BREAKING Polar Prince FELT Implosion + 11 More BOMBSHELLS From Titan Final Report

Episode Transcript

Speaker 1 (00:00):
And let's bring you some more detail on that highly
anticipated report.

Speaker 2 (00:04):
As I mentioned, it's final findings just released. Angie, you've been.

Speaker 3 (00:08):
Looking through them. You know, what's something that we've been
waiting for. And this is a detailed report, about three
hundred pages, seventeen recommendations in all.

Speaker 2 (00:15):
Here Postguard now says Ocean Gates Titan submersible implosion was preventable.
The Guard's final report on the tragedy, so CEO Stockton
Rush was warned many times about how dangerous his submersible
was and not only ignored the warnings, but threatened anyone
who raised concerns that often.

Speaker 3 (00:32):
In a damning report into the Titan submersible disaster, has
found that Ocean Gates, the company that made the underwater vehicle,
has critically flawed safety practices and used intimidation tactics to
evade regulatory scrutiny. I got my boss food three.

Speaker 4 (01:06):
Hello, and welcome to True Crime Rocket Science, the most
authentic and independent voice in true crime. Before we deal
with the eleven conclusions and observations from the USCG final report,
it's worth noting that an investigation into the Air India
crash is also pending. A final report. Now you will

(01:27):
notice how many concerns that were raised by this channel
regarding the Titan submersible months and even years ago or
reiterated in the comprehensive three hundred page plus report, which
you can download at a link in the description. In
terms of its conclusions for why the emplosion occurred in
the first place, it's interesting that the report offers two

(01:50):
scenarios instead of one. Was it the common fiber or
the adhesive joint between the forward dome and the titanium segment.
While the report seems reluctant to commit to one instead
of the other, and so instead it suggests it could
be either or kind of quite unbelievable. This suggests that

(02:10):
their remain limits to our scientific understanding of pressure materials,
particularly carbon fiber under compressive and fluctuating pressure. It also
shows that waiting for and depending on a final report
as though it's going to be the full and final
word on a particular incident is folly, especially when the
final report fails to fully answer certain critical questions worth

(02:34):
pointing out. The report also makes special mention that the
decision to store the Titan outside during the Canadian winter
something we highlighted was another serious factor undermining the safety
of the carbon fiber hole. The report also pointed out
the dodgy decision, something else we highlighted on this channel,

(02:55):
to tow the sub behind the polar prints, and all
of this, of course, agrid a host of additional safety
issues that were already in play at one point. I
also highlighted the absence of the tail cone in one
of my videos covering this whole case, and I wondered
at the time whether this was intentional or another serious issue,

(03:18):
and now, certainly, based on the report, it appears it
was yet another sign of serious of another serious incident.
On a personal note, I also found it interesting that
the toilet inside the Titan was revealed for the first time.
We knew about it, but this is the first time
we've seen it, and here it is. Its other conclusions

(03:39):
are more straightforward, and so let's examine eleven conclusions and
observations from the US Coast Guards final report before we
get to that. If you haven't subscribed to the channel,
please do Meanwhile, if you've found my analysis and this
is the one hundredth video and the Titan submersible playlist worthwhile, informative, valuable.

(04:00):
Please do hit the thanks button and let's get started.

Speaker 1 (04:04):
Yeah, this is a long report and it's not afraid
to point the finger at all. And most of that
is on the design and construction of the Titan. This
was a preventable tragedy, so this shouldn't have happened. And
the Marine Board of Investigation said that mister Stockton Russia
was the CEO of Ocean Gay and the pilot on
the Titans of Mask Well he died. They said that

(04:24):
he exhibited negligence.

Speaker 4 (04:26):
Right, So Number one, fundamental engineering principles not adhere to.
Stockton Rush was an aeronautical engineer who thought the engineering
of aircraft was the same as for pressure vessels. Well,
you're spectacularly wrong. And so point six point one point
one point one deals with Titan not adequately addressing many

(04:46):
of the fundamental engineering principles that would be crucial for
ensuring safety and reliability. Included on page two five to
four of the report is an image from the dive
prior to the dive that resulted in Titan's implosion. Number two,
whole fatigue not part of the overall calculus. Stockton Rush

(05:07):
did achieve a milestone of Swords, which was diving with
a cobbon fiber sub to the depths of the Titanic.
He did successfully do that on a couple of occasions.
His mistake was thinking he could do that repeatedly and
get away with it. Point six point one point one
point two. There was no meaningful analysis conducted to understand

(05:29):
the expected life cycle of the whole. Number three, patterns
of incidents were ignored rather than recognized, and this is
precisely what made Titan not an accident but an accident
waiting to happen. Six point one point one point four
ocean Gate continued to use Titan for operations after a
series of incidents. Number four, the carbon fiber design and

(05:51):
construction process was flawed. Well, I'm not sure if if
it wasn't flawed, whether the results would It wouldn't have
been the same. Certainly, flows would have accelerated the inevitable.
And that's six point one point one point five. Titans
carbon fibber hole design and construction introduced floors that weakened
its original structural integrity. Six point one point one point

(06:14):
six ocean Gate failed to conduct a detailed investigation of
the potentially damaging forces exerted on the Titans Carbon Fiber whole.
In other words, it failed to hold itself accountable. Number five,
Rush was responsible for a toxic safety culture. What the
company said they did and what they actually did were

(06:35):
quite different. The report seems to take the position that
since the perpetrator died, its point is to lay out
what he did wrong, particularly in a criminal sense. Six
point one point one point seven Ocean Gate's toxic safety culture,
corporate structure, and operational practices were critically flawed. So in
the same way that the whole had critical flaws, well,

