of energy or in terms
(25:45):
of South Korean productionfacilities that were in places
like St Petersburg car factories.
So in a sense, they wouldpotentially be playing both
sides of the fence, working withthe Ukrainians, working to
normalize the relationship withRussia.
I honestly don't think thatthis will be an issue in the
(26:06):
presidential campaign, in thesense that I think that neither
of the parties would answer thatquestion by saying I'm only
going to support Ukraine, I'monly going to support Russia.
It's just, you know, frankly,if the United States sort of
reaches some sort of deal, asgood or bad as it is,
particularly for Ukraine, others, like Korea, will simply follow
(26:30):
that trend and will try to takecommercial advantage of the new
opportunities that were created.
Speaker 1 (26:38):
How important still is the legacy, the historical
legacy between South Korea andJapan?
When you're looking at thetrilateral relationships and
their ability to work with theUS, both economically and also
in security, could be verycritical in the coming years.
How important is that whichyou've written about the legacy
(26:59):
of animosity, particularly fromthe period of 1910 to 1945?
Speaker 2 (27:03):
So history never disappears between two countries
that have the relationship thatJapan and Korea did.
Part of Korean identity is toidentify as being anti-Japan
because of the colonization ofthe country, but one of the
things that the impeached UNgovernment did was try to change
the narrative on this and focuson the future of two
(27:25):
democracies that share securityinterests in a very difficult
part of the world, that are alsoat the cutting edge of
technology and can help todefine the future norms and
rules of things like artificialintelligence and quantum
computing.
It was a very forward-lookingnarrative.
Unfortunately, president Moonmade decisions that got him
(27:47):
kicked out of office, and it'san open question whether this
election in Korea in June willresult in a leadership that
continues to try to push forwardthat new forward-looking
narrative.
Speaker 1 (27:58):
Is that a topic that divides the two parties?
I mean obviously previouspresident Moon Jae-in.
He had a different attitudetowards Japan and China than
Yoon, very different, and Idon't know how much that is the
two individual politicians orwhether that is the party
(28:18):
doctrine that one party is moreinterested in the trilateral
than the other.
Speaker 2 (28:23):
So I would say the inclination is that for the
progressive party in Korea youknow whose candidate is leading
in all the polls right now theytend to take more of a
traditional anti-Japan stance.
At the same time, I would saythe external situation compared
to when the last progressivegovernment was in power in Korea
(28:45):
, you know, there wasn't a warin the Middle East and a war in
Russia and Europe.
There wasn't the sort ofChinese assertive behavior that
we're seeing now.
There wasn't the relationshipbetween Russia and North Korea,
where Russia has basically givena security guarantee to North
Korea, and there wasn't asituation where the United
(29:09):
States was as unpredictable asit is today.
So my point is that, althoughthere may be political
inclinations to move in thedirection of focusing on the
past, the external environmenthas changed dramatically and
that might override any sort ofdomestic political
considerations.
Speaker 1 (29:25):
Yeah.
So there's not one factor, it'snot North Korea's participation
with Russia's war in Ukraine,with Trump's tariffs or any of
the other factors we'vediscussed today.
Speaker 2 (29:38):
It's the combination of those institutions are not
performing well the UN, the UNSecurity Council, the WTO, the
G20,.
There's a lot of uncertaintyout there and a lot of great
(29:59):
power competition.
A less reliable patron ally inthe United States.
The next Korean governmentneeds to find friends in the
region and Japan is the closestone that shares the most income.
Speaker 1 (30:08):
Now it's interesting you mentioned the UN Security
Council because of course, lastyear we had a.
Now it's interesting youmentioned the UN Security
Council because, of course, lastyear we had a rare it may have
been the first time, but it wascertainly a rare occurrence
where both Japan and South Koreawere on the Security Council.
Of course Japan cycled off.
They ended their two-year term.
They seem to work together okay.
(30:29):
I mean, given these pasthistories we were just talking
about, does that give you anyhope that they could work
together in that environment onthe Security Council?
Or has the Security Councilbeen so?
It hasn't really been centralto any major geostrategic issue
recently.
(30:49):
So is that an important factoror not?
Speaker 2 (30:52):
Well, I mean, I think it's important for countries
like Japan and Korea to worktogether.
Like-minded countries in the UNto work together especially now
because Russia and China havethe ability to obstruct any
actions by the UN SecurityCouncil and the United States is
a bit unreliable andunpredictable.
(31:15):
This means that theselike-minded countries, they may
not be able to push through UNSecurity Council resolutions,
but they can coordinate theirpolicies, whether it's
coordinating sanctions on Iranor whether it's coordinating
sanctions on Russia or NorthKorea or China.
They have the ability to worktogether outside of these global
(31:38):
governance institutions, notwith mandated UN Security
Council resolutions, but withcoordinated policy, constant
communication.
That's about all they can do.
I understand that that's what'salready taking place in the UN
among like-minded countries,precisely because they can't get
anything through the SecurityCouncil.
Speaker 1 (32:00):
Well, there are many threats that you can talk about
emanating from North Korea, andeach one of them could fill an
episode, and in fact, you have apodcast like that, the
Impossible State, on the CSISchannel.
Can you talk a little bit,maybe, about the issues that you
address in your podcast?
Speaker 2 (32:17):
So we try to address all of these issues in a
multifaceted way in thebi-weekly podcast at CSIS.
The Impossible State A lot ofthe focus lately has been on
Russia and DPRK.
The impossible state A lot ofthe focus lately has been on
Russia and DPRK.
The nature of this relationshipthat constitutes threats to the
United States and allies andpartners in the region and
(32:38):
around the world.
I mean, the most amazing thingabout this DPRK-Russia tie is
that North Korea is now asecurity factor in the heart of
Europe, which is something thatno one ever could have imagined,
and yet it's very present todayin ways that are incredibly
beneficial both to the Russiansand to the North Koreans who
(33:01):
could have imagined just a shortwhile ago that we would have
North Koreans fighting withEuropeans in Europe?
Speaker 1 (33:09):
Now this might be a good time to ask you about your
latest book, the Black Box,demystifying the Study of Korean
Unification in North Korea.
You believe that unificationwill happen, but just aren't
certain.
When Is that a fair summary ofyour position?
But just aren't certain.
When Is that a fair summary ofyour position?
Yes, when you look atreunification, are you also
looking at the German model, oris the situation too different
(33:32):
in Korea?
I mean difficult as it was withthe Stasi, they didn't have
anything, quite like the rulingKim family.
Speaker 2 (33:39):
Yes, that's right.
I think it's a metric ofcomparison only in the sense
that I think it's a metric ofcomparison only in the sense
that it's going to be muchharder than it was in the case
of the two Germany, because ofthe relative size of the
population that would have to beabsorbed by the South Koreans
compared to the West Germans,the economic gap between the two
(33:59):
is much wider.
And then in the German case,there was still interaction
between the East and the Westand there's no interaction
between the North and the South.
Speaker 1 (34:14):
Polls do show that support for reunification
declines among younger SouthKoreans, so is it more likely to
happen sooner and not perhapslater?
Speaker 2 (34:23):
Well, we don't know the answer to that question,
just like we didn't know whenthe Arab Spring was coming until
after it came, or the collapseof the Soviet Union until after
it happened.
But I do believe that thedivision of the Korean Peninsula
is a historical aberration.
Thousands of years of historyof Korea in this division have
(34:44):
only been since 1945.
So it was a very successfulperiod for South Korea, but one
that will always be remembered,where the Korean Peninsula was
divided, which is not thenatural state of things.
So I do think that at somepoint it will happen.
People like to tell me oh, lookat how long North Korea lasted.
There's no way it's going tocollapse.
(35:06):
It's very stable.
We say this about everyautocratic regime until it
collapses.
Right, North Korea is stable upuntil the day it collapses, in
which case everybody then says,oh, it wasn't stable at all.
And in terms of the youngergeneration, I think that's true.
The younger generation.
They don't understand thedivision of the Korean Peninsula
(35:28):
.
It's something they read aboutin history books.
South Koreans have grown up ina very affluent Korea, an
affluent, educated Korea that iscutting in from technology to
pop music and Netflix dramas andacademy award-winning movies,
(35:49):
so they have no relationship tonorth korea but actually I
wanted to ask about, I meanparasite, all of them, I mean um
, parasites, squid game, youknow a lot of those have this
underlying tension which, okay,north Korea is in the background
.
Speaker 1 (36:10):
I think it's clearly a metaphor.
In Parasite, the basement isNorth Korea.
So maybe North Korea may not beexperiencing that wave of the
K-pop and the K-drama, but it ispart of the metaphor, it's part
of the context.
It may be some of what givesthe tension or the interest to
those cultural productions.
Speaker 2 (36:31):
Yeah, and there actually are a lot.
There have been a lot of moviesand dramas that use the
division of the Korean Peninsulaas a way to tell a story.
So another one that's verypopular on Netflix was something
called Crash Landing on you.
It is essentially a Romeo andJuliet forbidden love story that
uses the division of thepeninsula as a backdrop.
(36:53):
So sure it figures.
Not something that can wish orwill away, it's something that
(37:14):
could happen.
It could happen very suddenly,because history shows that
everything happens suddenly.
It doesn't happen gradually.
Speaker 1 (37:22):
And looking at it from the other end.
North Korea is often called thehermit kingdom, but in fact
they may not be as isolated asthey once were.
With the internet, I mean, someinformation is, or more
information is, getting throughto them these days, isn't that
correct?
Speaker 2 (37:39):
Yeah, it's largely coming through China and through
markets in North Korea, fromChina.
A lot of this was shut downduring the COVID pandemic, when
the government actually tried totighten things up.
They used the pandemic andquarantine as a way to try to
tighten things up.
But you know, the pandemiclockdown has been lifted.
The border with China is open,you know, and all these things
(38:02):
start to come in creating music,bootleg, copies of movies,
where they get to see in thebackground the city of Seoul,
and they can't believe that thisis what the other side of Korea
looks like.
So it's hard to really keep allthat information out.
It's obviously not asfree-flowing as it might be,
it's still man-infested.
Speaker 1 (38:22):
And, of course, the internet.
You've written about thecybersecurity threat from North
Korea.
I was curious if you had moreto say on that, especially as
we've been hearing, with some ofthe cuts in the US, that
they're looking at cutting backthe cybersecurity efforts.
Is that a concern or is thatgoing to make it harder to track
North Korean cybersecuritythreats?
Speaker 2 (38:41):
The North Korean cyber threat really only came
onto the radar for the worldwhen the North Koreans hacked
Sony Pictures Entertainmentbecause of the movie the
Interview and because they tookoffense at this movie.
That was sort of ridiculing theNorth Korean leader.
Speaker 1 (38:59):
It was classic political satire in fact, but I
guess, how you look at the movie, the interview is also a bit of
a Rorschach test for how youfeel about North Korea, how
serious you think the questionis.
Speaker 2 (39:13):
Yeah, well, I would say that in North Korea there's
very little tolerance forpolitical satire, particularly
of the leader of the country,probably more severe in terms of
how they feel about it than thechinese were hypersensitive
about any jokes about she's inpain.
But what's interesting is that,first, north koreans cyber force
(39:34):
extremely good is larger thanthat of the united states wow
that's amazing right there islarger than that of the united
states yeah, yeah, they have ahuge cyber force, um, but it's
largely been focused on pettytheft.
They've used it largely to tryto uh get into cash accounts, uh
(39:57):
, teller machine cryptocurrency,particularly heightened during
the pandemic when all of theirtrade with china was shut down.
And then they also operate notjust out of North Korea, they
operate out of China, theyoperate out of Russia.
So it's a very serious, realproblem from a perspective of
cybercrime.