(06:57):
so did the management to some extent. And at the
core of these failures were glaring disparities between their written
safety protocols and their actual practices. It's also interesting that
the report blanks out certain faces, including Wen D Rush
in their report, as if fearing legal liability. Also interesting,

(07:17):
point four point one point five to three. The Master
of the Polar Prince said that, with the benefit of hindsight,
I now believe I felt the Polar Prince shudder at
around the time communications reportedly lost, in other words, at
the time of the implosion, but at the time we
thought nothing of it. It was slight. Number six, Rush

(07:39):
is accused of misrepresentation. This is point six point one
point one point eight. Mister Rush's intentional and systemic efforts
to misrepresent compliance with standards and partnerships relating to safety,
engineering and regulatory oversight provided a false sense of safety
for their passengers and so whose partnerships with these were

(08:03):
They were with the University of Washington, Boeing, NOWSA, etc.
This intentional skirting of regulations, often achieved by masking the
true intentions and operations of the vessels, was a key
element incorporated by ocean Gate during their strategic development of
the Titan business model. That's from page three hundred and

(08:23):
nineteen six point one point one point nine. A false
sense of safety and security was created by mister Rush
through his misrepresentation of Titans safety, achieved by falsely claiming
substantial safety margins, misleading mission specialists regarding testing procedures, and
exaggerating the number of whole test dives for the final

(08:44):
Titan hull and so all of this is really about
manipulating and being manipulative. Number seven financial pressures added to
overall pressures. You can imagine our selling tickets for a
quarter of a million dollars and then failing to deliver
on them again and again quickly created a suffocating pressure
which tempted those in control to flout the rules and

(09:07):
ultimately ordinary common sense. At six point one point one
point ten, Ocean Gates management, particularly mister Rush, fostered an
organizational culture that increased operational risk and allowed financial pressures,
operational demands, and mission specialist expectations to override their mission
director's duties and authorities. Number eight. Storing the submersible outside

(09:31):
was part of an ill advised cost cutting effort. That
six point one point one point eleven point one. Ocean
Gate's decision to cut costs and store the Titan submersible
and its associated equipment outdoors unprotected in inclement weather for
most of the Canadian winter exposed the whole to extreme

(09:51):
temperature fluctuations, and that also compromised the Titan's Hohle's integrity.
How does corbon fiber respond to being frozen? Answer? Not
particularly well. Number nine. The Polar Prince was also charted
based on cost and not capability. That six point one
point one point eleven point two. The decision to charter

(10:12):
the less expensive Polar Prints instead of a more capable
vessel like the Horizon Arctic for support operations, introduced logistical
and safety challenges. This is something we also covered in
depth on this channel. Number ten. Ocean Gates staff exodus
was a symptom of serious financial malaise. We know that

(10:33):
Stockton Rose seem to prefer to employ a younger workforce
over time. Now this wasn't so much a strategically sound
decision as it was another cost cutting measure. A younger
staff costs less and also talked back less. That's six
point one point one point eleven point three. Ocean Gate's

(10:54):
financial instability impacted its ability to retain a stable and
qualify workforce, which had profound negative implications. I think in
one of the videos we saw how an accountant was
suddenly becoming a pilot. Number eleven ocean Gate will not
be punished six point four. The MBI is not making

(11:17):
any referrals for separate civil penalty enforcement investigations against ocean
Gate because the company has permanently seized all maritime operations.
If Oceangate had continued as a business will they would
have recommended the following potential violations. So essentially, if Stockton
was still alive, he may have been found liable for

(11:38):
fraud and years he may even have faced criminal liability.
I don't think there's much of a surprise there, similar
possibly to what we saw in the Rust incident point
six point four point one fraud and intentional misconduct. Another
section deals with the MBI concluded that mister Rush, in
his dual role as CEO and as the king Master

(12:00):
or pilot of the Titan sub exhibited negligence that contributed
to the deaths for individuals. As both a corporate executive
responsible for the vessel's operation and its master during the casualty,
mister Rush may have been subject to criminal liability under
the standard set fourth end blah blah blahs. It's a

(12:20):
very interesting parallel to the situation we had with Rust Web.
You had people there who had dual roles. It is
important to note that the determination of whether any crime
was committed would be made by the Department of Justice
following its own investigation and analysis, which will not occur
in this instance due to the death of mister Rush.

(12:43):
So again, it's quite interesting how you wait for the
final report only to find out that this isn't really
even addressed, I'm a little surprised that no one else
is on the kosh that essentially, Rush has been regarded
as solely responsible for what happened. The US Coast Guard
also made a series of recommendations, including that it involved

(13:04):
itself more in submersible activities and that operators should submit
not only dive plans, but emergency response plans. That is,
in point eight point one point one point four, we
know that the Titan tragedy costs the US Coast God
untold millions in wasted efforts when it was clear the
crew were lost early on, and the US Coast Guard

(13:26):
didn't even have the capability for very deep sea rescues anyway,
these expenses, as far as I know, aren't mentioned in
the report neither unless I missed it, or recommendations on
how to prevent jurisdictional circumventions. It may be that maritime
law needs to catch up or be updated to the
latest maneuvers submit in the submersible industry. That said, from

(13:51):
what I've heard, the industry has shrunk following the Titan debarcle.
While I'm not going to take it further than that,
if you want to read the three hundred page report
on your own time. I'll put a link to that
report in the description. Thank you for listening, and I'll
see you guys next time.