(40:17):
But the Biden administrationmade a statement that they
believe that at least a goodpart of this currency is going
to finance weapons of massdestruction programs.
So now it's not just acybercrime threat, but it's a
proliferation threat.
Speaker 1 (40:33):
We covered so much ground and I'm sure this will be
very illuminating for ourlisteners.
Thank you for visiting us inthe Delegates' Lounge.
Speaker 2 (40:39):
Thank you for having me on the show.
Speaker 3 (40:49):
And that's it from the Delegates' Lounge.
We'd like to thank our esteemedguests, who've graciously
allowed us to share theirhard-earned insights into what
really matters.
And then there's you, ourlisteners, who we hope are
sufficiently edified to clamorfor more of the same.
Do drop in for a weekly episodeon Thursday, or from time to
time if we're on the road, forspecial events, in which case
there'll be a bonus episode.
Subscribe wherever you listento podcasts and, if you like
(41:09):
what you've heard, please take amoment to rate or review the
show, as it helps others whoshare your abiding interest in
world affairs to find their wayto the Delegates Lounge.
You can connect with us on manypopular social media platforms
or reach out to us directly atinfothedelicateloungecom.
We're a small team so we can'trespond to every message, but we
will read them.
Our show this week was writtenand produced by the host and by
(41:31):
yours truly executive producer,frank Radford.
Until next time, keep calm andcurious.
Welcome to the Delegates Lounge.
Pull up a chair.
I'm Alex Tarquinio, ajournalist based at the United
Nations here in New York Cityand your emcee for this podcast
featuring some of the mostinfluential minds in the world
today.
Settle in for some rivetingtete-a-tete, available wherever
you listen to podcasts.
Welcome back.
(00:37):
We're turning our attentiontowards Korea in this episode of
the Delegates Lounge.
It's a crucial moment in SouthKorea, where voters will head to
the polls next month to replaceformer President Yoon Suk-yol.
As you know, yoon was impeachedin response to his imposition
of martial law in the Republicof Korea in December, and the
impeachment was upheld by thecountry's constitutional court
(00:58):
in April.
On Saturday, may 3rd, yoon'sconservative party, the People
Power Party, held a conventionand selected Kim Moon-soo as
their candidate for the snapelection on June 3rd.
He will face off against LeeJae-myung, the candidate of
South Korea's Democratic Party,who narrowly lost the last
presidential election to Yoon.
Both of the major politicalparties have their fair share of
(01:21):
baggage.
While emotions are stillrunning high for the martial law
and impeachment saga, liJianming faces multiple
corruption trials.
Four debates are scheduled thismonth, with campaign issues
touching on bread and butter,concerns, social affairs and the
menace from North Korea.
It turns out that Kim Jong-unand Vladimir Putin scratching
each other's backs is mutuallyenabling.
(01:43):
Their growing militarypartnership is increasing the
threat level to neighboringdemocracies.
In recent elections from Canadato Australia, arguably the
Trump administration tariffshave also weighed heavily on
voters' minds.
Yun, it will be remembered, waspart of the historic Camp David
summit with President Joe Bidenand Japan's Prime Minister
(02:05):
Kishida Fumio, who met two yearsago to discuss strengthening
trilateral relations.
Then the Japanese and SouthKorean leaders attended the NATO
Summit in Washington last yearas Indo-Pacific partners of the
Transatlantic Alliance.
Now all three leaders havegotten the old heave-ho.
The Korea question has longheld a particular fascination
(02:27):
for me.
I was honored to be selected asa Kim Koo fellow in the Korea
Society's professional lectureseries in New York.
I owe that entirely to my goodfortune to be invited twice to
South Korea by the nation'spreeminent journalism
organization.
By chance, that's where I wasin March 2018, when the news
broke that Trump would meet withNorth Korea's leader.
(02:48):
It was so unreal that, as oneof only two Americans on the
press tour, I initially thoughtthey were teasing me.
When they told me about it, itwas immediately clear that we
were entering a new era inUS-Korea relations, although
it's still unclear what thatmeans.
We couldn't find a better guideto this surprising new era than
(03:10):
our guest in this episode.
Victor Cha is president of theGeopolitics and Foreign Policy
Department and Korea chair atthe Center for Strategic and
International Studies, a thinktank in Washington DC, often
referred to as CSIS.
He is also professor ofgovernment at Georgetown
University.
In 2021, he was appointed bythe Biden administration to
(03:31):
serve on the Defense PolicyBoard in an advisory role to the
Secretary of Defense.
He served on the NationalSecurity Council during the
George W Bush administrationfrom 2004 to 2007, when he was
responsible for Japan, korea,australia, new Zealand and
Pacific Island nations.
He received two outstandingservice commendations during his
tenure at the NSC and served asthe US Deputy Head of
(03:54):
Delegation at the Six-PartyTalks aimed at ending North
Korea's nuclear program throughnegotiations involving the
United States, north and SouthKorea, japan, china and Russia.
Dr Cho is the author of eightbooks.
His two most recent titles areKorea A New History of North and
South A Popular History of theKorean Peninsula, published by
Yale University Press in 2023,and the Black Box Demystifying
(04:18):
the Study of Korean Unificationin North Korea Korea, published
by Columbia University Press in2024.
It's a scholarly study of thepotential reunification of the
peninsula, which Dr Cha believeswill happen at some point.
The history book isaffectionately referred to as
the pink book because of itsbright pink cover with two
snarling tigers, and the newbook could be called a yellow
(04:41):
book with its fluorescent yellowcover featuring a picture of
Kim Il-sung, the first SupremeLeader of North Korea.
Dr Cha also hosts a podcast.
The Impossible State runs onthe CSIS podcast platform, where
each episode examines an aspectof the Korean Peninsula or the
wider region relative to it.
Since 2018, he and hiscolleagues have explored the
(05:04):
challenges facing this crucialpart of the world in more than
100 podcast episodes.
We're honored that he was ableto join us in the Delegates
Lounge to share his thoughts onthis pivotal moment in Korea
with our listeners.
Here's our conversation VictorCha, thank you so much for
(05:28):
joining us today in theDelegates' Lounge.
It is a pleasure and an honorto have you, especially at this
historically important time.
Korea is heading into a veryinteresting election on June 3rd
.
There's a lot of polarizationin South Korea right now, after
the impeachment I think that'sfair to say and some pretty
vibrant protests, for lack of abetter word.
(05:50):
How much would you expect keyissues to factor into the
campaign, beginning with theobvious how each candidate is
likely to handle Trump?
Speaker 2 (06:02):
It's a sprint to the finish.
They have about 30 days tocampaign and in South Korea it's
a direct presidential election,so the people vote directly for
their president.
There is no electoral collegeand it's a simple majority, so
it's about as direct a democracyas you can imagine.
There is clearly the backdropof the impeachment of the former
(06:24):
president, and that willcertainly be a topic that will
be discussed during the campaignby the opposition party, in
particular of pre-electioncampaigns.
They have to do with theeconomy.
They have to do withunemployment.
(06:53):
Korea is famous for being anovereducated society in which
it's been difficult for peoplewith undergraduate and graduate
degrees to get a full-time job.
There's a lot of part-time jobsand it's hard to get a
full-time job.
The price of real estate in thecapital city of Seoul is
incredibly high now that even ina dual-income family, both of
them being professionals adoctor and a professor, for
(07:13):
example can't even dream ofbuying their own place in the
capital city of Seoul becauseprices are so high.
Questions about the dominanceof the Chebel or the large
conglomerates that are squeezingout small and medium-sized
enterprises in terms offinancing and broader
opportunities for innovationthese are kind of the bread and
butter issues that we've alwaysseen in current campaigns.
(07:34):
But the one thing that I thinkwill be different is that we
have this huge issue of tariffsfrom the Trump administration,
because they are being hit bylike the quadruple whammy.
There's a 10% baseline tariff,there's the auto tariffs and
auto parts tariffs.
There's a reciprocal tariffthat 25% that Trump has put on
(07:58):
South Korea, and then there'salso the tariffs on Mexico,
which are affecting Koreanindustry in a major way, because
a lot of Korean manufacturinghad set up shop in Mexico and
was exporting into the UnitedStates.
So, essentially, first time ina long time that the United
States is a key issue in thecampaign.
It's not been the case, becausegenerally, popularity in the
(08:18):
United States is 80-85% amongthe Korean public.
Tariffs will be an issue.
Speaker 1 (08:23):
Has that been affected by the so-called
liberation?
I don't know if you're feelingliberated yet, but in Trump's
liberation day speech he didn'tspare South Korea or Japan so
much for the trilateralrelationship.
He announced a 25 percent yeah,so-called reciprocal tariff on
Korea before pausing it tonegotiate.
(08:45):
However, you know, as the Trumpadministration well knows,
during much of that negotiationperiod that 90-day period South
Korea doesn't really have agovernment, and I think it's
fair to call it a caretakergovernment now, before the June
3rd election, which doesn'tleave much time to negotiate
tariffs for the new government.
(09:06):
So would you expect that to bea key factor in this
presidential race?
Speaker 2 (09:12):
Sure, I think so.
I mean the acting governmentnow has sent a delegation to the
United States to negotiate withEssence and with Jameson Greer.
Whether they'll make anyprogress, it's very difficult to
say.
And it's very difficultpolitically for Korea because
(09:34):
the acting president has sentthe negotiating team to
Washington and the oppositionparty and the head of the
opposition party are actuallynow against the government,
negotiating an agreement withTrump that they would then be
stuck with if they took office.
So it's an extremelycomplicated position on the one
hand for green businesses andfor consumers.
(09:54):
Of course they would like thetariff exemptions to be
permanent, not just 90 days, butthe politics of the
presidential election iscomplicating this very much the
politics of the presidentialelection is complicating this
very much.
Speaker 1 (10:06):
You know, trump is fond of talking about cards and
having more cards.
I mean, south Korea does havesome cards and actually I was
looking into maritime issues.
I was kind of amazed.
I knew there were a lot of bigshipbuilders but actually that
part of the world does almostall of the shipbuilding and
South Korea is the largestshipbuilder among democracies,
second only to China, and thenJapan is third.
(10:29):
So there you have it.
Is this a bargaining chip inthe tariff negotiation with
Trump?
Speaker 2 (10:36):
The only way that this can be resolved is that the
so-called trade deal would haveto go beyond simply tariffs and
non-tariff barriers and thingsof that nature, for two reasons
One, because there probablyisn't enough in terms of tariffs
and non-tariff barriers,especially if that would satisfy
(10:57):
Trump, and two, the US positionis actually very rigid the 10%
baseline tariffs will stay,steel and aluminum tariffs will
stay, the auto tariffs will stay, but everything else is
negotiable, which is likebasically saying like here you
can have a piece of the pizzapie, but you can only have this
(11:19):
one bit of crust.
That's about it.
So it would have to be enlarged, and one of the ways to enlarge
the negotiation would be tolook at things like shipbuilding
, where Trump has clearlyexpressed an interest in
cooperating with others to rampup US shipbuilding to compete
with China.
There could be things done onenergy.
(11:39):
There's a lot of energy inAlaska that Trump wants to sell
to Asia.
That might be another area.
There's burden sharing on thesecurity side, where Trump wants
South Koreans to pay more forthe cost of stationing US forces
in Korea.
South Korea pays about abillion a little over a billion
dollars a year, but Trump sayshe wants more.
(12:00):
So enlarging the negotiationinto some of these things like
shipbuilding, strategic energydefense, cost sharing and
foreign direct investment mightbe one of those to try to come
up with a package buildingblocks of alliances.
There's the trilateral, thequad.
Speaker 1 (12:10):
Obviously, korea is not in all of those.
Trump, of course, famously fromhis first term, made it clear
(12:32):
he preferred bilateral talks.
What is your hope for the wholeCamp David process going
forward?
Obviously, all three leaders,their terms have ended, and not
in happy ways President Biden,prime Minister Kishida and South
Korean President Yoon.
Do you think there is acontinuation, a legacy of Camp
(12:54):
David?
Speaker 2 (12:54):
So I think the Camp David accord that was reached in
August of 2023 between US,japan and South Korea was
historic.
I think that it cannot continueright now until South Korea has
a new president.
Japan also has its own upperhouse elections this summer, but
once we get through those inJune and July, I think there is
(13:17):
the possibility that the threeleaders could try to continue
that tradition.
I think the main reason forJapan and South Korea is
self-evident, which is that thisis a critical three-way
relationship to balance againstChina and Russia and DPRK and
Russia together.
(13:37):
But what might entice Trump themost in terms of doing this?
The thing that would be mostinteresting to him would be he
would see it as a way of gettingleverage over China that the
United States, japan and SouthKorea are together.
And if you talk to people inthe first Trump administration,
they very much feel that thewhole trilateral effort was
started when they were first inoffice and then Biden really
(14:00):
took it to new heights.
So they don't deny thesuccesses Biden has had and I
think there's an inclination tocontinue it.
But for Trump it wouldn't beabout common values, the three
prominent democracies in Asia.
It would really be about havingleverage over Xi Jinping.
Speaker 1 (14:17):
What kind of leverage ?
Because obviously China hasbeen courting US trading
partners in the region well andall over the world since the
Liberation Day announcementabout the tariffs.
It's hard to imagine how SouthKorea and China could have a
larger trading partnerrelationship.
They already have a huge amountof trade.
(14:37):
So would this be gainingleverage over China economically
?
Because right now it seems tobe moving in the opposite
direction.
Speaker 2 (14:50):
So two things.
One is, I think, on thesecurity side, the idea that the
three allies are comingtogether, they're doing missile
defense, exercising together,they're intelligent, sharing
together anti-submarine warfare,these sorts of things, I think,
would certainly be seen byChina as a sign of strength Of
(15:10):
the three.
That might make China lessassertive, as it has been in the
South China Sea, in the EastChina Sea, philippines, across
the Taiwan Strait, into SouthKorean airspace and naval space.
They've been quite aggressiveand assertive.
But your point on tariffs isabsolutely right.
I mean, I think that what thesereciprocal tariffs are doing is
(15:32):
they are giving an opening toChina to try to find ways to
improve their relationships withsome of the US major allies in
the region.
So there was word that XiJinping is thinking of attending
APEC, which is to take place inKorea this year.
Xi Jinping never comes to thesethings it's usually the prime
(15:54):
minister who comes, and sothat's clearly a way to try to
make inroads into the spacethat's been opened up by the
tariff order against US alliesand partners.
China has also expressed aninterest in free trade
agreements that many in theEastern Pacific the Colombians,
(16:15):
the Japanese, the Australiansand others have been talking
about which the United Statespulled out of, in the first
Trump administration, somethingcalled CPTPP, in the first Trump
administration, somethingcalled CPTPP.
So the ultimate irony of all ofthis, of course, would be that
all these countries could cometogether free trade area of the
Asia-Pacific, with the UnitedStates not in there.
(16:37):
I say this is the ultimateirony because the United States'
aspiration has always been tocreate a free trade area in the
Asia-Pacific of which the UnitedStates would participate.
I'm not saying it's going tohappen, but theoretically, the
possibility is that that couldcome together, but it would not
include the United States.
Speaker 1 (16:55):
That would really be turning the tables on the whole
post-World War II economic order.
But switching gears moretowards security because you
mentioned that that could be apart of the economic
negotiations might also get into, for example, South Korea's
burden sharing.
Well, recently, Pete Hegsethomitted South Korea from the
itinerary for his firstIndo-Pacific trip as Secretary
(17:18):
of Defense.
Did that concern South Koreans,and might it have concerned
them enough to be a campaignissue?
Speaker 2 (17:25):
This trip was happening at a time when Korea
was it's in the middle of animpeachment crisis.
This was before theConstitutional Court had ruled
(17:54):
that the president should beimpeached.
They were not at that point yet.
Maybe they thought politicallyit was probably a good idea not
to stick their finger in thehornet's nest at that particular
time, but clearly it doesn'tsend a good message.
Some think it's a manifestationof a possible re.
It was certainly noticeablethat he skipped Korea and
(18:16):
hopefully he'll make a tripsometime soon.
Speaker 1 (18:36):
Well, do we have any clarity yet on Trump's
relationship with Kim Jong-un?
Because of course, in his firstadministration he went all the
way from Little Rocket man tothe Singapore Summit and many
Koreans actually favored theSingapore summit.
Are they hoping for a sequel,or is that too hard to imagine
now, with North Korea's directsupport of Russia's war in
(18:59):
Ukraine?
Speaker 2 (19:00):
Based on everything that we've heard, donald Trump
say he's interested inreengaging with Kim Jong-un.
For what purpose, not clear.
There are two things that we'veheard him say.
One is that he does considerKim Jong-un to be his friend and
he would certainly like to seehim again.
The other thing he keeps makingreference to is that he talks
(19:21):
about North Korea as a nuclearpower, which some might say is
just a slip of tongue, but ithas real meaning because it's
basically when the President ofthe United States says that
North Korea is a nuclear power,it's effectively saying that the
United States is recognizingNorth Korea as a nuclear weapon
state, which has not been USpolicy for 35 years.
(19:44):
Whether that's intentional ornot is unclear.
And, as you said, the otherpiece of this that's different
from Singapore is that back whenthey met in 2018, 2019, the
North Korean leader reallywanted to meet the US president
because he was trying to getsanctions lifted.
He was trying to balanceagainst, sort of, the dominant
(20:06):
shadow of China that was hangingover North Korea.
It's a very different situationtoday.
The UN sanctions regime againstNorth Korea is completely
broken.
Russia because of the war inUkraine and North Korea's
provision of ammunition,missiles and troops, troops,
(20:32):
food fuel technology going fromRussia to North Korea.
North Korea is now in a muchbetter position than they were
in 2018 and 2019.
And for that reason we have notbeen, at least for now,
re-engaging with the UnitedStates.
The Biden administration triedover 20 times to engage with
North Korea and got no response.
I don't know if Trump has triedto re-engage, but North Korea
(20:57):
is in a much different positionthan they were when the last
time the two leaders met.
Speaker 1 (21:03):
Well, in fact.
I mean, North Korea's mostrecent missile test was on
Halloween of all days, but itwas also just a few days before
the presidential election.
Do you think?
Was that Kim Jong-un's attemptat an October surprise?
Speaker 2 (21:17):
Well, they do like to do things on our holidays, so
they've done things on July 4th,labor Day, halloween.
That's not one that we've seenbefore.
It's hard to say.
We have seen a tendency ofNorth Korea to increase their
provocations, missiledemonstrations, other acts of
belligerence in US electionyears, and so, in that sense,
(21:42):
this October 31st surprise ispar for the course, and they
have carried out a few otherthings since then as they wait
to see whether the United Statesis going to re-engage.
I mean, I think for North Korea, they're not yearning, they're
not dying for re-engagement withthe United States, given all
they're getting from Russia.
At the same time, they'lllisten, like if the United
(22:04):
States says you know, let's talkabout X, y and Z.
I'm sure they'll listen, butthey feel they're in a much
better, stronger negotiableposition than they were in
2018-2019.
Speaker 1 (22:15):
You talked about all that North Korea is getting from
Russia.
I mean there are tangiblebenefits to their cooperation
with Russia, both in militaryknow-how, new weapons systems,
getting real battlefieldexperience.
Is that an issue, and is thatanother factor that could be an
implication to the election?
Speaker 2 (22:35):
North Korea is, as you said, gaining real combat
experience, practical combatexperience, lots of technology.
They probably completelyreplenished their munition
stockpiles from vintage 1950sera ammunition to much more
modern ammunition as they rampedup production at all their
(22:58):
facilities for Russia, forgiving millions of rounds of
ammunition to Russia.
So this certainly increasesboth the North Korean nuclear as
well as their conventionalthreat, which the United States
and South Korea really have nothad a good response yet, in part
because of the domesticdifficulties in South Korea, in
part because we haven't reallyseen the Trump administration's
(23:22):
security policy when it comes toAsia.
It's been largelydomestic-focused immigration,
fentanyl, and now it's focusedon tariffs, but we really
haven't seen a turn to.
You know what is sort of thetrademark security issue that
Trump's going to focus on inEurope and the Pacific.
Speaker 1 (23:44):
So we're all still waiting for that shoe to drop.
Now South Korean law, as Iunderstand it, prohibits the
direct exportation of weapons toan active conflict zone, but it
has supported Ukraine invarious ways and I don't know
how much of that is alsoinspired or how much has begun
since North Korea's cooperationwith Russia was stepped up, but
(24:05):
before the whole drawn outmartial law impeachment saga,
yun's government was supportingUkraine.
Can you talk a little bit abouthow they did that, and also,
might the election change that?
Speaker 2 (24:16):
Yeah, so they were providing.
You know, at the behest of NATOallies in the United States,
they were providing a lot ofeconomic and humanitarian
assistance.
They were providing somemunitions, not directly to
Ukraine.
They were providing somemunitions not directly to
Ukraine because, as you said,their law doesn't allow them to
provide ammunition directly to awarring party, but they were
(24:36):
supporting other countries thatwere providing ammunition to
Ukraine, including the UnitedStates and Poland, and it was
the other country.
But really, where the SouthKorean support meant the most
was I don't think it meant asmuch on the battlefield, but
where it meant the most was interms of the potential for South
(24:59):
Korean investment inreconstruction of Ukraine after
the war.
You know, I still think that'scertainly a possibility.
If there is some sort of peaceagreement that's reached, south
Korean companies will be very,very focused on helping to
rebuild the infrastructure andthe communications networks in
Ukraine.
But at the same time, if thereis a peace deal that Trump
(25:23):
negotiates that includes thelifting of sanctions against
Russia, I can't imagine thatthere would be any peace deal in
which Putin would not want thesanctions lifted.
That Trump would accommodate.
That also means that South Koreawould be able to normalize its
economic relations with Russiain terms of energy or in terms
(25:45):
of South Korean productionfacilities that were in places
like St Petersburg car factories.
So in a sense, they wouldpotentially be playing both
sides of the fence, working withthe Ukrainians, working to
normalize the relationship withRussia.
I honestly don't think thatthis will be an issue in the
(26:06):
presidential campaign, in thesense that I think that neither
of the parties would answer thatquestion by saying I'm only
going to support Ukraine, I'monly going to support Russia.
It's just, you know, frankly,if the United States sort of
reaches some sort of deal, asgood or bad as it is,
particularly for Ukraine, others, like Korea, will simply follow
(26:30):
that trend and will try to takecommercial advantage of the new
opportunities that were created.
Speaker 1 (26:38):
How important still is the legacy, the historical
legacy between South Korea andJapan?
When you're looking at thetrilateral relationships and
their ability to work with theUS, both economically and also
in security, could be verycritical in the coming years.
How important is that whichyou've written about the legacy
(26:59):
of animosity, particularly fromthe period of 1910 to 1945?
Speaker 2 (27:03):
So history never disappears between two countries
that have the relationship thatJapan and Korea did.
Part of Korean identity is toidentify as being anti-Japan
because of the colonization ofthe country, but one of the
things that the impeached UNgovernment did was try to change
the narrative on this and focuson the future of two
(27:25):
democracies that share securityinterests in a very difficult
part of the world, that are alsoat the cutting edge of
technology and can help todefine the future norms and
rules of things like artificialintelligence and quantum
computing.
It was a very forward-lookingnarrative.
Unfortunately, president Moonmade decisions that got him
(27:47):
kicked out of office, and it'san open question whether this
election in Korea in June willresult in a leadership that
continues to try to push forwardthat new forward-looking
narrative.
Speaker 1 (27:58):
Is that a topic that divides the two parties?
I mean obviously previouspresident Moon Jae-in.
He had a different attitudetowards Japan and China than
Yoon, very different, and Idon't know how much that is the
two individual politicians orwhether that is the party
(28:18):
doctrine that one party is moreinterested in the trilateral
than the other.
Speaker 2 (28:23):
So I would say the inclination is that for the
progressive party in Korea youknow whose candidate is leading
in all the polls right now theytend to take more of a
traditional anti-Japan stance.
At the same time, I would saythe external situation compared
to when the last progressivegovernment was in power in Korea
(28:45):
, you know, there wasn't a warin the Middle East and a war in
Russia and Europe.
There wasn't the sort ofChinese assertive behavior that
we're seeing now.
There wasn't the relationshipbetween Russia and North Korea,
where Russia has basically givena security guarantee to North
Korea, and there wasn't asituation where the United
(29:09):
States was as unpredictable asit is today.
So my point is that, althoughthere may be political
inclinations to move in thedirection of focusing on the
past, the external environmenthas changed dramatically and
that might override any sort ofdomestic political
considerations.
Speaker 1 (29:25):
Yeah.
So there's not one factor, it'snot North Korea's participation
with Russia's war in Ukraine,with Trump's tariffs or any of
the other factors we'vediscussed today.
Speaker 2 (29:38):
It's the combination of those institutions are not
performing well the UN, the UNSecurity Council, the WTO, the
G20,.
There's a lot of uncertaintyout there and a lot of great
(29:59):
power competition.
A less reliable patron ally inthe United States.
The next Korean governmentneeds to find friends in the
region and Japan is the closestone that shares the most income.
Speaker 1 (30:08):
Now it's interesting you mentioned the UN Security
Council because of course, lastyear we had a.
Now it's interesting youmentioned the UN Security
Council because, of course, lastyear we had a rare it may have
been the first time, but it wascertainly a rare occurrence
where both Japan and South Koreawere on the Security Council.
Of course Japan cycled off.
They ended their two-year term.
They seem to work together okay.
(30:29):
I mean, given these pasthistories we were just talking
about, does that give you anyhope that they could work
together in that environment onthe Security Council?
Or has the Security Councilbeen so?
It hasn't really been centralto any major geostrategic issue
recently.
(30:49):
So is that an important factoror not?
Speaker 2 (30:52):
Well, I mean, I think it's important for countries
like Japan and Korea to worktogether.
Like-minded countries in the UNto work together especially now
because Russia and China havethe ability to obstruct any
actions by the UN SecurityCouncil and the United States is
a bit unreliable andunpredictable.
(31:15):
This means that theselike-minded countries, they may
not be able to push through UNSecurity Council resolutions,
but they can coordinate theirpolicies, whether it's
coordinating sanctions on Iranor whether it's coordinating
sanctions on Russia or NorthKorea or China.
They have the ability to worktogether outside of these global
(31:38):
governance institutions, notwith mandated UN Security
Council resolutions, but withcoordinated policy, constant
communication.
That's about all they can do.
I understand that that's what'salready taking place in the UN
among like-minded countries,precisely because they can't get
anything through the SecurityCouncil.
Speaker 1 (32:00):
Well, there are many threats that you can talk about
emanating from North Korea, andeach one of them could fill an
episode, and in fact, you have apodcast like that, the
Impossible State, on the CSISchannel.
Can you talk a little bit,maybe, about the issues that you
address in your podcast?
Speaker 2 (32:17):
So we try to address all of these issues in a
multifaceted way in thebi-weekly podcast at CSIS.
The Impossible State A lot ofthe focus lately has been on
Russia and DPRK.
The impossible state A lot ofthe focus lately has been on
Russia and DPRK.
The nature of this relationshipthat constitutes threats to the
United States and allies andpartners in the region and
(32:38):
around the world.
I mean, the most amazing thingabout this DPRK-Russia tie is
that North Korea is now asecurity factor in the heart of
Europe, which is something thatno one ever could have imagined,
and yet it's very present todayin ways that are incredibly
beneficial both to the Russiansand to the North Koreans who
(33:01):
could have imagined just a shortwhile ago that we would have
North Koreans fighting withEuropeans in Europe?
Speaker 1 (33:09):
Now this might be a good time to ask you about your
latest book, the Black Box,demystifying the Study of Korean
Unification in North Korea.
You believe that unificationwill happen, but just aren't
certain.
When Is that a fair summary ofyour position?
But just aren't certain.
When Is that a fair summary ofyour position?
Yes, when you look atreunification, are you also
looking at the German model, oris the situation too different
(33:32):
in Korea?
I mean difficult as it was withthe Stasi, they didn't have
anything, quite like the rulingKim family.
Speaker 2 (33:39):
Yes, that's right.
I think it's a metric ofcomparison only in the sense
that I think it's a metric ofcomparison only in the sense
that it's going to be muchharder than it was in the case
of the two Germany, because ofthe relative size of the
population that would have to beabsorbed by the South Koreans
compared to the West Germans,the economic gap between the two
(33:59):
is much wider.
And then in the German case,there was still interaction
between the East and the Westand there's no interaction
between the North and the South.
Speaker 1 (34:14):
Polls do show that support for reunification
declines among younger SouthKoreans, so is it more likely to
happen sooner and not perhapslater?
Speaker 2 (34:23):
Well, we don't know the answer to that question,
just like we didn't know whenthe Arab Spring was coming until
after it came, or the collapseof the Soviet Union until after
it happened.
But I do believe that thedivision of the Korean Peninsula
is a historical aberration.
Thousands of years of historyof Korea in this division have
(34:44):
only been since 1945.
So it was a very successfulperiod for South Korea, but one
that will always be remembered,where the Korean Peninsula was
divided, which is not thenatural state of things.
So I do think that at somepoint it will happen.
People like to tell me oh, lookat how long North Korea lasted.
There's no way it's going tocollapse.
(35:06):
It's very stable.
We say this about everyautocratic regime until it
collapses.
Right, North Korea is stable upuntil the day it collapses, in
which case everybody then says,oh, it wasn't stable at all.
And in terms of the youngergeneration, I think that's true.
The younger generation.
They don't understand thedivision of the Korean Peninsula
(35:28):
.
It's something they read aboutin history books.
South Koreans have grown up ina very affluent Korea, an
affluent, educated Korea that iscutting in from technology to
pop music and Netflix dramas andacademy award-winning movies,
(35:49):
so they have no relationship tonorth korea but actually I
wanted to ask about, I meanparasite, all of them, I mean um
, parasites, squid game, youknow a lot of those have this
underlying tension which, okay,north Korea is in the background
.
Speaker 1 (36:10):
I think it's clearly a metaphor.
In Parasite, the basement isNorth Korea.
So maybe North Korea may not beexperiencing that wave of the
K-pop and the K-drama, but it ispart of the metaphor, it's part
of the context.
It may be some of what givesthe tension or the interest to
those cultural productions.
Speaker 2 (36:31):
Yeah, and there actually are a lot.
There have been a lot of moviesand dramas that use the
division of the Korean Peninsulaas a way to tell a story.
So another one that's verypopular on Netflix was something
called Crash Landing on you.
It is essentially a Romeo andJuliet forbidden love story that
uses the division of thepeninsula as a backdrop.
(36:53):
So sure it figures.
Not something that can wish orwill away, it's something that
(37:14):
could happen.
It could happen very suddenly,because history shows that
everything happens suddenly.
It doesn't happen gradually.
Speaker 1 (37:22):
And looking at it from the other end.
North Korea is often called thehermit kingdom, but in fact
they may not be as isolated asthey once were.
With the internet, I mean, someinformation is, or more
information is, getting throughto them these days, isn't that
correct?
Speaker 2 (37:39):
Yeah, it's largely coming through China and through
markets in North Korea, fromChina.
A lot of this was shut downduring the COVID pandemic, when
the government actually tried totighten things up.
They used the pandemic andquarantine as a way to try to
tighten things up.
But you know, the pandemiclockdown has been lifted.
The border with China is open,you know, and all these things
(38:02):
start to come in creating music,bootleg, copies of movies,
where they get to see in thebackground the city of Seoul,
and they can't believe that thisis what the other side of Korea
looks like.
So it's hard to really keep allthat information out.
It's obviously not asfree-flowing as it might be,
it's still man-infested.
Speaker 1 (38:22):
And, of course, the internet.
You've written about thecybersecurity threat from North
Korea.
I was curious if you had moreto say on that, especially as
we've been hearing, with some ofthe cuts in the US, that
they're looking at cutting backthe cybersecurity efforts.
Is that a concern or is thatgoing to make it harder to track
North Korean cybersecuritythreats?
Speaker 2 (38:41):
The North Korean cyber threat really only came
onto the radar for the worldwhen the North Koreans hacked
Sony Pictures Entertainmentbecause of the movie the
Interview and because they tookoffense at this movie.
That was sort of ridiculing theNorth Korean leader.
Speaker 1 (38:59):
It was classic political satire in fact, but I
guess, how you look at the movie, the interview is also a bit of
a Rorschach test for how youfeel about North Korea, how
serious you think the questionis.
Speaker 2 (39:13):
Yeah, well, I would say that in North Korea there's
very little tolerance forpolitical satire, particularly
of the leader of the country,probably more severe in terms of
how they feel about it than thechinese were hypersensitive
about any jokes about she's inpain.
But what's interesting is that,first, north koreans cyber force
(39:34):
extremely good is larger thanthat of the united states wow
that's amazing right there islarger than that of the united
states yeah, yeah, they have ahuge cyber force, um, but it's
largely been focused on pettytheft.
They've used it largely to tryto uh get into cash accounts, uh
(39:57):
, teller machine cryptocurrency,particularly heightened during
the pandemic when all of theirtrade with china was shut down.
And then they also operate notjust out of North Korea, they
operate out of China, theyoperate out of Russia.
So it's a very serious, realproblem from a perspective of
cybercrime.
(40:17):
But the Biden administrationmade a statement that they
believe that at least a goodpart of this currency is going
to finance weapons of massdestruction programs.
So now it's not just acybercrime threat, but it's a
proliferation threat.
Speaker 1 (40:33):
We covered so much ground and I'm sure this will be
very illuminating for ourlisteners.
Thank you for visiting us inthe Delegates' Lounge.
Speaker 2 (40:39):
Thank you for having me on the show.
Speaker 3 (40:49):
And that's it from the Delegates' Lounge.
We'd like to thank our esteemedguests, who've graciously
allowed us to share theirhard-earned insights into what
really matters.
And then there's you, ourlisteners, who we hope are
sufficiently edified to clamorfor more of the same.
Do drop in for a weekly episodeon Thursday, or from time to
time if we're on the road, forspecial events, in which case
there'll be a bonus episode.
Subscribe wherever you listento podcasts and, if you like
(41:09):
what you've heard, please take amoment to rate or review the
show, as it helps others whoshare your abiding interest in
world affairs to find their wayto the Delegates Lounge.
You can connect with us on manypopular social media platforms
or reach out to us directly atinfothedelicateloungecom.
We're a small team so we can'trespond to every message, but we
will read them.
Our show this week was writtenand produced by the host and by
(41:31):
yours truly executive producer,frank Radford.
Until next time, keep calm andcurious.
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